THE NEGRO OFFICER
The Plattsburg idea of military training was inaugurated in 1915, when
Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood organized a special training camp for civilians.
The purpose of the camp was to offer four weeks of intensive training
under the direct supervision of officers of the United States Army, and
it was intended that this should be of such thoroughness that the men
receiving it would be able to serve as officers in an emergency, as was
afterwards done by a large number of Plattsburg men who served under
General Pershing in the course of the trouble with Mexico.
Colored men were not given an opportunity to attend the Plattsburg
camps. There was, consequently, no way in which any considerable
number of them could secure the training necessary to enable them, in
an emergency, to serve as officers. In order to meet this exigency,
many Negroes and their friends endeavored to secure the establishment
of a training camp for colored officers, although at first the idea
of a separate camp was not popular. In the winter of 1917, however,
Major General Wood agreed to organize the camp if two hundred
colored men would signify their intention of attending; and in this
period of uncertainty and anxiety, friends of the movement started a
campaign with the hope of creating sufficient interest to warrant the
establishment of the camp.
Dr. Joel E. Spingarn, one of the principal officers of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People and a true friend of
the Negro, who was the strongest advocate of the training camp, in May,
1917, sent out a circular letter calling for colored men to enter the
volunteer service of the United States Army in order that the number
of men necessary for the establishment of the camp might be secured.
There was strong protest on the part of the Negro press and of many
individuals against a “segregated camp,” the criticisms coming from all
parts of the country. Dr. Spingarn, in reply, gave among other reasons
for the establishment of the camp the following: “The army officials
want the camp to fail. The last thing they want is to help colored
men to become commissioned officers. The camp is intended to fight
segregation, not to encourage it. Colored men in a camp by themselves
would all get a fair chance for promotion. Opposition on the part of
Negroes is helping the South, which does not want the Negroes to have
any kind of military training. If there is a war, there will doubtless
be conscription of all able-bodied men. The choice will be no longer
between volunteering or not volunteering, but between conscription and
rebellion. If conscription comes, will the leaders of the race help
their Southern enemies by preaching treason and rebellion, or will
they face facts right now and prepare themselves to go as leaders
and not as privates?” As the notes passed between the American and
German Governments, people more and more realized that the trend of
events would inevitably lead to war; this realization gave impetus to
the movement, and finally a concerted effort was made to secure the
training camp, even the opponents of the separate camp idea becoming
its supporters.
With the actual declaration of war with Germany came the imperative
need of this opportunity for Negroes to train as officers, as it was
certain that thousands would be called to the colors. Conferences
were held with the War Department officials, and Dr. Spingarn
meanwhile worked untiringly. Dr. Stephen M. Newman, president of
Howard University, Washington, D. C., together with a joint committee
of teachers and students and a citizens’ committee composed of
representative Negroes of Washington, also held conferences with
officials and labored in behalf of the camp.
There was misgiving on the part of many concerning the training of
Negroes as officers. Among the objections made to the establishment of
the camp was that “a separate camp could not be established because all
garrisons and forts were required for white men”; and it was further
said that “Negroes could not make officers, and if trained, Negro
soldiers would not follow them.” Many army men did not believe that the
camp would be a success because they did not feel that the Negro had
the ability to do the required work; and President Newman was even
asked by department officials if he honestly felt that colored people
had the intelligence and the grit to undergo such training as was given
in the preparation camps and come out as capable officers.
When the War Department was finally convinced that colored men should
at least have the opportunity to attend an officers’ training camp, and
all arrangements were made, news of the authorization of the same was
sent broadcast over the country; and few announcements have ever been
made that were received with more enthusiasm than the special dispatch
which was sent out from Washington on May 19, 1917, by Adjutant General
H. P. McCain to the chiefs of staff of the various departments of the
army:
“Training camps for colored citizens will be established at Fort Des
Moines, Iowa, under section 4, National Defense Act, and regulations
prescribed for present training camps, except as modified herein and
after. Total attendance 1250, of whom 250 will be non-commissioned
officers, colored regiments, regular army, to be sent on detached
service status, and 1000 citizens, either enlisted under section
4, National Defense Act, for three months, beginning June 18, with
agreement to accept appointment tendered, or Members of National
Guard, whose status will be as in case of National Guardsmen now
in training camps. Secure ... co-operation of colored citizens of
wide acquaintance and high standing. Training camps will be ready
to receive non-commissioned officers, regular army, June 5, and all
others June 15. Course begins June 18.”
Newspapers throughout the country commented on the fact that at last
Negroes would have a real opportunity to serve not only as privates
but as officers. Southern papers, while opposed on general principles
to military training for Negroes, spoke favorably of the plan, always
making clear, however, that Southern traditions must be upheld; thus
the Charleston _Post_ said, “Officers as high as majors may be
turned out, but will positively be used to command only Negroes.” But
as circumstances each day forced our countrymen to change some sacred,
traditional idea, and as the seemingly impossible came into being, as
it were, overnight, then the white citizens of each Southern state
were proud that it had its quota of Negroes “with a college training
or its equivalent” to send; and many Southern men gladly gave letters
of endorsement to representative Negroes who were setting forth upon
their great mission. Then in each of the six departments into which
the United States is divided by the War Department, Negroes presented
themselves for examination. Many traveled hundreds of miles to be
present on the appointed day. Some men, in their eagerness to serve,
appeared before the recruiting officers possessing the physical and age
qualifications, but lacking other preparation; and sometimes friends,
in their desire to reward loyal service, sent butlers and other helpers
for examination, only to have them disappointed. When it became evident
that Negroes would be called in large numbers, as the training of
officers indicated, many objections were made throughout the country
to having Negro soldiers stationed in certain camps. In an interview
Col. H. T. Ferguson especially assured the anxious citizens of Des
Moines that they would never regret the fact that their city had been
designated for the training of the first contingent of Negro officers
ever commissioned by the United States.
As June 15 approached and officer candidates were notified of their
acceptance, colored America felt as never before that it was entering
upon a new era and into the larger citizenship to which it had always
aspired. Joy reigned among the army sergeants at the thought not only
of trying for commissions themselves, but also of helping others of
their race to do likewise; and the civilians went forth with the
knowledge that all eyes were on them and that the prayers and hopes of
a race went with them. No knight ever started on a nobler quest than
did these Negro men from all walks of life, and the crowds that went to
the stations to bid them good-by and that watched the trains until they
were out of sight went home with a new feeling of confidence and of
hope.
On the arrival of the candidates at Des Moines, civilian customs,
thoughts, and habits soon gave way for the iron discipline involved
in making officers. Men who had thought of the camp as the place for
a summer vacation soon were undeceived. Colonel C. C. Ballou and his
staff of officers put them through a daily program beginning at 5.30
a. m. with reveille and flag-raising and ending with taps at 9.45 p. m.
From 7.30 to 8.30 a. m. there was infantry drill without arms, from
8.30 to 9 manual or physical training, from 9.15 to 10.15 infantry
drill, from 10.45 to 11.45 a practice hike without arms; then dinner;
from 1.30 to 2.30 p. m. musketry arms, from 2.30 to 3 semaphore
signaling, from 3 to 4.30 conferences on care of equipment, and from 7
to 8 evening study on the organization of the regiment. As progress was
made other work was taken up, including bayonet drill, trench-digging,
manoeuvering, map-making and target practice, and lectures were also
given showing the relation of the camp to the great national army.
It was fully realized that success or failure in the crucial test
carried with it far-reaching results. Colonel Ballou, in speaking to
the men on one occasion, said: “This is a momentous hour, and the
establishment of this camp is an epochal and unprecedented event in
the history of the colored race. Your race will be on trial with you
as its representatives, during the existence of this camp, and to
succeed there will be required of you strong bodies, keen intelligence,
absolute obedience to orders, unflagging industry, exemplary conduct,
and character of the highest order.” With such incentive the men worked
away at the most strenuous business in which they were ever engaged.
And yet there were some good times--recreation in the form of baseball
and other athletic contests and the privilege of visiting in the city
of Des Moines on Saturday and Sunday. The Y. M. C. A. furnished motion
pictures and programs on Saturday and Sunday evenings, and through
its efforts some of the leading speakers of the country appeared. Of
special inspiration in this connection was the presence in camp of one
of the secretaries, the “grand old man,” Dr. George W. Cabiniss, who
gave up a lucrative practice in Washington to be with the “boys,” and
who spent himself unstintingly in their behalf.
Soldiers were often invited to the churches as well as the homes in the
city, and here they occasionally rendered musical programs. By this
means the anxiety of the earlier days of the summer gave way to an
interest and friendship between the citizens and the candidates that
will live for decades. The first event which won general esteem for
the officer candidates was an exhibition drill in the Drake University
stadium, which was followed by musical numbers. Here ten thousand
people gathered and marveled at what their eyes beheld. The last big
event was the program given at White Sparrows, where hundreds of people
were turned away. Here the men sang the old plantation melodies with
the sweetness and plaintiveness possible only to the Negro, and arias
and recitatives from the great oratorios as well. The audience stood
in eagerness until the last note was sung; then as a tribute, at the
close of the concert, Rev. Dr. Medbury said of the candidates, “It is
not enough to say that by their demeanor while among us, their conduct
on the streets, in the theatres and business houses, they have brought
honor to their race; they are, rather, an honor to the race of men.”
Thus the spirit of the men themselves was the biggest factor in the
success of Fort Des Moines. They began their training knowing that
there were questions in the minds of many, and they spent hours of
toil in the effort to prove that they could make good. The attitude of
each one was to help somebody else. One man might be seen explaining
to a comrade some problem in mathematics, another helping in the study
of topography, and still another with some squad trying to perfect
it in the handling of arms. A precious jewel is not more carefully
guarded than was the good name of the camp. Like a sentinel on duty
each candidate watched lest some untoward act might work harm. One day
an apple orchard belonging to a neighboring farmer was invaded. The
farmer notified Colonel Ballou that some of the soldiers had stolen
his apples. When the men concerned found that the camp was accused, on
their own initiative they reported to headquarters and offered to pay
all damages. The commanding officer, in commenting on the incident,
said, “Something has happened to-day that has made me feel fine and
that is new in my army experience.”
The candidates were proud of their martial bearing. Their cleanliness
made a favorable impression everywhere they went. Soon after they
went to Des Moines some of the café and restaurant owners thought it
unwise to serve them, and when a number of the men entered a chop suey
“palace,” the Chinese proprietor rushed up to them waving his arms
wildly and shouting, “No servee black men; me lose all bliziness.” When
some other proprietors showed a disposition to act with similar policy,
Colonel George W. Ball of the 1st Iowa Infantry ordered that all men,
regardless of color, must be fed, saying, “This is Government business
and there can be no refusal to serve these men”; and drastic action
was threatened against all restaurant keepers who persisted in drawing
the color line. Naturally Utopian conditions did not always prevail
at the camp and there were many disappointments. Many an ambitious
“rookie” was sent home because of some defect or peculiarity that
prevented his making an officer, and even after some had served the
allotted time it was found that they were not suitable material. In
the process of elimination there were those who thought that they were
unjustly marked, and it is true that at Des Moines only five civilian
captains were made and that there the outcome was just the reverse of
that in the training camps for white men, which was that the men with
the superior training most frequently received the higher commissions.
Because of the policy followed one colonel said that “A great harm was
done not only the colored officer but the colored race as well,” for in
many cases the standard for officers was lowered by the commissioning
as captains of men with a sixth or eighth grade education and as second
lieutenants many college graduates. Through it all, however, there was
hope, because the candidates believed in themselves and others believed
in them, chief among whom was Secretary Baker, who said in one of the
darkest hours, “I am depending on you and the Fort Des Moines colored
officers’ training school. It should not be surpassed by any of the
other camps which are training officers, and the promotions are not to
be limited to lieutenants and captains, but to what you are capable of
making.”
As the end of the training period drew near an extra month was added.
This action raised doubts, not only in the minds of the candidates
but with the colored people throughout the country. It was a trying
season everywhere, for the extension of time came close upon the riots
at Houston. A general from the War Department came to the camp and
spoke in a most discouraging manner of the future of the candidates.
He questioned the advisability of continuing the camp and raised
doubts as to whether the candidates would ever be commissioned. A few
days after his visit it was announced that all who wanted to leave
might do so. Some of the more faint-hearted left, but most of the men
continued their studies and gained further knowledge of the essentials
of warfare. Gradually the clouds cleared away and those who remained
looked forward to the time when they would be real officers in the Army
of the United States.
Then came the day of days, October 15, 1917, when 625 colored men were
commissioned in the United States Army. As they came forward to receive
their commissions they were deeply moved, and even the commanding
officer showed visible signs of emotion as he gave to them words of
farewell and impressed upon them the seriousness of the task before
them. Dr. Emmett J. Scott, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War,
said to them: “I know you will bear in mind that in a very real sense
you and those who serve with you have in your keeping the good name of
a proud, expectant, and confident people”; and each man went away with
the feeling of responsibility that comes when life is dedicated to a
great cause. Thus a new chapter was begun in the history of the Negro
on this continent and the first skirmish to prove that Negro men could
absorb the training required of officers was won with honors.
* * * * *
After a brief vacation of fifteen days, the new officers reported to
the various camps and were assigned to their duties. While they had
successfully completed the course of study at Fort Des Moines, the
real test of making officers was still before them. This task was made
more difficult by the assignments to duty which some of them received.
Some were sent to the artillery and engineering corps and given tasks
for which they had had no preparation. Having already absorbed army
discipline, however, they went about their tasks with the hope of
mastering them, though with opinion against them.
The organization of the 92nd Division, composed entirely of Negroes
drafted into the National Army, made it necessary to train officers and
men in other branches than infantry and cavalry, with which Negroes
had formerly served and for which they had been trained. Therefore
engineer, artillery, and machine-gun regiments were formed along with
the other branches required in the full organization of a division.
While divisions were usually trained in one camp, the regiments of the
92nd were distributed in several groups.
The engineers were trained at Camp Sherman. Draftees with a knowledge
of the building trades were especially desirable for this branch of
service, and volunteers from well known industrial schools entered
this regiment. Colored infantry officers from Des Moines, captains and
lieutenants, who were without training in engineering, were put in
command. After seven months of training prior to their embarkation for
France, the captains were sent to infantry outfits, being relieved by
white engineer officers. This action on the part of the War Department
affected somewhat the morale of the regiment. After nearly three
months in France the colored lieutenants were also transferred. There
remained, however, five colored officers with the outfit--two tram
officers, two physicians, and a dentist. When these also were not
retained they and the soldiers felt that there was discrimination.
It is true that they were not trained as engineers, but the ultimate
trouble would seem rather to lie in withholding engineer training from
them while they were in the officers’ training school in Des Moines.
Negro soldiers had long been distinguished in the infantry and cavalry,
but they had never been placed in the artillery branch of service. It
was said that they could not learn the principles of artillery warfare,
and, as for their being officers, it was doubtful if they could measure
up to the requirements. Nevertheless at Camp Dix the 349th and 350th
artillery regiments were formed with colored men, and officers who had
graduated at Des Moines were put in command. Since it had been said
that Negro men could not be trained as artillerymen, it is interesting
that it should be thought that they could make artillery officers
without any training at all. A week before the recruits appeared
at the camp, some classes in artillery subjects were held for the
officers, and during the training of the regiment the officers were
many times taught subjects just the night before they were to teach
them to the men, school being held from one to two hours. Even under
these conditions a surprisingly efficient organization was developed.
After nearly seven months, however, the colored artillery officers
were declared inefficient. It was then decided that they would have to
go to the artillery school at Fort Sill, Okla. Twenty-four men were
sent, these being largely regular army men. Many of the well educated
infantry officers from other regiments applied for the artillery
work, but it was claimed that they could not be spared from their
organizations, and in some cases officers with low rating were sent to
Fort Sill against their desires. Is it surprising that many of these
failed to pass the entrance examination and that about half of them
asked to be returned to Camp Dix after the first week?
While the artillery school at Fort Sill gave the men every chance,
after the first two weeks the camp began returning the colored officers
to their outfits, until at the end of ten weeks only six remained.
These six were given artillery commissions. During their training
period they had separate barracks and a separate mess, though the camp
commander, Colonel Fleming, demanded that they receive the courtesy due
officers.
Soon after these graduates returned to Camp Dix, all the colored
officers were ordered to Camp Meade to attend an artillery school. On
their arrival at Meade, orders were issued that they put on enlisted
men’s clothes. The impression among the white officers of the 351st
Artillery, said to be due to verbal orders, was that senior colored
officers would first salute junior white officers and that, as far as
white officers were concerned, the colored officers were considered
officer candidates. They could wear their uniforms on Sunday, if passes
were given them to leave the camp. The War Department was notified of
conditions in the school and in four days the men were again returned
to their outfit just before it sailed for France.
White officers in the 349th and 350th who had commanded the colored
officers, formed a board to examine them. All were declared
inefficient, even the six graduates from Fort Sill, and were assigned
to the Depot Brigade. The War Department again intervened, and the
six graduates were ordered with their outfits again, and accompanied
them to France. While the remaining officers did not accompany their
regiments to France, they had done some fine work in teaching the men
the use of horses and in putting snap in the drill and in the handling
of the guns. The record made by these regiments, which continued their
training in France, was more than surprising. Accounts of their work
will be given elsewhere.
The experience of these officers in attempting to do artillery work
without training resulted in many charges and counter-charges with
reference to their fitness for this branch of service. Through the
office of the Assistant to the Secretary of War conferences were held
with department officials in the endeavor to secure for Negro men an
opportunity to train as officers. While there was opposition to the
undertaking, the plan was finally approved and an honest attempt was
made to select Negro men fitted, because of their training, to do work
in artillery schools. Ninety-six were gathered at Camp Meade, some
having been selected from the Signal Corps Engineers and artillery
regiments and some from the camps where infantry regiments of the
92nd Division were stationed. These men remained at Meade for a
month, with two white batteries, after which time they were sent to
Camp Taylor, Ky., where all artillery schools were centralized. The
colored candidates were not expected when they reached the school and
no arrangements had been made for them. The first night they spent
on the outskirts of the camp, and before they finally got settled
they were moved six times, always after spending enough time in one
place to get floors scrubbed, windows washed, and barracks thoroughly
cleaned. The commander of the school spoke to the battery and gave the
impression that it was not wanted. Between the batteries, however, the
relationship was good; the Western men were considerate in sharing
their knowledge with the colored candidates, who made an excellent
impression by their “pep” and snap in drilling and by the aptitude for
artillery work which they showed. Those candidates who remained in
the school until the end were recommended for firing battery, combat
trains, and replacement draft, but at the last the camp commander
decided that only those men recommended for firing batteries should
receive commissions. Thirty-three of the ninety-six men who started out
were graduated. Of the twenty-five hundred graduates of the school, ten
were honor men, and six of these were colored. Eleven more colored men
were graduated in October. The five students in each battery who were
highest at graduation were called out and given diplomas. As the five
Negro men came forward, the white candidates led in the cheering. After
the first graduation, of those men who remained, ten to fifteen were
dropped weekly. The last twelve were transferred to the 814th Pioneer
Infantry as sergeants, and accompanied that organization to England and
France. After much discussion in the War Department, and effort on the
part of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, concessions were
finally made and the thirty-three artillery officers were sent to Camp
Jackson, S. C., where Negro men were being trained as artillerymen.
Here there was great interest in them, especially on the part of the
Negro population of Columbia. These people stood in admiring groups
as the officers passed and sometimes gave vent to their emotions by
clapping or cheering. Trouble arose, however, chiefly over the matter
of salutes from the other soldiers; riots were feared; and after a week
these officers were sent to Newport News, and then on to France.
To the aviation school at Fort Sill four colored officers were
sent. The first to arrive was supposed to be white and was treated
accordingly. In the case of the other three, however, who arrived a
few days later, there could be no mistake as to identity. These men
were given a separate table and placed in a separate class, with
a sergeant instructor who observed no military courtesies. Such
treatment continued until the men asked to be returned to their
outfit. Because he was constantly seen in the company of the other
three men, the officer who was the first to arrive had been asked to
move to their table. After the others left, he continued the course,
remaining in camp until two days before graduation. To Fort Sill were
also sent those officers who were to receive instruction in the use
of the machine-gun. It developed that the man in the class who was
most efficient was a Negro. At the end of the course there was squad
competition in the mechanical manipulation of a machine-gun, and the
best of each squad was chosen. Some men objected to being represented
by a Negro, but a major intervened and said, “I don’t give a ---- if
the man is black; everybody knows he is the best.” All who watched the
competition marveled at the speed with which this man worked.
While these new officers were working at their task of training men
to fight, it became certain that replacements would have to be made
after they were in action at the front. Plans were not made on a scale
comparable with the demand, but there was some effort to meet the need.
A small number of men were selected from the various units of the
92nd Division and sent to the third officers’ training schools held
in such camps as Upton, Meade, Sherman, Dodge, Funston, and Travis.
Among the thousands who were receiving training they were almost lost,
but sometimes they won the highest honors. In all these camps, except
at Funston, they attended the same schools as the other candidates
and received the treatment due them. Some were assigned to the 92nd
Division and sailed to France with it, while others were detained to
assist as instructors in the cantonments.
When the fighting units reached France and were receiving final
training before moving up to the front line trenches, many of the
officers attended various schools. The majority of such men completed
the courses with high standing. One of the schools that proved a
distinct success was a machine-gun school conducted by colored officers
in charge of Lieut. B. A. Mosley, who made out the courses of study.
The object was to make machine-gun officers out of infantry officers,
giving them the principles of machine gunnery. Nearly two hundred
officers and non-commissioned officers were sent from this school,
which was approved by the First Corps and put on the standard of the A.
E. F. schools. Under date August 27, 1918, Major John P. Bubb said of
one of these schools: “In submitting reports of proficiency of captains
of the 92nd Division who have recently been under my instruction, I
request attention to the following facts. Certain captains, namely,
Jones, Saunders, Scott, Stephens, Holland, Hollingsworth, and Granson,
have done very well in their work. They are serious, dignified men of
excellent caliber and are fully able to maintain the positions of trust
and confidence in which they have been placed.... The balance of the
class (all captains) are I believe as good as the average student who
has passed through the school.”
In the fourth officers’ school, opened on May 15, 1918, at Camp Dodge,
there were 280 Negro candidates, which number was soon increased to
more than 300. These candidates were selected principally from the
units of the 92nd Division, though some came from elsewhere. This
school began under the command of Lt. Col. William G. Doane, who
was assisted by ten colored men, with Captain M. T. Dean as senior
instructor. For the first time in America, Negro officers in large
numbers were instructing soldiers in the science of modern warfare,
preparing them directly to take their places as officers in the great
National Army. These men served for fifteen days, when a telegram
was sent from the headquarters of the 92nd calling all the officers
to their regiment. Their work, however, had proved a success. The
candidates were all picked men, the school was well organized, and the
officers showed the greatest confidence and faith in each other.
In the centralization of the officers’ training schools the infantry
candidates were sent to Camp Pike, Little Rock, Ark., while the
machine-gun candidates were sent to Camp Hancock, Augusta, Ga. Camp
Pike had been spoken of in such a way by many Negro soldiers that
the officer candidates were not enthusiastic about going there, and
certainly this was true of the twenty-four second lieutenants who
were assigned as assistant instructors. Truck drivers sent to meet
them, on finding that they were colored, drove off, claiming that no
provision had been made for Negroes. In the camp they were a source of
wonderment. The instructors were white Southern officers and neither
officers nor men were cordial. As time passed, however, prejudice in
most cases turned to interest.
To Camp Hancock, Augusta, Ga., selected for the machine-gun school,
fifty-six Negro men were sent. Forty-three of that number were
graduated as second lieutenants. These men had been selected from
various outfits in the 92nd because of the knowledge of mathematics
and of the mechanical manipulation of the machine-gun which they had
acquired in the various camp schools. The presence of a number of
Negro officers in Augusta created a new situation, but both camp and
city rose to the occasion. The commander decreed that every officer
in the camp must receive the courtesy due him, and the leading paper
of Augusta carried editorials that had a wholesome effect on public
opinion. It happened that the thirteenth and last company in the school
was colored. In the drills and in marching to the range, these men were
last according to their number; but in marching in reverse order, as
they did in returning from the range, they became the leaders. Some
white candidates are said to have lost their commissions rather than
drill behind this company. Most of the men, however, co-operated with
the candidates in every way, and taught them map-reading in exchange
for explanation in the mechanism of the gun. The instructors were for
the most part French or British and apparently had little time for race
feeling.
When the companies were divided into sections for trench-digging,
dug-out practice, construction of shafts, and camouflaged machine-gun
emplacements, the white and the colored men were in the same classes,
and because of this contact both groups learned something of their
comrades and became more liberal in their thoughts. In general the fine
spirit prevailing in the camp was attributed to two things: first, to
the influence of the camp commander, who was himself a Southern man,
and second, to the fact that the new men reached camp just at the
time of the Fourth Liberty Loan drive. The South, as well as the rest
of the country, had really begun to feel the effects of the war, not
only financially but also in the drain on its man-power; and as the
13th company pursued its work with diligence and concentration, always
comparing favorably with others on the drill field, on the range,
and in class work, there was a realization of the fact that, after
all, they were fellow-Americans, slowly making headway; and when at
graduation these Negro men came forward to receive their commissions in
the great Liberty Theatre, where thousands of their comrades were, they
were greeted with deafening applause and every heart and voice and hand
seemed to cheer them on their way.
* * * * *
In the course of the preceding pages we have more than once touched
upon incidents which not only affected the Negro officer personally but
which also involved his real status in the army. It might now be in
place to consider a little more fully some of the points raised.
On the arrival of Negro officers at a camp, several questions
immediately arose, as to their eating, their living, and their general
contact with other officers. Sometimes they were not expected and
found that no preparation had been made for them. Fairly typical of
the Southern camps was Camp McClellan, Anniston, Ala., which showed
something of conditions especially at the beginning. Seven officers
were sent here in September, 1918, and placed in command of the
detention camp. In three weeks the detention camp was broken up and
the soldiers transferred to the depot brigade. The colored officers
were then attached to the 437th Reserve Labor Battalion, where they
were required to do very little work and were soon relieved of all
responsibility. Not all of the problems were confined to the South. In
the North, however, big-hearted generals were usually in command and
they decreed that regular army requirements should prevail.
One matter that constantly arose was that of the salute. Because of the
conflicting opinions on this subject, Gen. John B. Castleman, a major
in the Confederate army, was asked for a statement as to his attitude.
In giving his opinion he said: “The discipline of the army must be
maintained, and non-commissioned officers understand little of the
spirit of the army when they refuse to salute a Negro officer. I have
held several commissions in the military service, and I unhesitatingly
say that I would or will, at any time, salute an officer, superior or
inferior, who salutes me, without regard to the color of his skin. The
regulations, the laws, and the fundamentals of courtesy and discipline
upon which these regulations are based prescribe this. We are at war,
and soldiers are under the rules of the American army. We are all under
the flag. We salute the rank, not the individual.” This statement
by General Castleman did much to help conditions at Camp Taylor and
elsewhere. In general the military courtesies accorded Negro officers
depended largely on the stand of the generals commanding the camps. If
they demanded that strict military regulations be followed, trouble was
immediately reduced to a minimum. A notable example was the action of
Gen. Thomas H. Barry, of Camp Grant, Rockford, Ill., who on the arrival
of the Negro officers and men gave a “family talk” at headquarters in
which he said: “These men have come here on the same duty, actuated by
the same principles, as ourselves. They are entitled to respect because
they soon will be fighting to defend our homes. Colored officers
must be saluted as punctiliously as the white ones. The salute is of
vital importance to the whole fabric of discipline. It is not only a
courtesy, but a recognition of personal relations in the service.”
From time to time there were unfortunate occurrences which received
much publicity. Such was the case of Lieut. Joseph B. Saunders, who
was publicly assaulted at Vicksburg, Miss., because he wore his
uniform home after his period of training at Des Moines; also that
of Lieut. Charles A. Tribbett, who was arrested and placed in jail
for riding in a pullman car through the state of Oklahoma. There were
also many instances in camp in which the Negro men themselves largely
solved their problem. When colored officers arrived at Camp Funston,
Kan., not over 10 per cent of the white officers and men saluted them.
They had been told that they were going to have a hard time and set
themselves with resolute purpose to the great task before them. In
a month’s time the raw recruits were marching with heads up, eyes
front, shoulders back, and with every arm swinging in line. As they
marched to and from drill, the generals, colonels, and other officers
as well as the men would stand along the “Golden Belt” and watch the
black host as it passed. “This demonstration,” said one Negro captain,
“changed everything. Now all men salute, and officers always try to
salute first.” As Negro officers grew in numbers and were distributed
throughout the camps, and as accounts of heroic deeds were heralded
from the battlefields, and as it became generally known that Negroes
were responding liberally to the various calls at home, the American
public saw the justice of according recognition or merit where it was
due, and the principle of the salute for Negro officers was settled,
although in practice it was not always carried out.
Another matter that occasioned considerable feeling was that of
promotions. Many regular army officers served for several years with
junior rank, but always looked forward to the time when they would be
promoted. Their opportunity came during the war. Many junior officers
in the regular army and even civilian officers were promoted several
times in the course of a year. It was natural that colored officers
should also look forward to promotions, which were regarded as a
recognition of work well done.
According to a memorandum of September 11, 1918, the War Department
established the commands to be occupied by white and colored officers
in the organization of the 92nd Division, and indicated that every
opportunity would be given the Negro men to advance. In practice,
however, there seems to have been some difficulty about carrying out
the ideas therein suggested. The percentage of white officers in the
Division increased from 18 per cent at the beginning, to 42 per cent
on November 30, 1918. Very few recommendations for the promotion of
Negro officers were made and most of these are said to have been
“pigeon-holed” at headquarters. Some recommendations that were filed
in July and August, 1918, were held until after the signing of the
Armistice on November 11, when an A. E. F. order prohibited the
granting of any more commissions. Another factor which prevented
promotions in the 92nd Division was that colored officers from the
369th, 370th, and 372nd, and graduates from officers’ training schools
in France were largely transferred to the 92nd Division. This made
room for the promotion of white officers in the units from which the
Negro officers were transferred, but prevented the promotion of colored
officers in the 92nd.
Thus most of the Negro officers who served in the National Army were
in the 92nd Division. The creation of this Division with Negro line
officers was regarded by practically all regular army officers as one
of the greatest mistakes ever made by the War Department. From their
viewpoint it was wrong in principle, against all tradition, and could
not possibly be a success. Not believing in the matter in principle,
they did not want to deal with Negro men on such a basis; they did
things to discredit them, even to the extent of spreading propaganda as
to their unfitness for the work. Thus unfortunately the Negro officers
returned home feeling that their commanding officers were not their
friends; nor were matters improved by the effort of some incompetent
men “higher up” who tried to cover their own inefficiency by laying the
blame on the Negroes. The prevailing opinion expressed by the white
officers returning from France was that the Negro soldier up to the
rank of sergeant-major was a success, and they lauded the stevedore and
labor organizations as contributing much to the magnificent service
rendered by the Americans in Europe. The “experiment” of the Negro
officer, they felt, was a different matter. A careful review of all
the adverse points made might place them under four heads, as follows:
First, the racial distinctions recognized in civilian life continued to
be recognized in military life and presented a formidable barrier to
the existence of a genuine feeling of comradeship; second, the colored
officers were lacking in initiative and exhibited a characteristic
tendency to neglect the welfare of their men and to perform their
duties in a perfunctory manner, thus entailing on the part of senior
officers frequent attention to petty details; third, many of the Negro
officers went around with “a chip on their shoulders,” looking for
discrimination and trouble; and fourth, most of the colored officers
were willing to discipline their men but were unwilling themselves to
be disciplined, charging any attempt to discipline them to prejudice.
These are serious charges. In reply to them first of all it is to be
noted that on the troop ships, even before they got to France, the
Negro officers were treated not according to their military rank but
as on the basis of color. On the “George Washington,” for instance,
which carried the 368th infantry, the tickets for the colored officers
were marked with an X in the upper left hand corner, which enabled the
purser to place them “conveniently.” The tickets for the white officers
were not marked, and they were given first class passage on Deck A in
respect to both dining and state rooms; but the colored officers, from
the rank of captain down, were given second class passage in respect
to staterooms and dining rooms. In traveling in France also the Negro
officers were many times given third class coaches while the white
officers were given first class. Specific cases are given where the
officers were ordered by their commanders to take such passage. In the
hotels and cafés as well constant effort was made for segregation,
and in some cases instructions were given not to accept officers or
soldiers when applications for rooms were made. At the Grand Hotel
in Mayenne, where the division billeting officer was stationed, the
hotel proprietress informed the colored officers, many of whom had
previously stayed in the hotel, that they would have to go elsewhere
for accommodations. On going to the “town major” to see about the new
condition that had developed, the men were told that instructions had
been given to the effect that no more colored officers were to be
allowed in the hotel. Such incidents could be multiplied a hundred
times. While in themselves they are no positive proof of Negro valor,
they explain a situation which certainly has to be taken into account
in an impartial review.
As to the charges of lack of initiative and the neglect of their
men, the facts gathered from an investigation of conditions among
thousands of soldiers, both in America and France, would rather
indicate that colored officers generally took more interest in their
men than the average white officer, though of course some Negro
officers were inefficient just as were some of other races. The
charges of “neglecting the welfare of their men” were based in most
cases upon the difficulty in securing supplies for colored troops.
This was true not only with colored officers, for it was an accepted
fact that white officers over Negro troops often experienced the
greatest difficulty in getting the necessary supplies for their men.
Negro officers who displayed initiative were frequently reprimanded
for assuming authority, while on the other hand they were condemned
if they waited for instructions; for example, some who completed the
course at the First Corps School in France with credit were censured
for not performing duties that they had been ordered to discontinue
and were told to mind their business when they called attention to
grave military errors, some of which resulted in casualties. Duties
performed satisfactorily as a sergeant for more than ten years could
not be performed by the same man after he became a lieutenant without
the supervision of a battalion commander.
In general the colored officers found complete co-operation with
commanding officers nearly impossible. They were never taken into
the confidence of their military superiors and were rarely ever
questioned about matters affecting the men. One day a colonel met a
colored captain whom he thought he had seen before. “Haven’t I seen you
somewhere?” he asked. “Yes, sir,” replied the man, “I was with you on
the border; Captain French is my name, sir.” “Oh, I do remember,” said
the colonel, “you are Sergeant French.” “No, sir, I am Captain French.”
“Well,” said the colonel as he walked away, “if I forget and call you
Sergeant, don’t mind.”
In spite of all the difficulties and criticisms, however, large numbers
of Negro officers were able to command and lead troops for the first
time. In the pages to come there will be noted many instances not only
of courage but also of efficiency, and it is a significant fact that
the majority of these officers returned to the states in the 92nd
Division. This alone is proof that they were _fairly_ efficient,
especially when it is remembered that on the slightest occasion they
were sent before efficiency boards. More than a thousand of these Negro
line officers “saw it through” in France, rendering heroic service
in the World War; and it is pleasant to record that among those who
served with them there were those who were not afraid to give credit
where credit was due.
* * * * *
One other matter is of importance in this general connection, and
that is the question of the relation of the Negro officer to the
reorganization of the army after the war was over. There are and
probably always will be divers opinions as to the size and training
of the regular army in peace times, as well as to the composition of
the different units. In general, regular army officers felt that the
time had not come in army affairs when it was expedient to include
Negro officers in the plan of reorganization. Such a course was
considered “an injustice to West Point graduates who had served as
second lieutenants and waited their turn for promotion.” The question
was essentially not one of fitness but of tradition, as was shown by
the word of a major who now sleeps in the Argonne and who was asked to
send in the names of the men in his command who should go before an
efficiency board. He commended highly the work of his officers, but
concluded by saying that the whole principle of Negro officers was
wrong and that he recommended that all should be relieved from duty.
Such an attitude took tangible form in the action of members of some
of the examining boards for the regular army. One board discharged more
than half of the officers in the division it was considering. Many who
formerly had good grades were rated below 60, and while the questions
asked were simple enough, all answers were deemed unsatisfactory. In
the medical department similar conditions prevailed. It was natural
that the Negro men should feel that under the circumstances they had
hardly been fairly dealt with; moreover they had to meet the general
prejudice of regular army officers against all civilian officers. One
official said, “The regular army officers looked with disfavor upon
both the National Guard and National Army officers, the National Guard
officers discredited the National Army (90-day) officer, and all three
combined against the Negro officer.” When everything is considered, it
is difficult to reconcile the methods used to eliminate Negro officers
with the spirit of fairness and justice for which the army is renowned,
or with the gentleman’s agreement known to exist among fellow-officers,
and it is to be regretted that some of the adverse opinions expressed
were uttered by men in high positions who will help to determine the
future policy of the War Department.