PRESENT FORCES AND TENDENCIES IN THE FAR EAST
The Far Eastern situation is so complex that it is very difficult to
guess what will be the ultimate outcome of the Washington Conference,
and still more difficult to know what outcome we ought to desire. I will
endeavour to set forth the various factors each in turn, not simplifying
the issues, but rather aiming at producing a certain hesitancy which I
regard as desirable in dealing with China. I shall consider successively
the interests and desires of America, Japan, Russia and China, with an
attempt, in each case, to gauge what parts of these various interests
and desires are compatible with the welfare of mankind as a whole.[86]
I begin with America, as the leading spirit in the Conference and the
dominant Power in the world. American public opinion is in favour of
peace, and at the same time profoundly persuaded that America is wise
and virtuous while all other Powers are foolish and wicked. The
pessimistic half of this opinion I do not desire to dispute, but the
optimistic half is more open to question. Apart from peace, American
public opinion believes in commerce and industry, Protestant morality,
athletics, hygiene, and hypocrisy, which may be taken as the main
ingredients of American and English Kultur. Every American I met in the
Far East, with one exception, was a missionary for American Kultur,
whether nominally connected with Christian Missions or not. I ought to
explain that when I speak of hypocrisy I do not mean the conscious
hypocrisy practised by Japanese diplomats in their dealings with Western
Powers, but that deeper, unconscious kind which forms the chief strength
of the Anglo-Saxons. Everybody knows Labouchere's comment on Mr.
Gladstone, that like other politicians he always had a card up his
sleeve, but, unlike the others, he thought the Lord had put it there.
This attitude, which has been characteristic of England, has been
somewhat chastened among ourselves by the satire of men like Bernard
Shaw; but in America it is still just as prevalent and self-confident as
it was with us fifty years ago. There is much justification for such an
attitude. Gladstonian England was more of a moral force than the England
of the present day; and America is more of a moral force at this moment
than any other Power (except Russia). But the development from
Gladstone's moral fervour to the cynical imperialism of his successors
is one which we can now see to be inevitable; and a similar development
is bound to take place in the United States. Therefore, when we wish to
estimate the desirability of extending the influence of the United
States, we have to take account of this almost certain future loss of
idealism.
Nor is idealism in itself always an unmixed blessing to its victims. It
is apt to be incompatible with tolerance, with the practice of
live-and-let-live, which alone can make the world endurable for its less
pugnacious and energetic inhabitants. It is difficult for art or the
contemplative outlook to exist in an atmosphere of bustling practical
philanthropy, as difficult as it would be to write a book in the middle
of a spring cleaning. The ideals which inspire a spring-cleaning are
useful and valuable in their place, but when they are not enriched by
any others they are apt to produce a rather bleak and uncomfortable sort
of world.
All this may seem, at first sight, somewhat remote from the Washington
Conference, but it is essential if we are to take a just view of the
friction between America and Japan. I wish to admit at once that,
hitherto, America has been the best friend of China, and Japan the worst
enemy. It is also true that America is doing more than any other Power
to promote peace in the world, while Japan would probably favour war if
there were a good prospect of victory. On these grounds, I am glad to
see our Government making friends with America and abandoning the
militaristic Anglo-Japanese Alliance. But I do not wish this to be done
in a spirit of hostility to Japan, or in a blind reliance upon the
future good intentions of America. I shall therefore try to state
Japan's case, although, _for the present_, I think it weaker than
America's.
It should be observed, in the first place, that the present American
policy, both in regard to China and in regard to naval armaments, while
clearly good for the world, is quite as clearly in line with American
interests. To take the naval question first: America, with a navy equal
to our own, will be quite strong enough to make our Admiralty understand
that it is out of the question to go to war with America, so that
America will have as much control of the seas as there is any point in
having.[87] The Americans are adamant about the Japanese Navy, but very
pliant about French submarines, which only threaten us. Control of the
seas being secured, limitation of naval armaments merely decreases the
cost, and is an equal gain to all parties, involving no sacrifice of
American interests. To take next the question of China: American
ambitions in China are economic, and require only that the whole country
should be open to the commerce and industry of the United States. The
policy of spheres of influence is obviously less advantageous, to so
rich and economically strong a country as America, than the policy of
the universal Open Door. We cannot therefore regard America's liberal
policy as regards China and naval armaments as any reason for expecting
a liberal policy when it goes against self-interest.
In fact, there is evidence that when American interests or prejudices
are involved liberal and humanitarian principles have no weight
whatever. I will cite two instances: Panama tolls, and Russian trade. In
the matter of the Panama canal, America is bound by treaty not to
discriminate against our shipping; nevertheless a Bill has been passed
by a two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives, making a
discrimination in favour of American shipping. Even if the President
ultimately vetoes it, its present position shows that at least
two-thirds of the House of Representatives share Bethmann-Hollweg's view
of treaty obligations. And as for trade with Russia, England led the
way, while American hostility to the Bolsheviks remained implacable, and
to this day Gompers, in the name of American labour, thunders against
"shaking hands with murder." It cannot therefore be said that America is
_always_ honourable or humanitarian or liberal. The evidence is that
America adopts these virtues when they suit national or rather financial
interests, but fails to perceive their applicability in other cases.
I could of course have given many other instances, but I content myself
with one, because it especially concerns China. I quote from an American
weekly, The _Freeman_ (November 23, 1921, p. 244):--
On November 1st, the Chinese Government failed to meet an
obligation of $5,600,000, due and payable to a large
banking-house in Chicago. The State Department had facilitated
the negotiation of this loan in the first instance; and now, in
fulfilment of the promise of Governmental support in an
emergency, an official cablegram was launched upon Peking, with
intimations that continued defalcation might have a most serious
effect upon the financial and political rating of the Chinese
Republic. In the meantime, the American bankers of the new
international consortium had offered to advance to the Chinese
Government an amount which would cover the loan in default,
together with other obligations already in arrears, and still
others which will fall due on December 1st; and this proposal had
also received the full and energetic support of the Department of
State. That is to say, American financiers and politicians were
at one and the same time the heroes and villains of the piece;
having co-operated in the creation of a dangerous situation, they
came forward handsomely in the hour of trial with an offer to
save China from themselves as it were, if the Chinese Government
would only enter into relations with the consortium, and thus
prepare the way for the eventual establishment of an American
financial protectorate.
It should be added that the Peking Government, after repeated
negotiations, had decided not to accept loans from the consortium on the
terms on which they were offered. In my opinion, there were very
adequate grounds for this decision. As the same article in the _Freeman_
concludes:--
If this plan is put through, it will make the bankers of the
consortium the virtual owners of China; and among these bankers,
those of the United States are the only ones who are prepared to
take full advantage of the situation.
There is some reason to think that, at the beginning of the Washington
Conference, an attempt was made by the consortium banks, with the
connivance of the British but not of the American Government, to
establish, by means of the Conference, some measure of international
control over China. In the _Japan Weekly Chronicle_ for November 17,
1921 (p. 725), in a telegram headed "International Control of China," I
find it reported that America is thought to be seeking to establish
international control, and that Mr. Wellington Koo told the
_Philadelphia Public Ledger_: "We suspect the motives which led to the
suggestion and we thoroughly doubt its feasibility. China will bitterly
oppose any Conference plan to offer China international aid." He adds:
"International control will not do. China must be given time and
opportunity to find herself. The world should not misinterpret or
exaggerate the meaning of the convulsion which China is now passing
through." These are wise words, with which every true friend of China
must agree. In the same issue of the _Japan Weekly Chronicle_--which, by
the way, I consider the best weekly paper in the world--I find the
following (p. 728):--
Mr. Lennox Simpson [Putnam Weale] is quoted as saying: "The
international bankers have a scheme for the international control
of China. Mr. Lamont, representing the consortium, offered a
sixteen-million-dollar loan to China, which the Chinese
Government refused to accept because Mr. Lamont insisted that the
Hukuang bonds, German issue, which had been acquired by the
Morgan Company, should be paid out of it." Mr. Lamont, on hearing
this charge, made an emphatic denial, saying: "Simpson's
statement is unqualifiedly false. When this man Simpson talks
about resisting the control of the international banks he is
fantastic. We don't want control. We are anxious that the
Conference result in such a solution as will furnish full
opportunity to China to fulfil her own destiny."
Sagacious people will be inclined to conclude that so much anger must be
due to being touched on the raw, and that Mr. Lamont, if he had had
nothing to conceal, would not have spoken of a distinguished writer and
one of China's best friends as "this man Simpson."
I do not pretend that the evidence against the consortium is conclusive,
and I have not space here to set it all forth. But to any European
radical Mr. Lamont's statement that the consortium does not want control
reads like a contradiction in terms. Those who wish to lend to a
Government which is on the verge of bankruptcy, must aim at control,
for, even if there were not the incident of the Chicago Bank, it would
be impossible to believe that Messrs. Morgan are so purely philanthropic
as not to care whether they get any interest on their money or not,
although emissaries of the consortium in China have spoken as though
this were the case, thereby greatly increasing the suspicions of the
Chinese.
In the _New Republic_ for November 30, 1921, there is an article by Mr.
Brailsford entitled "A New Technique of Peace," which I fear is
prophetic even if not wholly applicable at the moment when it was
written. I expect to see, if the Americans are successful in the Far
East, China compelled to be orderly so as to afford a field for foreign
commerce and industry; a government which the West will consider good
substituted for the present go-as-you-please anarchy; a gradually
increasing flow of wealth from China to the investing countries, the
chief of which is America; the development of a sweated proletariat; the
spread of Christianity; the substitution of the American civilization
for the Chinese; the destruction of traditional beauty, except for such
_objets d'art_ as millionaires may think it worth while to buy; the
gradual awakening of China to her exploitation by the foreigner; and one
day, fifty or a hundred years hence, the massacre of every white man
throughout the Celestial Empire at a signal from some vast secret
society. All this is probably inevitable, human nature being what it is.
It will be done in order that rich men may grow richer, but we shall be
told that it is done in order that China may have "good" government. The
definition of the word "good" is difficult, but the definition of "good
government" is as easy as A.B.C.: it is government that yields fat
dividends to capitalists.
The Chinese are gentle, urbane, seeking only justice and freedom. They
have a civilization superior to ours in all that makes for human
happiness. They have a vigorous movement of young reformers, who, if
they are allowed a little time, will revivify China and produce
something immeasurably better than the worn-out grinding mechanism that
we call civilization. When Young China has done its work, Americans will
be able to make money by trading with China, without destroying the soul
of the country. China needs a period of anarchy in order to work out her
salvation; all great nations need such a period, from time to time. When
America went through such a period, in 1861-5, England thought of
intervening to insist on "good government," but fortunately abstained.
Now-a-days, in China, all the Powers want to intervene. Americans
recognize this in the case of the wicked Old World, but are smitten with
blindness when it comes to their own consortium. All I ask of them is
that they should admit that they are as other men, and cease to thank
God that they are not as this publican.
So much by way of criticism by America; we come now to the defence of
Japan.
Japan's relations with the Powers are not of her own seeking; all that
Japan asked of the world was to be let alone. This, however, did not
suit the white nations, among whom America led the way. It was a United
States squadron under Commodore Perry that first made Japan aware of
Western aggressiveness. Very soon it became evident that there were only
two ways of dealing with the white man, either to submit to him, or to
fight him with his own weapons. Japan adopted the latter course, and
developed a modern army trained by the Germans, a modern navy modelled
on the British, modern machinery derived from America, and modern
morals copied from the whole lot. Everybody except the British was
horrified, and called the Japanese "yellow monkeys." However, they began
to be respected when they defeated Russia, and after they had captured
Tsing-tao and half-enslaved China they were admitted to equality with
the other Great Powers at Versailles. The consideration shown to them by
the West is due to their armaments alone; none of their other good
qualities would have saved them from being regarded as "niggers."
People who have never been outside Europe can hardly imagine the
intensity of the colour prejudice that white men develop when brought
into contact with any different pigmentation. I have seen Chinese of the
highest education, men as cultured as (say) Dean Inge, treated by greasy
white men as if they were dirt, in a way in which, at home, no Duke
would venture to treat a crossing-sweeper. The Japanese are not treated
in this way, because they have a powerful army and navy. The fact that
white men, as individuals, no longer dare to bully individual Japanese,
is important as a beginning of better relations towards the coloured
races in general. If the Japanese, by defeat in war, are prevented from
retaining the status of a Great Power, the coloured races in general
will suffer, and the tottering insolence of the white man will be
re-established. Also the world will have lost the last chance of the
survival of civilizations of a different type from that of the
industrial West.
The civilization of Japan, in its material aspect, is similar to that of
the West, though industrialism, as yet, is not very developed. But in
its mental aspect it is utterly unlike the West, particularly the
Anglo-Saxon West. Worship of the Mikado, as an actually divine being,
is successfully taught in every village school, and provides the popular
support for nationalism. The nationalistic aims of Japan are not merely
economic; they are also dynastic and territorial in a mediæval way. The
morality of the Japanese is not utilitarian, but intensely idealistic.
Filial piety is the basis, and includes patriotism, because the Mikado
is the father of his people. The Japanese outlook has the same kind of
superstitious absence of realism that one finds in thirteenth-century
theories as to the relations of the Emperor and the Pope. But in Europe
the Emperor and the Pope were different people, and their quarrels
promoted freedom of thought; in Japan, since 1868, they are combined in
one sacred person, and there are no internal conflicts to produce doubt.
Japan, unlike China, is a religious country. The Chinese doubt a
proposition until it is proved to be true; the Japanese believe it until
it is proved to be false. I do not know of any evidence against the view
that the Mikado is divine. Japanese religion is essentially
nationalistic, like that of the Jews in the Old Testament. Shinto, the
State religion, has been in the main invented since 1868,[88] and
propagated by education in schools. (There was of course an old Shinto
religion, but most of what constitutes modern Shintoism is new.) It is
not a religion which aims at being universal, like Buddhism,
Christianity, and Islam; it is a tribal religion, only intended to
appeal to the Japanese. Buddhism subsists side by side with it, and is
believed by the same people. It is customary to adopt Shinto rites for
marriages and Buddhist rites for funerals, because Buddhism is
considered more suitable for mournful occasions. Although Buddhism is a
universal religion, its Japanese form is intensely national,[89] like
the Church of England. Many of its priests marry, and in some temples
the priesthood is hereditary. Its dignitaries remind one vividly of
English Archdeacons.
The Japanese, even when they adopt industrial methods, do not lose their
sense of beauty. One hears complaints that their goods are shoddy, but
they have a remarkable power of adapting artistic taste to
industrialism. If Japan were rich it might produce cities as beautiful
as Venice, by methods as modern as those of New York. Industrialism has
hitherto brought with it elsewhere a rising tide of ugliness, and any
nation which can show us how to make this tide recede deserves our
gratitude.
The Japanese are earnest, passionate, strong-willed, amazingly hard
working, and capable of boundless sacrifice to an ideal. Most of them
have the correlative defects: lack of humour, cruelty, intolerance, and
incapacity for free thought. But these defects are by no means
universal; one meets among them a certain number of men and women of
quite extraordinary excellence. And there is in their civilization as a
whole a degree of vigour and determination which commands the highest
respect.
The growth of industrialism in Japan has brought with it the growth of
Socialism and the Labour movement.[90] In China, the intellectuals are
often theoretical Socialists, but in the absence of Labour
organizations there is as yet little room for more than theory. In
Japan, Trade Unionism has made considerable advances, and every variety
of socialist and anarchist opinion is vigorously represented. In time,
if Japan becomes increasingly industrial, Socialism may become a
political force; as yet, I do not think it is. Japanese Socialists
resemble those of other countries, in that they do not share the
national superstitions. They are much persecuted by the Government, but
not so much as Socialists in America--so at least I am informed by an
American who is in a position to judge.
The real power is still in the hands of certain aristocratic families.
By the constitution, the Ministers of War and Marine are directly
responsible to the Mikado, not to the Diet or the Prime Minister. They
therefore can and do persist in policies which are disliked by the
Foreign Office. For example, if the Foreign Office were to promise the
evacuation of Vladivostok, the War Office might nevertheless decide to
keep the soldiers there, and there would be no constitutional remedy.
Some part, at least, of what appears as Japanese bad faith is explicable
in this way. There is of course a party which wishes to establish real
Parliamentary government, but it is not likely to come into power unless
the existing régime suffers some severe diplomatic humiliation. If the
Washington Conference had compelled the evacuation of not only Shantung
but also Vladivostok by diplomatic pressure, the effect on the internal
government of Japan would probably have been excellent.
The Japanese are firmly persuaded that they have no friends, and that
the Americana are their implacable foes. One gathers that the
Government regards war with America as unavoidable in the long run. The
argument would be that the economic imperialism of the United States
will not tolerate the industrial development of a formidable rival in
the Pacific, and that sooner or later the Japanese will be presented
with the alternative of dying by starvation or on the battlefield. Then
Bushido will come into play, and will lead to choice of the battlefield
in preference to starvation. Admiral Sato[91] (the Japanese Bernhardi,
as he is called) maintains that absence of Bushido in the Americans will
lead to their defeat, and that their money-grubbing souls will be
incapable of enduring the hardships and privations of a long war. This,
of course, is romantic nonsense. Bushido is no use in modern war, and
the Americans are quite as courageous and obstinate as the Japanese. A
war might last ten years, but it would certainly end in the defeat of
Japan.
One is constantly reminded of the situation between England and Germany
in the years before 1914. The Germans wanted to acquire a colonial
empire by means similar to those which we had employed; so do the
Japanese. We considered such methods wicked when employed by foreigners;
so do the Americans. The Germans developed their industries and roused
our hostility by competition; the Japanese are similarly competing with
America in Far Eastern markets. The Germans felt themselves encircled by
our alliances, which we regarded as purely defensive; the Japanese,
similarly, found themselves isolated at Washington (except for French
sympathy) since the superior diplomatic skill of the Americans has
brought us over to their side. The Germans at last, impelled by terrors
largely of their own creation, challenged the whole world, and fell; it
is very much to be feared that Japan may do likewise. The pros and cons
are so familiar in the case of Germany that I need not elaborate them
further, since the whole argument can be transferred bodily to the case
of Japan. There is, however, this difference, that, while Germany aimed
at hegemony of the whole world, the Japanese only aim at hegemony in
Eastern Asia.
The conflict between America and Japan is superficially economic, but,
as often happens, the economic rivalry is really a cloak for deeper
passions. Japan still believes in the divine right of kings; America
believes in the divine right of commerce. I have sometimes tried to
persuade Americans that there may be nations which will not gain by an
extension of their foreign commerce, but I have always found the attempt
futile. The Americans believe also that their religion and morality and
culture are far superior to those of the Far East. I regard this as a
delusion, though one shared by almost all Europeans. The Japanese,
profoundly and with all the strength of their being, long to preserve
their own culture and to avoid becoming like Europeans or Americans; and
in this I think we ought to sympathize with them. The colour prejudice
is even more intense among Americans than among Europeans; the Japanese
are determined to prove that the yellow man may be the equal of the
white man. In this, also, justice and humanity are on the side of Japan.
Thus on the deeper issues, which underlie the economic and diplomatic
conflict, my feelings go with the Japanese rather than with the
Americans.
Unfortunately, the Japanese are always putting themselves in the wrong
through impatience and contempt. They ought to have claimed for China
the same consideration that they have extorted towards themselves; then
they could have become, what they constantly profess to be, the
champions of Asia against Europe. The Chinese are prone to gratitude,
and would have helped Japan loyally if Japan had been a true friend to
them. But the Japanese despise the Chinese more than the Europeans do;
they do not want to destroy the belief in Eastern inferiority, but only
to be regarded as themselves belonging to the West. They have therefore
behaved so as to cause a well-deserved hatred of them in China. And this
same behaviour has made the best Americans as hostile to them as the
worst. If America had had none but base reasons for hostility to them,
they would have found many champions in the United States; as it is,
they have practically none. It is not yet too late; it is still possible
for them to win the affection of China and the respect of the best
Americans. To achieve this, they would have to change their Chinese
policy and adopt a more democratic constitution; but if they do not
achieve it, they will fall as Germany fell. And their fall will be a
great misfortune for mankind.
A war between America and Japan would be a very terrible thing in
itself, and a still more terrible thing in its consequences. It would
destroy Japanese civilization, ensure the subjugation of China to
Western culture, and launch America upon a career of world-wide
militaristic imperialism. It is therefore, at all costs, to be avoided.
If it is to be avoided, Japan must become more liberal; and Japan will
only become more liberal if the present régime is discredited by
failure. Therefore, in the interests of Japan no less than in the
interests of China, it would be well if Japan were forced, by the joint
diplomatic pressure of England and America, to disgorge, not only
Shantung, but also all of Manchuria except Port Arthur and its immediate
neighbourhood. (I make this exception because I think nothing short of
actual war would lead the Japanese to abandon Port Arthur.) Our Alliance
with Japan, since the end of the Russo-Japanese war, has been an
encouragement to Japan in all that she has done amiss. Not that Japan
has been worse than we have, but that certain kinds of crime are only
permitted to very great Powers, and have been committed by the Japanese
at an earlier stage of their career than prudence would warrant. Our
Alliance has been a contributory cause of Japan's mistakes, and the
ending of the Alliance is a necessary condition of Japanese reform.
We come now to Russia's part in the Chinese problem. There is a tendency
in Europe to regard Russia as decrepit, but this is a delusion. True,
millions are starving and industry is at a standstill. But that does not
mean what it would in a more highly organized country. Russia is still
able to steal a march on us in Persia and Afghanistan, and on the
Japanese in Outer Mongolia. Russia is still able to organize Bolshevik
propaganda in every country in Asia. And a great part of the
effectiveness of this propaganda lies in its promise of liberation from
Europe. So far, in China proper, it has affected hardly anyone except
the younger students, to whom Bolshevism appeals as a method of
developing industry without passing through the stage of private
capitalism. This appeal will doubtless diminish as the Bolsheviks are
more and more forced to revert to capitalism. Moreover, Bolshevism, as
it has developed in Russia, is quite peculiarly inapplicable to China,
for the following reasons: (1) It requires a strong centralized State,
whereas China has a very weak State, and is tending more and more to
federalism instead of centralization; (2) Bolshevism requires a very
great deal of government, and more control of individual lives by the
authorities than has ever been known before, whereas China has developed
personal liberty to an extraordinary degree, and is the country of all
others where the doctrines of anarchism seem to find successful
practical application; (3) Bolshevism dislikes private trading, which is
the breath of life to all Chinese except the literati. For these
reasons, it is not likely that Bolshevism as a creed will make much
progress in China proper. But Bolshevism as a political force is not the
same thing as Bolshevism as a creed. The arguments which proved
successful with the Ameer of Afghanistan or the nomads of Mongolia were
probably different from those employed in discussion with Mr. Lansbury.
The Asiatic expansion of Bolshevik influence is not a distinctively
Bolshevik phenomenon, but a continuation of traditional Russian policy,
carried on by men who are more energetic, more intelligent, and less
corrupt than the officials of the Tsar's régime, and who moreover, like
the Americans, believe themselves to be engaged in the liberation of
mankind, not in mere imperialistic expansion. This belief, of course,
adds enormously to the vigour and success of Bolshevik imperialism, and
gives an impulse to Asiatic expansion which is not likely to be soon
spent, unless there is an actual restoration of the Tsarist régime
under some new Kolchak dependent upon alien arms for his throne and his
life.
It is therefore not at all unlikely, if the international situation
develops in certain ways, that Russia may set to work to regain
Manchuria, and to recover that influence over Peking which the control
of Manchuria is bound to give to any foreign Power. It would probably be
useless to attempt such an enterprise while Japan remains unembarrassed,
but it would at once become feasible if Japan were at war with America
or with Great Britain. There is therefore nothing improbable in the
supposition that Russia may, within the next ten or twenty years,
recover the position which she held in relation to China before the
Russo-Japanese war. It must be remembered also that the Russians have an
instinct for colonization, and have been trekking eastward for
centuries. This tendency has been interrupted by the disasters of the
last seven years, but is likely to assert itself again before long.
The hegemony of Russia in Asia would not, to my mind, be in any way
regrettable. Russia would probably not be strong enough to tyrannize as
much as the English, the Americans, or the Japanese would do. Moreover,
the Russians are sufficiently Asiatic in outlook and character to be
able to enter into relations of equality and mutual understanding with
Asiatics, in a way which seems quite impossible for the English-speaking
nations. And an Asiatic block, if it could be formed, would be strong
for defence and weak for attack, which would make for peace. Therefore,
on the whole, such a result, if it came about, would probably be
desirable In the interests of mankind as a whole.
What, meanwhile, is China's interest? What would be ideally best for
China would be to recover Manchuria and Shantung, and then be let alone.
The anarchy in China might take a long time to subside, but in the end
some system suited to China would be established. The artificial ending
of Chinese anarchy by outside interference means the establishment of
some system convenient for foreign trade and industry, but probably
quite unfitted to the needs of the Chinese themselves. The English in
the seventeenth century, the French in the eighteenth, the Americans in
the nineteenth, and the Russians in our own day, have passed through
years of anarchy and civil war, which were essential to their
development, and could not have been curtailed by outside interference
without grave detriment to the final solution. So it is with China.
Western political ideas have swept away the old imperial system, but
have not yet proved strong enough to put anything stable in its place.
The problem of transforming China into a modern country is a difficult
one, and foreigners ought to be willing to have some patience while the
Chinese attempt its solution. They understand their own country, and we
do not. If they are let alone, they will, in the end, find a solution
suitable to their character, which we shall certainly not do. A solution
slowly reached by themselves may be stable, whereas one prematurely
imposed by outside Powers will be artificial and therefore unstable.
There is, however, very little hope that the decisions reached by the
Washington Conference will permanently benefit China, and a considerable
chance that they may do quite the reverse. In Manchuria the _status quo_
is to be maintained, while in Shantung the Japanese have made
concessions, the value of which only time can show. The Four
Powers--America, Great Britain, France, and Japan--have agreed to
exploit China in combination, not competitively. There is a consortium
as regards loans, which will have the power of the purse and will
therefore be the real Government of China. As the Americans are the only
people who have much spare capital, they will control the consortium. As
they consider their civilization the finest in the world, they will set
to work to turn the Chinese into muscular Christians. As the financiers
are the most splendid feature of the American civilization, China must
be so governed as to enrich the financiers, who will in return establish
colleges and hospitals and Y.M.C.A.'s throughout the length and breadth
of the land, and employ agents to buy up the artistic treasures of China
for sepulture in their mansions. Chinese intellect, like that of
America, will be, directly or indirectly, in the pay of the Trust
magnates, and therefore no effective voice will be, raised in favour of
radical reform. The inauguration of this system will be welcomed even by
some Socialists in the West as a great victory for peace and freedom.
But it is impossible to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear, or peace
and freedom out of capitalism. The fourfold agreement between England,
France, America and Japan is, perhaps, a safeguard of peace, but in so
far as it brings peace nearer it puts freedom further off. It is the
peace obtained when competing firms join in a combine, which is by no
means always advantageous to those who have profited by the previous
competition. It is quite possible to dominate China without infringing
the principle of the Open Door. This principle merely ensures that the
domination everywhere shall be American, because America is the
strongest Power financially and commercially. It is to America's
interest to secure, in China, certain things consistent with Chinese
interests, and certain others inconsistent with them. The Americans, for
the sake of commerce and good investments, would wish to see a stable
government in China, an increase in the purchasing power of the people,
and an absence of territorial aggression by other Powers. But they will
not wish to see the Chinese strong enough to own and work their own
railways or mines, and they will resent all attempts at economic
independence, particularly when (as is to be expected) they take the
form of State Socialism, or what Lenin calls State Capitalism. They will
keep a _dossier_ of every student educated in colleges under American
control, and will probably see to it that those who profess Socialist or
Radical opinions shall get no posts. They will insist upon the standard
of hypocrisy which led them to hound out Gorky when he visited the
United States. They will destroy beauty and substitute tidiness. In
short, they will insist upon China becoming as like as possible to
"God's own country," except that it will not be allowed to keep the
wealth generated by its industries. The Chinese have it in them to give
to the world a new contribution to civilization as valuable as that
which they gave in the past. This would be prevented by the domination
of the Americans, because they believe their own civilization to be
perfect.
The ideal of capitalism, if it could be achieved, would be to destroy
competition among capitalists by means of Trusts, but to keep alive
competition among workers. To some extent Trade Unionism has succeeded
in diminishing competition among wage-earners within the advanced
industrial countries; but it has only intensified the conflict between
workers of different races, particularly between the white and yellow
races.[92] Under the existing economic system, the competition of cheap
Asiatic labour in America, Canada or Australia might well be harmful to
white labour in those countries. But under Socialism an influx of
industrious, skilled workers in sparsely populated countries would be an
obvious gain to everybody. Under Socialism, the immigration of any
person who produces more than he or she consumes will be a gain to every
other individual in the community, since it increases the wealth per
head. But under capitalism, owing to competition for jobs, a worker who
either produces much or consumes little is the natural enemy of the
others; thus the system makes for inefficient work, and creates an
opposition between the general interest and the individual interest of
the wage-earner. The case of yellow labour in America and the British
Dominions is one of the most unfortunate instances of the artificial
conflicts of interest produced by the capitalist system. This whole
question of Asiatic immigration, which is liable to cause trouble for
centuries to come, can only be radically solved by Socialism, since
Socialism alone can bring the private interests of workers in this
matter into harmony with the interests of their nation and of the world.
The concentration of the world's capital in a few nations, which, by
means of it, are able to drain all other nations of their wealth, is
obviously not a system by which permanent peace can be secured except
through the complete subjection of the poorer nations. In the long run,
China will see no reason to leave the profits of industry in the hands
of foreigners. If, for the present, Russia is successfully starved into
submission to foreign capital, Russia also will, when the time is ripe,
attempt a new rebellion against the world-empire of finance. I cannot
see, therefore, any establishment of a stable world-system as a result
of the syndicate formed at Washington. On the contrary, we may expect
that, when Asia has thoroughly assimilated our economic system, the
Marxian class-war will break out in the form of a war between Asia and
the West, with America as the protagonist of capitalism, and Russia as
the champion of Asia and Socialism. In such a war, Asia would be
fighting for freedom, but probably too late to preserve the distinctive
civilizations which now make Asia valuable to the human family. Indeed,
the war would probably be so devastating that no civilization of any
sort would survive it.
To sum up: the real government of the world is in the hands of the big
financiers, except on questions which rouse passionate public interest.
No doubt the exclusion of Asiatics from America and the Dominions is due
to popular pressure, and is against the interests of big finance. But
not many questions rouse so much popular feeling, and among them only a
few are sufficiently simple to be incapable of misrepresentation in the
interests of the capitalists. Even in such a case as Asiatic
immigration, it is the capitalist system which causes the anti-social
interests of wage-earners and makes them illiberal. The existing system
makes each man's individual interest opposed, in some vital point, to
the interest of the whole. And what applies to individuals applies also
to nations; under the existing economic system, a nation's interest is
seldom the same as that of the world at large, and then only by
accident. International peace might conceivably be secured under the
present system, but only by a combination of the strong to exploit the
weak. Such a combination is being attempted as the outcome of
Washington; but it can only diminish, in the long run, the little
freedom now enjoyed by the weaker nations. The essential evil of the
present system, as Socialists have pointed out over and over again, is
production for profit instead of for use. A man or a company or a nation
produces goods, not in order to consume them, but in order to sell them.
Hence arise competition and exploitation and all the evils, both in
internal labour problems and in international relations. The development
of Chinese commerce by capitalistic methods means an increase, for the
Chinese, in the prices of the things they export, which are also the
things they chiefly consume, and the artificial stimulation of new needs
for foreign goods, which places China at the mercy of those who supply
these goods, destroys the existing contentment, and generates a feverish
pursuit of purely material ends. In a socialistic world, production will
be regulated by the same authority which represents the needs of the
consumers, and the whole business of competitive buying and selling will
cease. Until then, it is possible to have peace by submission to
exploitation, or some degree of freedom by continual war, but it is not
possible to have both peace and freedom. The success of the present
American policy may, for a time, secure peace, but will certainly not
secure freedom for the weaker nations, such as Chinese. Only
international Socialism can secure both; and owing to the stimulation of
revolt by capitalist oppression, even peace alone can never be secure
until international Socialism is established throughout the world.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 86: The interests of England, apart from the question of
India, are roughly the same as those of America. Broadly speaking,
British interests are allied with American finance, as against the
pacifistic and agrarian tendencies of the Middle West.]
[Footnote 87: It is interesting to observe that, since the Washington
Conference, the American Administration has used the naval ratio there
agreed upon to induce Congress to consent to a larger expenditure on the
navy than would otherwise have been sanctioned. Expenditure on the navy
is unpopular in America, but by its parade of pacifism the Government
has been enabled to extract the necessary money out of the pockets of
reluctant taxpayers. See _The Times'_ New York Correspondent's telegram
in _The Times_ of April 10, 1922; also April 17 and 22.]
[Footnote 88: See Chamberlain, _The Invention of a New Religion_,
published by the Rationalist Press Association.]
[Footnote 89: See Murdoch, _History of Japan_, I. pp. 500 ff.]
[Footnote 90: An excellent account of these is given in _The Socialist
and Labour Movement in Japan_, by an American Sociologist, published by
the _Japan Chronicle_.]
[Footnote 91: Author of a book called _If Japan and America Fight_.]
[Footnote 92: The attitude of white labour to that of Asia is
illustrated by the following telegram which appeared in _The Times_ for
April 5, 1922, from its Melbourne correspondent: "A deputation of
shipwrights and allied trades complained to Mr. Hughes, the Prime
Minister, that four Commonwealth ships had been repaired at Antwerp
instead of in Australia, and that two had been repaired in India by
black labour receiving eight annas (8d.) a day. When the deputation
reached the black labour allegation Mr. Hughes jumped from his chair and
turned on his interviewers with, 'Black labour be damned. Go to
blithering blazes. Don't talk to me about black labour.' Hurrying from
the room, he pushed his way through the deputation...." I do not
generally agree with Mr. Hughes, but on this occasion, deeply as I
deplore his language, I find myself in agreement with his sentiments,
assuming that the phrase "black labour be damned" is meant to confer a
blessing.]