Congress, and probably they particularly wish it should not meet till
Genet is gone. At this meeting I received a letter from Mr. Remsen at
New York, informing me of the event of the combat between the Ambuscade
and the Boston. Knox broke out into the most unqualified abuse of
Captain Courtnay. Hamilton, with less fury, but with the deepest
vexation, loaded him with censures. Both showed the most unequivocal
mortification at the event.
August the 6th, 1793. The President calls on me at my house in the
country, and introduces my letter of July the 31st, announcing that I
should resign at the close of the next month. He again expressed his
repentance at not having resigned himself, and how much it was increased
by seeing that he was to be deserted by those on whose aid he had
counted: that he did not know where he should look to find characters
to fill up the offices; that mere talents did not suffice for the
department of State, but it required a person conversant in foreign
affairs, perhaps acquainted with foreign courts; that without this, the
best talents would be awkward and at a loss. He told me that Colonel
Hamilton had three or four weeks ago written to him, informing him that
private as well as public reasons had brought him to the determination
to retire, and that he should do it towards the close of the next
session. He said he had often before intimated dispositions to resign,
but never as decisively before; that he supposed he had fixed on the
latter part of next session, to give an opportunity to Congress to
examine into his conduct: that our going out at times so different,
increased his difficulty; for if he had both places to fill at once, he
might consult both the particular talents and geographical situation
of our successors. He expressed great apprehensions at the fermentation
which seemed to be working in the mind of the public; that many
descriptions of persons, actuated by different causes, appeared to
be uniting; what it would end in he knew not; a new Congress was to
assemble, more numerous, perhaps of a different spirit; the first
expressions of their sentiment would be important; if I would only stay
to the end of that, it would relieve him considerably.
I expressed to him my excessive repugnance to public life, the
particular uneasiness of my situation in this place, where the laws of
society oblige me always to move exactly in the circle which I know to
bear me peculiar hatred; that is to say, the wealthy aristocrats,
the merchants connected closely with England, the new created paper
fortunes; that thus surrounded, my words were caught, multiplied,
misconstrued, and even fabricated and spread abroad to my injury; that
he saw also, that there was such an opposition of views between myself
and another part of the administration, as to render it peculiarly
unpleasing, and to destroy the necessary harmony. Without knowing
the views of what is called the republican party here, or having any
communication with them, I could, undertake to assure him, from my
intimacy with that party in the late Congress, that there was not a view
in the republican party as spread over the United States, which went
to the frame of the government; that I believed the next Congress would
attempt nothing material, but to render their own body independent; that
that party were firm in their dispositions to support the government;
that the manoeuvres of Mr. Genet might produce some little
embarrassment, but that he would be abandoned by the republicans the
moment they knew the nature of his conduct; and on the whole, no crisis
existed which threatened any thing.
He said, he believed the views of the republican party were perfectly
pure, but when men put a machine into motion, it is impossible for them
to stop it exactly where they would choose, or to say where it will
stop. That the constitution we have is an excellent one, if we can keep
it where it is; that it was, indeed, supposed there was a party disposed
to change it into a monarchical form, but that he could conscientiously
declare there was not a man in the United States who would set his
face more decidedly against it than himself. Here I interrupted him by
saying, ‘No rational man in the United States suspects you of any other
disposition; but there does not pass a week, in which we cannot prove
declarations dropping from the monarchical party, that our government is
good for nothing, is a milk-and-water thing which cannot support itself,
we must knock it down, and set up something of more energy. He said, if
that was the case, he thought it a proof of their insanity, for that the
republican spirit of the Union was so manifest and so solid, that it was
astonishing how any one could expect to move it.
He returned to the difficulty of naming my successor; he said Mr.
Madison would be his first choice, but that he had always expressed to
him such a decision against public office, that he could not expect he
would undertake it. Mr. Jay would prefer his present office. He said
that Mr. Jay had a great opinion of the talents of Mr. King; that there
was also Mr. Smith of South Carolina, and E. Rutledge: but he observed,
that, name whom he would, some objections would be made, some would be
called speculators, some one thing, some another; and he asked me to
mention any characters occurring to me. I asked him if Governor Johnson
of Maryland had occurred to him. He said he had; that he was a man
of great good sense, an honest man, and, he believed, clear of
speculations: but this, says he, is an instance of what I was observing;
with all these qualifications, Governor Johnson, from a want of
familiarity with foreign affairs, would be in them like a fish out of
water; every thing would be new to him, and he awkward in every thing.
I confessed to him that I had considered Johnson rather as fit for the
Treasury department. ‘Yes,’ says he, ‘for that he would be the fittest
appointment that could be made; he is a man acquainted with figures, and
having as good a knowledge of the resources of this country as any man.’
I asked him if Chancellor Livingston had occurred to him. He said yes;
but he was from New York, and to appoint him while Hamilton was in, and
before it should be known he was going out, would excite a newspaper
conflagration, as the ultimate arrangement would not be known. He said
McLurg had occurred to him as a man of first-rate abilities, but it is
said that he is a speculator. He asked me what sort of a man Wolcot was.
I told him I knew nothing of him myself; I had heard him characterized
as a cunning man. I asked him whether some person could not take my
office per interim, till he should make an appointment; as Mr. Randolph,
for instance. ‘Yes,’ says he; ‘but there you would raise the expectation
of keeping it, and I do not know that he is fit for it, nor what is
thought of Mr. Randolph.’ I avoided noticing the last observation, and
he put the question to me directly. I then told him, I went into society
so little as to be unable to answer it. I knew that the embarrassments
in his private affairs had obliged him to use expedients, which had
injured him with the merchants and shop-keepers, and affected his
character of independence; that these embarrassments were serious, and
not likely to cease soon. He said, if I would only stay in till the end
of another quarter (the last of December), it would get us through the
difficulties of this year, and he was satisfied that the affairs of
Europe would be settled with this campaign: for that either France would
be overwhelmed by it, or the confederacy would give up the contest. By
that time, too, Congress will have manifested its character and views. I
told him that I had set my private affairs in motion in a line which
had powerfully called for my presence the last spring, and that they
had suffered immensely from my not going home; that I had now calculated
them to my return in the fall, and to fail in going then, would be
the loss of another year, and prejudicial beyond measure. I asked
him whether he could not name Governor Johnson to my office, under an
express arrangement that at the close of the session he should take that
of the Treasury. He said that men never chose to descend; that being
once in a higher department, he would not like to go into a lower one.
He asked me whether I could not arrange my affairs by going home. I told
him I did not think the public business would admit of it; that there
never was a day now, in which the absence of the Secretary of State
would not be inconvenient to the public. And he concluded by desiring
that I would take two or three days to consider whether I could not stay
in till the end of another quarter, for that, like a man going, to the
gallows, he was willing to put it off as long as he could; but if I
persisted, he must then look about him and make up his mind to do the
best he could: and so he took leave.
November the 5th, 1793. E. Randolph tells me, that Hamilton, in
conversation with him yesterday, said, ‘Sir, if all the people in
America were now assembled, and to call on me to say whether I am a
friend to the French revolution, I would declare that I have it in
abhorrence?’
November the 8th, 1793. At a conference at the President’s, where I read
several letters of Mr. Genet; on finishing one of them, I asked what
should be the answer. The President thereupon took occasion to observe,
that Mr. Genet’s conduct continued to be of so extraordinary a nature,
that he meant to propose to our serious consideration, whether he
should not have his functions discontinued, and be ordered away. He
went lengthily into observations on his conduct, to raise against the
executive, 1. the people, 2. the State governments, 3. the Congress.
He showed he felt the venom of Genet’s pen, but declared he would not
choose his insolence should be regarded any farther, than as might be
thought to affect the honor of the country. Hamilton and Knox readily
and zealously argued for dismissing Mr. Genet. Randolph opposed it with
firmness, and pretty lengthily. The President replied to him lengthily,
and concluded by saying he did not wish to have the thing hastily
decided, but that we should consider of it, and give our opinions on his
return from Reading and Lancaster. Accordingly, November the 18th, we
met at his house; read new volumes of Genet’s letters, received since
the President’s departure; then took up the discussion of the subjects
of communication to Congress. 1. The Proclamation. E. Randolph read the
statement he had prepared; Hamilton did not like it; said much about his
own views; that the President had a right to declare his opinion to
our citizens and foreign nations; that it was not the interest of this
country to join in the war, and that we were under no obligation to join
in it; that though the declaration would not legally bind Congress, yet
the President had a right to give his opinion of it, and he was against
any explanation in the speech, which should yield that he did not intend
that foreign nations should consider it as a declaration of neutrality,
future as well as present; that he understood it as meant to give them
that sort of assurance and satisfaction, and to say otherwise now,
would be a deception on them. He was for the President’s using
such expressions, as should neither affirm his right to make such
a declaration to foreign nations, nor yield it. Randolph and myself
opposed the right of the President to declare any thing future on the
question, Shall there or shall there not be a war? and that no such
thing was intended; that Hamilton’s construction of the effect of the
proclamation would have been a determination of the question of the
guarantee, which we both denied to have intended, and I had at the
time declared the executive incompetent to. Randolph said he meant that
foreign nations should understand it as an intimation of the President’s
opinion, that neutrality would be our interest. I declared my meaning to
have been, that foreign nations should understand no such thing; that,
on the contrary, I would have chosen them to be doubtful, and to come
and bid for our neutrality. I admitted the President, having received
the nation at the close of Congress in a state of peace, was bound to
preserve them in that state till Congress should meet again, and might
proclaim any thing which went no farther. The President declared he
never had an idea that he could bind Congress against declaring war, or
that any thing contained in his proclamation could look beyond the first
day of their meeting. His main view was to keep our people in peace;
he apologized for the use of the term neutrality in his answers,
and justified it, by having submitted the first of them (that to the
merchants, wherein it was used) to our consideration, and we had not
objected to the term. He concluded in the end, that Colonel Hamilton
should prepare a paragraph on this subject for the speech, and it should
then be considered. We were here called to dinner.
After dinner, the _renvoi_ of Genet was proposed by himself. I opposed
it on these topics. France, the only nation on earth sincerely our
friend. The measure so harsh a one, that no precedent is produced
where it has not been followed by war. Our messenger has now been gone
eighty-four days; consequently, we may hourly expect the return, and
to be relieved by their revocation of him. Were it now resolved on, it
would be eight or ten days before the matter on which the order should
be founded, could be selected, arranged, discussed, and forwarded. This
would bring us within four or five days of the meeting of Congress.
Would it not be better to wait and see how the pulse of that body, new
as it is, would beat. They are with us now, probably, but such a step as
this may carry many over to Genet’s side. Genet will not obey the
order, &c. &c. The President asked me what I would do if Genet sent the
accusation to us to be communicated to Congress, as he threatened in the
letter to Moultrie. I said I would not send it to Congress; but either
put it in the newspapers, or send it back to him to be published if he
pleased. Other questions and answers were put and returned in a quicker
altercation than I ever before saw the President use. Hamilton was for
the _renvoi_; spoke much of the dignity of the nation; that they were
now to form their character; that our conduct now would tempt or deter
other foreign ministers from treating us in the same manner; touched on
the President’s personal feelings; did not believe France would make it
a cause of war; if she did, we ought to do what was right, and meet the
consequences, &c. Knox on the same side, and said he thought it very
possible Mr. Genet would either declare us a department of France, or
levy troops here and endeavor to reduce us to obedience. Randolph of my
opinion, and argued chiefly on the resurrection of popularity to Genet,
which might be produced by this measure. That at present he was dead in
the public opinion, if we would but leave him so. The President lamented
there was not unanimity among us; that as it was, we had left him
exactly where we found him; and so it ended.
November the 21st. We met at the President’s. The manner of explaining
to Congress the intentions of the proclamation, was the matter of
debate. Randolph produced his way of stating it. This expressed its
views to have been, 1. to keep our citizens quiet; 2. to intimate to
foreign nations that it was the President’s opinion, that the interests
and dispositions of this country were for peace. Hamilton produced his
statement, in which he declared his intention to be, to say nothing
which could be laid hold of for any purpose; to leave the proclamation
to explain itself. He entered pretty fully into all the argumentation
of Pacificus; he justified the right of the President to declare his
opinion for a future neutrality, and that there existed no circumstances
to oblige the United States to enter into the war on account of the
guarantee; and that in agreeing to the proclamation, he meant it to be
understood as conveying both those declarations; viz. neutrality, and
that the _casus foederis_ on the guarantee did not exist. He admitted
the Congress might declare war, notwithstanding these declarations of
the President. In like manner, they might declare war in the face of a
treaty, and in direct infraction of it. Among other positions laid down
by him, this was with great positiveness; that the constitution having
given power to the President and Senate to make treaties, they might
make a treaty of neutrality which should take from Congress the right to
declare war in that particular case, and that under the form of a treaty
they might exercise any powers whatever, even those exclusively given by
the constitution to the House of Representatives. Randolph opposed this
position, and seemed to think that where they undertook to do acts by
treaty (as to settle a tariff of duties), which were exclusively given
to the legislature, that an act of the legislature would be necessary
to confirm them, as happens in England, when a treaty interferes with
duties established by law. I insisted that in giving to the President
and Senate a power to make treaties, the constitution meant only to
authorize them to carry into effect, by way of treaty, any powers they
might constitutionally exercise. I was sensible of the weak points in
this position, but there were still weaker in the other hypothesis; and
if it be impossible to discover a rational measure of authority to have
been given by this clause, I would rather suppose that the cases
which my hypothesis would leave unprovided, were not thought of by the
convention, or if thought of, could not be agreed on, or were thought
of and deemed unnecessary to be invested in the government. Of this
last description, were treaties of neutrality, treaties offensive and
defensive, &c. In every event, I would rather construe so narrowly as
to oblige the nation to amend, and thus declare what powers they would
agree to yield, than too broadly, and, indeed, so broadly as to enable
the executive and Senate to do things which the constitution forbids.
On the question, which form of explaining the principles of the
proclamation should be adopted, I declared for Randolph’s, though it
gave to that instrument more objects than I had contemplated. Knox
declared for Hamilton’s. The President said he had had but one
object, the keeping our people quiet till Congress should meet; that
nevertheless, to declare he did not mean a declaration of neutrality,
in the technical sense of the phrase, might perhaps be crying _peccavi_
before he was charged. However, he did not decide between the two
draughts.
November the 23rd. At the President’s. Present, Knox, Randolph, and Th:
Jefferson. Subject, the heads of the speech. One was, a proposition to
Congress to fortify the principal harbors. I opposed the expediency
of the General Government’s undertaking it, and the expediency of the
President’s proposing it. It was amended, by substituting a proposition
to adopt means for enforcing respect to the jurisdiction of the United
States within its waters. It was proposed to recommend the establishment
of a military academy. I objected that none of the specified powers
given by the constitution to Congress, would authorize this. It was,
therefore, referred for further consideration and inquiry. Knox was for
both propositions. Randolph against the former, but said nothing as to
the latter. The President acknowledged he had doubted of the expediency
of undertaking the former; and as to the latter, though it would be a
good thing, he did not wish to bring on any thing which might generate
heat and ill-humor. It was agreed that Randolph should draw the speech
and the messages.
November the 28th. Met at the President’s. I read over a list of the
papers copying, to be communicated to Congress on the subject of Mr.
Genet. It was agreed that Genet’s letter of August the 13th to the
President, mine of August the 16th, and Genet’s of November to myself
and the Attorney General, desiring a prosecution of Jay and King,
should not be sent to the legislature: on a general opinion, that the
discussion of the fact certified by Jay and King had better be left to
the channel of the newspapers, and in the private hands in which it now
is, than for the President to meddle in it, or give room to a discussion
of it in Congress.
Randolph had prepared a draught of the speech. The clause recommending
fortifications was left out; but that for a military academy was
inserted. I opposed it, as unauthorized by the constitution. Hamilton
and Knox approved it without discussion. Randolph was for it, saying
that the words of the constitution anthorizing Congress to lay taxes,
&c. for the common defence, might comprehend it. The President said he
would not choose to recommend any thing against the constitution, but if
it was doubtful, he was so impressed with the necessity of this measure,
that he would refer it to Congress, and let them decide for themselves
whether the constitution authorized it or not. It was, therefore,
left in. I was happy to see that Randolph had, by accident, used the
expression ‘our republic,’ in the speech. The President, however, made
no objection to it, and so, as much as it had disconcerted him on
a former occasion with me, it was now put into his own mouth to be
pronounced to the two Houses of legislature.
No material alterations were proposed or made in any part of the
draught.
After dinner, I produced the draught of messages on the subject of
France and England, proposing that that relative to Spain should be
subsequent and secret.
Hamilton objected to the draught in toto; said that the contrast drawn
between the conduct of France and England amounted to a declaration of
war; he denied that France had ever done us favors; that it was mean for
a nation to acknowledge favors; that the dispositions of the people of
this country towards France, he considered as a serious calamity; that
the executive ought not, by an echo of this language, to nourish that
disposition in the people; that the offers in commerce made us by
France, were the offspring of the moment, of circumstances which would
not last, and it was wrong to receive as permanent, things merely
temporary; that he could demonstrate that Great Britain showed us
more favors than France. In complaisance to him I whittled down the
expressions without opposition; struck out that of ‘favors ancient and
recent’ from France; softened some terms, and omitted some sentiments
respecting Great Britain. He still was against the whole, but insisted
that, at any rate, it should be a secret communication, because the
matters it stated were still depending. These were, 1. the inexecution
of the treaty; 2. the restraining our commerce to their own ports and
those of their friends. Knox joined Hamilton in every thing. Randolph
was for the communications; that the documents respecting the first
should be given in as public; but that those respecting the second
should not be given to the legislature at all, but kept secret. I began
to tremble now for the whole, lest all should be kept secret. I urged,
especially, the duty now incumbent on the President, to lay before the
legislature and the public what had passed on the inexecution of the
treaty, since Mr. Hammond’s answer of this month might be considered
as the last we should ever have; that, therefore, it could no longer
be considered as a negotiation pending. I urged that the documents
respecting the stopping our corn ought also to go, but insisted that if
it should be thought better to withhold them, the restrictions should
not go to those respecting the treaty; that neither of these subjects
was more in a state of pendency than the recall of Mr. Genet, on which,
nevertheless, no scruples had been expressed. The President took up
the subject with more vehemence than I have seen him show, and decided
without reserve, that not only what had passed on the inexecution of the
treaty should go in as public (in which Hamilton and Knox had divided
in opinion from Randolph and myself), but also that those respecting the
stopping our corn should go in as public (wherein Hamilton, Knox, and
Randolph had been against me.) This was the first instance I had seen of
his deciding on the opinion of one against that of three others, which
proved his own to have been very strong.