THE U.S.A. TANK CORPS
On April 2, 1917, the United States of America entered the Great War.
Up to this date tanks had not accomplished much. British machines had
taken part in the battles of the Somme and Ancre, and the first French
ones had made their appearance on the training ground in October 1916.
In June 1917, Lieutenant-Colonel H. Parker was detailed to inquire into
the military value of tanks, and in the following month he forwarded
his report on this subject to the Operation Section of the Infantry
Committee of Colonel C. B. Baker’s Commission.
Lieutenant-Colonel Parker’s report makes good reading; not only is
it virile but sound. It was indeed a great pity that it was not more
completely acted on. The following is an extract from it:
“1. A hole 30 k. wide _punched_ through _the whole German
formation_ deep enough to uncover a line of communication to a
flank attack.
“This hole must be wide enough to assure the passage of lighter
equipment--the divisional machine-gun companies can follow the
tanks because the tanks will _make_ a road for them.
“The wave of machine guns--divisional companies--must turn out to
right and left, supported by a second line of tanks, to widen the
breach.
“The wave of machine guns must be followed by _cavalry_--‘hell for
leather’--if the hole is once punched through, and this cavalry
must strike lines of communication _at all hazards_. Possibly
motor-cycle machine guns may be better adapted to this use than
cavalry, but _I am a believer in the cavalry_. Support it with
Jitney-carried infantry and machine guns as quickly as possible.
“2. The problem is _that of passing a defile_. _Nothing more._
It is like trying to force a mountain pass, where the sides are
occupied by enemy who can fire down into the pass. The ‘pass’ is
some 30 k. in length, and we must have something that can _drive
through_. Then turn to the sides and widen the breach. Assail 100
k. to cover assault.
“It is the old ‘flying wedge’ of football, with interference coming
through the hole in the line. The ‘tanks’ take the place of the
‘line buckers’ who open the hole; the ‘Divisional Jitney machine
guns’ are the ‘interference,’ the ‘cavalry’ will carry the ball as
soon as the hole is opened, _i.e._ ride through and hit the line of
communication.
“3. The operation works out this way:
(_a_) A cloud of fighting avions at high altitude, to clear the air.
(_b_) A cloud of observation avions at low altitude, just in front
of the line of tanks, dropping bombs and using machine guns
on the trenches.
(_c_) Our long-range artillery blocking the German artillery.
(_d_) Our lighter artillery barraging the front to prevent escape
of the Germans in their front lines.
(_e_) Our mobile machine guns following up the tanks at about 500
yards, covering them with _canopy fire_, step by step.
(_f_) Our Divisional Jitney companies of machine guns driving in
‘hell-bent’ after the tanks and widening the breach.
(_g_) Our cavalry riding through this breach as soon as it is
opened for them and swinging out _à la_ Jeb. Stuart around
McClellan’s Army. Sacrificed? of course, but winning results
worth the sacrifice.
(_h_) Jitney or truck-transported infantry following as fast as
gasoline can carry it to support the success and make our
foothold sure.
(_i_) Truck-transported--or tank-transported--artillery following
as fast as possible.
“I BELIEVE SUCH A PLAN WILL WIN. FRITZ HAS NOT THE RESOURCES TO
ADOPT SUCH A PLAN. WE HAVE. WE SHOULD DO IT AND DO IT NOW as far as
preparation goes in material. It will take time to get ready.”
Shortly before this report was written, Colonel Rockenbach, the
commander designate of the American Tank Corps, landed in France
and proceeded with General Pershing to Chaumont, the U.S.A. General
Headquarters.
On September 23, 1917, a project for a Tank Corps was approved. The
Corps was to consist of 5 heavy and 20 light battalions, together with
headquarter units, depots and workshops, while in the United States a
training centre comprising 2 heavy and 5 light battalions was to be
maintained. In May 1918 the establishment of the Corps was expanded to
15 brigades, each brigade to consist of 1 heavy and 2 light battalions,
the former to be armed with the Mark VIII and the latter with the
Renault tank.
Meanwhile an immense constructional programme was developed for both
Mark VIII.s and Renaults, yet, in spite of this, by November 11, 1918,
one year and seven months after America entered the war, only some
twenty odd American-built Renault tanks had been landed in France.
The slowness in American construction is very apparent when it is
remembered that a similar period only elapsed between the first sketch
drawing of the British Mark I tank, in February 1915, and the landing
of this machine in France in August 1916.
The lack of machines in the American Tank Corps rendered the training
of its personnel impossible, consequently at the beginning of 1918
two training camps were started, one at Bovington--the British Tank
Training Centre--and the other at Bourg in the Haute-Marne, where
training was carried out under French supervision. The history of the
units trained at these two centres will be dealt with separately as
follows:
By February 1918, 500 volunteers from various branches of the American
Army were assembled at Bourg for instruction. On March 27, 10 Renault
machines were taken over from the French, another 15 being sent to
Bourg in June. In August, 144 Renault tanks arrived, and 2 light
battalions were at once mobilised under the command of Colonel G. S.
Patten and were railed to the St. Mihiel area, where they operated with
the First American Army, which attacked the famous salient on September
12.
From a tank point of view this attack was a disappointing one. From
railhead both battalions moved 20 kilometres to their positions of
assembly, but on the first day of the attack, owing to the difficulties
of ground in a well-established defence area, they never succeeded in
catching up with the infantry. These troops moved forward rapidly, for
it must be remembered that the enemy’s resistance was very feeble,
the salient having already been partially evacuated by the enemy.
Owing to lack of petrol the tanks did not participate in the second
day’s fighting, and on the third they appear only on one occasion to
have come into contact with the enemy and to have collected a number
of prisoners. The following day these two battalions were withdrawn
practically intact, only three machines being left behind damaged or
broken down.
The American tanks next appear fighting side by side with French
tank units in the Argonne operations. Profiting by their previous
experience, although infantry and tanks had never met on the training
ground, the two American tank battalions materially assisted their
infantry.
On the first day of the Argonne attack, September 26, it had been
intended to keep a reserve of tanks in hand for the second day’s
operations, but owing to the infantry being held up these went into the
attack about noon.
From this date until October 13 these battalions were continually
placed at the disposal of the infantry commanders, but were not often
called upon to take an active part in operations. Frequently they were
moved many miles, to the detriment of their tracks and engines and
without achieving any great result; they were also used independently
for reconnaissance work and for unsupported attacks delivered against
positions the infantry had failed to capture.
On October 13 the remains of these two battalions were withdrawn and
a provisional company was formed which accompanied the advance of the
American forces until the cessation of hostilities on November 11, 1918.
The 301st U.S.A. Heavy Tank Battalion arrived at Wool on April 10, and
continued training under British instruction until August 24, when
it embarked for France. Soon after its arrival in this country it was
attached to the 1st British Tank Brigade.
On September 29 the 301st American Tank Battalion took part in the
important attack carried out by the 27th and 30th American Divisions
against the Hindenburg Line running east of the Bellicourt tunnel.
The attack started at 5.50 a.m. in a thick mist, and though the 30th
American Division reached the Bellicourt tunnel to time, the 27th on
its left was held up. On the front of the last-named Division only one
tank succeeded in crossing the tunnel, the others running foul of an
old British minefield as described in Chapter XXXV. Of the thirty-four
tanks which took part in this attack only ten rallied.
On October 8, when the Fourth Army resumed the offensive, the 301st
Battalion was allotted to the IInd American Corps, which was attacking
a position some 3,000 yards north-west of Brancourt with the IXth
British Corps on its right and the XIIIth on its left. This attack was
a complete success; the 301st Battalion fought right through to its
final objective, rendering the greatest assistance to the infantry, who
worked in close co-operation with the tanks. One tank in particular did
great execution: it advanced, firing both its 6-pounders at the railway
cutting between Beaurevoir and Montbrehain, the ground being littered
with German dead.
Nine days later, on the 17th, the attack was continued, the 301st
Battalion again being attached to the IInd American Corps, the
objective of which was a line running west of Busigny--eastern edge
of La Sablière wood (south of Busigny)--west of Bohain. In this
operation the crossing of the river Selle, south of St. Souplet, was
a most difficult problem, as the river ran through “No Man’s Land”;
nevertheless, by means of low-flying aeroplanes reconnaissance and
night-patrol work was carried out, crossings were selected, and on the
actual day of the attack no fewer than nineteen tanks out of the twenty
operating successfully crossed the stream.
The next and last attack carried out by the 301st Battalion during the
war took place on October 23, when nine tanks of this unit assisted
the 6th and 1st British Divisions in an attack in the neighbourhood of
Bazuel, south-east of Le Cateau. This operation was part of the Fourth
Army’s attack, the objectives of which were the high ground overlooking
the canal de la Sambre et Oise, between Catillon, and Bois l’Evêque and
the villages of Fontaine-au-Bois, Robersart, and Bousies.
All nine tanks moved forward at zero hour behind the barrage, and
from the report of an observer who saw these machines in action it
appears that they cleared up the whole of the ground as far as the
Bazuel-Catillon road. Very little opposition was met with, but in
spite of this, owing to the poor visibility and the enclosed nature of
the country, the infantry were slow in following the tanks and great
difficulty was experienced in maintaining touch with them. Nevertheless
all infantry commanders expressed themselves well pleased with the work
the tanks had accomplished, which had chiefly consisted in reducing
strong points and breaking paths through the hedges. Of the nine tanks
which took the field all rallied; no casualties other than five men,
slightly gassed, were suffered. The attack on this day was altogether a
fitting conclusion to the brief but conspicuously gallant career of the
301st American Tank Battalion.