THE BATTLES OF EPEHY AND CAMBRAI--ST. QUENTIN
On September 4 all Tank Brigades were withdrawn from Armies and placed
in G.H.Q. reserve to refit and reorganise. When this had been completed
Tank Brigades were constituted as follows:
1st Tank Brigade 7th Battalion Mark IV.
11th „ Mark V Star.
12th „ Mark IV.
15th „ Mark V Star.
2nd Tank Brigade 10th „ Mark V.
14th „ Mark V.
3rd Tank Brigade 3rd „ Medium A.
6th „ Medium A.
9th „ Mark V.
17th „ Armoured cars.
4th Tank Brigade 1st „ Mark V.
4th „ Mark V.
5th „ Mark V.
301st American Battalion Mark V Star.
5th Tank Brigade 2nd Battalion Mark V.
8th „ Mark V.
13th „ Mark V.
At 7 a.m. on September 17, in a heavy storm of rain, the Fourth and
Third Armies initiated the battle of Epehy by attacking on a front of
some seventeen miles from Holnon to Gouzeaucourt, the First French Army
co-operating south of Holnon.
On September 18 the 4th and 5th Tank Brigades were released from G.H.Q.
reserve and allotted to the Fourth Army, the 2nd Tank Battalion having
been transferred to this Army on September 13.
On this day the battle of Epehy continued on the front Epehy-Villeret,
some 7,000 yards long. In this attack twenty tanks of the 2nd Battalion
assisted the IIIrd Corps, Australian Corps, and IXth Corps. On the
IIIrd Corps front heavy machine-gun fire was encountered and overcome,
many machine guns being destroyed. On that of the IXth progress was
slow, and the Australians, meeting with little resistance, captured
Ronssoy and Hargicourt.
After two days’ rest the attack was continued on the 21st, nine tanks
of the 2nd Battalion operating on the IIIrd Corps front against the
Knoll and Guillemont farm. Two of these machines carried forward
infantry, but the machine-gun fire was so heavy that it was not
possible to drop them. During this day the enemy put up a most
determined resistance and there were not sufficient tanks engaged
to silence his machine guns. Another two days’ rest followed, and
then again was the attack renewed on the IXth Corps front against
Fresnoy-le-Petit and the Quadrilateral, nineteen machines of the 13th
Battalion attacking with the 1st and 6th Divisions. So heavy was the
enemy’s gas barrage on this day that some of the tank crews were forced
to wear their respirators for over two hours on end. In spite of the
enemy being in great strength eighteen machines assisted the infantry.
Thus ended the battle of Epehy and though the advance was not great
nearly 12,000 prisoners and 100 guns were added to the “bag.”
Preparations were now set in hand for an extensive attack against the
Hindenburg and auxiliary lines of defence, which together formed a zone
of entrenchments for the most part very heavily wired and extending
over a depth varying from 8,000 to 16,000 yards. This attack entailed
another hasty reorganisation of tank battalions, which was completed by
September 26, when the battle order of Brigades was as follows:
_1st Tank Brigade_ 7th Battalion Mark IV Bullecourt.
H.Q. Bihucourt 11th „ Mark V Star Barastre.
12th „ Mark IV W. of Ruyaulcourt.
1st T.S. Coy. S. of Velu.
2nd G.C. Coy. Bancourt.
_2nd Tank Brigade_ 10th Battalion Mark V Star Auchy les Hesdin.
H.Q. Gomiecourt 14th „ Mark V Winnipeg Camp.
15th „ Mark V Star Hermies.
2nd T.S. Coy. Gomiecourt.
1st G.C. Coy. N.W. of
Vaux-Vraucourt.
_3rd Tank Brigade_ 5th Battalion Mark V E. of Cartigny.
H.Q. Barleux 6th „ Medium A S. of Tincourt.
9th „ Mark V S. of Tincourt.
3rd T.S. Coy. S. of Tincourt.
_4th Tank Brigade_ 1st Battalion Mark V Manancourt.
H.Q.
Templeux-la-Fosse 4th „ Mark V S. of Manancourt.
301st American Mark V Star S. of Manancourt.
Battalion
4th T.S. Coy. S. of Manancourt.
_5th Tank Brigade_ 2nd Battalion Mark V Suzanne.
H.Q. Bois-de-Buire 3rd „ Medium A S. of Roisel.
8th „ Mark V S. of Tincourt.
13th „ Mark V S. of Tincourt.
16th „ Mark V Star S. of Tincourt.
17th „ Armoured Buire.
Cars
5th T.S. Coy. S. of Tincourt.
The rapidity with which these changes were made would, a few months
back, have bewildered both the Tank Corps Headquarter Staff and the
Brigade and Battalion Commanders themselves; now the knack of rapid
movement had been mastered, and though great energy had to be exerted
during such reorganisations, they were generally accomplished in time
and efficiently.
On September 27 the great battle began, comprising the First, Third,
and Fourth Armies on a front of sixteen miles. The battlefield was
divided into two main sectors, to the north that of the First and Third
Armies, between the Sensée river and Gouzeaucourt, with the object of
capturing Bourlon hill, and to the south that of the Fourth Army with
the capture of the Knoll, Guillemont farm, and Quennemont farm as its
objectives.
East of the First Army front line ran the canal Du Nord, a formidable
obstacle to tanks in spite of the fact that it was dry, having never
been completed. This canal varied from 36 to 50 ft. wide at the bottom,
and was 12 ft. deep, and the slopes of its sides were in many places
steep. The enemy, evidently suspecting that tanks might attempt to
cross it, had at certain places rendered this temporarily impossible,
so it was thought, by cutting in its bank a vertical wall 9 ft.
deep for several hundreds of yards along the eastern side between
Mœuvres and Inchy. In the Maquion-Bourlon sector the enemy had made
little anti-tank preparation, probably considering that the canal
itself formed a sufficient obstacle. In the Beaucamp sector, however,
anti-tank preparations were exceptionally thorough, many anti-tank
rifles being placed in position here.
Sixteen tanks of the 7th Battalion, all Mark IV.s, some of which had
fought over very nearly the same ground in November 1917, were allotted
to co-operate with the Canadian Corps. In spite of the formidable great
ditch which lay in front of them, fifteen of these machines crossed
the canal Du Nord near Mœuvres, and attacked Bourlon village and the
western edge of Bourlon wood. Of these fifteen machines only three were
put out of action, one by a mine placed in a road leading through a gap
in the canal and two by a battery near Deligny hill.
On the Third Army front Corps were disposed from north to south as
follows: XVIIth, VIth, IVth, and Vth Corps.
Twenty-six tanks of the 15th Battalion operated with the XVIIth Corps
south of Bourlon wood, and with the VIth Corps against Flesquières and
Premy Chapel. A fine performance was here carried out in crossing the
canal, and although more than one attempt had to be made by several of
the tanks the 9 ft. wall was successfully surmounted. This attack was
an overwhelming success in spite of the heavy tank casualties, 11 out
of the 26 machines operating being hit on the extreme objectives. On
the IVth Corps front 12 machines of the 11th Battalion attacked between
Gouzeaucourt and Trescault: this operation was, however, only partially
successful.
On the front of the Fourth Army the 27th American Division, supported
by twelve tanks of the 4th Tank Battalion, carried out a preparatory
attack on the Knoll, Guillemont and Quennemont farms, the object being
to advance the front line so as to be in a better position to attack in
force on the 29th. The Germans holding this sector of their line were
reliable and well led troops, and in spite of the fact that the tanks
and infantry reached their objectives a counter-attack drove them back,
with the result that up to zero-hour on the 29th the actual location of
our front line was very uncertain.
On September 28 a small local attack, which was completely successful,
was carried out against Raillencourt and St. Olle; in this six tanks of
the 7th Battalion took part.
On the following day seven tanks of the 11th Battalion co-operated with
the Vth Corps in the capture of Gonnelieu and Villers Guislain in spite
of strong resistance put up by the enemy.
On the Fourth Army front an important battle of considerable magnitude
was fought on the 29th, involving some 175 tanks. The object of this
battle was to force the Hindenburg Line between Bellenglise and
Vendhuile. Along this front is situated the St. Quentin canal, and as,
between Bellicourt and Vendhuile, this canal runs underground through
a tunnel, it provided the German garrisons of this sector of their
line with good underground cover. An operation on this sector had been
the subject of careful study by the Tank Corps General Staff both in
England and France ever since the summer of 1917, as this tunnel and
a shorter one just north of St. Quentin provide the only negotiable
approaches for tanks over the canal. It was fully realised that the
enemy would put up a most determined resistance to secure his retention
of the tunnel, for should it be occupied by us the whole of the
Hindenburg defences north and south of it would be threatened.
The attack was to be carried out by four Corps, the IXth Corps on the
right, the American and Australian Corps in the centre, and the IIIrd
Corps on the left.
The American Corps was to capture the first objective, the strongly
entrenched system east of Bony; the Australian Corps was then to pass
through the gap made and be followed by the American Corps exploiting
north and south. The IXth Corps was to clear the west bank of the
St. Quentin canal under cover of the southern wing of the American
exploitation force, whilst the IIIrd Corps was to move forward with the
left of the American Corps.
Tanks were allotted to Corps as follows:
3rd Tank Brigade, 5th, 6th, and 9th Battalions, to the IXth Corps.
4th Tank Brigade, 1st, 4th, and 301st American Battalion, to the
Australian Corps.
5th Tank Brigade, 8th, 13th, and 16th Battalions, in Army reserve.
The 301st American Battalion was attached for operations to the 27th
American Division.
A thick mist covered the ground when the tanks moved forward at 5.50
a.m. It will be remembered that the situation opposite the Knoll
and the two farms of Guillemont and Quennemont was very obscure.
This attack, which was to break the well sited and highly organised
Hindenburg Line, was necessarily a “set piece” attack in which
objectives, allotment of tanks, etc., had to be carefully worked out
beforehand. The plan of operations was based on the assumption that
the line--the Knoll--Guillemont farm--Quennemont farm--would form the
“jumping off” line. The resistance put up by the enemy in this sector
was far greater than ordinary, with the result that up to the time of
the attack the above line was still in German hands. This meant that
the artillery programme would have to be hastily changed or left as it
was. The latter course was decided on so as to obviate confusion, and
this necessitated the infantry attackers starting at a considerable
distance in rear of the protective barrage. As events turned out the
task set the Americans proved too severe, nevertheless with great
gallantry they pushed forward, some of them actually forcing their way
through the German defences. The majority, however, were mown down by
the exceptionally heavy machine-gun fire which was brought to bear on
them. The attack failed.
Meanwhile the 301st American Tank Battalion met with a disaster,
for, whilst moving forward from near Ronssoy, it ran into an old
British minefield west of Guillemont farm laid in the previous
February; ten machines were blown up and only two succeeded in
assisting the infantry. This minefield consisted of rows of buried
2 in. trench-mortar bombs, each containing 50 lb. of ammonal; the
explosions were terrific, the whole bottom of many machines being torn
out; in nearly all cases the crews of these tanks suffered very heavy
casualties.
In the south, tanks of the 4th and 5th Brigades cleared Nauroy and
Bellicourt and broke through the Hindenburg Line. The mist now began
to lift, and consequent on the failure of the northern attack, the
attackers were placed, tactically, in a very dangerous situation, for
the enemy was now able to fire into their backs. Several tanks, which
had been allotted to later objectives, on realising the seriousness of
the situation went into action on their own initiative without either
artillery or infantry support. This very gallant action undoubtedly
saved a great many infantry casualties, though the tanks themselves
suffered heavy losses.
On the right the attack of the IXth Corps was a complete success; in
the first rush the 46th Division crossed the canal, a magnificent
performance, and captured Magny and Etricourt with 4,000 prisoners. The
tanks operating with this Corps, being unable to cross with the troops,
who waded and swam the water in the canal, moved on Bellicourt, a
difficult operation in the dense fog. From this place they swung south,
working down the bank of the canal, and arrived in time to take part
in the capture of Magny. During this action the enemy’s artillery fire
proved very accurate; which was, however, to be expected, for this was
the third tank assault on the Knoll--Guillemont--Quennemont position;
consequently the German gunners had become thoroughly drilled in the
defence of this sector.
On the following day eighteen tanks of the 13th Battalion worked up
the Hindenburg and the Nauroy--Le Catelet lines, but on account of
some misunderstanding the infantry did not follow, consequently the
operation did not prove of much value.
On the First Army front six tanks of the 9th Battalion operated with
the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions against Cuvillers, Blecourt, and
Tilloy; they crossed the Douai-Cambrai road near Sancourt and greatly
helped the infantry by overcoming the determined machine-gun resistance
which was encountered throughout this attack. On the next day further
tanks of this Battalion assisted the 32nd Division in occupying the
Fonsomme line east of Joncourt. In this action smoke clouds were used
from tanks to cover their approach from the observation of the German
gunners; this proved very successful and undoubtedly reduced loss by
gun fire. One tank had a curious experience: a smoke bomb having burst
on the top of it, the crew were forced to evacuate the machine on
account of the fumes being drawn inside. The tank commander, having
put the fire out, was unable to find his crew; as time was short
he got inside the tank and continued his advance alone; on his way
forward he took on board an officer and two men of the Manchester
Regiment. The tank then went into action against a machine-gun nest;
as the improvised crew was ignorant of the Hotchkiss gun each time
a jam occurred the tank commander had to leave the driver’s seat to
rectify it. Shortly afterwards the truant crew turned up, so the tank
commander, having first driven his newly-made comrades to cover,
dropped them, and then proceeded on his way.
On October 3 an attack was launched against the Sequehart-Bony front
in which twenty machines of the 5th Tank Brigade proved of very great
assistance to the 32nd and 46th Divisions. Sequehart was cleared and so
was Ramicourt and Doon copse, but Montbrehain remained uncaptured.
On the 4th, the 3rd Tank Battalion was transferred from the 5th to the
3rd Tank Brigade, and a day later the 16th Tank Battalion from the
5th to the 4th Tank Brigade. The 8th, 9th, and 18th Battalions were
withdrawn into G.H.Q. reserve. On the 5th the first phase of the battle
of Cambrai--St. Quentin opened with a failure to take Beaurevoir in
which attack six tanks of the 4th Tank Battalion attempted to assist
the 25th Division. Co-operation in this action was indifferent, due
chiefly to the fact that the infantry of this division had never been
trained to work with tanks. This failure was partially retrieved by
a brilliantly executed attack by the Australians supported by twelve
tanks of the 16th Battalion against Montbrehain. This village was held
by the enemy in strength, and many good targets at close quarters were
obtained for 6-pounders firing case shot. The co-operation throughout
was excellent, as, since the battle of Hamel, had always been the case
when operating with the Australian Corps--tank commanders constantly
getting out of their tanks and talking to the infantry.
The second phase of the Cambrai--St. Quentin battle opened on the
morning of October 8 on an eighteen miles front--it was entirely
successful. Tanks were allotted as follows, eighty-two in all being
used:
1st Tank Brigade 12th Battalion 1 Company to IVth Corps.
1 Company to VIth Corps.
1 Company to XVIIth Corps.
11th Battalion To Vth Corps.
4th Tank Brigade 1st Battalion To XIIIth Corps.
301st American Battalion To IInd American Corps.
3rd Tank Brigade 3rd Battalion To IInd American Corps.
6th Battalion To IXth Corps.
The attacks, carried out by the 12th Tank Battalion on the front
Niergnies--La Targette, were successful, the infantry universally
testifying to the assistance rendered by this battalion. An interesting
encounter now took place, the enemy counter-attacking from the
direction of Awoingt with four captured British Mark IV tanks, one male
and three females. The counter-attack was speedily dealt with, the
renegade male being knocked out by a 6-pounder shell fired by one of
our own tanks and one female put out of action by a shell fired from a
captured German field gun by a tank section commander; the remaining
two females fled on the approach of one of our machines of the same
sex. So ended the second tank encounter as successfully as the first,
which it will be remembered was fought near the village of Cachy on
April 24, 1918.
The other actions fought on this day were briefly as follows:
One Company of the 11th Battalion assisted the 32nd Division against
Villers-Outreaux, another company operated with the 21st Division
and the third company with the 38th. This last company was of great
assistance, as the infantry had been held up by a broad belt of wire
which they were unable to cross until the tanks crushed down pathways
through it.
The 6th Tank Battalion, operating with the IInd American Corps, carried
out its programme, one of its machines putting three batteries of field
guns out of action in Fraicourt wood; and the 3rd Battalion came into
action in the neighbourhood of Serain. This village was very strongly
defended, the enemy holding it to cover his withdrawal.
On October 9 the attack continued along the whole front, eight tanks
of the 4th Battalion coming into action east of Premont and the 17th
Armoured Car Battalion, under orders of the Cavalry Corps, operating
around Maurois and Honnechy. Two days later, on the 11th, five tanks
of the 5th Battalion operated with the 6th Division north of Riguerval
wood; this was the last tank action fought in this battle.
The battle of Cambrai--St. Quentin was at an end. The Hindenburg Line
had now to all intents and purposes ceased to exist as an obstacle. It
had been broken on a front of nearly thirty miles, on which frontage
a penetration of some twenty miles had been effected, and no fewer
than 630 guns and 48,000 prisoners captured during the last fourteen
days. The effect of this great battle, coupled with the successes of
the French in the south and the operations east of Ypres and round
Courtrai, fought by the British, French, and Belgians in the north,
resulted in the withdrawal of the German forces in the Roubaix, Lille,
and Douai area, and with this withdrawal the whole of the British
forces in France from north of Menin to Bohain, seven miles north-west
of Guise, were faced with field warfare; open country stretched before
them, uncut by trench, unhung by wire. The period of exploitation
had arrived--that period all our endeavours had been concentrated on
attaining during four years of the most desperate and relentless war in
history.
Considering the comparative weakness of the British Army, the time of
the year, and the nature of the fighting, it had truly been a notable
performance on the part of the English and the Dominion infantry, to
have fought their way so far. To carry out a rapid pursuit was beyond
their endeavours, for the German Army, though beaten, was not yet
broken. For cavalry to do so was unthinkable, for the German rearguards
possessed many thousands of machine guns, and as long as these weapons
existed, pursuit, as cavalry dream it to be, is utterly impossible.
One arm alone could have turned the present defeat into a rout--the
tank, but few of these remained, for since August 8 no fewer than 819
machines had been handed over to Salvage by the tank battalions, and
these battalions themselves had lost in personnel 550 officers and
2,557 other ranks, a small number indeed when compared with the number
of actions the Corps had been engaged in, yet a severe loss out of a
fighting state of some 1,500 officers and 8,000 other ranks.
Had it been possible at this crisis to put into the field two fresh
brigades of medium tanks, that is about 300 machines, the cost of which
would be approximately £1,500,000, or one-fifth that of one day’s
cost of the war, the greatest war in all history might have closed
on or near the field of Waterloo in a decisive victory ending in an
unconditional surrender or an irretrievable rout.