seems to have subjected them, without any scrupulous inquiries into
their virtue or abilities; they have been taught from their childhood to
consider them as placed in a higher rank than themselves, and are,
therefore, not disgusted at any transient bursts of impatience, or
sudden starts of caprice, which would produce, at least, resentment,
and, perhaps, mutiny, in men newly exalted from a low station. The more
attentively, sir, we look upon the world, the more strongly shall we be
convinced of the truth of these assertions, and the more evidently shall
we discover the influence which operates, in a degree scarcely credible,
even to those who have experienced its power, and which is, indeed, one
of the chief means of subordination, by which society is held together.
Nor are officers of birth, sir, to be preferred to men who are
recommended by nothing but military service, only because they are more
cheerfully obeyed, but for another reason of equal importance. It has
been observed, that, in reality, they discharge the duty of commanders
in a manner more likely to preserve dignity and increase reverence; that
they discover, on all occasions, a sense of honour, and dread of
disgrace, which are not easily to be found in a mind contracted by a
mean education, and depressed by long habits of subjection.
It is not, indeed, sir, universally and unvariably certain, that a man,
raised from meanness and poverty, will be insolent and oppressive; nor
do I doubt but there are many now languishing in obscurity, whose
abilities might add new lustre to the highest honours, and whose
integrity would very faithfully discharge the most important trust, and
in their favour, wherever they can be discovered, some exceptions ought
to be made; but as general rules are generally to be followed, as well
in military regulations as other transactions, it will be found, upon
the exactest inquiry, by no means improper to advance gentlemen to posts
of command rather than private sentinels, however skilful or courageous.
It is to be considered, sir, that the present state of the continent,
has for many years made it necessary to support an army, even when we
are not engaged in an actual war; that this army, though of late it has,
for the ease of the people, been sometimes encamped during the summer,
is, for the greatest part, quartered in towns, and mingled with the rest
of the community, but governed, at the same time, by the officers, and
subject to the martial law. It has often been observed by those who have
argued against standing forces, that this difference of government makes
different societies, which do not combine in the same interest, nor much
favour one another; and it is, indeed, certain, that feuds are sometimes
produced, that when any private quarrel happens, either by drunkenness
or accident, or claims really disputable, between a soldier and any
other, person, each applies for support and assistance to those in the
same condition with himself, the cause becomes general, and the soldiers
and townsmen are not easily restrained from blows and bloodshed.
It is true, likewise, that the rhetorick of the patriots has been so
efficacious, that their arguments have been so clamorously echoed, and
their weekly productions so diligently dispersed, that a great part of
the nation, as men always willingly admit what will produce immediate
ease or advantage, believes the army to be an useless burden imposed
upon the people for the support of the ministry; that the landlord,
therefore, looks upon the soldier as an intruder forced into his house,
and rioting in sloth at his expense; and the farmer and manufacturer
have learned to call the army the vermin of the land, the caterpillars
of the nation, the devourers of other men's industry, the enemies of
liberty, and the slaves of the court.
It is not to be supposed, sir, that the soldiers entertain the same
ideas of their profession, or that they do not conceive themselves
injured by such representations: they undoubtedly consider themselves as
the bulwark of their country, as men selected for the defence of the
rest of the community, as those who have engaged, at the hazard of their
lives, to repel invasion, and repress rebellion, and who contribute more
than their part to the general felicity, by securing property, and
preventing danger.
It is not to be doubted, sir, but sentiments so widely different, must
produce an equal contrariety of claims, and diversity of conduct: the
trader imagines, that the man who subsists upon the taxes which are
raised only from his labour, ought to consider himself as his inferiour,
at least, if not as his hireling and his servant; the soldier wonders
how he can ever conceive himself sufficiently grateful to him that has
devoted his life to his defence, and to whom he must fly for protection
whenever danger shall approach him, and concludes, that he has an
incontestable right to the better part of that, of which the
preservation of the whole depends upon him.
Thus does self-love magnify every man in his own eyes, and so
differently will men determine when each is to judge in his own cause.
Which of these competitors thinks most justly of his own station and
character, or whether both are not mistaken in their opinion, I think it
by no means necessary to decide. This, at least, is evident, that to
preserve peace and harmony between two bodies of men obliged to live
together with sentiments so opposite, there is required an uncommon
degree of prudence, moderation, and knowledge of mankind, which is
chiefly to be exerted on the part of the soldiers, because they are
subject to more rigorous command, and are more easily governed by the
authority of their superiours.
Let us suppose any dispute of this kind, sir, to happen where the
soldiers were commanded only by private sentinels, disguised in the
dress of officers, but retaining, what it cannot be expected that they
should suddenly be able to lay aside, the prejudices which they had
imbibed in the ranks, and all the ardour of trifling competition in
which their station had once engaged them. What could be expected from
their councils and direction? Can it be imagined that they would inquire
impartially into the original cause of the dispute, that they would
attend equally to the parties, endeavour, by mildness and candour, to
soften the malevolence of each, and terminate the dispute by some
addressful expedient, or decent accommodation? He, surely, must be very
little acquainted with the vulgar notions of bravery and honour, that
could form any hopes of such conduct.
The plain soldier, sir, has not accustomed himself to regulate his
motions by reason, nor has learned any more of honour, than that it
consists in adhering invariably to his pretensions, even though he
should discover that they are false; and in resenting affronts with the
utmost rigour, even when they were provoked by himself, he is taught,
that it is his business to conquer in whatever cause, and that to desist
from any of his attempts, or retract any of his assertions, is unworthy
of a man of honour.
Warm with such notions as these, sir, would such officers, as have been
recommended by the honourable gentleman, apply themselves to the
termination of differences? Without any knowledge of the laws of
society, without any settled ideas of the different rights of different
persons, they would have nothing in view but the honour of their
profession, nor endeavour to support it by any other method than that of
violence. If a soldier was affronted by a farmer, they would probably
lay his territories waste, and ravage his plantations like an enemy's
country; if another disagreed with his landlord, they would advise him
to _make good his quarters_, to invade the magazines of provision
without restraint, to force the barricadoes of the cellar, and to forage
in the stables without controul.
But gentlemen, sir, are proper judges of debates between the army and
the rest of the community, because they are equally related to both
parties, as men who possess or expect estates, or who are allied to
those whose influence arises from their property. As men bred in
affluence and freedom, and acquainted with the blessings of our
constitution, and the necessity of civil government, they cannot
willingly contribute to the increase of the military power, and as
members of the army they cannot but be desirous to support their own
rank, and to hinder their profession from sinking into contempt; it is,
therefore, their care to repress insolence on one part, and to prevent
oppression on the other, to stop dissensions in their beginning, and
reconcile all the different pretensions of Britons and soldiers.
I am, indeed, surprised, sir, to hear the promotion of serjeants
recommended by the honourable gentleman who has so often strained his
lungs, and exhausted his invention, to explain how much our constitution
is endangered by the army, how readily those men will concur in the
abolition of property who have nothing to lose, and how easily they may
be persuaded to destroy the liberties of their country, who are already
cut off from the enjoyment of them, who, therefore, can only behold with
envy and malevolence those advantages which they cannot hope to possess,
and which produce in them no other effects than a quicker sense of their
own misery.
Upon what principles, sir, any gentleman can form those notions, or with
what view he can so long and so studiously disperse them, it is his
province to explain; for the only reason that can be offered by any
other person for his incessant declamations, the desire of securing his
country from the oppression of a standing army, is now for ever
overthrown by this new proposal; which, if it were to be received, would
in a very few years produce an army proper to be employed in the
execution of the most detestable designs, an army that could be of no
other use than to gratify an ambitious prince, or a wicked ministry, as
it would be commanded, not by men who had lost their liberty, but by men
who never enjoyed it, by men who would abolish our constitution without
knowing that they were engaged in any criminal undertaking, who have no
other sense of the enjoyment of authority than that it is the power of
acting without controul, who have no knowledge of any other laws than
the commands of their superiours.
To men like these, sir, to men raised up from poverty and servility to
rank and power, to ignorance invested with command, and to meanness
elated with preferment, would any real patriot, any zealous assertor of
liberty, any inflexible enemy to the corruptions of the ministry,
consign the protection of his country, and intrust to these our
happiness, properties, and our lives?
Whether the honourable gentleman has changed any of the sentiments which
he has hitherto appeared to admit with regard to the army, whether this
new determination is only an instance of that inconsistency which is
scarcely to be avoided in the vindication of a bad cause, or whether he
was betrayed to it only by his hatred of the administration, which would
prompt him to recant his own advice, if it should happen to be approved,
I will not pretend to determine, but I must lament, on this occasion,
the entertainment which the house will lose, by the eternal cessation of
any harangues on the army, since he cannot now declaim on either part
without contradicting his former declarations.
Nor will the honourable gentleman find less difficulty in proving, that
justice, rather than policy, requires the promotion of Serjeants to
commissions. Military preferments are always at the disposal of the
crown, nor can any right be pretended to them, but such as arises from
the custom which has been generally followed in conferring them, which
is not only variable at pleasure, but has never been, at any time,
regularly observed. The order of rotation has been suffered sometimes to
proceed, because of two persons, otherwise equal, he that has served
longest may plead the most merit; but the plea of service has been
always overruled by birth or powerful recommendation. And though, sir,
it is natural for men disappointed to complain, yet as those officers,
whose preferment has been delayed, were not thought, in reality, to have
received any injury, their murmurs have been the less regarded.
It might be expected, sir, from a patriot, a lamenter of the degeneracy
of mankind, and an inflexible opponent of corruption, that he should
consider rather facts than persons, that he should regulate his decision
by the unvariable principles of reason and justice, and that, therefore,
he should not applaud at one time what he condemns at another.
But this gentleman seems to have established some new maxims of conduct,
and, perhaps, upon new notions of morality; for he seems to imagine,
that his friends may seize, as their right, what his adversaries cannot
touch without robbery, though the claim of both be the same.
It is well known, sir, to the whole army, that a noble person, whose
abilities are so loudly celebrated, whose virtues are so liberally
praised, and whose removal from his military employments is so solemnly
lamented as a publick calamity, obtained his first preferments by
pretensions very different from military merit, and that at the age only
of seventeen, a time of life in which, whatever might be his abilities,
very little prudence or experience could be expected, he was advanced to
the command of a regiment, and exalted above many officers whose known
bravery and frequent hazards entitled them to favour.
I do not assert that he was undeservedly promoted, or condemn those who
either solicited or granted his commission; I maintain only, that what
was then reasonable and just, is not now either iniquitous or
ridiculous, and different persons in the same circumstances have a right
to the same treatment.
In the reign of queen Anne, a reign, sir, which every Briton recollects
with so much satisfaction, and which will for ever afford examples of
the wisest councils, and most successful wars, when new regiments were
to be raised, it was far from being thought necessary to observe this
gentleman's favourite method of rotation; posts were filled, not with
the officers of other regiments, that room might be left for the
promotion of serjeants, but with gentlemen who had never seen a battle,
or learned any part of the military discipline.
But though, sir, the regulation of our army be thus violently attacked,
the greatest crime of the ministry is, in this gentleman's opinion, that
of levying new troops, when we have no employment for our standing
forces, of laying unnecessary impositions upon the nation, and alarming
with the fears of an invasion, only that the army might be increased.
On this head, sir, a declaration of the duke of MARLBOROUGH has been
produced, with a great pomp of circumstances, and such a seeming
accuracy of narration, that the attention of the house was engaged, and
the account was received with all the solemnity of universal silence,
and with the veneration due to so high an authority in a question of so
much importance.
The subject is, indeed, so worthy of regard, that I think, sir, every
man ought to contribute to its elucidation, and, therefore, I take the
liberty of adding to the honourable gentleman's relation, what I hope
will be heard with equal curiosity, the method by which that great
commander proposed to put a stop to an invasion with so small a number.
He was very far, sir, from imagining that he should be able to repel
them by open force, he was far from being so confident of his
superiority in military skill, as to imagine that he should defeat them
by stratagem, and, therefore, he designed, by burning the villages, and
destroying the country, to deprive them of the means of subsistence, and
harass them with famine; to hover at a distance, and cut off those
parties which necessity should force out to forage, till a body of
troops could be assembled sufficient to overthrow them in a battle, or
to drive them back to their ships.
Such was the scheme, sir, as I have been informed, of this great man,
nor, perhaps, can any other be struck out by human abilities, where
greater numbers are to be opposed by smaller. But this scheme, though
preferable, in the last extremities, to slavery, is such as cannot be
mentioned without horrour, and of which the execution ought to be
avoided by every expedient that can be practised without the danger of
our liberties. We ought, certainly, not to reject a nauseous medicine,
by which that health is preserved, which, if lost, can only be restored
by the amputation of a limb.
As it was, therefore, necessary, sir, to secure our coasts from an
invasion, it was necessary to raise new troops for the American
expedition; nor did this method produce any delay, for the regiments
were completed a long time before the ships of war and the transports
were ready to convoy and receive them, nor could the utmost ardour and
diligence despatch them sooner from our coasts.
The ships, sir, were, by the violence of a frost, scarcely exampled,
retained, for a long time, in the harbours, without a possibility of
being put to sea; when they were all assembled at the place appointed
for their conjunction, they waited for a wind; all the delay that can be
objected, was produced by the seasons, of which the regulation was in no
man's power.
But the time, sir, which was unwillingly spent in the camp, was not,
however, lost or misemployed, for the troops were, by the order of the
general, every day exercised, and instructed in the art of war, so that
what was lost in time, was more than recompensed by the advantage of
better discipline.
Nor did these troops appear an herd so ignorant and contemptible, as
they have been represented by malicious invectives and ludicrous
descriptions; there were not, indeed, among them many grey-headed
warriours, nor were their former campaigns and past exploits the
subjects of their conversation; but there was not one amongst them who
did not appear ready to suffer, in the cause of his country, all that
the most hardened veteran could undergo, or whose alacrity and eagerness
did not promise perseverance in the march, and intrepidity in the
battle.
Their general, sir, who saw them pursue their exercises, declared how
much he was satisfied with their proficiency, applauded their
appearance, and expressed his confidence in their courage; nor do I
doubt, but our enemies will find, that it is not necessary to send out
our most formidable forces to humble them, and that the youth of Britain
will compensate their want of experience by their courage.
If I, sir, have been drawn aside from the present question, it is by
following, perhaps, with an exactness too scrupulous, the honourable
gentleman, whose propositions I have now shown to be erroneous, and
whose reproaches will, I believe, now appear rather the effects of
disappointment than of zeal, and, therefore, I think it now necessary to
return to the business before us, the consideration of the present
establishment, from which, as it was approved by the duke of
MARLBOROUGH, and has been defended with very strong arguments, by one of
the most experienced officers of this time, I cannot think it safe or
prudent to depart.
Mr. GRENVILLE spoke next, to the following effect:--Sir, as a noble
person has been frequently hinted at in this debate, to whom my relation
is well known, and whom, as I know him well, I have the strongest
motives to reverence and honour, I cannot forbear to give, on this
occasion, an attestation which he will be allowed to deserve by all
those whom interest has not blinded, and corruption depraved.
It will be allowed, sir, that he is one of those who are indebted for
their honours only to merit, one whom the malice of a court cannot
debase, as its favour cannot exalt; he is one of those whose loss of
employments can be a reproach only to those who take them from him, as
he cannot forfeit them but by performing his duty, and can only give
offence by steady integrity, and a resolution to speak as he thinks, and
to act as his conscience dictates.
There are, sir, men, I know, to whom this panegyrick will seem romantick
and chimerical, men, to whom integrity and conscience are idle sounds,
men, who are content to catch the word of their leader, who have no
sense of the obligation of any law but the supreme will of him that pays
them, and who know not any virtue but diligence in attendance, and
readiness in obedience.
It is surely, sir, no loss to the noble person to be debarred from any
fellowship with men like these. Nothing can be more unpleasing to virtue
than such a situation as lays it under a necessity of beholding
wickedness that cannot be reformed; as the sight of a pesthouse must
raise horrour, though we should suppose the spectator secure from the
contagion.
Mr. ORD spoke next, in substance as follows:--Sir, as I cannot approve
the scheme now proposed, for augmenting our forces, I shall endeavour to
show why the arguments, by which it has hitherto been supported, have
failed to convince me, and shall lay before the house some reasons
against it, to which I shall expect an answer, before I shall think that
I can agree to it, without squandering the money of which my
constituents have intrusted me with the disposal.
The argument, sir, with which this motion was introduced, which is,
indeed, the strongest that has yet been offered, was, that this estimate
is less expensive than one that was laid before the house in a late
reign, and that, therefore, it could not reasonably be charged with
extravagance.
Let us now consider this argument with that care which is required by
the importance of the question, let us inquire what consequences will
follow from it, and to what previous suppositions it must owe its force.
The argument, sir, evidently supposes that the estimate in king
William's reign was drawn up without any intention to deceive the house,
or to raise money for purposes different from those for which it was
really expended. But if we suppose that estimate to be fraudulently
calculated, this may contain the same fallacies in a lower degree, and
the only merit that can be claimed by the authors of it, will be, that
they are not the most rapacious plunderers of their country, that,
however they may be charged with profusion of publick money, they are
yet more modest than some of their predecessors.
But it is known, sir, that in king William's reign, very few estimates
were honestly computed; it is known that the rotation of parties, and
fluctuation of measures, reduced the ministry to subsist upon artifices,
to amuse the senate with exorbitant demands, only that they might obtain
the necessary grants, and to pretend expenses which never were incurred,
that the supplies which the publick affairs really required, might not
be withheld; as fraudulent tradesmen fix immoderate prices, that the
buyer may make offers proportionate to their demands.
The estimates, therefore, of that reign are of very little authority,
though they might sometimes pass the house without censure; for it is to
be considered, that by the frequency of new elections, the greatest part
of the members were often unacquainted with the state of publick
accounts, and that an army was so little known to this kingdom, that the
true expense of it might easily be concealed.
Nor is this, sir, the only fallacy of this argument; for it supposes,
likewise, that the nation is no less wealthy than in the time when that
computation was offered, with which this is so triumphantly compared.
For every man knows that publick as well as private expenses are to be
proportioned to the revenue by which they are supplied, and that the
charges which are easily supported at one time, may threaten ruin at
another.
But unhappily, sir, it is evident, that, since the days of that
sovereign, the nation has been exhausted by a long and wasteful war, and
since, by a peace equally destructive, it is embarrassed with an
enormous debt, and entangled in treaties, of which the support may call
every day for new expenses; it has suffered since that time a thousand
losses, but gained no advantage, and yet the expenses of that time are
mentioned as an example to be compared with those which are proposed in
this.
The difference of the condition of the British nation at those two
periods of time, sir, is not less than that of the strength of the same
man in the vigour of youth and the frigidity of old age, in the flush of
health and the languor of disease, of the same man newly risen from rest
and plenty, and debilitated with hunger and fatigue.
To make such a comparison, sir, betrays, at least, a very criminal
insensibility, of the publick misery, if it may not be charged with
greater malignity. I know not whether those who shall hear of this
debate, may not impute such reflections rather to cruelty than
negligence, and imagine that those who squander the treasure of the
nation take pleasure in reproaching that poverty which their counsels
produce, and indulge their own vanity by contemplating the calamities
from which they are themselves secure, and to which they are indebted
for opportunities of increasing their own fortunes, and gratifying their
ambition. It is evident, that an estimate which requires less than that
which has been mentioned, may yet exact more than the nation can now
raise, without feeling too great inconveniencies to be compensated by
the advantages which can be expected from our new forces. Nor is it
sufficient that it is lower than those of former times; for, as it ought
to be the care of the government to preserve the ease and happiness of
the people, it should be reduced in proportion to the diminution of the
national wealth.
The right honourable gentleman confesses, sir, that frugality is a
virtue, and his argument supposes that to contract expenses is an
argument of prudent measures; why then is he afraid of carrying virtue
to a greater height, of making the burden still more light, and
preferring the cheapest estimate that can be proposed, when it is
asserted by those whose authority is most worthy of regard, that it will
produce no weakness in our troops, nor give our enemies any superiority?
I do not pretend any other skill in military affairs, than may be gained
by casual conversation with soldiers, and by a cursory observation of
daily occurrences; but I speak with greater confidence on this occasion,
because I do not think any other qualifications necessary for the
determination of this question, than a habit of just reasoning, and
freedom from the prejudices of interest.
Every man knows, sir, without a military education, that it is imprudent
to purchase any thing at a greater price which may be procured at a
less, and that when the same sum will buy two things, of which one is
evidently preferable to the other, the best ought to be chosen.
If the application of either of these two positions will decide this
controversy, there will be no need of recurring to experience, of citing
the authority of foreign commanders, of comparing the actions of the
German and British generals, or of inquiring how battles have been lost,
or to what victories are to be ascribed.
It is evident, sir, that the scheme now proposed, is twice as costly as
that which is recommended in opposition to it, and therefore, unless it
will produce twice the advantage, it must be acknowledged to be
imprudently chosen. The advantage in war, is to be rated by comparing
the strength of different numbers in different circumstances, and
inquiring what degree of superiority will be found.
If we suppose, sir, two bodies of men, equally armed and disciplined,
opposed to each other without any advantage of situation, we must
conceive that neither party could be conquered, that the balance of the
day must remain equal, and that the contest would continue undecided.
It cannot be objected to this supposition, sir, that no such event is
recorded in history, because in war many causes really act which cannot
be estimated; one army may consist of soldiers more courageous, and more
confident in the justice of their cause; unforeseen accidents may
operate, orders may be mistaken, or leaders may be misinformed; but all
these considerations are to be set aside in speculation, because they
may equally be alleged on either part.
Two bodies of men, sir, equally numerous, being, therefore, supposed
equal, it is to be inquired how either may be superiour to the other. It
is proposed, on one part, to produce this effect by doubling the number
of officers rather than increasing that of the soldiers; on the other,
to double the soldiers under the same officers, the expense being the
same of both methods.
When two armies, modelled according to these different schemes, enter
the field, what event can be expected? Either five thousand men, with a
double number of officers, must be equal to ten thousand, differently
regulated, or the publick has paid more for assistance of the officers
than its real value, and has chosen, of two methods equally expensive,
that which is least efficacious.
This, sir, is the state of the question now before us; our present
deficiency is not of men but money, and we may procure ten thousand men
regulated like the foreign troops, at the same expense as five thousand
in the form proposed; but I am afraid that no man will be found to
assert, that the addition of officers will be equivalent to a double
number of soldiers.
Thus it is evident, sir, evident to demonstration, that the most
expensive method is, at the same time, the least advantageous, and that
the proposal of new regiments is intended to augment the strength of the
ministry rather than of the army.
If we suppose, sir, what is more than any foreigner will grant, that the
additional officers raise a body of five thousand men to an equality
with six thousand, is not the pay of four thousand men apparently thrown
away? And do not the officers receive a reward which their service
cannot deserve? Would it not be far more rational to raise seven
thousand, by which our army would be stronger by a seventh part, and as
the pay of three thousand would be saved, the publick would be richer by
almost a third.
Surely, sir, numerical arguments cannot but deserve some consideration,
even from those who have learned by long practice to explain away mere
probability at pleasure, to select the circumstances of complicated
questions, and only to show those which may be produced in favour of
their own opinions.
In the present question, sir, there is very little room for fallacy; nor
do I see what remains to the decision of it, but that those gentlemen
who have been acquainted with military operations, inform us, what
degree of superiority is conferred by any assignable number of officers;
that we may compare their service with the price, and discover whether
the same money will not purchase greater advantages.
The experience of the late war may evince, sir, that those troops which
have the greatest number of officers are not always victorious; for our
establishment never admitted the same, or nearly the same number with
that of the French, our enemies; nevertheless, we still boast of our
victories; nor is it certain that we might not have been equally
successful, though the number of our officers had been yet less.
Foreigners, sir, are very far from discovering the defect of their own
establishment, or imagining that they should become more formidable by
imitating our methods. When I travelled, I took opportunities of
conversing with the generals of those nations which are most famous for
the valour of their troops, and was informed by them, that they thought
a multitude of officers by no means useful, and that they were so far
from desiring to see their own regulation changed, that they should make
no scruple of recommending it to other nations, who, in their opinion,
squandered their treasure upon useless commissions, and increased the
calamities of war by unnecessary burdens.
I hope no man will think it sufficient to reply to these arguments with
general assertions, or will deny the necessity of frugality, and extol
the opulence of the nation, the extent of our commerce, and the
happiness of our condition. Such indeed, sir, is the method of
argumentation made use of by the hireling scribblers of the court, who,
because they feel none of the publick calamities, represent all
complaints as criminal murmurs, and charge those with sedition who
petition only for relief. Wretches like these would celebrate our
victories, though our country should be overrun by an invader, would
praise the lenity of any government by which themselves should be
spared, and would boast of the happiness of plenty, when half the people
should be languishing with famine.
I do not suppose, sir, that the despicable sophistry of prostitutes like
these has any effect here, nor should I have thought them worthy of the
least notice, had it not been proper to inquire, whether those may not
be justly suspected of some inclination to deceive, even in this
assembly, by whom the most profligate of mankind are openly paid for the
promulgation of falsehood, and the patronage of corruption.
It is indeed, sir, artful, in those who are daily impairing our honour
and influence, to endeavour to conceal from the people their own
weakness, that weakness which is so well known in foreign countries,
that every nation is encouraged to insult us, and by which it may
reasonably be imagined that new enemies will, in a short time, be
raised.
The late changes in our military regulations have, indeed, taken away
all the terrour of our arms; those troops are now no longer dreaded, by
which the liberties of Europe were recovered, and the French reduced to
abandon their schemes of universal empire, for the defence of their own
country, because the officers by whom they were formerly conducted to
glory and to victory, are now dismissed, and men advanced to their
posts, who are neither feared nor known.
When the duke of ARGYLE was lately deprived of his command, the
Spaniards could not conceal their satisfaction; they bestowed, however
unwillingly, the highest panegyrick upon his bravery and conduct, by
showing that he was the only Briton of whom they were afraid. Nor did
their allies, the French, discover less exultation; for by them it was
declared, that the nation was now disarmed, that either no war was
intended, or that none could be successfully prosecuted, since, as they
made no scruple to assert, though I know not whether I ought to repeat
it, we have no other man capable of commanding armies, or conducting any
great design.
I am informed that this illustrious warriour, whose abilities are
sufficiently attested by these enemies, that have felt their prevalence,
is of opinion, that the number of officers now required is not
necessary, and has declared that he should with equal confidence
undertake either invasion or defence, with forces modelled after the
German custom; and since I have shown, that, unless the troops so
regulated, are equivalent to a double number, added to the standing
regiments, part of the expense of the officers is evidently squandered,
I shall vote against the motion, unless it be proved, which I believe
will not be attempted, that the force of a regiment is doubled by
doubling the officers.
General WADE then spoke, to the purpose following:--Sir, the learned
gentleman who spoke last, must be acknowledged to have discovered a very
specious method of reasoning, and to have carried his inquiry as far as
speculation without experience can hope to proceed, but has, in my
opinion, admitted a false principle, by which all his argument has been
perplexed.
He supposes, that the advantages must be always in proportion to the
money expended in procuring them, and that, therefore, if five thousand
men, raised at any given cost, will be equal to five thousand, they
ought, if they are regulated according to an establishment of double the
charge, to be able to encounter ten thousand.
But in this supposition, sir, he forgets that the possibility of loss is
to be thrown into the balance against the advantage of the expense
saved, and that though the strength of the troops be not increased in
proportion to the increase of the cost, yet the additional security
against a great loss may justly entitle the most expensive regulation to
the preference.
Suppose five thousand men to be brought into the field against six
thousand; if they can, by multiplying their officers at a double
expense, be enabled to engage successfully a body superiour in number by
only a sixth part, the nation may be justly said to gain all that would
have been lost by suffering a defeat.
That we ought not to choose a worse method when we can discover a
better, is indisputably true, but which method is worse or better, can
be discovered only by experience. The last war has taught us, that our
troops in their present establishment are superiour to the forces of
France, but how much they might suffer by any alteration it is not
possible to foresee.
Success is gained by courage, and courage is produced by an opinion of
superiority; and it may easily be imagined, that our soldiers, who judge
of their own strength only by experience, imagine their own
establishment and discipline advanced to the highest perfection; nor
would they expect any other consequences from an alteration of it, but
weakness and defeats. It is, therefore, dangerous to change the model of
our forces, because it is dangerous to depress the spirit of our
soldiers.
Though it is confessed, sir, that the French, whose officers are still
more numerous, have been conquered by our troops, it must be likewise
alleged, that they had yielded us far easier victories had their
officers been wanting; for to them are they indebted for their conquests
wherever they have been successful, and for their resistance wherever
they have been with difficulty defeated; their soldiers are a spiritless
herd, and were they not invigorated by the example of their leaders, and
restrained by the fear of instant punishment, would fly at the approach
of any enemy, without waiting for the attack.
I cannot, therefore, sir, but be of opinion, that the necessity of a
large number of officers, may be learned even from the behaviour of
those troops which have been unsuccessful, since it is certain, that
though they have been often overcome, they have generally resisted with
great steadiness, and retired with great order.
If those, who are only speculative warriours, shall imagine that their
arguments are not confuted, I can only repeat what I declared when I
first attempted to deliver my sentiments in this debate, that I do not
pretend to be very skilful in the arts of disputation. I, who claim no
other title than that of an old soldier, cannot hope to prevail much by
my oratory; it is enough for me that I am confident of confuting those
arguments in the field, which I oppose in the senate.
Mr. FOX spoke next, in this manner:--Sir, I am far from thinking that
this question has been hitherto fully explained by those who have either
considered it only as a dispute about money, or a question merely
speculative concerning the proportions between different degrees of
expense, and probability of success. In a war of this kind, expense is
the last and lowest consideration, and where experience may be
consulted, the conjectures of speculation ought to have no weight.
The method, sir, by which our troops have hitherto been regulated, is
well known to have produced success beyond our expectations, to have
exalted us to the arbitration of the world, to have reduced the French
to change their threats of forcing a monarch upon us, into petitions for
peace, and to have established the liberties of almost every nation of
the world that can call itself free.
Whether this method, sir, so successful, so easy, and so formidable,
shall be changed, whether it shall be changed at a time when the whole
continent is in commotion, and every nation calling soldiers to its
standard; when the French, recovered from their defeats, seem to have
forgotten the force of that hand that crushed them in the pride of
victory; when they seem to be reviving their former designs, and
rekindling their extinguished ambition; whether, at such a time, the
regulations of our army shall be changed to save, upon the highest
computation, only thirty thousand pounds, is the present question.
On such a question, sir, I cannot observe, without astonishment, any man
deliberating for a single moment. To suspend our opinion in this case,
would be to balance our lives, our liberties, our patrimonies, and our
posterity, against thirty thousand pounds.
The effects of our present method, sir, are well known to ourselves, our
confederates, our enemies, to every man that has heard the name of
Blenheim and Ramillies; the consequences of the establishment, now
contended for, our most experienced commanders own themselves unable to
foresee, and I am far from believing that theoretical disquisitions can
enable any man to make great discoveries in military affairs.
Our own inexperience of the method which is so warmly recommended, is
not the strongest objection to it, though even this ought, in my
opinion, to restrain us from trying it at this hazardous conjuncture.
But since arguments, merely negative, may be thought over-balanced by
the prospect of saving money, I shall lay before the house, what effects
the want of officers has produced, with regard to those nations whose
poverty has laid them under a necessity of parsimonious establishments.
When the Germans were defeated by the French, in the late war, I was at
the Sardinian court, where the battle was, as it may easily be supposed,
the reigning subject of conversation, and where they did not want
opportunities of informing themselves minutely of all the circumstances
which contributed to the event; it was there, sir, universally
determined, that the Germans lost the day merely for want of officers.
It was observed also, sir, that some troops, which were once courted and
feared by all the neighbouring potentates, had lost their reputation in
later times, of which no reason could be alleged, but that they had
lessened the number of their officers; such is the change in the model
of the Walloons, and such is the consequence produced by it.
I am very far, sir, from thinking, that reason is not to be consulted in
military operations, as in other affairs, and have no less satisfaction
than the learned gentleman who spoke last but one, in clear and
demonstrative deductions; but in this question, reason itself informs
me, that regard ought only to be had to experience, and that authority
unsupported by practice, ought to have no prevalence.
I shall, therefore, sir, make no inquiry into the abilities of the
generals, by whom these contrary opinions are defended, nor draw any
parallel between their actions or their knowledge. It is sufficient for
me that the one is proposing a new scheme, and that the opinion of the
other can plead the practice of king William, and the duke of
MARLBOROUGH, and the success of the last war.
Yet, sir, if parsimony be a virtue at this time so eminently necessary,
it may be urged in favour of this estimate, that it will be less
expensive than those that have been formerly offered, and that as all
changes ought to be gradual, this may be considered as the first step
towards a general reduction of the publick charge.
Mr. HEATHCOTE spoke to the following purpose:--Sir, it is not without
astonishment, that I heard the honourable gentleman who spoke lately,
conclude his remarks with an attempt to renew our apprehensions of the
pretender, a chimerical invader, an enemy in the clouds, without spirit,
and without forces, without dominions, without money, and without
allies; a miserable fugitive, that has not a friend in this kingdom, or
none but such as are exasperated by those whom the men that mention him
with so much terrour are attempting to vindicate.
The vanity, sir, of such fears, the folly of admitting them, if they are
real, and of counterfeiting them, if they are false, has been
sufficiently exposed in this debate, by my honourable friend; but as he
thought it unnecessary to employ arguments in proof of what cannot be
denied, and believed it sufficient to ridicule a panick which he
supposed merely political, I, who judge, perhaps, more favourably of the
sincerity of some, and more tenderly of the cowardice of others, shall
endeavour to show, that the frequent revolutions which have happened in
this nation, afford us no reason for fearing another, equally sudden and
unforeseen in favour of the pretender.
The government, sir, is always stronger, as it is complicated with the
private interest of more individuals; because, though there are few that
have comprehension sufficient to discern the general advantage of the
community, almost every man is capable of attending to his own; and
though not many have virtue to stand up in opposition to the approach of
general calamities, of which every one may hope to exempt himself from
his particular share, yet the most sanguine are alarmed, and the most
indolent awakened at any danger which threatens themselves, and will
exert their utmost power to obviate or escape it.
For this reason, sir, I have long considered the publick funds
established in this nation, as a barrier to the government, which cannot
easily be broken: a foreign prince cannot now be placed upon the throne,
but in opposition almost to every wealthy man, who, having trusted the
government with his money, has reposited a pledge of his own fidelity.
But to this gentleman, sir, whom I am now answering, arguments can be of
very little importance, because, by his own confession, he is retained
as a mere machine, to speak at the direction of another, and to utter
sentiments which he never conceived, and which his hesitation and abrupt
conclusion shows him to admit with very little examination. He had not
even allowed himself time to know the opinion which he was to assert, or
to imprint upon his memory those arguments to which he was to add the
sanction of his authority. He seems to have boldly promised to speak,
and then to have inquired what he was to say. Yet has this gentleman
often declaimed here with all the apparent ardour of integrity, and been
heard with that regard which is only due to virtue and independence.
Some of his assertions are such, however, as require confutation, which
is, perhaps, more necessary since he has produced an authority for them,
which many of those who heard him may think of much greater weight than
his own. He affirms, that we can suffer only by an invasion, and infers
from this position, that we need only to guard our own coasts. I am of
an opinion very different, and having not yet prevailed upon myself to
receive notes from any other person, cannot forbear to speak what I
think, and what the publick prosperity requires to be generally known.
We may surely suffer by many other causes, by the ignorance, or
treachery, or cowardice of the ministry, by the negligence of that
person to whom this gentleman was probably indebted for his notes. We
may suffer by the loss of our sugar colonies, which may be justly valued
at ten millions.
These plantations, which afford us almost all the profitable trade that
is now left us, have been exposed to the insults of the enemy, without
any other guard than two ships, almost unfit for service. They have been
left to the protection of chance, with no other security, at a time when
the Spaniards had fitted out a squadron, to infest and ravage our
American dominions.
The admiral, who was sent into America, was confined for almost a year
in the ports, without forces, ships, or ammunition, which yet might have
been sent in a few months, had not pretences of delay been studiously
invented, had not the preparations been obstructed by clandestine
expedients, and had not every man been tacitly assured, that he should
recommend himself to his superiours, by raising difficulties, rather
than by removing them.
Such was the conduct of those who now stand up in the face of their
country, and, without diffidence or shame, boast of their zeal, their
assiduity, and their despatch; who proclaim, with an air of triumphant
innocence, that no art or diligence could have been more expeditious,
and that the embarkation was only impeded by the seasons and the winds.
With assertions equally intrepid, and arguments equally contemptible,
has the same person, who boasted his expedition, endeavoured to defend
the establishment of new regiments, in opposition to the practice of
foreign nations, and to the opinion of the greatest general among us;
and, to show how little he fears confutation, has recommended his scheme
on account of its frugality.
It is not to be wondered, sir, that such an orator should undertake to
defend the model of the troops sent to America, that he should prefer
boys to veterans, and assert the propriety of intrusting new levies to
unexperienced commanders; for he has given us in this debate such proofs
of controversial courage, that nothing can be now imagined too arduous
for him to attempt.
His strength, sir, is, indeed, not equal to his spirit, and he is
frequently unsuccessful in his most vigorous efforts, but it must be
confessed that he is generally overborne only by the force of truth, by
a power which few can resist so resolutely as himself, and which,
therefore, though it makes no impression upon him, prevails upon others
to leave him sometimes alone in the vindication of his positions.
The examples, sir, of those noble persons who were advanced early to
commissions, will be produced by him without effect, because the cases
are by no means parallel. They were not invested with command till they
had spent some time in the service, and exhibited proofs of their
courage and their capacity; and it cannot be doubted, but some men may
discover at seventeen, more merit than others in the full strength of
manhood.
But, sir, there is another consideration of more importance, which will
annihilate the parallel, and destroy the argument founded upon it. At
the time in which these persons were preferred, the nation had but newly
seen an army, and had, therefore, very few old officers whose experience
could be trusted, or whose services required to be rewarded: the
ministers were obliged to select those, who, though they did not
understand the military sciences, were likely to attain them in a short
time, and the event has sufficiently proved, that in the choice no
greater regard was paid to interest than to judgment.
It was prudent, likewise, sir, to choose young persons, supposing their
abilities equal with those of others, because the nation was likely to
possess them longer, and would not be reduced, by an interval of peace,
to make war again with raw forces, under the direction of ignorant
commanders.
But this provision, however reasonable, the wisdom of this ministry has
found means to defeat, by detaining at home the disciplined troops, and
depriving the most experienced generals of their commands, at a time
when they are most necessary, at a time when the whole world is in arms,
when the ambition of France is reviving its claims, and the Spaniards
are preparing to invade our colonies.
But, sir, though our generals are discarded, we are sufficiently
informed, that it is not because we are imagined to be in a state of
safety; for the increase of our army betrays our fear, of which, whether
it will be dispelled or increased by such measures, it is not difficult
to determine.
An army thus numerous, sir, is, in the opinion of every honest Briton,
of every man that reveres the constitution, or loves his liberty, an
evil more to be dreaded, than any from which we can be defended by it.
The most unpopular act of the most unpopular of our monarchs, was the
establishment of a standing-army; nor do I know any thing to be feared
from the exaltation of the dreadful pretender to the throne, but that he
will govern the nation with an armed force.
If our troops continue to be increased, which we may reasonably suspect,
since, if arguments like these be admitted, pretences for augmentations
can never be wanting, the consequences are easily foreseen; they will
grow too numerous to be quartered in the towns, and, with an affectation
of easing them of such unwelcome guests, it will be proposed, that after
having spent the summer in a camp, they shall retire in winter to
barracks. Then will the burden of a standing army be imposed for ever on
the nation; then may our liberties be openly invaded, and those who now
oppress us by the power only of money, will then throw aside the mask,
and deliver themselves from the constraint of hypocrisy; those who now
sooth us with promises and protestations, will then intimidate us with
threatenings, and, perhaps, revenge the opposition of their schemes by
persecution and sequestrations.
Mr. GAGE spoke next, to the following effect:--Sir, if the weakness of
arguments proved the insincerity of those who produce them, I should be
inclined to suspect the advocates for the establishment of new
regiments, of designs very different from the defence of their country;
but as their intentions cannot be known, they cannot be censured, and I
shall, therefore, confine myself to an examination of the reasons which
they have offered, and the authorities which they have cited.
The German general, who has been mentioned on this occasion with so much
regard, is not less known to me than to the honourable gentleman, nor
have I been less diligent to improve the hours in which I enjoyed his
friendship and conversation. Among other questions, which my familiarity
with him entitled me to propose, I have asked him to what causes he
imputed the ill success of the last war, and he frankly ascribed the
miscarriages of it to the unhappy divisions by which the German councils
were at that time embarrassed.
Faction produces nearly the same consequence in all countries, and had
then influenced the imperial court, as of late the court of Great
Britain, to dismiss the most able and experienced commanders, and to
intrust the conduct of the war to men unequal to the undertaking; who,
when they were defeated for want of skill, endeavoured to persuade their
patrons and their countrymen, that they lost the victory for want of
officers.
They might, perhaps, think of their countrymen, what our ministers seem
to imagine of us, that to gain belief among them, it was sufficient to
assert boldly, that they had not any memory of past transactions, and
that, therefore, they could not observe, that the same troops were
victorious under Eugene, which were defeated under the direction of his
successours; nor could discover that the regulation was the same, where
the effects were different.
Thus, in every place, it is the practice of men in power, to blind the
people by false representations, and to impute the publick calamities
rather to any other cause than their own misconduct. It is every where
equally their practice to oppress and obscure those who owe their
greatness to their virtue or abilities, because they can never be
reduced to blind obedience, or taught to be creatures of the ministry,
because men who can discover truth, will sometimes speak it, and because
those are best qualified to deceive others, who can be persuaded that
they are contending for the right.
But it is surely time for this nation to rouse from indolence, and to
resolve to put an end to frauds that have been so long known. It is time
to watch with more vigilance the distribution of the publick treasure,
and to consider rather how to contract the national expenses, than upon
what pretences new offices may be erected, and new dependencies created.
It is time to consider how our debts may be lessened, and by what
expedients our taxes may be diminished.
Our taxes, sir, are such, at present, as perhaps no nation was ever
loaded with before, such as never were paid to raise forces against an
invader, or imposed by the insolence of victory upon a conquered people.
Every gentleman pays to the government more than two thirds of his
estate, by various exactions.--This assertion is received, I see, with
surprise, by some, whose ample patrimonies have exempted them from the
necessity of nice computations, and with an affected appearance of
contempt by others, who, instead of paying taxes, may be said to receive
them, and whose interest it is to keep the nation ignorant of the causes
of its misery, and to extenuate those calamities by which themselves are
enriched.
But, sir, to endeavour to confute demonstration by a grin, or to laugh
away the deductions of arithmetick, is, surely, such a degree of
effrontery, as nothing but a post of profit can produce; nor is it for
the sake of these men, that I shall endeavour to elucidate my assertion;
for they cannot but be well informed of the state of our taxes, whose
chief employment is to receive and to squander the money which arises
from them.
It is frequent, sir, among gentlemen, to mistake the amount of the taxes
which are laid upon the nation, by passing over, in their estimates, all
those which are not paid immediately out of the visible rents of their
lands, and imagining that they are in no degree interested in the
imposts upon manufactures or other commodities. They do not consider
that whenever they purchase any thing of which the price is enhanced by
duties, those duties are levied upon them, and that there is no
difference between paying ten shillings a year in land taxes, and paying
five shillings in land taxes, and five shillings to manufacturers to be
paid by them to the government.
It would be, in reality, equally rational for a man to please himself
with his frugality, by directing half his expenses to be paid by his
steward, and the event is such as might be expected from such a method
of economy; for, as the steward might probably bring in false accounts,
the tradesman commonly adds twopence to the price of his goods for every
penny which is laid on them by the government; as it is easy to show,
particularly in the prices of those two great necessaries of life,
candles and leather.
Now, sir, let any gentleman add to the land tax the duties raised from
the malt, candles, salt, soap, leather, distilled liquors, and other
commodities used in his house; let him add the expenses of travelling so
far as they are increased by the burden laid upon innkeepers, and the
extortions of the tradesmen which the excises have occasioned, and he
will easily agree with me that he pays more than two-thirds of his
estate for the support of the government.
It cannot, therefore, be doubted that it is now necessary to stop in our
career of expenses, and to inquire how much longer this weight of
imposts can possibly be supported. It has already, sir, depressed our
commerce, and overborne our manufactures, and if it be yet increased, if
there be no hope of seeing it alleviated, every wise man will seek a
milder government and enlist himself amongst slaves that have masters
more wise or more compassionate.
We ought to consider, sir, whether some of our present expenses are not
superfluous or detrimental, whether many of our offices are not merely
pensions without employment, and whether multitudes do not receive
salaries, who serve the government only by their interest and their
votes. Such offices, if they are found, ought immediately to be
abolished, and such salaries withdrawn, by which a fund might be now
established for maintaining the war, and afterwards for the payment of
our debts.
It is not now, sir, in my opinion, a question whether we shall choose
the dearest or the cheapest method of increasing our forces, for it
seems to me not possible to supply any new expenses. New troops will
require more money to raise and to pay them, and more money can only be
obtained by new taxes; but what now remains to be taxed, or what tax can
be increased? The only resource left us is a lottery, and whether that
will succeed is likewise a lottery; but though folly and credulity
should once more operate according to our wishes, the nation is, in the
meantime, impoverished, and at last lotteries must certainly fail, like
other expedients. When the publick wealth is entirely exhausted,
artifice and violence will be equally vain. And though the troops may
possibly be raised, according to the estimate, I know not how we shall
pay them, or from what fund, yet unmortgaged, the officers who will be
entailed upon us, can hope to receive their half-pay.
For my part, sir, I think the question so easy to be decided, that I am
astonished to see it the subject of a debate, and imagine that the
controversy might be ended only by asking the gentleman, on whose
opinion all his party appear to rely, without any knowledge or
conviction of their own, whether, if he were to defend a nation from its
enemies, and could procure only a small sum for the war, he would not
model his forces by the cheapest method.
Mr. SLOPER then spoke thus:--Sir, I cannot, without the highest
satisfaction, observe any advances made in useful knowledge, by my
fellow-subjects, as the glory of such attainments must add to the
reputation of the kingdom which gives rise to such elevated abilities.
This satisfaction I have received from the observations of the right
honourable member, whose accurate computations cannot but promise great
improvements of the doctrine of arithmetick; nor can I forbear to
solicit him, for the sake of the publick, to take into his consideration
the present methods of traffick used by our merchants, and to strike out
some more commodious method of stating the accoinpts between those two
contending parties, debtor and creditor. This he would, doubtless,
execute with great reputation, who has proved, from the state of our
taxes, that new forces require new funds, and that new funds cannot be
established without a lottery.
I am, indeed, inclined to differ from him in the last of his positions,
and believe the nation not yet so much exhausted but that it may easily
bear the expense of the war, and shall, therefore, vote for that
establishment of our troops which will be most likely to procure
success, without the least apprehension of being censured either by the
present age, or by posterity, as a machine of the ministry, or an
oppressor of my country.
General WADE spoke again, thus:--Sir, since the right honourable member
has been pleased to insinuate, that by answering a plain question I may
put an end to the debate, I am willing to give a proof of my desire to
promote unanimity in our councils, and despatch in our affairs, by
complying with his proposal.
If I were obliged with a small sum to raise an army for the defence of a
kingdom, I should, undoubtedly, proceed with the utmost frugality; but
this noble person's ideas of frugality would, perhaps, be very different
from mine; he would think those expenses superfluous, which to me would
seem indispensably necessary, and though we should both intend the
preservation of the country, we should provide for its security by
different methods.
He would employ the money in such a manner as might procure the greatest
numbers; I should make my first inquiry after the most skilful officers,
and should imagine myself obliged, by my fidelity to the nation that
intrusted me with its defence, to procure their assistance, though at a
high price.
It is not easy for persons who have never seen a battle or a siege,
whatever may be their natural abilities, or however cultivated by
reading and contemplation, to conceive the advantage of discipline and
regularity, which is such, that a small body of veteran troops will
drive before them multitudes of men, perhaps equally bold and resolute
with themselves, if they are unacquainted with the rules of war, and
unprovided with leaders to direct their motions.
I should, therefore, in the case which he has mentioned, prefer
discipline to numbers, and rather enter the field with a few troops,
well governed and well instructed, than with a confused multitude,
unacquainted with their duty, unable to conduct themselves, and without
officers to conduct them.
Mr. VINER spoke next, to the following effect:--Sir, I am not very
solicitous what may be the determination of the house upon this
question, because I think it more necessary to resolve against an
augmentation of the army, than to inquire, whether it shall be made by
one method or another.
Every addition to our troops, I consider as some approach towards the
establishment of arbitrary power, as it is an alienation of part of the
British people, by which they are deprived of the benefits of the
constitution, and subjected to rigorous laws, from which every other
individual is exempt.
The principal of these laws, which all the rest are intended to enforce,
requires from every soldier an unlimited and absolute obedience to the
commands of his officers, who hold their commission, and expect
advancement, by the same compliance with the orders of the ministry.
The danger of adding to the number of men, thus separated from their
fellow-subjects, and directed by the arbitrary determinations of their
officers, has been often explained with great strength and perspicuity;
nor should I have taken this occasion of recalling it to the attention
of the house, but that I think it a consideration, to which, in all
debates on the army, the first regard ought to be paid.
Colonel MORDAUNT spoke to the purpose following:--Sir, the objection
which the honourable gentleman has raised, will be most easily removed,
by considering the words of the act by which the military authority is
established, where it is by no means declared, that either officers or
soldiers are obliged indiscriminately to obey all the orders which they
shall receive, but that they shall, on pain of the punishments there
enacted, obey all the _lawful_ orders of their commanders.
The obedience, therefore, sir, required from a soldier, is an obedience
according to law, like that of any other Briton, unless it can be
imagined that the word _lawful_ is, in that place, without a meaning.
Nor does his condition differ from that of his fellow-subjects by an
exemption from any law, but by a greater number of duties, and stricter
obligations to the performance of them; and I am not able to conceive
how our constitution can be endangered by augmenting an army, which, as
it can only act in conformity to it, can act only in defence of it.
[The question at last was put, that the new-raised troops be
incorporated into the standing corps, but it passed in the negative, 232
to 166.]