THE TANK SUPPLY COMPANIES
Tanks, like every other arm of the Army, require a highly organised
supply service, and being cross-country machines they must be served by
machines of similar powers of locomotion. This was probably realised
before tanks were originally dispatched to France in 1916, but, during
the battles of the Somme, Ancre, and Arras, it was not possible to
organise any system of cross-country supply on account of every machine
being required for either fighting or training purposes. In February
1917 the first organisation for cross-country supply was formulated.
This consisted in allotting two supply tanks to each company, but the
delay in the arrival of Mark IV machines prevented this organisation
taking form until May 1917.
Supply tanks were first employed at the battle of Messines, the Mark I
tanks, which had now been discarded as fighting machines, being used
for this purpose. These machines were fitted with large soft steel
sponsons made at the Tank Corps Central Workshops. During this battle
they were not much used owing to the limited scope of the operations.
Between June 1917 and the opening of the Third Battle of Ypres each
tank battalion received six supply tanks, two for each company, but
during this battle they did not prove a success on account of the
appalling conditions of the ground, the sponsons continually becoming
wedged in the shell-holes, which necessitated much digging out to
relieve them.
Just prior to the opening of this battle the first of the gun-carrier
tanks arrived in France, and was dispatched to Flanders and attached to
the XVIIIth Corps for experiment. Later on others followed, until by
the end of the year forty-four of these machines had been received.
The idea of the gun-carrier was that of mechanical artillery, the
machine being really a mechanical gun mounting capable of carrying a
60-pounder or 6 in. howitzer. Its total shell capacity without the gun
was 200 6 in. shells, weighing approximately 10 tons.
Considering the difficulties of the ground very good work was done by
the gun-carriers during the Ypres operations, several hundreds of tons
of ammunition being carried forward as well as a few 60-pounders.
In September a new method of supply was experimented with; this
consisted in towing behind any type of tank three sledges connected
with the roof of the machine by a cable. At the battle of Cambrai this
method proved a great success, and not only were tank supplies hauled
forward but also telegraph cable and bridging material.
During the autumn and winter of 1917 much careful thought had been
devoted both in France and England to the question not only of tank
supply but of being able to carry forward infantry, particularly
machine-gunners, in armoured carrier tanks; the result of this was the
design of a large carrier tank known as the Mark IX and the raising of
a new unit known as an “Infantry Carrier Company.”
These carrier units were first formed on February 1, 1918. The first
two companies consisted mostly of Royal Engineer personnel, and the
next three of infantry. The standard of the personnel was very good,
about 60 per cent. having already seen service overseas. The 1st
and 2nd Companies proceeded to France about the middle of May, the
remaining three arriving in June and July.
The organisation of each of these companies was as follows:
A company headquarters and four sections, each section consisting
of six Mark IV supply tanks, or tenders, as they were sometimes
called. The object of these companies was laid down in Tank Corps
Standing Orders as follows:
“The Tank Supply Company is a unit of Brigade Troops for the
carriage of supplies, from the point where wheeled vehicles cease,
to battalions. The responsibility for maintaining battalion
supplies rests with Brigade Headquarters. The duties of the Brigade
Supply Officer will in no way be shared by the O.C. Tank Supply
Company. The Tank Supply Company will be used as a mobile reserve
of supplies under the immediate control of Brigade Headquarters.”
These supply companies were never used for carrying forward infantry,
as the Mark IX tank did not materialise until October 1918; they
proved, however, of the greatest use during all the tank operations of
the last year of the war.
During June the two Gun Carrier Companies were definitely converted
into Supply Companies and were attached to the 3rd and 5th Brigades. At
the battle of Hamel, on July 4, four of these machines did excellent
work, carrying forward between twenty and twenty-five tons of R.E.
material and dumping this a few hundred yards behind the final
objective within half an hour of this objective being captured. These
machines were driven by four officers and sixteen men, and had the
material they transported been brought up by carrier parties at least
1,200 men would have been required; in man-power alone these four
machines thus saved 1,184 soldiers, or approximately two infantry
battalions at battle strength.
On arrival in France the 1st and 2nd Supply Companies were posted to
the 1st and 4th Tank Brigades, and the 3rd, 4th, and 5th were sent to
Blingel Camp, in the Bermicourt area, where good facilities existed for
tank driving and maintenance. At about the end of July the 3rd and 5th
Companies were equipped with Mark IV supply tanks, and female Mark IV
machines fitted with a sledge equipment.
At the beginning of August the distribution of the various supply units
was as follows:
No. 1 Gun Carrier Company 5th Tank Brigade.
No. 2 Gun Carrier Company 3rd Tank Brigade.
No. 1 Tank Supply Company 1st Tank Brigade.
No. 2 Tank Supply Company 4th Tank Brigade.
No. 3 Tank Supply Company Blingel Camp.
No. 4 Tank Supply Company 2nd Tank Brigade.
No. 5 Tank Supply Company Blingel Camp.
All these companies, less No. 1 Tank Supply Company and No. 2 Gun
Carrier Company, took part in the battle of Amiens.
No. 1 Gun Carrier Company suffered an unfortunate experience on August
7. It had moved forward to an orchard on the western side of Villers
Bretonneux, each of its machines being loaded up with explosives of
various kinds. A shell fired from a German battery in the vicinity of
Chipilly set fire to one of the camouflage nets, and the result of
this was that though six out of the twenty-two machines got away the
remaining sixteen were blown up, the explosion being terrific.
The 3rd Tank Supply Company was allotted to the Canadian Corps to carry
forward infantry supplies such as grenades, S.A.A., and drinking water.
The female Mark IV. tanks equipped with sledges were attached to the
Canadian Engineers for the purpose of bringing forward material in
order to repair the bridges over the Luce river. Owing to weak cables
this operation proved a failure, most of these machines breaking down
before they had covered a mile.
The policy which was first adopted of attaching a section of six supply
tanks to each battalion did not work well, the Company Headquarters
was usually left in the air, and soon lost touch with its sections. In
order to remedy this defect from August 9 onwards company commanders
were instructed to establish “report centres” well in advance of the
battlefield. These centres were “baited” by sending the mails there;
to obtain news from home it was consequently necessary for section
commanders to send runners in to fetch them; by this means touch with
the Company Headquarters was automatically maintained.[29]
In the battles north of the Somme, commencing on August 21, much
useful work was carried out, the tank-drivers having by now become
thoroughly expert in driving and maintenance. The sections were now
properly brigaded, each company being looked upon as a unit and not
as a mere headquarters for four separate units. Proper telephonic
communication was now established between the sections and the company,
and consequently much time was saved not only within the company itself
but by the various units it was supplying.
During all the battles onwards from August 8 to the capture of
Landrecies the work carried out by the Tank Supply Companies and the
Gun Carrier Companies was not only useful but of great importance, as
in many places the roads were too bad for mechanical transport. When
they were not required to bring forward tank supplies they were engaged
in carrying every sort of ammunition and engineer stores, especially
through zones which were harassed by machine-gun fire and in which, had
infantry carrying parties been used, many lives would have been lost.
When the possibilities of these companies became realised, infantry
commanders were continually asking for their assistance, preference
being given to the gun-carriers on account of their greater capacity
for light stores.
The Gun Carrier Companies, besides doing excellent work as infantry
supply companies, kept both field and heavy artillery well supplied.
No. 2 Gun Carrier Company carried out some very successful heavy
sniping by carrying forward a 6 in. howitzer, and by moving it from
place to place during the night it both harassed and puzzled the
enemy. Besides this, several successful gas attacks were carried out
with the aid of the gun-carriers, which transported the projectors and
bombs to positions over country which wheeled transport could not have
negotiated. By using these machines it was possible to get in three or
more “shoots” in one night and to retire out of the danger zone before
dawn.
If in the days of the great Napoleon, when a soldier went into action
with frequently less than twenty balls in his pouch and a couple of
spare flints, an Army “crawled on its stomach,” how much more does
it crawl to-day! When the lessons of the war are sorted and tabulated
in order of importance, very near the top, if not at the top itself,
will be found that of “road capacity,” in other words, that victory
rests with the side which can maintain the broadest communications.
To widen existing roads directly by enlarging them or to construct
new roads are both works of great labour; they absorb not only time
and men but also transport of every kind, especially in a country
like north-eastern France, where suitable stone for road-metalling is
practically non-existent. To do so indirectly is best accomplished by
a cross-country tractor, that is, by a machine which can move on or
off a road. With such a machine roads can be indefinitely widened;
paradoxically they cease to exist, for they are no longer necessary.
The tank is, first of all, a cross-country tractor, and it is curious
that none of the contending nations appear to have appreciated this
until well towards the end of the war, in spite of the fact that the
reason for the general slowness of the advances which followed any
initial success was nearly always due to inadequacy of supply.
By the end of March 1918 the German attack “petered out” for want
of supplies; by the end of May it again did likewise for a similar
reason. Had the Germans possessed on March 21 and May 27 5,000 to 6,000
efficient cross-country tractors, each of which could have carried five
tons of supplies, all the hosts of brave men, which the United States
of America could have poured into France, could not have prevented a
separation of the British and French Armies from being effected. Had
such a separation taken place it is impossible to say what the result
might not have been; but what is possible to say is that had the
Germans “scrapped” half their guns and replaced them by cross-country
tractors they would have gone nearer winning the war than they did.