CHAPTER XXVI_The Desert Mounted Corps An Account of the Cavalry Operations in Palestine and Syria 1917-1918

TRANSPORT AND AMMUNITION SUPPLY

The advance to Damascus and Aleppo in September and October 1918 proved

with what a small amount of transport cavalry can operate, when local

supplies are available. As already explained, during this advance no

transport accompanied the divisions, except ammunition wagons and a few

motor ambulance cars.

The opportunities for cavalry making a raid such a great distance into

enemy country have seldom occurred in the past, and are likely to

become even more rare in the future. When they do occur, however, the

experience of this campaign points to the conclusion that there can be

few countries in which cavalry can operate as such effectively, where

they would not be able to dispense almost entirely with transport. The

fact that mounted troops can move freely, denotes that the country is

not excessively mountainous, and is, therefore (excluding desert land),

more or less cultivated, thus providing food for man and horse. It

must be remembered that much of the country through which the cavalry

passed between the 25th of September and the 28th of October is poorly

cultivated, and all of it had been mercilessly laid under requisition

by the Turks and Germans for the supply of their armies. Yet it was

found possible to secure food and forage for three cavalry divisions,

a total of nearly 20,000 men and a similar number of horses, without

extreme difficulty, and without in any way depriving the inhabitants of

essential food.

If, however, the country through which it is proposed to advance is

incapable of supporting the force, sufficient transport must be taken

to carry supplies for such a number of days as may be requisite. The

pace of the cavalry will then be, to a great extent, limited by the

pace of their transport, and for this reason every effort should be

made to increase the mobility of cavalry transport vehicles.

_Vehicles._--At the beginning of the 1917 operations the cavalry

ammunition columns and supply trains were equipped partly with G.S. and

partly with limbered G.S. wagons. During the subsequent operations,

both at the beginning, when movement took place over a sandy or dusty

plain, and later on, when the whole country was a sea of mud, and vast

areas were under water, the G.S. wagons were constantly in trouble. The

experience of the whole campaign was overwhelmingly in favour of the

L.G.S. wagon. The sole advantage of the G.S. wagon lies in its greater

capacity for carrying bulky loads. For this reason it is very suitable

for use in barracks or standing camps, where such stuff as hay, straw,

etc., have to be carried. As regards weight, however, the L.G.S. wagon

holds its own against the G.S. on roads, and is superior in roadless

or hilly country. That is to say, the L.G.S. wagon, with two men and

four horses, can, in such country, carry more than two-thirds of the

load possible for the G.S. wagon, with its three drivers and six

horses. Further, the lower centre of gravity, four large wheels and

much greater lock angle of the former, enables it to cross country over

which the latter cannot move at all. One advantage claimed for the G.S.

type is that the wagon body is supposed to be capable of being used

as a pontoon. The writer has tried it as such, in peace time, and his

experience has decided him that he would rather swim.

The above remarks are, of course, to be taken as applying to cavalry

transport only.

There is one weakness in the L.G.S. wagon which is commended to the

notice of the Royal Ordnance Corps. The bolt which fastens the wagon

body on to the carriage passes through the axle. Towards the end of

the campaign, after several years' hard and continuous work, a number

of these axles began to break, and always at the place where the bolt

passed through them. It is suggested that, in future manufacture, the

fastening might consist of a steel collar over the axle, instead of a

bolt through it.

_Horses._--The remarks on type, which have been made with regard

to the cavalry riding horse, apply with equal force to the cavalry

draught horse. Many of our English draught animals were of far too

heavy a type, either for horse artillery or for cavalry transport. It

is sometimes argued that a proportion of heavy horses is very useful

when wagons begin to get stuck in boggy places. But it is not much

use having these equine Samsons at all, if they are not available at

the time their services are required. And this is what invariably

happens. Nothing in the nature of a cart horse can live with cavalry

in a march of forty miles, and, in this campaign, there was one of

over ninety miles on end, and marches of forty, fifty and sixty miles

were comparatively common. If heavy horses are forced to keep up with

cavalry over such distances, they very soon give up the unequal fight

and die; if they are allowed to go their own pace, they are a day's

march in rear at the end of twenty-four hours, and the transport thus

requires an escort of a size that can ill be spared from the fighting

forces.

Another advantage of having a lighter-built, better-bred type of horse

for transport, is that they then form a reserve for the cavalry. In

the artillery it is the rule for riding and draught horses to change

places frequently, thus resting both kinds in turn. This custom might

profitably be employed occasionally in the cavalry.

The Australians have an admirable type of cavalry draught horse: 15 to

15.2 hands high, short-backed, well-coupled, and showing a good deal of

breeding. The disappearance from our English roads first of the coaches

and then of the horse-drawn buses, has deprived us almost entirely of

our once fine type of light draught horse, and it seems as if we shall,

in the future, have to depend more and more on the Dominions for our

supply of such horses. There were a certain number of Canadian horses

in the Corps transport. They were hard and sound, but of a coarser

type, with heavier shoulders and less handy than those from Australia.

_Other transport animals._--At different times, camels, mules, and

donkeys were used by the cavalry for transport purposes. The first

named are, of course, entirely unsuitable, except for work in the

desert, but, as we had some 30,000 of them in our possession in 1917,

a legacy from Sinai, and there was a shortage of other transport, they

were largely used during the 1917 operations. No attempt was made to

keep up, or even near, the cavalry on the march, but the camels worked

in a system of convoys along defined routes, forming dumps behind

the advancing line of cavalry, from which the divisional trains drew

supplies. The uselessness and danger of camels in mountainous country

was convincingly demonstrated in the mountains of Judæa and in the two

trans-Jordan raids, and, after the second of these, the Imperial Camel

Corps Brigade was disbanded, and the cavalry saw no more of the patient

but unlovable beasts that had worked for them for more than two years.

Mules were in use in the transport to a certain extent all through

the campaign, but the experience of the 1917 operations led to their

being replaced by horses in all transport that was required to keep up

with the cavalry. Their hardihood, soundness, and remarkable freedom

from disease, no less than their patience and docility, render them

admirable for infantry transport, and even, possibly, for field

artillery, but they suffer from the serious disability, from the

cavalry or horse artillery point of view, that they cannot go the

pace. Left to themselves, they can march indefinitely, but, if pushed

along faster than their natural gait, they rapidly lose condition, and

soon become so debilitated as to be well-nigh useless. As this natural

pace is slower than that of horses, they must always be pushed when

acting with cavalry, and this fact renders them unsuitable for use with

mounted troops.

Donkeys were first used in supply convoys in the Judæan Hills in the

winter of 1917, some 400 being sent up from Egypt for this purpose.

They did most excellent work, supplying the troops in the line at a

time when there were no roads available. They are admirably adapted

for such special work, being small, hardy, and easily handled, and

requiring no attention. For any other purpose they are, of course, not

to be seriously considered. Owing to the chronic shortage of horses in

the country, those details of regiments who did not usually accompany

their units into action were, in 1917, given donkeys to ride. There

were about half a dozen in each cavalry regiment or similar unit.

Most of these were gradually exchanged for Arab ponies captured from

the enemy, but a few carried on right through the campaign, up to the

capture of Aleppo. How they kept up through some of the long marches

of 1918, carrying a heavy man and all his kit, is a mystery, but they

contrived to do so somehow.

[Illustration]

_Ammunition._--Prior to the commencement of the 1917 operations in

Palestine, the amount of small arm ammunition laid down to be carried

in a cavalry divisional ammunition column was 250,000 rounds per

brigade, or 1,000,000 in the column for the four-brigade divisions

of that time. This was a ridiculously over-large amount. On the

other hand, the amount of gun ammunition was very small. Indeed the

divisional column commander who said that he carried in his column

three weeks' supply for the small arms and three hours' for the guns,

can scarcely be accused of hyperbole.

After the second battle of Gaza, during which the cavalry were engaged

all day long dismounted, in a very heavy fire fight, it was found that,

after replenishing the regimental reserves, only about one-sixth of

the small arm ammunition in the divisional ammunition columns had been

issued. The guns, on the other hand, had expended nearly three times

the total quantity of ammunition carried in the column.

As a result of this action, the whole question of ammunition supply

was considered afresh, and the columns were reorganised with an

establishment of 200 rounds of shell per gun, and 120,000 of small

arm ammunition per brigade, calculated as to 84,000 rounds for the

machine gun squadron and 12,000 rounds for each regiment. These

proportions worked satisfactorily, though the gun ammunition might

still be somewhat increased, even at the expense of the small arms.

The result of the whole series of operations seems to point to the

fact that an establishment of 100,000 rounds of small arm ammunition

per brigade, or 300,000 per division, and 250 rounds of gun ammunition

per gun, or 4500 for a division, would form the best proportion. This

would give a total of 442 rounds of shell per gun, carried in the

field, not an unduly large amount for a modern, quick-firing gun, when

it is remembered that Napoleon considered that the muzzle-loading,

slow-firing field pieces of his day should be supplied with not less

than 300 rounds apiece.

_Loads._--The weights laid down in the 1914 War Establishments to be

carried both in G.S. and L.G.S. wagons were found to be only suitable

for transport accompanying infantry along well-metalled roads. After

the second battle of Gaza, a new load table was drawn up empirically.

A series of experiments, carried out just prior to the commencement of

the Beersheba operations, demonstrated that even these reduced loads

were far too heavy for G.S. wagons in such country. Unfortunately these

experiments were ignored, and the G.S. wagons started the operations

with the loads as laid down in the new tables. The result was that,

during the march from the Shellal area to Khalasa, the G.S. wagons were

strewn over twenty miles of country, and some 200 camels had to be

requisitioned at short notice from the supply columns to lighten the

wagons.

After the fall of Beersheba, the G.S. wagons of the divisional

ammunition column were taken over by the Corps, as already narrated,

and they took no further part in the operations until they rejoined

their respective divisions on the 19th November.

As a result of the 1917 series of operations, the load question was

again reviewed, and the following loads were decided upon.

G.S. wagons, 23 boxes of 13-pounder gun ammunition or 26 boxes of small

arm ammunition, a total load behind the 6 horses of about 35 cwt.

L.G.S. wagons, 16 boxes of gun or 18 boxes of small arm ammunition, a

total load behind the 4 horses of about 24 cwt.

These loads were proved by considerable subsequent experience to be the

maximum with which wagons could operate efficiently with cavalry in

such country. It is to be remarked that practically no sandy country

was encountered after the fall of Beersheba, but the unmetalled tracks

along which the transport had to march were, in the winters of 1917 and

1918, often almost impassable owing to the mud.

Before leaving the subject of ammunition supply, attention should

be drawn to the vital necessity of cavalry regiments replenishing

their regimental reserve of small arm ammunition from the ammunition

column _every day_. Obvious as this duty may appear, it is one that

is frequently neglected, especially during a time of long marches.

It frequently happened that, in spite of repeated applications, the

ammunition column commanders could not get indents from the regiments

for days at a time. Such delays were often followed by sudden demands

for the immediate supply of a large quantity of ammunition, which,

perhaps, was not all available at the moment. There ensued mutual

recriminations, and much extra work for the tired horses of both the

columns and the regimental ammunition wagons, all of which might have

been avoided by more forethought and attention to detail.

APPENDIX I

(_a_) THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS

When the Desert Mounted Corps officially came into being, it was

constituted as follows:--

_Commander_: Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Chauvel, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.,

Australian Imperial Forces.

AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION (ANZAC).

_Commander_: Major-General Sir E.W.C. Chaytor, K.C.M.G., C.B.,

p.s.c., A.D.C., New Zealand Imperial Forces.

1ST AUSTRALIAN LIGHT HORSE BRIGADE.

_Commander_: Brigadier-General C.F. Cox, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.I.F.

1st, 2nd, and 3rd Regiments Australian Light Horse.

2ND AUSTRALIAN LIGHT HORSE BRIGADE.

_Commander_: Brigadier-General G. de L. Ryrie, C.B., C.M.G., A.I.F.

5th, 6th, and 7th Regiments Australian Light Horse.

NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED BRIGADE.

_Commander_: Brigadier-General W. Meldrum, C.M.G., D.S.O., N.Z.I.F.

Auckland, Canterbury, and Wellington Regiments of Mounted Rifles.

_ARTILLERY._

18th Brigade R.H.A. (Inverness, Ayrshire, and Somerset Batteries) and

Divisional Ammunition Column.

YEOMANRY DIVISION.

_Commander_: Major-General Sir G. de S. Barrow, K.C.M.G., C.B.,

p.s.c., Indian Army.

6TH MOUNTED BRIGADE.

_Commander_: Brigadier-General C.A.C. Godwin, D.S.O., I.A. Dorset,

Bucks, and Berks Yeomanry Regiments.

8TH MOUNTED BRIGADE.

_Commander_: Brigadier-General C.S. Rome, D.S.O.

1st City of London and 1st and 3rd County of London Yeomanry

Regiments.

22ND MOUNTED BRIGADE.

_Commander_: Brigadier-General F.A.B. Fryer (relinquished command

December 1917).

Brigadier-General P.D. FitzGerald, D.S.O., p.s.c.

Stafford, Lincoln, and East Riding Yeomanry Regiments.

_ARTILLERY._

20th Brigade R.H.A. (Berks, Hants, and Leicester Batteries) and

Divisional Ammunition Column.

AUSTRALIAN MOUNTED DIVISION.

_Commander_: Major-General Sir H.W. Hodgson, K.C.M.G., C.V.O., C.B.

3RD AUSTRALIAN LIGHT HORSE BRIGADE.

_Commander_: Brigadier-General L.C. Wilson, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.I.F.

8th, 9th, and 10th Regiments Australian Light Horse.

4TH AUSTRALIAN LIGHT HORSE BRIGADE.

_Commander_: Brigadier-General W. Grant, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.I.F.

4th, 11th, and 12th Regiments Australian Light Horse.

5TH MOUNTED BRIGADE.

_Commander_: Brigadier-General P.D. Fitzgerald, D.S.O., p.s.c.

(relinquished command November 1917).

Brigadier-General P.J.V. Kelly, C.M.G., D.S.O.

_ARTILLERY._

19th Brigade R.H.A. ('A' and 'B' Batteries Honourable Artillery

Company, and Notts Battery R.H.A.) and Divisional Ammunition Column.

CORPS RESERVE.

7TH MOUNTED BRIGADE.

_Commander_: Brigadier-General J.T. Wigan, C.M.G., D.S.O.,

(relinquished command December 1917).

Brigadier-General G.V. Clarke, D.S.O.

Sherwood Rangers, South Notts and Herts Yeomanry Regiments, with

Essex Battery R.H.A., and Brigade Ammunition Column.

IMPERIAL CAMEL CORPS BRIGADE.

_Commander_: Brigadier-General S. Smith, V.C., D.S.O.

Two Australian and one British Camel Battalions, with the Hongkong

and Singapore Mountain Battery R.G.A.

After the reorganisation consequent on the despatch of many of the

Yeomanry regiments to France, in April and May 1918, and the arrival of

Indian Cavalry Regiments from Europe, the Corps was expanded into four

divisions as follows:--

4th CAVALRY DIVISION.

_Commander_: Major-General Sir G. de S. Barrow, K.C.M.G., etc.

10TH CAVALRY BRIGADE.

_Commander_: Brigadier-General W.G.K. Green, D.S.O., I.A.

Dorset Yeomanry, 2nd Lancers, 38th Central India Horse.

11TH CAVALRY BRIGADE.

_Commander_: Brigadier-General C.L. Gregory, C.B., p.s.c., I.A. 1st

County of London Yeomanry, 29th Lancers, 36th Jacob's Horse.

12TH CAVALRY BRIGADE.

_Commander_: Brigadier-General J.T. Wigan, C.M.G., D.S.O. Stafford

Yeomanry, 6th Cavalry, 19th Lancers.

_ARTILLERY._

20th Brigade R.H.A. and Divisional Ammunition Column.

5TH CAVALRY DIVISION.

_Commander_: Major-General Sir H.J.M. MacAndrew, K.C.M.G., C.B.,

D.S.O., Indian Army.

13TH CAVALRY BRIGADE.

_Commander_: Brigadier-General P.J.V. Kelly, C.M.G., D.S.O.

(relinquished command September 1918).

Brigadier-General G.A. Weir, D.S.O.

Gloucester Yeomanry, 9th Hodson's Horse, 18th Lancers.

14TH CAVALRY BRIGADE.

_Commander_: Brigadier-General G.V. Clarke, D.S.O.

Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry, 20th Deccan Horse, 34th Poona Horse.

15TH (IMPERIAL SERVICE) CAVALRY BRIGADE.

_Commander_: Brigadier-General C.R. Harbord, D.S.O., I.A. Jodhpur,

Mysore and 1st Hyderabad Lancers.[31]

_ARTILLERY._

'B' Battery H.A.C. and Essex Battery R.H.A., with Divisional

Ammunition Column.

The Anzac and the Australian Mounted Divisions remained the same,

except that the 5th Mounted Brigade was replaced in the latter by the

5th A.L.H. Brigade, which consisted of the 14th and 15th Regiments

A.L.H. (composed of men of the Camel Corps Brigade, which had been

disbanded after the second trans-Jordan raid), and the French Régiment

Mixte de Cavalerie. Swords were issued to the Australian Mounted

Division at the beginning of August 1918, and the men had about six

weeks' training in the use of them before the operations commenced.

The Australian troopers took to their new weapon enthusiastically, and

showed, later on, that they knew how to use it.

(_b_) INFANTRY

During the 1917 operations, the infantry were organised as follows:--

20TH CORPS.

_Commander_: Lieutenant-General Sir Philip Chetwode, Bart.,

K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.

10TH DIVISION.

_Commander_: Major-General J.R. Longley, C.B., C.M.G.

53RD DIVISION.

_Commander_: Major-General S.F. Mott, C.B., p.s.c.

60TH DIVISION.

_Commander_: Major-General Sir J.S.M. Shea, K.C.M.G., D.S.O., p.s.c.,

I.A.

74TH DIVISION.

_Commander_: Major-General E.S. Girdwood, C.B.

21ST CORPS.

_Commander_: Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Bulfin, K.C.B., C.V.O.

52ND DIVISION.

_Commander_: Major-General J. Hill, C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., I.A.

54TH DIVISION.

_Commander_: Major-General S.W. Hare, C.B.

75TH DIVISION.

_Commander_: Major-General P.C. Palin, C.B., C.M.G., I.A.

On the reorganisation of the infantry in the spring of 1918, the

3rd (Lahore) and 7th (Meerut) Divisions replaced the 52nd and 74th

Divisions, which were sent to France. The 3rd was commanded by

Major-General A.R. Hoskins, C.M.G., D.S.O., p.s.c., and the 7th by

Major-General Sir V.B. Fane, K.C.I.E., C.B.

Three-quarters of the British troops in all divisions except the 54th

were replaced by Indians.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 31: These regiments were all maintained by the Ruling Princes

of their respective States in India.]

APPENDIX II

NOTE ON THE ARAB MOVEMENT

A SHERIF (plur. Ashraf) is one who claims descent direct from the

Prophet Mohammed, through his daughter Fatima, wife of Ali, the third

Khalif. These Ashraf are found all over the Arabic-speaking world, but

only those whose pedigrees are inscribed in the Register of Mecca are

universally accepted as true descendants of the Prophet. This register

has been kept with extraordinary care, and it is probable that it dates

back to the time of Mohammed himself. There are in the Hedjaz several

families of these true Ashraf, who form the aristocracy of the Arab

world, live under a law of their own, and enjoy a number of special

privileges.

For the first four centuries after the death of the Prophet, the

Ashraf, though regarded with veneration and respect by the Arabs,

held no temporal power. At the end of the tenth century, however, a

Sherif of Mecca proclaimed himself Emir of the Ashraf, and succeeded

in establishing his dynasty as the temporal chiefs (under the Khalif)

of the Hedjaz. The ruling prince of the Ashraf of Mecca was known for

centuries in Europe as 'The Grand Sherif of Mecca,' and, in former

times, when the city was not as jealously guarded as it now is, more

than one Christian sovereign sent an embassy to him there.

During the succeeding five hundred years, internecine strife, resulting

in frequent changes of dynasty, weakened the temporal power of the

Emirs of Mecca, and correspondingly increased the ascendancy of the

Turks. In the sixteenth century, however, the Emir Katada, by a series

of conquests of rival claimants, possessed himself of the chief power

in the Hedjaz, and established his own family as the head of the

Ashraf.

Sherif Hussein, a lineal descendant of Katada, succeeded to the Emirate

in 1908. A man of powerful will and strong ambitions, Hussein began

almost at once to consider the possibility of securing the independence

of the Hedjaz, and possibly even of all the Arabs, from Turkish

dominion. His task was an exceedingly difficult one. The Sultan of

Turkey, as Khalif of Islam, was regarded as the spiritual head of all

Moslems, and any open action against him would be likely to meet with

strong opposition in all Moslem countries outside Arabia. A Turkish

Army Corps, with its headquarters at Sanah, near Aden, garrisoned

and controlled the country; and the Emir's own people, split up into

innumerable tribes and clans, were torn by bitter inter-tribal feuds,

many of which dated back for centuries.

The ease with which the Sultan Abdul Hamid was overthrown by the

Committee of Union and Progress at the time of the Turkish Revolution,

encouraged the Sherif in his dream of establishing an independent

Arab State. He became the representative of the Hedjaz in the Turkish

Parliament, and for a time lived in Constantinople. Very soon,

however, disgusted with the intrigues and jealousies of the C.U.P.,

and realising that he had nothing to hope for from this body of needy

adventurers, he retired from his position, and went back into the

desert, where for the next four or five years he lived the rigorous

life of a patriarchal desert Sheikh, preparing his four sons for the

struggle to come, and gathering round him a small number of chiefs

pledged to the cause of Arabian independence.

The declaration of war by Turkey on Great Britain furnished the Emir

with the chance which he had long awaited, and the atrocities committed

by the Turks in Syria at the beginning of the war caused the oppressed

Arabs to turn to him as their national champion. He at once threw in

his lot with the British, though not openly at first, and set to work,

with the fierce energy characteristic of him, to stir up the tribes of

the Hedjaz against the Turks.

The outbreak of the rebellion was precipitated by the arrival at

Medina in May 1916 of a large Turkish force, charged with the task of

re-establishing the waning authority of the Sultan in the Hedjaz. The

Emir himself, though as full of energy and determination as ever, was

now too old to bear the rigours of a desert campaign, and accordingly

placed the command of his Bedouin followers in the hands of his three

eldest sons Ali, Abdullah, and Feisal. Of Ali we know little, though

he was active in the summer of 1918 and in the early part of 1917.

Abdullah, the second son, was of a retiring disposition, a theologian

and philosopher, and a deep student of the Koran. Feisal alone

inherited his father's energy and power of command, without, however,

the old man's ungovernable temper. The youngest son, Zeid, was still

only a boy.

A line of Arab pickets was established round Medina, under the command

of Feisal, and the railway north of the town was cut in several places.

But the Arabs, not being provided at this time with explosives, and

being ignorant of modern methods of demolition, did not effect enough

before being driven off by relief parties with machine guns, to

interrupt seriously the communication of Medina with the north, and the

besieging force, short of arms and supplies, and without artillery,

could do little more than watch the city from afar. Jiddah, however,

the port of Mecca, which was attacked on June 9th, held out barely a

week. Cut off from Mecca by the loss of the military block-houses on

the road, and bombarded by British warships and aeroplanes, the Turkish

garrison surrendered on the 16th June. The fall of Mecca followed a

month later, and an Arab force under Sherif Abdullah then proceeded to

blockade the hill town of Taif, where the bulk of the Turkish forces,

outside Medina, was established in summer quarters. This place held

out till near the end of September, when Ghalib Pasha, the G.O.C.,

despairing of help, and cut off by the Arabs from all sources of

supply, surrendered with the garrison of 2000 men.

By the end of the year all the small Turkish posts scattered throughout

the Hedjaz had fallen to the Arabs. Medina still held out, and it was

clear that the Arab forces, indifferently armed, and inexperienced in

modern siege warfare, could not hope to reduce this city. The Turkish

garrison, with the lines of communication troops along the railway to

the north, numbered some 15,000 men, well-armed and equipped, and in

all respects capable of prolonged resistance.

Acting on the advice of the British officers with them, the Arabs,

therefore, abandoned for the time being all attempts on Medina, and

concentrated all their efforts on a systematic attack on the Hedjaz

Railway north of the town. During the first six months of 1917 a

constant succession of raids so interrupted the traffic on the railway

that the Turks could with difficulty keep open their communications

between Medina and Damascus.

In July 1917 the Emir Feisal seized Akaba, at the north end of the Red

Sea, and made this place his base for further raiding operations on the

railway as far north as Maan.

In January 1918 he succeeded in destroying the branch line to the Hish

Forest, from which the Turkish locomotives were drawing their fuel, and

then attacked Maan itself (see p. 153.) Though unable to capture the

town, the Arabs established themselves across the railway two miles

farther south, and, in the course of the succeeding three months,

destroyed seventy miles of the line. Medina was thus finally isolated,

and the garrison was faced with the two alternatives of holding out in

the town till the end of the war, or of attempting to cut a way out to

the north. As the latter alternative meant almost certain destruction,

the Turks decided to stay where they were. They remained in Medina till

they were compelled to surrender, under the terms of the Armistice of

the 31st October 1918.

The strong position taken up by the Turkish IVth Army east of the

Jordan during the summer of 1918, prevented the Emir from making

any further move northwards. He remained about Maan, collecting

his resources for the coming struggle, and carrying on a vigorous

propaganda among the surrounding tribes, till the British advance

in September caused the IVth Army to retire, and gave the Arabs the

opportunity of completing the task to which they had set themselves in

1916.

APPENDIX III

SUMMARY OF TERMS OF THE TURKISH ARMISTICE WHICH CAME INTO FORCE ON

OCTOBER 31, 1918.

_Art. 1._--Opening of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus and access to the

Black Sea. The Allied occupation of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts.

_Art. 2._--The position of all minefields, torpedo tubes, and other

obstructions in Turkish waters to be indicated, and assistance to be

given to sweep or remove them as may be required.

_Art. 3._--All available information regarding the mines in the Black

Sea to be communicated.

_Art. 4._--All Allied prisoners and Armenians interned to be collected

in Constantinople, and handed over unconditionally to the Allies.

_Art. 5._--The immediate demobilisation of the army except troops

required for the surveillance of the frontier and maintenance of

internal order, their number and disposal to be determined later by the

Allies, after consultation with the Turkish Government.

_Art. 6._--The surrender of all war vessels in Turkish waters or the

waters occupied by Turkey. These ships to be interned at such Turkish

port or ports, as may be directed, except such small vessels as are

required for police or similar purposes in Turkish territorial waters.

_Art. 7._--The Allies to have the right to occupy any strategic points,

in the event of any situation arising which threatens the security of

the Allies.

_Art. 8._--The free use by Allied ships of all ports and anchorages

now in Turkish occupation, and the denial of their use to the enemy.

Similar conditions to apply to Turkish mercantile shipping in Turkish

waters, for the purposes of trade and the demobilisation of the army.

_Art. 9._--The use of all ship-repairing facilities at all Turkish

ports and arsenals.

_Art. 10._--Allied occupation of the Taurus tunnel system.

_Art. 11._--Withdrawal of Turkish troops from north-western Persia.

Part of Trans-Caucasia to be evacuated; the remainder to be evacuated

if the Allies require, after they study the situation there.

_Art. 12._--Wireless and cable stations to be under Allied control;

Turkish Government messages excepted.

_Art. 13._--Prohibition of the destruction of any naval, military, or

commercial material by the Turks.

_Art. 14._--Facilities to be given for the purchase of coal, oil-fuel,

and naval material from Turkish sources, after the requirements of the

country have been met. None of the above material to be exported.

_Art. 15._--Allied control of all railways, and Allied occupation of

Batoum. Turkey not to object to the Allied occupation of Baku.

_Art. 16._--The surrender of the garrisons of the Hedjaz, Asir, Yemen,

Syria, and Mesopotamia, and the withdrawal of troops from Cilicia,

except those maintaining order, as determined under Clause 5. The

surrender of all ports in Cilicia.

_Art. 17._--The surrender of all Turkish officers in Tripolitania and

Cyrenaica to the nearest Italian garrison. Turkey to guarantee to stop

supplies to, and communication with, these officers, if they do not

obey the order of surrender.

_Art. 18._--The surrender of all ports occupied in Tripolitania and

Cyrenaica, including Misurata, to the nearest Allied garrison.

_Art. 19._--All Germans and Austrians, naval, military, and civilian,

to quit Turkey within a month. Those in remote districts to do so as

soon as possible thereafter.

_Art. 20._--Compliance with the Allies' orders as regards the disposal

of arms and the transport of the demobilised, under Clause 5.

_Art. 21._--An Allied representative to be attached to the Turkish

Ministry of Supplies, to safeguard Allied interests.

_Art. 22._--Turkish prisoners to be kept at the disposal of the Allies.

The release of Turkish civilian prisoners and prisoners over military

age to be considered.

_Art. 23._--Turkey to cease all relations with the Central Powers.

_Art. 24._--In case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets the Allies

reserve the right to occupy any of them.

INDEX

Abasan el Kebir, 12.

Abdullah, Emir, 339.

Abid Miriam, 177.

Abraham's Well, 41.

Abu el Teaha, 3.

---- Jerwal, 32.

---- Shusheh (Plain of Philistia) 85, 89.

---- ---- (Plain of Esdraelon), 200, 206.

---- Tellul, 178.

---- ---- Action of, 181, 185.

---- el Hareira, 3.

Acre, capture of, 232.

Adana, 295.

Administration of Enemy Territory. See Enemy Territory.

Advance Guards, 252-257, 267-269, 285-289.

---- ---- Artillery with, 305, 306.

Afghanistan, 2.

Afule, 4, 191, 192.

---- capture of, 210.

Ain Arik, 105.

---- el Duk, 177, 180.

---- el Hekr, 137.

---- el Sir, 135, 241.

---- el Subian, 222.

---- Hemar, 159.

---- Kohleh, 38.

---- Shibleh, 193, 222.

Aintab, 295, 301.

Aircraft, British, xv, 15, 188, 197, 198, 204.

---- ---- superiority of, 6, 261.

---- ---- co-operation with cavalry, 285, 286.

---- ---- bombing operations, 198, 216, 218, 222, 226.

---- Enemy, 6, 9, 15, 174, 210, 216, 261, 288.

Ajalon, Vale of, 89, 102.

Ajje, 199, 219.

Akaba, 129, 340.

Akir, 79, 84.

Ak Su Lakes, 301.

Aleppo, 4, 282, 295.

---- advance on, 287, 288, 289.

---- capture of, 290.

---- riots in, 297.

'Aleppo Hunt,' 301.

Alexandretta, 295.

Ali, Emir, 339.

Allenby, Field-Marshal Viscount, 1, 7, 247.

---- ---- tactics of, xiv, xv, 20, 39, 194.

---- ---- success in deceiving enemy, 5, 17, 195.

---- ---- good judgment of, 39, 76.

---- ---- meeting with General Chauvel, 225.

Amman, 5, 126, 132.

---- unsuccessful attacks on, 143, 145, 147-149.

---- capture of, 241.

Ammunition--

Captured enemy, 56, 85.

Columns, 46, 48, 63, 96, 328, 329, 330.

Gun, 328, 329, 330.

Loads of, for wagons, 329, 330.

Replenishment of, 46, 330.

Sent up to El Salt, 166, 167.

Small arm, 328, 329, 330.

Supply, 328, 329, 330.

Amwas, 88, 102.

Anatolians, 68.

Anebta, 220.

Ansarie, 289.

Anthrax, 320.

Anti-Lebanon Mountains, 296.

Antioch, 282.

Anzac Mounted Division, 7, 8, 24, 38, 40, 45, 122, 127, 133, 155, 175,

179, 190, 241, 302, App. I. _a_.

A.P.M., adventure of the, 97-99.

Arab Movement. Appendix II.

Arab ponies. See Horses.

Arab Punar, 295.

Arabs--

Beni Sakhr Tribe, 155, 156, 165, 244, 245.

Butchered by Turks, 264.

Character of, 130, 280.

Christian, 98, 144.

Friendly, 37, 145.

Guides, 23, 206.

Hostile to British, 15, 35, 150, 244, 245.

Hostile to Turks, 212, 240, 243, 244, 245, 275, 280.

Huweitat Tribe, 130.

Intertribal feuds among, 130, 144, 338.

Looting by, 211, 243, 280, 281.

Regular army of. See Sherifian Army.

Spies, 5, 119.

Unreliable information of, 104, 135, 206, 259, 260.

Vengeance of, 265.

Ardahan, 263.

Arak el Menshiye, 59, 61, 62, 74.

---- Suweidan, 60.

Arara, 205.

Arish, 16.

Arkub el Khaluf, 165.

Armageddon, 191.

Armenians, character of, 299.

---- attempt to massacre, 297.

Armenian refugees, 296.

---- Reparations Committee, 297, 298.

Armistice, 293.

---- terms of, 342.

Armoured cars, xv, 85, 109, 160, 195, 204, 205, 208, 209, 211, 220, 226,

232, 249, 267, 284.

---- ---- in advance on Aleppo, 285-292.

---- ---- Enemy, 288.

Arsuf, 191.

Artillery, Royal Horse. See Horse Artillery.

---- ---- ---- loss of. See Guns loss of.

---- shortage of, 179, 190.

---- Enemy field, xiv, 26, 186.

---- ---- heavy, xiv, 9, 45, 186, 187, 188.

---- ---- shelling own troops, 60, 66, 183.

Asluj, 7.

Atawineh, 3.

Attara, 109.

Auja, 4.

Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division. See Anzac Mounted

Division.

Australian Light Horse Brigades--

1st, 7, 8, 24, 45, 51, 59, 65, 69, 71, 128, 136, 154, 157, 165, 174,

181, 229, 240, 243.

2nd, 7, 8, 24, 45, 51, 59, 137, 154, 157, 165, 228, 229, 241, 242.

3rd, 7, 8, 21, 26, 52, 72, 102, 115, 117, 157, 165, 213, 249, 259,

267, 277, 279.

4th, 8, 28, 31, 45, 52, 56, 72, 115, 157, 160, 175, 248, 249, 268.

5th, 190, 199, 217, 220, 259, 269.

Australian Light Horse Regiments--

1st, 157.

2nd, 27, 28, 69, 182.

3rd, 28, 229.

4th, 162, 250, 268, 269.

5th, 184, 242.

6th, 170.

8th, 158, 159, 172, 267.

9th, 158, 267.

10th, 158, 159, 213, 268, 277.

11th, 157, 160, 249, 263.

12th, 250, 268, 269, 275.

14th, 217.

15th, 221.

Australian Mounted Division, 8, 24, 26, 72, 102, 113, 155, 175, 179,

190, 197, 200, 202, 212, 247, 249, 252, 258, 266, 293, 296, 302,

App. I. _a._

Australians as scouts, 140.

---- weight of, 95.

Austrians, 9.

Ayun Kara, 86.

Baalbek, 284, 285, 287, 295.

Baghdad, 1.

Balata, 221.

Baldwin II., Castle of, 258.

Balin, 66, 72.

Barada, River, 269.

Baramkie Station, 277.

Barley, 313, 314.

Barrow, Major-General Sir G. de S., 42, 80, 89, 209, 240, 302.

Barrow's Detachment, 42.

Batoum, 263.

Bayonets, used in cavalry charge, 29, 56.

Becke, Major A.F., XV.

Beersheba, Arabs in, 36, 37, 38.

---- capture of, 30.

---- defences of, 3, 20.

---- description of, 20, 33, 34, 35.

---- Railway, 4.

Beirût, 282, 284, 295.

Beisan, 134, 191, 211.

Beit Dejan, 19, 220.

---- Dukka, 107.

---- Duras, 60.

---- Hanun, 48, 52.

---- Jibrin, 66, 70, 97.

---- Lid, 220.

---- Likia, 107.

---- Ras, 253.

---- Sira, 103.

---- Ur el Foka, 106, 113.

---- Ur el Tahta, 101, 103, 113.

Beitunia, 105.

Belled el Sheikh, 233.

Berfilya, 101.

Berkusie, 66, 72.

Beshshit, 80.

Bethlehem, 98.

Bire, 101.

Bir Adas, 199.

---- el Arara, 23.

---- el Hammam, 23.

---- el Makruneh, 32.

---- el Nettar, 39.

---- Jemameh, 44, 51.

---- Salim Abu Irgeig, 23.

Birket Ata, 204.

Bivouac shelters, 12.

Blockhouses, 20, 27, 28, 256.

Bluff, the, 182, 183.

Bridges, and bridgeheads--

Beersheba, 35.

Benat Yakub, 258.

El Rastan, 288.

Enemy, 128, 129, 157, 158.

Esdud, 65, 69, 118.

Jordan, 128, 129, 135, 136, 146, 153, 157, 158, 175.

Nahr el Auja, 108, 109, 110.

Shellal, 17.

Brigandage, 296.

Brisbane, Captain, 142.

British Forces. See Troops, British.

Buggar, 21.

Bulfin, Lieutenant-General Sir Edward, 9.

Bureir, 50, 59.

Burj, 115.

Burka, 65, 71.

Bursȳm, 313.

Butler, Lady, 55.

Cacolets, 151, 173.

Camel Corps Brigade, 8, 69, 133, 137, 154, App. I. _a_.

Camel Transport Corps, 36, 62, 63.

Camels, 36, 63, 325.

---- Arabs impressed by British, 36.

---- prices realised by captured, 318.

---- unsuitability of, in hill country, 141, 173, 325, 326.

Cameron, Lieutenant-Colonel, 244.

Carchemish, 302.

Carmel, Mount, 192, 212, 233.

Casualties, British, 31, 54, 84, 92, 94, 114, 151, 152, 181, 268, 287,

293.

---- Enemy, 31, 54, 83, 85, 92, 117, 153, 154, 184, 251, 272, 276, 278.

Cavalry--

Detail of, 8, App. I. _a_.

Disease amongst. See Disease.

Enemy. See Turks.

French, ix, 190, 221, 259, 319.

in mountain country, 102, 104-108, 112-122, 127, 128, 136-151,

165-175, 219.

in trenches, 155, 156.

Organisation for the advance on Aleppo, 285.

Reorganisation of, 154, 179, App. I. _a_.

Training, 12, 13, 14, 55.

Withdrawal of, from Syria, 302.

Charges of Cavalry--

Abu Naj, 230, 231.

Abu Shusheh, 90.

Beersheba, 29.

Haifa, 235, 236.

Haritan, 292.

Henu Ford, 185, 186.

Huj, 53.

Irbid, 253.

Kaukab, 269.

Khan Ayash, 279.

Remte, 256.

training for, 55, 56.

unsuccessful, 230, 253, 254, 292.

of Turkish Cavalry, 22.

Chauvel, Lieutenant-General Sir H.G., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., xvi, 8, 169,

279.

Chaytor, Major-General Sir E.W.C., 108, 138, 143, 149, 164.

Chaytor's Force, 196, 201, 220, 227, 229, 240-246.

Chetwode, Lieutenant-General Sir Philip, Bart., viii, 7, 9, 33.

Christians, 98, 144.

Cilicia, 295.

Circassians, 144, 263, 264.

Climate, 15, 63, 104, 117, 177, 179, 180, 189, 311.

Cold, 104, 118, 119, 137, 144.

Committee of Union and Progress, 298.

Communications, British, 16, 17, 112, 129, 164, 263.

---- Enemy, 4, 129, 191, 192, 193.

Communiqués, Enemy, 16, 100.

Counter-attacks, Enemy--

Balin, 72, 73, 74.

El Burj, 117.

Jisr el Damieh, 160.

Khuweilfeh, 38, 39, 40.

Nebi Samwil, 107.

Richon-le-Zion, 86.

Country, description of. See Topography.

Cox, Brigadier-General, 27, 65.

Cripps, Lieutenant-Colonel, 90.

Crusaders, 103.

Damascus, 4.

---- capture of, 275, 279.

---- disorders in, 280, 281.

---- importance of, 247.

---- the race for, 251-275.

Daraya, 278.

Darb el Haj, 243.

Darfur campaign, 314.

Davison, Captain, 209.

Dead Sea, 126, 179, 180.

Deceiving the enemy, 5, 17, 175, 176, 177, 195, 196, 197, 210, 211,

213, 214, 293.

Defences, British--

Gaza-Beersheba, 5, 12.

Jaffa-Jerusalem, 114.

Jordan Valley, 175, 178, 179.

Defences, Turkish--

Gaza-Beersheba, 3, 20.

Damascus, 268.

Defences, Turkish--

Jaffa-Jerusalem, 114.

On 19th September 1918, 191, 193, 199, 200, 220.

Nazareth, 214.

Trans-Jordan, 133, 156.

Nahr Rubin, 70, 71.

Aleppo, 289.

Deir Ali, 268.

---- el Belah, 16, 17.

---- el Ghusn, 219.

---- el Hawa, 39.

---- el Kuddis, 119.

---- el Saras, 261.

---- Khabiye, 273.

---- Sineid, 4.

Deraa Junction, 4, 191, 192, 248, 252, 257, 264, 295.

Desert Column, the, viii, 7, 16.

Desert Mounted Corps, ix, 9, 293.

---- ---- ---- detail of, 8, App. I.

---- ---- ---- reorganisation of, 179, App. I. _a_.

---- ---- ---- administration of Syria by, 295-301.

---- ---- ---- disbandment of, 302.

Dhahariyeh, 21.

Disease, among British troops, x, 181, 246, 283, 284, 287.

---- ---- Enemy, 60, 276, 278, 279.

Dobell, Major-General Sir C., viii.

Documents, captured enemy, 5, 57, 178, 194, 198, 208.

Dome, 220.

Donkeys, 166, 325, 326, 327.

Dothan Pass, 213.

Druses, 263, 264.

Duma, 277.

Dust, 71, 179, 180, 187, 311.

Dysentery, 60, 278.

Eastern Force, viii.

Egypt, 2.

Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 1, 7.

Enemy Territory, advances into, 122, 293.

---- ---- administration of, 295-301.

---- ---- disorder in, 296, 297.

Engineers, Royal, 16, 17, 287, 288.

---- Australian, 16, 17.

---- Enemy, 49, 132.

Entrenching tools, 13.

Ellar, 219.

Equipment, 12, 13, 320, 321.

---- weight of, 95.

Esani, 7.

Escorts. See Horse Artillery.

Esdraelon, Plain of, 191, 209.

Esdud, 60, 118.

Euphrates, River, 282.

Exchange, stabilisation of, 299, 301.

---- gambles in, 299, 300.

Ezra, 255.

Fahme, 219.

Falkenhayn, Marshal von, 2, 72.

Faluje, 59, 61, 62, 66.

Feisal, Emir, 130, 153, 280, 281, 339, 340, 341.

Fevzi Pasha, 9.

Fire support, 29, 55, 82, 90, 209, 254, 260, 269, 291, 304, 305.

Flag of truce, 289.

Forage, 13, 62, 248, 313, 314.

---- local, 248, 314.

Fox hounds, 301.

Fuheis, 144, 168.

Funduk, 220.

Furkha, 191.

Gafar Pasha, 297.

Galilee, Sea of, 134, 191.

Gallipoli, 1.

Games, 301.

Gamli, 5.

Gaza, defences of, 3.

---- attack of, 22, 32.

---- capture of, 48.

---- description of, 124, 125.

Gebel el Shegeib, 23.

German Emperor, 121.

Germans, 9, 154, 181, 214, 219, 250, 251.

---- ill-treatment of Turks by, xiii, xiv, 193, 194, 260, 276.

---- breaches of laws of war by, 216, 250, 251.

---- drunkenness, 185.

---- venereal disease among, 279.

---- indifference to Turkish brutality, 265.

---- spies, 5.

Gezer, 89.

Ghabaghib, 271.

Ghalib Pasha, 340.

Ghazale, 255.

Gheyadah, 80.

Ghoraniyeh, 128, 133, 135, 153, 228.

---- Enemy attack on, 154.

Glanders, 320.

Godwin, Brigadier-General C.A., 80, 90.

Good Samaritan Inn, 127.

Gram, 313, 314.

Grant, Brigadier-General W., 28, 29, 31, 161, 249, 263, 317.

Gray-Cheape, Lieut.-Colonel H., 53.

Gregory, Brigadier-General, 231.

Grenades, 117.

Guns, captured, xii, 30, 52, 55, 85, 100, 102, 122, 205, 211, 226,

232, 238, 245, 262, 268, 279, 283, 293.

---- loss of R.H.A., 163.

Hableh, 199.

Haifa, 191, 192, 232.

---- capture of, 232-238.

---- annexation expedition, 227.

Hama, 282, 288.

Hamame, 66.

Haram, 202.

Harbaj, 234.

Harbord, Brigadier-General, 233, 291.

Hareira, 43.

Harista el Basal, 277.

Haritan, action of, 291.

Harithie, 232.

Haroun al Rashid, 302.

Haud, 133, 136, 157, 165.

Hauran, 248, 263, 272.

Head ropes. See Picketing gear.

Heat, 15, 63, 177, 179, 180, 311.

Hebron, 21.

Hedjaz, 126, 337.

---- Force, 129, 130, 131, 133, 153, 240, 242, 243.

---- ---- surrender of, 244, 245.

---- King of. See Hussein.

Heel ropes. See Picketing gear.

Henu Ford, 185.

Hermon, Mount, 212.

Hills. See Topography.

Hiseia, 21.

Hish Forest, 130, 340.

Hodgson, Major-General Sir H.W., 21, 73, 74, 75, 167, 169.

Homs, 282, 286, 287, 294, 295.

Horse Artillery, 27.

Ammunition, 308, 309, 328, 329.

Command, 303, 304.

Detail of, App. I. _a_.

Horse Artillery--

Employment of, 74, 75, 259, 260, 269.

Escorts for, 306, 307.

Horses for, 319.

Howitzers, 307.

Reserves 304, 305.

Special requirements of, 309.

With advance guard, 269, 305, 306.