THE PLAN OF OPERATIONS
The Commander-in-Chiefs plan was bold and simple, and promised great
results. It depended for its success largely on the resolution and
vigour with which the first part of the plan, the attack of Beersheba,
was carried out. Owing to the waterless nature of the country, this
place had to be in our hands within twenty-four hours from the
commencement of the operations. If it were not, the troops would have
to be withdrawn, owing to lack of water, the attack abandoned, and
the operations commenced anew at some later date, against an enemy
forewarned of our plans, and with the prospect of the winter rains
putting a stop to our advance before it had well begun.
The operations as a whole divided themselves naturally into three
main parts, in each of which the fighting would be of a totally
different character. First, the attack and capture of the enemy's
entrenched positions from Beersheba to the sea. This was primarily
an infantry operation. Secondly, the pursuit of the enemy over the
plain of Philistia, culminating in the capture of Junction Station,
and the consequent isolation of any enemy force endeavouring to cover
Jerusalem. This was to be the cavalry's opportunity. And lastly, the
advance through the Judæan hills, and the capture of the Holy City.
For obvious reasons only the first part of these operations could
be thought out in detail beforehand. The plan for this phase was as
follows:--
1. To seize Beersheba and the high ground to the north and north-west
of it, by a combined attack of cavalry and infantry, thus throwing open
the left flank of the main enemy position at Hareira and Sharia. After
the fall of Beersheba the cavalry would thus all be concentrated on the
right flank of our forces, ready to pursue the enemy when driven from
the remainder of his positions. The possession of Beersheba would, it
was hoped, give us the necessary water to enable us to maintain our
cavalry on this flank till the conclusion of the second phase of the
attack.
2. To deliver the main infantry attack against the enemy's open left
flank at Hareira, and endeavour to roll up his line from east to west.
3. In order to deceive the enemy up to the last moment as to the real
point of our main attack, to pin him to his positions, and to draw
reinforcements away from his left flank, an attack, preceded by a
week's bombardment, was to be launched on the Gaza defences twenty-four
to forty-eight hours previous to 2.
As the attack on Beersheba necessitated a march of some seventy miles
on the part of the cavalry, who were to attack from the east, and of
about twenty for the infantry, over unknown country, a great deal of
preliminary work was required. The water supply had to be developed,
tracks and the crossing places of wadis improved and marked on the
maps, and the enemy positions south and west of Beersheba most
carefully reconnoitred. It was also very desirable that all commanders
should gain some knowledge of the country over which they were to lead
their troops.
To these ends our line was organised as follows:--
A permanent position, strongly entrenched and wired, was constructed
from the sea at Gaza to Shellal on the Wadi Ghuzze, and held by
infantry. From Shellal a lightly entrenched line extended to El
Gamli, and this was held by one cavalry division, which also supplied
the outposts and patrols in the wide 'no man's land' at this end
of the line. A second cavalry division was held in support in the
neighbourhood of Abasan el Kebir, and the third was in reserve,
resting, on the seashore near Tel el Marrakeb. These divisions relieved
one another every month.
The cavalry divisions in the line and at Abasan lived in bivouacs made
of light, wooden hurdles, covered with grass mats, and erected over
rectangular pits dug in the ground. These bivouac shelters gave fair
cover from the sun, and the pits afforded some protection from enemy
bombs. The division on the seashore was accommodated in tents.
The two former divisions had to be ready at all times to move out to
battle at half an hour's notice, and much of the training was directed
towards cutting down the time taken to turn out in 'marching order.'
The division in the line had plenty of work to do, with daily outposts,
extended patrol work, and the long reconnaissances undertaken every
fortnight, so that the training was confined to the periods spent at
Abasan.
As the operations were to take place in the late summer, and, it was
hoped, would be concluded before the winter rains set in, no great
provision against cold and wet was called for. Blankets and greatcoats
were, therefore, not to be carried. Each man was provided with a
pair of officers' pattern saddle-wallets, in which he carried three
days' rations (including the iron ration) of bully beef, biscuit, and
groceries, besides the few articles of clothing he was allowed to take.
Two nose-bags on each saddle carried 19 lb. of grain (two days' forage
on the marching scale). A third day's forage was carried in limbered
G.S. wagons, three to each regiment. The divisions were, therefore,
self-supporting for three days, without recourse to their divisional
trains. The latter, during the subsequent operations, did not accompany
their divisions, but acted as carriers between them and the advanced
ration dumps established by the corps' lorry column each day. One other
L.G.S. wagon was allowed per regiment for technical stores, cooking
utensils, etc. All entrenching tools were carried on pack animals.
In order to test the mobility of the troops, it was the custom for
each divisional commander, during the period when his division was in
the Abasan area, to issue from time to time a surprise order for the
troops to turn out ready for operations, and rendezvous by brigades or
regiments in stated places, where they were carefully inspected. These
orders were generally issued in the early morning, and, as no hint of
them was ever given beforehand, even to the Staff, they constituted
a real test of mobility. The time taken by each unit to turn out was
noted by Staff officers, and the keenest rivalry sprang up between the
divisions and the different units of each division to make the best
showing. Ration and store wagons were packed each night, nose-bags
filled after the last feed and tied on the saddles, and all harness and
saddlery laid out in order behind the horses. The men's wallets were
kept packed permanently, the rations in them being renewed from time
to time, when the old ones were consumed. The record ultimately went
to one of the Horse Artillery batteries, which turned out complete
in full marching order, with all its ammunition, rations, and stores
correct, in eleven minutes from the receipt of the order.
About once a fortnight the cavalry division that was in the line made
a reconnaissance towards Beersheba, the other two divisions closing
up to Shellal and Abasan respectively. Moving out in the afternoon,
the division would march all night, and occupy a line of posts on the
high ground west of Beersheba by dawn next morning. Behind this line
of protecting posts the infantry corps and divisional commanders,
and innumerable lesser fry, disported themselves in motor cars and
on horseback. The senior corps commander and his staff used to be
irreverently referred to as the 'Royal Party,' a flippant term which
may be excused by the tedium and discomfort of the operations.
After seeing the last of the infantry commanders safely away, the
cavalry used to withdraw, and march back to Shellal during the night.
The reconnaissances thus entailed two nights and a day of almost
continual movement and watchfulness, without any sleep or rest, during
which time it was not uncommon for regiments to cover seventy miles
or more. Apart from the fatigue occasioned by thirty-six hours of
constant anxiety and hard work, the absence of water caused severe
hardship to the horses and no little discomfort to their riders. No
water for horses was available from the afternoon of the day on which
the division moved out till the evening of the following day, when,
as a rule, they got a drink at Esani on the way back to Shellal. The
men started with full bottles, and got one refill from the regimental
water-carts.
The day was made up of a series of petty annoyances. The scattered
squadrons were invariably bombed by the enemy, generally with effect,
and the Turks' light guns, brought out to concealed positions, from
which they had previously registered all the high ground, wadi
crossings, etc., added to the general discomfort by their continual,
galling shell fire. Many of the crossings in this part of the country
consisted of a narrow, stony cleft in the rock sides of the wadi, down
which troops could only move in very narrow formation, often only in
single file. When, as sometimes happened, a whole brigade of cavalry
had to cross by one of these narrow drifts, while the bed of the wadi
was being swept by shrapnel and high explosive shell the whole time,
tempers were apt to get short. We on our side could rarely spare an
aeroplane to observe for one of our own batteries, and so were seldom
able to locate the hostile guns. The inability to reply effectively
increased the exasperation caused by their fire. Many of the
surrounding natives had been armed by the Turks and stirred up against
us, and, though they never succeeded in causing us any casualties,
their hostility added to the general insecurity, and increased the need
for watchfulness.
For the rest, the country was a desert of blistering rocks and stones,
the temperature ranged up to 110 degrees in the shade (of which there
was none save that cast by the bodies of men and horses), and the flies
were innumerable and persistent. It was with a sigh of heartfelt relief
that the troops saw the last of the motor cars of the 'Royal Parties'
disappear in a cloud of dust to the north-west, and received the
welcome order to withdraw and march back to Shellal through the cool
night.
There was, however, one never-failing amusement to be got out of these
reconnaissances. This came on the following day, when we intercepted
the Turkish wireless _communiqué_ on its way to the Berlin press. These
_communiqués_ never varied in their description of the operations.
'The enemy made a determined attack on Beersheba with about seventy
squadrons supported by artillery.' This was the invariable formula.
'After heavy fighting, the hostile forces were defeated and driven
right back to their original positions, having suffered important
losses!' One imagines that even the simple Berliner must have become,
at last, somewhat sceptical of these regular, fortnightly victories.
The result of this series of reconnaissances to the west and south-west
of Beersheba was that every general officer who was to lead troops over
this area gained a very thorough knowledge of the country, which was of
the highest value in the subsequent operations. The sappers attached
to the cavalry divisions also took advantage of the reconnaissances to
reconnoitre for water at Khalasa and Asluj, where they subsequently
repaired the wells that had been destroyed by the Turks, and to develop
the supply at Esani in the Wadi Ghuzze. They also improved and marked
many of the wadi crossings, and made route surveys of the whole area.
Our line of communications, at this time, consisted of a broad-gauge
railway, which had been laid by the Royal Engineers across the 130
miles of desert from Kantara on the Suez Canal to Deir el Belah, about
eight miles south of Gaza. The railhead of this line had followed close
behind the Desert Column during its advance across Sinai. After the
occupation of El Arish, the doubling of the railway track had been
taken in hand, and, by the end of September 1917, the double track
extended as far as Deir el Belah. During September and October a
branch line was laid from this place to Shellal, where it was carried
over the Wadi Ghuzze, here some 800 yards wide and sixty feet deep, on
a fine trestle bridge built by British and Australian Sappers. Work was
then continued towards Karm, whence a narrow-gauge line was to be run
out to Beersheba, as soon as that place was in our hands.
In order to relieve the railway of some of its heavy traffic, to enable
it to bring up stores for the 'Big Push,' a sea-borne supply line from
Port Said to Deir el Belah was organised by the Royal Navy during
September. All the supplies for the 21st Corps, which held the coastal
sector of our line, were then carried by sea, and landed in surf boats
on the coast. The shipping, convoying, and landing of stores were
admirably carried out by the Navy, under great difficulties.
Towards the end of October these long and careful preparations were
completed, and the troops began to move unobtrusively to their
concentration areas, leaving their old camps standing, in order to
deceive enemy aircraft. So well were these large troop movements
concealed, that, up to the moment when our attack was launched, the
enemy believed that we had six infantry divisions still in the Gaza
sector and only one in the eastern sector. This apparent disposition
of our troops confirmed him in his mistaken opinion that our main
attack would be delivered against Gaza, and caused him to concentrate
most of his available reserves behind the western portion of his line,
a fact which contributed materially to our success in the subsequent
operations.