[DEBATE ON THE ADDRESS.]
The king came again to the house of lords, and the commons being sent
for, his majesty approved their choice of a president, and made a speech
to both houses, in which he represented to them, That their counsel was
in a particular manner necessary, as they were engaged in a war with
Spain, as the affairs of all Europe were in confusion, by the
confederacy of many formidable powers for the destruction of the house
of Austria; that both houses of the preceding session had come to the
strongest resolutions in favour of the queen of Hungary, but that the
other powers who were equally engaged to support her, had not yet acted
according to their stipulations; that he had endeavoured to assist her
ever since the death of the emperour Charles, and hoped that a just
sense of common danger would induce other nations to unite with him; but
that in this uncertain situation, it was necessary that Britain should
be in a condition of supporting itself and its allies, as any exigency
might require. He therefore ordered the estimates for the ensuing year
to be laid before the commons.--This speech being under the consideration
of the house of lords, lord MILTON spoke in the following manner:
My lords, though the present perplexity of our affairs, the contrariety
of opinions produced by it, and the warmth with which each opinion will
probably be supported, might justly discourage me from proposing any of
my sentiments to this great assembly, yet I cannot repress my
inclination to offer a motion, in my opinion, regular and seasonable,
and which, if it should appear otherwise to your lordships, will, I
hope, though it should not be received, at least be forgiven, because I
have never before wearied your patience, or interrupted or retarded your
consultations.
But I am very far from imagining that by this motion I can give any
occasion to debate or opposition, because I shall propose no innovation
in the principles, or alteration of the practice of this assembly, nor
intend any thing more than to lay before your lordships my opinion of
the manner in which it may be proper to address his majesty.
To return him our humble thanks for his most gracious speech from the
throne, and, at the same time, to present unto his majesty our sincere
and joyful congratulations on his safe and happy return into this
empire.
To observe with the utmost thankfulness the great concern which his
majesty has been pleased to express for carrying on the just and
necessary war against Spain, which we hope, by the divine blessing upon
his majesty's arms, will be attended with success equal to the justice
of his cause, and the ardent wishes of his people. That,
His majesty has so truly represented the impending dangers to which
Europe is exposed, in the present critical conjuncture, as must awaken,
in every one, an attention suitable to the occasion: and we cannot but
be fully sensible of the evil consequences arising from the designs and
enterprises, formed and carrying on for the subversion or reduction of
the house of Austria, which threaten such apparent mischiefs to the
common cause.
To acknowledge his imperial goodness in expressing so earnest a desire
to receive, and so high a regard for, the advice of his parliament: his
majesty, secure of the loyalty and affections of his people, may rely
upon that, with the best-grounded confidence; and to assure his majesty,
that we will not fail to take the important points, which he has been
pleased to mention to us, into our most serious consideration; and, in
the most dutiful manner, to offer to his majesty such advice as shall
appear to us to be most conducive to the honour and true interest of his
crown and kingdoms. To assure his majesty that we have a due sense, how
much the present posture of affairs calls upon us for that unanimity,
vigour, and despatch, which his majesty has so wisely recommended to us;
and to give his majesty the strongest assurances, that we will
vigorously and heartily concur in all just and necessary measures for
the defence and support of his majesty, the maintenance of the balance
and liberties of Europe, and the assistance of our allies.
That as duty and affection to his majesty are, in us, fixed and
unalterable principles, so we feel the impressions of them, at this
time, so strong and lively in our breasts, that we cannot omit to lay
hold on this opportunity of approaching his imperial presence, to renew
the most sincere professions of our constant and inviolable fidelity:
and to promise his majesty, that we will, at the hazard of all that is
dear to us, exert ourselves for the defence and preservation of his
sacred person and government, and the maintenance of the protestant
succession in his imperial house, on which the continuance of the
protestant religion, and the liberties of Britain, do, under God,
depend.
My lords, as this address will not obstruct any future inquiries, by any
approbation of past measures, either positive or implied, I doubt not
but your lordships will readily concur in it, and am persuaded, that it
will confirm his majesty's regard for our councils, and confidence in
our loyalty.
Lord LOVEL spoke next, to this effect:--My lords, the dangers which have
been justly represented by his majesty, ought to remind us of the
importance of unusual circumspection in our conduct, and deter us from
any innovations, of which we may not foresee the consequences, at a time
when there may be no opportunity of repairing any miscarriage, or
correcting any mistake.
There appears, my lords, not to be at this time any particular reason
for changing the form of our addresses, no privileges of our house have
been invaded, nor any designs formed against the publick. His majesty
has evidently not deviated from the practice of the wisest and most
beloved of our British monarchs; he has, upon this emergence of
unexpected difficulties, summoned the senate to counsel and assist him;
and surely it will not be consistent with the wisdom of this house to
increase the present perplexity of our affairs, by new embarrassments,
which may be easily imagined likely to arise from an address different
from those which custom has established.
The prospect which now lies before us, a prospect which presents us only
with dangers, distraction, invasions, and revolutions, ought to engage
our attentions, without leaving us at leisure for disputations upon
ceremonies or forms. It ought to be the care of every lord in this
house, not how to address, but how to advise his majesty; how to assist
the councils of the publick, and contribute to such determinations, as
may avert the calamities that impend over mankind, and stop the wild
excursions of power and ambition.
We ought to reflect, my lords, that the expectations of all Europe are
raised by the convocation of this assembly; and that from our
resolutions, whole nations are waiting for their sentence. And how will
mankind be disappointed when they shall hear, that instead of declaring
war upon usurpers, or imposing peace on the disturbers of mankind,
instead of equipping navies to direct the course of commerce, or raising
armies to regulate the state of the continent, we met here in a full
assembly, and disagreed upon the form of an address.
Let us, therefore, my lords, lay aside, at least for this time, all
petty debates and minute inquiries, and engage all in the great attempt
of reestablishing quiet in the world, and settling the limits of the
kingdoms of Europe.
Then lord CARTERET spoke, in substance as follows:--My lords, there is,
I find, at least one point upon which it is probable that those will now
agree whose sentiments have hitherto been, on almost every occasion,
widely different. The danger of our present situation is generally
allowed; but the consequences deduced from it are so contrary to each
other, as give little hopes of that unanimity which times of danger
particularly require.
It is alleged by the noble lord who spoke last, that since we are now
involved in difficulties, we ought only to inquire how to extricate
ourselves, and, therefore, ought not to leave ourselves the right of
inquiring how we were entangled in them, lest the perplexity of
different considerations should dissipate our attention, and disable us
from forming any useful determinations, or exerting any vigorous efforts
for our deliverance.
But, in my opinion, my lords, the most probable way of removing
difficulties, is to examine how they were produced, and, by consequence,
to whom they are to be imputed; for certainly, my lords, it is not to be
hoped that we shall regain what we have lost, but by measures different
from those which have reduced us to our present state, and by the
assistance of other counsellors than those who have sunk us into the
contempt, and exposed us to the ravages of every nation throughout the
world.
That this inquiry, my lords, may be free and unobstructed, it is
necessary to address the throne, after the manner of our ancestors, in
general terms, without descending to particular facts, which, as we have
not yet examined them, we can neither censure nor approve.
It has been objected by the noble lord, that foreign nations will be
disappointed by hearing, that instead of menaces of vengeance, and
declarations of unalterable adherence to the liberties of Europe, we
have wasted our time at this important juncture in settling the form of
an address.
That little time may be wasted on this occasion, I hope your lordships
will very speedily agree to an address suitable to the dignity of those
who make it, and to the occasion upon which it is made; for I cannot but
allow, that the present state of affairs calls upon us for despatch: but
though business ought, at this time, undoubtedly to be expedited, I hope
it will not be precipitated; and if it be demanded that the most
important questions be first determined, I know not any thing of greater
moment than that before us.
How we shall gratify the expectations of foreign powers, ought not, my
lords, to be our first or chief consideration; we ought, certainly,
first to inquire how the people may be set free from those suspicions,
which a long train of measures, evidently tending to impair their
privileges, has raised; and how they may be confirmed in their fidelity
to the government, of which they have for many years found no other
effects than taxes and exactions, for which they have received neither
protection abroad, nor encouragement at home.
But, my lords, if it be necessary to consult the inclinations, and
cultivate the esteem of foreign powers, I believe nothing will raise
more confidence in our allies, if there be any who are not now ashamed
of that name, or more intimidate those whose designs it is our interest
to defeat, than an open testimony of our resolution no longer to approve
that conduct by which the liberty of half Europe has been endangered;
and not to lavish praises on those men, who have in twenty years never
transacted any thing to the real benefit of their country, and of whom
it is highly probable that they have in the present war stipulated for
the defeat of all our attempts, and agreed, by some execrable compact,
to facilitate the exaltation of the house of Bourbon.
Upon what facts I ground accusations so atrocious may justly be inquired
by your lordships; nor shall I find any difficulty in answering your
demand. For, if we extend our view over the whole world, and inquire
into the state of all our affairs, we shall find nothing but defeats,
miscarriages, and impotence, with their usual consequences, contempt and
distrust. We shall discover neither any tokens of that fear among our
enemies, which the power of the nation, and the reputation of our former
victories, might naturally produce; nor any proofs of that confidence
among those whom we still continue to term our allies, which the vigour
with which we have formerly supported our confederacies, give us a right
to expect. Those whom we once trampled, insult us; and those whom we
once protected, give us no credit.
How reasonably, my lords, all nations have withdrawn from us their
reverence and esteem, will appear by a transient examination of our late
conduct, whether it regarded Europe in general, or influenced only the
particular affairs of the British nation; for it will appear beyond
possibility of doubt, that whoever has trusted the administration,
whether their own country, or any foreign powers, has trusted only to be
betrayed.
There is among our allies none whom we are more obliged to support than
the queen of Hungary, whose rights we are engaged, by all the
solemnities of treaties, to defend, and in whose cause every motive
operates that can warm the bosom of a man of virtue. Justice and
compassion plead equally on her side, and we are called upon to assist
her by our own interest, as well as the general duty of society, by
which every man is required to prevent oppression.
What has been the effect of all these considerations may easily be
discovered from the present state of the continent, which is ravaged
without mercy by the armies of Spain and France. Why all succours have
been denied the queen of Hungary, and why the inveterate and hereditary
enemies of our nation, are suffered to enlarge their dominions without
resistance; why the rivals of our trade are left at full liberty to
equip their squadrons, and the persecutors of our religion suffered to
overrun those countries from whence only we can hope for assistance,
when the hatred which the difference of opinions produces, shall
threaten us with invasions and slavery, the whole world has long asked
to no purpose, and, therefore, it is without prospect of receiving
satisfaction that I engage in the same inquiry.
Yet, since it is our duty to judge of the state of the publick, and a
true judgment can be the result only of accurate examination, I shall
proceed, without being discouraged by the ill success of former
attempts, to discover the motives of our late measures, and the ends
intended to be produced by them.
Why the queen of Hungary was not assisted with land-forces, I shall, at
present, forbear to ask; that she expected them is, indeed, evident from
her solicitations; and, I suppose, it is no less apparent from treaties,
that she had a right to expect them; nor am I able to conceive, why
subsidies have been paid for troops which are never to be employed, or
why foreign princes should be enriched with the plunder of a nation
which they cannot injure, and do not defend.
But I know, my lords, how easily it may be replied, that the expenses of
a land war are certain, and the event hazardous, and that it is always
prudent to act with evident advantage on our side, and that the
superiority of Britain consists wholly in naval armaments.
That the fleets of Britain are equal in force and number of ships to the
united navies of the greatest part of the world; that our admirals are
men of known bravery, and long experience, and, therefore, formidable
not only for their real abilities and natural courage, but for the
confidence which their presence necessarily excites in their followers,
and the terrour which must always accompany success, and enervate those
who are accustomed to defeats; that our sailors are a race of men
distinguished by their ardour for war, and their intrepidity in danger,
from the rest of the human species; that they seem beings superiour to
fear, and delighted with those objects which cannot be named without
filling every other breast with horrour; that they are capable of
rushing upon apparent destruction without reluctance, and of standing
without concern amidst the complicated terrours of a naval war, is
universally known, and confessed, my lords, even by those whose interest
it is to doubt or deny it.
Upon the ocean, therefore, we are allowed to be irresistible; to be able
to shut up the ports of the continent, imprison the nations of Europe
within the limits of their own territories, deprive them of all foreign
assistance, and put a stop to the commerce of the world. It is allowed
that we are placed the sentinels at the barriers of nature, and the
arbiters of the intercourse of mankind.
These are appellations, my lords, which, however splendid and
ostentatious, our ancestors obtained and preserved with less advantages
than we possess, by whom I am afraid they are about to be forfeited. The
dominion of the ocean was asserted in former times in opposition to
powers far more able to contest it, than those which we have so long
submissively courted, and of which we are now evidently afraid.
For that we fear them, my lords, they are sufficiently convinced; and it
must be confessed, with whatsoever shame, that their opinion is well
founded; for to what motive but fear can it be imputed, that we have so
long supported their insolence without resentment, and their ravages
without reprisals; that we have fitted out fleets without any design of
dismissing them from our harbours, or sent them to the sea only to be
gazed at from the shores, by those whose menaces or artifice had given
occasion to their equipment, and in whom they raised no other emotions
than contempt of our cowardice, or pity of our folly?
To what, my lords, can it be attributed, that the queen of Hungary has
yet received no assistance from allies thus powerful; from allies whose
fleets cover the sea, whose commerce extends to the remotest part of the
world, and whose wealth may be justly expected to be proportionate to
their commerce. To what can we ascribe the confidence with which the
house of Bourbon threatens the ruin of a princess, who numbers among her
allies the emperour of Britain?
Nothing is more evident, my lords, than that the queen of Hungary has
been disappointed of the advantages which she expected from her
friendship with this nation, only by a degree of cowardice too
despicable to be mentioned without such terms, as the importance of this
debate, and the dignity of this assembly, do not admit; nor is it less
certain, from the conduct of her enemies, that they knew what would be
our measures, and confided for security in that cowardice which has
never yet deceived them.
It cannot, my lords, be asserted, that our ally, however distressed, has
yet received the least assistance from our arms; neither the justice of
our cause has yet been able to awaken our virtue, nor the inseparable
union of her interest with our own, to excite our vigilance.
But, perhaps, my lords, we have had no opportunity of exerting our
force; perhaps the situation both of our enemies and ally was such, that
neither the one could be protected, nor the other opposed, by a naval
power; and, therefore, our inactivity was the effect not of want of
courage, but want of opportunity.
Though our ministers, my lords, have hitherto given no eminent proofs of
geographical knowledge, or of very accurate acquaintance with the state
of foreign countries, yet there is reason to believe that they must at
some time have heard or read, that the house of Austria had territories
in Italy; they must have been informed, unless their disbursements for
secret service are bestowed with very little judgment, that against
these dominions an army has been raised by the Spaniards; and they must
have discovered, partly by the information of their correspondents,
partly by the inspection of a map, and partly by the sagacity which
distinguishes them from all past and present ministers, that this army
was to be transported by sea from the coast of Spain to that of Italy.
This knowledge, my lords, however attained, might have furnished minds,
which have always been found so fruitful of expedients, with a method of
hindering the descent of the Spanish troops, for which nothing more was
necessary than that they should have ordered admiral Haddock, instead of
retiring before the Spanish fleet of war, and watching them only that
they might escape, to lie still before Barcelona, where the transports
were stationed, with a convoy of only three men of war, and hinder their
departure.
I hope it will be observed by your lordships, that though the road of
Barcelona is open and indefensible, though the fleet was unprotected by
ships of force, and though they lay, as I am informed, beyond the reach
of the guns on the fortifications upon the shore, I do not require that
Haddock should have destroyed the army and the ships.
I am too well acquainted, my lords, with the lenity of our ministers to
the enemies of their country, and am too well convinced of the prudence
and tenderness of the restrictions by which the power of our admirals is
limited, to expect that our guns should be ever used but in salutations
of respect, or exultations on the conclusion of a peace. I am convinced,
that our ministers would shudder at the name of bloodshed and
destruction, and that they had rather hear that a thousand merchants
were made bankrupts by privateers, or all our allies deprived of their
dominions, than that one Spanish ship was sunk or burnt by the navies of
Britain.
But, my lords, though they are willing to spare the blood of their
enemies, yet surely they might have obstructed their enterprises; they
might have withheld those whom they were unwilling to strike, and have
endeavoured to fright those whom they determined never to hurt.
To speak in terms more adapted to the subject before us: that the fleet
of Spain, a fleet of transports with such a convoy, should lie three
weeks in an open road, professedly fitted out against an ally united to
us by every tie of nature, and of policy, by the solemnity of treaties,
and conformity of interest; that it should lie undisturbed almost within
sight of a British navy; that it should lie there not only without
danger, but without apprehension of danger, has raised the astonishment
of every nation in Europe, has blasted the reputation of our arms,
impaired the influence of our counsels, and weakened the credit of our
publick faith.
There may be some, my lords, that will impute this absurdity of our
conduct, this disregard of our interest, this desertion of our
alliances, and this neglect of the most apparent opportunities of
success, not to cowardice, but treachery; a cause more detestable, as
more atrociously criminal.
This opinion, my lords, I think it not necessary to oppose, both because
it cannot be charged with improbability, and because I think it may be
easily reconciled with my own assertions; for cowardice abroad produces
treachery at home, and they become traitors to their country who are
hindered by cowardice from the prosecution of her interest, and the
opposition of her enemies.
It may however be proper to declare, my lords, that I do not impute this
fatal cowardice to those who are intrusted with the command of our
navies, but to those from whom they are obliged to receive their
instructions, and upon whom they unhappily depend for the advancement of
their fortunes.
It is at least reasonable to impute miscarriages rather to those, who
are known to have given, formerly, such orders as a brave admiral
perished under the ignominious necessity of observing, than to those of
whom it cannot be said that any former part of their lives has been
stained with the reproach of cowardice; at least it is necessary to
suspend our judgment, till the truth shall be made apparent by a rigid
inquiry; and it is, therefore, proper to offer an address in general
terms, by which neither the actions or counsels of any man shall be
condemned nor approved.
It would be more unreasonable to charge our soldiers or our sailors with
cowardice, because they have shown, even in those actions which have
failed of success, that they miscarried rather through temerity than
fear; and that whenever they are suffered to attack their enemies, they
are ready to march forward even where there is no possibility of
returning, and that they are only to be withheld from conquest by
obstacles which human prowess cannot surmount.
Such, my lords, was the state of those heroes who died under the walls
of Carthagena; that died in an enterprise so ill concerted, that I
ventured, with no great skill in war, and without the least pretence to
prescience, to foretell in this house that it would miscarry.
That it would, that it must miscarry; that it was even intended only to
amuse the nation with the appearance of an expedition, without any
design of weakening our enemies, was easily discovered; for why else, my
lords, was the army composed of men newly drawn from the shop, and from
the plough, unacquainted with the use of arms, and ignorant of the very
terms of military discipline, when we had among us large bodies of
troops long kept up under the appearance of a regular establishment;
troops of whom we have long felt the expense, but of which the time is
not, it seems, yet come, that we are to know the use.
These men, my lords, who have so long practised the motions of battle,
and who have given in the park so many proofs of their dexterity and
activity, who have at least learned to distinguish the different sounds
of the drum, and know the faces and voices of the subaltern officers, at
least, might have been imagined better qualified for an attempt upon a
foreign kingdom, than those who were necessarily strangers to every part
of the military operations, and might have been sent upon our first
declaration of war, while the new-raised forces acquired at home the
same arts under the same inspection.
But, my lords, whether it was imagined that new forces would be long
before they learned the implicit obedience necessary to a soldier;
whether it was imagined that it would not be easy on a sudden to collect
troops of men so tall and well proportioned, or so well skilled in the
martial arts of curling and powdering their hair; or whether it would
have been dangerous to have deprived the other house of the counsels and
votes of many worthy members, who had at the same time a seat in the
senate, and a commission in the army, it was thought necessary to send
out raw forces to attack our enemies, and to keep our disciplined troops
at home to awe the nation.
Nor did the minister, my lords, think it sufficient to obstruct the
expedition to America by employing new-raised troops, unless they were
likewise placed under the command of a man, who, though of undoubted
courage, was, with respect to the conduct of an army, as ignorant as
themselves. It was therefore determined, my lords, that all those
officers who had gained experience in former wars, and purchased
military knowledge by personal danger, should be disappointed and
rejected for the sake of advancing a man, who, as he had less skill, was
less likely to be successful, and was, therefore, more proper to direct
an expedition proposed only to intimidate the British nation.
That the event was such as might be expected from the means, your
lordships need not to be informed, nor can it be questioned with what
intentions these means were contrived.
I am very far, my lords, from charging our ministers with ignorance, or
upbraiding them with mistakes on this occasion, for their whole conduct
has been uniform, and all their schemes consistent with each other: nor
do I doubt their knowledge of the consequence of their measures, so far
as it was to be foreseen by human prudence.
Whether they have carried on negotiations, or made war; whether they
have conducted our own affairs, or those of our ally the queen of
Hungary, they have still discovered the same intention, and promoted it
by the same means. They have suffered the Spanish fleets to sail first
for supplies from one port to another, and then from the coasts of Spain
to those of America. They have permitted the Spaniards, without
opposition, to land in Italy, when it was not necessary even to withhold
them from it by any actual violence; for had the fleet, my lords, been
under my command, I would have only sent the Spanish admiral a
prohibition to sail, and am sure it would have been observed.
They have neglected to purchase the friendship of the king of Prussia,
which might, perhaps, have been obtained upon easy terms, but which they
ought to have gained at whatever rate; and, to conclude, we have been
lately informed that the neutrality is signed.
Such, my lords, is the conduct of the ministry, by which it cannot be
denied that we are involved in many difficulties, and exposed to great
contempt; but from this contempt we may recover, and disentangle
ourselves from these difficulties, by a vigorous prosecution of measures
opposite to those by which we have been reduced to our present state.
If we consider, without that confusion which fear naturally produces,
the circumstances of our affairs, it will appear that we have
opportunities in our hands of recovering our losses, and reestablishing
our reputation; those losses which have been suffered while we had two
hundred ships of war at sea, which have permitted three hundred
merchant-ships to be taken; and that reputation which has been destroyed
when there was no temptation either to a compliance with our enemies, or
to a desertion of our friends.
It is well known, my lords, that we make war at present rather with the
queen than the people of Spain; and it is reasonable to conclude, that a
war carried on contrary to the general good, and against the general
opinion, cannot be lasting.
It is certain that the Spaniards, whenever they have been attacked by
men acquainted with the science of war, and furnished with necessary
stores for hostile attempts, have discovered either ignorance or
cowardice, and have either fled meanly, or resisted unskilfully.
It is, therefore, probable, my lords, that either our enemies will
desist from the prosecution of a war, which few of them approve; or that
we shall, by vigorous descents upon their coasts, and their colonies,
the interruption of their trade, and the diminution of their forces,
soon compel them to receive peace upon our own terms.
But these advantages, my lords, are only to be expected from a change of
conduct, which change can never be produced by a seeming approbation of
the past measures. I am therefore of opinion, that we ought to address
the throne in general terms, according to the ancient practice of this
house.
In considering the address proposed, I cannot but conclude that it is
too much diffused, and that it would be more forcible if it was more
concise: to shorten it will be no difficult task, by the omission of all
the clauses that correspond with particular parts of his majesty's
speech, which I cannot discover the necessity of repeating.
In the congratulation to his majesty upon his return to his once
glorious dominions, no lord shall concur more readily or more zealously
than myself; nor shall I even deny to extend my compliments to the
ministry, when it shall appear that they deserve them; but I am never
willing to be lavish of praise, because it becomes less valuable by
being prodigally bestowed; and on occasions so important as this, I can
never consent to praise before I have examined, because inquiry comes
too late after approbation.
Lord CHOLMONDELEY rose next, and spoke to this effect:--My lords, if the
dangers that threaten our happiness and our safety be such as they have
been represented; if ambition has extended her power almost beyond a
possibility of resistance, and oppression, elated with success, begins
to design no less than the universal slavery of mankind; if the powers
of Europe stand aghast at the calamities which hang over them, and
listen with helpless confusion to that storm which they can neither
avoid nor resist, how ought our conduct to be influenced by this
uncommon state of affairs? Ought we not to catch the alarm while it is
possible to make preparation against the danger? Ought we not to
improve, with the utmost diligence, the important interval? to unite our
counsels for the protection of liberty, and exert all our influence
against the common enemies of society, the unwearied disturbers of the
tranquillity of mankind?
To what purpose, my lords, are the miseries that the present
distractions of Europe may bring upon us, so pathetically described, and
so accurately enumerated, if they are to produce no effect upon our
counsels? And what effect can be wished from them, but unanimity, with
that vigour and despatch which are its natural consequences, and that
success with which steadiness and expedition are generally rewarded?
It might be hoped, my lords, that those who have so clear a view of our
present embarrassments, and whose sagacity and acuteness expose them to
a sensibility of future miseries, perhaps more painful than would be
excited by any present and real calamities, should not be thus tortured
to no purpose. Every passion, my lords, has its proper object by which
it may be laudably gratified, and every disposition of mind may be
directed to useful ends. The true use of that foresight of future
events, with which some great capacities are so eminently endowed, is
that of producing caution and suggesting expedients. What advantage, my
lords, would it be to navigators, that their pilot could, by any
preternatural power, discover sands or rocks, if he was too negligent or
too stubborn to turn the vessel out of the danger?
Or how, my lords, to pursue the comparison, would that pilot be treated
by the crew, who, after having informed them of their approach to a
shoal or whirlpool, and set before them, with all his rhetorick, the
horrours of a shipwreck, should, instead of directing them to avoid
destruction, and assisting their endeavours for their common safety,
amuse them with the miscarriages of past voyages, and the blunders and
stupidity of their former pilot?
Whether any parallel can be formed between such ill-timed satire, and
wild misconduct, and the manner in which your lordships have been
treated on this occasion, it is not my province to determine. Nor have I
any other design than to show that the only proper conduct in time of
real danger, is preparation against it; and that wit and eloquence
themselves, if employed to any other purpose, lose their excellence,
because they lose their propriety.
It does not appear, my lords, that the address now proposed includes any
approbation of past measures, and therefore it is needless to inquire,
on this occasion, whether the conduct of our ministers or admirals
deserves praise or censure.
It does not appear, my lords, that by censuring any part of our late
conduct, however detrimental to the publick it may at present be
imagined, any of our losses will be repaired, or any part of our
reputation retrieved; and, therefore, such proceedings would only retard
our counsels, and divert our thoughts from more important
considerations; considerations which his majesty has recommended to us,
and which cannot be more strongly pressed upon us than by the noble lord
who opposed the motion; for he most powerfully incites to unanimity and
attention, who most strongly represents the danger of our situation.
Of the good effects of publick consultations, I need not observe, my
lords, that they arise from the joint endeavour of many understandings
cooperating to the same end; from the reasonings and observations of
many individuals of different studies, inclinations, and experience, all
directed to the illustration of the same question, which is, therefore,
so accurately discussed, so variously illustrated, and so amply
displayed, that a more comprehensive view is obtained of its relations
and consequences, than can be hoped from the wisdom or knowledge of any
single man.
But this advantage, my lords, can only be expected from union and
concurrence; for when the different members of a national council enter
with different designs, and exert their abilities not so much to promote
any general purposes, as to obviate the measures, and confute the
arguments of each other, the publick is deprived of all the benefit that
might be expected from the collective wisdom of assemblies, whatever may
be the capacity of those who compose them. The senate thus divided and
disturbed, will, perhaps, conclude with less prudence than any single
member, as any man may more easily discover truth without assistance,
than when others of equal abilities are employed in perplexing his
inquiries, and interrupting the operations of his mind.
Thus, my lords, it might be safer for a nation, even in time of terrour
and disorder, to be deprived of the counsels of this house, than to
confide in the determinations of an assembly not uniform in its views,
nor connected in its interests; an assembly from which little can be
hoped by those who observe that it cannot, without a tedious debate,
prolonged with all the heat of opposition, despatch the first and most
cursory part of publick business,--an address to his majesty.
It has been for a long time a practice too frequent, to confound past
with present questions, to perplex every debate by an endless
multiplication of objects, and to obstruct our determinations by
substituting one inquiry in the place of another.
The only question, my lords, now before us is, whether the address which
the noble lord proposed, implies any commendation of past measures, not
whether those measures deserve to be commended; which is an inquiry not
at present to be pursued, because we have not now before us the means of
attaining satisfaction in it, and which ought, therefore, to be delayed
till it shall be your lordships' pleasure to appoint a day for examining
the state of the nation, and to demand those letters, instructions, and
memorials, which are necessary to an accurate and senatorial
disquisition.
In the mean time, since it is at least as expedient for me to vindicate,
as for others to accuse those of whose conduct neither they nor I have
yet any regular cognizance, and I may justly expect from the candour of
your lordships, that you will be no less willing to hear an apologist
than a censurer, I will venture to suspend the true question a few
moments, to justify that conduct which has been so wantonly and so
contemptuously derided.
That the preservation of the house of Austria, my lords, ought to engage
the closest attention of the British nation, is freely confessed. It is
evident that by no other means our commerce, our liberty, or our
religion can be secured, or the house of Bourbon restrained from
overwhelming the universe. It is allowed that the queen of Hungary has a
claim to our assistance by other ties than those of interest; that it
was promised upon the faith of treaties, and it is demanded by the
loudest calls of honour, justice and compassion. And did it not appear
too juvenile and romantick, I might add, that her personal excellencies
are such as might call armies to her assistance from the remotest
corners of the earth; that her constancy in the assertion of her rights
might animate every generous mind with equal firmness; and her
intrepidity in the midst of danger and distress, when every day brings
accounts of new encroachments, and every new encroachment discourages
those from whom she may claim assistance from declaring in her favour,
might inspire with ardour for her preservation all those in whom virtue
can excite reverence, or whom calamities unjustly inflicted can touch
with indignation.
Nor am I afraid to affirm, my lords, that the condition of this
illustrious princess raised all these emotions in the court of Britain,
and that the vigour of our proceedings will appear proportioned to our
ardour for her success. No sooner was the true state of affairs
incontestably known, than twelve thousand auxiliary troops were hired,
and commanded to march to her assistance, but her affairs making it more
eligible for her to employ her own subjects in her defence, and the want
of money being the only obstacle that hindered her from raising armies
proportioned to those of her enemies, she required, that instead of
troops, a supply of money might be sent her, with which his majesty
willingly complied.
The British ministers in the mean time endeavoured, by the strongest
arguments and most importunate solicitations, to animate her allies to
equal vigour, or to procure her assistance from other powers whose
interest was more remotely affected by her distress: if the effects of
their endeavours are not yet manifest, it cannot be imputed to the want
either of sincerity or diligence; and if any other powers should be
persuaded to arm in the common cause, it ought to be ascribed to the
influence of the British counsels.
In the prosecution of the war with Spain, it does not appear, my lords,
that any measures have been neglected, which prudence, or bravery, or
experience, could be expected to dictate. If we have suffered greater
losses than we expected, if our enemies have been sometimes favoured by
the winds, or sometimes have been so happy as to conceal their designs,
and elude the diligence of our commanders, who is to be censured? or
what is to be concluded, but that which never was denied, that the
chance of war is uncertain, that men are inclined to make fallacious
calculations of the probabilities of future events, and that our enemies
may sometimes be as artful, as diligent, and as sagacious as ourselves?
It was the general opinion of the British people, my lords, if the
general opinion may be collected from the clamours and expectations
which every man has had opportunities of observing, that in declaring
war upon Spain, we only engaged to chastise the insolence of a nation of
helpless savages, who might, indeed, rob and murder a defenceless
trader, but who could only hold up their hands and cry out for mercy, or
sculk in secret creeks and unfrequented coasts, when ships of war should
be fitted out against them. They imagined that the fortifications of the
Spanish citadels would be abandoned at the first sound of cannon, and
that their armies would turn their backs at the sight of the standard of
Britain.
It was not remembered, my lords, that the greatest part of our trade was
carried on in sight of the Spanish coasts, and that our merchants must
be consequently exposed to incessant molestation from light vessels,
which our ships of war could not pursue over rocks and shallows. It was
not sufficiently considered, that a trading nation must always make war
with a nation that has fewer merchants, under the disadvantage of being
more exposed to the rapacity of private adventurers. How much we had to
fear on this account was shown us by the late war with France, in which
the privateers of a few petty ports, injured the commerce of this
nation, more than their mighty navies and celebrated admirals.
My lords, it would very little become this august assembly, this
assembly so renowned for wisdom, and for justice, to confound want of
prudence with want of success; since on many occasions the wisest
measures may be defeated by accidents which could not be foreseen; since
they may sometimes be discovered by deserters, or spies, and sometimes
eluded by an enemy equally skilful with ourselves in the science of war.
That any of these apologies are necessary to the administration, I am
far from intending to insinuate, for I know not that we have failed of
success in any of our designs, except the attack of Carthagena, of which
the miscarriage cannot, at least, be imputed to the ministry; nor is it
evident that any other causes of it are to be assigned than the
difficulty of the enterprise; and when, my lords, did any nation make
war, without experiencing some disappointments?
These considerations, my lords, I have thought myself obliged, by my
regard to truth and justice, to lay before you, to dissipate those
suspicions and that anxiety which might have arisen from a different
representation of our late measures; for I cannot but once more observe,
that a vindication of the conduct of the ministry is by no means a
necessary preparative to the address proposed.
The address which was so modestly offered to your lordships, cannot be
said to contain any more than a general answer to his majesty's speech,
and such declarations of our duty and affection, as are always due to
our sovereign, and always expected by him on such occasions.
If our allies have been neglected or betrayed, my lords, we shall be
still at liberty to discover and to punish negligence so detrimental,
and treachery so reproachful to the British nation. If in the war
against Spain we have failed of success, we shall still reserve in our
own hands the right of inquiring whether we were unsuccessful by the
superiority of our enemies, or by our own fault; whether our commanders
wanted orders, or neglected to obey them; for what clause can be
produced in the address by which any of these inquiries can be supposed
to be predetermined?
Let us, therefore, remember, my lords, the danger of our present state,
and the necessity of steadiness, vigour, and wisdom, for our own
preservation and that of Europe; let us consider that publick wisdom is
the result of united counsels, and steadiness and vigour, of united
influence; let us remember that our example may be of equal use with our
assistance, and that both the allies and the subjects of Great Britain
will be conjoined by our union, and distracted by our divisions; and let
us, therefore, endeavour to promote the general interest of the world,
by an unanimous address to his majesty, in the terms proposed by the
noble lord.
Lord TALBOT spoke in the following manner:--My lords, after the display
of the present state of Europe, and the account of the measures of the
British ministers, which the noble lord who spoke against the motion has
laid before you, there is little necessity for another attempt to
convince you that our liberty and the liberty of Europe are in danger,
or of disturbing your reflections by another enumeration of follies and
misfortunes.
To mention the folly of our measures is superfluous likewise, for
another reason. They who do not already acknowledge it, may be justly
suspected of suppressing their conviction; for how can it be possible,
that they who cannot produce a single instance of wisdom or fortitude,
who cannot point out one enterprise wisely concerted and successfully
executed, can yet sincerely declare, that nothing has been omitted which
our interest required?
The measures, my lords, which are now pursued, are the same which for
twenty months have kept the whole nation in continual disturbance, and
have raised the indignation of every man, whose private interest was not
promoted by them. These measures cannot be said to be rashly censured,
or condemned before they are seen in their full extent, or expanded into
all their consequences; for they have been prosecuted, my lords, with
all the confidence of authority and all the perseverance of obstinacy,
without any other opposition than fruitless clamours, or petitions
unregarded. And what consequences have they produced? What but poverty
and distractions at home, and the contempt and insults of foreign
powers? What but the necessity of retrieving by war the losses sustained
by timorous and dilatory negotiations; and the miscarriages of a war, in
which only folly and cowardice have involved us?
Nothing, my lords, is more astonishing, than that it should be asserted
in this assembly that we have no ill success to complain of. Might we
not hope for success, if we have calculated the events of war, and made
a suitable preparation? And how is this to be done, but by comparing our
forces with that of our enemy, who must, undoubtedly, be more or less
formidable according to the proportion which his treasures and his
troops bear to our own?
Upon the assurance of the certainty of this practice, upon the evidence,
my lords, of arithmetical demonstration, we were inclined to believe,
that the power of Britain was not to be resisted by Spain, and therefore
demanded that our merchants should be no longer plundered, insulted,
imprisoned, and tortured by so despicable an enemy.
That we did not foresee all the consequences of this demand, we are now
ready to confess; we did not conjecture that new troops would be raised
for the invasion of the Spanish dominions, only that we might be reduced
to the level with our enemies. We did not imagine that the superiority
of our naval force would produce no other consequence than an inequality
of expense, and that the royal navies of Britain would be equipped only
for show, only to harass the sailors with the hateful molestation of an
impress, and to weaken the crews of our mercantile vessels, that they
might be more easily taken by the privateers of Spain.
We did not expect, my lords, that our navies would sail out under the
command of admirals renowned for bravery, knowledge, and vigilance, and
float upon the ocean without design, or enter ports and leave them,
equally inoffensive as a packet-boat, or petty trader.
But not to speak any longer, my lords, in terms so little suited to the
importance of the question which I am endeavouring to clear, or to the
enormity of the conduct which I attempt to expose; the success of war is
only to be estimated by the advantages which are gained, in proportion
to the loss which is suffered; of which loss the expenses occasioned by
the war are always the chief part, and of which it is, therefore, usual,
at the conclusion of a peace, for the conquered power to promise the
payment.
Let us examine, my lords, in consequence of this position, the success
of our present war against Spain; let us consider what each nation has
suffered, and it will easily appear how justly we boast of our wisdom
and vigour.
It is not on this occasion necessary to form minute calculations, or to
compute the expense of every company of soldiers and squadron of ships;
it is only necessary to assert, what will, I hope, not be very readily
denied, even by those whom daily practice of absurd apologies has
rendered impregnable by the force of truth, that such expenses as have
neither contributed to our own defence, nor to the disadvantage of the
Spaniards, have been thrown away.
If this be granted, my lords, it will appear, that no nation ever beheld
its treasures so profusely squandered, ever paid taxes so willingly, and
so patiently saw them perverted; for it cannot, my lords, be proved,
that any part of our preparations has produced a proportionate effect;
but it may be readily shown how many fleets have been equipped only that
the merchants might want sailors, and that the public stores might be
consumed.
As to our ill success in America, which has been imputed only to the
chance of war, it will be reasonable, my lords, to ascribe to other
causes, so much of it as might have been prevented by a more speedy
reinforcement of Vernon, or may be supposed to have arisen from the
inexperience of our troops, and the escape of the Spaniards from Ferrol.
If our fleets had been sent more early into that part of the world, the
Spaniards would have had no time to strengthen their garrisons; had our
troops been acquainted with discipline, the attack would have been made
with greater judgment; and had not the Spaniards escaped from Ferrol, we
should have had no enemy in America to encounter. Had all our ministers
and all our admirals done their duty, it is evident that not only
Carthagena had been taken, but that half the dominions of Spain might
now have owned the sovereignty of the crown of Britain.
This, my lords, may be observed of the only enterprise, which it is
reasonable to believe was in reality intended against the Spaniards, if
even of this our ministers had not before contrived the defeat. But of
all the rest of our armaments it does not appear that any effect has
been felt but by ourselves, it cannot be discovered that they even
raised any alarms or anxiety either in our enemies or their allies, by
whom perhaps it was known that they were only designed as punishments
for the merchants of Britain.
That our merchants have already been severely chastised for their
insolence in complaining of their losses, and their temerity in raising
in the nation a regard for its commerce, its honour, and its rights, is
evident from a dreadful list of three hundred ships taken by the
Spaniards, some of which were abandoned by their convoys, and others
seized within sight of the coasts of Britain.
It may be urged, my lords, that the Spaniards have likewise lost a great
number of vessels; but what else could they expect when they engaged in
a war against the greatest naval power of the universe? And it is to be
remembered, that the Spaniards have this consolation in their
misfortunes, that of their ships none have been deserted by their
convoys, or wilfully exposed to capture by being robbed of their crews,
to supply ships of war with idle hands.
The Spaniards will likewise consider, that they have not harassed their
subjects for the protection of their trade; that they have not fitted
out fleets only to amuse the populace. They comfort themselves with the
hope, that the Britons will soon be reduced to a state of weakness below
themselves, and wait patiently for the time in which the masters of the
sea shall receive from them the regulation of their commerce and the
limits of their navigation.
Nor can it be doubted, my lords, but that by adhering to these measures,
our ministers will in a short time gratify their hopes; for whatsoever
be the difference between the power of two contending nations, if the
richer spends its treasures without effect, and exposes its troops to
unhealthy climates and impracticable expeditions, while the weaker is
parsimonious and prudent, they must soon be brought to an equality; and
by continuing the same conduct, the weaker power must at length prevail.
That this has been hitherto the state of the war between Britain and
Spain, it is not necessary to prove to your lordships; it is apparent,
that the expenses of the Spaniards have been far less than those of
Britain; and, therefore, if we should suppose the actual losses of war
equal, we are only wearing out our force in useless efforts, and our
enemies grow every day comparatively stronger.
But, my lords, let us not flatter ourselves that our actual losses have
been equal; let us, before we determine this question, accurately
compare the number and the value of our ships and cargoes with those of
the Spaniards, and see on which side the loss will fall.
And let us not forget, what in all the calculations which I have yet
seen on either part has been totally overlooked, the number of men
killed, or captives in the British and Spanish dominions. Men, my lords,
are at once strength and riches; and, therefore, it is to be considered,
that the most irreparable loss which any nation can sustain is the
diminution of its people: money may be repaid, and commerce may be
recovered; even liberty may be regained, but the loss of people can
never be retrieved. Even the twentieth generation may have reason to
exclaim, How much more numerous and more powerful would this nation have
been, had our ancestors not been betrayed in the expedition to
Carthagena!
What loss, my lords, have the Spaniards sustained which can be put in
balance with that of our army in America, an army given up to the
vultures of an unhealthy climate, and of which those who perished by the
sword, were in reality rescued from more lingering torments?
What equivalent can be mentioned for the liberty of multitudes of
Britons, now languishing in the prisons of Spain, or obliged by
hardships and desperation to assist the enemies of their country? What
have the Spaniards suffered that can be opposed to the detriment which
the commerce of this nation feels from the detention of our sailors?
These, my lords, are losses not to be paralleled by the destruction of
Porto Bello, even though that expedition should be ascribed to the
ministry. These are losses which may extend their consequences to many
ages, which may long impede our commerce, and diminish our shipping.
It is not to be imagined, my lords, that in this time of peculiar
danger, parents will destine their children to maritime employments, or
that any man will engage in naval business who can exercise any other
profession; and therefore the death or captivity of a sailor leaves a
vacuity in our commerce, since no other will be ready to supply his
place. Thus, by degrees, the continuance of the war will contract our
trade, and those parts of it which we cannot occupy, will be snatched by
the French or Dutch, from whom it is not probable that they will ever be
recovered.
This, my lords, is another circumstance of disadvantage to which the
Spaniards are not exposed; for their traffick being only from one part
of their dominions to another, cannot be destroyed, but will, after the
short interruption of a war, be again equally certain and equally
profitable.
It appears, therefore, my lords, that we have hitherto suffered more
than the Spaniards, more than the nation which we have so much reason to
despise; it appears that our fleets have been useless, and that our
troops have been only sent out to be destroyed; and it will, therefore,
surely be allowed me to assert, that the war has not been hitherto
successful.
I am, therefore, of opinion, my lords, that as the address now proposed,
cannot but be understood both by his majesty and the nation, to imply,
in some degree, a commendation of that conduct which cannot be
commended, which ought never to be mentioned but with detestation and
contempt, it will be unworthy of this house, offensive to the whole
nation, and unjust to his majesty.
His majesty, my lords, has summoned us to advise him in this important
juncture, and the nation expects from our determinations its relief or
its destruction: nor will either have much to hope from our counsels,
if, in our first publick act, we endeavour to deceive them.
It seems, therefore, proper to change the common form of our addresses
to the throne, to do once, at least, what his majesty demands and the
people expect, and to remember that no characters are more inconsistent,
than those of a counsellor of the king, and a flatterer of the ministry.
Then lord ABINGDON spoke to this effect:--My lords, I have always
observed that debates are prolonged, and inquiries perplexed, by the
neglect of method; and therefore think it necessary to move, That the
question may be read, that the noble lords who shall be inclined to
explain their sentiments upon it, may have always the chief point in
view, and not deviate into foreign considerations.
[It was read accordingly.]
Lord CARTERET spoke next, to the purpose following:--My lords, I am
convinced of the propriety of the last motion by the advantage which it
has afforded me of viewing more deliberately and distinctly the question
before us; the consideration of which has confirmed me in my own
opinion, that the address now proposed is only a flattering repetition
of the speech, and that the speech was drawn up only to betray us into
an encomium on the ministry; who, as they certainly have not deserved
any commendations, will, I hope, not receive them from your lordships.
For what has been the result of all their measures, but a general
confusion, the depression of our own nation and our allies, and the
exaltation of the house of Bourbon?
It is universally allowed, my lords, and therefore it would be
superfluous to prove, that the liberties of Europe are now in the utmost
danger; that the house of Bourbon has arrived almost at that exalted
pinnacle of authority, from whence it will look down with contempt upon
all other powers, to which it will henceforward prescribe laws at
pleasure, whose dominions will be limited by its direction, and whose
armies will march at its command.
That Britain will be long exempted from the general servitude, that we
shall be able to stand alone against the whole power of Europe, which
the French may then bring down upon us, and preserve ourselves
independent, while every other nation acknowledges the authority of an
arbitrary conqueror, is by no means likely, and might be, perhaps,
demonstrated to be not possible.
How long we might be able to retain our liberty, it is beyond the reach
of policy to determine, but as it is evident, that when the empire is
subdued, the Dutch will quickly fall under the same dominion, and that
all their ports and all their commerce will then be in the hands of the
French, it cannot be denied that our commerce will quickly be at an end.
We shall then lose the dominion of the sea, and all our distant colonies
and settlements, and be shut up in our own island, where the continuance
of our liberties can be determined only by the resolution with which we
shall defend them.
That this, my lords, must probably, in a few years, be our state, if the
schemes of the house of Bourbon should succeed, is certain beyond all
controversy; and therefore it is evident, that no man to whom such a
condition does not appear eligible, can look unconcerned at the
confusion of the continent, or consider the destruction of the house of
Austria, without endeavouring to prevent it.
But, my lords, though such endeavours are the duty of all who are
engaged in the transaction of publick affairs, though the importance of
the cause of the queen of Hungary be acknowledged in the speech to which
we are to return an address, it does not appear that the ministers of
Britain have once attempted to assist her, or have even forborne any
thing which might aggravate her distress.
The only effectual methods by which any efficacious relief could have
been procured, were that of reconciling her with the king of Prussia, or
that of prevailing upon the Muscovites to succour her.
A reconciliation with the king of Prussia would have been my first care,
if the honour of advising on this occasion had fallen to my lot. To have
mediated successfully between them could surely have been no difficult
task, because each party could not but know how much it was their common
interest to exclude the French from the empire, and how certainly this
untimely discord must expose them both to their ancient enemy.
As in private life, my lords, when two friends carry any dispute between
them to improper degrees of anger or resentment, it is the province of a
third to moderate the passion of each, and to restore that benevolence
which a difference of interest or opinion had impaired; so in alliances,
or the friendships of nations, whenever it unhappily falls out that two
of them forget the general good, and lay themselves open to those evils
from which a strict union only can preserve them, it is necessary that
some other power should interpose, and prevent the dangers of a
perpetual discord.
Whether this was attempted, my lords, I know not; but if any such design
was in appearance prosecuted, it may be reasonably imagined from the
event, that the negotiators were defective either in skill or in
diligence; for how can it be conceived that any man should act contrary
to his own interest, to whom the state of his affairs is truly
represented?
But not to suppress what I cannot doubt, I am convinced, my lords, that
there is in reality no design of assisting the queen of Hungary; either
our ministers have not yet recovered from their apprehensions of the
exorbitant power of the house of Austria, by which they were frighted
some years ago into the bosom of France for shelter, and which left them
no expedient but the treaty of Hanover; or they are now equally afraid
of France, and expect the _pretender_ to be forced upon them by the
power whom they so lately solicited to secure them from him.
Whatever is the motive of their conduct, it is evident, my lords, that
they are at present to the unfortunate queen of Hungary, either
professed enemies, or treacherous allies; for they have permitted the
invasion of her Italian dominions, when they might have prevented it
without a blow, only by commanding the Spaniards not to transport their
troops.
To argue that our fleet in the Mediterranean was not of strength
sufficient to oppose their passage, is a subterfuge to which they can
only be driven by the necessity of making some apology, and an absolute
inability to produce any which will not immediately be discovered to be
groundless.
It is known, my lords, to all Europe, that Haddock had then under his
command thirteen ships of the line, and nine frigates, and that the
Spanish convoy consisted only of three ships; and yet they sailed before
his eyes with a degree of security which nothing could have produced but
a passport from the court of Britain, and an assured exemption from the
danger of an attack.
It may be urged, that they were protected by the French squadron, and
that Haddock durst not attack them, because he was unable to contend
with the united fleets; but my lords, even this is known to be false: it
is known that they bore no proportion to the strength of the British
squadron, that they could not have made even the appearance of a battle,
and that our commanders could have been only employed in pursuit and
captures.
This, my lords, was well known to our ministers, who were afraid only of
destroying the French squadron, and were very far from apprehending any
danger from it; but being determined to purchase, on any terms, the
continuance of the friendship of their old protectors, consented to the
invasion of Italy, and procured a squadron to sail out, under pretence
of defending the Spanish transports, that their compliance might not be
discovered.
All this, my lords, may reasonably be suspected at the first view of
their proceedings; for how could an inferiour force venture into the way
of an enemy, unless upon security that they should not be attacked? But
the late treaty of neutrality has changed suspicion into certainty, has
discovered the source of all their measures, and shown that the invasion
of Italy is permitted to preserve Hanover from the like calamity.
There is great danger, my lords, lest this last treaty of Hanover should
give the decisive blow to the liberties of Europe. How much it
embarrasses the queen of Hungary, by making it necessary for her to
divide her forces, is obvious at the first view; but this is not, in my
opinion, its most fatal consequence. The other powers will be incited,
by the example of our ministry, to conclude treaties of neutrality in
the same manner. They will distrust every appearance of our zeal for the
house of Austria, and imagine that we intend only an hypocritical
assistance, and that our generals, our ambassadors, and our admirals,
have, in reality, the same orders.
Nothing, my lords, is more dangerous than to weaken the publick faith.
When a nation can be no longer trusted, it loses all its influence,
because none can fear its menaces, or depend on its alliance. A nation
no longer trusted, must stand alone and unsupported; and it is certain
that the nation which is justly suspected of holding with its open
enemies a secret intercourse to the prejudice of its allies, can be no
longer trusted.
This suspicion, my lords, this hateful, this reproachful character, is
now fixed upon the court of Britain; nor does it take its rise only from
the forbearance of our admiral, but has received new confirmation from
the behaviour of our ambassador, who denied the treaty of neutrality,
when the French minister declared it to the Dutch. Such now, my lords,
is the reputation of the British court, a reputation produced by the
most flagrant and notorious instances of cowardice and falsehood, which
cannot but make all our endeavours ineffectual, and discourage all those
powers whose conjunction we might have promoted, from entering into any
other engagements than such as we may purchase for stated subsidies. For
who, upon any other motive than immediate interest, would form an
alliance with a power which, upon the first appearance of danger, gives
up a confederate, to purchase, not a large extent of territory, not a
new field of commerce, not a port or a citadel, but an abject
neutrality!
But however mean may be a supplication for peace, or however infamous
the desertion of an ally, I wish, my lords, that the liberty of invading
the queen of Hungary's dominions without opposition, had been the most
culpable concession of our illustrious ministers, of whom it is
reasonable to believe, that they have stipulated with the Spaniards,
that they shall be repaid the expense of the war by the plunder of our
merchants.
That our commerce has been unnecessarily exposed to the ravages of
privateers, from which a very small degree of caution might have
preserved it; that three hundred trading ships have been taken, and that
three thousand British sailors are now in captivity, is a consideration
too melancholy to be long dwelt upon, and a truth too certain to be
suppressed or denied.
How such havock could have been made, had not our ships of war concluded
a treaty of neutrality with the Spaniards, and left the war to be
carried on only by the merchants, it is not easy to conceive; for surely
it will not be pretended, that all these losses were the necessary
consequence of our situation with regard to Spain, which, if it exposed
the Portugal traders to hazard, did not hinder us from guarding our own
coasts.