On the 4th of December, sir William YONGE, secretary at war, having
presented to the house of commons an estimate of the expense of raising
ten thousand men, the same was taken into consideration in a committee
on the supply, and after debate agreed to. At the report of this
proceeding, on the 11th, another debate happened on a motion that the
new-raised men should be incorporated into the standing regiments, etc.
As in these two debates the arguments were the same, they are thrown
into one, to prevent unnecessary repetitions.
Sir William YONGE opened the debate with respect to what he had
delivered in the estimate, after the manner following:--Sir, as this
estimate has been drawn up after very accurate calculations and careful
inquiries, I hope that no objections will be raised against it, and that
the sum necessary for raising the new regiments will be very readily
granted by that house, which voted the war necessary for which they are
designed.
I hope it will be admitted as some proof of frugality, that this
estimate requires less money than one that was laid before the senate in
the reign of king William; for if it be considered, that since that
time, the necessaries of life are become dearer, and that, therefore,
all expenses are increased, it will appear to be the effect of the
exactest economy, that the sum required for the same service is less.
I have heard, indeed, sir, that in conversation, the method of raising
troops on this occasion has been censured as improper, and that in the
opinion of some, whose judgment cannot be entirely disregarded, it would
be more reasonable to add more men to our regiments already established,
than to raise new regiments with new officers.
The chief argument, sir, produced in support of their method of
augmentation, is drawn from the necessity of publick frugality, a very
popular topick, which never fails to produce favour and attention; for
every man is naturally inclined to hear his friend, and to consider that
man as performing the office of friendship, who proposes methods of
alleviating his taxes.
Frugality is undoubtedly a virtue very necessary to the happiness of the
nation, and such as there occur frequent occasions of inculcating to
those who are intrusted with the superintendence of publick
disbursements, but I am far from thinking that this estimate affords any
opportunity for declamations of this kind, and am of opinion that the
addition of new soldiers to each regiment, would, in reality, be more
expensive.
It cannot be denied, sir, that by augmenting the regiments, there would
be immediately saved to the publick the expense of the officers which
are necessary in the method now proposed; but it is to be considered how
much the number of officers contributes to the regularity and discipline
of the troops, and how much discipline and order promote their success.
It is to be considered, sir, that the most successful method of making
war is undoubtedly the cheapest, and that nothing is more expensive than
defeats.
If by raising the same number of men under fewer officers, we should
give our enemies any advantage, if a single party should be cut off, a
garrison forced, an expedition rendered fruitless, or the war protracted
but a few months, where will be the advantage of this admired frugality?
What would be the consequence, but the same or a greater expense, not to
gain advantages, but to repair losses, and obviate the effects of our
former parsimony?
In private life, sir, it is common for men to involve themselves in
expense, only by avoiding it; to repair houses at greater charges than
new ones might be built, and to pay interest, rather than the debt. Weak
minds are frighted at the mention of extraordinary efforts, and decline
large expenses, though security and future affluence may be purchased by
them; as tender bodies shrink from severe operations, though they are
the certain methods of restoring health and vigour. The effects of this
timidity are the same in both cases, the estate is impaired insensibly,
and the body languishes by degrees, till no remedy can be applied.
Such examples, sir, are frequent, and the folly of imitating them is
therefore greater, for who would pursue that track by which he has seen
others led to destruction? Nor need we search for remote illustrations
to discover the destructive tendency of unseasonable tenderness for the
publick, for I believe the whole history of the wars of king William
will prove, that too close an attention to parsimony is inconsistent
with great achievements.
It may be expected that I, who cannot claim any regard in this
disquisition, from my own experience, should produce some decisive
evidence in favour of the method which I have taken upon me to defend;
this expectation I shall endeavour to satisfy, by alleging the authority
of the greatest commander of later ages, whom neither his friends nor
his enemies will deny to have been well versed in these subjects, and
whose success is a sufficient proof of the soundness of his principles.
The illustrious duke of MARLBOROUGH was of opinion, that the whole force
of the French armies consisted in the number of the officers, and that
to be always equal to them in the field, it was necessary to form our
troops nearly upon the same plan; to this scheme he conformed in his
practice of war, and how much his practice confirmed his opinion, let
Blenheim and Ramillies attest.
As I pretend not to have determined myself on this question, otherwise
than by authority, and, as I know not any authority equal to that of the
duke of MARLBOROUGH, I cannot discharge the trust reposed in me by my
country, any otherwise, than by proposing, that, on this occasion, we
agree to grant his majesty the sum calculated for raising the new
regiments, as I believe that method of augmentation most likely to
produce success in our undertakings, and consequently to procure a
speedy conclusion of the war.
Mr. PULTENEY spoke next, to the following effect:--Sir, I have been so
long accustomed to the debates of this house, and have so often attended
to the eloquence of the right honourable gentleman, that I am never
startled at paradoxes, nor shocked at absurdities; I can now hear with
great tranquillity an harangue upon the necessity of placemen in this
house, upon the usefulness of standing armies, and the happiness of a
general excise.
I am no longer offended with facts quoted in opposition to history, nor
with calculations drawn up without regard to the rules of arithmetick; I
know that there are persons in this house, who think themselves obliged
to speak, even when in their own opinion nothing can be said with weight
or with propriety; who come hither prepared against the shame of
confutation, and determined not to be convinced.
To reason with such men, sir, is, indeed, no pleasing task; it is to
fight with enchanted heroes, upon whom the common weapons of argument
have no effect, and who must be softened by a countercharm, before they
can be attacked with any prospect of success.
There are some, however, of whom I am willing to believe that they
dispute only for truth, and inquire with the view of attaining a
solution of their doubts. For the sake of these, sir, I think it
necessary to declare my sentiments, as I shall be desirous, in my turn,
to hear their sentiments; but with regard to those whose opinion I know
already by their posts, I should think it of great advantage to the
despatch of publick affairs, if they would content themselves with
voting for their pay, without any ambition of other service, or adding
the praise of volubility to that of steadiness.
Having this opportunity, sir, of declaring my opinion of the measures
pursued in regulating our military preparations, I shall not confine
myself entirely to the present question, but lay before the house my
thoughts upon some parts of the establishment, which may, perhaps,
require a reform, and which are at least proper objects of
consideration, though not absolutely necessary to the determination of
our opinion upon the present motion.
I have long ago, sir, declared, what, therefore, it is scarcely of any
use to repeat, that I know not any advantage to be hoped from a standing
army, nor can discover why the ablest and most vigorous of the
inhabitants of this kingdom should be seduced from the loom, the anvil
and the plough, only to live at ease upon the labour of industry, only
to insult their landlords, and rob the farmers. I never could find why
any body of men should be exempt from the common labour of social
duties, or why they should be supported by a community, who contribute
neither to its honour nor its defence.
I doubt not, sir, but I shall hear, on this occasion, of the service of
our troops in the suppression of riots; we shall be told, by the next
pompous orator who shall rise up in defence of the army, that they have
often dispersed the smugglers; that the colliers have been driven down
by the terrour of their appearance to their subterraneous
fortifications; that the weavers, in the midst of that rage which hunger
and oppression excited, fled at their approach; that they have at our
markets bravely regulated the price of butter, and, sometimes, in the
utmost exertion of heroick fury, broken those eggs which they were not
suffered to purchase on their own terms.
Some one, perhaps, of more penetration, may inform us of the use which
has been made of them at elections, where the surly burgesses have been
sometimes blind to the merit of those worthy gentlemen, whom the
soldiers have known how to esteem according to their desert; nor,
indeed, do I see how those can refuse their votes in favour of our
troops, who are indebted for the power of giving them, to their kind
interposition.
To these arguments, sir, I shall content myself with answering, that
those who are versed in the history of Britain, know that we have had
colliers and weavers for many years before a standing army was heard of
among us, and that it is, nevertheless, nowhere recorded that any of our
kings were deposed by those formidable bodies of men, or that any
remarkable changes were made by them in the form of our government; and,
therefore, till some reason shall be alleged, why such insurrections are
now more dangerous, and our civil magistrates more impotent than in
former ages, I humbly conceive, that even without the protection of a
standing army, we might yet sleep in security, notwithstanding the plots
of the colliers, and the combinations of the weavers.
But I must own, sir, these are not our only enemies, for there is
somewhere, yet in existence, a person that lays claim to the dominion of
these kingdoms, and pleads an hereditary title to dispose of our wealth,
to subvert our liberties, and destroy our religion.
If any foreigner, sir, unacquainted with our affairs, were to be present
at our debates, and to hear with what ardour we animate each other to an
obstinate resistance of this pretender to the throne, how often he is
represented as hovering over us, and how often we have caught a general
panick, and imagined ourselves upon the verge of destruction, how often
our most zealous patriots take opportunities of declaring their
resolution to die in defence of their liberties; and how pathetically
our most elegant declaimers have expatiated on the misery of that
unhappy race, whom they should leave behind to groan under the
oppression of absolute power, what would be his opinion of this
pretender, whom he saw so perpetually dreaded, against whom so many
alliances were formed, so many armies were levied, and so many navies
equipped?
Would he not believe him to be some formidable tyrant in a neighbouring
country, the lord of wide dominions, and the master of numerous armies
and powerful fleets? Would he not imagine that he could assemble half
the continent at his call, that he was supported by powerful alliances,
and that nothing but a fair wind was required to land him on our coasts
at the head of millions? And would he not, even on that supposition, be
inclined to censure us as timorous, as somewhat regardless of the honour
of our nation, and condemn us for giving way to such suspicions and
exclamations, as have a natural tendency to heighten the apprehension of
danger, and depress the spirits of the people?
But what would be his conclusion, sir, when he should be told, what in
reality is true, that this dreadful pretender is an unhappy fugitive,
driven in his infancy from this country, and by consequence without any
personal interest; that he is supported by the charity of a prince whose
name is hated almost by every inhabitant of the kingdom; that he has
neither sovereignty, nor money, nor alliances, nor reputation in war,
nor skill in policy; that all his actions are watched by British spies;
and that the few friends that remain to support the farce of a court,
are such only as dare not return to their native country, and are,
therefore, without fortune, and without dependants?
What could a wise man conceive of a nation held in continual alarms by
an enemy like this; of a nation always watchful against an invasion from
a man who has neither dominions to supply, nor money to hire a single
regiment; from a man whose title all the neighbouring princes disown,
and who is at such a distance from them, that he cannot be assisted by
them without open preparations, of which we cannot fail of having
intelligence, and which may be defeated, without danger, by the vessels
regularly stationed on our coasts?
Would not any stranger imagine, sir, that we were a nation infected with
a general phrensy, that cowardice had perverted our imaginations, filled
us with apprehensions of impossible invasions, raised phantoms before
our eyes, and distracted us with wild ideas of slavery and tyranny,
oppression and persecution?
I have dwelt thus long on this point, because I know the pretender is
the last refuge of those who defend a standing army; not that I propose
to convince any man of the folly of such apprehensions, or to fortify
him against such terrours for the time to come; for if any man, in
reality, now dreads the pretender, fear must be his distemper; he is
doomed to live in terrours, and it is of no importance whether he dreads
an invasion or a goblin, whether he is afraid to disband the army, or to
put out his candle in the night; his imagination is tainted, and he must
be cured, not by argument, but by physick.
But the greatest part of those who disturb our consultations with the
mention of the pretender, are men of a very different character, men
equally unconcerned about his designs, or his motions, with those who
are most desirous of setting the nation free from the burden of an army,
and very often such as we may discover, from their conduct, to be
determined to comply with every government; and such as have, therefore,
nothing to fear from a change of masters.
The men, for whose sake I am now speaking, sir, laugh equally with
myself at the apprehensions of those whom they contribute to terrify;
they know too well the impotence of the pretender to dread an invasion
from him, and affect only to continue their outcries, that they may not
be deprived of a topick, on which, by long practice, they have attained
an uncommon facility of haranguing, which they know how to diversify
with various combinations of circumstances, and how to accommodate to
any emergent occasion, without the pain of torturing their inventions.
It may be useful, sir, to inform these men, that their disguise ought at
last to be thrown off, because it deceives no longer, and that the
nation cannot be cheated but at the expense of more cunning than they
are willing, or perhaps able, to display. A mask must necessarily be
thrown aside, when, instead of concealing, it discovers him by whom it
is used.
Those who are attempting, sir, to deceive others, and whose character is
exalted, in their own opinion, in proportion to the success of their
endeavours, have surely a sense of shame, though they have none of
virtue, and cannot, without pain, find their artifices detected, and
themselves made the objects of ridicule, by those stratagems which they
employ for the deception of others.
I hope, therefore, sir, that, for their own sakes, these declaimers on
the exploded story of the pretender, will change their bugbear, that if
it be necessary to frighten those whom they want art or eloquence to
persuade, they will find out some other object of terrour, which, after
a little practice in private meetings, they may first produce in the
court, and then turn loose in the senate.
The world, methinks, allows them a sufficient choice of tyrants more
formidable than the pretender. Suppose they should revive the history of
the Mohocks. The Mohocks are a dreadful race, not to be mentioned
without horrour, by a true lover of his country, and a steady adherent
to the house of Hanover; they might then very easily increase our army,
or enhance our taxes; for who would not be urged by his wife and
daughter to agree to any measures that might secure them from the
Mohocks?
But as an army is, at present, likely to be kept up for our defence,
against an enemy less formidable, it may be more seasonable to propose
the regulation than the dismission of our troops, and to mention those
evils which arise from the present establishment, rather than those
which are inseparable from the expense of a standing force.
If it be necessary, sir, to support soldiers, I suppose that it will not
be denied by the advocates for an army, that we ought to levy such
troops as may be of use; yet in their practice they seem to have paid
very little regard to this principle. Our troopers are mounted upon
horses which can serve no purpose but that of show, which may, indeed,
wheel about in the park with a formidable air, but can neither advance
upon an enemy with impetuosity, nor retreat from him with expedition;
and which, therefore, though purchased by the nation at a very high
price, and supported at a large expense, can only grace a review, but
are of very little use in an enemy's country, and must perish in the
march, or stand unactive in the battle.
Nor is much more service to be expected, sir, from their riders, than
from the horses, for there are very few of them acquainted with the
first elements of their profession, or who have ever learned more than a
few postures of exercise, and the meaning of a few words of command, but
have a number of officers with large appointments.
The French troops, sir, if they are doubly officered, are officered and
maintained at a less expense, and to greater effect; for the soldiers
are better instructed, and the same number of men cost not, perhaps,
much more than half the charge of a British regiment.
The guards, sir, that are maintained about this metropolis, for no other
purpose than to keep up the splendour of a modern court, cost the
nation, yearly, such a sum as would be sufficient to support an army of
Frenchmen, for the protection of their frontier towns, or the invasion
of neighbouring countries.
For my part, I cannot see what injury would be done to the nation by
abolishing an establishment, at the same time useless and expensive, and
employing that money which is at present squandered upon idlers without
effect, upon levies of useful soldiers for marching regiments, who might
be employed, when occasion should require them, in the service of their
country.
It will, doubtless, be objected, that the officers of this body of men,
many of whom are persons of the highest merit, and who have, generally,
purchased their commissions, might very justly complain of being
deprived, without a crime, of that which they have bought at its full
value, and to which, therefore, they imagine themselves entitled, till
they shall forfeit their right by some offence against the laws, or some
neglect of their duty.
I shall not, sir, at present, inquire into the justness of this plea,
nor examine, whether he who purchases an employment, which he knows to
be useless, and therefore burdensome to the publick, deserves that the
publick should be solicitous to support him in the enjoyment of it; but
I shall declare, on this occasion, with confidence, that I know many of
the officers of the guards to be men of honour, who would gladly
exchange their posts, so chargeable to the nation, for an opportunity of
serving it, and who are not very anxious for the increase of their pay,
so they may not be degraded from their present rank.
If these gentlemen, sir, might, in the regiments that should be raised
by disbanding the guards, be advanced to higher commissions, though with
some diminution of their pay, they would imagine themselves abundantly
compensated by the happiness of becoming useful subjects, and serving
that nation by which they have been, hitherto, supported only to fill up
the pomp of levees, and add to the magnificence of drawing-rooms, to
loiter in antechambers, and to quarrel at gaming tables.
If this scheme should not be approved, the method eligible, in the next
degree, seems to be that of incorporating our new levies into the
regiments already raised, that being associated with men already
acquainted with discipline, they may learn their duty much more
expeditiously than in separate bodies, where one officer will be obliged
to attend to the instruction of great numbers, and where no man will be
excited to application, because no man will see any degree of excellence
which he may be ambitious of attaining.
I have, indeed, heard no reason alleged for the necessity of new levies,
which appeared likely to convince even those by whom it was produced. It
appears to me that our present army is more than sufficient for the
publick service, without an augmentation, and that some of our regiments
might immediately embark, not only without danger to the nation, but
with far greater hopes of success, as our enemies would have less time
to strengthen their fortifications, and collect their troops, and as
disciplined forces are more formidable than troops newly levied; for
discipline must be of great efficacy to the success of military
undertakings, or all arguments which have been used in the defence of a
standing army fall to the ground.
In answer to this proposal, we shall probably be once again intimidated
with an invasion, whether from the pretender, the Spaniards, the French,
or any other power, it is of no great importance. An invasion is a
formidable sound; the sack of towns, the destruction of villages, the
captivity of our children, the ruin of our fortunes, and the desolation
of our country, are frightful images, and may, therefore, be
successfully produced, on this occasion, to perplex our thoughts, and
embarrass our inquiries.
To remove, therefore, this panick, and to dissipate, for ever, the
phantoms of invasion, I will lay before the house the opinion of the
great commander whose name has already been introduced in this debate.
In the late reign, on a day when the great officers of the crown, and
many of the council, were at a publick feast in the city, a report was
suddenly spread that the duke of Ormond had landed in the west, with two
thousand men. This account was, in appearance, well attested, and
universally believed; all jollity was, therefore, at an end, the company
departed, the council was summoned, and every man offered such
expedients as his present thoughts, confused and oppressed with the
proximity of the danger, suggested to him. One proposed, that a body of
troops should be sent to a distant part of the kingdom, to restrain the
seditions of the populace; another apprehended more danger from a
different quarter, and advised that the inhabitants should be awed by
another detachment sent thither; the most experienced easily saw the
unprofitableness of the measures proposed, but could not so easily
strike out more efficacious expedients, and therefore sat in great
perplexity. Lord Somers, particularly, shook his head, and seemed to
consider the kingdom as in the hands of the invaders, and the dreadful
pretender as seated on the throne.
At last, the duke of MARLBOROUGH, who had hitherto sat silent, asked
calmly, whether they were certain that any forces were really landed,
and was answered, that though it might not be absolutely certain, yet
they were to consult and send orders upon that supposition. Then, says
he, I will lay down this great rule to be observed invariably, whenever
you are invaded. Attend only to one point, nor have any other purpose in
view than that of destroying the regular forces that shall be landed in
the kingdom, without any regard to petty insurrections, which may be
always easily quelled, and which will probably cease of themselves, when
the army by which they were excited is cut off. For this end, let it be
your rule, to keep your army undivided, and to make no motion but
towards the enemies; fight them with the utmost expedition before they
can fortify themselves, or receive reinforcements from the continent. By
the observation of this plain method of operation, continued he, I will
engage, without any other force than the regiments generally stationed
about the capital, to put a stop to any troops that shall be landed on
the coast of Britain.
So far was this great officer, who was acquainted with the whole art of
war, from sinking into astonishment at the sound of an invasion, and so
far from thinking it necessary that the nation should be harassed by
standing troops, to preserve it from being plundered by a foreign army.
But though our troops, sir, should not be necessary to prevent an
invasion, they may be useful in services of equal importance; the
ministry may think the suffrages of the officers more serviceable than
their swords, and may be more afraid of exposing themselves than the
nation by any detachment of their forces.
Such is, at present, sir, the state of this unhappy country, that
neither in peace nor war are any measures taken, but with a view of
increasing or confirming the power of the ministry; for this purpose
those troops whose officers have seats here, are to be retained at home,
and the fate of our American settlements to be committed to new-levied
forces, without military skill.
For this reason is an army to be raised without necessity, and raised in
a manner that may furnish the court with an opportunity of extending its
influence, by the disposal of great numbers of new commissions. By this
plan every family that is burdened with a relation whose vices have
ruined his fortune, or whose stupidity disqualifies him for employment,
will have an opportunity of selling, for a commission, its interest at
the approaching election; dependence will be propagated, and the
troublesome spirit of liberty be depressed.
To little purpose will it be objected, that soldiers and officers will
be equally ignorant, that discipline is not infused instantaneously,
that a military dress will not make a soldier, that men can only know
their duty by instruction, and that nothing is to be hoped from
ploughmen and manufacturers, commanded by schoolboys. The success of the
expedition is not so much considered by those who have the direction of
the levies, as that of the election, and while they keep their posts,
they are very little concerned about the affairs of America.
In defence of this method, it has, indeed, been affirmed, that it was
preferred by the duke of MARLBOROUGH; but we are not informed to whom,
or upon what occasion he declared his opinion, and, therefore, are left
at liberty to doubt, whether his authority is not produced for a method
which he did not approve, or approved only at some particular time for
some extraordinary service.
It is urged, that he recommended it by his practice, and that his
success is a sufficient proof that his practice was founded upon right
maxims. But if it be remembered what was, in that time, the method of
obtaining commissions, and who it was that had the disposal of them, it
will appear not absolutely certain, that his practice ought to be
produced as a decisive proof of his opinion.
If the success of troops be properly urged as an argument for the form
of their establishment, may not the victories of prince Eugene afford a
proof, equally convincing, that a few officers are sufficient? And if
the arguments which arise from success are equal on both sides, ought
not the necessity of saving the publick money to turn the balance?
War, sir, is in its own nature a calamity very grievous to the most
powerful and flourishing people, and to a trading nation is particularly
destructive, as it at once exhausts our wealth, and interrupts our
commerce, at once drinks up the stream and chokes up the fountain. In
those countries whose affairs are wholly transacted within their own
frontiers, where there is either very little money, or where their
wealth is dug out of their own mines, they are only weakened by the loss
of men, or by the diminution of their dominions, and, in general, can
only suffer by being overcome.
But the state of Britain is far different; it is not necessary to our
ruin that an enemy should be stronger than ourselves, that he should be
able to pour armies into our country, to cover the sea with fleets, to
burn our villages by incursions, or destroy our fortresses with bombs;
for he that can secure his own dominions from our attacks, to which
nothing but distance and some advantages of situation are necessary, may
support a war against us, and he that can fit out privateers to
interrupt our trade, may, without obtaining a victory, reduce us to
distress.
Our situation, sir, as it preserves us from the danger of an invasion,
except from that powerful monarch, the pretender, who is, indeed, always
to be dreaded, has, likewise, the effect of securing other nations from
being invaded by us; for it is very difficult to transport in one fleet,
and to land at one time, a number sufficient to force their way into a
country where the ports are fortified, and the inhabitants in arms.
Our wars, sir, are, therefore, to be determined by naval battles, and
those nations have very little to fear from us who have no trade to be
disturbed, and no navies to be destroyed; if they can only fit out
cruisers, which may always be done by granting commissions to foreign
adventurers, they may ruin our merchants by captures, exhaust the nation
by the necessity of convoys, and give neutral traders an opportunity of
establishing their credit at those markets which have been, hitherto,
supplied by our manufactures.
This is, indeed, far from being at present an exact account of the state
of Spain, whose wide-extended dominions are liable to insults, and from
whom many of her most wealthy provinces may be torn without great hazard
or difficulty. The particular state of her commerce, which, being only
carried on from one part of her dominions to another, can only be for a
time interrupted, but is in no danger of being invaded by any rival, or
lost by disuse, at least requires our consideration, and we ought to
make war with the utmost frugality, against a people whom no hostilities
can really impoverish, whose commerce may be said to lie at rest rather
than to be shackled, as it will rise into greater vigour at the end of
the war, and whose treasures, though the want of them is a present
inconvenience, are only piled up for a time of security.
As the only method, sir, of reducing this nation, must be that of
invading its colonies, and dismembering its provinces, by which the
chief persons will be deprived of their revenues, and a general
discontent be spread over the people, the forces which are levied for
this expedition, an expedition on which so much of the honour of our
arms and the prosperity of our trade must necessarily depend, ought to
be selected with the greatest care, and disciplined with the exactest
regularity.
On this occasion, therefore, it is surely improper to employ troops
newly collected from shops and villages, and yet more irrational to
trust them to the direction of boys called on this occasion from the
frolicks of a school, or forced from the bosoms of their mothers, and
the softness of the nursery. It is not without compassion, compassion
very far extended, that I consider the unhappy striplings doomed to a
camp, from whom the sun has hitherto been screened, and the wind
excluded, who have been taught, by many tender lectures, the
unwholesomeness of the evening mists and the morning dews, who have been
wrapt in furs in winter, and cooled with fans in summer, who have lived
without any fatigue but that of dress, or any care but that of their
complexion.
Who can forbear, sir, some degree of sympathy, when he sees animals like
these taking their last farewell of the maid that has fed them with
sweetmeats, and defended them from insects; when he sees them drest up
in the habiliments of soldiers, loaded with a sword, and invested with a
command, not to mount the guard at the palace, nor to display their lace
at a review; not to protect ladies at the door of an assembly room, nor
to show their intrepidity at a country fair, but to enter into a kind of
fellowship with the rugged sailor, to hear the tumult of a storm, to
sustain the change of climates, and to be set on shore in an enemy's
dominions?
Surely, he that can see such spectacles without sorrow, must have
hardened his heart beyond the common degrees of cruelty, and it may
reasonably be expected, that he who can propose any method by which such
hardships may be escaped, will be thought entitled to gratitude and
praise.
For my part, I should imagine, sir, that an easy method might be
discovered of obviating such misery, without lessening that number of
officers, which, perhaps, in opposition to reason and experience, some
gentlemen will continue to think necessary, and hope that this may be no
improper time to declare my opinion.
I have observed, that for some time no private centinel has ever risen
to any rank above that of a serjeant, and that commissions have been
reserved as rewards for other services than those of the camp. This
procedure I cannot but think at once impolitick and unjust.
It is impolitick, sir, as it has a natural tendency to extinguish in the
soldiery all emulation and all industry. Soldiers have an equal genius
with other men, and undoubtedly there might be found among them great
numbers capable of learning and of improving the military sciences; but
they have, likewise, the same love of ease, and the desire of honour and
of profit, and will not condemn themselves to labour without the
prospect of reward, nor sacrifice their time to the attainment of that
knowledge, which can have no other effect than to make them discover the
stupidity of their commanders, and render their obedience more
difficult, as it will destroy that reverence which is necessary to
subordination.
It is unjust, sir, because it is not to be doubted, that some soldiers,
by the natural force of their faculties, or by a laudable activity of
mind, have extended their knowledge beyond the duties of a private
station; and he that excels in his profession, has an equitable claim to
distinction and preferment. To advance any man in the army, because his
father is an orator in the senate, or the chief inhabitant of a borough,
seems not more rational, than to make another man a judge, because some
of his ancestors were skilled in gunnery; nor would the lawyers have
juster reasons for complaint in one case, than the soldiers in the
other.
It is, therefore, sir, in my opinion, necessary to the advancement of
military knowledge, that, as a centinel is, for excelling in his
profession, advanced to the degree of a serjeant, the serjeant, who
continues his application, and performs his duty, should, in time, be
honoured with a commission.
It may be objected, indeed, that serjeants, though they are skilful
commanders in war, can very seldom arrive at any remarkable skill in
politicks, and though they should be so fortunate as to gain estates,
could never be of any use as the representatives of a borough; and to
what purpose should those men be advanced, who can only serve their
country, but can contribute very little to the support of the court?
This is, I own, sir, an objection, which I despair of answering to the
satisfaction of those by whom it will be raised. The hardy serjeant
would never cringe gracefully at a levee, would never attain to any
successful degree of address in soliciting votes; and if he should by
mere bribery be deputed hither, would be unable to defend the conduct of
his directors.
In vindication of the present scheme, I believe few of those rugged
warriours would find many arguments; they would not recommend to the
nation a troop of boys, under the command of boys, as the most proper
forces to be sent to make conquests in distant countries, nor would
imagine, that unskilful soldiers could, under the direction of officers
equally ignorant with themselves, attain the knowledge of their duty in
the same time as if they were incorporated with regular troops, in which
every man might receive instructions, and learn his business from his
comrade.
I had lately, sir, the opportunity of hearing the opinion of one of the
greatest generals in the world, on this subject, who declared, with the
utmost confidence of certainty, that raw troops could be disciplined in
a short time, only by being incorporated with those that had been
already taught their duty, and asserted, that with an army so mixed, he
should think himself sufficiently enabled to meet any forces of the same
number, and should not fear to acquit himself successfully, either in
attacking or defending.
Such are the sentiments of this great man, to whom I know not whether
any name can be opposed that deserves equally to be reverenced. He has
had the honour of defending the rights of his country in the senate as
well as in the field, has signalized himself equally in the debate and
in the battle, and, perhaps, deserves less regard for having hazarded
his life, than for having been divested of his employments.
Since, therefore, it is apparent that great numbers of officers are by
no means necessary to success in war, since they are dangerous to our
liberty in time of peace, since they are certainly expensive, and at
best not certainly useful; and since the greatest general of the present
age has declared, that our new levies ought to be mingled with our
standing forces, I shall think it my duty to vote against the present
scheme of raising new regiments, and shall agree to no other supplies
than such as may be sufficient for adding the same numbers to the
present army.
General WADE then spoke as follows:--Sir, though I cannot pretend to
pursue the honourable gentleman through the whole compass of his
argument, nor shall attempt to stand up as his rival, either in extent
of knowledge, or elegance of language, yet as my course of life has
necessarily furnished me with some observations relating to the question
before us, and my present station in the army may, in some measure, be
said to make it my duty to declare my opinion, I shall lay before the
house a few considerations, with the artless simplicity of a plain
soldier, without engaging in a formal debate, or attempting to overthrow
the arguments of others.
It is observed, sir, that for the greatest part, the farther any man has
advanced in life, the less confidence he places in speculation, and the
more he learns to rest upon experience, as the only sure guide in human
affairs; and as the transactions in which he is engaged are more
important, with the greater anxiety does he inquire after precedents,
and the more timorously does he proceed, when he is obliged to regulate
his conduct by conjecture or by deliberation.
This remark, sir, though it may be just with regard to all states of
life, is yet more constantly and certainly applicable to that of the
soldier; because, as his profession is more hazardous than any other, he
must with more caution guard against miscarriages and errours. The old
soldier, therefore, very rarely ventures beyond the verge of experience,
unless in compliance with particular accidents, which does not make any
change in his general scheme, or in situations where nothing can
preserve him but some new stratagem or unprecedented effort, which are
not to be mentioned as part of his original plan of operation, because
they are produced always by unforeseen emergencies, and are to be
imputed, not to choice, but to necessity; for, in consequence of my
first principle, an old soldier never willingly involves himself in
difficulties, or proceeds in such a manner as that he may not expect
success by the regular operations of war.
It will not, therefore, be strange, if I, who, having served in the
army, in the wars of king William, may justly claim the title of an old
soldier, should not easily depart from the methods established in my
youth; methods of which their effects have shown me, that they at least
answer the intention for which they were contrived, and which,
therefore, I shall be afraid of rejecting, lest those which it is
proposed to substitute in their place, however probable in speculation,
should be found defective in practice, and the reasonings, which,
indeed, I cannot answer, should be confuted in the field, where
eloquence has very little power.
The troops of Britain, formed according to the present establishment,
have been found successful; they have preserved the liberties of Europe,
and driven the armies of France before them; they have appeared equally
formidable in sieges and in battles, and with strength equally
irresistible have pressed forward in the field, and mounted the breach.
It may be urged, that this vigour, alacrity, and success, cannot be
proved to have been produced by the number of officers by whom they were
commanded; but since, on the contrary, it cannot be shown that the
number of officers did not contribute to their victories, I think it not
prudent to try the experiment, which, if it should succeed, as it
possibly may, would produce no great advantage; and if it should fail,
and that it may fail no man will deny, must bring upon us, not only the
expense which we are so solicitous to avoid, but disgrace and losses, a
long interruption of our trade, and the slaughter of great numbers of
our fellow-subjects.
Thus far, sir, I have proceeded upon a supposition that the balance of
argument is equal on both sides, and that nothing could be alleged on
one part but experience, or objected to the other but the want of it;
but as I am now called to declare my opinion in a question relating to
my profession, a question of great importance to the publick, I should
think that I had not discharged my duty to my country with that fidelity
which may justly be exacted from me, if I should omit any observation
that my memory may suggest, by which the house may be better enabled to
proceed in this inquiry.
I think it, therefore, proper to declare, that we not only, in the last
great war, experienced the usefulness of numerous officers, but that we
have likewise felt the want of them on a signal occasion, and that the
only great advantage which our enemies obtained, was gained over an army
rendered weak by the want of the usual number of officers. Such were the
forces that were defeated at the fatal battle of Almanza, by which
almost all Spain was recovered from us. And it is, sir, the opinion of
very skilful commanders, that the Germans, only by having fewer officers
than the French, did not succeed in those long and obstinate battles of
Parma and Guastalla.
It is, indeed, natural to imagine, that a greater number of officers
must promote success, because courage is kindled by example, and it is,
therefore, of use to every man to have his leader in his view. Shame, at
one time, and affection at another, may produce the effects of courage
where it is wanted, and those may follow their commander, who are
inclined to desert their duty; for it is seldom known that, while the
officers appear confident, the soldiers despair, or that they think of
retreating but after the example of their leaders.
Where there are only few officers, it is apparent that more is left to
chance, in which it becomes not a wise man to place any confidence; for
if the officers are killed at the beginning of the action, the soldiers
must become an useless, defenceless herd, without order, without
unanimity, and without design; but by the present method, if an officer
happens to fall, his place is immediately supplied by another, the
action goes forward, and the enemy receives no advantage from confusion
or delay.
I am, therefore of opinion, that in raising troops for the expedition
now intended, the established method ought to be followed, and that we
ought not to hazard the success of our attempt by new regulations, of
which no human sagacity can fortell the event.
Though it cannot be denied, that some addition might be made to our
companies without any visible or certain inconvenience, yet the
augmentation now intended is too numerous to be so incorporated without
some neglect of discipline, as the officers would be charged with more
men than they could properly superintend.
There is, indeed, sir, another method of incorporation, by adding new
companies to each regiment; but of this method the advantage would be
small, because the number of captains and inferiour officers must be the
same, and the pay of only the field officers would be saved, and this
trifling gain would be far over-balanced by the inconveniencies which
experience has shown to arise from it. There have been regiments formed
of thirteen companies, instead of ten; but it was found, that as the
officers of a company may be over-charged with soldiers, a colonel may
likewise have more companies than he can conveniently inspect, and the
ancient regulation was restored, as the least liable to difficulties and
objections.
Having thus endeavoured to vindicate the manner in which our new troops
are proposed to be levied, it may be expected that I should now make
some observations on the service in which they are to be employed, which
I cannot think liable to any unanswerable objection. It is now, sir, in
our choice whether we will send the new regiments abroad or keep them at
home; and our choice may easily be determined by comparing the value of
our colonies with that of their mother country. If it be not necessary
to have any army here to defend us against insults and invasions, the
question about the manner of raising or employing new regiments is
superfluous, because none ought to be raised, as our old troops are
sufficiently numerous for foreign service. But if the security of the
nation requires an army, would it not be madness to send those troops to
a distant part of the world, in which we can confide most! Would not
those, who speak with such contempt of an expedition undertaken by boys,
have a better reason for their censure, if only boys were stationed on
our coasts to repel the veterans of France? Would not such measures
animate our enemies, and invite an invasion?
It may, perhaps, be urged farther, that the troops which are sent into
America, are more likely to succeed in their design, than any regiment
of ancient establishment. The chief danger to be feared in that part of
the world, is not from the enemy but the climate, with which young men
are most able to contend, though they may not be equally qualified for
attempts in which skill is equally necessary with vigour.
I am convinced, sir, that this war has hitherto been prosecuted with
ardour and fidelity, and that no measures have been taken but such as
experience and reason have supported, and therefore affirm, without
scruple, that if we are not successful, our miscarriages must be imputed
to the chance of war, from which no prudence can exempt us.
Lord QUARENDON spoke next, in the following manner, being his first
speech:--Sir, having-but very lately had the honour of a seat in this
assembly, I am conscious how little I am acquainted with either the
subjects or forms of debate, and should, therefore, continue to listen
to the sentiments of persons more experienced, with silent veneration,
did I not observe with how much indulgence they are heard who mean well,
however deficient in knowledge, or in eloquence.
As the honourable gentleman who spoke last, sir, professes to have
formed his opinion rather from facts than arguments, I hope I shall be
indulged by the house, in an attempt to examine those facts which he has
produced, because I think them not sufficient to support his positions,
which must, therefore, be established by some other proofs, before a
decision of this question can be fixed by them.
With regard to his experience, to which undoubtedly no small degree of
veneration is due, he confesses that we have tried only one of the two
forms of establishment now in competition, and that, therefore, though
he has had reason to approve that with which he is most acquainted, he
has no certain proofs of the inefficacy or imperfection of the other.
But experience, sir, may be extended much farther than our own personal
transactions, and may very justly comprehend those observations which we
have had opportunities of making upon the conduct and success of others.
This gentleman, though he has only commanded in the armies of Britain,
has seen the forces of other nations, has remarked their regulations,
and heard of their actions with our confederates in the last war; he has
probably acted in conjunction, and though it is known that they differ
from us in the proportion of soldiers and officers, he has mentioned no
disadvantage which might be supposed to arise from their establishment,
and therefore, I suppose, he cannot deny that their behaviour and
success was the same with that of our own troops.
The battles of Almanza, Parma, and Guastalla, which he has particularly
mentioned, were lost, as he informs us, by armies not officered
according to the establishment which he recommends to us: but it is
observable that his argument is defective in an essential part; for
though he affirms that the armies which were defeated had fewer officers
than the enemy, he has neither shown, nor attempted to show, that the
want of officers occasioned the defeat, or that the loss would have been
prevented by a greater number.
These instances, therefore, can be of no effect on the determination of
the present question; for though it is certain that at Germany, and at
other places, armies with few officers have lost the battle, it is not
less common for those troops that are more liberally supplied, to be
overthrown by others which are differently modelled.
With regard, sir, to the troops of Germany, I have heard them praised,
in many parts of Europe, as not inferiour either to those of France, or
of any other nation, and have been informed, that their ill success,
both at Parma and Guastalla, may be justly imputed to other causes than
the want of officers.
There has, perhaps, sir, seldom been an example of firmness, discipline,
and resolution, beyond that which was shown by the Germans at the action
of Parma, where they attacked the trenches of the French, sustained the
fire of the ramparts of the city, and though they lost their
commander-in-chief and two others, towards the beginning of the action,
they continued the fight for eleven hours, and at last retired only at
the approach of night.
At Guastalla, sir, they attacked the French in their trenches, even with
forces inferiour in number, so far were they from any diffidence in the
form of their establishment; and after a fight of seven hours, in which
their loss was, under all their disadvantages, not greater than that of
their enemies, they retreated to their former camp unmolested and
unpursued. The French, sir, were preserved in both these battles, not by
the number of their officers, but by their situation, by woods,
cassines, ditches, and intrenchments.
Nor do I discover, sir, what can be inferred from his observation of the
influence of example in time of action, but that officers should be
selected with great care, and not be promoted by favour, or interest, or
caprice; for an example of cowardice in a leader must be pernicious, in
proportion as that of bravery is beneficial; and as, where more officers
are supposed necessary, there is less room for choice, it must be
allowed that the troops, which have more officers than other forces, are
in more danger of being infected with cowardice.
It appears, therefore, to me that the expense of the present
establishment is a certain evil, and that the advantages are very
doubtful: it appears that the present state of the nation requires
frugality, and, therefore, I shall vote for the incorporation of our new
levies with the old regiments.
By this incorporation, sir, our new-levied troops will be no longer
distinguished from our veterans; they will be equally acquainted with
discipline, and will learn, from the conversation of their associates, a
spirit of enterprise, and a contempt of danger; we may then employ
forces equally formidable in all parts of the publick service, and
invade the dominions of our enemies, without leaving our own country
desolate.
The arguments which the honourable gentleman has offered in defence of
sending our younger troops to America, which may likewise be used
against an incorporation, is, in my opinion, sir, far from being
conclusive; for it supposes, what will not be granted, that a cold
climate may be changed for a hotter with more safety by a young than an
old man. I have been told, on the contrary, that superabundant heat is
the great disease of youth, and that the want of it produces most of the
infirmities of age; and every one has known the lives of persons
languishing with age, prolonged by a removal into warm countries. I am,
therefore, of opinion, that the honourable gentleman's argument is
defective in all its parts, and hope that I shall not be charged with
obstinacy or perverseness for dissenting from him.
Mr. HOWE spoke next, in substance as follows:--Sir, before I engage in a
discussion of the question, I cannot but think it necessary to observe,
that the honourable gentleman who spoke the second in this debate, has
been very far from consulting either policy or justice in his
declamation, and that he deviated from the subject only to ridicule his
country, to exalt our enemies, and depress our efforts.
He has described, sir, the British youth, the sons of noble families,
and the hopes of the nation, in terms too contemptuous to be heard
without indignation; he has amused himself with displaying their
ignorance and their effeminacy, and has indulged his imagination in a
malignant kind of gaiety, which, however it may divert himself, is very
far from contributing either to the reformation or prevention of those
practices which he censures.
I believe, sir, it will be granted, that nothing ought to please but in
proportion to its propriety and truth; and, if we try the satire that we
have lately heard, by this test, it will be found to have very little
claim to applause; for our armies must be composed of the youth of the
nation; and, for my part, I cannot discover what advantage we shall gain
over the Spaniards, by informing them how little our troops are
accustomed to danger, how short a time they have been acquainted with
fatigue, how tenderly they have been nursed, how easily they may be
frighted, and how certainly they will be conquered, if they but meet
with opposition.
Nor, sir, is such an account of the youth of Britain more true, in my
opinion, than it is prudent. I am far from discovering any such
remarkable degeneracy in the age, or any great prevalence of cowardice
and unmanly delicacy; nor do I doubt of hearing that our youth, if they
are sent upon any expedition, have shown that the British courage is not
yet extinguished, and that, if they are ranged on the plains of America,
they will discover themselves the sons of those that forced those
passes, and those trenches, that other troops would have failed in
attempting.
That the degeneracy of the British youth, is, at least, not universal,
we have just now sir, received an incontestable proof from the gentleman
who spoke last, and spoke with so much elegance of language, and
justness of reasoning, as shows, that there are to be found, among the
youth of Britain, persons very well qualified for the senate; and I have
never heard that a post in the army required greater abilities.
The pleasure, however, with which I have attended to his remarks, has
not so far prejudiced me in favour of his opinion, as that I shall
easily consent to change that method of discipline, to which our troops
have been accustomed, and of which we know by experience, that it is, at
least, not less efficacious than that of any other nation. Customs, if
they are not bad, are not to be changed, because it is an argument in
favour of a practice that the people have experienced it, and approved
it, and every change is disagreeable to those who judge only by
prejudice, of whom I need not say how great is the number.
Many arguments may, sir, in my opinion, be added to our experience in
favour of the present establishment. The number of officers--but I find
myself unable to pursue my design, because I can no longer read my
notes, which, being written by another hand, somewhat embarrass me in
this decline of the light. I shall, therefore, only make some
observations upon the speech of the gentleman who spoke the second in
this debate, and hope that I shall be allowed to deviate from the
principal question, since I do it only in pursuit of another.
He has observed, that our troopers are mounted upon horses that are of
no use; a remark, sir, which I never heard from any other person, and
for which, I believe, no authority can be produced: they are mounted,
indeed, upon horses very different from those which are used by other
nations, because scarcely any other country breeds horses of equal size
and strength, and, therefore, I am informed that the French have
purchased horses from this island, and believe that all the cavalry of
Europe would be mounted upon our horses if they could procure them. I
have been informed, that their pressure in the shock of battle is such,
as no forces in the world are able to sustain; and that it was not less
by the strength of our horses than the spirit of our soldiers, that the
squadrons of France were, in the battle of Blenheim, pushed into the
Danube.
Nor do I less disapprove his censure of the choice which has been made
of the troops intended for the American service, which, though I
ardently desire its success, I cannot think of equal importance with the
defence of our own country; for though we may be disgraced by a defeat,
we can be endangered only by an invasion; and, therefore, I think it
necessary to retain those troops on which we may best rely for the
security of this island, lest our enemies should take the advantage of
their absence, and set the pretender on the throne.
Sir William YONGE next rose, and spoke to the effect following:--Sir, it
is a standing maxim, both in private life and public transactions, that
no man can obtain great advantages who is afraid of petty
inconveniencies; and that he that will hope to obtain his end without
expense, will languish for ever in fruitless wishes, and have the
mortification of seeing the adventurous and the liberal enjoy that
felicity, which, though it is within his reach, he is afraid of seizing.
When the depredations of the Spaniards became first the subject of our
debates, nothing was heard amongst us but threats of vengeance, demands
of reparation, assertions of sovereignty, and resolutions to obtain
security: the importance of our commerce, the necessity of rigorous
measures, the danger of pusillanimity, the meanness of negotiation, and
the disadvantages of delay, were thundered from every part of the house.
Every man seemed to imagine that there was no mean between victory and
ruin, and that not to humble Spain was to betray our country to insults,
ignominy, and slavery.
Far was I then, sir, from suspecting, that when the war, thus vehemently
urged, should be declared, that the prosecution of it would produce any
debates. I doubted not but that every man would be desirous of
signalizing his zeal for the prosperity of commerce, by expediting the
supplies, and forwarding the preparations; and that the only contention
among us would be, who should appear the most ardent enemy of Spain.
But no sooner are hostilities begun against this insolent and oppressive
nation, than those who expressed most resentment at the prudence and
moderation by which they were delayed, those that accused every attempt
for an accommodation, of cowardice, and charged the ministry with
conniving at the rapine of pirates, begin to inquire into the necessity
of the expenses occasioned by the war, to harangue on the advantages of
parsimony, and to think it of more importance to ease our taxes than to
subdue our enemies.
In pursuance of this new doctrine they are now endeavouring to embarrass
the measures of his majesty, that they may save, according to their own
computation, only thirty thousand pounds, which, in reality, I can
easily show to be no more than fifteen thousand.
For the sake of this important sum, our army is to be modelled by a new
regulation, and the success of the war is to be impeded, the security of
our commerce to be hazarded, and our colonies are to be endangered.
Frugality is, undoubtedly, a virtue, but is, like others, to be
practised on proper occasions: to compute expenses with a scrupulous
nicety, in time of war, is to prefer money to safety, and, by a very
perverse kind of policy, to hazard the whole for the preservation of a
part.
The gentlemen, sir, who have most endeavoured to distinguish themselves
as the constant opponents of the administration, have charged it, on all
occasions, with giving encouragement to the Spaniards, but can charge it
with nothing so likely to raise the confidence and confirm the obstinacy
of the enemy, as the objections which they themselves have made to the
present scheme of levying forces; for to how great a degree of poverty
must they believe that nation reduced, of which the warmest patriots
struggle to save a sum so inconsiderable, by an experiment of so much
uncertainty? And how easily will the Spaniards promise themselves, that
they shall gain the victory only by obliging us to continue in a state
of war, a state which, by our own confession, we are not able to
support?
Had any other argument, sir, been produced than the necessity of
parsimony, it had been less dangerous to have agreed to this new scheme;
but to adopt it only for the sake of sparing fifteen thousand pounds,
would be to make ourselves contemptible, to intimidate our allies, and
to unite all those against us, who are inclined to trample on misery,
and to plunder weakness.
I am inclined to judge so favourably, sir, of the intentions of those
whom I am now opposing, that I believe they have only used this
argument, because they were able to produce no other, and that if either
reason or experience had been on their side, the poverty of the nation
had not been mentioned.
But the honourable gentleman, who has been so long engaged in military
employments, has shown that all our success has been obtained by the
present establishment, and that the battle in which we suffered most,
was lost by our unfortunate deficiency of officers.
Nor do his reasons, sir, however modestly offered, deserve less regard
than his experience, for he has shown that a greater number of officers
naturally contribute to preserve discipline, and excite courage; and it
is not necessary that a man should be much a soldier to discover, that
discipline and courage united, must generally prevail. To the examples
which he has produced in favour of his opinion, it has been objected,
that victories equally wonderful have been gained with fewer officers,
and, by the honourable gentleman that spoke the second on this occasion,
the actions of Eugene were opposed to those of the duke of MARLBOROUGH.
That victories have been gained by troops differently regulated, I
cannot deny; victories have likewise been gained, sir, under every
circumstance of disadvantage; victories have been gained by inferiour
numbers, and by raw troops, over veteran armies, yet no prudent general
ever produced these instances as arguments against the usefulness of
discipline, or as proofs that superiority of numbers was no advantage.
The success of prince Eugene, in the late war, was far from convincing
the British general, that the German establishment was preferable to our
own; for he required that the Hessian troops, which were paid by
Britain, should be officered like our national troops. In this he could
be influenced only by his own opinion; for he neither nominated their
officers, nor could advance his interest at home by creating new posts
to which he did not recommend; he could, therefore, only regard the
success of the war, and changed their model only because he thought it
defective.
The Germans themselves, sir, are far from imagining that their armies
might not be made more formidable by approaching nearer to the British
methods; for one of their officers, a man of great reputation and
experience, has informed me, that they were convinced of their defect,
and that nothing hindered them from adding more officers, but the fear
of expenses; that they imputed all their defeats to the necessity of
parsimony, that their men wanted not courage but leaders, and that their
enemies gained advantages merely by the superiority of their opulence.
In the late war, it was common for the auxiliary troops, when they were
sent upon any expedition of importance, to be supplied with officers
either from their other regiments, or by the British forces; so
necessary did the duke of MARLBOROUGH think a larger number of officers
in time of action, that where he could not alter the establishment, he
deviated from the common methods of war, and transferred his officers
occasionally into troops over which they had no settled authority.
It is, therefore, most evident, sir, that the model on which our troops
are formed, was, by this great commander, preferred to that which is now
so warmly recommended, and I know not why we should recede from his
practice, if we are desirous of his success.
Nor can I discover, sir, any better method of selecting officers than
that which has of late been followed, however some may censure or
ridicule it. To advance gentlemen to command, seems to be the most
likely way to unite authority with rank, for no man willingly obeys
those to whom he has lately seen himself equal, or whose conduct in
lower stations he has, perhaps, had opportunities of examining too
nearly.
The distinction of birth, however chimerical in itself, has been so long
admitted, and so universally received, that it is generally imagined to
confer on one man an indelible and evident superiority over another, a
superiority, which those who would easily imagine themselves equal in
merit cannot deny, and which they allow more willingly, because, though
it be an advantage to possess it, to want it cannot be justly considered
as a reproach.