THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME
With the close of the battle of Cambrai the British Army abandoned
the offensive, which had been initiated on April 9, and a period of
passive defence was developed. At this time all three Tank Brigades
had assembled at or near Bray-sur-Somme, where extensive hutments
existed and where the old devastated area offered excellent facilities
for training. Towards the end of December a request was made by the
Tank Corps to establish at Bray a large tank and infantry school, so
that co-operation between these two arms might be secured; further, as
artillery ranges were near at hand it was felt that a complete tactical
unity of action between tanks, infantry, artillery, and aeroplanes
could now be established: besides this, Bray formed an excellent
strategical centre to the Somme area should the Germans at any time
launch an attack between the Oise and the Scarpe.
Early in January 1918 orders were, however, received that in place of
remaining assembled at one spot the Tank Corps was to form a defensive
cordon stretching from about Roisel to a little south of Bethune--a
frontage of some sixty miles. In February this line was taken up, tank
units being distributed as follows:
Fifth Army, 4th Tank Brigade 1st Bn. Doingt wood.
„ „ H.Q. Templeux La Fosse 4th Bn. Buire wood.
„ „ 5th Bn. Buire wood.
Third Army, 2nd Tank Brigade 2nd Bn. Velu wood.
„ „ H.Q. Thilloy 8th Bn. Fremicourt.
„ „ 10th Bn. Fremicourt.
„ „ 3rd Tank Brigade 6th Bn. Wailly.
G.H.Q. Reserve, H.Q. Henincourt 3rd Bn. Bray.
„ „ 9th Bn. Bray.
„ „ 5th Tank Brigade 13th Bn. Bray (unequipped).
„ „ H.Q. Bray.
First Army, 1st Tank Brigade 7th Bn. Boyeffles.
„ „ H.Q. Bois d’Olhain 11th Bn. Bois des Alleux.
„ „ 12th Bn. Bois de Verdrel.
It will be seen that by this date the Tank Corps had grown from three
to five brigades, in all thirteen battalions; machines, however, were
short, and the total fighting strength in tanks at this time was only
320 Mark IV and 50 Medium A Tanks (Whippets) fit for action.
The general plan was that tank units should co-operate with Army and
Corps reserves in the deliberate counter-attack against tactical
points in what was known as the battle zone, a belt of ground running
several miles in rear of and parallel to the forward or outpost zone;
no retirement from this zone was to be contemplated. Prior to March
20 the weather had been fine, the ground was good and a thorough
reconnaissance had been made of some 1,500 square miles of country;
supply dumps had been formed and communication by wireless, cable,
dispatch rider and runner established throughout the units of the Tank
Corps.
On March 21 at 5 a.m. the German bombardment opened on a front roughly
running from La Fère to the river Scarpe, with a break round the old
Cambrai battlefield. The first tanks to be engaged were three forward
sections of the 4th Battalion north-west of St. Emilie, north-west of
Peizière, and at Geninwell copse. These came into action about noon and
fought most gallantly against heavy odds. The first section, supported
by two companies of the 2nd Royal Munster Fusiliers, recaptured a
battery of guns near Esclairvillers wood; later on in the day this
section assisted in the counter-attack of the Connaught Rangers on
Ronssoy wood; meanwhile the second section cleared the bridge and
cutting north-east of Peizière. Whilst these actions were being fought
in the Fifth Army area, on the Third Army front one company of the
8th Tank Battalion co-operated with the 57th Infantry Brigade in a
counter-attack on the village of Doignies. Zero hour was fixed at 6.40
p.m., but the attack was delayed and it was almost dark before the
objective was reached. The village was cleared of the enemy, but on
account of the darkness it was never completely occupied by our own men
and eventually passed back into German hands.
On the following day, March 22, an Advanced Tank Corps Headquarters
was opened at Hamencourt, a mile east of Doullens, in order to
facilitate the battle liaison duties of the staff. On this day a most
successful and gallant action was fought by the 2nd Tank Battalion in
the neighbourhood of Vaux Vraucourt and Morchies. At 2.45 p.m. orders
were issued for the 2nd Tank Battalion to advance and counter-attack
the enemy, who had broken through the line Vaux Vraucourt-Morchies and
was pushing forward towards Beugny. Two companies of infantry were
detailed to support the tanks, but as eventually these could not be
spared the tanks went into action alone. The counter-attack began to
develop around Beugny at about 4.30 p.m. Concentrated artillery fire
was brought to bear on the tanks, but in spite of this they advanced
amongst the enemy, put a field battery out of action, and by enfilading
several trenches full of Germans inflicted heavy casualties on them.
The enemy was eventually driven back behind the Vaux Vraucourt-Morchies
position, which was then reoccupied by our infantry. Thirty tanks took
part in this action; seventeen of these were hit and 70 per cent. of
casualties suffered by their crews. Heavy though these losses were
the enemy had suffered severely, and more important still his plan of
action was upset.
On the Fifth Army front the penetration effected by the enemy caused
a rapid withdrawal of our troops, and to cover this the 4th and 5th
Tank Battalions moved eastwards on either side of the Cologne river,
which joins the Somme at Peronne; the village of Epehy was cleared of
the enemy and much valuable time was gained at Roisel and Hervilly by
tank counter-attacks. The German infantry would not face the tanks, and
broke whenever they saw them advancing.
On March 23 no tank action was fought on the Third Army front. On
the Fifth Army front, the 1st Tank Battalion, which had not yet been
engaged, took up a position on the reverse slope west of Moislains with
machine-gun posts pushed out on the forward slope. The enemy, however,
would not attack the line of tanks but worked round their flanks--the
1st Tank Battalion eventually withdrew towards Maricourt. The 4th and
5th Tank Battalions covered the withdrawal of our infantry on either
side of the Cologne river, and by the evening ten tanks of the 4th
Battalion had concentrated at Cléry and those of the 5th Battalion at
Brie bridge, three miles south of Peronne. Shortly after their arrival
here this bridge was blown up and the whole of the 5th Battalion tanks,
except three, had to be destroyed for lack of petrol. Of these three,
one succeeded in crossing the bridge after the explosion and the
remaining two effected their escape _via_ Peronne. All three were lost
on the next day.
The following day, the 8th Tank Battalion was engaged in a most
successful action south-east of Bapaume. Two companies advanced against
Bus and Barastre, while a third covered the 6th Infantry Brigade’s
consolidation of a line of trenches. All tanks came into action and
inflicted heavy casualties at close range, the enemy was checked for a
considerable time and the 2nd Division was thus enabled to extricate
itself from a most difficult position with little loss. The enemy was
in force, but as was always the case, he would not face the tanks, and
if he could not work round their flanks his advance halted until his
guns could be brought up to deal with them.
It was on March 24 that a considerable number of Lewis-gun sections
were first formed during this battle out of tank crews who had lost
their machines. The 9th Tank Battalion handed its machines over to
the 3rd Battalion and moved out as a Lewis-gun Battalion from Bray to
assist the 35th Division and the 9th Cavalry Brigade in the defence of
Montauban and Maricourt. The instructional staff of the Tank Driving
School which, in February, had moved from Wailly to Aveluy, was rapidly
formed into Lewis-gun sections, and with such tanks as were fit for
action held a defensive line from Fricourt to Bazentin, covering the
Albert-Bapaume road. The 5th Tank Battalion, south of the Somme, now
without machines, was also formed into a Lewis-gun Battalion as crews
were collected. This battalion in particular carried out most gallant
and useful work, forty-five Lewis-gun groups being kept continuously in
action. Several of these groups lost touch with their headquarters, but
continued fighting with any troops in their vicinity until March 31.
On March 25 two companies of the 10th Tank Battalion came into action
at Achiet-le-Grand and Achiet-le-Petit. At the first-named village,
with the 42nd Division, one of these companies attacked the enemy, who,
in large numbers, had broken through near Bapaume, and delayed his
advance for several hours. By this date no fewer than 113 Lewis-gun
groups had been posted in the La Maisonette--Chaulnes, Bray and
Pozières--Contalmaison--Montauban--Maricourt areas, and during the
night twenty more were sent out to hold the crossings over the river
Ancre between Aveluy and Beaucourt. At this time Grandecourt and
Miraumont were already in the enemy’s hands and the position was most
precarious. These groups held these crossings for several days and
inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy each time he attempted to force
a passage.
March 26 is an interesting date in the history of the Tank Corps, for,
on the afternoon of this day, the Whippet Tanks made their debut.
Twelve of these machines, belonging to the 3rd Tank Battalion, moving
northwards from Bray were ordered to advance through the village of
Colincamps to clear up the situation, which was very obscure. About 300
of the enemy were met with advancing on the village in several groups;
these were taken completely by surprise, and on seeing the rapidly
moving tanks fled in disorder, making no attempt at resistance. The
Whippets then patrolled towards Serre and after dispersing several
strong enemy patrols withdrew, having suffered no losses in tanks or
personnel. This action was particularly opportune, as it checked an
enveloping movement directed against Hebuterne at a time when there was
a gap in our line.
[Illustration: PLATE III
MEDIUM MARK “A” TANK (WHIPPET).]
Save for a few minor tank engagements on March 27, 28, 29, 30, and
31, so far as the Tank Corps was concerned, the Second Battle of
the Somme had come to an end, and, before closing this chapter, it is
of interest to deduce the main lessons learnt from these the first
defensive operations the Tank Corps had ever taken part in.
On March 21, tanks were too scattered ever to pull their full weight.
To hit with them as they then were distributed was like hitting out
with an open hand in place of a clenched fist, and when the blow fell
there was no time to hit and simultaneously close the fingers. Out of
a total of some 370 tanks only 180 came into action. The continual
withdrawal of tanks by infantry formations in place of moving them
forwards amongst the enemy resulted in many machines being worn out
before they had fired a shot; this was a faulty use of an offensive
weapon.
The two main lessons learnt were: firstly, that speed and circuit are
the two essentials for an open-warfare machine; and secondly, one
which has already been mentioned but which is so important that it
is worth mentioning again, namely, that no great Army, such as the
Germans massed against us on March 21, can depend on road and rail
supply only. Consequently unless these means of supply are supplemented
by cross-country mechanical transport, that is, transport which is
independent of road and rail, the greatest success will always be
limited by the endurance of the horses’ legs. Men without supplies are
an incumbrance, and guns and machine guns without ammunition are mere
scrap iron. Had the Germans after March 26 been able to supply their
troops mechanically across country, there can be little doubt that
their advance would have been continued, for we could not have stopped
it, and they might well have won the war. Fatigue may stop an advance
gradually, but lack of supplies will stop it absolutely--this is the
second and greatest lesson of the Second Battle of the Somme, if not of
the entire war.