CHAPTER II

CHINA BEFORE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Where the Chinese came from is a matter of conjecture. Their early

history is known only from their own annals, which throw no light upon

the question. The Shu-King, one of the Confucian classics (edited, not

composed, by Confucius), begins, like Livy, with legendary accounts of

princes whose virtues and vices are intended to supply edification or

warning to subsequent rulers. Yao and Shun were two model Emperors,

whose date (if any) was somewhere in the third millennium B.C. "The age

of Yao and Shun," in Chinese literature, means what "the Golden Age"

mean with us. It seems certain that, when Chinese history begins, the

Chinese occupied only a small part of what is now China, along the banks

of the Yellow River. They were agricultural, and had already reached a

fairly high level of civilization--much higher than that of any other

part of Eastern Asia. The Yellow River is a fierce and terrible stream,

too swift for navigation, turgid, and full of mud, depositing silt upon

its bed until it rises above the surrounding country, when it suddenly

alters its course, sweeping away villages and towns in a destructive

torrent. Among most early agricultural nations, such a river would have

inspired superstitious awe, and floods would have been averted by human

sacrifice; in the Shu-King, however, there is little trace of

superstition. Yao and Shun, and Yü (the latter's successor), were all

occupied in combating the inundations, but their methods were those of

the engineer, not of the miracle-worker. This shows, at least, the state

of belief in the time of Confucius. The character ascribed to Yao shows

what was expected of an Emperor:--

He was reverential, intelligent, accomplished, and

thoughtful--naturally and without effort. He was sincerely

courteous, and capable of all complaisance. The display of these

qualities reached to the four extremities of the empire, and

extended from earth to heaven. He was able to make the able and

virtuous distinguished, and thence proceeded to the love of the

nine classes of his kindred, who all became harmonious. He also

regulated and polished the people of his domain, who all became

brightly intelligent. Finally, he united and harmonized the

myriad States of the empire; and lo! the black-haired people were

transformed. The result was universal concord.[1]

The first date which can be assigned with precision in Chinese history

is that of an eclipse of the sun in 776 B.C.[2] There is no reason to

doubt the general correctness of the records for considerably earlier

times, but their exact chronology cannot be fixed. At this period, the

Chou dynasty, which fell in 249 B.C. and is supposed to have begun in

1122 B.C., was already declining in power as compared with a number of

nominally subordinate feudal States. The position of the Emperor at this

time, and for the next 500 years, was similar to that of the King of

France during those parts of the Middle Ages when his authority was at

its lowest ebb. Chinese history consists of a series of dynasties, each

strong at first and weak afterwards, each gradually losing control over

subordinates, each followed by a period of anarchy (sometimes lasting

for centuries), and ultimately succeeded by a new dynasty which

temporarily re-establishes a strong Central Government. Historians

always attribute the fall of a dynasty to the excessive power of

eunuchs, but perhaps this is, in part, a literary convention.

What distinguishes the Emperor is not so much his political power, which

fluctuates with the strength of his personality, as certain religious

prerogatives. The Emperor is the Son of Heaven; he sacrifices to Heaven

at the winter solstice. The early Chinese used "Heaven" as synonymous

with "The Supreme Ruler," a monotheistic God;[3] indeed Professor Giles

maintains, by arguments which seem conclusive, that the correct

translation of the Emperor's title would be "Son of God." The word

"Tien," in Chinese, is used both for the sky and for God, though the

latter sense has become rare. The expression "Shang Ti," which means

"Supreme Ruler," belongs in the main to pre-Confucian times, but both

terms originally represented a God as definitely anthropomorphic as the

God of the Old Testament.[4]

As time went by the Supreme Ruler became more shadowy, while "Heaven"

remained, on account of the Imperial rites connected with it. The

Emperor alone had the privilege of worshipping "Heaven," and the rites

continued practically unchanged until the fall of the Manchu dynasty in

1911. In modern times they were performed in the Temple of Heaven in

Peking, one of the most beautiful places in the world. The annual

sacrifice in the Temple of Heaven represented almost the sole official

survival of pre-Confucian religion, or indeed of anything that could be

called religion in the strict sense; for Buddhism and Taoism have never

had any connection with the State.

The history of China is known in some detail from the year 722 B.C.,

because with this year begins Confucius' _Springs and Autumns_, which is

a chronicle of the State of Lu, in which Confucius was an official.

One of the odd things about the history of China is that after the

Emperors have been succeeding each other for more than 2,000 years, one

comes to a ruler who is known as the "First Emperor," Shih Huang Ti. He

acquired control over the whole Empire, after a series of wars, in 221

B.C., and died in 210 B.C. Apart from his conquests, he is remarkable

for three achievements: the building of the Great Wall against the Huns,

the destruction of feudalism, and the burning of the books. The

destruction of feudalism, it must be confessed, had to be repeated by

many subsequent rulers; for a long time, feudalism tended to grow up

again whenever the Central Government was in weak hands. But Shih Huang

Ti was the first ruler who made his authority really effective over all

China in historical times. Although his dynasty came to an end with his

son, the impression he made is shown by the fact that our word "China"

is probably derived from his family name, Tsin or Chin[5]. (The Chinese

put the family name first.) His Empire was roughly co-extensive with

what is now China proper.

The destruction of the books was a curious incident. Shih Huang Ti, as

appears from his calling himself "First Emperor," disliked being

reminded of the fact that China had existed before his time; therefore

history was anathema to him. Moreover the literati were already a strong

force in the country, and were always (following Confucius) in favour of

the preservation of ancient customs, whereas Shih Huang Ti was a

vigorous innovator. Moreover, he appears to have been uneducated and not

of pure Chinese race. Moved by the combined motives of vanity and

radicalism, he issued an edict decreeing that--

All official histories, except the memoirs of Tsin (his own

family), shall be burned; except the persons who have the office

of literati of the great learning, those who in the Empire permit

themselves to hide the Shi-King, the Shu-King (Confucian

classics), or the discourses of the hundred schools, must all go

before the local civil and military authorities so that they may

be burned. Those who shall dare to discuss among themselves the

Shi-King and the Shu-King shall be put to death and their corpses

exposed in a public place; those who shall make use of antiquity

to belittle modern times shall be put to death with their

relations.... Thirty days after the publication of this edict,

those who have not burned their books shall be branded and sent

to forced labour. The books which shall not be proscribed are

those of medicine and pharmacy, of divination ..., of agriculture

and of arboriculture. As for those who desire to study the laws

and ordinances, let them take the officials as masters. (Cordier,

op. cit. i. p. 203.)

It will be seen that the First Emperor was something of a Bolshevik. The

Chinese literati, naturally, have blackened his memory. On the other

hand, modern Chinese reformers, who have experienced the opposition of

old-fashioned scholars, have a certain sympathy with his attempt to

destroy the innate conservatism of his subjects. Thus Li Ung Bing[6]

says:--

No radical change can take place in China without encountering

the opposition of the literati. This was no less the case then

than it is now. To abolish feudalism by one stroke was a radical

change indeed. Whether the change was for the better or the

worse, the men of letters took no time to inquire; whatever was

good enough for their fathers was good enough for them and their

children. They found numerous authorities in the classics to

support their contention and these they freely quoted to show

that Shih Huang Ti was wrong. They continued to criticize the

government to such an extent that something had to be done to

silence the voice of antiquity ... As to how far this decree (on

the burning of the books) was enforced, it is hard to say. At any

rate, it exempted all libraries of the government, or such as

were in possession of a class of officials called Po Szu or

Learned Men. If any real damage was done to Chinese literature

under the decree in question, it is safe to say that it was not

of such a nature as later writers would have us believe. Still,

this extreme measure failed to secure the desired end, and a

number of the men of letters in Han Yang, the capital, was

subsequently buried alive.

This passage is written from the point of view of Young China, which is

anxious to assimilate Western learning in place of the dead scholarship

of the Chinese classics. China, like every other civilized country, has

a tradition which stands in the way of progress. The Chinese have

excelled in stability rather than in progress; therefore Young China,

which perceives that the advent of industrial civilization has made

progress essential to continued national existence, naturally looks with

a favourable eye upon Shih Huang Ti's struggle with the reactionary

pedants of his age. The very considerable literature which has come

down to us from before his time shows, in any case, that his edict was

somewhat ineffective; and in fact it was repealed after twenty-two

years, in 191. B.C.

After a brief reign by the son of the First Emperor, who did not inherit

his capacity, we come to the great Han dynasty, which reigned from 206

B.C. to A.D. 220. This was the great age of Chinese imperialism--exactly

coeval with the great age of Rome. In the course of their campaigns in

Northern India and Central Asia, the Chinese were brought into contact

with India, with Persia, and even with the Roman Empire.[7] Their

relations with India had a profound effect upon their religion, as well

as upon that of Japan, since they led to the introduction of Buddhism.

Relations with Rome were chiefly promoted by the Roman desire for silk,

and continued until the rise of Mohammedanism. They had little

importance for China, though we learn, for example, that about A.D. 164

a treatise on astronomy was brought to China from the Roman Empire.[8]

Marcus Aurelius appears in Chinese history under the name An Tun, which

stands for Antoninus.

It was during this period that the Chinese acquired that immense

prestige in the Far East which lasted until the arrival of European

armies and navies in the nineteenth century. One is sometimes tempted to

think that the irruption of the white man into China may prove almost as

ephemeral as the raids of Huns and Tartars into Europe. The military

superiority of Europe to Asia is not an eternal law of nature, as we are

tempted to think; and our superiority in civilization is a mere

delusion. Our histories, which treat the Mediterranean as the centre of

the universe, give quite a wrong perspective. Cordier,[9] dealing with

the campaigns and voyages of discovery which took place under the Han

dynasty, says:--

The Occidentals have singularly contracted the field of the

history of the world when they have grouped around the people of

Israel, Greece, and Rome the little that they knew of the

expansion of the human race, being completely ignorant of these

voyagers who ploughed the China Sea and the Indian Ocean, of

these cavalcades across the immensities of Central Asia up to the

Persian Gulf. The greatest part of the universe, and at the same

time a civilization different but certainly as developed as that

of the ancient Greeks and Romans, remained unknown to those who

wrote the history of their little world while they believed that

they, were setting forth the history of the world as a whole.

In our day, this provincialism, which impregnates all our culture, is

liable to have disastrous consequences politically, as well as for the

civilization of mankind. We must make room for Asia in our thoughts, if

we are not to rouse Asia to a fury of self-assertion.

After the Han dynasty there are various short dynasties and periods of

disorder, until we come to the Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-907). Under this

dynasty, in its prosperous days, the Empire acquired its greatest

extent, and art and poetry reached their highest point.[10] The Empire

of Jenghis Khan (died 1227) was considerably greater, and contained a

great part of China; but Jenghis Khan was a foreign conqueror. Jenghis

and his generals, starting from Mongolia, appeared as conquerors in

China, India, Persia, and Russia. Throughout Central Asia, Jenghis

destroyed every man, woman, and child in the cities he captured. When

Merv was captured, it was transformed into a desert and 700,000 people

were killed. But it was said that many had escaped by lying among the

corpses and pretending to be dead; therefore at the capture of Nishapur,

shortly afterwards, it was ordered that all the inhabitants should have

their heads cut off. Three pyramids of heads were made, one of men, one

of women, and one of children. As it was feared that some might have

escaped by hiding underground, a detachment of soldiers was left to kill

any that might emerge.[11] Similar horrors were enacted at Moscow and

Kieff, in Hungary and Poland. Yet the man responsible for these

massacres was sought in alliance by St. Louis and the Pope. The times of

Jenghis Khan remind one of the present day, except that his methods of

causing death were more merciful than those that have been employed

since the Armistice.

Kublai Khan (died 1294), who is familiar, at least by name, through

Marco Polo and Coleridge; was the grandson of Jenghis Khan, and the

first Mongol who was acknowledged Emperor of China, where he ousted the

Sung dynasty (960-1277). By this time, contact with China had somewhat

abated the savagery of the first conquerors. Kublai removed his capital

from Kara Korom in Mongolia to Peking. He built walls like those which

still surround the city, and established on the walls an observatory

which is preserved to this day. Until 1900, two of the astronomical

instruments constructed by Kublai were still to be seen in this

observatory, but the Germans removed them to Potsdam after the

suppression of the Boxers.[12] I understand they have been restored in

accordance with one of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. If

so, this was probably the most important benefit which that treaty

secured to the world.

Kublai plays the same part in Japanese history that Philip II plays in

the history of England. He prepared an Invincible Armada, or rather two

successive armadas, to conquer Japan, but they were defeated, partly by

storms, and partly by Japanese valour.

After Kublai, the Mongol Emperors more and more adopted Chinese ways,

and lost their tyrannical vigour. Their dynasty came to an end in 1370,

and was succeeded by the pure Chinese Ming dynasty, which lasted until

the Manchu conquest of 1644. The Manchus in turn adopted Chinese ways,

and were overthrown by a patriotic revolution in 1911, having

contributed nothing notable to the native culture of China except the

pigtail, officially abandoned at the Revolution.

The persistence of the Chinese Empire down to our own day is not to be

attributed to any military skill; on the contrary, considering its

extent and resources, it has at most times shown itself weak and

incompetent in war. Its southern neighbours were even less warlike, and

were less in extent. Its northern and western neighbours inhabited a

barren country, largely desert, which was only capable of supporting a

very sparse population. The Huns were defeated by the Chinese after

centuries of warfare; the Tartars and Manchus, on the contrary,

conquered China. But they were too few and too uncivilized to impose

their ideas or their way of life upon China, which absorbed them and

went on its way as if they had never existed. Rome could have survived

the Goths, if they had come alone, but the successive waves of

barbarians came too quickly to be all civilized in turn. China was saved

from this fate by the Gobi Desert and the Tibetan uplands. Since the

white men have taken to coming by sea, the old geographical immunity is

lost, and greater energy will be required to preserve the national

independence.

In spite of geographical advantages, however, the persistence of Chinese

civilization, fundamentally unchanged since the introduction of

Buddhism, is a remarkable phenomenon. Egypt and Babylonia persisted as

long, but since they fell there has been nothing comparable in the

world. Perhaps the main cause is the immense population of China, with

an almost complete identity of culture throughout. In the middle of the

eighth century, the population of China is estimated at over 50

millions, though ten years later, as a result of devastating wars, it is

said to have sunk to about 17 millions.[13] A census has been taken at

various times in Chinese history, but usually a census of houses, not of

individuals. From the number of houses the population is computed by a

more or less doubtful calculation. It is probable, also, that different

methods were adopted on different occasions, and that comparisons

between different enumerations are therefore rather unsafe. Putnam

Weale[14] says:--

The first census taken by the Manchus in 1651, after the

restoration of order, returned China's population at 55 million

persons, which is less than the number given in the first census

of the Han dynasty, A.D. 1, and about the same as when Kublai

Khan established the Mongal dynasty in 1295. (This is presumably

a misprint, as Kublai died in 1294.) Thus we are faced by the

amazing fact that, from the beginning of the Christian era, the

toll of life taken by internecine and frontier wars in China was

so great that in spite of all territorial expansion the

population for upwards of sixteen centuries remained more or less

stationary. There is in all history no similar record. Now,

however, came a vast change. Thus three years after the death of

the celebrated Manchu Emperor Kang Hsi, in 1720, the population

had risen to 125 millions. At the beginning of the reign of the

no less illustrious Ch'ien Lung (1743) it was returned at 145

millions; towards the end of his reign, in 1783, it had doubled,

and was given as 283 millions. In the reign of Chia Ch'ing (1812)

it had risen to 360 millions; before the Taiping rebellion (1842)

it had grown to 413 millions; after that terrible rising it sunk

to 261 millions.

I do not think such definite statements are warranted. The China Year

Book for 1919 (the latest I have seen) says (p. 1):--

The taking of a census by the methods adopted in Western nations

has never yet been attempted in China, and consequently estimates

of the total population have varied to an extraordinary degree.

The nearest approach to a reliable estimate is, probably, the

census taken by the Minchengpu (Ministry of Interior) in 1910,

the results of which are embodied in a report submitted to the

Department of State at Washington by Mr. Raymond P. Tenney, a

Student Interpreter at the U.S. Legation, Peking.... It is

pointed out that even this census can only be regarded as

approximate, as, with few exceptions, households and not

individuals were counted.

The estimated population of the Chinese Empire (exclusive of Tibet) is

given, on the basis of this census, as 329,542,000, while the population

of Tibet is estimated at 1,500,000. Estimates which have been made at

various other dates are given as follows (p. 2):

A.D. A.D.

1381 59,850,000 / 143,125,225

1412 66,377,000 1760--203,916,477

1580 60,692,000 1761 205,293,053

1662 21,068,000 1762 198,214,553

1668 25,386,209 1790 155,249,897

/ 23,312,200 / 307,467,200

1710 --27,241,129 1792- 333,000,000

1711 28,241,129 / 362,467,183

1736 125,046,245 1812--360,440,000

/ 157,343,975 1842 413,021,000

1743 149,332,730 1868 404,946,514

\ 150,265,475 1881 380,000,000

1753 103,050,600 1882 381,309,000

1885 377,636,000

These figures suffice to show how little is known about the population

of China. Not only are widely divergent estimates made in the same year

(_e.g._ 1760), but in other respects the figures are incredible. Mr.

Putnam Weale might contend that the drop from 60 millions in 1580 to 21

millions in 1662 was due to the wars leading to the Manchu conquest. But

no one can believe that between 1711 and 1736 the population increased

from 28 millions to 125 millions, or that it doubled between 1790 and

1792. No one knows whether the population of China is increasing or

diminishing, whether people in general have large or small families, or

any of the other facts that vital statistics are designed to elucidate.

What is said on these subjects, however dogmatic, is no more than

guess-work. Even the population of Peking is unknown. It is said to be

about 900,000, but it may be anywhere between 800,000 and a million. As

for the population of the Chinese Empire, it is probably safe to assume

that it is between three and four hundred millions, and somewhat likely

that it is below three hundred and fifty millions. Very little indeed

can be said with confidence as to the population of China in former

times; so little that, on the whole, authors who give statistics are to

be distrusted.

There are certain broad features of the traditional Chinese civilization

which give it its distinctive character. I should be inclined to select

as the most important: (1) The use of ideograms instead of an alphabet

in writing; (2) The substitution of the Confucian ethic for religion

among the educated classes; (3) government by literati chosen by

examination instead of by a hereditary aristocracy. The family system

distinguishes traditional China from modern Europe, but represents a

stage which most other civilizations have passed through, and which is

therefore not distinctively Chinese; the three characteristics which I

have enumerated, on the other hand, distinguish China from all other

countries of past times. Something must be said at this stage about each

of the three.

1. As everyone knows, the Chinese do not have letters, as we do, but

symbols for whole words. This has, of course, many inconveniences: it

means that, in learning to write, there are an immense number of

different signs to be learnt, not only 26 as with us; that there is no

such thing as alphabetical order, so that dictionaries, files,

catalogues, etc., are difficult to arrange and linotype is impossible;

that foreign words, such as proper names and scientific terms, cannot be

written down by sound, as in European languages, but have to be

represented by some elaborate device.[15] For these reasons, there is a

movement for phonetic writing among the more advanced Chinese reformers;

and I think the success of this movement is essential if China is to

take her place among the bustling hustling nations which consider that

they have a monopoly of all excellence. Even if there were no other

argument for the change, the difficulty of elementary education, where

reading and writing take so long to learn, would be alone sufficient to

decide any believer in democracy. For practical purposes, therefore, the

movement for phonetic writing deserves support.

There are, however, many considerations, less obvious to a European,

which can be adduced in favour of the ideographic system, to which

something of the solid stability of the Chinese civilization is probably

traceable. To us, it seems obvious that a written word must represent a

sound, whereas to the Chinese it represents an idea. We have adopted the

Chinese system ourselves as regards numerals; "1922," for example, can

be read in English, French, or any other language, with quite different

sounds, but with the same meaning. Similarly what is written in Chinese

characters can be read throughout China, in spite of the difference of

dialects which are mutually unintelligible when spoken. Even a Japanese,

without knowing a word of spoken Chinese, can read out Chinese script in

Japanese, just as he could read a row of numerals written by an

Englishman. And the Chinese can still read their classics, although the

spoken language must have changed as much as French has changed from

Latin.

The advantage of writing over speech is its greater permanence, which

enables it to be a means of communication between different places and

different times. But since the spoken language changes from place to

place and from time to time, the characteristic advantage of writing is

more fully attained by a script which does not aim at representing

spoken sounds than by one which does.

Speaking historically, there is nothing peculiar in the Chinese method

of writing, which represents a stage through which all writing probably

passed. Writing everywhere seems to have begun as pictures, not as a

symbolic representation of sounds. I understand that in Egyptian

hieroglyphics the course of development from ideograms to phonetic

writing can be studied. What is peculiar in China is the preservation of

the ideographic system throughout thousands of years of advanced

civilization--a preservation probably due, at least in part, to the fact

that the spoken language is monosyllabic, uninflected and full of

homonyms.

As to the way in which the Chinese system of writing has affected the

mentality of those who employ it, I find some suggestive reflections in

an article published in the _Chinese Students' Monthly_ (Baltimore),

for February 1922, by Mr. Chi Li, in an article on "Some Anthropological

Problems of China." He says (p. 327):--

Language has been traditionally treated by European scientists as

a collection of sounds instead of an expression of something

inner and deeper than the vocal apparatus as it should be. The

accumulative effect of language-symbols upon one's mental

formulation is still an unexploited field. Dividing the world

culture of the living races on this basis, one perceives a

fundamental difference of its types between the alphabetical

users and the hieroglyphic users, each of which has its own

virtues and vices. Now, with all respects to alphabetical

civilization, it must be frankly stated that it has a grave and

inherent defect in its lack of solidity. The most civilized

portion under the alphabetical culture is also inhabited by the

most fickled people. The history of the Western land repeats the

same story over and over again. Thus up and down with the Greeks;

up and down with Rome; up and down with the Arabs. The ancient

Semitic and Hametic peoples are essentially alphabetic users, and

their civilizations show the same lack of solidity as the Greeks

and the Romans. Certainly this phenomenon can be partially

explained by the extra-fluidity of the alphabetical language

which cannot be depended upon as a suitable organ to conserve any

solid idea. Intellectual contents of these people may be likened

to waterfalls and cataracts, rather than seas and oceans. No

other people is richer in ideas than they; but no people would

give up their valuable ideas as quickly as they do....

The Chinese language is by all means the counterpart of the

alphabetic stock. It lacks most of the virtues that are found in

the alphabetic language; but as an embodiment of simple and final

truth, it is invulnerable to storm and stress. It has already

protected the Chinese civilization for more than forty centuries.

It is solid, square, and beautiful, exactly as the spirit of it

represents. Whether it is the spirit that has produced this

language or whether this language has in turn accentuated the

spirit remains to be determined.

Without committing ourselves wholly to the theory here set forth, which

is impregnated with Chinese patriotism, we must nevertheless admit that

the Westerner is unaccustomed to the idea of "alphabetical civilization"

as merely one kind, to which he happens to belong. I am not competent to

judge as to the importance of the ideographic script in producing the

distinctive characteristics of Chinese civilization, but I have no doubt

that this importance is very great, and is more or less of the kind

indicated in the above quotation.

2. Confucius (B.C. 551-479) must be reckoned, as regards his social

influence, with the founders of religions. His effect on institutions

and on men's thoughts has been of the same kind of magnitude as that of

Buddha, Christ, or Mahomet, but curiously different in its nature.

Unlike Buddha and Christ, he is a completely historical character, about

whose life a great deal is known, and with whom legend and myth have

been less busy than with most men of his kind. What most distinguishes

him from other founders is that he inculcated a strict code of ethics,

which has been respected ever since, but associated it with very little

religious dogma, which gave place to complete theological scepticism in

the countless generations of Chinese literati who revered his memory and

administered the Empire.

Confucius himself belongs rather to the type of Lycurgus and Solon than

to that of the great founders of religions. He was a practical

statesman, concerned with the administration of the State; the virtues

he sought to inculcate were not those of personal holiness, or designed

to secure salvation in a future life, but rather those which lead to a

peaceful and prosperous community here on earth. His outlook was

essentially conservative, and aimed at preserving the virtues of former

ages. He accepted the existing religion--a rather unemphatic

monotheism, combined with belief that the spirits of the dead preserved

a shadowy existence, which it was the duty of their descendants to

render as comfortable as possible. He did not, however, lay any stress

upon supernatural matters. In answer to a question, he gave the

following definition of wisdom: "To cultivate earnestly our duty towards

our neighbour, and to reverence spiritual beings while maintaining

always a due reserve."[16] But reverence for spiritual beings was not an

_active_ part of Confucianism, except in the form of ancestor-worship,

which was part of filial piety, and thus merged in duty towards one's

neighbour. Filial piety included obedience to the Emperor, except when

he was so wicked as to forfeit his divine right--for the Chinese, unlike

the Japanese, have always held that resistance to the Emperor was

justified if he governed very badly. The following passage from

Professor Giles[17] illustrates this point:--

The Emperor has been uniformly regarded as the son of God by

adoption only, and liable to be displaced from that position as a

punishment for the offence of misrule.... If the ruler failed in

his duties, the obligation of the people was at an end, and his

divine right disappeared simultaneously. Of this we have an

example in a portion of the Canon to be examined by and by. Under

the year 558 B.C. we find the following narrative. One of the

feudal princes asked an official, saying, "Have not the people of

the Wei State done very wrong in expelling their ruler?" "Perhaps

the ruler himself," was the reply, "may have done very wrong....

If the life of the people is impoverished, and if the spirits

are deprived of their sacrifices, of what use is the ruler, and

what can the people do but get rid of him?"

This very sensible doctrine has been accepted at all times throughout

Chinese history, and has made rebellions only too frequent.

Filial piety, and the strength of the family generally, are perhaps the

weakest point in Confucian ethics, the only point where the system

departs seriously from common sense. Family feeling has militated

against public spirit, and the authority of the old has increased the

tyranny of ancient custom. In the present day, when China is confronted

with problems requiring a radically new outlook, these features of the

Confucian system have made it a barrier to necessary reconstruction, and

accordingly we find all those foreigners who wish to exploit China

praising the old tradition and deriding the efforts of Young China to

construct something more suited to modern needs. The way in which

Confucian emphasis on filial piety prevented the growth of public spirit

is illustrated by the following story:[18]

One of the feudal princes was boasting to Confucius of the high

level of morality which prevailed in his own State. "Among us

here," he said, "you will find upright men. If a father has

stolen a sheep, his son will give evidence against him." "In my

part of the country," replied Confucius, "there is a different

standard from this. A father will shield his son, a son will

shield his father. It is thus that uprightness will be found."

It is interesting to contrast this story with that of the elder Brutus

and his sons, upon which we in the West were all brought up.

Chao Ki, expounding the Confucian doctrine, says it is contrary to

filial piety to refuse a lucrative post by which to relieve the

indigence of one's aged parents.[19] This form of sin, however, is rare

in China as in other countries.

The worst failure of filial piety, however, is to remain without

children, since ancestors are supposed to suffer if they have no

descendants to keep up their cult. It is probable that this doctrine has

made the Chinese more prolific, in which case it has had great

biological importance. Filial piety is, of course, in no way peculiar to

China, but has been universal at a certain stage of culture. In this

respect, as in certain others, what is peculiar to China is the

preservation of the old custom after a very high level of civilization

had been attained. The early Greeks and Romans did not differ from the

Chinese in this respect, but as their civilization advanced the family

became less and less important. In China, this did not begin to happen

until our own day.

Whatever may be said against filial piety carried to excess, it is

certainly less harmful than its Western counterpart, patriotism. Both,

of course, err in inculcating duties to a certain portion of mankind to

the practical exclusion of the rest. But patriotism directs one's

loyalty to a fighting unit, which filial piety does not (except in a

very primitive society). Therefore patriotism leads much more easily to

militarism and imperialism. The principal method of advancing the

interests of one's nation is homicide; the principal method of advancing

the interest of one's family is corruption and intrigue. Therefore

family feeling is less harmful than patriotism. This view is borne out

by the history and present condition of China as compared to Europe.

Apart from filial piety, Confucianism was, in practice, mainly a code

of civilized behaviour, degenerating at times into an etiquette book. It

taught self-restraint, moderation, and above all courtesy. Its moral

code was not, like those of Buddhism and Christianity, so severe that

only a few saints could hope to live up to it, or so much concerned with

personal salvation as to be incompatible with political institutions. It

was not difficult for a man of the world to live up to the more

imperative parts of the Confucian teaching. But in order to do this he

must exercise at all times a certain kind of self-control--an extension

of the kind which children learn when they are taught to "behave." He

must not break into violent passions; he must not be arrogant; he must

"save face," and never inflict humiliations upon defeated adversaries;

he must be moderate in all things, never carried away by excessive love

or hate; in a word, he must keep calm reason always in control of all

his actions. This attitude existed in Europe in the eighteenth century,

but perished in the French Revolution: romanticism, Rousseau, and the

guillotine put an end to it. In China, though wars and revolutions have

occurred constantly, Confucian calm has survived them all, making them

less terrible for the participants, and making all who were not

immediately involved hold aloof. It is bad manners in China to attack

your adversary in wet weather. Wu-Pei-Fu, I am told, once did it, and

won a victory; the beaten general complained of the breach of etiquette;

so Wu-Pei-Fu went back to the position he held before the battle, and

fought all over again on a fine day. (It should be said that battles in

China are seldom bloody.) In such a country, militarism is not the

scourge it is with us; and the difference is due to the Confucian

ethics.[20]

Confucianism did not assume its present form until the twelfth century

A.D., when the personal God in whom Confucius had believed was thrust

aside by the philosopher Chu Fu Tze,[21] whose interpretation of

Confucianism has ever since been recognized as orthodox. Since the fall

of the Mongols (1370), the Government has uniformly favoured

Confucianism as the teaching of the State; before that, there were

struggles with Buddhism and Taoism, which were connected with magic, and

appealed to superstitious Emperors, quite a number of whom died of

drinking the Taoist elixir of life. The Mongol Emperors were Buddhists

of the Lama religion, which still prevails in Tibet and Mongolia; but

the Manchu Emperors, though also northern conquerors, were

ultra-orthodox Confucians. It has been customary in China, for many

centuries, for the literati to be pure Confucians, sceptical in religion

but not in morals, while the rest of the population believed and

practised all three religions simultaneously. The Chinese have not the

belief, which we owe to the Jews, that if one religion is true, all

others must be false. At the present day, however, there appears to be

very little in the way of religion in China, though the belief in magic

lingers on among the uneducated. At all times, even when there was

religion, its intensity was far less than in Europe. It is remarkable

that religious scepticism has not led, in China, to any corresponding

ethical scepticism, as it has done repeatedly in Europe.

3. I come now to the system of selecting officials by competitive

examination, without which it is hardly likely that so literary and

unsuperstitious a system as that of Confucius could have maintained its

hold. The view of the modern Chinese on this subject is set forth by the

present President of the Republic of China, Hsu Shi-chang, in his book

on _China after the War_, pp. 59-60.[22] After considering the

educational system under the Chou dynasty, he continues:

In later periods, in spite of minor changes, the importance of

moral virtues continued to be stressed upon. For instance, during

the most flourishing period of Tang Dynasty (627-650 A.D.), the

Imperial Academy of Learning, known as Kuo-tzu-chien, was

composed of four collegiate departments, in which ethics was

considered as the most important of all studies. It was said that

in the Academy there were more than three thousand students who

were able and virtuous in nearly all respects, while the total

enrolment, including aspirants from Korea and Japan, was as high

as eight thousand. At the same time, there was a system of

"elections" through which able and virtuous men were recommended

by different districts to the Emperor for appointment to public

offices. College training and local elections supplemented each

other, but in both moral virtues were given the greatest

emphasis.

Although the Imperial Academy exists till this day, it has never

been as nourishing as during that period. For this change the

introduction of the competitive examination or Ko-chü system,

must be held responsible. The "election" system furnished no

fixed standard for the recommendation of public service

candidates, and, as a result, tended to create an aristocratic

class from which alone were to be found eligible men.

Consequently, the Sung Emperors (960-1277 A.D.) abolished the

elections, set aside the Imperial Academy, and inaugurated the

competitive examination system in their place. The examinations

were to supply both scholars and practical statesmen, and they

were periodically held throughout the later dynasties until the

introduction of the modern educational regime. Useless and

stereotyped as they were in later days, they once served some

useful purpose. Besides, the ethical background of Chinese

education had already been so firmly established, that, in spite

of the emphasis laid by these examinations on pure literary

attainments, moral teachings have survived till this day in

family education and in private schools.

Although the system of awarding Government posts for proficiency in

examinations is much better than most other systems that have prevailed,

such as nepotism, bribery, threats of insurrection, etc., yet the

Chinese system, at any rate after it assumed its final form, was harmful

through the fact that it was based solely on the classics, that it was

purely literary, and that it allowed no scope whatever for originality.

The system was established in its final form by the Emperor Hung Wu

(1368-1398), and remained unchanged until 1905. One of the first objects

of modern Chinese reformers was to get it swept away. Li Ung Bing[23]

says:

In spite of the many good things that may be said to the credit

of Hung Wu, he will ever be remembered in connection with a form

of evil which has eaten into the very heart of the nation. This

was the system of triennial examinations, or rather the form of

Chinese composition, called the "Essay," or the "Eight Legs,"

which, for the first time in the history of Chinese literature,

was made the basis of all literary contests. It was so-named,

because after the introduction of the theme the writer was

required to treat it in four paragraphs, each consisting of two

members, made up of an equal number of sentences and words. The

theme was always chosen from either the Four Books, or the Five

Classics. The writer could not express any opinion of his own, or

any views at variance with those expressed by Chu Hsi and his

school. All he was required to do was to put the few words of

Confucius, or whomsoever it might be, into an essay in conformity

with the prescribed rules. Degrees, which were to serve as

passports to Government positions, were awarded the best writers.

To say that the training afforded by the time required to make a

man efficient in the art of such writing, would at the same time

qualify him to hold the various offices under the Government, was

absurd. But absurd as the whole system was, it was handed down to

recent times from the third year of the reign of Hung Wu, and was

not abolished until a few years ago. No system was more perfect

or effective in retarding the intellectual and literary

development of a nation. With her "Eight Legs," China long ago

reached the lowest point on her downhill journey. It is largely

on account of the long lease of life that was granted to this

rotten system that the teachings of the Sung philosophers have

been so long venerated.

These are the words of a Chinese patriot of the present day, and no

doubt, as a modern system, the "Eight Legs" deserve all the hard things

that he says about them. But in the fourteenth century, when one

considers the practicable alternatives, one can see that there was

probably much to be said for such a plan. At any rate, for good or evil,

the examination system profoundly affected the civilization of China.

Among its good effects were: A widely-diffused respect for learning; the

possibility of doing without a hereditary aristocracy; the selection of

administrators who must at least have been capable of industry; and the

preservation of Chinese civilization in spite of barbarian conquest.

But, like so much else in traditional China, it has had to be swept away

to meet modern needs. I hope nothing of greater value will have to

perish in the struggle to repel the foreign exploiters and the fierce

and cruel system which they miscall civilization.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: Legge's _Shu-King,_ p. 15. Quoted in Hirth, _Ancient

History of China_, Columbia University Press, 1911--a book which gives

much useful critical information about early China.]

[Footnote 2: Hirth, op. cit. p. 174. 775 is often wrongly given.]

[Footnote 3: See Hirth, op. cit., p. 100 ff.]

[Footnote 4: On this subject, see Professor Giles's _Confucianism and

its Rivals,_ Williams & Norgate, 1915, Lecture I, especially p. 9.]

[Footnote 5: Cf. Henri Cordier, _Histoire Générale de la Chine_, Paris,

1920, vol. i. p. 213.]

[Footnote 6: _Outlines of Chinese History_ (Shanghai, Commercial Press,

1914), p. 61.]

[Footnote 7: See Hirth, _China and the Roman Orient_ (Leipzig and

Shanghai, 1885), an admirable and fascinating monograph. There are

allusions to the Chinese in Virgil and Horace; cf. Cordier, op. cit., i.

p. 271.]

[Footnote 8: Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 281.]

[Footnote 9: Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 237.]

[Footnote 10: Murdoch, in his _History of Japan_ (vol. i. p. 146), thus

describes the greatness of the early Tang Empire:

"In the following year (618) Li Yuen, Prince of T'ang, established the

illustrious dynasty of that name, which continued to sway the fortunes

of China for nearly three centuries (618-908). After a brilliant reign

of ten years he handed over the imperial dignity to his son, Tai-tsung

(627-650), perhaps the greatest monarch the Middle Kingdom has ever

seen. At this time China undoubtedly stood in the very forefront of

civilization. She was then the most powerful, the most enlightened, the

most progressive, and the best governed empire, not only in Asia, but on

the face of the globe. Tai-tsung's frontiers reached from the confines

of Persia, the Caspian Sea, and the Altai of the Kirghis steppe, along

these mountains to the north side of the Gobi desert eastward to the

inner Hing-an, while Sogdiana, Khorassan, and the regions around the

Hindu Rush also acknowledged his suzerainty. The sovereign of Nepal and

Magadha in India sent envoys; and in 643 envoys appeared from the

Byzantine Empire and the Court of Persia."]

[Footnote 11: Cordier, op. cit. ii. p. 212.]

[Footnote 12: Cordier, op. cit. ii. p. 339.]

[Footnote 13: Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 484.]

[Footnote 14: _The Truth About China and Japan_. George Allen & Unwin,

Ltd., pp. 13, 14.]

[Footnote 15: For example, the nearest approach that could be made in

Chinese to my own name was "Lo-Su." There is a word "Lo," and a word

"Su," for both of which there are characters; but no combination of

characters gives a better approximation to the sound of my name.]

[Footnote 16: Giles, op. cit., p. 74. Professor Giles adds, _à propos_

of the phrase "maintaining always a due reserve," the following

footnote: "Dr. Legge has 'to keep aloof from them,' which would be

equivalent to 'have nothing to do with them.' Confucius seems rather to

have meant 'no familiarity.'"]

[Footnote 17: Op. cit., p. 21.]

[Footnote 18: Giles, op. cit. p. 86.]

[Footnote 19: Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 167.]

[Footnote 20: As far as anti-militarism is concerned, Taoism is even

more emphatic. "The best soldiers," says Lao-Tze, "do not fight."

(Giles, op. cit. p. 150.) Chinese armies contain many good soldiers.]

[Footnote 21: Giles, op. cit., Lecture VIII. When Chu Fu Tze was dead,

and his son-in-law was watching beside his coffin, a singular incident

occurred. Although the sage had spent his life teaching that miracles

are impossible, the coffin rose and remained suspended three feet above

the ground. The pious son-in-law was horrified. "O my revered

father-in-law," he prayed, "do not destroy my faith that miracles are

impossible." Whereupon the coffin slowly descended to earth again, and

the son-in-law's faith revived.]

[Footnote 22: Translated by the Bureau of Economic Information, Peking,

1920.]

[Footnote 23: Op. cit. p. 233.]

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