THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE
The Washington Conference, and the simultaneous conference, at
Washington, between the Chinese and Japanese, have somewhat modified the
Far Eastern situation. The general aspects of the new situation will be
dealt with in the next chapter; for the present it is the actual
decisions arrived at in Washington that concern us, as well as their
effect upon the Japanese position in Siberia.
In the first place, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has apparently been
brought to an end, as a result of the conclusion of the Four Power Pact
between America, Great Britain, France and Japan. Within this general
alliance of the exploiting Powers, there is a subordinate grouping of
America and Great Britain against France and Japan, the former standing
for international capitalism, the latter for national capitalism. The
situation is not yet plain, because England and America disagree as
regards Russia, and because America is not yet prepared to take part in
the reconstruction of Europe; but in the Far East, at any rate, we seem
to have decided to seek the friendship of America rather than of Japan.
It may perhaps be hoped that this will make our Chinese policy more
liberal than it has been. We have announced the restoration of
Wei-hai-wei--a piece of generosity which would have been more impressive
but for two facts: first, that Wei-hai-wei is completely useless to us,
and secondly, that the lease had only two more years to run. By the
terms of the lease, in fact, it should have been restored as soon as
Russia lost Port Arthur, however many years it still had to run at that
date.
One very important result of the Washington Conference is the agreement
not to fortify islands in the Pacific, with certain specified
exceptions. This agreement, if it is adhered to, will make war between
America and Japan very difficult, unless we were allied with America.
Without a naval base somewhere near Japan, America could hardly bring
naval force to bear on the Japanese Navy. It had been the intention of
the Navy Department to fortify Guam with a view to turning it into a
first-class naval base. The fact that America has been willing to forgo
this intention must be taken as evidence of a genuine desire to preserve
the peace with Japan.
Various small concessions were made to China. There is to be a revision
of the Customs Schedule to bring it to an effective five per cent. The
foreign Post Offices are to be abolished, though the Japanese have
insisted that a certain number of Japanese should be employed in the
Chinese Post Office. They had the effrontery to pretend that they
desired this for the sake of the efficiency of the postal service,
though the Chinese post is excellent and the Japanese is notoriously one
of the worst in the world. The chief use to which the Japanese have put
their postal service in China has been the importation of morphia, as
they have not allowed the Chinese Customs authorities to examine parcels
sent through their Post Office. The development of the Japanese
importation of morphia into China, as well as the growth of the poppy
in Manchuria, where they have control, has been a very sinister feature
of their penetration of China.[84]
Of course the Open Door, equality of opportunity, the independence and
integrity of China, etc. etc., were reaffirmed at Washington; but these
are mere empty phrases devoid of meaning.
From the Chinese point of view, the chief achievement at Washington was
the Shantung Treaty. Ever since the expulsion by the Germans at the end
of 1914, the Japanese had held Kiaochow Bay, which includes the port of
Tsingtau; they had stationed troops along the whole extent of the
Shantung Railway; and by the treaty following the Twenty-one Demands,
they had preferential treatment as regards all industrial undertakings
in Shantung. The railway belonged to them by right of conquest, and
through it they acquired control of the whole province. When an excuse
was needed for increasing the garrison, they supplied arms to brigands,
and claimed that their intervention was necessary to suppress the
resulting disorder. This state of affairs was legalized by the Treaty of
Versailles, to which, however, America and China were not parties. The
Washington Conference, therefore, supplied an opportunity of raising the
question afresh.
At first, however, it seemed as if the Japanese would have things all
their own way. The Chinese wished to raise the question before the
Conference, while the Japanese wished to settle it in direct negotiation
with China. This point was important, because, ever since the
Lansing-Ishii agreement, the Japanese have tried to get the Powers to
recognize, in practice if not in theory, an informal Japanese
Protectorate over China, as a first step towards which it was necessary
to establish the principle that the Japanese should not be interfered
with in their diplomatic dealings with China. The Conference agreed to
the Japanese proposal that the Shantung question should not come before
the Conference, but should be dealt with in direct negotiations between
the Japanese and Chinese. The Japanese victory on this point, however,
was not complete, because it was arranged that, in the event of a
deadlock, Mr. Hughes and Sir Arthur Balfour should mediate. A deadlock,
of course, soon occurred, and it then appeared that the British were no
longer prepared to back up the Japanese whole-heartedly, as in the old
days. The American Administration, for the sake of peace, showed some
disposition to urge the Chinese to give way. But American opinion was
roused on the Shantung question, and it appeared that, unless a solution
more or less satisfactory to China was reached, the Senate would
probably refuse to ratify the various treaties which embodied the work
of the Conference. Therefore, at the last moment, the Americans strongly
urged Japan to give way, and we took the same line, though perhaps less
strongly. The result was the conclusion of the Shantung Treaty between
China and Japan.
By this Treaty, the Chinese recover everything in Shantung, except the
private property of Japanese subjects, and certain restrictions as
regards the railway. The railway was the great difficulty in the
negotiations, since, so long as the Japanese could control that, they
would have the province at their mercy. The Chinese offered to buy back
the railway at once, having raised about half the money as a result of
a patriotic movement among their merchants. This, however, the Japanese
refused to agree to. What was finally done was that the Chinese were
compelled to borrow the money from the Japanese Government to be repaid
in fifteen years, with an option of repayment in five years. The railway
was valued at 53,400,000 gold marks, plus the costs involved in repairs
or improvements incurred by Japan, less deterioration; and it was to be
handed over to China within nine months of the signature of the treaty.
Until the purchase price, borrowed from Japan, is repaid, the Japanese
retain a certain degree of control over the railway: a Japanese traffic
manager is to be appointed, and two accountants, one Chinese and the
other Japanese, under the control of a Chinese President.
It is clear that, on paper, this gives the Chinese everything five years
hence. Whether things will work out so depends upon whether, five years
hence, any Power is prepared to force Japan to keep her word. As both
Mr. Hughes and Sir Arthur Balfour strongly urged the Chinese to agree to
this compromise, it must be assumed that America and Great Britain have
some responsibility for seeing that it is properly carried out. In that
case, we may perhaps expect that in the end China will acquire complete
control of the Shantung railway.
On the whole, it must be said that China did better at Washington than
might have been expected. As regards the larger aspects of the new
international situation arising out of the Conference, I shall deal with
them in the next chapter. But in our present connection it is necessary
to consider certain Far Eastern questions _not_ discussed at Washington,
since the mere fact that they were not discussed gave them a new form.
The question of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia was not raised at
Washington. It may therefore be assumed that Japan's position there is
secure until such time as the Chinese, or the Russians, or both
together, are strong enough to challenge it. America, at any rate, will
not raise the question unless friction occurs on some other issue. (See
Appendix.)
The Siberian question also was not settled. Therefore Japan's ambitions
in Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces will presumably remain
unchecked except in so far as the Russians unaided are able to check
them. There is a chronic state of semi-war between the Japanese and the
Far Eastern Republic, and there seems no reason why it should end in any
near future. The Japanese from time to time announce that they have
decided to withdraw, but they simultaneously send fresh troops. A
conference between them and the Chita Government has been taking place
at Dairen, and from time to time announcements have appeared to the
effect that an agreement has been reached or was about to be reached.
But on April 16th (1922) the Japanese broke up the Conference. _The
Times_ of April 27th contains both the Japanese and the Russian official
accounts of this break up. The Japanese statement is given in _The
Times_ as follows:--
The Japanese Embassy communicates the text of a statement given
out on April 20th by the Japanese Foreign Office on the Dairen
Conference.
It begins by recalling that in response to the repeatedly
expressed desire of the Chita Government, the Japanese Government
decided to enter into negotiations. The first meeting took place
on August 26th last year.
The Japanese demands included the non-enforcement of communistic
principles in the Republic against Japanese, the prohibition of
Bolshevist propaganda, the abolition of menacing military
establishments, the adoption of the principle of the open door in
Siberia, and the removal of industrial restrictions on
foreigners. Desiring speedily to conclude an agreement, so that
the withdrawal of troops might be carried out as soon as
possible, Japan met the wishes of Chita as far as practicable.
Though, from the outset, Chita pressed for a speedy settlement of
the Nicolaievsk affair, Japan eventually agreed to take up the
Nicolaievsk affair immediately after the conclusion of the basis
agreement. She further assured Chita that in settling the affair
Japan had no intention of violating the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Russia, and that the troops would be
speedily withdrawn from Saghalin after the settlement of the
affair, and that Chita'a wishes in regard to the transfer of
property now in the custody of the Japanese authorities would be
met.
The 11th Division of the troops in Siberia was originally to be
relieved during April, but if the Dairen Conference had
progressed satisfactorily, the troops, instead of being relieved,
would have been sent home. Japan therefore intimated to Chita
that should the basis agreement be concluded within a reasonable
period these troops would be immediately withdrawn, and proposed
the signature of the agreement by the middle of April, so that
the preparations for the relief of the said division might be
dispensed with. Thereupon Chita not only proposed the immediate
despatch of Chita troops to Vladivostok without waiting for the
withdrawal of the Japanese troops, but urged that Japan should
fix a tine-limit for the complete withdrawal of all her troops.
Japan informed Chita that the withdrawal would be carried out
within a short period after the conclusion of the detailed
arrangements, giving a definite period as desired, and at the
same time she proposed the signing of the agreement drawn up by
Japan.
Whereas Japan thus throughout the negotiations maintained a
sincere and conciliatory attitude, the Chita delegates entirely
ignored the spirit in which she offered concessions and brought
up one demand after another, thereby trying to gain time. Not
only did they refuse to entertain the Japanese proposals, but
declared that they would drop the negotiations and return to
Chita immediately. The only conclusion from this attitude of the
Chita Government is that they lacked a sincere effort to bring
the negotiations to fruition, and the Japanese Government
instructed its delegates to quit Dairen.
The Russian official account is given by _The Times_ immediately below
the above. It is as follows:--
On April 16th the Japanese broke up the Dairen Conference with
the Far Eastern Republic. The Far Eastern Delegation left Dairen.
Agreement was reached between the Japanese and Russian
Delegations on March 30th on all points of the general treaty,
but when the question of military evacuation was reached the
Japanese Delegation proposed a formula permitting continued
Japanese intervention.
Between March 30th and April 15th the Japanese dragged on the
negotiations _re_ military convention, reproaching the Far
Eastern delegates for mistrusting the Japanese Government. The
Russian Delegation declared that the general treaty would be
signed only upon obtaining precise written guarantees of Japanese
military evacuation.
On April 15th the Japanese Delegation presented an ultimatum
demanding a reply from the Far Eastern representatives in half an
hour as to whether they were willing to sign a general agreement
with new Japanese conditions forbidding an increase in the Far
Eastern Navy and retaining a Japanese military mission on Far
Eastern territory. _Re_ evacuation, the Japanese presented a Note
promising evacuation if "not prevented by unforeseen
circumstances." The Russian Delegation rejected this ultimatum.
On April 16th the Japanese declared the Dairen Conference broken
up. The Japanese delegates left for Tokyo, and Japanese troops
remain in the zone established by the agreement of March 29th.
Readers will believe one or other of these official statements according
to their prejudices, while those who wish to think themselves impartial
will assume that the truth lies somewhere between the two. For my part,
I believe the Russian statement. But even from the Japanese communiqué
it is evident that what wrecked the Conference was Japanese
unwillingness to evacuate Vladivostok and the Maritime Province; all
that they were willing to give was a vague promise to evacuate some day,
which would have had no more value than Mr. Gladstone's promise to
evacuate Egypt.
It will be observed that the Conference went well for Chita until the
Senate had ratified the Washington treaties. After that, the Japanese
felt that they had a free hand in all Far Eastern matters not dealt with
at Washington. The practical effect of the Washington decisions will
naturally be to make the Japanese seek compensation, at the expense of
the Far Eastern Republic, for what they have had to surrender in China.
This result was to be expected, and was presumably foreseen by the
assembled peacemakers.[85]
It will be seen that the Japanese policy involves hostility to Russia.
This is no doubt one reason for the friendship between Japan and France.
Another reason is that both are the champions of nationalistic
capitalism, as against the international capitalism aimed at by Messrs.
Morgan and Mr. Lloyd George, because France and Japan look to their
armaments as the chief source of their income, while England and America
look rather to their commerce and industry. It would be interesting to
compute how much coal and iron France and Japan have acquired in recent
years by means of their armies. England and America already possessed
coal and iron; hence their different policy. An uninvited delegation
from the Far Eastern Republic at Washington produced documents tending
to show that France and Japan came there as secret allies. Although the
authenticity of the documents was denied, most people, apparently,
believed them to be genuine. In any case, it is to be expected that
France and Japan will stand together, now that the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance has come to an end and the Anglo-French Entente has become
anything but cordial. Thus it is to be feared that Washington and Genoa
have sown the seeds of future wars--unless, by some miracle, the
"civilized" nations should grow weary of suicide.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 84: See _e.g._ chap. viii. of Millard's _Democracy and the
Eastern Question._]
[Footnote 85: I ought perhaps to confess that I have a bias in favour of
the Far Eastern Republic, owing to my friendship for their diplomatic
mission which was in Peking while I was there. I never met a more
high-minded set of men in any country. And although they were
communists, and knew the views that I had expressed on Russia, they
showed me great kindness. I do not think, however, that these courtesies
have affected my view of the dispute between Chita and Tokyo.]