AEROPLANE CO-OPERATION WITH TANKS
Prior to July 1, 1918, no definite aeroplane and tank co-operation had
been organised, though the want of such co-operation had been long
felt, and in one of the attacks on Bourlon wood, during the battle of
Cambrai, aeroplanes had proved their value in protecting tanks from the
enemy’s field guns.
The assistance which aeroplanes can afford tanks falls under the two
main headings of information and protection; in the future, no doubt,
those of command and supply will be added.
Prior to the battle of Arras, in February and March 1917, certain
experiments were carried out in communication between tanks, aeroplanes
and captive balloons by means of the Aldis daylight signalling lamp,
as already mentioned in Chapter XXIV; these experiments did not prove
a success. During the battle of Messines aeroplanes, with considerable
accuracy, reported the whereabouts of tanks on the battlefield. At the
Third Battle of Ypres this useful work was continued, and again at
the battle of Cambrai, but during these last operations the days were
usually so misty as to forbid much useful work being accomplished.
After the battle of Cambrai every endeavour was made by the Tank Corps
to get this co-operation regularised and placed on a sound footing,
but except for some remarkable tests carried out by the 1st Tank
Brigade in the vicinity of Fricourt, in February 1918, in which it was
conclusively demonstrated that low-flying aeroplanes could render the
greatest protective assistance to tanks, nothing was done to institute
a definite system of co-operation. To do so, only one thing was
required--namely, the attachment of a flight or squadron of aeroplanes
to the Tank Corps for experimental purposes. At length on July 1, 1918,
some five weeks before the battle of Amiens began, No. 8 Squadron,
R.A.F., equipped with eighteen Armstrong-Whitworth machines, was
attached to the Tank Corps, for the purpose of co-operating with the
tanks and carrying out experiments with a view to future development.
This squadron was under the command of Major T. Leigh-Mallory, D.S.O.,
and it was due to the energy of this officer that, in the extremely
short time available, such extensive progress was made in aeroplane
and tank co-operation, especially in contact work. The benefit which
resulted from this co-operation cannot be over-estimated.
Early in June, No. 42 Squadron, R.A.F., had already carried out
experiments with smoke flares and Very lights which were successful,
whilst No. 22 Squadron attempted wireless telephony, and No. 15
Squadron visual signalling communication by means of discs swung out
from the fuselage. These experiments formed the basis of the work which
No. 8 Squadron now started on with the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Tank Brigades,
continuing it up to the opening of the August offensive.
The account of the co-operation of No. 8 Squadron may be conveniently
divided into three periods:
(i) The period of preparation, July 1 to August 8.
(ii) The battle of Amiens.
(iii) The battle of Bapaume to November 11, 1918.
During the last-mentioned period No. 8 Squadron was reinforced by No.
73 Squadron, which, being equipped with Sopwith-Camel machines, was
able to deal effectively with the enemy’s anti-tank guns.
The first essential of successful co-operation being comradeship, a
firm alliance was at once established between the flights of No. 8
Squadron and the tank units with which this squadron was working.
This was carried out by attaching tank officers to the flights, these
officers frequently flying, whilst pilots and observers were given
rides in the tanks.
The battle of Hamel, on July 4, was the first occasion upon which
aeroplanes were definitely detailed to work with tanks, C Flight of No.
8 Squadron being attached to the 5th Tank Brigade for this operation.
The morning was a peculiarly dark one, with clouds at 1,000 ft.;
nevertheless one aeroplane managed to get off at 2.50 a.m. and a second
at 3 a.m. These two machines flew low over the enemy’s lines with
the object of drowning the noise of the approaching tanks. Later on
another machine, flying down into the smoke of the artillery barrage,
silenced some guns which were giving considerable trouble. Altogether
the assistance that No. 8 Squadron rendered the Tank Corps, on this the
first occasion upon which these two mechanical arms co-operated, boded
well of the future.
After the battle of Hamel, tests and training were continued, “B”
Flight concentrating on wireless telegraphy and telephony with the 1st
Tank Brigade, and “A” Flight on visual signalling with the 3rd Tank
Brigade.
The wireless telephony tests, though of exceptional interest, did not
prove very successful. Under very favourable conditions speech could
be heard in a moving tank from an aeroplane flying at an altitude of
500 ft. and not more than a quarter of a mile away. It was consequently
decided that, for immediate use, wireless telephony was not a practical
means of communication.
Towards the end of July a series of most successful tests were carried
out in wireless telegraphy, tanks clearly receiving messages from
aeroplanes at 2,500 ft. altitude and 9,000 yards away. Successful as
these experiments proved, they were destined to be still-born, for
time was insufficient to develop them or to apply them during active
operations.
The disc signalling carried out by “A” Flight was instituted as a
means of directing Whippet tanks on to their objectives. By degrees a
complete code of signals was evolved so that the aeroplane was able to
communicate both the nature and direction of the target. In conjunction
with disc signalling, various kinds of smoke bombs and Very lights
were experimented with, and by means of these several very successful
manœuvres were carried out at the Tank Gunnery School at Merlimont.
In spite of the fact that the period of preparation was too short
to enable the results of tests to be applied in battle, pilots and
observers had got to know a great many of the tank officers with
whom they were going to co-operate, and in addition had learnt much
concerning the limitations of tanks, and the kind of information
required by their staffs and crews during action.
The programme of work for No. 8 Squadron on the opening day of the
battle of Amiens was as follows:
(i) Machines to fly over the line for the last hour of the tank
approach march in order to drown the noise of the tank engines.
(ii) Contact and counter-attack patrols to keep tank units constantly
informed, by dropping messages at fixed stations, as to the progress of
the battle.
(iii) All machines were instructed to help the tanks whenever an
opportunity arose.
On August 5 the Squadron concentrated at Vignacourt, “C” Flight being
detailed to work with the 5th Tank Brigade and “B” and “A” Flights with
the 4th and 3rd Brigades.
At 2.50 a.m. on August 8 three machines “took off” to cover the tanks
during the last hour of the approach march. The morning was dark and
the clouds appeared high. Each of these machines dropped six 25 lb.
bombs, at intervals, over the enemy’s lines. Between 4.50 a.m. and
5 a.m. the first four tank-contact patrol machines “took off.” The
valleys were already coated with thick mist and within an hour the
whole country for miles was obscured. By flying very low and making
use of gaps in the mist, one of these machines was able to report that
tanks had passed through Demuin, and consequently it was known that the
bridge there must be intact. The first message to be dropped at the
Advanced Headquarters of the Tank Corps read as follows:
“To Advanced H.Q. Tank Corps
“(per aeroplane).
“W.4. 8th.
“Machine landed 8.30 a.m. reports AAA 6.15 a.m. 4 tanks seen in
action on a line 500 yards west of road through C.17.b, C.11.d,
C.12.a AAA 7.15 a.m. 4 tanks seen together heading E on road
beyond Hourges at C.11 central AAA 3 tanks seen together in C.6.d
uncertain AAA 7.20 a.m. Green Line taken, tanks rallying to move
off again AAA Foregoing report applies to 5th Tank Battalion
Sector AAA 7.45 a.m. 4 tanks on road leading north out of Demuin
V.25.C.4.8 AAA 1 tank at D.1.c central AAA 4 tanks at C.11.d.3.8
heading east AAA 7.45 a.m. French infantry seen in large numbers
on western outskirts of Moreuil wood and French barrage on a
line C.17.c C.23.a, & C.29.a & 28.D AAA Motor transport probably
armoured cars seen on road in U.26 near Domart AAA German balloon
observed up just east of Caix about 8 a.m. at 1,200 ft. AAA Bombs
dropped in W.22.d south of Harbonnières, target guns AAA Addressed
22nd Wing 3rd, 4th and 5th Tank Bde. Advanced Hqrs. AAA.
“Sent by aeroplane to dropping ground Advanced H.Q. Tank Corps.
“Note added.
“Cavalry and tanks in large numbers proceeding east at 8 a.m. south
of Bois d’Aquenne.
“Intelligence Officer,
“8th Squadron, R.A.F.
“8.50 a.m.”
Many other such messages were dropped during the day, the Tank Brigade
Headquarters being well posted with information as the attack proceeded.
On the following three days of the battle the enemy’s resistance in
the air became much more marked. On August 9 and 10 good targets
were observed from the air in the form of large parties of infantry
and transport. On the 10th, Captain West and Lieutenant Haslam were
co-operating with tanks near Rosières when movement along the roads was
noticed in the neighbourhood of Roye. Although some 8,000 yards from
our lines Captain West immediately flew his machines in that direction
and with great effect bombed and fired on the enemy’s transport
moving eastwards. Just as he turned to fly back he was attacked by
seven Fokker biplanes. With almost the first burst one of the hostile
machines, which had got above Captain West’s right-hand wing, shot his
left leg off between the knee and the thigh, three explosive bullets
hitting it. In spite of the fact that West’s leg fell amongst the
controls and that he was wounded in the right foot he managed to fly
his machine back and land it in our lines. For this act of gallantry he
was awarded the Victoria Cross.
During the battle of Amiens aeroplane co-operation had been chiefly
confined to contact and counter-attack patrols. The tanks had, however,
during this battle, suffered heavily from the German field guns, so, in
the next great battle, the battle of Bapaume, it was decided to make
counter-gun work a feature of aeroplane co-operation.
Instead of sending all machines up on contact and counter-attack
patrol, as many machines as possible were reserved for counter-gun
work. From this time onwards the tendency was to concentrate more and
more on this important duty, and as fresh experiences were gained this
work grew more and more successful. Fortunately, just before the Third
Army attack began, on August 21, No. 73 Squadron (Sopwith-Camels) was
attached to the Tank Corps for this form of co-operation.
The tactics adopted in this counter-gun work are interesting. To send
down zone calls was useless, as the German gunners opened fire, as a
rule, when the tanks were but 1,000 yards away. Immediate action was,
therefore, necessary, and this was taken by bombing and machine-gunning
hostile artillery until the tanks had run over the emplacements. The
method of locating the hostile gun positions consisted in carefully
studying the ground prior to the attack by consulting maps and air
photographs, and from this study to make out a chart of all likely gun
positions. On September 2 a most valuable document was captured which
set forth the complete scheme the Germans had adopted in connection
with the distribution of their guns for anti-tank work; further, in
this document were described the various types of positions anti-tank
gunners should take up. By the aid of this document and a large-scale
map it was possible to plot out beforehand the majority of possible
gun positions. As each of our aeroplanes had only about 2,000 yards of
front to watch, the result was that all likely places were periodically
bombed. In this way, by selecting the likely places beforehand, a great
number of anti-tank guns were spotted as soon as they opened fire, and
thus immense service was rendered to the tanks.
August 21 was the most disappointing day No. 8 Squadron experienced
whilst attached to the Tank Corps. The morning was very foggy and it
was quite impossible for the machines to leave the ground until 11
a.m., a little over six hours after zero, which was at 4.55 a.m. In
spite of this the counter-gun machines were not too late to carry out
useful work against several batteries; this work was chiefly carried
out by No. 73 Squadron, which was quite new to the work. The value
of the experience gained on this day was amply demonstrated by the
effective work carried out by this Squadron on the 23rd, when many
hostile guns were attacked and their crews scattered. A good example of
the valuable work carried out by No. 73 Squadron occurred on September
2.
A gun was observed being man-handled towards Chaufours wood; 800 rounds
were fired at it, the gun crew leaving the gun and seeking security
in the wood. A little later on this crew, emerging from the wood,
attempted to haul the gun into it; fire was once again opened by the
aeroplane, but in spite of it the crew succeeded in their object. Bombs
were then dropped on the wood, and no further movement was observed.
On September 29 a wireless-signal tank was used as a dropping station.
This proved a most useful innovation, for one aeroplane dropping its
message at this station found, on its return home, that this message
had been received by the headquarters to which it was directed within
a few minutes of it having been dropped, in fact, far quicker than it
would have been had the aeroplane dropped it at the headquarters itself.
The dropping of messages to tanks in action was also successfully
accomplished during the 29th. One of these messages sent down the
information that the Germans were still holding the village of Bony;
a group of tanks, receiving this, at once wheeled towards Bony and
attacked it.
On October 8 aeroplanes once again carried out useful co-operation
with the tanks. The following account is taken from the report of an
aeroplane the pilot of which observed the tanks attacking Serain:
“As the tanks were approaching we dropped bombs on various
parties of Germans who were in the village. The tanks were then
surrounding the village, one going right into the centre of it; a
second attacked the orchard to the south, mopping up parties of
Germans; whilst a third came round the north of the village and was
approaching a small valley in which were 200 to 300 Germans covered
by a stretch of dead ground. On seeing the tank approaching the
Germans fled eastwards, whereupon we flew towards them firing our
machine guns, doing great execution.”
Such actions as these were of daily occurrence and they only went to
prove what the headquarters of the Tank Corps had long held--namely,
that the co-operation of aeroplanes with tanks is of incalculable
importance, the aeroplanes protecting the tanks and the tanks
protecting the infantry. In the future, no doubt, not only will
messages be dropped and hostile guns silenced, but the commanders
of tank battalions will be carried in the air, these officers
communicating with their machines by means of wireless telephony, and
supplies of petrol will be transported by means of aeroplane for the
replenishment of the tanks.