TANK BATTLE RECORDS
In order to record the personal experiences of each tank Crew
Commander in battle, and to collect statistics as to the work of the
tanks themselves, shortly before the battle of Arras was fought, a
form was introduced known as a “Tank Battle History Sheet.” These
sheets were issued to Crew Commanders prior to an engagement, were
filled in by them after its completion and, eventually, forwarded
to Tank Corps Headquarters, where they were summarised by the Tank
Corps General Staff. By this means it was possible to collect many
valuable experiences from the soldiers themselves, information which
unfortunately so frequently is apt to evaporate when the final battle
report starts on its journey from one headquarters to the next.
Outside the material value of these reports they frequently possessed
a psychological value, and by reading them with a little insight it
was possible to gauge, with fair accuracy, the moral of the fighting
men, an “atmosphere” so difficult to breathe when in rear of the battle
line, so impossible to create, and yet so necessary to the mental
health of the General Staff and the Higher Command.
This system of record, initiated at the battle of Arras, was maintained
in the Tank Corps up to the conclusion of the war, many hundreds of
these brief histories being written. The following are taken, almost at
random, from those made out during the above-mentioned battle, and are
fair examples of early tank fighting.
BATTLE HISTORY OF CREW NO. D.6. TANK NO. 505. DATE 9/4/17.
COMMANDED BY LIEUTENANT A----
Unit to which attached 14th Division.
Hour the tank started for action 6.20 a.m., April 9, 1917.
Hour of zero 5.30 a.m. (14th Division attacking
at 7.30 a.m.).
Extent and nature of hostile Increasing as tank worked
shell fire along Hindenburg Line.
Ammunition expended 3,500 rounds S.A.A.
Casualties Nil.
Position of tank after action Caught in large tank trap
and struck by shell fire.
Condition of tank after action Damaged by shell fire.
_Orders received._--To attack Telegraph hill with infantry of 14th
Division at 7.30 a.m. on April 9, 1917, then proceed along Hindenburg
Line to Neuville Vitasse. To wait at rallying-point N.E. of Neuville
Vitasse until infantry advanced again towards Wancourt. To proceed with
infantry to Wancourt and assist them wherever necessary.
_Report of action._--Tank left starting-point at Beaurains at
6.30 a.m., on April 9, 1917, crossed our front line at 7.27 a.m.,
attacking Telegraph hill with the infantry at 7.30 a.m.; then worked
towards Neuville Vitasse along the Hindenburg Line. At a point about
1,000 yards N.E. of Neuville Vitasse, the tank was caught in a trap
consisting of a large gun-pit carefully covered with turf. I and
Sergeant B---- immediately got out and went to guide other tanks clear
of the trap in spite of M.G. and shell fire.
(Signed) A----, Lieut.,
O.C. Tank D.6.
BATTLE HISTORY OF CREW NO. D.9. TANK NO. 770. DATE 9/4/17.
COMMANDED BY 2ND LIEUTENANT C----
Unit to which attached 30th Division.
Hour the tank started for action 4.45 a.m.
Hour of zero 5.30 a.m.
Extent and nature of hostile Very severe from the moment
shell fire of entry into enemy lines.
Ammunition expended Unknown.
Casualties Corporal wounded, since
sent to hospital.
Position of tank after action Ditched in C.T. near Neuville
Vitasse trench.
Condition of tank after action Ditched but sound.
_Orders received._--To proceed from Mercatel to the Zoo trench system
through the Cojeul switch to Nepal trench, from thence with the
infantry to Wancourt.
_Report of action._--Owing to mechanical trouble tank was delayed
in coming into action. Having rectified this, I proceeded to join
D.10--D.11 as ordered.
I eventually found these tanks out of action and proceeded alone to a
further line of trenches, where I met with decidedly severe hostile
machine-gun and shell fire. I consider we were successful in quelling
one of the many sniper posts, but on account of being ditched were
prevented from proceeding. It would appear, however, that the presence
of my tank--it being on the right flank of our infantry, which was
up in the air--was a deterrent to the enemy, of whom small bodies
were still in existence in the vicinity. I caused my 6-pounders to
be manned, and we held our position for three days, when the tank
was eventually got out of her position. As a whole, the crew worked
together well and cheerfully, but I would especially commend Corporal
D---- for unfailing cheerfulness and devotion to duty under very trying
and disappointing circumstances.
(Signed) C----, 2nd Lieut.,
O.C. Tank D.9.
BATTLE HISTORY OF CREW NO. D.4. TANK NO. 783. DATE 23/4/17.
COMMANDED BY LIEUTENANT E----
Unit to which attached 50th Division (4th Battalion
Yorks. Regt.).
Hour the tank started for action 3.30 a.m.
Hour of zero 4.45 a.m.
Extent and nature of hostile Shell fire heavy, practically
shell fire no shrapnel. Machine-gun
fire not excessive.
Ammunition expended Approximately 40 rounds
(6-pounder).
Casualties Nil.
Position of tank after action 0.19.b.05 (approx.).
Condition of tank after action Unserviceable: both tracks
broken, probably other
damage from direct hits;
also on fire.
_Orders received._--To attack enemy strong point at 0.19.a.07 as
my first objective, then to proceed to banks in 0.19.b. and return
with the infantry until the Blue Line was consolidated, as my second
objective.
My third objective was to conform with an advance by the infantry at
zero plus seven hours, and to attack a tangle of trenches in 0.21.a.
& b. just in advance of the Red Line. It was eventually left to my
decision as to the possibility of attempting this third objective.
_Report of action._--Advanced with infantry, but owing to heavy mist
had great difficulty in following exact route. Reached first objective
at 5.20 a.m., having approached it from the river side. Successfully
dealt with several of the enemy on left bank of river, causing them
to retire. Cruised about until joined by tank No. 522, D. 3. Then
proceeded towards second objective. On the way I saw our infantry
retiring, went ahead to stop enemy advance. Whilst going forward I
saw Lieutenant F----’s tank, which was then off its route. Lieutenant
F---- came out of his tank and informed me that he had lost his way. I
redirected him, and he then rejoined his tank. Almost immediately after
this (approx. 6.30 a.m.) both tanks came under direct anti-tank gun and
machine-gun fire. The latter was silenced by my left 6-pounder gun.
I manœuvred to present as small a target as possible to the former.
The tank, however, received about six direct hits, which damaged both
tracks, set alight the spare petrol carried in box in rear of tank,
and possibly caused other serious damage. The whole crew succeeded in
escaping from the tank unhurt. Position of tank as stated.
I then returned to Coy. H.Q. and reported.
(Signed) E----, Lieut.,
O.C. Tank D.4.
BATTLE HISTORY OF CREW NO. D.10. TANK NO. 784. DATE 23/4/17.
COMMANDED BY 2ND LIEUTENANT G----
Unit to which attached 98th Infantry Brigade.
Hour the tank started for action 4.45 a.m.
Hour of zero 4.45 a.m.
Extent and nature of hostile First three hours artillery fire
shell fire not very heavy, but from then
very heavy fire until
rallying-point was reached.
No direct fire by anti-tank
guns.
Ammunition expended 290 rounds 6-pounder, remainder
on tank could not be used
owing to the shells sticking
in shell casings on tank. Eight
pans for Lewis-gun ammunition.
Casualties Nil.
Position of tank after action Factory Croisilles, 12 noon.
Condition of tank after action Good--only required refilling
and greasing.
_Orders received._--To advance from starting-point on British front
line at T.4.b.4.5 to Hindenburg Line at point T.6.a.0.5, from which
point infantry were to bomb along Hindenburg Line (front and support)
to river Sensée at U.7.a.4.4. Tank to assist infantry and after
objective at river taken to proceed to Croisilles.
_Report of action._--I started from starting-point at T.4.b.4.5 at
zero, and made for Hindenburg wire at T.6.a.0.5, crossing same and
getting into touch with our infantry, from whom I received report
that they were held up by machine-guns along the trench. I proceeded
to this point and cleared the obstacle. I then travelled parallel to
the trench, knocking out machine-gun emplacements and snipers’ posts
all the way down to point U.1.c.5.0. The infantry kept in touch all
the way down, moving slightly in rear of tank, and after emplacements
were knocked out they took the occupants prisoners. In two cases white
flags were hoisted as soon as the emplacement was hit. The shooting
was very good. Up to point U.1.c.5.0 the shelling had been casual, but
when we reached the N. bank of the sunken road at this point and were
firing into emplacements towards the river we were in full observation
from the village and the artillery fire became very heavy. The supply
of 6-pounder ammunition now became exhausted, and the ground on the
S. side of sunken road being very bad, I decided to move back along
the trench and then crossed the wire, and crossing sunken road at
about T.12.b.5.3, made for rallying-point at Factory at Croisilles,
where I arrived at 12 noon. I was shelled heavily all the way back to
the rallying-point, but no damage was done. I was of opinion that the
Hindenburg front line was too bad (wide) to cross, and so could not
deal with support line and was unable to observe this line from front
line. I sent two pigeon messages at 9.30 a.m. and 12 noon. I had only
one message clip, so had to fasten second message with cotton.
(Signed) G----, 2nd Lieut.,
O.C. Tank D. 10.
BATTLE HISTORY OF CREW NO. 9. TANK NO. 716. DATE 23/4/17.
COMMANDED BY 2ND LIEUTENANT H----
Unit to which attached 51st Division.
Hour the tank started for action 5.12 a.m.
Hour of zero 4.15 a.m.
Extent and nature of hostile Severe.
shell fire
Ammunition expended About 220 6-pounder; 14
drums L.G.
Casualties Four.
Position of tank after action H.24.b.3.9. (Sheet 51B).
Condition of tank after action Bellied, right track very
slack.
_Orders received._--To clear Mount Pleasant wood, Rœux, and northern
edge of village.
_Report of action._--Time allowed for tanks from deployment point to
starting-point proved to be insufficient, which delayed my start some
twenty minutes. Having learnt that the other car which was operating
with me was “out of action,” I made my way alone to the railway arch,
where I was held up some few minutes owing to a number of stretcher
cases which had to be removed, and a sand-bag barricade which I could
not push down.
I soon caught up the infantry, who were held up by machine-gun fire in
Mount Pleasant wood. At their request I altered my course and made for
the northern side of the wood running parallel with the trench which we
held at the south of the wood, and which the enemy held at the north.
I was told that a bombing party would follow me up the trench.
Having cleared this wood, I pushed on towards the village of Rœux,
where I again met the infantry who had come round the other side of
Mount Pleasant wood, where they were again held up by machine-gun fire
which came from the buildings.
Our barrage could only have been very slight, to judge from the
comparatively small amount of damage which was done to the buildings.
Here I used 200 rounds of 6-pounder ammunition.
It is difficult to estimate with any accuracy the number of
machine-guns actually “put out.” One of my best targets was a party of
some thirty men whom we drove out of a house with 6-pounders, and then
sprayed with Lewis-gun fire.
I am sure that at least one 6-pounder shell dropped amongst these--this
made a distinct impression.
Another target that presented itself was a party of men coming towards
us. I do not know whether they intended giving themselves up or whether
they were a bombing party--I took them for the latter.
Parties were frequently seen coming up from the rear, through gaps in
the buildings.
Twice an enemy officer rallied some dozen or so men and rushed a house
that we had already cleared. Here again a 6-pounder through the window
disposed of any of the enemy remaining in the buildings.
In regard to the machine-guns in the wood, we could only locate them
by little puffs of smoke at which we fired our 6-pounders. We did not
take our departure until these puffs had disappeared, and there was in
consequence reasonable ground to suppose that the guns had been knocked
out. Finally our infantry reached the village. Apparently there was no
officer commanding our infantry in this part of the line.
I then moved towards Rœux wood and learnt of a sniper still left in
Mount Pleasant wood and a machine-gun, which was causing great trouble,
on the railway embankment, and I then made my way back to the railway
arch with a view to running parallel with the embankment towards the
station, but unfortunately my car bellied in the very marshy ground by
the canal.
With regard to casualties, it is my opinion that I was in the district
sufficiently long enough, some three hours, to enable the enemy to send
for a supply of armour-piercing bullets. All four of my crew were hit
whilst in the car.
The Lewis-gun mountings were bad, many targets were lost owing to the
time it took to mount the gun, and finally we mounted the gun through
the front flaps. The flap of the present mounting does not rise high
enough to clear the foresight.
Both the 6-pounder guns worked splendidly, only giving one misfire
the whole time. There was no hostile shelling of any kind in the
village of Rœux or immediately in the district where I was operating,
but the enemy barrage falling round the railway was of a very severe
nature. When I found that it was impossible for me to proceed towards
the railway station, I sent off a pigeon message at the request of
an O.C. requesting that one of the cars operating in the Chemical
Works district should be detailed to deal with the machine-gun on the
embankment.
I cannot speak too highly of the efficiency and general work of the
crew.
I have handed two German diaries, which came into my possession, to the
Company Intelligence Officer.
(Signed) H----, 2nd Lieut.,
O.C. Tank No. 716.