THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
AUTHORITIES.—In addition to the books named above, the reader
may consult the earlier letters of Sir Charles Napier in the
collection named _The Navy, its Past and Present_; _The Past
and Future of the British Navy_, by the Hon. G. Plunkett (Lord
Dunsany); _Impressment Fully Considered_, by Captain A. J.
Griffiths; Captain Mahan’s _War of 1812_; Captain Robinson’s
_British Tar_ and _Nelson’s Signals_, published by the
Admiralty, and written by Mr. Perrin.
The phrase “The Command of the Sea” may be so used as to be rhetorical
and misleading. It is so used when it is meant to assert or imply that
the power exercising the command can exclude an opponent from access to
the sea, or can be secured against all loss and defeat on the water.
If “command” means solitary possession, then it was never enjoyed
by England throughout the whole of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic
wars. Her navy suffered more small defeats, and her trade was more
harassed in 1813 than in any year of the war. In 1810, six years after
Trafalgar, three French frigates sailed to the Indian Ocean. Two of
them were lost in action, but the third, the _Clorinde_, made her way
home, and, though she was chased by a line-of-battle ship, got safe
into Brest. In that year four English frigates were destroyed at a blow
at Grand Port in Mauritius. When “command” is used with exaggeration
it has not much more meaning than the figurative expression which
speaks of the ocean as covered by the sails of a naval power. There
have been men who took these words as intended to state a fact. General
Lauriston, who accompanied Villeneuve to the West Indies, says in one
of his letters that they had all heard of the English ships as covering
the ocean, and yet they had only seen two at anchor in the Antilles.
If, however, we are content to employ the words as meaning the power
to send fleets to and fro, to conduct trade, to effect conquests, and
carry on wars oversea—then England had the command from the beginning,
and had it because she fought an enemy crippled by revolutionary
anarchy. The use she made of her superiority was often governed by
considerations wholly unconnected with the strength of the navy. If she
did not conquer Java till 1811 it was not for want of naval strength.
It was because a large army could not be sent from India while Mysore
was unconquered and the Mahrattas were not subdued. But if we are to
discuss all these aspects of a multiform war, a short history of the
Royal Navy would be lost in a long history of more than twenty years
of warfare on land, of diplomacy, and of finance. We must be content
to keep to the forces with which England exercised the command of the
sea, the purposes for which she used them, and the methods which she
employed. The forces were the material strength and quality of the
navy. Her purposes were the protection of trade, and the prosecution
of wars over sea. The methods were, first, the destruction of the
enemies’ main fleets, which I have already endeavoured to deal with,
and then blockades, patrol by vessels cruising on the ocean routes, the
transport of, and co-operation with, the armies.
+------+---------+-------+---------+---------+---------+---------+--------+
| |Sea-going|Harbour| In |Harbour, | | | |
| | Ships. | Ships,|Ordinary.| in |Building.|Officers.| Men. |
| | | etc. | |Ordinary.| | | |
+------+---------+-------+---------+---------+---------+---------+--------+
| | | | | | | | |
| 1794 | 279 | 32 | 49 | 60 | 37 | 2207 | 85,000|
| 1795 | 326 | 69 | 37 | 51 | 27 | 2727 | 100,000|
| 1796 | 376 | 70 | 29 | 59 | 58 | 3094 | 110,000|
| 1797 | 401 | 80 | 34 | 72 | 46 | 3351 | 120,000|
| 1798 | 451 | 85 | 51 | 73 | 36 | 3482 | 120,000|
| 1799 | 469 | 115 | 48 | 62 | 28 | 3744 | 120,000|
| 1800 | 468 | 131 | 42 | 88 | 28 | 3658 | 120,000|
| 1801 | 472 | 134 | 39 | 90 | 36 | 3693 | 120,000|
| 1802 | 451 | 128 | 54 | 113 | 35 | 3950 | 130,000|
| 1803 | 232 | 10 | 210 | 156 | 55 | 4220 | 50,000|
| 1804 | 395 | 45 | 79 | 103 | 80 | 4203 | 100,000|
| 1805 | 508 | 45 | 69 | 104 | 81 | 4228 | 120,000|
| 1806 | 579 | 55 | 46 | 108 | 131 | 4172 | 120,000|
| 1807 | 636 | 58 | 54 | 117 | 108 | 4511 | 120,000|
| 1808 | 642 | 53 | 59 | 167 | 111 | 4823 | 130,000|
| 1809 | 709 | 64 | 46 | 160 | 82 | 4955 | 130,000|
| 1810 | 692 | 72 | 37 | 175 | 72 | 5118 | 145,000|
| 1811 | 658 | 69 | 38 | 195 | 59 | 5107 | 145,000|
| 1812 | 621 | 71 | 40 | 166 | 80 | 5260 | 145,000|
| 1813 | 613 | 72 | 40 | 174 | 110 | 5502 | 140,000|
| 1814 | 644 | 69 | 43 | 180 | 72 | 5594 | 140,000|
| 1815 | 485 | 35 | 115 | 206 | 43 | 5682 | 70,000|
| | | | | | | | |
+------+---------+-------+---------+---------+---------+---------+--------+
When the war began in 1793 the Royal Navy had in commission for
sea-service:—26 ships of the line from 60 guns and upwards, 7 of 50,
and 3 of 44 guns, and 199 vessels, from 38-gun frigates down to the
cutter of 4 guns. In commission for harbour duty were 3 ships of the
line and 11 of other classes. She had 169 vessels, including 87 of
the line, 5 of 50 and 15 of 44 guns; “in ordinary,” that is to say,
not in commission but fit, when repaired, for active service; 72, of
which 25 were of the line, 7 were of 50, and 3 of 44 guns, only fit for
harbour duty but not in commission; 21, of which 12 were of the line,
were building or ordered to be built—in all, 411 vessels. The officers
on the active list were 2378 in number, and 45,000 men were voted by
Parliament.
The strength of the navy at the beginning of the succeeding years of
the war was as given in the table on the preceding page.
In 1800, 120,000 men were voted for the first two months of the year,
and 110,000 for the rest of the year. In 1801, 120,000 were voted for
the first three months, and 135,000 for the rest of the year. In 1802,
the year of the peace, 130,000, 88,000, and 70,000 were successively
voted. In 1803, the year of the renewal of the war, the votes were
for 50,000, 60,000, 100,000 men successively. In 1807 the numbers
were 120,000 for the first month, and then 135,000. In 1814 they were
140,000 for seven, and 90,000 for six months. The vote was by the month
of twenty-eight days and thirteen to the year.
During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars the use of the carronade
in the navy was considerably extended. This piece, invented by General
Melville, and first cast in the Carron foundry in Scotland, was
introduced into the navy in 1779. It was a short piece with a large
bore, and a powder chamber, light, easily handled and destructive to
timber when fired at short range. The shot was large in proportion to
the size of the piece, and because of its destructive effect on wood
it was to have been named the “Smasher.” At first the carronades were
only placed where there was no room for long guns. But its effect
at close quarters proved so tempting that in some cases the long
guns were replaced by carronades. In 1782 the =Rainbow=, 44, was so
rearmed. The change made in the weight of her broadside added—or
seemed to add—immensely to her strength. Her forty-four long guns
gave a broadside weight of 318 lbs. The forty-eight carronades she
received in lieu of long guns, gave her a broadside of 1238 lbs. The
=Rainbow= made an easy capture of a beautiful French frigate, the
_Hébé_. But then she was able to come close to the French ship before
opening fire. When this advantage could not be secured the carronade
was of no value, for it had only a short range. Its weakness was fully
demonstrated in the action between the =Phœbe= and the American frigate
_Essex_. The American ship was armed with carronades on her gun deck.
The =Phœbe= was to windward, and her captain, Hillyar, who knew the
inferiority of his opponent’s armament, kept his distance, and battered
the American into ruin. As the carronade was never counted officially
in the armament of a ship, its introduction led to confusion, and some
dishonesty in estimating the strength of our ships and our enemies.
We counted all the pieces of ordnance of our opponent but only our
own “guns.” The carronade was adopted by foreign navies after 1783.
During the wars which began in 1793 the navy had the benefit of a
much improved system of signalling. The old system was one by which
particular combinations of flags, or the place of flags in the rigging,
conveyed a certain order. The new or numerary system was elaborated by
Lord Howe in combination with Kempenfelt, and was largely developed by
Sir Home Popham.
It will be seen from this list that the navy attained to its maximum of
numbers of ship’s officers and men in the years following Trafalgar.
The increase was most marked after 1808, the year of the beginning of
the war in Spain, and the largest numbers were reached from 1810 to
1814. There is a very general agreement among the best authority that
the augmented size of the fleet was not accompanied by a growth in
real power. It is maintained that, on the contrary, the efficiency of
the fleet fell off. Its gunnery was neglected for mere “polish,” and
the crews deteriorated in quality. Many explanations of the decline
have been given. The disappearance of French fleets from the sea is
said to have rendered our officers somewhat careless of their gunnery.
The unwillingness of the Admiralty to authorise expenditure of powder
in practice has been rendered responsible for the decline of skill.
The hardships of life in the navy aggravated by the brutality of some
officers are held to have deterred men from entering the service, and
to have made them eager to desert when they were in it. The large
proportion of foreigners employed is given as another cause of the loss
of efficiency. There are elements of truth in all this criticism and
apology. When seven hundred vessels more or less were in commission,
only a small minority had an opportunity to see service. Some officers
of known zeal and capacity passed years without once being under fire.
If the heart of a captain was intent on seamanship and smartness he
might be tempted, by the small chance of meeting a foe, to neglect the
gun drill of his crew. If he feared to be blamed by the Admiralty for
expending too much powder, he would not venture to avail himself of the
device employed by some of his colleagues, who obtained practice for
their men by pretending to see suspicious strangers, and who did not
hesitate to make fictitious entries in their logs. After the loss of
several English vessels, captured in rapid succession by the Americans
in the war of 1812, the decline of our gunnery became a commonplace. So
did the cruelty of certain captains of “crack” ships, who sacrificed
everything, including humanity, to “overpolish.” We hear of crews
driven to mutinous explosions by officers who would send their men
aloft ten or twelve times to finish off some mere detail of the set
or stowing of sails. Such men enforced attention to their pedantry
and foppery by the lash. Mere declamation can be neglected, but we
cannot reject the testimony of Codrington given in the very midst of
the American war, in a private letter written from the station, and
supported by examples. “I have heard,” he said, “many shocking stories
of cruelty and misconduct witnessed by the relators, officers now in
this ship.” If there is any truth in the statement that the number of
floggings inflicted in English ships diminished by a half when the
Admiralty ordered quarterly returns of punishments to be made, it is
manifest that there must have been a gross abuse of the power to flog.
It is certain that we employed many foreigners, and one of the English
vessels lost in the war of 1812, the =Epervier=, had foreigners in her
crew.
Yet it is doubtful whether these explanations of the decline of
our discipline and skill are satisfactory. No vessel lost to the
Americans was so scandalously lost as the =Ambuscade=, taken by the
French _Bayonnaise_ in 1798. She was outmanœuvred by a smaller ship,
and carried by boarding. In the American war the =Phœbe=, which took
the _Essex_ in the South Seas, and the =Shannon=, which took the
_Chesapeake_, were nowise inferior to their opponents in gunnery. Nor
were we always beaten in that war by gunnery or by American seamen.
The _Decatur_, which took the =Dominica= by boarding, was commanded by
a French privateer, Captain Diron, and manned by a French crew. The
discipline of the navy was as severe for the marine as for other men.
Yet there never was any difficulty in recruiting for the marines. If
our navy sank below the level of 1805, the reason must be sought in its
size. One hundred and forty-five thousand men was an immense number to
take from the population of Great Britain when it was less than half
what it is to-day. And they had to be found just when increased numbers
of soldiers were needed, when our merchant shipping had doubled, and
when there was a great development of manufacturing industry and of
agriculture. If we had been forced to rely on our own population we
could not have found the men. We succeeded because multitudes of
foreign seamen were driven to seek service in England by the ruin of
commerce in their native countries. Even with their help the Admiralty
was unable to supply crews of good quality to all the ships. If the
=Epervier= was largely manned by negroes and foreigners, she had many
feeble, undersized Englishmen who were taken because no better could be
obtained. The physical strength of the men was a consideration of the
first importance in the warships of the old navy. All the work at the
guns had to be done by downright pulling and hauling. The proportion
of one man to every 500 pounds of metal was just sufficient to work
the gun, and could not be maintained when the crew was short-handed,
or when it was necessary to fight both broadsides. The effort required
to run out a 32-pounder, which weighed 55 cwt. 2 lb. on the weather
broadside when the ship was leaning over, was severe even for a
full crew of twelve men. The demand for good men had far outrun the
supply. The existence of the United States added materially to our
difficulties, for it supplied our sailors with an English-speaking
country to which they could escape. During the later stages of the
war the navy was compelled to form its crews with ever-increasing
difficulty. It found marines who, when they enlisted, had a security
for permanent employment and a pension. The sailors did not form a
permanent corps and were sent adrift when their ship was paid off.
The regular bred seamen preferred the good wages and freedom of the
merchant service, or emigrated to America. The miscellaneous landsmen,
who formed a large part of our crews, were obtained by bounties and
the press. The press did indeed take time-expired apprentices from
the merchant ships at sea, and they constituted a valuable part of
our crews. On land it was of little value. During 1811, 1812, and
1813, 29,405 men were impressed, 27,300 of them deserted, and as 3000
trustworthy men were employed in the gangs which seized them, the navy
was in fact the loser to the amount of 1000 men. The naval rendezvous,
placed in “the vilest sort of public house, with a something that had
once been a Union Jack suspended from a pole, but from filth and dirt
wearing the appearance of a black flag,” was not only a scandal, but a
useless expense. Pressgang midshipman was a byword for a ruffian. The
practice of incorporating criminals and vagabonds in the navy, which
was as old as the reign of Queen Elizabeth, was continued throughout
the great war. Captain Anselm Griffiths, whose description of a naval
rendezvous has been quoted above, is emphatic about the criminal
element in the navy. “What,” he says, “was the mass of discontent and
impatience generated by a forced association with the refuse of our
jails, convicts, vagabonds, thieves not brought to justice from lenity,
smugglers, White Boys, suspected Irish during the rebellion, all who
from loss of character could not procure employment, the idle and the
worthless,—all was fish that came to the net.”
Such accounts of the crews of the navy as this might be quoted in
numbers. We are tempted to wonder how the work was done with such men,
and whether there can be any foundation for the praise given to the
seamanship and gunnery of the navy. But Captain Griffiths, and other
authorities who support him, spoke of the bad elements. With them
were others of a very different order—the marines and the pressed men
of good character. The great length of the war allowed time for the
formation of a class of men who were trained wholly in the navy and
were attached to it by habit and affection. When Broke commissioned
the =Shannon=, he left England with a crew composed of drafts from the
guardships of very mixed quality, and of a majority of boys provided
by the Patriotic Society and the workhouses. If the =Shannon= had
met a well-appointed American frigate within three months she would
have fared no better than the =Epervier= or the =Java=. But she was
six years in commission before her famous action. Broke had time to
weed out the bad characters. The boys grew to manhood under his wise
training. The same process was going on in other ships. If we could
have limited the establishment of the navy to 80,000 or even 100,000
men, every ship might have been as well manned as the =Shannon=. It
is even possible that the weaknesses of the navy were made to appear
greater than they really were by the fact that the Admiralty, which
naturally looked first to fleets Napoleon was building in European
ports, kept its best men for the European stations, and compelled
captains, whose ships were commissioned for distant seas, to put up
with the worst. The increase in the staff of officers from over two to
over five thousand, brought with it the necessity for not being too
exacting as to their quality. Something must be allowed for the jobbery
of the time. There were men in the navy who owed their positions to
no merit of their own, but to the fact that some one of influence
had spoken for them. We must, again, allow for the fact that there
was as yet no uniform standard of discipline. The captains had wide
discretion, and the bad ones were unchecked.
Whatever evils the overgrowth of the navy brought with it, the increase
was unavoidable. In the years following Trafalgar, the English Navy
was in something not unlike the position of the French armies in Spain
after 1809. They were far more numerous than the army of Wellington
in Portugal. Yet they were frequently unable to collect a force to
oppose him, because they were compelled to spread themselves over the
whole of Spain. We have recently learned how rapidly an army, which is
powerful on a field of battle, can be frittered into small detachments
when it has to guard long lines of communication, and to occupy a
wide expanse of territory. The English Government was, from the year
1793, under a peremptory obligation to guard trade routes extending
from Canton to the St. Lawrence. The task did not become lighter after
Trafalgar. Napoleon adopted a definite policy. He began to build line
of battleships on a great scale. As his power spread he increased
their numbers till he had upwards of one hundred and fifty in ports
extending from Venice to Hamburg. They were rarely sent to sea. Many
of them, built hastily of green timber, began to rot so soon as they
were launched. But it was impossible to neglect them. Squadrons must be
employed to watch them. The bulk of our navy was necessarily employed
in that work. While our squadrons were watching hostile ports, our
commerce was subject to a double form of attack. Light squadrons and
single ships sailed from French ports on commerce destroying cruises.
Privateers sailed not only from French ports, but from colonial
harbours, Martinique and Guadaloupe, Bourbon and Mauritius, and the
Dutch islands of Java and Sumatra. These attacks had to be guarded
against by blockade, by convoy, by patrol, and by the conquest of the
ports from which the privateers sailed.
The history of blockade cannot be told. It is a long monotonous roll
of sailings from one point to another and back again, of periodical
returns to port to refit or for provisions, of ships driven away by
gales from the land, or forced to work to sea that they might not be
driven on a lee shore. The daily fulfilment of a routine, isolation
from family life and all society other than that of messmates, exposure
to cold, to heat, to wet, make up the lot of the officers and men of a
blockading fleet. And this was the work on which the majority of the
navy was employed. The brief intervals spent in a home port when food
and water had to be renewed, were hardly less painful than the time
spent on the cruising-ground, for the rule that neither officer nor man
might sleep on shore rendered the promise of more leave, given in 1797,
almost nugatory. Indeed an increase of pay was the most solid advantage
the seamen gained in that year. In 1808, when the need for more men
became very urgent the pay of the sailor was raised to £1, 12s. for the
lunar month. The secluded unnatural life of the blockading squadrons
was terrible for all ranks. Some of the consequences it produced cannot
be named. Not a few of the men went mad under the strain, multitudes
were hardened in heart and distorted in character.
The blockades did the work assigned them. When, in 1809, Napoleon
endeavoured to send a strong squadron, drawn partly from the Brest
fleet and partly from ships at Rochefort, to the West Indies, his
plan was ruined by the Channel fleet. The bulk of his force did get
away from Brest, but only to be sighted by the British forces and
driven into the Basque roads. There they were attacked by fireships
under the immediate command of Lord Cochrane (Dundonald) and the
superior direction of Lord Gambier. The operation was not so completely
successful as it might have been. Cochrane was so dissatisfied by the
interference of his commander-in-chief that he forced the Admiralty to
bring Gambier to a court martial. Even so, the attack ruined the French
squadron, and the reinforcements never reached the French islands. Here
we see the normal working of the blockade, which left the French fleet
no chance of getting to sea, except by the help of good fortune in
evading the watch of the British ships.
No great French fleet ventured to sea, and only once did a considerable
French squadron incur the risk of trusting itself far from port among
the English forces. Napoleon would not hazard the great fleet he was
building up till he had vanquished all enemies on the Continent, and
could make a final attack with all the forces of Europe. But though
the main purpose was achieved the duty became continually more severe
till after the Russian campaign, when the destruction of the Grand
Army compelled the Emperor to take the crews of his ships and make
regiments of them. As his power spread up to 1812, more and ever more
ports had to be watched, and it became constantly less possible to
block them all effectually. The vast works he carried out at Cherbourg
made the harbour capable of holding line-of-battle ships and imposed
more blockading duty on the navy. After the fall of Prussia in 1807 he
brought the coast of the Baltic under his control, and more ships were
needed to counteract his plans. The coast-line to be watched was so
long that though the English Government strained its resources to the
utmost, though the navy was increased by desperate measures, it was
impossible to prevent cruisers and small squadrons from escaping to
sea. In 1812 when 621 vessels were in commission, and the establishment
of the navy was 145,000 men, Admiral Allemand sailed from Rochefort.
He eluded the blockading squadron. He almost succeeded in cutting off
the =Pompée=, 74, which was compelled to start eighty tons of water
to lighten herself for flight. He cruised in the Atlantic for the
destruction of commerce, and, though he had little fortune in meeting
English trading vessels, he got safe back to Brest. Allemand’s raid
shows that the new fleet Napoleon was forming was not so incapable of
keeping the sea as it has often been supposed to have been. An action
fought in this same year must have been a warning to the English
Government, if any were needed, that it dare not fail to maintain its
naval forces at the highest attainable level of strength. On the 21st
February the =Victorious=, 74, Captain Talbot, which was watching the
growing Franco-Venetian squadron at Venice, fought an action with one
of the vessels belonging to it, the _Rivoli_, 74, Captain Barré. The
=Victorious= had been detached from the Toulon blockade, the _Rivoli_
was at sea for the first time, yet the action lasted for four hours,
and though the _Rivoli_ was finally compelled to surrender, she
inflicted a loss of 27 killed and 99 wounded on the =Victorious=.
At the beginning of 1808, the year in which the great increase began,
the need for numbers had been even more effectually taught. English
troops were then engaged in somewhat fretful operations on the coast of
Calabria. The French had recovered Corfu and held Venice. The calls on
our fleet in the Mediterranean were many. Collingwood was co-operating
with the troops, in southern Italy, leaving frigates to watch Toulon.
The French Government decided to reinforce its squadron at Toulon
by bringing round six ships—the _Majestueux_, 120, the _Ajax_,
_Jemmappes_, _Lion_, _Magnanime_, and _Suffren_, 74’s, from Rochefort.
They were commanded by the same Admiral Allemand who was throughout
his career very successful in avoiding the many squadrons sent against
him. Rochefort was blockaded by Sir Richard Strachan with seven sail
of the line. Sir Richard generally kept his squadron at anchor in the
Basque Roads, but at the close of November 1807 he was compelled, by
the lack of provisions, to go to the rendezvous he had assigned to the
victuallers which were coming to join him—a point thirty miles or so
south of Roche Bonne. A frigate and a brig were left to keep watch.
North-easterly gales forced Strachan to the south. The victuallers did
not keep touch punctually. The work of transferring cargo at sea in
rough weather was tedious. Allemand, seeing that he had only a frigate
and a brig before him, put to sea on the 17th January and steered for
the Mediterranean. He had a good start, and as the wind turned to the
west and rose to a storm he got clear away with five of his ships. The
_Majestueux_ was injured in the gale and compelled to return to Toulon.
Allemand passed the Straits of Gibraltar and reached Toulon, unseen by
any English cruiser, on the 6th February. Strachan, who was fighting
his way back to his station against the north-easterly wind when he
heard of Allemand’s escape, followed him to the Mediterranean. But he
was embayed by the westerly gale. He did not pass the Straits till the
10th, and he joined Thornborough, Collingwood’s second in command, at
Palermo on the 21st. Ganteaume, who commanded at Toulon, put to sea
with Allemand’s ships on the 7th February, made his way round to Corfu
to revictual the garrison, drove off the =Standard=, which he found
there, discharged his mission, and was safe back at Toulon by the 10th
April. Collingwood, who concentrated his ships and pursued him, failed
to meet him. In the meantime, two French frigates, the _Pénélope_ and
_Thémis_, which sailed from Bordeaux on the 21st January, had cruised
near Madeira, had destroyed English property to the value of a quarter
of a million, had entered the Mediterranean, and had reached Toulon
before the end of March. Criticism after the event could show that if
this or the other officer had done something he did not do, Allemand,
Ganteaume, and the frigates would have been cut short somewhere. But
the palpable fact was that our forces had not prevented the cruises
of the Frenchmen. When Strachan followed Allemand he necessarily left
Rochefort free for the privateers to enter or leave. With all our
superiority over the French fleets we still could not have too many
men, too many ships, and an increase was not to be avoided, be the
evils it entailed what they might.
The blockading fleets composed the screen covering all the other
operations of our ships. They were not able to protect completely,
but without such protection as they did afford other duties could not
have been performed. The most exacting and most constant of these
was convoy. The whole British Navy was engaged in the protection of
trade, but the task was peculiarly imposed on the ships which sailed
with the fleets of merchant vessels. It had always been counted one of
the most pressing of an admiral’s duties to protect “the trade.” Hood
took a crowd of merchant crafts with him when he sailed to reinforce
Rodney in the West Indies in 1780. Rodney brought the trade with him
when he returned home in ill-health. Howe was called upon to see a
hundred trading ships well clear of the Channel when he sailed in
1794. But after that year the main fleets were relieved of the duty.
They were left free to pursue the enemy’s fleets, and the protection
of the traders against privateers, and single man-of-war cruisers was
left to detachments. It was a tedious and thankless duty. The rate of
sailing of the merchant ships was very slow. The need for vigilance was
unceasing, and peculiarly great, while just leaving or approaching the
land, for it was then that the prowling privateer was most active. As
the trading fleet neared its destination the skippers were tempted to
push ahead to reach their market first, and they frequently fell into
the hands of the hostile commerce destroyers. The naval officers, who
were liable to be accused of neglecting their duty by the owners of the
captured ships, had long complained of their inability to control the
merchant skippers. When the war was renewed in 1803 the Government took
measures to reduce the loss inflicted on our shipping to the lowest
attainable level, by compelling all vessels not specially exempted
to sail in convoy. It passed “An Act for the better Protection of
the Trade of the United Kingdom during the present Hostilities with
France” (anno 43^d Geo. III. cap. 57). By this Act merchant ships were
required to sail in convoys, to obey the naval officer commanding,
and not to separate wilfully under a penalty of £1000, if the cargo
belonged to a private owner, and of £1500 if it was composed of naval
or military stores. If a vessel did leave the convoy, and was captured,
the owner forfeited all right to recover his insurances. Vessels might
be licensed to sail without convoy, and the vessels of the East India
Company, and of the Hudson’s Bay Company were expressly exempted.
An event which occurred on the 14th and 15th February 1804 would seem
to indicate that the East India Company could well dispense with
convoy. The French admiral, Linois, the victor of Algeciras, had been
sent to the east with General Decaen. He obtained early news of the
outbreak of hostilities when at or near Pondicherry and went off at
once to Java in such a hurry, that he did not wait for an English naval
officer whom he had invited to breakfast. On his way he captured a
number of valuable English ships, and then he sailed from Batavia to
intercept the Company’s vessels on their way from Canton to Europe.
This very valuable trading fleet consisted of sixteen vessels of the
nominal burden of 1200 tons, but a real tonnage of from 1300 to 1500.
They were armed with from 30 to 36 guns, and carried crews of 60 white
seamen, and 120 Lascars. Their guns were as a rule of no great value,
and in real force they were far inferior not only to a frigate but to
a heavy corvette. Linois had with him the _Marengo_, 74, the _Belle
Poule_, 40-gun frigate, the _Semillante_, 36, the _Berceau_, 22, and
the _Aventurier_, 16. On the 14th February he sighted the Company’s
ships to the E.N.E. of Pulo Aor, an island near the east side of the
southern extremity of the Malay Peninsula. They were on their way to
the Straits of Malacca—sixteen of them in all—the =Earl Camden=, the
ship of the Company’s commodore, Nathaniel Dance; the =Warley=, Henry
Wilson; =Alfred=, James Farquharson; =Royal George=, John Fam Timmins;
=Coutts=, Robert Torin; =Wexford=, W. Stanley Clarke; =Ganges=,
William Moffat; =Exeter=, Henry Meriton; =Earl of Abergavenny=, John
Wordsworth; =Henry Addington=, John Kirkpatrick; =Bombay Castle=, Arch.
Hamilton; =Cumberland=, W. Ward Farrer; =Hope=, Jas. Prendergass;
=Dorsetshire=, Rob. Hunter Brown; =Warren Hastings=, Thomas Larkins;
=Ocean=, J. Christ. Lochner. The size of the 1200-ton ships, the fact
that they were painted to represent two tiers of guns, the craft of
Commodore Dance, who hoisted the man-of-war pennant on three of them,
and the bold bearing they all assumed, cowed Linois. He hesitated to
attack till the Indiamen saw his hesitation, bore down on him and
drove him to flight. The Company’s skippers richly deserved all the
praise and rewards they received. The knighthood given to Dance was
handsomely earned. Yet it would be a great mistake to conclude from the
affair of Pulo Aor that the Company’s ships could rely on their own
strength. Linois was singularly disappointing to his friends whenever
he attempted to attack, though he could fight manfully with his back to
the wall. Indiamen did on several occasions make gallant and successful
fights. On the other hand they were frequently taken by frigates and
privateers. When Sir E. Pellew came to take the command in the East
Indies in 1804 the shipping had been well-nigh ruined in the Bay of
Bengal by French and Dutch privateers. It was only by submitting to
accept convoy that the Company was able to revive its trade.
There were, however, limits to what the navy could do to protect trade
by convoy. Vessels might be captured while on their way from their
port of departure to the rendezvous. Gales might scatter them when
collected. Fog and mist might afford cover to the assailant. By far the
most effectual of all ways of protecting trade was to capture the ports
from which the assailants sailed. Therefore from 1793 to 1811, when
the Dutch island of Java was taken, the navy was engaged in a series
of colonial expeditions. They began with the seizure of St. Pierre
and Miquelon, the two little islands belonging to France on the south
coast of Newfoundland, and of Pondicherry—three ports always occupied
at the beginning of a war, and restored at the close. St. Pierre and
Miquelon were taken in May, and Pondicherry was occupied August of
1793. In the same year Tobago was taken from the French, and Martinique
was attacked without success. The royalists of the island called the
English forces in, but Rochambeau, the general in command, held his
ground. The planters of the French half of San Domingo also appealed
to England for protection against their insurgent slaves. It was so
freely given that Jamaica was for a time left without a garrison. The
spectacle of a triumphant servile revolt was dreadful to all the slave
owners of the West Indies. The operations on the coast of this island
were disastrous to the troops. They dared not carry negroes with them
from our own islands lest they should be infected in the rebellious
spirit of the French slaves. No use could be made of the negroes of
San Domingo. Therefore the soldiers had to engage in work which is
fatal to the white man in the tropics. Whole battalions were swept
away by fevers. The part of the navy in this case and in most colonial
expeditions was to carry the troops, to land them, to supply naval
brigades. These services were necessarily unvarying in character. The
occupation of a Dutch island in the Moluccas differs only in the names
of the men and ships from the occupation of a French island in the West
Indies. In these cases, too, the navy though an indispensable, was a
subordinate, part of the forces engaged. It carried the soldiers and
it helped them, but the army effected the conquest. Nothing could well
be more idle than to speculate as to which of the two, the sailor or
the soldier, was the more essential to the victory. The soldiers could
not reach the place to be taken unless they were carried in ships,
and the sailors could not occupy the land without the soldiers. To
speak of these conquests as the gift of the Sea Power is inaccurate if
not absurd. The Sea Power of itself could never have taken the Cape,
or Mauritius. Many of them were not taken to be kept. The permanent
occupation of Martinique or Guadaloupe would have been offensive to
the West Indian interest, since their produce would have competed
with that of our own islands in the home market. These islands were
taken primarily because they were the headquarters of the privateers
who preyed on our commerce, and secondarily because they were useful
pledges to have in hand when peace was to be arranged.
A list of these expeditions given without monotonous detail will show
by what steps England applied and completed her command of the sea.
In January 1794 Sir John Jervis arrived at Jamaica with four sail of
the line, escorting 7000 troops under the command of Sir C. Grey. They
made an easy conquest of Martinique, which had a garrison of only
700 men in March, and in April occupied St. Lucia and Guadaloupe.
In June, Victor Hugues, by birth a mean white of the last-named
island, and a Jacobin of the most brutal character, but of energy
and capacity, arrived from Europe with nine vessels, and troops. He
landed in Guadaloupe. An attack made on his ships at Pointe à Pitre
by Jervis was repulsed. He drove the British garrison from pillar
to post, and reconquered the island by December. Reinforcements
reached him in September. Others sailed from Brest in November, and,
though attacked by English ships near Désirade, reached Guadaloupe in
January 1795. Hugues rapidly took or retook Santa Lucia, St. Vincent,
Grenada, and Dominica. Our naval forces were not numerous enough to
watch everywhere. Nor were our troops, who were rapidly diminished by
disease, able to occupy in sufficient force.
In August of 1795 Rear-Admiral Keith Elphinstone (Lord Keith) landed
the troops which occupied the Cape. In July and August of the year the
ships on the East India station and troops from India occupied the
Dutch posts on the east side of Ceylon, in Molucca, and Cochin.
In April 1796 Rear-Admiral Christian came to take the command in the
West Indies in succession to Jervis, bringing troops under the command
of Sir Ralph Abercromby. Santa Lucia was retaken at once, St. Vincent
and Grenada in June. In the East Indies the Dutch posts at Colombo,
Amboyna, Banda, etc., were occupied. In August a half-manned Dutch
squadron of three line-of-battle ships and four frigates fell into the
hands of Keith at Saldanha Bay.
In February 1797 Spain having declared war, Rear-Admiral Harvey and
Abercromby, with 5 sail of the line and troops, seized Trinidad. The
Spanish admiral, Ruiz de Apodaca, whose ships were half-manned, burnt
his squadron, and the small garrison could offer no resistance. An
attack on Porto Rico in April was beaten off.
In 1799 Surinam was occupied.
In September 1800 Curaçao was surrendered by the inhabitants, who
were terrorised by a mob of piratical adventurers calling themselves
republicans.
In 1801, on the formation of the Northern Coalition, the Danish and
Swedish islands in the West Indies, St. Martin, Saba, St. Thomas, St.
John, Santa Cruz, St. Bartholomew, were occupied. The Dutch island,
St. Eustatius, was occupied. In the East Indies, Ternate was taken.
Portugal having been driven by the threats of France and Spain to
exclude other trade, we took possession of Madeira.
By the terms of the Peace of Amiens, England made a wholesale
restoration of her conquests. Trinidad, which was of value as a depôt
for the smuggling trade with the Spanish colonies in South America, was
retained. In the East we kept Ceylon. On the renewal of the war the
work of the previous years had to be done over again.
In 1803 the Dutch islands in the West Indies were reoccupied, and the
negroes of San Domingo were helped to destroy the remnants of the
French troops among them.
In 1804, at the close of the year, an unsuccessful attack was made on
Curaçao. Surinam was occupied in April and May.
In 1806 the Cape was reoccupied.
In 1807 Curaçao was taken at a rush by Captain Brisbane.
In 1808 Marigalante fell into our hands, but an attempt to seize St.
Martin ended in the death or capture of all the men landed.
In 1809 Senegal was taken for the express purpose of rooting out
the privateers who made it their headquarters. In the West Indies a
powerful expedition, carrying 10,000 troops under General Beckwith,
escorted by Admiral Cochrane, took Martinique. Cayenne was occupied by
a naval brigade, and our old enemy, Victor Hugues, the Governor, became
our prisoner.
In 1810 Cochrane and Beckwith took Guadaloupe. In the East, Mauritius
was taken, and Amboyna and the Moluccas fell into our hands.
In 1811 the work was completed by the occupation of Java by a large
army from India.
These expeditions, which sailed to occupy islands from which attacks
could be made on our trade, were not the only tasks imposed on the navy
in the interest of commerce. As Napoleon fixed his yoke on Europe, and
endeavoured to compel all its peoples to join him in excluding English
trade, it became necessary to force an entry to new markets, and to
find the means of getting access to the old. It was in order to obtain
fresh markets that the expeditions to the river Plate were undertaken
in 1806 and 1807. Few passages in history are better fitted to show
what is the rigid limit of the power of a fleet than these adventures.
The first was promoted by the admiral on the Cape Station, Sir Home
Popham. He saw that new markets were becoming necessary, and he knew
that the Spanish colonists were discontented. From these sound premises
he drew the illegitimate deduction that the people of Buenos Ayres
would welcome English rule. He persuaded the authorities at the Cape
to despatch troops to Buenos Ayres. The navy carried them there, but
it could not save General Beresford and his men from being compelled
to capitulate when the townsmen rose on them. The commercial classes
in England forced the Government to continue the enterprise begun by
Sir Home. Monte Video was occupied, and Buenos Ayres was again attacked
in 1807. But our troops, ill-commanded by General Whitelocke, were
again forced to surrender. England was on the verge of finding herself
committed to a war of conquest in South America, which would have
employed her whole disposable army, when the rising of Spain against
Napoleon in 1808 gave her an honourable excuse for withdrawing from a
compromising adventure.
The eager disposition of the trading classes in England to follow the
lead given by Sir Home Popham, was immediately stimulated by Napoleon’s
Berlin decree of the 27th October 1806. It was the beginning of a
furious rivalry between himself and the British Government, in which
each endeavoured to prevent the other from obtaining any benefit from
neutral trade. The emperor strove to exclude our commerce, and we to
prevent any goods from reaching Europe except through English ports.
The neutral was ground between the upper and the nether millstone. The
navy was employed in covering a vast contraband trade, which arose
inevitably from the natural desire of the inhabitants of Europe to
obtain goods they needed, and England’s equally natural desire to
sell. There was an element of hypocrisy on both sides, and in practice
each undid much of its public policy by an underhand use of a licensed
trade. Napoleon undoubtedly employed this device to obtain the very
things he pretended to exclude. But he attempted to confine the right
to disregard his decrees to himself. Therefore the smuggling trade
could not be dispensed with, and it became one of the duties of the
navy to shepherd the smugglers. The great field of this peculiar
commerce was the Baltic. The Peace of Tilsit, between France and
Russia in July 1807, threatened England with a renewal of the Northern
Coalition. Her Government, whether informed of the secret articles of
the treaty directed against it, or acting, as it was entitled to act,
on the certainty that the Emperor of the French would lay hands on any
weapon he could reach to be used against England, took prompt measures
to diminish the danger. In September it despatched a powerful combined
expedition to occupy Copenhagen and seize the Danish fleet. If this
vigorous measure requires any justification, one can be found in the
paroxysm of rage which it provoked in Napoleon.
The seizure of the Danish fleet entailed a war with Denmark, and
during the ensuing years the navy had to fight many sharp actions in
order to cover the merchant vessels on their way into and out of the
Baltic. When in that sea the trading vessels were frequently compelled
to cruise to and fro till they could co-operate with the smugglers on
shore, or till the Governments found a way of admitting their goods
out of sight of Napoleon’s agents. As Russia was compelled to make
believe to go to war with England, and was very seriously engaged in
depriving the Swedes of Finland, a brush took place in August 1808. The
English fleet co-operated with the inefficient fleet of the Swedes, and
escorted the 200 transports carrying English troops, under Sir John
Moore, to their assistance. The Russian fleet would not be drawn into
a battle, but one of their liners, the _Sewolod_, 74, was cut off and
taken. The Russian crew showed solid courage, but their gunnery was not
above the Spanish level. The British fleets remained in the Baltic till
the downfall of Napoleon began. The service was trying, and the loss
from shipwreck was at times severe. But the work was mainly political,
apart from the obligation to protect the traders from privateers
sailing from ports under French control. Among the political duties
discharged was one which demonstrated the scope of the navy’s power.
Napoleon had compelled the Spanish Government to supply him with a
body of troops for use in Germany—for he was as hard put to it to find
men for the vast armies his victories compelled him to maintain, as
the British Government was to keep up the establishment of its navy.
He had stationed the Spaniards in Denmark, and they were there when
their country rose against the French in 1808. The British Government
found means to inform the Spanish general, Romana, of what had taken
place. He concentrated the greater part of his men, by forced marches
in August, at Nyborg in Fünen, and embarked them on board an English
squadron commanded by Sir R. Keats. They were sent on to Spain.
It cannot well be said that the power of the navy was shown in the
discharge of another piece of political duty it had been called upon
to perform at the other extremity of Europe from the Baltic. In 1806
Napoleon was instigating the Turks to attack Russia, who was still in
arms against him. The English Government desired to help the enemy
of our enemy, and Sir Thomas Duckworth was sent with a squadron to
coerce the Turks into keeping the peace. He forced the passage of
the Dardanelles in February 1807, and placed his squadron opposite
Constantinople. But he unfortunately allowed himself to be played upon
by the diplomacy of the Turks, and the French ambassador, General
Sebastiani. He delayed action till the Turks had thrown up batteries
which made the position of his squadron dangerous, and he was compelled
to retreat. On his return his squadron was roughly handled by the
Turkish batteries.
With the beginning of the war in the Peninsula the navy was provided
with a field on which it could perform, profitably and with a definite
aim, duties which it had too often been called upon to discharge to
no purpose. From the beginning of the war it had escorted troops to
be landed for conquest or co-operation with allies. Many of these
undertakings were of the most futile character. If it took Abercromby
to success in Egypt, it also took General Fraser to disaster. It
carried Sir John Moore to the fiasco of the Swedish expedition, and
General Stuart to that barren victory at Maida in Calabria, which
was followed by re-embarkation, and served no other purpose than to
aggravate the sufferings of the very people we came to help. After
Sir Sidney Smith covered the escape of the Portuguese royal family in
November 1807 and escorted them to Brazil, the work of our army was to
be done on a great scale, nobly, and with triumphant results in Spain
and Portugal. It would be pleasant to dwell on the incidents of the
story; on the feats of the =Impérieuse=, and the untiring activity of
English cruisers which intercepted the coast roads, and helped to keep
the war alive all along the coast of the Bay of Biscay. The navy helped
to take coast forts, or defend them. It embarked the Spanish irregular
bands when hard pressed, and disembarked them to begin again. It
contributed marines to hold the lines of Torres Vedras. It kept the sea
routes clear for the food and reinforcements sent to Wellington’s army.
But a service made up of scores of small actions cannot be shown by a
few examples, or told fully except at great length.
The same work was being done on a smaller scale on the coasts of
Sicily and Calabria, to guard the island against the attacks of the
two successive French rulers in Naples—the emperor’s brother Joseph,
and his brother-in-law Murat—and to keep resistance to them alive on
the mainland. When Napoleon had extorted Venice and Dalmatia from
Austria, English ships entered the Adriatic to carry on there the work
of blockade and harassment which others were doing elsewhere. But in
this sea the little war of skirmishes, single combats, and affairs in
boats, was varied by an action too considerable and too significant to
be allowed to pass among minor operations.
On the 13th March 1811 a Franco-Venetian squadron of four heavy
frigates, two lighter frigates, and some small craft, commanded by
Captain Dubourdieu, attacked an English squadron of three frigates
and a 22-gun corvette, under Captain Hoste, near Lissa. The French
officer was to windward, and he attacked in two divisions, a weather
and a lee line, heading to cut through the English and surround the
rear ships. If Hoste had been forced to remain passive with an awkward
fleet, Dubourdieu would no doubt have succeeded. But a good breeze
was blowing, and the English squadron was thoroughly alert. Hoste
closed his line till the bowsprit of one ship was over the taffrail
of the ship ahead of her, and he stood on. As he was moving ahead the
Franco-Venetians were compelled to advance on slanting lines, and
the lee ships masked part of the weather line. Hoste knew that a sunk
rock lay across his course. He stood on in hot action with the leader
of the Franco-Venetian weather line and of the lee line, which came
behind, till he could not safely go any further. He then wore his
line together. The leading Franco-Venetian ship, the =Favorite=, ran
on the rocks, and the others wore to escape her fate. Their division
into two lines became a cause of confusion. The single unhampered
English line cut them to pieces, and they were beaten with the loss
of three frigates. Dubourdieu would have done better if he had formed
his squadron in a single line, had engaged the four English vessels
to windward with four of his frigates, and had left the two others to
double on one end of Hoste’s line. Even so he would probably have been
beaten. When the English had turned, two French vessels assailed the
=Amphion=, Hoste’s frigate, which was now the rear ship of his line.
But the English officer shot from between them, and crossed the bows of
the vessel on his lee quarter. Superior mobility and quality more than
counterbalanced advantages of number and position or ingenuity of plan
of attack.
This is the lesson which Lissa teaches, and which had been taught by
every encounter in the war, great or small. But patent as it was,
England might have overlooked it but for a series of actions with a
new enemy which occurred at the close of the twenty-three years of
war. It is not my intention to depart from my rule of not describing
small ship actions or operations on lakes. Therefore I do not tell in
detail the events of the war of 1812 with the United States. The single
ship actions and encounters between flotillas on the American lakes,
of which it was composed, have been affectionately studied by the
patriotism of a great people. To us they are, but for one consequence
they had, only minor events in a long and varied history. To describe
how the vast numerical superiority of the English navy enabled it in
the end to drive the American flag from the sea and to cover invasion
of the territory of the United States, would be to tell a story which
has little intrinsic interest. The consequence of the early actions of
the war were, however, of extreme importance.
There was a serious risk that England would come to the end of the war
in the complacent belief that she was endowed with a privilege to be
superior on the sea. Her superiority was the fair reward of foresight
and preparation. When looked at properly, her victories over the French
and Spanish Navies afforded no guarantee that she would not be beaten
if she forgot that:—
The same arts that did gain
A power must it maintain.
The rapid loss of a handful of vessels to a single opponent in the
course of a few months drove that lesson home by a spasm of pain to
our pride and self-confidence. The United States were not at that time
able to maintain a great fleet. The rulers of the Republic very wisely
decided that since they could not possess many ships, they would take
care that such ships as they had should be of excellent quality and
excellently handled. They won the just reward of sound judgment and
timely preparation. Nor was that reward a slight one. The victories of
the United States frigates and sloops taught England that there was on
the other side of the Atlantic a growing power which must one day be
numerous and wealthy, which would be able to maintain great fleets, and
had shown that her seamen could defeat all but the best of the English
Navy. Idle attempts were made to belittle these successes by insisting
on the size and armament of the American frigates. The navy knew their
size and armament before it fought them. It learnt only from experience
that the Americans could make full use of these advantages, which they
had for the rest procured for themselves and not by accident. The good
sense of the navy and the country would not be blinded. Englishmen
drew the very sane deduction that they could be beaten at sea if they
allowed other people to surpass them in the quality of their armaments
and in skill. Nothing is more striking than the sense of insecurity,
the doubts about the future, the painful consciousness that there was
something misleading and hollow in all our naval successes, which can
be traced in the writings of seamen from the end of the great war. They
all insist that we must not rest on our successes, but prepare for yet
harder struggles in the future. A great work of reform and instruction
began in the years immediately after the close of the war, and it
began under the impulse given by the successes of the American ships.
The fortune of England has been wonderful, and it never served her
better than when it gave her that warning. The Americans had beaten her
because they were prepared and capable, and what the Americans had done
others could do if we allowed ourselves to be surpassed.
That what we needs must call fortune has had a great share in the
victories of England on the sea cannot be denied by any sound-minded
man who looks at the history of her navy as a whole. Fortune, and not
England, has provided that from the day when Hubert de Burgh and the
men of the Cinque Ports defeated Eustace the Monk, till the Treaty
of Paris was signed in 1815, she has never had to meet an enemy at
once strong in numbers and good in quality on the sea, except during
the second half of the seventeenth century when she fought the Dutch.
They, a small people occupying a little corner of land, compelled to
fight on shore for very existence, were necessarily surpassed. The
Spaniard was always inept at sea. The French navy, the creation of
Louis XIV., has been valiant, ingenious, not seldom successful, but it
was neglected, starved, misused by the monarchy, and so torn to pieces
by the Revolution that it could never recover. The sound national
instinct, the healthy social order, the innate love of good work
which have shaped our Navy, are just subjects for pride. But they are
also a lesson and a warning. Great navies are forming now, which have
thoroughly learned all we have taught. We must not rely on possessing
the same superiority we had in the eighteenth century without strenuous
effort. And we must not forget what that superiority was. It did not
lie in numbers nor in armament, nor in methods of attack, however
valuable these elements of strength may be. It lay in that skill of
the men who handled the weapons, in that loyalty to the service, in
that readiness of resource, promptitude to decide, and firmness to act,
without which, numbers, arms, and ingenious tactics are of no avail.
FOOTNOTES
[1] I have thought best to leave whatever it is needful to say about
the internal history of the British Navy in these years until it can
find a place in the account of the events of 1797.
[2] I omit all mention of the mutinies in single ships which began to
occur about this time, thinking it more convenient, and more likely to
tend to clearness, to treat them along with the general outbreak of
1797.
[3] We may stop for a moment to look at this list of accidents.
Whenever an accident happens to the navy to-day there is an outcry over
the decay of seamanship, and profuse assertions that such things did
not occur in the good old days are made. Yet we see that, when Bridport
started on his tardy pursuit of Morard de Galle, two collisions and
one grounding took place in his fleet. Between the 10th December 1796
and the 12th February 1797 there were six accidents, two of them total
losses in the fleet of Jervis—nine accidents in about eight weeks
among the best forces we had. The losses of Villaret-Joyeuse in his
disastrous winter cruise in 1794 were hardly greater. The grounding
of the =St. George= was attributed to the Portuguese pilot. But the
presence of a pilot does not remove the responsibility of the captain
and his officers. Lisbon was as familiar to us as any English port.
Would a navigating officer now need a pilot when entering or leaving
Lisbon? And was the pilot responsible for blundering into the frigate?
[4] The times entered in the logs were taken from the watches of
signal officers and masters. They were not chronometers, nor were the
observations made by men engaged in calm scientific investigation.
Discrepancies are frequent, and it is rarely, perhaps never, possible
to be sure if the time at which any movement was made to within a
quarter of an hour or twenty minutes. Other discrepancies are frequent.
[5] The occupation of the Dutch Colonies will be told when the
ancillary services of the navy are dealt with as a whole.
[6] Though I do not undertake to give a full account of the Commissions
and their Reports, I will take leave to say a few words as to the
general impression an examination of them has left on me. There was
waste due:—1st, to the division of responsibility between the Admiralty
Board and the Navy Office; 2nd, to the survival of the old belief that
a man in a Government office committed no mortal sin if he “licked
his fingers”; 3rd, to the fact that while the work of the Admiralty
and Navy Board had increased enormously since 1793, there had been no
proportionate increase in the administering and supervising staff.
Pitt, who long clung to the belief that France would be reduced to
submission by financial distress, and was by nature a rigid economist,
was unwilling to add to the permanent expenses of Government, and
accounts remained unchecked and unbalanced for want of hands to do
the work. Money was lost, because expenditure could not be followed,
and checked. Fallen mankind availed itself of the opportunity. Big
men kept public money lying at their bankers, who gave them interest
for it. Little men drew pay for work they never did. Contractors took
illegitimate profits. All this was bad, but it may all be conceded,
and yet we may find that we cannot accept the wholesale denunciations
of the Navy Board made by St. Vincent, and by his men, notably his
sycophantic secretary, Tucker. Such a story as that of the illegal—at
least the tyrannical—impressment of D. E. Bartholomew speaks very ill
for the spirit prevailing in the men about St. Vincent, and for him.
The notorious case of Sir Home Popham is even worse. Sir Home was
accused of having wasted public money on the repair of his ship in
India. He was very capable of taking care of himself, and he forced
an inquiry. It was proved to demonstration that in the accounts on
which the accusation brought against him was based, the same sums had
been counted several times over, and some of them were given in pounds
sterling, and not in the correct currency—rupees. The total was in fact
multiplied by ten, and a legitimate outlay of £7000 was swollen, either
by deliberate dishonesty, or by carelessness amounting to dishonest
negligence, to an enormous figure. How many officials were denounced on
no better grounds than Sir Home Popham? No man is so unscrupulous in
accusation as a passionate reformer convinced of his own virtue, unless
it be a follower eager to earn the approval of his reforming patron by
a display of zeal.
[7] I give all figures _sous bénéfice d’inventaire_. Nothing is better
calculated to show how hard men find it to be accurate than the
discrepancies between the list of ships given by different authorities
in 1804, or at any time. James does not agree with Tucker (_Life of
St. Vincent_), and neither agree with Captain Desbrière (_Projets et
Tentatives_). It must be remembered, too, that at any given moment a
squadron might be below its establishment owing to the absence of ships
in need of repair or stores, or above it because ships joined the flag
as reliefs or in transit.
[8] I am not unaware that Duncan’s ships bore down on the Dutch at
Camperdown from windward, and that although they suffered a greater
loss of life in proportion than the ships of Trafalgar, they were
not sunk, or ruined beyond repair. But at Camperdown our ships were
running before a strong breeze, on a rough sea, and were on an average
heavier ships than their opponents. Therefore they crossed the belt
of danger during their approach more rapidly, were better able to
stand hammering, and were fired at from a more unsteady platform than
was afforded by the almost becalmed ships of the Franco-Spaniards.
Moreover, the Dutch deliberately reserved their fire.
INDEX
Abercromby, Sir Ralph, General, in Cadiz, 419
commands troops in Mediterranean,413-414
in expedition to Egypt, 420, 421
in West Indies, 483
Aboukir, position of, 392
Turks defeated at, 409
=Achille=, at Trafalgar, 458
_Achille_, at Trafalgar, 460
on 1st June, 319
taken on 1st June, 321
=Achilles=, flagship of Rodney, 178
in blockade of Vannes, 186
Achin, Suffren winters at, 291
Acre, siege of, 409
_Actif_, action with =Nonsuch=, 263
=Active=, sent by Hood to North America,
captured, 267
sights Villeneuve, 447
=Adamant=, at battle of Camperdown, 351 _et seq._
_Admiraal de Ruiter_, flagship of Zoutman, 256
_Admirable_, burnt at Cherbourg, 43
French, La Hogue, 38
_Admiral Generaal_, in Dutch squadron, 1781, 256
=Adventure=, La Hogue, 37
=Advice=, La Hogue, 37
Affleck, Sir Edmond, Admiral, in command at New York, 267
=Africa=, at Trafalgar, 458 _et seq._
_Africaine_, taken, 420, 421
=Agamemnon=, at Copenhagen, 426 _et seq._
at Trafalgar, 458
detached by Kempenfelt, 273
_Aggershuus_, at Copenhagen, 426 _et seq._
=Agincourt=, at battle of Camperdown, 352
_Aigle_, at Trafalgar, 460
joins Villeneuve, 447
_Aigrette_, at battle of Quiberon, 190
_Aimable_, French, La Hogue, 38
in squadron of D’Estaign, 229
Aix, island of, plundered, 167
=Ajax=, at Trafalgar, 458
joins Nelson, 455
_Ajax_, in squadron of Allemand, 477
in squadron of Suffren, 287
Alava, J. M. de, Admiral, at Trafalgar, 460
=Albemarle=, La Hogue, 37
Albemarle, Lord, General, at taking of Havana, 196
_Alceste_, Sardinian frigate, taken by French, 330
_Alcide_, taken by Boscawen, 142
=Alcmene= brings news of mutiny to ships off Cadiz, 380
on coast of Egypt, 401
_Alcmène_, in squadron of D’Estaign, 229
=Alexander=, joins Nelson, 388
at battle of Nile, 393, 397
taken by French, 324
taken by Nelson to Naples, 401
_Alexandre_, separates from fleet of D’Orvilliers, 224
taken, 327
=Alfred=, in action at Pulo Aor, 480
in battle of 1st June, 320
Algeciras, action at, 430-433
_Algesiras_, at Trafalgar, 460
_Alkmaar_, at battle of Camperdown, 351
Allan, Lord, comes to Chatham, 373
Allemand, Admiral, escape of from Brest, 477
his cruise from Rochefort, 452, 455
second sortie, 477 _et seq._
Allouarn, Captain, commands _Juste_ at battle of Quiberon, 190
Alms, James, Captain, commands =Monmouth=, 283 _et seq._
=Amazon=, attacks _Droits de l’homme_, 340
_Ambitieux_, French, La Hogue, 38
Tourville hoists flag in, 41
Ambrose, Captain, court-martial on, 115, 116
=Ambuscade=, capture of, 472
=Amelia=, in action of Tory Island, 400
=America=, driven to sea, 259
in action with La Clue, 180
_America_, in battle of 1st June, 319
taken on 1st June, 321
Amherst, Lord, General, at taking of Louisbourg, 171, 173
Amiens, Peace of, 435
=Amphion=, carries pennant of Sir W. Hoste, 489
_Amsterdam_, Dutch, La Hogue, 37
_Anacreon_, her cruise to Ireland, 401
Andrews, Captain, commands =Defiance= at battle of Minorca, 152
=Andromache=, look-out ship of Rodney’s fleet, 276
=Anglesea=, taken by French, 120, 121
Angria, pirate chief, 140
=Anna=, victualler with Anson’s squadron, 108
Anson, George, Baron, his voyage round the world, 107, 109
convoys Duke of Marlborough to coast of France, 168
defeats La Jonquière and St. George, 123, 124
his political weakness, 148
is appointed to lead expedition to South Seas, 103
made a peer, 125
on Board of Admiralty, 117, 118
=Anson=, in action off Tory Island, 400
=Antelope=, Byng goes home as prisoner in, 155
takes Belliqueux, 175, 176
Antraigues, Count d’, secret service of, 442
Apodaca, Ruiz de, burns his ships at Trinidad, 483
_Apollo_, French privateer, takes =Anglesea=, 120
_Aquilon_, at the battle of the Nile, 395 _et seq._
prize sent to Gibraltar, 401
Aranda, Count of, Spanish Ambassador, quoted, 254
Arbuthnot, Marriot, Admiral, action off Capes of Virginia, 260
at New York, 259
commands =Portland= at battle of Quiberon, 189
defends Channel Islands, reaches New York, 244
sent to America, 241
=Ardent=, at Copenhagen, 426 _et seq._
at battle of Camperdown, 352
taken by Allies, 242
with Howe at New York, 230
=Arethusa=, action with _Belle Poule_, 223
_Argonanta_, at Trafalgar, 460
_Argonaute_, at Trafalgar, 460
Argumosa, T., commands _Monarca_ at Trafalgar, 460
“Armed Ship,” what was, 214
Arnold, Benedict, attacks Quebec, 218
in Virginia, 260
=Arrogant=, unfit for service, 209
Artois Count d’ (Charles X.), to command expedition, 326
Ashby, John, knighted, 20
at battle of Hogue, La, _q.v._
at Beachy Head, _q.v._
in joint commission of 1691, 32
Asiento, what was, leads to war with Spain, 99
=Atlas=, stranding of, 342, 343
_Audacieux_, joins Villaret-Joyeuse, 312
=Audacious=, at Algeciras, 431, 433
at battle of the Nile, 394 _et seq._
in Howe’s fleet, 311
sent to Gibraltar, 401
_Aventurier_, in action at Pulo Aor, 480
=Babet=, at action at Groix, 327
_Bahama_, at Trafalgar, 460
taken by American privateers, 219
Baird, P., Captain, commands =Portland= at battle of Minorca, 152
commands =Defiance= at battle of Quiberon, 189
Baker, John, Admiral, in command in Mediterranean, 54
Balchen, Sir John, Admiral, sent to coast of Spain, 109
his death, 121
Bâle, Peace of, 294
Balfour, George, Captain, boards _Bienfaisant_, 173, 174
Ball, Sir Alexander John, Admiral, commands =Alexander= at battle of
Nile, 394
Ballinamuck, surrender of French at, 398
Bantry Bay, battle in, 18, 19
French ships at, 338-339
=Barfleur=, at battle of Cape St. Vincent, 346 _et seq._
on 1st June, 319
Barfleur Cape. _See_ Hogue, La
Bargas, J., commands _San Ildefonso_ at Trafalgar, 460
Barham, Lord. _See_ Middleton, Sir C.
Barlow, captain of =Phœbe=, 420
Barnett, Curtis, Commodore, sails to East Indies, 128
takes prizes, 129;
his death, _ibid._
Barras de Saint Laurent, Chef d’escadre, joins Grasse, 268, 269
Barrington, Samuel, Admiral, captain of =Achilles= in blockade of Vannes,
186
at Barbadoes, 237
takes Santa Lucia, beats off D’Estaign, 238
Barrow, Sir John, quoted, 133
Bart, Jean, privateer, 74
Bartholomew, D. E., Captain, pressed, 437 _note_
Basque Roads, action in, 476
Bastia, taken, 328
_Batave_, damaged, 405
in fleet of Bruix, 403 _et seq._
_Batavier_, at battle of Camperdown, 351
Batticaloa, Suffren refits at, 289
Battle of 1st June 1794, 318-320
Bausset, Chef d’escadre, in capture of Moutray’s convoy, 252
Bayntun, H. W., Captain, commands =Leviathan= at Trafalgar, 458
_Bayonnaise_, takes =Ambuscade=, 472
Beachy Head, battle of, 24-29
Beaudoin, L. A., commands _Fougueux_ at Trafalgar, 460
Beauffremont, at Louisbourgh, 163
commands _Tonnant_, at battle of Quiberon, 190
sails to America, 162
Beaumont Lemaître, Captain, commands _Téméraire_ at battle of Minorca, 152
Beaver, Philip, Captain, cuts out _Prima_, 414
quoted, 419, 433, 434
Beckwith, General, takes Martinique and Guadaloupe, 484
=Bedford=, at battle of Camperdown, 352
dismasted, 259
Bedford, Duke of, at head of Admiralty, 117
Belingant, Chevalier de, commands _Northumberland_ at battle of Quiberon,
190
Bell, George, lieutenant of =Indefatigable=, 341
_Belle Poule_, action with =Arethusa=, 223
in action at Pulo Aor, 480
=Belleisle=, at Trafalgar, 458 _et seq._
former French _Formidable_, 327
Belleisle. _See_ Quiberon
taken, 196
=Bellerophon=, at battle of the Nile, 394 _et seq._
at Trafalgar, 458
in Howe’s fleet, 310 _et seq._
sent to Gibraltar, 401
=Belliqueux=, at battle of Camperdown, 352
_Belliquex_, taken, Bristol Channel, 175
=Bellona=, at Copenhagen, 426
in action off Cape Ortegal, 466
_Bellone_, in expedition of Bompard, 399
Benbow, John, Vice-Admiral, commands expedition to West Indies, 53
attacks St. Malo, 49
his career and death, 91 _et seq._
Bengal, Bay of, operations in, 196, 202
Bentley, Sir John, Vice-Admiral, commands =Warspight= in battle of
Quiberon, 189
_Berceau_, in action at Pulo Aor, 480
Berenger, C., commands _Scipion_ at Trafalgar, 460
Beresford, Marshal, Lord, surrenders at Buenos Ayres, 485
Berkeley, Hon. G. Cranfield, Baron, Admiral, commands =Marlborough=, 311
Berkeley, Lord, Admiral, attacks Brest, 50, 51
bombards Dieppe and Havre, 51
Bernadotte, Marshal, and King of Sweden, commands in West of France, 418
Berry, Sir Edward, Captain, carries Nelson’s despatches, 401
commands =Agamemnon= at Trafalgar, 458
Rear-Admiral, captain of =Vanguard= at battle of the Nile, 394 _et seq._
Bertie, captain of =Ardent= at Copenhagen, 426 _et seq._
Bertie, Lord Robert, his regiment in Byng’s squadron, 148 _et seq._
Bertie, Sir Albemarle, Admiral, commands =Thunderer= in Howe’s fleet, 311
=Berwick=, at battle of Toulon, 113
in north squadron, 1781, 255 _et seq._
La Hogue, 37
taken by French, 330
_Berwick_, at Trafalgar, 460
_Beschermer_, at battle of Camperdown, 351
Bettesworth, captain of =Curieux=, 450
Bévisier. _See_ Beachy Head
_Bexhirmer_, Dutch, La Hogue, 37
Bexley, Lord, _see_ Vansittart, 424
_Biche_, at Louisbourg, 172
Bickerton, Sir Richard, Admiral, blockades Carthagena, 453
joins Collingwood off Cadiz, 455
Vice-Admiral, joins Hughes, 290
_Bienfaisant_, taken at Louisbourg, 173
Bigot de Morogues, commands _Magnifique_ at battle of Quiberon, 190
head of _Académie de la Marine_, 147
_Bizarre_, at battle of Quiberon, 190
in squadron of Suffren, 286 _et seq._
Blackwood, Sir Henry, Admiral, commands =Euryalus= at Trafalgar, 460
_et seq._
Blakeney, General, lieutenant-governor of Minorca, warns Ministry, 147
Blane, Sir Gilbert, physician to fleet, 275, 276
Blanquet Duchayla, Admiral, at battle of the Nile, 395 _et seq._
=Blenheim=, at battle of Cape St. Vincent, 345-349
Bligh, General, takes Cherbourg, 168
Bligh, Sir Richard Rodney, Admiral,
captain of =Alexander=, 324
Bligh, William, Admiral, captain of =Glatton= at Copenhagen, 426
commands =Director= at battle of Camperdown, 351
in mutiny at Nore, 370 _et seq._
Blockade, methods of, 304, 305
Bloys, Rear-Admiral, at battle of Camperdown, 351
=Boadicea=, pursues Bompard, 399
Boca Chica, entry to Carthagena, 104
Boischateau, Keremar de, Captain, commands _Brilliant_ at battle of
Quiberon, 190
=Bombay Castle=, in action at Pulo Aor, 480
lost, 243
Bompard, Admiral, his expedition to Ireland, 398, 399
Bompard, M. de, cruise to West Indies, 177
in West Indies, 195
returns to Brest, 187
Bonaparte. _See_ Napoleon
=Bonaventure=, La Hogue, 37
=Bonne Citoyenne=, at battle of Cape St. Vincent, 345
joins Nelson, 388
on coast of Egypt, 401
Boscawen, Sir Edward, Admiral, his career and character; takes command in
East Indies, 131
action with La Clue, 179-182
convoy scattered on his return home, 175
on Board of Admiralty, 148
operations in North America, 141
operations on Coromandel coast, 131, 132
returns home, 141
sails to intercept Dubois de Lamotte, 141
takes Louisbourg, 171, 173
=Boston=, attacked by French, 76
Boston, French squadron at, 235, 236
Boteler, Captain, succeeds Wren in West Indies, 52
Bott, mutineer, 369
Bouillé, Marquis de, co-operates in taking of St. Kitts, 275
retakes St. Eustatius, 271
surprises Dominica, 237
takes Tobago, 265
Boulogne, attacks on flotilla at, 434, 435
Bounties for seamen offered, 143
=Bounty= mentioned, 324
_Bourbon_, French, La Hogue, 38
_Bourgoyne_, separates from fleet of D’Orvilliers, 224
Bouvet, M. de, French officer, relieves Pondicherry, 131
Bouvet, Rear-Admiral, in expedition to Ireland, 337, 339
Bover, Lieutenant, threatened by mutineers at Spithead, 367
Bowyer, Sir George, Admiral, wounded on 1st June, 319
=Boyne=, at battle of Toulon, 115
Boys, Commodore, blockades Dunkirk, 178
Braddoch, General, his attack on Port Duquesne, and death, 141
_Brandenberg_, Dutch, La Hogue, 37
_Brave_, French, La Hogue, 38
=Breda=, Benbow’s flagship, 92
La Hogue, 37
Brenton, Sir Edward, Captain, quoted, 377
Brereton, Major-General, misleads Nelson, 450
Brest, port of, and attack on, 51
Brett, Peircy, Admiral, commands =Lion= in action with _Elizabeth_, 122
in Downs, 178
Bridport, Lord. _See_ Hood, Alexander
_Brilliant_, at battle of Quiberon, 190
French, La Hogue, 38
=Brilliant=, in mutiny at Nore, 374
in squadron of Suffren, 286
_Brilliante_, in squadron of Tronjolly, 282
Brinley, John, mutinous seaman, 90
=Bristol=, in Anson’s fleet, 1747, 124
=Britannia=, at battle of Cape St. Vincent, 346 _et seq_.
at Trafalgar, 458
flagship of Russell, 41
La Hogue, 37
Brodrick, Thomas, Admiral, in action with La Clue, 179, 182
commands in Mediterranean, 162
Bronard, G. A., commands _Algesiras_ at Trafalgar, 460
Brookes, Cæsar, midshipman of =Milford=, 84 _et seq._
Brown, Rob. Hunter, captain of =Dorsetshire=, 480
Browning, master of =Mountjoy=, killed at Londonderry, 21
Brueys d’Aigalliers, Admiral, commands in expedition to Egypt, 389
anchors at Aboukir, the disposition of his ships, 392, 393
Bruix, Eustache, his cruise to Mediterranean, 403, 407
Brune, Marshal, subdues Italy, 417
=Brunswick=, on 1st June, 320
_Brutus_, at battle of Camperdown, 351
_Bucentaure_, flagship of Villeneuve, at Trafalgar, 460
=Buckingham=, flagship of Temple West at battle of Minorca, 152
Buckle, M., Captain, commands =Namur= at battle of Quiberon, 189
Buckner, Rear-Admiral, at Nore in mutiny, 370 _et seq._
Buenos Ayres, expeditions to, 485
Bullen, Sir Charles, commands =Britannia= at Trafalgar, 458
Bunker Hill, battle of, 218
Burchett, Josiah, quoted, 68
=Burford=, at battle of Quiberon, 189
La Hogue, 37
Burgess, Captain, commanded =Ardent= at Camperdown, killed, 352 _et seq._
Burgoyne, General, his advance, 218
Burke, Edmund, character of Keppel, 221
on naval estimates, 209
Burrish, Captain, court-martial on, 114
Burslem, F., Captain, commands =Coventry= at battle of Quiberon, 189
Bussy, General, in East Indies, 291 _et seq._
Butler, Captain, succeeds Wilmot;
lawsuit with Ruth Wilmot, 89
Buxton, Theophilus, steward, 89
Byard, Sir T., Captain, commands =Bedford= at battle of Camperdown, 352
Byng, Sir George, Admiral, father of John Byng, created Viscount
Torrington, 148
in taking of Gibraltar, 64 _et seq._
in command in Mediterranean, 54
Byng, John, Admiral, commands in Channel, 145
birth and early career, 147, 148
takes reliefs to Minorca;
his campaign and death, 148, 156
Byron, Captain, commands =Andromache=, 276
Byron, John, Admiral, his career and character; sails to America, 222
in North America and West Indies, 235, 240
stormy passage, 232, 233
_Ça Ira_, taken, 330
Cadiz, bombarded, 387
mutiny averted in ships off, 381-382
threatened, 419
=Cæsar=, at Algeciras, 431-433
flagship of Sir Richard Strachan, 466
in Howe’s fleet, 312 _et seq._
Cagigal, F. X., commands _San Agustin_ at Trafalgar, 460
Calder, Sir Robert, Admiral, captain of fleet with Jervis, 346 _et seq._
commands off Ferrol, 450, 452
court-martial, 460
joins Collingwood off Cadiz, 455
Caldwell, Sir Benjamin, commands =Agamemnon=, 273
Callis, Captain, burns Spanish galleys at St. Tropez, 110
Calvi, taken, 328
_Calypso_, at battle of Quiberon, 190
Camaret Bay. _See_ Brest
Camas, J. G. F., commands _Berwick_ at Trafalgar, 460
Cambon, Captain, commands _Mercure_ at the battle of the Nile, 395
_et seq._
=Cambridge=, La Hogue, 37
Campbell, John, Captain, flag-captain at battle of Quiberon, 189
takes French convoy, 169
Campbell, captain of =Blenheim=, overawes mutineers of =Marlborough=, 383
Campbell, Portuguese officer, gives information to Nelson, 449
reports position of Spaniards to Jervis, 345
Camperdown, battle of, 351, 354
Camperdown, Viscount. _See_ Duncan, Adam
=Canada=, escapes from French squadron, 323
in action off Tory Island, 400
Cape Coast-Castle attacked by French, 170
Cape Français, action off, 170, 171
Cape, mutiny at, 381
restored and retaken, 484
taken, 483
=Captain=, at battle of Minorca, 152
at Louisbourg, 172
La Hogue, 37
Nelson’s pennant in, at battle of Cape St. Vincent, 344, 349
_Captain General_, Dutch, La Hogue, 37
Captain’s servants, 95, 96
Carkett, Robert, first lieutenant of =Monmouth=, 161
Carleton, Sir Guy, General, defends Quebec, 218
_Carlotta_, Portuguese frigate, 345
Carmarthen, Peregrine Osborne, 2nd Duke of Leeds, Marquis of, in attack
on Brest, 51
=Carnarvon=, Indiaman, taken by French, 175
Carnegie, William, Earl of Northesk, in mutiny at Nore, 377
third in command at Trafalgar, 458
Carrickfergus, taken by Thurot, 195
Carronade, by whom invented, and use of, 469, 470
Carter, Rear-Admiral, at La Hogue, _q.v._
Carthagena, English attack on, 104, 105
Casabianca, flag-captain (French), at battle of the Nile, 395 _et seq._
Casse, M. du, French naval officer, his action with Benbow, 92, 93
Castagnier, Captain, lands invaders at Fishguard, 335
_Casteel Medenblick_, Dutch, La Hogue, 37
Castlebar, French victory at, 398
=Castor=, taken by French, 308
Castries, Marquis de, French Minister of Marine, 296
Catamarans, failure of, 443
Catford, Captain, commands =Captain= at battle of Minorca, 152
Cathcart, Lord-General, appointed to command troops in West Indies, 103
his death, 104
Caumont, Chevalier de, Captain, commands _Inflexible_ at battle of
Quiberon, 190
Cautious Leeshore. _See_ Keppel
Cawdor, French surrender to, 335
Cayenne, taken, 484
_Censeur_, in fleet of Bruix, 403
retaken by French, 331
taken, 330
_Centaure_, in action of La Clue with Boscawen, 181
=Centurion=, 125
at Gibraltar, 1704, 65
flagship of Anson, 107-109
joins Howe at New York, 232
La Hogue, 37
_Cerberus_, at battle of Camperdown, 351
=Cerberus=, brings report of approach of Spanish fleet to Rodney, 250
_César_, action with =Isis=, 235
in squadron of Estaign, 229
Ceylon, Dutch possessions in, taken, 483
Chandernagore, taken, 198
Charles Edward, Prince, sails in _Doutelle_, 122
Charles III., King of Spain, and his navy, 217
_Charlotte Amelie_, at Copenhagen, 426 _et seq._
Chartres, Duke of, at battle of Ushant, 225
Chasteloger, Captain, commands _Intrépide_ at battle of Quiberon, 190
Châteaurenault, Count of, French Admiral, brings troops to Ireland, 17
at Beachy Head, _q.v._
fails to join Tourville in 1692, 34
fights battle in Bantry Bay, 18-19
joins Tourville, 24
sails from Toulon to Brest, 58
=Chatham=, at battle of Quiberon, 189
La Hogue, 37
Chatham, fortified against mutineers, 373
Cherbourg, enlarged by Napoleon, 476
taken, 168
_Chesapeake_, taken by =Shannon=, 472
=Chester=, La Hogue, 37
taken by French, 78
=Chesterfield=, in Byng’s squadron, 151
Chézac, captain of _Soleil Royal_ at battle of Quiberon, 190
=Chichester=, at battle of Quiberon, 189
at battle of Toulon, 115
=Childers= sloop, brings news of war with Holland to Rodney, 261
_Chimère_, in squadron of D’Estaign, 229
Chouans, what were, 334, 335
Christian, Sir Hugh Cloberry, Rear-Admiral, in West Indies, 483
Churruca, C., commands _San Juan Nepomuceno_ at Trafalgar, 460
Cillart, Captain, surrenders _Sévère_, 290
_Cisalpin_, in fleet of Bruix, 403
Cisneros, B. H., Admiral, at Trafalgar, 460
Clarke, W. Stanley, captain of =Wexford=, 480
_Classes_, original _inscription maritime_. _See_ Navy, French Royal
Clerk, John, referred to, 315 _et seq._
Clinton, Sir Henry, General, retreats from Philadelphia to New York, 230
Clive, Lord, co-operates with Watson in taking Geriah, 140
_Clorinde_, her cruise to East Indies, 467
Clue, La. _See_ La Clue
=Clyde=, in mutiny at Nore, 356 _et seq._
leaves mutineers, 374
_Cocarde_, in expedition to Ireland, 338
Cochin, Dutch ports taken, 483
Cochrane, Lord (Earl Dundonald), taken, 431
at Basque Roads, 476
Cochrane, Sir Alexander Forrester, Admiral, in West Indies, 448
takes Martinique and Guadaloupe, 484
Codrington, Colonel, governor of Virgin Islands, 69 _et seq._
Codrington, Sir Edward, Admiral, captain of =Babet=, 327
commands =Orion= at Trafalgar, 458 _et seq._
quoted, 471
Coghlan, Jeremiah, Captain, cuts out French privateer, 418
Colbert, organises French Navy, 9
Colbert de Seignelay succeeds his father, 10
Collier, Sir John, in North America, 244
Collingwood, Commodore, in West Indies, 247
Collingwood, Cuthbert, Lord, Vice-Admiral, conduct off Cadiz, 455
commands =Barfleur= on 1st June, 319
commands =Excellent= at battle of Cape St. Vincent, 346
misses Ganteaume, 477, 478
replaces Orde at Cadiz, 449
second in command at Trafalgar, 458 _et seq._
=Colossus=, at battle of Cape St. Vincent, 346 _et seq._
at Trafalgar, 458
in collision with =Culloden=, 343
joins Jervis, 343
Colpoys, Sir John, Admiral, commands off Brest, 338
goes to Spithead, 342
mutiny in his flagship, 364 _et seq._
_Comète_, escapes from Louisbourg, 174
_Concorde_, in Savary’s squadron, 398
sent by Grasse to North America, 267
Conflans, Marechal de, commands Brest fleet, 176
at battle of Quiberon, 187, 194
blockaded by Hawke, 182, 183
his orders, 187
leaves Brest, _ibid._
plan of campaign, 183
Conn, J., Captain, commands =Dreadnought= at Trafalgar, 458
_Conquerant_, at battle of the Nile, 395 _et seq._
French, La Hogue, 38
prize sent to Gibraltar, 401
=Conqueror=, at Trafalgar, 458
Constable, captain of =Windsor=, his misconduct, 92
dismissed and imprisoned, 93
_Constitution_, in fleet of Bruix, 403
_Content_, at Battle of Minorca, 152
convoys trade, 127
French, La Hogue, 38
helps to take Northumberland, 119
_Convention_, in battle of 1st June, 319
in fleet of Bruix, 403
Convoy, act to regulate, 479
ships employed on, in 1778, 213
Cooke, Edward, Captain, at Toulon, 302
Cooke, J., Captain, commands =Bellerophon= at Trafalgar, 458
Cooper, Captain, court-martial on, 115
Copenhagen, battle of, 424, 430
_Coquille_, in expedition of Bompard, 399
Córdoba, Jose de, commands Spanish fleet at St. Vincent, 344
Cordoba, Luis de, commands allied fleet in Channel, 269
his piety, 262
Spanish admiral, in Channel, 241, 242
takes English convoy, 252, 253
Corfu, occupied by French, 402
Cornish, Sir Samuel, vice-admiral in expedition to Manilla, 196
Cornwall, Captain, commands =Intrepid= at battle of Minorca, 152
captain, killed at battle of Toulon, 113
=Cornwall=, joins Howe at New York, 232
La Hogue, 37
Cornwallis, Sir William, Admiral, action with Ternay, 251
blockades Brest, 438
divides his fleet, 454
drives back Brest fleet, 455
retreat of, 326
Cornwallis, Lord, General, takes Charlestown, 244
Corsairs, French, 73, 79
Corsica, occupation of, 328 _et seq._
evacuation of, 332
Cotgrave, Captain, in action at Boulogne, 435
Cotton, Sir Charles, Admiral, joins Keith, 408
Countess, Captain, commands =Ethalion=, 399
_Courageux_, French, La Hogue, 38
=Courageux=, lost, 343
in action off Cape Ortegal, 466
Courand, Captain, commands _Sans Pariel_, 314
_Couronne_, battle of Minorca, 152
French, La Hogue, 38
Court, M. de, French Admiral, at battle of Toulon, 112 _et seq._
supports Spaniards, 110
Court-martial, reorganisation of, by Act 22nd, George II., 136, 139
Coutance Laselle, Captain, commands _Sphinx_ at battle of Quiberon, 190
=Coutts= in action at Pulo Aor, 480
_Covadonga, Nuestra Señora de_, Spanish galleon, taken by Anson, 109
=Coventry=, at battle of Quiberon, 189
Craig, General, brings troops to Mediterranean, 449
Craven, first-lieutenant of =Northumberland=, 120
Croisic, Pointe de. _See_ Quiberon
=Crown=, La Hogue, 37
Cruikshank, Isaac, caricatures Howe, 301
Cruisers, ships employed as, in 1778, 213
Cuddalore, occupied by Suffren, 289
siege of, 291
Cullemberg, Admiral, Dutch, at Beachy Head, _q.v._
=Culloden=, at battle of Minorca, 152
grounds on Aboukir shoal, 394
in action with La Clue, 180
in attack on Santa Cruz, 387
in battle of Cape St. Vincent, 345, 349
in collision with =Colossus=, 343
lost on Long Island, 259
on 1st June, 319
Cumberland, Duke of, recommends creation of Marines, 144
=Cumberland= in action at Pulo Aor, 480
taken, 339
taken by French, 78
Cuming, Captain of =Russell= at Copenhagen, 426 _et seq._
Cumming Thomas, Quaker, advocates expedition to coast of Africa, 170
_et seq._
Cunningham, Sir Charles, Rear-admiral, his account of mutiny at Nore,
quoted 356 _et seq._,
captain of =Clyde=, _ibid._
Curaçao, occupied, 483,
restored, retaken, 484
=Curieux=, sent to England, 450
Curtis, Sir Roger, commands squadron in Channel, 337
his caution on 1st June, 321
joins flag off Cadiz, 388
Dacres, J. R., Captain, commands =Barfleur= at Battle of Cape St.
Vincent, 346
Dalbarade, Captain, commands _Conquerent_ at the battle of the Nile, 395
_et seq._
Dance, Sir Nathaniel, East India Company’s commodore, 480
Danish fleet seized, 486
Islands in West Indies taken, 483
=Daphne= taken, 325
Darby, George, Vice-Admiral, in command in Channel, 251
outmatched in Channel, 270
relieves Gibraltar, 262, 263
Darby, Captain, commands =Bellerophon= in battle of the Nile, 394
_et seq._
Dardanelles, Passage of, 487
=Dartmouth=, at Londonderry, 21
_Dauphin Royal_, at battle of Quiberon, 190
escapes Boscawen, 142
D’Aché, Count, in East Indies, 198-202
D’Aiguillon, Duke, General, to command army of invasion, 177
D’Albert de Rions, Comte, ill-treated by mob, 297
_Decatur_ captures =Dominica=, 472
Decrés, Admiral, his defence of _Guillaume Tell_, 412
=Defence=, at battle of the Nile, 394 _et seq._
at Copenhagen, 426 _et seq._
at Trafalgar, 458
on 1st June, 319
sent to Gibraltar, 401
unfit for service, 209
=Defiance=, at battle of Minorca, 152
at battle of Quiberon, 189
at Trafalgar, 458
flagship of Richard Graves at Copenhagen, 425 _et seq._
in Anson’s fleet, 1747, 124
in Benbow’s squadron, 92
La Hogue, 37
D’Herville, Captain, commands _Fier_ at battle of Minorca, 152
D’Hocquart, Captain, French Navy, taken by Boscawen, 142
Delaval, Sir Ralph, at Beachy Head, _q.v._
in joint commission of, 1693, 45
with Smyrna convoy, 35
_Delft_, at battle of Camperdown, 351
Dutch, La Hogue, 37
Denieport, G., commands _Achille_ at Trafalgar, 460
Denis, Sir Peter, Vice-admiral, commands =Dorsetshire= at battle of
Quiberon, 189
_Denmark_, at Copenhagen, 426 _et seq._
Denmark, Prince George of, husband of Queen Anne, Lord High Admiral, 59
_De Provinzen_, Dutch, La Hogue, 37
=Deptford=, joins Byng, 149
La Hogue, 37
_Desaix_, in action at Algeciras, 430 _et seq._
Desbrière, Captain, quoted, 334
D’Estaign, Charles Henri, Théodat D’Estaign du Saillans, Comte, his
career and character, sails to America, 222 _et seq._
in West Indies and Carolina, 236, 240
passed Gibraltar, 229,
operation on coast of North America, 229, 234
Destouches, Chevalier, in command of French squadron at Newport, 259
D’Estrèes, at Beachy Head, _q.v._
brings French squadron to Portsmouth, 9
Devaux, General, commands troops in Algeciras, 431
=Devonshire=, blown up in action with French, 78
La Hogue, 37
_Devries_, at battle of Camperdown, 351
De Winter, Jan Willem, Dutch Admiral, at battle of Camperdown, 351, 354
=Diadem=, at battle of Cape St. Vincent, 346
_Diamant_, French, La Hogue, 38
taken by Boscawen, 141
Diamond Rock, English position, taken, 448
Dickson, Captain of =Veteran=, 427 _et seq._
=Didon=, joins Villeneuve, 448
taken, 453
Digby, Captain, commands =Africa= at Trafalgar, 458
Digby, Rear-Admiral, pursues La Motte Picquet, 263
commanded =Dunkirk= at battle of Quiberon, 189
sent to North America, 269
Diggs, D., Captain, commands =Maidstone= at battle of Quiberon, 189
_Diligente_, French privateer, 76
Dilk, captain, court martial on, 115
Dilkes, Captain of _Raisonable_, 427 _et seq._
Dilkes, Sir Thomas, at battle of Malaga, 65
=Director=, at battle of Camperdown, 352
at Nore, 370
Diron, captain of _Decatur_, 472
=Discovery=, deserts mutineers, 377
_Dix Août_, in fleet of Bruix, 403
Dixon, captain of =Ramillies=, 427 _et seq._
Dixon, James, master of Northumberland, 138
Dixon, Manley, Captain, his humanity to his men, 359
Djezzar, Pasha of Acre, 409
Dogger Bank, battle of, 257, 258
=Dolphin=, in Byng’s squadron, 151
in North Sea squadron, 256
Domett, Sir William, Admiral, captain of fleet with Sir Hyde Parker,
426 _et seq._
Dominica, action off, on 9th April, 277
battle of, 12th April, 278, 279
taken, 483
taken from French, 196
=Dominica=, taken by _Decatur_, 472
Don, master of =Ardent=, killed at battle of Camperdown, 354
Donnidge, Mr., surgeon of Milford, 84, 85
Dordelin, captain of _Tyrannicide_, in fleet of Villaret-Joyeuse, 313
_et seq._
Dorré, lieutenant of _Revolutionnaire_, 311
=Dorsetshire=, at battle of Quiberon, 189
court-martial on lieutenants of, 115
in action at Pulo Aor, 480
D’Orves, dies at sea, 286
takes command of French naval forces in East Indies, 283
D’Orvilliers, Guillonet, Comte, at battle of Ushant, 223, 226
commands Brest fleet, 221
in channel, 241, 242
Douglas, Sir Charles, captain of fleet, with Rodney, 276;
his advice to Rodney, 278
serves on American Lakes, 218
Douglas, Sir James, Admiral, at taking of Dominica, 196
_Doutelle_, carries Prince Charles Edward to Scotland, 122
=Dragon=, money spent on, rotten, 209
with Admiral Knight’s convoy, 449
_Dragon_, at battle of Quiberon, 190
Drake, Sir Francis Samuel, Rear-Admiral, commands =Falkland= at battle
of Quiberon, 189
commands van in battle of Lynn Haven, 268
detached by Rodney, 265
Draper, Sir William, Lieutenant-General, at taking of Manila, 196
=Dreadnought=, at Trafalgar, 458
commanded by Boscawen, 141
La Hogue, 37
_Droits de l’homme_, destruction of, 339-342
Drucourt, governor of Louisbourg, 171, 173
Drury, W. O’Brien, Captain, commands =Powerful= at battle of Camperdown,
352
Dubois de Lamotte, French naval officer, takes reinforcements to Canada,
141, 142
Dubourdieu, Captain, at battle of Lissa, 488
Duchaffault de Besné, action with Boscawen, takes =Carnarvon=, reaches
France, 172
attempts to relieve Louisbourg, _ibid._
escapes British fleet, 175
=Duchess=, La Hogue, 37
Duckworth, Sir John Thomas, Admiral, at Minorca, 402
at Constantinople, 487
at Minorca, 404
Duff, G., Captain, commands =Mars= at Trafalgar, 458
Duff, Robert, Vice-Admiral, in blockade of Vannes, and battle of
Quiberon, 186 _et seq._
Dugommier, French general, retakes Toulon, 303
_Duguay-Trouin_ at Trafalgar, 460
taken off Cape Ortegal, 466
Duguay-Trouin, Réné, defeats English convoy, 78
French privateer and naval officer, 74
his birth and education, 75
prisoner at Plymouth, 76
takes Dutch convoy, 77
=Duke=, at battle of Quiberon, 189
in mutiny at Spithead, 366 _et seq._
La Hogue, 37
Dumanoir-le-Pelley, or Lepelley, Admiral, his flight from Trafalgar and
capture, 466
commands allied van at Trafalgar, 460 _et seq._
Dumourier, Captain, commands _Trajan_, 314
Duncan, Adam, Lord Camperdown, his antecedents, 350
commands in North Sea, 327
fights battle of Camperdown, 552, 554
mutiny in his squadron, 375
watches the Texel single handed, 376
Dundas, Henry, Lord Melville, in Pitt’s cabinet, 350
Dundas, Sir David, General, in Corsica, 328
Dundonald. _See_ Cochrane, Lord
=Dunkirk=, 90
at battle of Quiberon, 189
in Boscawen’s squadron, 142
Dupetit-Thouard, commands _Tonnant_ at battle of the Nile, 395 _et seq._
Dupleix, French governor of Pondicherry, seizes Madras, his intrigues, 139
Duquesne, captain of _Foudroyant_, 160, 161
Duquesne, Fort, attack on, 403
_Duquesne_, in fleet of Bruix, 141
Durevest, Captain, commands the _Sage_ at battle of Minorca, 152
sails to America, 158
Durham, P. C. Captain, commands =Defiance= at Trafalgar, 458
d’Urtubie, Vicomte, Captain, commands _Dauphin Royal_ at battle of
Quiberon, 190
Dutch sailors, in English ships, 414
=Eagle=, La Hogue, 37
with Howe at New York, 231
=Earl Camden=, ship of Commodore Dance, 480
=Earl of Abergavenny=, in action at Pulo Aor, 480
_Echo_, at Louisbourg, 172
=Edgar=, at Copenhagen, 425 _et seq._
called in by Sir Vincent, 405
La Hogue, 37
Edgcumbe, George, Earl of Mount Edgcumbe, commands squadron in
Mediterranean, 149
commands =Hero= at battle of Quiberon, 189
in =Lancaster= at battle of Minorca, 152
Edwards, Captain Richard, defeated by Duguay-Trouin, 78
=Egmont=, at battle of Cape St. Vincent, 346 _et seq._
=Egyptienne=, with Calder, 451
_Egyptienne_, reaches Alexandria, 420
Eimeriau, Captain, commands _Spartiate_
at battle of the Nile, 395 _et seq._
Ekins, Sir Charles, Admiral, quoted, 359 _et seq._
El Arish, convention of, 416-417
Elba, occupied, 332
=Elephant=, flagship of Nelson at Copenhagen, 425 _et seq._
_Elephantin_, at Copenhagen, 426 _et seq._
_Elèves_, rank in French Navy, 296
=Elisabeth=, taken by French, 78
_Elisabeth_, action with =Lion=, 122
=Elizabeth=, La Hogue, 37
Elliot, John, Admiral, his action with Thurot, 195
Elliot, Sir Gilbert, Earl Minto, Commissioner in Corsica, 329 _et seq._
advises choice of Nelson to command in Mediterranean, 388
Ellis, Welbore, Treasurer of Navy, 209
Ellison, captain of =Marlborough=, rebuked by Jervis, 383
commits suicide, _ibid._
Elton, Captain, loses =Anglesea=, 120, 121
_Elven_, at Copenhagen, 426 _et seq._
Embden, occupied, 169
_Embuscade_, in expedition of Bompard, 399
=Emerald=, in attack on Santa Cruz, 387
joins Nelson, 388
on coast of Egypt, 401
_Engageante_, in squadron of D’Estaign, 229
_Entend_, French, La Hogue, 38
_Eole_, on 1st June, 319
=Eolus=, commanded by Captain Elliot, 195
=Epervier=, taken, 471
Epron, J., commands _Argonaute_ at Trafalgar, 460
_Erste Edele_, Dutch, La Hogue, 37
Escaño, A., Rear-Admiral, at Trafalgar, 460
_Esperance_, taken by Byng’s Channel squadron, 145
Espiritu Santo, Cape, the _Covadonga_ taken by Anson near, 109
=Essex=, at battle of Quiberon, 189
at battle of Toulon, 115
commanded by Captain John Campbell, 169
La Hogue, 37
_Essex_, taken by =Phœbe=, 470
Essington, W., Captain, commands =Triumph= at battle of Camperdown, 352
_Ethalion_, pursues Bompard, 399
Etienne, Captain, commands _Henreux_ at battle of the Nile, 395 _et seq._
=Etna=, fireship at Louisbourg, 173
_Etswont_, Dutch, La Hogue, 37
=Euryalus=, at Trafalgar, 455 _et seq._
Evans, Captain, commands =Union= at battle of Quiberon, 189
_Eveillé_, at battle of Quiberon, 190
Everitt, Captain, commands =Buckingham= at battle of Minorca, 152
=Excellent=, at battle of Cape St. Vincent, 346
_Excellent_, French, La Hogue, 38
=Exeter= in action at Pulo Aor, 480
in action of 17 Feb. 1782, 288
Exmouth Lord. _See_ Pellew, Sir Edward
=Expedition=, La Hogue, 37
Fairfax, Sir William George, Vice-Admiral, commanded =Venerable= at
Camperdown, 352
=Falkland=, at battle of Quiberon, 189
Fancourt, Captain, his weakness in mutiny at Nore, 377
captain of =Agamemnon= at Copenhagen, 426 _et seq._
Fandino, commands Spanish guarda costa, his treatment of Captain
Jenkins, 100
_Fantasque_, in squadron of D’Estaign, 229
Farquharson, James, captain of =Alfred=, 480
Farrer, W. Ward, captain of =Cumberland=, 480
_Favorite_ taken at Lissa, 489
Fenwick, Sir John, his murder plot, 57
Ferdinand, King of Naples, defeated, submits to French, 416
detains Nelson at Palermo, 404
Ferguson, Colonel, surrenders Tobago, 265
Ferris, Captain, commands =Inflexible= at Nore, 370
Captain of =Hannibal=, 432
Ferrol, action off, 451
French ships at, 438 _et seq._
threatened, 419
_Fidèle_, at Louisbourg, 172
_Fier_, at battle of Minorca, 152
Fighting, instructions or orders, beginning of the, 3
their leading principles and effect, 4, 5
=Firedrake= at Bantry Bay, 19
=Firm=, in blockade of Vannes, 186
_Firme_, taken, 451
Fishguard, French land at, 335
_Flamand_, in squadron of Suffren, 286
Fleury, Cardinal, Prime Minister of France, his peace policy, 98
Flores, Luis de, commands _San Francisco de Asis_ at Trafalgar, 460
Flotilla, invasion, 1803 to 1805, constitution of, 442, 443
invasion, collected by Napoleon, 433
Foley, Sir Thomas, Admiral, captain of =Goliath=, 393 _et seq._
commands =Britannia= at battle of Cape St. Vincent, 346
captain of =Elephant= at Copenhagen, 425
Foligno, treaty of, 417
_Formidable_, at battle of Quiberon, 190
at Trafalgar, 460
in action at Algeciras, 430 _et seq._
in fleet of Bruix, 403
taken, 327
taken off Cape Ortegal, 466
=Formidable=, collision of, with =Ville de Paris=, 342
flagship of Palliser at Ushant, 225
Rodney’s flagship, 279
Forant, French Admiral. _See_ Bantry Bay
Forbin, Comte de, serves with Duquay Tronin, 78
Forde, Captain of _La Nymphe_, 267
Forrest, Commodore, action with Kersaint, 170, 171
_Fort_, French, La Hogue, 38
_Forte_, action with =Sybille= mentioned, 302
Fortescue, E., Captain, commands =Hercules= in battle of Quiberon, 189
=Fortitude=, in North Sea Squadron, 1784, 256
=Fortune=, Jans Byng, 149
=Foudroyant=, at capture of _Genéreux_, 412
in action of Tory Island, 400
_Foudroyant_, captured, 159, 161
flagship of La Galisonière, 152
French, La Hogue, 38
_Fougueux_, at Trafalgar, 460
damaged, 405
in fleet of Bruix, 403
Foul weather Jack, _see_ Byron, John
Foulis, Captain, at Cherbourg, 43
Fowke, General, Governor of Gibraltar, 149 _et seq._
Fox, General, commands troops, 413
=Fox=, sunk in attack on Santa Cruz, 387
Fox, Thomas, Captain, captures French convoy, 125
_François_, French privateer, 76
in Savar’s squadron, 398
_Franklin_, at battle of the Nile, 395 _et seq._
prize sent to Gibraltar, 401
Fraser, captain of =Nymphe=, 403
Fraser, General, commands troops in St. Kitts, 274
_Fraternité_, Hoche and Morard de Galle sail in, 337, 339
Frederick, T. L., Captain, commands =Illustrious=, 331
commands =Blenheim= at battle of Cape St. Vincent, 346
Fremantle, Sir Thomas Francis, Vice-Admiral, captain of =Ganges= at
Copenhagen, 426 _et seq._
commands =Neptune= at Trafalgar, 458
_Freya_ seized, 423
_Frisia_, Dutch, La Hogue, 37
Froger de l’Eguille, commands _Foudroyant_ at battle of Minorca, 152
Frogmore, Captain, his death, 115
Frye, lieutenant of marines, case of, 117, 137
Gabanons, Captain, commands _Couronne_ at battle of Minorca, 152
Gabaret, Louis, French Admiral, at battle in Bantry Bay, 18
at Beachy Head, _q.v._
lands James II. in Ireland, 17
_Gæsterland_, Dutch, La Hogue, 37
Gage, General, commands at Boston, 219
_Gaillard_, French, La Hogue, 38
Galiano, D., commands _Bahama_ in Trafalgar, 460
Galissonière. _See_ La Galissonière
Gallivats, pirate galleys of Malabar Coast, 140
Galves, Bernardo de, conquers Florida, 243
Gambier, James, Vice-Admiral, commands =Burford= at battle of
Quiberon, 189
Lord-Admiral, at action in Basque Roads, 476
succeeds Howe, superseded by Byron, 235
=Ganges=, at Copenhagen, 426 _et seq._
in action at Pulo Aor, 480
Ganteaume, Honoré, Admiral, Captain of the Fleet (French) at the battle
of the Nile, 395, _et seq._
commands Brest fleet, 445
commands _Trente et-un Mai_, 314
his cruise to carry reinforcements to Egypt, 421, 423
relieves Corfu, 478
Garde de la Marine. _See_ Navy, French Royal
Gardiner, Captain, flag-captain with Byng at Minorca, 152
his advice to Byng, 154
Gardiner, Captain, brings about capture of _Foudroyant_;
his death, 159, 161
Gardner, Alan, Baron, Admiral, captain of =Maidstone=, 230
draws sword on mutineers, 368
in Howe’s fleet, 313 _et seq._
Gardner, Alan Hyde, Captain, commands =Hero=, 466
Gardoqui, J., commands _Santa Ana_ at Trafalgar, 460
_Gasparin_, on 1st June, 318
Gassin, Captain, of _Jacobin_, 319
Gaston, Miguel, Captain, commands _San Justo_ at Trafalgar, 460
Spanish Admiral, escorts treasure ships, 270
_Gaulois_, in fleet of Bruix, 403
Geary, Sir Francis, Admiral, commands reserve squadrons, 187
commands in Channel, 251
_Gelderland_, A, Dutch, La Hogue, 37
B, Dutch, La Hogue, 37
_Gelykeid_, at battle of Camperdown, 351
_Généreux_, at battle of the Nile, 395 _et seq._
at Corfu, 404
taken, 412
takes =Leander=, 401
Genêt, M., French diplomatic agent, 305
Gentili, General, occupies Corsica, 332
Geriah, pirate stronghold taken, 140
_Gerner_, at Copenhagen, 426 _et seq._
Gibraltar, besieged, 254
relief of, by Howe, 280, 281
sights French squadron, 179
taken, 65
to be attacked by Allies, 64
state of fortress, _ibid._ 64
=Gibraltar=, driven on Pearl Rock, 343
on 1st June, 319
Gillet, Captain, commands _Franklin_ at battle of the Nile, 395 _et seq._
Gillray, James, caricatures Howe, 301
Glandève, Commodore de, at battle of Minorca, 152
=Glatton=, at Copenhagen, 426 _et seq._
_Glorieux_, at battle of Quiberon, 190
French, La Hogue, 38
=Glory=, in battle of 1st June, 320
=Gloucester=, in Anson’s squadron, 107, 108
Goes, Van der, Dutch Admiral, with Smyrna convoy, 45
=Goliath=, at battle of Cape St. Vincent, 346 _et seq._
at battle of the Nile, 393 _et seq._
taken by Nelson to Naples, 401
Goree, repulse of English at, 171
Gould, Davidge, Captain, commands =Audacious= at battle of the Nile, 394
_et seq._
Gourrège, P. P., commands _Aigle_ at Trafalgar, 460
Grabs, pirate craft of Malabar Coast, 140