THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
[Illustration: LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR H.G. CHAUVEL, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.
Commanding the Desert Mounted Corps.]
THE
DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
AN ACCOUNT OF THE CAVALRY OPERATIONS
IN PALESTINE AND SYRIA
1917-1918
BY
LIEUT.-COLONEL
THE HON. R.M.P. PRESTON, D.S.O.
_With an Introduction by_
LIEUT.-GENERAL
SIR H.G. CHAUVEL, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.
[Illustration]
BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
1921
_Printed in Great Britain_
TO
B
DEAR LOYAL FRIEND AND PERFECT COMRADE
WITHOUT WHOSE ENCOURAGEMENT AND HELP
THIS BOOK WOULD NEVER HAVE
BEEN WRITTEN
INTRODUCTION
It gives me great pleasure to write a few words of introduction to
Lieut.-Col. Preston's _History of the Desert Mounted Corps_, which
I had the honour to command. In writing this History Lieut.-Col.
Preston has done a service to his country which I am sure will be
fully appreciated, particularly, perhaps, by those who served in the
Corps, and who feel that the part they played in the Great War is but
little known to the general public. As a work on Cavalry Tactics, I
trust it will be of some value to the student of Military History,
and, if it does nothing else, it must demonstrate to the world that
the horse-soldier is just as valuable in modern warfare as he ever has
been in the past. Indeed, the whole of the operations in Palestine
and Syria, under General Allenby, were text-book illustrations of the
perfect combination of all arms, both in attack and defence, and the
last operations in this theatre, which led to the total destruction of
the Turkish Arms and the elimination of Germany's Allies from the War,
could not have been undertaken without large masses of Cavalry.
Lieut.-Col. Preston is well qualified to undertake the work. First of
all in command of one of my finest Horse Batteries, and subsequently
as C.R.A. of the Australian Mounted Division, he was often in touch
with my Staff, being constantly employed on reconnaissance duties, in
which he was peculiarly expert. He served throughout the whole of the
operations of which he writes, and had considerable previous experience
in the Sinai Campaign, in which the Horse Artillery of the Desert
Column played so conspicuous a part.
This History commences with the reorganisation of the British Troops
in the Egyptian theatre of the War, on Sir Edmund Allenby taking
over command in June 1917. The troops operating East of the Suez
Canal had hitherto been known as the 'Eastern Force,' which had been
successively commanded by Sir Herbert Lawrence, Sir Charles Dobell and
Sir Philip Chetwode, who were again directly under the orders of the
Commander-in-Chief in Cairo.
The advanced troops of 'Eastern Force,' viz., all the available
Cavalry, Horse Artillery and Camel Corps, with from one to two
Divisions of Infantry, had been organised into what was called 'The
Desert Column.' Sir Edmund Allenby decided to take command of the
troops in the Eastern Field himself. The available Infantry was formed
into two Army Corps, and the Cavalry of the Desert Column was formed
into a Cavalry Corps of three Divisions (subsequently increased to four
on the arrival of the Indian Cavalry from France early in 1918). The
name of the original Desert Column was preserved as far as possible in
the title of the new Cavalry Corps, as most of the troops composing
it had fought throughout the Sinai Campaign, and by them much had
already been accomplished. The Turk had been driven from the vicinity
of the Suez Canal, across the Sinai Desert to the Palestine Border and
beyond, and several hard-won battles had been fought. Also, covered by
these operations, a railway and pipe line had been constructed, without
which, under modern conditions, the further invasion of Palestine could
not have been attempted.
The Desert Mounted Corps was composed of Australians, New Zealanders,
British Yeomanry, and Territorial Horse Artillery and Indian Cavalry,
with French Cavalry added for the last operations; and it says much for
the loyalty of all, and the mutual confidence in each other, that the
whole worked so harmoniously and efficiently to one end. It will be
readily understood, too, that operations of the nature Colonel Preston
describes could not have been carried out successfully without a highly
efficient staff. I was peculiarly fortunate in the _personnel_ of my
staff and also in my Divisional Commanders, two of whom were Indian
Cavalry Officers, one a British Cavalry Officer, and the fourth an
Officer of the New Zealand Staff Corps.
To a leader or a student of military history the campaign was intensely
interesting, but at the same time there were many hardships--intense
heat in the summer, with dust and insect pests inconceivable to those
who did not go through the campaign, and cold and heavy rains in the
winter. The fortitude and endurance of the troops was beyond all
praise, but the summer of 1918 spent by the Corps in the Jordan Valley,
at about 1200 feet below sea-level, with a temperature varying from 110
to 125 degrees, will not be forgotten by them.
The occupation of this area was essential to the success of General
Allenby's final operations; and everything possible was done to
alleviate the conditions--with considerable success, as, though our
wastage from malaria and other diseases was heavy, the greater bulk
of the cases of malaria were contracted after leaving the areas which
had been treated under the supervision of our Medical Staff. Our most
serious losses occurred after reaching Damascus, and, on the farther
advance to Aleppo, one division was brought to a complete standstill by
the ravages of this disease.
Though drawn from such widely different quarters of the Empire, the
_personnel_ of the Corps was well fitted for the class of warfare
it was called upon to undertake. The horsemen of Australia and New
Zealand were accustomed to wide spaces and long days in the saddle, and
were full of initiative, self-reliance and determination to overcome
every obstacle in their way. The Yeomanry, though not so accustomed
to hardships, had behind them the glorious traditions of the British
Cavalry, in the annals of which their charges at Huj and El Mughar will
live for all time. The Horse Artillery too, drawn from the Counties of
England and Scotland and the City of London, lived through the whole of
the campaigns in Sinai and Palestine with their comrades from overseas,
and showed themselves no whit behind-hand in the matter of endurance.
The value of their work is best shown by the esteem in which they were
held by the other troops. The long apprenticeship of the Indian Cavalry
to the trench warfare of the Western Front had robbed them of none of
their dash and brilliancy in the open warfare to which they were so
eminently fitted. The _personnel_ of the Signal Service, Engineers,
Army Service Corps, Army Ordnance Corps, Army Medical Corps, and Army
Veterinary Corps came from the same sources as the other troops--units
often being composed of mixed _personnel_--and to the efficiency of
these the successes attained by the Corps were very largely due.
HARRY CHAUVEL,
_Lieut.-General,
late Commanding the Desert Mounted Corps_.
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE,
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL,
_3rd September 1920_.
AUTHOR'S NOTE
As regards both the numbers engaged and the results achieved, the
campaign in Palestine and Syria ranks as the most important ever
undertaken by cavalry. In the first series of operations our troops
made a direct advance of seventy miles into enemy territory, and
captured some 17,000 prisoners and about 120 guns. The final operations
resulted in an advance of 450 miles, the complete destruction of three
Turkish Armies, with a loss of about 90,000 prisoners and 400 guns, and
the overwhelming defeat of what had hitherto been considered one of the
first-class Military Powers.
These remarks must not be taken, in any way, as underrating the value
of the work of our infantry, who, as always, bore the brunt of the
fighting, while denied much of the interest and excitement of the long
pursuits that fell to the lot of the cavalry. In both the main series
of operations, the infantry prepared the way for the cavalry, and
enabled them to complete the victory won, in the first instance, by the
bayonets.
General Allenby's campaign divides itself naturally into three phases.
First, the Beersheba-Gaza battle and the subsequent pursuit over the
Philistine Plain, culminating in the capture of Jerusalem; secondly,
the operations in the Jordan Valley, and east of the river Jordan; and
thirdly, the final series, resulting in the destruction of the Turkish
Armies, and the capture of Damascus, Aleppo, etc., followed by the
capitulation of the Turkish Empire.
Though the Turks at their best are not to be compared in fighting
value with the troops of the first-class fighting nations of Europe,
such as the British, French, and Germans, they generally fought well
against our infantry, attacking with vigour, and defending their
entrenched positions most stubbornly. They were well supplied with all
the appurtenances of modern warfare, and, in the first part of the
campaign, were generally well led.
At the commencement of the operations, the Turkish soldiers were of
good _morale_ on the whole, their physique was excellent, and their
health satisfactory. There was a large proportion of seasoned soldiers
among them, many with the Gallipoli medal. In the latter part of the
campaign, however, their _morale_ had deteriorated considerably, their
physique was greatly undermined by disease, and there were few old
soldiers left, nearly all having been killed or captured, or died of
disease. Many units were full of untrained troops, ill-disciplined
and demoralised. After the first day's fighting, there was little
resistance by the enemy, except when stiffened by a large proportion of
German troops, as at Semakh and Jisr Benat Yakub.
There were doubtless many causes for this deterioration of _morale_
among the Turkish troops, but, unquestionably, one of the chief was the
constant friction that existed between Turkish and German officers,
which spread downwards to the ranks of both nations. The hectoring
stupidity of the Prussian was nowhere better exemplified than in his
treatment of his Turkish Allies. German officers openly and constantly
expressed their contempt for the Turks, whom they compared to niggers,
and numerous instances came to our knowledge of German N.C.O.'s and
privates beating and kicking Turkish officers.
The three things which the Turks feared most were a threat to their
communications, a charge of cavalry, and a heavy aerial attack. As
regards the first, there was, I believe, no instance in the campaign
when they fought on to the end after being surrounded, though, on
several occasions, Turkish units continued to attack till annihilated.
The losses of the Turks were much heavier than ours in every action
of the campaign, even when they were successful, or partially so, as
in the two trans-Jordan raids.[1] This fact was largely due to their
bad rifle shooting. While our troops were good enough shots to pick
off Turkish soldiers showing their heads above rocks and trenches,
the Turks, as a rule, could only hit our men when standing up during
an advance. When the enemy made his great effort to retake Jerusalem,
on the 26th of December 1917, the number of dead Turks found on the
position after the battle was greater than our total casualties.
As a set-off to their bad rifle shooting, the enemy troops were
supplied with a far larger proportion of machine guns than we were.
Their machine-gun companies, which were largely staffed by Germans,
were generally effective, and caused us the major part of our
casualties during the war.
Their field artillery work in general was slow and inaccurate, but the
heavy artillery, manned by Germans or Austrians, was almost invariably
good.
The above remarks as to _morale_ should be borne in mind in estimating
the tactics of General Allenby.
It will be noticed that he took greater risks in the latter part of
the campaign than he had done at the beginning. These risks were fully
justified by the very complete knowledge of the reduced state of the
enemy's _morale_ which had been acquired by our Intelligence Staff.
In spite of the indifferent _morale_ of the enemy troops, the campaign
is of great value to the student of cavalry tactics, being, as it is,
the only instance in modern war of cavalry operating on a large scale.
It demonstrated once more the soundness of the principles laid down
in our training manuals, which appear to be immutable, in spite of
aircraft and other devilish inventions of present day warfare.
The value of aeroplanes and armoured cars acting in conjunction with
cavalry was very clearly brought out, notably in the final series of
operations.
My thanks are due to Lieutenant-Colonel R.H. Osborne, D.S.O., M.C.,
20th Hussars, cavalry instructor at the Staff College Camberley, for
very kindly reading the manuscript, and for many valuable suggestions
and corrections. Also to Major A.F. Becke, R.A., in charge of the
Historical Section, W.D., for much help in studying war diaries and
maps.
My thanks are also due to the many officers, too numerous to mention
individually, who have very kindly lent me their private diaries, or
given me information about obscure points. I have taken every care
to make the narrative as accurate as possible, but, if any who read
it notice inaccuracies, I shall be very grateful if they will point
them out to me. I have also to thank those who have allowed me to use
photographs taken by them as illustrations. A number of the photographs
taken on the enemy side were obtained from Mr. C. Raad, photographer,
of Jerusalem, who had secured the original negatives, and by whose
permission they are reproduced in the book.
Lastly, I desire to thank Lieutenant-General Sir H.G. Chauvel, K.C.B.,
K.C.M.G., Commander of the Desert Mounted Corps throughout the
campaign, for his help and encouragement, and for having very kindly
written the preface to the book.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: Except in the two first battles of Gaza, April and May
1917, when our losses, in comparison with the numbers engaged, were as
severe as in some of the hardest fought battles on the Western Front.]
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
PAGE
Preliminary. Situation in the East in June 1917. Objectives of
the Palestine Campaign. The country. The opposing armies 1
CHAPTER II
Plan of the operations. Laying the foundations. Cavalry
reconnaissances. Work of the engineers. Maps and water supply 10
CHAPTER III
1917
Oct. 27th to Nov. 1st
The first round. The attack on Beersheba. Charge
of the 4th A.L.H. Brigade. Capture of the town with
2000 prisoners. Destruction of the wells. First attack
on the Gaza defences. German buildings in Beersheba.
Arab sheikhs and the Camel Transport Corps 18
CHAPTER IV
Nov. 2nd to Nov. 7th
The decisive battle. Enemy counterstroke on the
east. Hard fighting of the cavalry and the 53rd
Division. Lack of water. Capture of Tel Khuweilfeh.
And of Hareira and Sharia. Enemy's front broken.
Cavalry through the gap. Fall of Gaza 38
CHAPTER V
Nov. 8th and 9th
The pursuit. All three cavalry divisions employed.
Strong enemy resistance. Charge of the Yeomanry at
Huj. Water at last. Sufferings of the horses. Delay
caused by lack of water. Arak el Menshiye and Beit
Duras 50
CHAPTER VI
Nov. 10th to Nov. 12th
The Cavalry Corps in line from the railway to the sea.
Difficulties of supply. Withdrawal of all but two
infantry divisions. Great heat and lack of water causes
a slackening of the pursuit. Anzac Division seizes the
Esdud bridge. Stiffening of the enemy resistance.
The action of Balin 61
CHAPTER VII
Nov. 13th to Nov. 15th
Attack on the enemy line. Charge of the 6th Mounted
Brigade at El Mughar. Armoured cars enter Junction
Station. Capture of the station. Enemy forces cut
in two. Right group driven northwards across the
River Auja, and left group into the Judæan Hills.
Occupation of Ramleh, Ludd, and Jaffa. The Sidun-Abu
Shusheh position. Second charge of the 6th
Mounted Brigade 77
CHAPTER VIII
Nov. 16th and 17th
Necessity for reinforcements, and exhaustion of horses
causes a lull in the operations. A waterless record.
The Australian cavalry horse. Junction Station. Reappearance
of the Corps Ammunition Column. The Predatory Gunner. The
A.P.M.'s Odyssey. A Turkish _communiqué_ 93
CHAPTER IX
Nov. 18th to Nov. 25th
The advance resumed. Amwas. The Australian
Mounted Division withdrawn to rest. The Yeomanry
Division enter the mountains. Rain. Unsuccessful
attacks on the Beitunia Ridge. Difficulties of the
country. Our infantry seize Nebi Samwil. The
Anzac Mounted Division forces the crossing of the
Nahr el Auja in the plain. And is driven back 101
CHAPTER X
Dec. 1st to Dec. 31st
Hard fighting and bad weather in the hills. Our communications
cut. The last of the Yeomanry Division.
Winter conditions in the Philistine Plain. Rain and
mud. Floods cause breakdowns in the supply services.
A 'Merry Christmas.' Enemy spies in the mountains.
Surrender of Jerusalem. Final crossing of the Auja.
Results achieved by the Desert Mounted Corps during
the operations 112
CHAPTER XI
1918
Jan. 1st to Feb. 28th
'Rest and Refit.' The ruins of Gaza. Decision to
extend the battle line to the Jordan. The country between
Jerusalem and the Dead Sea basin. The
first descent into the Jordan Valley. Occupation of Jericho.
A naval battle 1300 feet below the level of the ocean.
Second descent into the Valley. Our right flank
established on the river Jordan. Operations of the
Arab forces 123
CHAPTER XII
Mar. 1st to Apr. 2nd
The first trans-Jordan raid. Description of the trans-Jordan
country. Bridging the Jordan. Difficulties
of the cavalry. Rain and cold. Hedjaz Railway cut
north and south of Amman. Unsuccessful attacks
on the town. Large enemy reinforcements arrive on
the scene. Floods sweep away the bridges over the
Jordan. Hard fighting at El Salt. Attack on Amman
abandoned. Withdrawal of the raiding force 132
CHAPTER XIII
Apr. 3rd to May 4th
Results of the raid. Successes of the Arab Army.
Reorganisation of the Cavalry Corps. The second
trans-Jordan raid. Capture of El Salt. Failure of
first attack on Shunet Nimrin. Enemy reinforcements
cross the Jordan at Jisr el Damieh. 4th A.L.H.
Brigade hard pressed. Loss of the guns. Enemy
clears the way to El Salt. The Beni Sakhr play us
false. Precarious position of our cavalry in the hills.
Failure of second attack on Shunet Nimrin. Hard
fighting at El Salt. Ammunition running out. The
raiding force withdraws across the Jordan. Results
of the raid 153
CHAPTER XIV
May 5th to Aug. 31st
Decision to hold the Jordan Valley during the summer.
The Valley line. Description of the country and
climate. Enemy attacks on Abu Tellul and El Henu
repulsed. An example of 'Kultur.' Out of the Valley
of Desolation 177
CHAPTER XV
Sept. 1st to Sept. 18th
Preparations for the great drive. Description of the
Turkish line and the country behind it. The opposing
forces. Precautions to ensure secrecy. Plan of the
operations. Lawrence's Arabs cut the enemy railway
at Deraa junction. At the starting post 190
CHAPTER XVI
Sept. 19th to Sept. 21st
Opening the door. Cavalry through the gap and over
the Carmel Range. On the Plain of Armageddon. 13th
Cavalry Brigade captures the enemy G.H.Q. at Nazareth.
Cavalry seize Afule, Jenin, and Beisan. Big
haul of prisoners at Jenin 202
CHAPTER XVII
Sept. 19th to Sept. 22nd
Rolling up the enemy flank. Work of the 5th A.L.H.
Brigade. Our infantry attack all along the line and
drive in the Turkish front. Our cavalry reoccupy
Nazareth. Sad fate of the 'Haifa Annexation Expedition.'
Chaytor's force closes the Jisr el Damieh
road, and advances on Shunet Nimrin. Turkish
armies trapped 217
CHAPTER XVIII
Sept. 23rd
Drawing the net. Action of Makhadet Abu Naj.
Capture of Haifa. Action at Makhadet el Masudi.
Turkish VIIth and VIIIth Armies completely destroyed.
Adventures of Chaytor's Force. Surrender of the
Hedjaz Corps. British and Turks as 'Allies' 229
CHAPTER XIX
Sept. 24th to Sept. 27th
Decision to advance on Damascus. The orders for
the advance. 4th A.L.H. Brigade captures Semakh.
Treachery of the Germans. Capture of Tiberias. The
race for Damascus. 4th Cavalry Division strikes at
the flank of the retreating IVth Army. And joins
hands with the Arab forces 247
CHAPTER XX
Sept. 27th and Sept. 28th
The action at the Bridge of Jacob's Daughters. A
memory of Napoleon's campaign in Syria. Last crossing
of the Jordan. Occupation of El Kuneitra. Some
undisciplined 'Allies.' 4th Cavalry Division reaches
El Mezerib. Turks massacre women and children.
The Arabs' vengeance 258
CHAPTER XXI
Sept. 29th to Oct. 5th
The last lap of the race to Damascus. Orders of the
Cavalry Corps. A fight in the darkness. The action
of Kaukab. 5th A.L.H. Brigade closes the Beirût
road. Our two columns meet at Damascus. End of
the Turkish IVth Army. Capture of the city with
12,000 prisoners. Terrible condition of the enemy
troops. A record charge by Australian cavalry. Disorders
in Damascus 266
CHAPTER XXII
Oct. 5th to Oct. 31st
Decision to advance to Rayak and Beirût. Sickness
in the Corps. Occupation of Homs and Tripoli. 5th
Cavalry Division ordered to advance to Aleppo. A
hunt by the armoured cars. A piece of bluff.
Fall of Aleppo. The last of the Turkish army. The Armistice.
Captures of the Desert Mounted Corps 282
CHAPTER XXIII
Police work. The Desert Mounted Corps administers a country
larger than Scotland. Condition of the country after the
Armistice. Pax Britannica. Co-operation of the Arabs. Work
of the Armenian Reparations Committee. Character of the
Armenians. A gamble in exchange. Sport and games. End
of the Desert Mounted Corps. Northern Syria handed over to
the French 295
CHAPTER XXIV
Horse Artillery 303
CHAPTER XXV
Horses 311
CHAPTER XXVI
Transport and Ammunition Supply 322
APPENDIX I: (_a_) The Desert Mounted Corps 331
(_b_) Infantry 335
APPENDIX II: Note on the Arab Movement 337
APPENDIX III: Terms of Turkish Armistice 342
ILLUSTRATIONS
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR H.G. CHAUVEL, K.C.B.,
K.C.M.G. _Frontispiece_
TO FACE PAGE
WATER AT ESANI 20
COUNTRY NEAR BEERSHEBA 20
BEERSHEBA 36
BEERSHEBA FIRST TRAIN 36
TURKISH CAVALRY 48
TURKISH MACHINE GUNS 48
AFTER THE CHARGE AT HUJ 76
MARCHING OVER PHILISTINE PLAIN 76
VON FALKENHAYN 108
AUSTRIAN HOWITZER 108
R.H.A. IN ACTION IN MOUNTAINS 120
READING BRITISH PROCLAMATION IN JERUSALEM 120
MOSQUE AT GAZA 124
GERMAN MOTOR BOAT 152
GRAIN FROM MOAB 152
RIVER JORDAN 176
SHUNET NIMRIN 176
MOTOR LORRIES 'BEFORE' 212
MOTOR LORRIES 'AFTER' 212
GERMAN AIRCRAFT 228
IN THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY 228
NAZARETH 252
TIBERIAS 252
R.H.A. FORDING RIVER JORDAN 270
BARADA GORGE, DAMASCUS 270
FEISAL'S HEADQUARTERS AT DAMASCUS 278
TRIPOLI 278
ALEPPO 288
ARABS AND FEISAL'S SOLDIERS 288
RIVER EUPHRATES 296
AINTAB 296
INSCRIPTION AT DOG RIVER 302
LIST OF MAPS AND DIAGRAMS.
KEY MAP 327
_Folding out._
MAP A 122
" B 246
" C 280
" D 294
_Full page._
DIAGRAM 1 18
" 2 46
" 3 80
" 4 86
" 5 170
" 6 222
" 7 236
THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
AN ACCOUNT OF THE CAVALRY OPERATIONS IN PALESTINE AND SYRIA, 1917-1918
CHAPTER I
THE COUNTRY AND THE OPPOSING FORCES
When General Allenby arrived in Egypt in June 1917, and assumed command
of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, British prestige in the East
was at a very low ebb. The evacuation of Gallipoli in December 1915,
followed by the fall of Kut el Amara four months later, and by our two
unsuccessful attacks on Gaza in the spring of the following year, had
invested the Turkish arms with a legend of invincibility which was
spreading rapidly in all Moslem countries. For the first time in seven
centuries, sang the journalistic bards of Stamboul, the followers of
Islam had triumphed over the Infidel; Allah was leading the Faithful to
victory; the Empire of the Moslems was at hand.
The fall of Baghdad in March 1917 somewhat dashed these high hopes,
it is true. But the Germans, to whom the city was, at the moment, of
no more importance than any other dirty Eastern village, had little
difficulty in persuading the Turks that its loss was a mere incident
in the world war, which would be more than made good in the final, and
glorious, peace terms. Nevertheless, the Turks insisted on making an
effort to recapture the place, and for this purpose a special, picked
force, known as the _Yilderim_, or Lightning, Army Group, was in
process of formation in northern Syria at this time. The command of
this group had been entrusted to the redoubtable von Falkenhayn, who
was at Aleppo, directing the training and organisation of the troops.
Comforted by highly coloured accounts of the efficiency and fighting
value of this force, the Turks rapidly recovered from the effects of
the loss of Baghdad. Bombastic articles, inspired by Potsdam, began
to make their appearance in the Turkish press, chronicling the doings
of the 'Lightning' armies. They were to recapture Baghdad, drive the
British into the Persian Gulf, and then march to the 'relief' of India.
Afterwards the presumptuous little force that had dared to oppose the
Turks' advance into their own province of Egypt would be dealt with in
a suitable manner; Egypt would be delivered; and the Suez Canal, 'the
jugular vein of the British Empire,' would be severed.
Aided by such writings, and supported by German money, Pan-Islamic
emissaries were busily engaged in every Moslem or partly Moslem
country, stirring up the Faithful to sedition and revolt. India,
Afghanistan, Persia, and Egypt were all in a state of suppressed
excitement and unrest, and it is probable that one more British reverse
in the East would have been sufficient to set all these countries in
a blaze. The least imaginative can form some idea of the tremendous
consequences that such an upheaval would have had upon the war in
general. Yet the newspapers of that time show clearly that there was a
considerable, and vociferous, body of public opinion, both in England
and in France, that regarded the Syrian and Mesopotamian campaigns as
useless and extravagant 'side-shows,' and clamoured insistently for the
recall of the troops engaged in them.
Thus, both for the purpose of re-establishing our waning prestige in
the East, and of silencing the mischievous agitation at home, it was
imperative that a signal defeat should be inflicted on the Turks as
soon as possible. The capture of Jerusalem, which city ranks only after
Mecca and Stamboul among the holy places of Islam, would set a fitting
seal upon such a defeat, and would be certain to create a profound
impression upon Moslems the world over.
Jerusalem, therefore, became the political objective of the new British
Commander-in-Chief. The strategical objective will be discussed later.
The situation in Palestine in the summer of 1917 was not, however, at
first sight, very encouraging. Our two abortive attempts on Gaza had
shown the German commanders the weak points in the Turkish defences,
and they had set to work, with characteristic energy and thoroughness,
to strengthen them. 'Gaza itself had been made into a strong, modern
fortress, heavily entrenched and wired, and offering every facility
for protracted defence. The remainder of the enemy's line consisted
of a series of strong localities, viz.: the Sihan group of works, the
Atawineh group, the Abu el Hareira-Abu el Teaha trench system (near
Sharia), and, finally, the works covering Beersheba. These groups of
works were generally from 1500 to 2000 yards apart, except that the
distance from the Hareira group to Beersheba was about four and a
half miles.... By the end of October these strong localities had been
joined up so as to form a practically continuous line from the sea to a
point south of Sharia. The defensive works round Beersheba remained a
detached system, but had been improved and extended.'[2]
The Turkish forces were thus on a wide front, the distance from Gaza
to Beersheba being about thirty miles, but a well-graded, metalled
road, which they had made just behind their line, connecting these two
places, afforded good lateral communication, and any threatened point
of their front could be very quickly reinforced.
From July onwards continual reinforcements of men, guns, and stores had
arrived on the enemy's front, and he had formed several large supply
and ammunition depots at different places behind his lines. He had
also laid two lines of railway from the so-called Junction Station on
the Jerusalem-Jaffa line, one to Deir Sineid, just north of Gaza, and
the other to Beersheba, and beyond it to the village of El Auja,[3]
on the Turko-Egyptian frontier, some twenty-five miles south-west of
Beersheba. It was evident that the Turks intended to hold on to the
Gaza-Beersheba line at all costs, in order to cover the concentration
and despatch of the Yilderim Force to Mesopotamia.
This Junction Station was to be the strategical objective of our
operations. From the junction a railway ran northwards, through Tul
Keram, Messudieh, Jenin and Afule, to Deraa on the Hedjaz Railway,
whence the latter line continued to Damascus, Aleppo, and the
Baghdad Railway. With the junction in our hands, any enemy force in
the Judæan hills, protecting Jerusalem, would be cut off from all
railway communication to the north, and would be compelled to rely
for its supplies on the difficult mountain road between Messudieh and
Jerusalem, or on the longer and still more difficult road from Amman
station on the Hedjaz Railway, thirty miles east of the Jordan, _via_
Jericho to Jerusalem.
Our own position extended from the sea at Gaza to a point on the Wadi
Ghuzze near El Gamli, some fourteen miles south-west of Sharia and
eighteen miles west of Beersheba. The opposing lines thus formed a
rough 'V,' with its apex at Gaza, where the lines were, in some places,
only a couple of hundred yards apart. From here they diverged to El
Gamli, which was about nine miles from the nearest part of the Turkish
positions. The intervening space was watched by our cavalry.
The right flank of our line being thus 'in the air' out in the
desert, it was a comparatively easy matter for enemy spies, disguised
as peaceful natives, to pass round it under cover of darkness, and
approach our positions from the rear in daylight. Native hawkers, other
than those with passes from the Intelligence Staff, were forbidden to
approach our lines, but it was impossible to control all the natives in
such a scattered area, and much can be seen, with the aid of a pair of
field-glasses, from the top of a hill a mile away. There were also at
least two very daring Germans, who several times penetrated our lines
disguised as British officers. They were both exceedingly bold and
resourceful men, and it is probable that they obtained a good deal of
useful information, before they met the almost inevitable fate of spies.
Before the end of our time of preparation, however, methods were
evolved to deal with this nuisance, and the enemy was kept in ignorance
of our movements and intentions with that success which always
attended the efforts of General Allenby in this direction. An enemy
staff document, subsequently captured by us, and dated just prior to
the commencement of the operations, stated that: 'An outflanking
attack on Beersheba with about one infantry and one cavalry division
is indicated, but the main attack, as before, must be expected on the
Gaza front.' How far wrong was this appreciation of the situation will
be apparent later on. The same document also stated that we had six
infantry divisions in the Gaza sector, whereas at the time there were
only three.
The Royal Air Force was an important factor in denying information to
the enemy during the latter part of our time of preparation. One of
the first things the Commander-in-Chief had done on his arrival at the
front, was to re-equip the force completely. Hitherto the German Flying
Corps had done what it liked in the air over our lines. For several
months on end our troops had been bombed, almost with impunity, every
day. Our own pilots, starved alike of aeroplanes and of materials for
repairs, gingerly manoeuvring their antiquated and rickety machines,
fought gallantly but hopelessly against the fast Taubes and Fokkers of
the German airmen, and day by day the pitiful list of casualties that
might have been so easily avoided grew longer.
In four months all this had changed. Our pilots, equipped with new,
up-to-date and fast machines, met the Germans on level terms, and
quickly began to obtain supremacy in the air. By the end of October
this supremacy was definitely established, and the few enemy pilots who
crossed our lines at that time flew warily, ever on the look-out for
one of our fighting machines.
The country occupied by the opposing armies varied considerably in
character. The district near the coast consisted of a series of high
dunes of loose, shifting sand, impassable for wheeled traffic. Farther
east the ground became harder, but it was still sandy and heavy going
for transport. Eastwards again, towards Beersheba, the country changed
to a wilderness of bare, rocky hills, intersected by innumerable
wadis (dry river beds). These wadis were, for the most part, enclosed
between limestone cliffs, sometimes 100 feet or more in height, and
impassable except where the few native tracks crossed them. The whole
of this part of the country was waterless, except for three very deep
wells at Khalasa and one at Asluj (all of which had been destroyed by
the Turks), and some fairly good pools in the Wadi Ghuzze at Esani and
Shellal. In Beersheba itself there were seven good wells.
Northwards of the enemy's positions, between the Judæan mountains and
the sea, stretched the great plain of Philistia, a strip of rolling
down-land fifteen to twenty miles wide, admirably suited for the
employment of mounted troops.
The appointment of General Allenby, himself a cavalryman, to the
command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, presaged the employment of
cavalry on a much larger scale than had hitherto been attempted. From
his first study of the problem before him, the new Commander-in-Chief
realised the predominant part that cavalry would play in the
operations, and devoted himself, with his customary energy, to
organising a force suitable for the work in prospect.
For the advance across the Sinai Desert from the Suez Canal, a special
force had been organised, under the command of Sir Philip Chetwode.
This force, which was known as the Desert Column, consisted of the
Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division (which then included the
1st, 2nd, and 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigades and the New Zealand
Mounted Brigade), the 5th Mounted Brigade (Yeomanry), and the 42nd and
52nd Infantry Divisions.
The 2nd Mounted (Yeomanry) Division, which had arrived in Egypt in
April 1915, had been sent to Gallipoli dismounted. After the evacuation
of the peninsula, part of this division had been remounted. The 5th
Mounted Brigade had taken part in the advance across Sinai, and other
units of the division had been employed in the campaign against the
Senussi, and in the Fayoum and other parts of Egypt. Most of these
scattered units had been collected prior to the first battle of Gaza,
and organised into two divisions of four brigades each, including a
new brigade of Australian Light Horse (the 4th) which had been formed,
partly out of Light Horsemen who had returned from Gallipoli, and
partly out of reinforcements from Australia. General Allen by now
remounted the remainder of the Yeomanry in Egypt, and formed out of
them two new brigades. The ten brigades thus available were organised
as a corps of three divisions: the Australian and New Zealand (1st and
2nd A.L.H. Brigades and the New Zealand Brigade), generally known as
the Anzac Mounted Division; the Australian Mounted Division (3rd and
4th A.L.H. and 5th Mounted Brigades); and the Yeomanry Division (6th,
8th, and 22nd Mounted Brigades). The corps reserve consisted of the
7th Mounted Brigade, and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade, while the
(Indian) Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade[4] formed part of the Army
troops. Only the Yeomanry Division and the 7th Mounted and Imperial
Service Cavalry Brigades were at this time armed with swords.
It was originally intended to call this force the 2nd Cavalry Corps,
but General Chauvel, who was appointed to command it, asked that the
name of the Desert Column might be perpetuated in that of the new
force. It was accordingly named the Desert Mounted Corps.[5]
The infantry of the Expeditionary Force, largely augmented by troops
in Egypt, was formed into two corps of three divisions each, the 20th
under Sir Philip Chetwode, and the 21st commanded by Lieutenant-General
Bulfin, with one other infantry division. The 20th Corps (10th, 53rd,
and 74th Divisions, with the 60th Division attached) was in the
eastern sector of our line, while the 21st Corps (53rd, 54th, and 75th
Divisions) held the trenches opposite Gaza.[6]
The Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade was attached to the 21st Corps
during the operations. This brigade had not yet seen any serious
service, and its fighting qualities were rather an unknown factor.
Later on in the campaign, however, all three regiments distinguished
themselves greatly, and established a fine reputation for dash.
Our total forces numbered some 76,000 fighting men, of whom about
20,000 were mounted, with 550 guns. The enemy troops opposed to us
consisted of nine Turkish divisions, organised in two armies, the VIIth
and VIIIth, and one cavalry division, a total of about 49,000 fighting
men, 3000 of whom were mounted, with 360 guns.[7] Our superiority in
numbers, though considerable, thus fell short of the Napoleonic minimum
for the attack of entrenched positions, but our large preponderance
of cavalry promised great results, if we could succeed in driving the
Turks out of their fortifications.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 2: General Allenby's despatch, dated 16th December 1917.]
[Footnote 3: The portion of the line between Beersheba and El Auja was
raided by our cavalry in May 1917, and about thirty miles of the track
destroyed, in order to prevent any attempted raid on our communications
_via_ the latter place.]
[Footnote 4: Raised and equipped by some of the ruling princes of
India.]
[Footnote 5: See Appendix I. _a._]
[Footnote 6: See Appendix I. _b._]
[Footnote 7: The VIIth Army was commanded by the German General Kress
von Kressenstein, and the VIIIth by Fevzi Pasha. The general staff of
all the enemy formations was in the hands of the Germans. All ranks
of the flying corps, heavy artillery and motor transport corps, and
the officers of the engineer and supply services and of the railway
administration were also Germans. There were a few German and Austrian
infantry battalions.]