THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME AND THE SECOND BATTLE OF ARRAS
The operations which took place between the conclusion of the great
battle of Amiens and the signing of the armistice may conveniently be
divided into three periods:
(i) The battle of Bapaume and the Second Battle of Arras--August 21 to
September 3.
(ii) The battles of Epehy and Cambrai St. Quentin--September 18 to
October 10.
(iii) The battles of the Selle and Maubeuge--October 17 to November 11.
The first comprises the fighting in the devastated area, the second
the breaking through of the Hindenburg system of trenches, and the
third open warfare east of this system. Each of these periods will be
dealt with in a separate chapter, in which most of the detail of battle
preparation will be omitted so as to avoid a repetition of descriptions
of work which had by now been reduced to a routine in the Tank Corps.
Towards the end of the battle of Amiens it became apparent that the
enemy was commencing to withdraw his troops in the Pusieux-Serre area
opposite the Third Army front, and that, in all probability, this
retirement was only part of a general withdrawal on the entire front
south of the Scarpe. It was, therefore, decided on August 13 that the
Third Army should prepare an attack on the German front north of the
Somme, whilst the Fourth Army continued to press the enemy south of
this river. Consequent on this decision the 3rd, 6th, 9th, 10th, 14th,
and 15th Tank Battalions were withdrawn from the Fourth Army area, and
concentrated in that of the Third. On August 15 to these battalions
were added the 7th, 11th, and 12th of the 1st Tank Brigade. These
moves necessitated a complete reshuffling of Tank Brigades, which on
August 19 were constituted as follows:
(i) _In the Third Army Area:_
1st Tank Brigade 3rd Battalion Medium A.
7th „ Mark IV.
10th „ Mark V.
17th „ Armoured cars.
2nd Tank Brigade 6th „ Medium A.
12th „ Mark IV.
15th „ Mark V Star.
3rd Tank Brigade 9th „ Mark V.
11th „ Mark V Star.
14th „ Mark V.
_(ii) In the Fourth Army Area:_
4th Tank Brigade 1st Battalion Mark V Star.
4th „ Mark V.
5th „ Mark V.
5th Tank Brigade 2nd „ Mark V.
8th „ Mark V.
13th „ Mark V.
On the Third Army front the attack was to be launched on August 21
and, if successful, this attack was to be pushed forward and the front
extended by an attack delivered by the Fourth Army south of the Somme.
The general plan was as follows:
The VIth, IVth, and Vth Corps of the Third Army were to attack on the
line Beaucourt-sur-Ancre--Moyenneville, a frontage of 17,000 yards,
with the object of driving the enemy eastwards across the Arras-Bapaume
road and of forcing him from the Somme area. Tanks were only to operate
between Moyenneville and Bucquoy, as the ground south of this frontage
was unsuited to tank movement; for this reason no tanks were allotted
to the Vth Corps.
The allotment of tanks was as follows:
VIth Corps 2nd and 3rd Tank Brigades.
IVth Corps 1st Tank Brigade.
Owing to the little time available and the necessity for maintaining
secrecy it was not possible to carry out any training with the
divisions of the Third Army; many of these, however, had previously
attended demonstrations at Bermicourt, to supplement which notes were
now issued and as many lectures as possible given prior to this attack.
Another difficulty was reconnaissance, time for which was most limited.
Again previous work came to the rescue; for many officers in the Tank
Corps had carefully studied the area of attack prior to the Second
Battle of the Somme and had fought over it during the German spring
offensive.
On the Fourth Army front the IIIrd Corps, on the left of this Army and
north of the river Somme, was to attack between Bray and Albert. The
4th Tank Brigade was to assist in the attack and its machines were
allotted to divisions as follows:
4th Battalion 10 tanks to 12th Division.
„ „ 4 tanks to 18th Division.
5th Battalion 10 tanks to 47th Division.
1st Battalion 15 tanks to Fourth Army reserve.
South of the Somme the 5th Tank Brigade was ordered to co-operate with
the Australian Corps on the front Herleville--Chuignolles; the object
of the attack being to capture these villages and the rise running east
of them. Tanks were allotted as follows:
8th Battalion 12 tanks to 32nd Division.
2nd Battalion 12 tanks to 1st Australian Brigade.
13th Battalion 12 tanks to 2nd Australian Brigade.
The battle of Bapaume, which began on August 21, is of particular
interest in that it was the first attack launched against a new
tactical system of defence recently adopted by the enemy, namely, the
holding of his reserves well in rear of a lightly held outpost line. In
conformity with the principles of this system of defence in depth the
Germans had withdrawn their guns behind the Albert-Arras railway; this
eventually complicated the tank attack, for had they remained forward,
as so frequently they had heretofore done, they would have been
surprised and captured during the first phase of the battle; as it was,
they accounted for many of our machines during the third phase.
In consequence of the enemy’s new system of defence and the varying
powers of the three marks of machines used by the 1st and 2nd Tank
Brigades, tanks were disposed in echelons as follows:
(i) Two battalions of Mark IV tanks to operate as far as the second
objective.
(ii) One battalion of Mark V and one of Mark V star machines to operate
against the second objective and proceed as far as the Albert-Arras
railway.
(iii) Two battalions of Whippets to operate beyond the Albert-Arras
railway line.
Zero hour was at 4.55 a.m. The Mark IV battalion moved forward and
successfully cleared the first objective and pushed on towards the
second. Once again the attack was a surprise, perhaps not so much
through it being unexpected as through the inability of the Germans to
meet it, especially as their guns had been withdrawn. To illustrate how
complete this surprise was it is only necessary to mention that candles
were found still burning in the trenches when we crossed them, and
papers and equipment scattered broadcast gave evidence of the hurried
flight of the enemy. The second echelon and the Whippets had, however,
a far more difficult task to accomplish. The Albert-Arras railway had,
previous to the attack, been turned into a strongly defended line of
machine-gun nests covered by the German guns east of it. Unfortunately
the thick ground mist, which had shielded the approach of the first
echelon, now began to lift; this enabled the German artillery observers
to direct a deadly fire on the tanks, in fact, each individual tank
became the centre of a zone of bullets and bursting shells. Avoiding
these zones, our infantry pushed on with few casualties. During this
day’s fighting many parties of the enemy, some over a hundred strong,
surrendered _en bloc_ directly the tanks were seen approaching. Such
action on the part of the German infantry was becoming a stereotyped
procedure in all tank attacks. On the 21st, of the 190 tanks which took
part in the attack, 37 received direct hits.
On August 22 the IIIrd Corps launched its attack on a front of some
10,000 yards with complete success. The tanks, which had been
instructed by the IIIrd Corps to proceed in rear of the infantry, in
actual fact led the attack the whole way, effecting a penetration of
about 4,000 yards. All objectives were gained, and at the end of the
day our line ran east of Albert, east of Meaulte, east of the Happy
Valley, and through the western outskirts of Bray-sur-Somme.
On the following day the attack of the IIIrd Corps was continued in
conjunction with that of the Third Army to the north and the Australian
Corps to the south. The IIIrd Corps captured Tara and Usna hills,
employing six tanks of the 1st Tank Battalion in this action. On the
Australian front the thirty-six machines of the 5th Tank Brigade
deployed and led the infantry right on to their objective, which was
successfully occupied. On reaching this the machines of the 2nd and
13th Battalions exploited north of Chuignolles with the 3rd Australian
Brigade, whilst those of the 8th Battalion rallied. During this attack
the enemy put up a stout resistance, his machine-gunners fighting with
great spirit and in many cases continuing to fire their guns until
run over by the tanks. Curiously enough, in comparison with this, on
the previous day the enemy’s machine-gunners on the IIIrd Corps front
scarcely put up any fight at all, and when asked why they had not done
so replied: “Oh! it would not have been any good.”
The following is a typical battle-history sheet depicting the tank
fighting at this period; it was written by a tank commander who took
part in the above attack.
“At 4.25 a.m. on the 23rd instant, I proceeded with my female
tank ‘Mabel’ (No. 9382) in front of the infantry. I made a very
zigzag course to the wood in the south-west edge of the village
of Chuignolles, where I encountered an anti-tank gun which was
eventually knocked out by the male tank commanded by 2nd Lieut.
Simmonds, who was operating on my right. I then worked up the
south side of the village, heavily machine-gunning all the crops
and copses, and dislodged several machine-gun crews of the enemy.
I next came back to the village and mopped up the enemy on the
outskirts until it was clear. Then, emerging from the smoke of
two shells which dropped short, I found myself in the midst of
a battery of whizz-bangs. The gunners of this battery I at once
proceeded to obliterate with good success, after which I came
behind another battery and proceeded with the same operation. Then
I started to take infantry over to the high ground south of Square
wood in L.35d, when I was called back by an Australian colonel to
attend to some M.G. nests which had been left in the centre of
the village; here I mopped up twelve M.G. nests and then started
to catch up the remainder of the tanks and the barrage, but while
at the top of a very steep bank, approximately R.10.b.30.50, I
received a direct hit from a whizz-bang on the front horns, which
sent me out of control to the bottom of the bank, where I found it
had broken one plate of my left track. After repairing this, the
barrage having finished, and as tanks were coming back to rally, I
brought my tank back to the rallying-point at Amy wood.”
In the Third Army the attack was re-opened on August 23 by a moonlight
operation, starting at 4 a.m., carried out against the village of
Gomiecourt. The 3rd Division, supported by ten Mark IV tanks of the
12th Battalion, attacked this village and carried it. A little later
the Guards Division with four Mark IV.s captured the village of
Hamelincourt.
At 11 a.m. the VIth Corps, assisted by fifteen Whippets, attacked in
the direction of Ervillers--Behagnies--Sapignies, and by noon were
east of the Bapaume-Arras road. Near Sapignies heavy machine-gun
fire was encountered, which prevented our infantry moving forward;
notwithstanding this the Whippets continued their advance. In one
machine the officer and sergeant were killed; the remaining man,
however, after placing the corpses in a shell-hole, continued
single-handed to follow the other tanks, and when a target offered
itself, locked his back axle and fired his Hotchkiss gun. Although
Sapignies and Behagnies were not captured the operation was successful
in securing a large number of prisoners. This attack materially
assisted that of the IVth Corps on Achiet-le-Grand and Bihucourt, which
were captured by the 37th Division and six Mark V tanks of the 1st
Tank Brigade.
At 5.7 a.m., in spite of a very heavy gas barrage which took place
between 2 a.m. and 4 a.m., eighteen tanks of the 11th Battalion and
eight of the 9th Battalion co-operated with the 52nd and 56th Divisions
in an attack on the Hamelincourt-Heninel spur. Both these objectives
were carried with small loss.
On August 24 the attacks of the Third and Fourth Armies were pushed
with vigour, the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Tank Brigades co-operating.
At 2 a.m. on the IVth Corps front four Mark IV machines assisted the
37th Division west of Sapignies; later on, seven Mark IV tanks and
nineteen Whippets attacked with the New Zealand and 37th Divisions on
Grevillers, Biefvillers, and Loupart wood, which were captured. On the
front of the 56th Division a bloody engagement began at 7 a.m. for the
ownership of the line St. Leger--Henin-sur-Cojeul, eleven tanks of the
11th Battalion co-operating after an approach march of 10,000 yards.
All objectives were gained. At 2 p.m. this attack was continued, two
tanks leading the infantry north of Croisilles as far as the Hindenburg
Line, which was strongly held. Both these machines had particularly
exciting experiences. One received a direct hit which rendered the
officer commanding it unconscious; recovering his senses, he at once
took charge of his machine and pushed on. In the other the crew were
forced to evacuate the tank on account of the enemy surrounding it
with phosphorus bombs; before leaving it the officer in command turned
the tank’s head towards home and then, getting out, walked between
the front horns of the machine until the fumes had cleared away. All
this time the tank was surrounded by the enemy. This attack failed; it
is interesting, however, to note that one tank of the 11th Battalion
covered during this operation 40,000 yards in some twenty-six hours.
At 3.30 p.m. five tanks of the 9th Battalion took part in an attack
on the line Mory copse--Camouflage copse. At first there was not much
opposition, but after Mory copse was reached the enemy put up a stout
resistance and, refusing to surrender, was killed almost to a man,
one party of about sixty being put out of action by four rounds of
6-pounder case shot.
At dawn this day on the Fourth Army front five tanks of the 1st
Battalion assisted the 47th Division in the recapture of the Happy
Valley, which had been lost on the previous afternoon. This attack was
entirely successful, and besides the Happy Valley the extensive village
of Bray was added to our gains.
On the evening of August 24 the 3rd Tank Brigade was transferred
from the Third Army to the Canadian Corps of the First Army for the
forthcoming attack on the First Army front, which was to initiate the
Second Battle of Arras. This entailed a lengthy night march of 29,000
yards from Blaireville and Boisleux-au-Mont to Moyenneville, thence to
Achicourt.
On August 25 minor tank attacks were carried out on the IVth Corps
front against Favreuil, Avesnes, Thilloy, and Sapignies, and on the
26th tanks of the 9th Battalion, some of which had moved 37,000 yards
since the night of the 24th-25th, attacked with the Guards Division
north of Mory. This attack was not a great success, due to the dense
mist, which made co-operation almost impossible and the maintenance
of direction most difficult. During this engagement one tank had five
members of its crew wounded by anti-tank rifle bullets.
On the Canadian Corps’ front an attack was carried out opposite Fampoux
and Neuville-Vitasse, the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions operating with
tanks of the 9th and 11th Divisions against Wancourt, Guemappe, and
Monchy-le-Preux. Near Monchy several tanks were knocked out, the crews
joining the infantry to repel a local counter-attack. The sergeant of
one crew, hearing that the enemy had captured his tank, collected his
men and charged forward to recover it, arriving at one sponson door of
the machine as the enemy were scrambling out of the opposite one.
On the following day, the 27th, operations continued east of
Monchy-le-Preux, and in the Guemappe-Cherisy area, but ceased
altogether as far as tanks were concerned until the 29th. On this
day minor tank operations were carried out on the Third Army front
south-west of Beugnatre by the 1st Brigade, the enemy having evacuated
Thilloy and Bapaume. This Brigade, on the 30th, co-operated with the
5th British and New Zealand Divisions against Fremicourt, Beugny,
Bancourt, Haplincourt, and Velu wood, whilst the 2nd Tank Brigade
attacked Vaux-Vraucourt. All these attacks were successful.
On the last day of August 1918, probably the most decisive month
in the whole war, nine Mark IV.s of the 12th Battalion and four
Whippets of the 6th Battalion attacked the Longatte trench, Moreuil
switch, and Vraucourt trench, taking all these objectives, and on the
following day, September 1, Whippets of the 6th Battalion completed the
above operations by establishing the infantry on the slopes east of
Vaux-Vraucourt.
The Second Battle of Arras reached its zenith on September 2 when the
famous Drocourt-Queant line, which we had failed to reach in April
1917, was broken. Starting from the south the 1st Tank Brigade operated
with the 42nd and 5th Divisions against Beugny and Villars-au-Flos.
To the north of this attack the 2nd Tank Brigade assisted in the VIth
Corps operations against Moreuil, Lagnicourt, and Morchies. This attack
was made in conjunction with those of the Canadian and XVIIth Corps
against the Drocourt-Queant line. This line was attacked by the 1st
and 4th Canadian Divisions and the 4th Division, together with as many
tanks as the 9th, 11th, and 14th Battalions of the 3rd Tank Brigade
could muster. The assembly of these machines was difficult owing not
only to the intricate nature of the Sensée valley but to the fact that
active operations were taking place throughout these preparations.
The Drocourt-Queant line, built in the spring of 1917, was protected
by immensely strong belts of wire entanglement, and it was expected
that every effort would be made on the part of the enemy to hold these
defences at all cost; nevertheless, on the whole, less opposition was
encountered than had been anticipated. Except for anti-tank rifle fire,
which was especially noticeable at Villers-les-Cagnicourt, the tanks
met little opposition. It is estimated that in this attack one company
of tanks alone destroyed over seventy hostile machine guns, the German
gunners surrendering to the tanks as they approached.
On the next day, the enemy falling back, the Whippet tanks pushed
forward to Hermies and Dermicourt. Thus the Second Battle of Arras
ended in an overwhelming success by the piercing of the renowned
Drocourt-Queant line. A blow had now been delivered from which the
enemy’s moral never recovered.
Since August 21, in all, 511 tanks had been in action, and except
for one or two minor failures every attack had culminated in a cheap
success--cheap as regards our own infantry casualties, especially so
when it is remembered that during the fortnight which comprised the
battle of Bapaume and the Second Battle of Arras no fewer than 470 guns
and 53,000 prisoners were captured. Thus in a little less than one
month the German Army had lost to the First, Third, and Fourth British
Armies 870 guns and 75,000 men without counting killed and wounded.