THE SECOND BATTLE OF GAZA
On account of the assistance rendered to the British infantry by tanks
during the battle of the Somme a decision was arrived at in England to
despatch a number of these machines to Egypt to assist our troops in
the Sinai peninsula, especially in the neighbourhood of El Arish, south
of the Turkish frontier. The number originally decided on was twelve,
but this was eventually cut down to eight, and, through an unfortunate
error, old experimental machines were sent out instead of new ones as
intended.
The detachment, under the command of Major N. Nutt, consisted of 22
officers and 226 other ranks drawn from the original E Company, and
together with its tanks, workshops, and transport, it embarked at
Devonport and Avonmouth in December 1916, arriving in Egypt during the
following month.
Demonstrations and schemes were at once arranged for so that the staffs
of the various fighting formations could witness what tanks were able
to accomplish. These schemes were carried out on the sand dunes near
Gilban, some ten miles north of Kantara on the Suez Canal.
In February,[22] orders were suddenly received one day for the
detachment to move with all possible speed to the fighting zone. This
was carried out, and within three hours of receiving the orders the
entire detachment, with tanks and accessories, had entrained at Gilban,
and was speeding northwards towards the area of operations. Next day a
delay occurred at El Arish, which the day previously had been captured
by the Australians; but, the same evening, the train proceeded to Rafa,
a frontier town, which had only just been evacuated by the Turks, and
early next morning reached Khan Yunus, some fifteen miles south-west
of Gaza, an old Crusader stronghold surrounded by vast fig groves and
other vegetation; here the detachment remained for ten days.
During this halt the First Battle of Gaza had come to an end, our
troops having been obliged to retire and take up a position to
the south of the town owing to the appearance of strong Turkish
reinforcements from the direction of Beersheba; these threatened the
British communications.
Hostilities now ceased and preparations were begun for the Second
Battle of Gaza, which was to prove one of the fiercest contests of the
war in its eastern theatre. For this battle, early in March, the Tank
Detachment moved from Khan Yunus to Deir el Belah.
The Turkish Army at this period, numbering some 30,000 men, was
disposed along a sixteen-mile front extending from Gaza south-eastwards
to Hareira and Shekia. The British plan of operations was as follows:
The G.O.C. Desert Column was entrusted with the operations against the
Hareira front, protecting the right flank, whilst the task of seizing
the important ridges of Sheikh Abbas and Mansara, both commanding Gaza
and situated to the south of this town, was assigned to the 52nd, 53rd,
and 54th Divisions; the 74th Division remaining in general reserve.
The tanks of the detachment, which had been held in G.H.Q. reserve,
were now allotted to divisions as follows:
(i) 53rd Division, operating from the sea to the Cairo road, running
through Romani trench: two tanks which were to be held in reserve until
the infantry had advanced to the line--Red House-Tel El Ajjul-Money
House-the coast.
(ii) 52nd Division, operating from Kurd valley to Wadi El Nukhabir:
four tanks to support the infantry attack on the Mansara ridge.
(iii) 54th Division, operating on a front extending from 500 yards west
of Abbas ridge to the Gaza-Beersheba road: two tanks to support the
infantry attack on the Sheikh Abbas ridge.
Z day was to be April 17. Two days prior to this the eight tanks left
Deir El Belah after dusk, two proceeding over the Druid ridge through
St. James’s Park, thence by Tel El Nujeid across the Wadi Ghuzze to
Money hill; four from Deir El Belah in an easterly direction through
Piccadilly Circus over the prominent ridge of In Seirat, then eastwards
to Sheikh Nebhan on the Wadi Ghuzze; two followed the same route as
far as In Seirat, and from there made for a point south-east of Sheikh
Nebhan.
All eight tanks reached their positions of assembly before dawn without
mishap and in good condition. Meanwhile ammunition and supply dumps had
been established at various spots close to the Wadi Ghuzze.
In the battle which now ensued the position of the tanks in relation
to the infantry varied according to the nature of the ground and the
resistance of the enemy. The attacks of the 53rd and 52nd Divisions
came as a complete surprise, the two tanks allotted to the former moved
to a position south of Money hill on the evening of the first day, and
the four with the latter reached a point south of the Mansara ridge.
None of these machines came into action as the Turks retired from their
trenches and strongholds in complete confusion. On the 54th Division’s
front both of the tanks allotted to this Division came into action;
one, however, received a direct hit and was destroyed, but the other
did good work in clearing the enemy’s trenches north-west of the Abbas
ridge, killing many Turks and enabling our infantry to occupy these
defences.
On the evening of April 17, the three attacking divisions entrenched
themselves on the line running approximately from Marine View, on
the coast, through Heart hill-Kurd hill-Mansara-Abbas, and thence
south-east to Atawineh ridge. A pause of forty-eight hours now took
place wherein to prepare for the second phase of the battle.
[Illustration: THE SECOND & THIRD BATTLES OF GAZA
17th April 1917 & 1st November 1917.]
On the morning of April 19, this second phase opened. The Australian
Corps, on the right flank, was to deliver an attack on the eastern
defences of Gaza, whilst the 52nd, 53rd, and 54th Divisions were to
constitute the main attack, and to advance on a line running from
the coast to the stronghold of Ali El Muntar. Battleships were to
co-operate in this attack.
Tanks were allotted to Divisions as follows:
(i) 53rd Division, objective--Mazar trench to Sheikh Redwam; one
tank to assist in the capture of Sampson ridge, El Arish and Sheikh
Redwam redoubts, and one tank to operate against Sheikh Ajlin,
Belah-Yunus-Rafa-Zowaiid-El Burs trenches and to await further orders
at El Arish trench.
(ii) 52nd Division, objective--the enemy’s trenches from Queen’s hill
to Ali El Muntar. For this operation four tanks were allotted, and
their objectives, which were Outpost hill, the Labyrinth, the Warren
and Ali El Muntar, were changed during the night of the 18th-19th. This
resulted in considerable confusion. According to the change one tank
was to precede the assault on Green hill, one to clear Lees hill and
Outpost hill, and the remaining two to be kept in reserve at Kurd hill.
(iii) 54th Division, objective--Kirbet El Sihan and El Sire-Ali El
Muntar ridge as far as Australia hill; one tank to seize the redoubt
west of Kirbet El Sihan.
From the above it will be seen a good deal was expected of the tanks,
in fact these seven machines were to tackle a problem which in France
would have been considered distinctly formidable for two complete
battalions.
Of the two tanks with the 53rd Division one broke its track,
consequently the other--the Tiger--led the advance alone and drove the
enemy from Sampson ridge, which was then occupied by our infantry; it
then proceeded to El Arish redoubt, but, the infantry being unable to
follow, after six hours’ action, during which it fired 27,000 rounds of
S.A.A., it withdrew to Regent’s Park, all its crew having been wounded.
On the front of the 52nd Division a desperate battle took place: the
tank operating against Lees hill and Outpost hill fell into a gully,
the sides of which unexpectedly collapsed. Its place was taken by the
tank detailed for Green hill; Outpost hill was reached and cleared,
when this machine received a direct hit.
The enemy’s machine-gun fire was now intense, so one of the reserve
tanks was ordered up. After desperate losses the infantry eventually
captured the hill, only to be driven off it by a counter-attack; they
then withdrew to a line passing east and west through Queen’s hill,
the reserve tank withdrawing at the same time to Kurd hill. In the
attack delivered by the remaining division, the 54th, no better luck
was experienced. The one machine working with this division moved on
the great redoubt north-west of Kirbet El Sihan, and reaching this
work the Turkish garrison surrendered. The infantry then took over the
position. Shortly after this a direct hit broke one of the tracks of
this tank, and a counter-attack eventually resulted in its capture with
the infantry who had occupied the redoubt.
In spite of the fact that this battle was unsuccessful, the work
carried out by the Tank Detachment constitutes a remarkable feat of
arms. The tanks engaged were Mark I’s and II’s, which, by the time
the battle was ended, had each covered on an average some 40 miles
of country. Reconnaissance, due to want of time, was practically
non-existent, and the limitations of the tank were not understood
by the infantry commanders, who expected miracles from a far from
perfect machine. The objectives allotted were not only difficult, but
too numerous, yet in spite of this the protection which these eight
tanks afforded the attacking infantry on a five-mile frontage was
considerable and fully appreciated; it was, however, quite inadequate
on account of the hundreds of ingeniously hidden machine-guns, to which
the Turks mainly owed their victory.