TWO STAGGERING BLOWS.
1.—_Woerth._
Alike in Alsace and Lorraine, the actions which made the 6th of August
a date so memorable in this swiftly moving war were undesigned on the
part of the assailant and unexpected on the part of the assailed. In
other words, as General von Moltke did not intend to throw the force
of his right and centre against the main body of the Imperialists
until all the Corps were closer to the frontier and to each other, so
the Crown Prince proposed to employ the day in changing front from
the south to the west and then direct his serried lines upon the
front and flanks of MacMahon’s Army, which he confidently expected
to find in position behind the Sulz and the Sauer, covering the road
to Bitsche. The despatches of the French Marshal also show that he
counted on a day’s respite, since his orders to De Failly were that
the two divisions commanded by that ill-used officer were to march on
the 6th to join the 1st Corps, so that they might be in line to fight
a battle on the following day. But De Failly, harassed by fluctuating
orders from Metz, shifted hither and thither, now to the right, now to
the left, and never permitted to keep his Corps in hand, was unable
to do more than start one division on the road to Reichshofen, while
he assembled the other at Bitsche, and left one-half the third on
the Saar to share the misfortunes of Napoleon and Bazaine. No such
hesitation and infirmity of purpose characterized the conduct of the
German commanders. They had well-defined plans, indeed, and issued
clear and precise orders, yet both the one and the other were so
framed that they could be modified to deal with unexpected incidents,
and adapted at once to the actually ascertained circumstances of the
moment, which is the very essence of war. The spirit of the German
training gives a large discretion to superior officers, who are taught
to apply the rules issued for their guidance to the military situation
which, in the field, is certain to vary from day to day, or even from
hour to hour. Moreover, a German general who attacks is certain to
receive the ready support of comrades who may be near, while those more
remote, who hear the sound of battle or receive a request for help, at
once hasten forward, reporting the fact to, without awaiting orders
from, superior authority. Nothing testifies more effectively to the
soundness of the higher education in the Prussian military system than
the fact that it is possible not only to confer these large powers on
subordinates, but to encourage the use of them. At the same time it
must be acknowledged that, in any army where the officers do not make
the study of war their daily and hourly business, and where the best
of the best are not selected for command and staff duty, the latitude
enjoyed by the Germans could not be granted, because its capricious and
unintelligent use would lead to needless bloodshed, the frustration of
great designs, and perhaps shameful defeat.
It has been already stated that both commanders had intended to assume
the offensive and fight a battle on the 7th, the Crown Prince proposing
to bring up the greater part of his Army and envelop the French,
and Marshal MacMahon, who thought he was dealing with the heads of
columns, having drawn up a plan to attack the Germans in front with the
1st and turn their right flank with the 5th Corps. Had he known how
strong and how compact was the array of his opponent he never could
have framed a scheme which would have transferred to the enemy all the
advantages possessed by himself. The contingency of a forward movement
on his part had been foreseen and guarded against, and the precautions
adopted on the evening of the 5th would have become far more formidable
had the next day passed by without a battle. But those very protective
measures, as will be seen, tended to precipitate a conflict by bringing
the troops into contact on the front and left flank of the French
position. Marshal MacMahon had selected and occupied exceptionally
strong ground. He posted his divisions on a high plateau west of
the Sauer and the Sulz, between Neehwiller and Eberbach, having
Froeschwiller as a kind of redoubt in the centre, and the wooded slopes
of the hills running steeply down to the brooks in his front. The
left wing, where General Ducrot commanded, was thrown back to guard
the passages through the woodlands, which led down the right bank of
the Sulz from Mattstal into the position. The centre fronted Woerth,
which was not occupied, and the right, without leaning on any special
protective obstacle, was in the woods and villages south-east of
Elsasshausen, with reserves in the rear which, says the German official
narrative, together with the open country, were a sufficient guard
against a direct flank attack, an opinion not justified by the result.
The Sauer was deep, the bridges had been broken, and the ascents on
the French side were prolonged, except on one point, and swept by
musketry and cannon. Among the vines and copses, in the villages
and farmsteads, everywhere protected by open ground, over which an
assailant must pass, stood the French Army—Ducrot on the left, facing
north-west, Raoult in the centre, Lartigue on the right, having behind
him Conseil-Dumesnil’s division of the 7th Corps. Pellé, who succeeded
Abel Douay, was in reserve; and the cavalry were partly in rear of the
right, and partly behind the centre. The official German history speaks
of the position as especially strong, regards the mass of troops seated
there, put down at forty-five thousand men, as amply sufficient for a
vigorous defence, and contends that the defect of numbers was balanced
by a respectable artillery and the superiority of the Chassepot over
the far-famed needle-gun. A Bavarian soldier-author, Captain Hugo
Helvig, however, says that the ground held by the French had all the
disadvantages of so-called “unassailable” positions—it had no issues to
the front, consequently the defenders could not become the assailants;
its right was “in the air” and its left “rested on that most doubtful
of all supports to wings—a wood.” Thus the Bavarian captain differs
from the General Staff. The fact seems to be that the position was so
formidable that it could only be carried by onsets on both flanks,
which, of course, implies that the assailant must have the control of
superior numbers. Another point to be noted is that the great road to
Bitsche was a prolongation of the front and in rear of the left, and
that, as happened, in case of a severe defeat, the temptation would
be all powerful to retreat by cross roads on Saverne, that is, away
from instead of towards the main body of the Imperial Army. Marshal
MacMahon had hoped to be the assailant, but he held that if the German
Army continued its march southward beyond Hagenau, he would have to
retreat, a movement the Crown Prince was not likely to make, since the
orders from the King’s head-quarters were to seek out and fight the
enemy wherever he might be found, a rule which governed all the German
operations up to the fatal day of Sedan.
Early on the morning of the 6th, the German columns were approaching,
from the north and the east, the strong position just described.
Hartmann’s Bavarians, after marching westward through the Hochwald
to Mattstal, had turned south, down the Sulzbach. The 5th Corps, in
position overnight at Preuschdorf, had, of course, strong advanced
posts between Goersdorf and Dieffenbach, while von der Tann’s
Bavarians were on the march from Ingolsheim, also through the lower
Hochwald road, by Lampertsloch upon Goersdorf and the Sauer. Further
to the left, the 11th Corps and Von Werder’s combined divisions were
wheeling up to the right, so as to extend the line on the outer flank
of the 5th Corps. The Hochwald rose five or six hundred feet above
the battlefield. Like most uplands, it was intersected by vales and
country roads, and nearly every hollow had its beck which flowed into
the principal stream. This was the Sauer. Rising in hills beyond
Lembach, it ran in a southerly direction along the whole German front,
receiving the Sulz at Woerth, and dividing into two streams opposite
Gunstett. These greater and lesser brooks, though spanned by few
bridges, were well supplied with mills, which always facilitate the
passage of streams. Large villages, also, filled up the valley bottoms
here and there, and the country abounded in cultivation. Through this
peopled and industrious region the main roads ran from north to south,
generally speaking, the road and railway from Bitsche to Hagenau,
and on to Strasburg, passing in rear of MacMahon’s position close to
Niederbronn and Reichshofen, and another highway to Hagenau, a common
centre for roads in these parts, descended from Lembach, and, after
crossing, followed the right bank of the Sauer. Thus there were plenty
of communications in all directions, despite the elevated, wooded and
broken character of a district, wherein all arms could move freely,
except cavalry.
_The Battle Begins._
The action was brought on by the eagerness of each side to discover
the strength and intentions of the other. In this way, General von
Walther, at daybreak, riding towards the Sauer, hearing noises in the
French camp, which he construed to mean preparations for a retreat,
ordered out a battery and some infantry, to test the accuracy of
his observations. The guns cannonaded Woerth, and the skirmishers,
finding the town unoccupied, but the bridge broken, forded the stream,
and advanced far enough to draw fire from the French foot and four
batteries. The Prussian guns, though fewer, displayed that superiority
over the French which they maintained throughout, and the observant
officers above Woerth knew, by the arrival of the ambulance men on
the opposite hills, that their shells had told upon the enemy. The
skirmish ceased after an hour had passed, but it served to show that
the French were still in position. Opposite Gunstett there stood a
Bruch-Mühle, or mill in the marsh, and in this place the Germans had
posted a company, supported by another in the vines. Their purpose was
to protect the left flank of the 5th Corps, and keep up a connection
with the 11th, then on the march. The French sent forward, twice,
bodies of skirmishers against the mill, supporting them the second time
by artillery, and setting the mill on fire; but on neither occasion
did they press the attack, and the Germans retained a point of passage
which proved useful later in the day.
These affairs at Woerth and Gunstett ceased about eight o’clock, but
the cannonade at the former, echoing among the hills to the north,
brought the Bavarians down the Sulz at a sharp pace, and thus into
contact with Ducrot’s division. For General Hartmann, on the highlands,
could see the great camp about Froeschwiller, and, directing his
4th Division on that place, and ordering up the reserve artillery
from Mattstal, the General led his men quickly down the valley. An
ineffective exchange of cannon-shots at long range ensued; but as the
Bavarians emerged into the open, they came within reach of the French
artillery. Nevertheless they persisted, until quitting the wood, they
were overwhelmed by the Chassepot and fell back. A stiff conflict now
arose on a front between Neehwiller and the Saw Mill on the Sulz, and
even on the left bank of this stream, down which the leading columns
of a Bavarian brigade had made their way. In short, Hartmann’s zealous
soldiers, working forward impetuously, had fairly fastened on to the
French left wing, striking it on the flank which formed an angle to the
main line of battle, and holding it firmly on the ground. The French,
however, had no thought of retiring, and besides, at that moment, they
had the vantage. When the combat had lasted two hours, General von
Hartmann received an order directing him to break it off, and he began
at once his preparations to withdraw. The task was not easy, and before
it was far advanced a request arrived from the Commander of the 5th
Corps for support, as he was about to assail the heights above Woerth.
It was heartily complied with, all the more readily, as the roar of a
fierce cannonade to the south swept up the valley; but as the Bavarians
had begun to withdraw, some time elapsed before the engagement on this
side could be strenuously renewed.
_Attack on Woerth._
We have already said that the Crown Prince, not having all his Corps
in compact order, did not intend to fight a battle until the next day.
But what befell was this. The officer at the head of the staff of the
5th Corps reached the front after the reconnaissance on Woerth was
over. Just as he rode up, the smoke of Hartmann’s guns was visible on
one side, and the noise of the skirmishers at Gunstett on the other. In
order to prevent the French from overwhelming either, it was agreed,
there and then, to renew the contest, and shortly after nine o’clock
the artillery of the 5th Corps, ranged on the heights, opened fire. At
the same time, a portion of the 11th Corps, hearing the guns, had moved
up rapidly towards Gunstett, and three of their batteries were soon in
line. Thus, the Bavarians rushed into battle in order to support the
5th Corps, this body resumed the combat to sustain the Bavarians, and
the advanced guard of the 11th fell on promptly, because the 5th seemed
in peril. The Prussian artillery soon quelled, not the ardour, but the
fire of the French gunners; and then the infantry, both in the centre
and on the left, went steadily into action, passing through Woerth,
and beginning to creep up the opposite heights. They made no way, and
many men fell, while further down the stream, opposite Spachbach and
Gunstett, part of the troops which had gone eagerly towards the woods,
were smitten severely, and driven back headlong over the river. Still
some clung to the hollow ways, Woerth was always held fast, and when
the foot recoiled before the telling Chassepot, the eighty-four pieces
in battery lent their aid, averted serious pursuit, and flung a shower
of shells into the woods. It was at this period that the defect of the
French position became apparent. If the hardy Gauls could repel an
onset, they could not, in turn, deliver a counter stroke, because the
advantages of the defensive would pass, in that case, to the adversary.
But the Germans across the Sauer, who still held their ground, had
much to endure, and were only saved by the arrival of fresh troops,
and by seeking every available shelter from the incessant rifle fire.
In the meantime, the 11th Corps was marching to the sound of the guns.
General von Bose, its commander, had reached Gunstett in the forenoon,
and, seeing how matters stood, had called up his nearest division, had
ordered the other to advance on the left, and had informed Von Werder
that an action had begun, in consequence whereof the Badeners and
Würtembergers were also directed on the Sauer.
It was about one o’clock when the Crown Prince rode up to the front
and took command. He had ridden out from Soultz at noon, because he
plainly heard the sounds of conflict, and on his road had been met by
an officer from Von Kirchbach, bearing a report which informed the
Commander-in-Chief that it was no longer possible to stop the fray. At
the time he arrived, the advanced brigade of Von der Tann’s Bavarians
had thrust itself into the gap between Preuschdorf and Goersdorf, and
had brought three batteries into action, but the remainder of the
Corps were still in the rear. The Crown Prince thus found his front
line engaged without any reserve close at hand, and that no progress
had been made either on the centre or the wings; but he knew that the
latter would be quickly reinforced, and that the former, sustained by
two hundred guns, constituted an ample guarantee against an offensive
movement. No better opportunity of grappling with a relatively weak
enemy was likely to occur, and it was to be feared that if the chance
were offered, he would escape from a dangerous situation by skilfully
extricating his Army. The Crown Prince, therefore, determined to
strike home, yet qualifying his boldness with caution, he still wished
to delay the attack in front and flank until the troops on the march
could reach the battlefield. No such postponement was practicable,
even if desirable, because the fighting Commander of the 5th Corps had
already, before the advice came to hand, flung his foremost brigades
over the Sauer. So the action was destined to be fought out, from
beginning to end, on places extemporized by subordinate officers; but
they were adapted to the actual facts, and in accordance with the
main idea which was sketched by the Chief. It may be said, indeed,
that the battle of Woerth was brought on, worked out, and completed
by the Corps commanders; and the cheerful readiness with which they
supported each other, furnished indisputable testimony to the soundness
of their training, the excellence of the bodies they commanded, and
the formidable character, as well as the suppleness of the military
institutions, which, if not founded, had been carried so near to
perfection by Von Roon, Von Moltke and the King.
Begun in the early morning by a series of skirmishes on the river
front, the action had developed into a battle at mid-day. The resolute
Von Kirchbach, acting on his own responsibility, had thrown the entire
5th Corps into the fight; yet so strong was the position occupied by
the defenders, that a successful issue depended upon the rapidity
and energy with which the assaults on both flanks were conducted by
brigades and divisions only then entering one after the other upon
a fiercely contested field. At mid-day, the French line of battle
had been nowhere broken or imperilled. Hartmann’s Bavarians on one
side had been checked; the advance brigade of the 11th Corps, on the
other, had been driven back over the Sauer, and Lartigue’s troops
were actually pressing upon the bridges near the mill in the marsh,
which, however, they could not pass. The enormous line of German guns
restrained and punished the French infantry, when not engaged in
silencing the inferior artillery of the defender. But no impression
had been made upon the wooded heights filled with the soldiers of
Ducrot, upon Raoult’s men in the centre above Woerth, or on Lartigue’s
troops, who, backed by Conseil-Dumesnil, stood fast about Morsbronn,
Eberbach, and Elsasshausen. So it was at noon, when the hardihood of
Von Kirchbach forced on a decisive issue. Passing his men through, and
on both sides of Woerth, he began a series of sustained attacks upon
Raoult, who stiffly contested every foot of woodland, and even repelled
the assailants, who, nevertheless, fighting with perseverance, and
undismayed by the slaughter, gradually gained a little ground on both
sides of the road to Froeschwiller. By comparatively slow degrees,
they crept up the slopes, and established a front of battle; but the
regiments, battalions, companies, were all mixed together, and, as
the officers fell fast, the men had often to depend upon themselves.
While these alternately advancing, receding, and yet again advancing
troops were grappling with the centre, Hartmann renewed his onsets,
part of Von der Tann’s Corps dashed over the Sauer, filling up the gap
in the line, and joining his right to Hartmann’s left; and the leading
brigades of a fresh division of the 11th Corps, moving steadily and
swiftly over the river below Gunstett, backed by all the cannon which
the nature of the ground permitted the gunners to use, assailed the
French right with measured and sustained fury, and, indeed, decided the
battle.
_Attack on the French right._
The French were posted in great force on their right—where they had
two divisions, one in rear of the other, between the Sauer and the
Eberbach, having in support a powerful brigade of horsemen, Cuirassiers
and Lancers, under General Michel. The infantry, as a rule, faced to
the eastward; while the attacking columns not only fronted to the
westward, but also to the north-west; in other words, they fastened
on the front from Spachbach, struck diagonally at the outer flank
from Morsbronn, and even swept round towards the rear. The area of
the combat on this part of the field was included on an oblong space
bounded on the west by the Eberbach, and on the east by the Sauer,
having Morsbronn at the south-eastern angle and outside the French
lines; Albrechtshaüser, a large farmstead, a little to the north of the
former, and opposite Gunstett; and beyond that point to the north-west
the undulating wooded uplands, called the Niederwald, whence the
ground slightly fell towards Elsasshausen, and rose again to a greater
height at Froeschwiller, the centre and redoubt of the position. As
the 22nd Division of the 11th Corps came up from Dürrenbach, they
broke obliquely into this oblong, the direction of their attack
mainly following the cross road through the forest from Morsbronn to
Elsasshausen, while their comrades pierced the woods to the north of
the great farmstead. No difficulty was encountered in expelling the
handful of French from the village, but at the farm the Germans had
a sharper combat, which they won by a converging movement, yet the
defenders had time to retire into the forest. Thus two useful supports
were secured, almost perpendicular to the French flank, and the
pathways leading towards Reichshofen were uncovered. General Lartigue
at once discerned the peril, and, in order that he might obtain time
to throw back his right, he directed General Michel to charge the left
flank of the Germans before they could recover from the confusion
consequent on a rapid and irregular advance through the villages,
outbuildings, and hopfields, and array a less broken front.
The French cavalry appear to have considered that their main function
was restricted to combats in great battles. The traditions handed
down from the days of Kellerman and Murat and Lasalle survived in all
their freshness, and the belief prevailed that a charge of French
horseman, pushed home, would ride over any infantry, even in serried
formation. They had disdained to reckon with the breech-loader in the
hands of cool, well-disciplined opponents; and as their chance of
acting on their convictions had come, so they were ready and willing
to prove how strong and genuine was their faith in the headlong
valour of resolute cavaliers. Instead of using one regiment, Michel
employed both, and a portion of the 6th lancers as well. He started
forth from his position near Eberbach, his horsemen formed in echelon
from the right, the 8th Cuirassiers leading in column of squadrons,
followed by the 9th and the Lancers. Unluckily for them, they had to
traverse ground unsuitable for cavalry. Here groups of trees, there
stumps, and again deep drains, disjointed the close formations, and
when they emerged into better galloping ground, indeed before they had
quitted the obstructions, these gallant fellows were exposed to the
deadly fire of the needle-gun. Nevertheless, with fiery courage, the
Cuirassiers dashed upon the scattered German infantry, who, until the
cavalry approached, had been under a hail of shot from the Chassepots
in the Niederwald. Yet the Teutons did not quail, form square, or run
into groups—they stood stolidly in line, hurled out a volley at three
hundred yards, and then smote the oncoming horsemen with unintermitted
fire. The field was soon strewn with dead and wounded men and horses;
yet the survivors rushed on, and sought safety by riding round the
German line or through the village, where they were brought to bay,
and captured by the score. Each regiment, as it rode hardily into the
fray, met with a similar fate, and even the fugitives who got into the
rear were encountered by a Prussian Hussar regiment, and still further
scattered, so that very few ever wandered back into the French lines.
As a charge Michel’s valiant onset was fruitless; yet the sacrifice
of so many brave horsemen secured a great object—it enabled General
Lartigue to throw back his right, rearrange his defensive line in the
woods, and renew the contest by a series of violent counter-attacks.
A furious outburst of the French infantry from the south-west angle
of the Niederwald overpowered the German infantry, and drove them
completely out of the farmstead so recently won. Yet the victors could
not hold the place, because the batteries north of Gunstett at once
struck and arrested them with a heavy fire, which gave time for fresh
troops to move rapidly into line, restore the combat, and once more
press back the dashing French infantry into the wood. On this point
the fighting was rough and sustained, for the French charged again and
again, and did not give way until the Germans on their right, forcing
their way through the wood, had crowned a summit which turned the line.
The sturdy adversary, who yielded slowly, was now within the forest,
and the German troops on the left had come up to Eberbach, capturing
MacMahon’s baggage, thus developing a connected front from stream to
stream across the great woodland. In short, nearly all the 11th Corps
was solidly arrayed, and in resistless motion upon the exposed flank
of MacMahon’s position, while part of the Würtembergers, with some
horse, were stretching forward beyond the Eberbach, and heading for
Reichshofen itself. The Germans, indeed, had gained the north-western
border of the woodland, and General von Bose had ordered the one-half
of his guns and his reserve of foot to cross the Sauer, and push the
battle home. His right was now in connection with the left of the
5th Corps, which had continued its obstinate and sanguinary conflict
with Raoult’s division on both sides of the road from Woerth to
Froeschwiller, without mastering much ground. As the Bavarians were
equally held at bay by the French left, the issue of the battle plainly
depended on the vigorous and unfaltering energies of the 11th Corps.
_Attack on Elsasshausen._
That fine body had been in action for two hours and a half, and,
despite a long march on to the field, was still fresh, its too
impetuous advanced brigade, alone, having been roughly handled, and
thrust back earlier in the day. The task now before them was the
capture of Elsasshausen, which would open the road to Froeschwiller,
take off the pressure from the 5th Corps, place Ducrot’s steadfast
infantry in peril, and enable the whole available mass of German troops
to close in upon the outnumbered remnant of MacMahon’s devoted Army.
For these brave men, although obliged to give ground, were fighting in
a manner worthy of their old renown, now dashing forward in vehement
onslaughts, again striking heavy blows when overpowered and thrust
back. Lartigue’s and some of Raoult’s troops stood on the right and
left of Elsasshausen, supported by batteries on the higher ground,
and two cavalry brigades in a hollow near the Eberbach. The foremost
infantry occupied a copse which was separated from the main forest by
a little glade, and this defensive wooded post had, so far, brought
the extreme right of the 11th Corps to a stand. About half-past two,
the centre and left had come up to the north-western edge of the
Niederwald, and thus the French in the copse had fresh foes on their
hands. They replied by a bold attack upon the adversary, whose front
lines of skirmishers were immediately driven in. The gallant effort
carried the assailants into the great wood, but not far; for behind the
flying skirmishers, on both sides of the road, were troops which had
more or less maintained a compact formation. Instead of yielding before
the French advance, the German infantry, accepting the challenge, came
steadily forward along the whole front, bore down the skirmishers,
dispersed the supporting battalion, and, following the enemy with
unfaltering steps, crossed the glade, and drove him into, and out of,
the copse-wood, which had hitherto been an impassable obstacle. As the
entire line rushed forward, they arrived at the skirt of the wood, and,
coming at once under the fire of the French guns on the heights, and
the infantry in Elsasshausen, they suffered severe losses. Then their
own artillery drove up and went into action, setting the village on
fire, yet not dismaying its garrison. The tension was so great, and the
men fell so fast, that General von Bose resolved to risk a close attack
upon an enemy whose position was critical, and whose endurance had been
put to so exhausting a strain.
Thereupon, at the welcome signal, the bands of disordered foot
soldiers—for nearly every atom of regular formation had long
disappeared—dashed, with loud shouts, into the French position,
carrying the village at a bound, and, pushing up the hillsides,
took two guns and five mitrailleuses. The troops of the 11th had
now crossed the deep road running south-westward from Woerth, had
effected a junction with groups of several regiments belonging to
the 5th, which formed a sort of spray upon the inner flank; and had
besides, as already noted, extended south-westward towards the road
to Reichshofen. Once more the French strove, if not to retrieve a lost
battle, at least to insure time for retreat. They fell upon the Germans
along the whole line, making great gaps in its extent, and driving
the adversary into the forest; but here, again, the artillery saved
the foot, and, by its daring and effective fire, restored the battle,
giving the much-tried infantry time to rally, and return upon their
tracks. The Germans had barely time to recover from the confusion into
which they had been thrown by a furious onset, than the four Cuirassier
regiments, commanded by General Bonnemains, were seen preparing to
charge. Unluckily for these stout horsemen, the tract over which they
had to gallop was seamed with deep ditches, and barred by rows of low
trees, so that not only could no compact formation be maintained, but
the cavaliers were not, in some instances, able to reach their foes,
who were well sheltered among the vine-stocks, and behind the walls
of the hop-gardens. Moreover, the German infantry were assisted by
batteries of guns, which were able to begin with shells, and end with
grape-shot. The cavalry did all they could to close; but their efforts
were fruitless, and the enormous loss they endured may be fairly
regarded as a sacrifice willingly made to gain time for the now hardly
bested army to retire.
_MacMahon Orders a Retreat._
Indeed, the hour when a decision must be taken had struck, and
MacMahon, who had cleverly fought his battle, did not hesitate. He
determined to hold Froeschwiller as long as he could to cover the
retreat, and then fly to Saverne. For, although neither Hartmann
nor Von der Tann, despite their desperate onsets, had been able to
shake or dismay Ducrot, still, he was well aware that Raoult’s and
Lartigue’s divisions had been driven back upon Froeschwiller, and he
could see from the heights one fresh column of Bavarians moving towards
Neehwiller, on his left, and another descending from the Hochwald to
join the throng on the right bank of the Sulz. Moreover, two brigades
of Würtembergers had come up to support the 11th Corps, and one part
of them, with horsemen and guns, threatened Reichshofen, a Bavarian
brigade, as we have said, was heading for Niederbronn. In addition,
some of Ducrot’s intrenchments were carried by a Prussian Regiment on
the right of the 5th Corps, and it was evident that the fierce struggle
for Froeschwiller would be the last and final act of the tragedy. Yet,
so slowly did the French recede, that an hour or more was consumed in
expelling them from their last stronghold; and except on that point,
their does not seem to have been any serious fighting. The reason was
that the place was held to facilitate the withdrawal of such troops as
could gain the line of retreat, and although the disaster was great, it
would have been greater had not Raoult, who was wounded and captured in
the village, done his uttermost to withstand the concentric rush of his
triumphant enemies.
_The Close of the Battle._
No specific and detailed account, apparently, exists, of this last
desperate stand. But it is plain that, as the French centre and right
yielded before Von Kirchbach and especially Von Bose, as the impetuous
infantry onsets were fruitless, as the cavalry had been destroyed and
the French guns could not bear up against the accurate and constant
fire of their opponents, so the Germans swept onwards and almost
encircled their foes. When Ducrot began to retire, the Bavarians
sprang forward up the steeps and through the woods, which had held
them so long at bay; the stout and much-tried 5th Corps pushed onward,
and the 11th, already on the outskirts of Froeschwiller and extending
beyond it, broke into its south-eastern and southern defences; so that
portions of all the troops engaged in this sanguinary battle swarmed
in, at last, upon the devoted band who hopelessly, yet nobly, clung
to the final barrier. How bravely and steadfastly they fought may be
inferred from the losses inflicted upon the Germans, whose officers,
foremost among the confused crowd of mingled regiments and companies,
were heavily punished, whose rank and file went down in scores. Even
after the day had been decided, the French in Froeschwiller still
resisted, and the combats there did not cease until five o’clock. But
in the open the German flanking columns had done great execution on
the line of retreat. A mixed body of Prussian and Würtemberg cavalry
had ridden up on the extreme left, one Bavarian brigade had moved
through Neehwiller upon Niederbronn, and another had marched through
Froeschwiller upon Reichshofen. The horsemen kept the fugitives in
motion and captured _matériel_; the first mentioned Bavarian brigade
struck the division of General Guyot de Lespart, which had reached
Niederbronn from Bitsche; and the second bore down on Reichshofen.
The succouring division had arrived only in time to share the common
calamity, for assailed by the Bavarians and embarrassed by the flocks
of fugitives, one-half retreated with them upon Saverne, and the other
hastily retraced its steps to Bitsche, marching through the summer
night. The battle had been so destructive and the pursuit so sharp
that the wrecks of MacMahon’s shattered host hardly halted by day or
night until they had traversed the country roads leading upon Saverne,
whence they could gain the western side of the Vosges. Nor did all his
wearied soldiers follow this path of safety. Many fled through Hagenau
to Strasburg, more retreated with the brigade of Abbatucci to Bitsche,
and nine thousand two hundred officers and men remained behind as
prisoners of war. The Marshal’s Army was utterly ruined, Strasburg was
uncovered, the defiles of the Vosges, except that of Phalsbourg, were
open to the invader who, in addition to the mass of prisoners, seized
on the field, in some cases after a brilliant combat, twenty-eight
guns, five mitrailleuses, one eagle, four flags, and much _matériel_ of
war. The actual French loss in killed and wounded during the fight did
not exceed six thousand; while the victors, as assailants, had no fewer
than 489 officers and 10,153 men killed and wounded. It was a heavy
penalty, and represents the cost of a decisive battle when forced on by
the initiative of Corps commanders before the entire force available
for such an engagement could be marched up within striking distance of
a confident and expectant foe.
One other consequence of an unforeseen engagement was that the 5th
Division of cavalry, which would have been so useful towards the
close of the day, was unable to enter the field until nightfall. The
Crown Prince and General Blumenthal, not having the exact information
which might have been supplied by horsemen who rode at the heels of
the fugitives, remained in doubt as to the line or lines of retreat
which they followed. It was not until the next day that reports were
sent in which suggested rather than described whither the French Army
had gone. Prince Albrecht, who led the cavalry, had hastened forward
to Ingweiler, on the road to Saverne, but he notified that, though a
considerable body had fled by this route, the larger part had retired
towards Bitsche. Later on the 7th he entered Steinburg, where he
was in contact with the enemy, but, as infantry were seen, he was
apprehensive of a night attack from Saverne, and judged it expedient
to fall back upon Buchswiller. The division had ridden more than forty
miles in a difficult country during the day. From the north-west
came information that the patrols of the 6th Corps had been met at
Dambach, and that the French were not visible anywhere. The explanation
of this fact is that one division of the 6th, directed on Bitsche,
had, in anticipation of orders, pushed troops into the hills, and
had thus touched the right of the main body. The reason why neither
MacMahon nor De Failly were discovered was that the Marshal had fallen
back to Sarrebourg, and that the General had hurried to join him by
Petite-Pierre; and thus contact with the enemy was lost by the Germans
because the defiles of the Vosges were left without defenders.
2.—_Spicheren._
As the critical hours drew nearer when the capacity of the Emperor
Napoleon and Marshal Lebœuf, applied to the conduct of a great war,
was to be put to the severest test, so their hesitation increased
and their inherent unfitness for the heavy task became more and more
apparent. Marshal Bazaine had been intrusted with the command of
three corps “for military operations only,” yet the supreme control
was retained in Metz, and the Corps commanders looked more steadily
in that direction than they did towards the Marshal’s head-quarters
at St. Avold. Along the whole front, at every point, an attack by the
enemy was apprehended. General de Ladmirault was convinced that the
7th Prussian Corps would strive to turn his left; Marshal Bazaine was
disturbed by the fear that the same body of troops would come upon him
from Saarlouis; General Frossard felt so uncomfortable in the angle
or curve on the Saar, which he occupied, that he vehemently desired
to see the Army concentrated in the position of Cadenbronn, a few
miles to the rear of Spicheren; General Montaudon, who had a division
at Sarreguemines, was certain that the enemy intended to swoop down
upon him; and General de Failly was in daily alarm lest the Prussians
should advance upon the gap of Rohrbach. At Metz all these conflicting
surmises weighed upon, we might almost say collectively governed the
Emperor and the Marshal, who issued, recalled, qualified, and again
issued perplexing orders. It is true that, owing to the supineness of
the cavalry, and the indifference of the peasantry on the border, they
were without any authentic information; but if that had been supplied
it is very doubtful whether they would have been able to profit by it;
and they were evidently unable to reason out a sound plan which would
give them the best chances of thwarting the adversary’s designs or of
facing them on the best terms. The sole idea which prevailed was that
every line should be protected; and thus, on the 5th, the Guard was at
Courcelles; Bazaine’s four divisions, hitherto echeloned on the line
from St. Avold to Forbach, were strung out on a country road between
St. Avold and Sarreguemines; De Ladmirault, who had been ordered to
approach the Marshal, misled by the apparition of Prussian patrols,
gave only a partial effect to the order; while Frossard, on the evening
of that day, instead of the next morning, made those movements to the
rear which attracted the notice of his opponents and drew them upon
him. At dawn on the 6th, “the Army of the Rhine” was posted over a
wide space in loosely-connected groups; yet, despite all the errors
committed, there were still three divisions sufficiently near the 2nd
Corps on the Spicheren heights to have converted the coming defeat into
a brilliant victory. That great opportunity was lost, because the
soldierly spirit and the warlike training, in which the French were
deficient, were displayed to such an astonishing degree by the Germans
whom they had so unwisely despised.
The watchful cavalry on the right bank of the Saar had noted at once
the retrograde movement which General Frossard effected on the evening
of the 5th, and the German leaders were led to infer from the tenour of
the reports sent in, that the whole French line was being shifted to
the rear, which was not a correct inference at that moment. Yet it was
true and obvious that Frossard had withdrawn from the hills in close
proximity to Saarbrück. In order to ascertain, if possible, how far
and in what degree the French had retired, small parties of horsemen
crossed the river soon after daylight, and rode, not only along the
direct route to Forbach until they were stopped by cannon fire, but
swept round the left flank, and even looked into the rear, observed
the French camps, and alarmed both Marshal Bazaine and General de
Ladmirault. Above Sarreguemines they tried to break up the railway,
and did destroy the telegraph; and thus, by appearing on all sides,
these enterprising mounted men filled the adversary with apprehensions,
and supplied their own Generals with sound intelligence. Some
information, less inaccurate than usual, must have reached the Imperial
head-quarters at Metz, seeing that a telegram sent thence, between four
and five in the morning, warned Frossard that he might be seriously
attacked in the course of the day; but it does not appear that the same
caution was transmitted to Bazaine, with or without instructions to
support his comrade. It is a nice question whether the general conduct
of the war suffered the greater damage from the active interference or
the negligence of the Emperor and his staff.
While the cavalry were keeping the French well in view, the leading
columns of the 7th and 8th Corps were moving up towards the Saar,
and one division of the Third was equally on the alert. General von
Rheinbaben had already ridden over the unbroken bridges, had posted
some squadrons on the lower ground, and had drawn a sharp fire from
the French guns. The German staff were astonished when they learned
that the bridges had not been injured. The reason was soon apparent.
The Emperor still cherished the illusion that he might be able to
assume the offensive, a course he had prepared for by collecting
large magazines at Forbach and Sarreguemines on the very edge of the
frontier; and his dreams were now to be dispelled by the rude touch of
the zealous and masterful armies whose active outposts were now over
the Saar.
_The Battle-field._
The ground occupied by the 2nd Corps was an undulating upland lying
between the great road to Metz and the river, which, running in a
northerly direction from the spurs of the Vosges, turns somewhat
abruptly to the west a couple of miles above Saarbrück on its way
to the Moselle. The heights of Spicheren, partly wooded and partly
bare, fall sharply to the stream in the front and on the eastern
flank, while on the west lies the hollow through which the highway and
the railroad have been constructed. The foremost spur of the mass,
separated by a valley from the Spicheren hills, is a narrow rocky
eminence, which Frossard names the Spur, and the Germans call the
Rotheberg, or Red Hill, because its cliffs were so bright in colour,
and shone out conspicuously from afar. On the French right of this
rugged cliff were dense woods, and on the left the vale, having beyond
it more woods, and towards Forbach, farms, houses and factories.
The upper or southern end was almost closed by the large village
of Stiring-Wendel, inhabited by workers in iron, and having on the
outskirts those unseemly mounds of slag with which this useful industry
defaces the aspect of nature. The village stands between the road
and railway, and as the heights rise abruptly on each side, all the
approaches, except those through the woods on the west and north-west,
were commanded by the guns and infantry on the slopes. It should be
noted that west of the neck which connected the red horse-shoe shaped
hill with the central heights in front of Spicheren village, there
is a deep, irregular, transversal valley, which proved useful to the
defence. General Frossard placed Laveaucoupet’s division upon the
Spicheren hills, in two lines, and occupied the Red Hill, which he
had intrenched, with a battalion of Chasseurs. In rear of all stood
Bataille’s division at Œtingen. On the left front, Jolivet’s brigade of
Vergé’s division occupied Stiring, and Valazé’s was placed to the west
of Forbach, looking down the road to Saarlouis. As Frossard dreaded
an attack from that side, especially as the road up the valley from
Rosseln turned the position, his engineer-general threw up a long
intrenchment, barring the route. It was in this order that the 2nd
Corps stood when some daring German horsemen trotted up the high road
to feel for it, while others, on the west, pressed so far forward that
they discerned the camps at St. Avold. Below the front of the position,
and just outside Saarbrück, the foot-hills, Reppertsberg, Galgenberg,
Winterberg, and so on, and the hollows among them were unoccupied by
the French, and it was into and upon these that Rheinbaben pushed with
his cavalry and guns, which, from the Parade ground, exchanged shots
with the French pieces established on the Red Hill or Spur.
_The Germans begin the Fight._
On the German side, the determination to lay hands upon, and arrest
what was supposed to be a retreating enemy, was identical and
simultaneous; and it is the spontaneous activity of every officer
and soldier within reach, to share in the conflict which is the
characteristic of the day’s operations. General Kameke, commanding the
14th Division, 7th Corps, when on the march, heard that Frossard had
drawn back, and, asking whether he might cross the river, was told
to act on his own judgment; so he pressed southward. General Goeben,
chief of the 8th Corps, had ridden out to judge for himself, and
finding his comrades of the 7th ready to advance, offered his support.
General von Alvensleben, commanding the 3rd Corps, a singularly alert
and ready officer, ordered up his 5th Division, commanded by General
von Stülpnagel, but before the order arrived, General Doering, who had
been early to the outposts, had anticipated the command, because he
thought that Kameke might be overweighted. General von Schwerin, later
in the day, collected his brigade at St. Ingbert, and sent a part of
them forward by rail. In like manner General von Barnekoff, commanding
the 16th Division, 8th Corps, hearing the sound of artillery, had
anticipated the desire of Goeben, and by mid-day his advanced guard,
under Colonel von Rex, was close upon the scene of action. General von
Zastrow, who had permitted Kameke to do what he thought fit, applied
to Von Steinmetz for leave to push forward the whole 7th Corps, and
the fiery veteran at once complied, saying, “The enemy ought to be
punished for his negligence,” a characteristic yet not necessarily a
wise speech, as the business of a General is not to chastise even the
negligent, unless it serves the main purpose of the operations in
hand. Thus we see that the mere noise of battle attracted the Germans
from all quarters; and hence it happened that the fronts of the two
armies, then in line of march, hastened into a fight by degrees—in
detachments, so to speak—which would have produced a heavy reverse had
all the French brigade and divisional commanders who were within hail,
been as prompt, persistent and zealous as their impetuous opponents.
Until near noontide, there had been merely a bickering of outposts,
chiefly on the north-western side; and it was only when the 14th
Division crossed the river and moved up the foothills, that the action
really began. At this time it was still supposed that the battalions,
batteries, and sections of horsemen visible were a rear-guard, covering
what is now called the “entrainment” of troops at Forbach; for the
greater part of Laveaucoupet’s soldiers were below the crests, and in
the forest-land, while Jolivet’s brigade made no great show in and
about the village of Stiring. Kameke’s young soldiers went eagerly and
joyously into their first battle. They consisted of six battalions, led
by General von François, and were soon extended from the Metz road on
the German right, to the wooded ascents east of the Red Hill, which,
in reality, became the main object of attack. The plan followed was
the favourite tactical movement, so often practised with success—a
direct onset on the enemy’s front, and an advance on both flanks. These
operations were supported by the fire of three batteries, which soon
obliged the French gunners on the Red Spur to recede. An extraordinary
and almost indescribable infantry combat now began over a wide space,
sustained by the battalions of the 14th Division fighting by companies.
On one side they endeavoured to approach Stiring; in the centre they
were a long time huddled together under the craigs of the Rotheberg;
further to the left they dashed into the Giffert Wald, and emerged
into comparatively open ground, only to find themselves shattered by
a heavy fire, and obliged to seek cover. For the battalions engaged
soon discovered that, instead of a rear-guard, they had to encounter
half a _corps d’armée_; and, although reinforcements were rapidly
approaching, yet, as the afternoon wore on, it became evident that
the assailants could only maintain their footing by displaying great
obstinacy, and enduring bitter losses. After two hours’ hard fighting
five fresh battalions, belonging to Von Woyna’s brigade of Kameke’s
division came into action on the right, and sought to operate on the
French left flank, some following the railway, others pressing into
the thick woods on the west. The density of the copses threw the lines
into confusion, so that the companies were blended, and, as guidance
was almost impossible, trust had to be reposed in the soldierly
instincts and training alike of officers and men, and on the genuine
comradeship so conspicuous throughout all ranks of the Prussian Army.
Practically, at this moment, the French, although beset on all sides
by their enterprising foes, had a distinct advantage, for they smote
the venturesome columns as they emerged here and there, and it may be
said that, between three and four o’clock, the German artillery on the
Galgenberg and Folster Höhe, held the French in check, and averted
an irresistible offensive movement. Yet the German infantry were
tenacious; when pressed back they collected afresh in groups, and went
on again; and General Frossard was so impressed by the audacity of his
foes, that he brought up Bataille’s division from Œtingen, and directed
Valazé to quit the hill above Forbach, and reinforce the defenders of
Stiring. Indeed, threatened on both flanks, the whole of the 2nd Corps
was gradually drawn into the fray, and its commander, though somewhat
late, appealed for aid to Marshal Bazaine, who himself did not feel
secure at St. Avold.
_The Red Hill Stormed._
Shortly after three o’clock, General von François, obeying the orders
of his chief, Von Kameke, resolved to storm the Red Hill. The German
leader was under the impression that the French were yielding on all
sides, which was not strictly correct, for the fresh troops were just
coming into action, and the Germans were superior, alone, in the range
and accuracy of their superb artillery. The gallant François, sword in
hand, leading the Fusilier battalion of the 74th Regiment, climbed the
steep, springing from ledge to ledge, and dashed over the crest, and
drove the surprised French chasseurs out of the foremost intrenchment,
and fastened themselves firmly on the hill. The Chasseurs, who had
retired into a second line of defences, poured in a murderous fire;
General von François, heading a fresh onset, fell pierced by five
bullets, yet lived long enough to feel that his Fusiliers and a company
of the 39th, which had clambered up on the left, had gained a foothold
they were certain to maintain. There were many brilliant acts of
heroism on that day, but the storming of the Red Hill stands out as the
finest example of soldiership and daring. Nor less so the stubbornness
with which the stormers stood fast; especially as the French, at that
moment, had thrown a body of troops against the German left, so strong
and aggressive, that the valiant companies in the Giffert Wald were
swept clean out of the wood.
Fortunately, at the same time, the advanced guards of the 5th and
16th Divisions, already referred to, had crossed the Saar. General
von Goeben, who had also arrived, took command, and formed a strong
resolution. He decided that, as the battle had reached a critical
stage, it would be unwise to keep reserves; so he flung everything
to hand into the fight, on the ground that the essential thing was
to impart new life to a combat which had become indecisive, if not
adverse to the assailant. Accordingly, the artillery was brought up
to a strength of six batteries, and one part of the fresh troops was
sent to reinforce the left, and another towards the Red Hill. Shortly
afterwards, Von Goeben had to relinquish the command to his senior,
Von Zastrow, the commander of the 7th Corps; but the chief business
of the principal leaders consisted in pushing up reinforcements as
they arrived; the forward fighting being directed by the Generals and
Colonels in actual contact with the enemy.
_Progress of the Action._
For two hours, that is, between four and six o’clock, the front of
battle swagged to and fro, for the French fought valiantly, and, by
repeated forward rushes, compelled their pertinacious assailants to
give, or repelled their energetic attempts to gain, ground. A German
company would dash out from cover, and thrust the defenders to the
rear; then, smitten in front and flank, it would recede, followed by
the French, who, taken in flank by the opportune advent of a hostile
group, would retreat to the woods, or the friendly shelter of a
depression in the soil. Nevertheless, in the centre, and on their own
left, the Germans made some progress. A battalion of the 5th Division
mastered the defence in the Pfaffen Wald on the French right; a group
of companies crowned the highest point in the Giffert Wald; and the new
arrivals, drawn alike from the 8th and the 3rd Corps, pushed up the
ravine on the east, and the slopes on the west of the Red Hill, until
their combined fire and frequent rushes forced the French out of their
second line of intrenchments on the neck of high land which connected
the Red Hill with the heights of Spicheren. The French strove fiercely,
again and again, to recover the vantage ground, yet could not prevail;
but their comrades below, in the south-west corner of the Giffert Wald,
stoutly held on, so that the fight in this quarter became stationary,
as neither side could make any progress.
On the German right, during the same interval of time, there had been
sharper alternations of fortune. Here the French held strong positions,
not only in the village of Stiring-Wendel, but on the hillsides above
it, and especially on the tongue of upland called the Forbacher Berg.
The assailant had succeeded in taking and keeping the farmsteads on the
railway, the “Brême d’or” and the “Baraque Mouton,” but the efforts of
General von Woyna to operate on the French left had been so roughly
encountered that he drew back his troops to a point far down the
valley. In fact, General Frossard had strengthened Vergé, who held fast
to Stiring, by Valazé’s brigade, and General Bataille had also sent
half his division to support his comrade. The consequence was that the
German projects were frustrated; while, on the other hand, their heavy
batteries on the Folster Höhe had such an ascendancy that the French
could not secure any advantage by moving down the vale.
Yet they were not, as yet, worsted in the combat at any point, save on
the salient of the Red Hill. Upon that eminence the German commanders
now determined to send both cavalry and guns. The horsemen, however,
could gain no footing, either by riding up the hillsides, or following
the zigzags of the Spicheren road, which ascends the eastern face
of the promontory. The artillery had better fortune. First one gun,
and then another, was welcomed by the shouts of the much-tried and
steadfast defenders; eight pieces first succeeded in overcoming all
obstacles; finally, four other guns, completing the two batteries,
came into action, and their fire was efficacious in restraining the
ardour of the French, and rendering the position absolutely secure from
assault. But they suffered great losses, which were inflicted not only
by the powerful batteries on the opposite height, but by the Chassepot
fire from the front and the Giffert Wald. The German commanders had
discovered by a harsh experience that the battle could not be won
either by an offensive movement from the centre, or flanking operations
on the left, because the neck of highland south of the Red Hill was too
strongly held, while the deep valley interposed between the forests and
the Spicheren Downs brought the flanking battalions to a halt, under
cover. It was then determined to employ the latest arrivals, the troops
of the 5th Division, in an effort to storm the Forbacher Berg from
the Metz road valley, and at the same time to renew a front and flank
attack upon Stiring-Wendel.
Here we may note two facts which are apt illustrations of that
efficiency, the fruit of wise forethought, which prevailed in the
German host. One is that a battery, attached to the 1st Corps, arrived
on the Saar, by railway, direct from Königsberg, on the confines of
East Prussia, and, driving up, actually went into position, and opened
fire from the Folster Höhe. It was the first light battery commanded by
Captain Schmidt, whose exploit was, then, at least, without parallel.
The other is that the 2nd battalion of the 53rd Regiment, starting at
six in the morning from Wadern, actually marched, part of the time
as artillery escort, nearly twenty-eight miles in thirteen hours,
and, towards sunset, stood in array on the field of battle. The like
goodwill and energy were displayed by all the troops; but this example
of zeal and endurance deserves special record.
_Frossard Retires._
The final and decisive encounters on this sanguinary field were
delivered on the western fronts. Four battalions were directed along or
near the Metz road upon the heights above Stiring, while the troops on
the extreme German right, which, it will be remembered, had suffered
a reverse, resumed their march upon the village. These simultaneous
onsets were all the more effective, because the French commander was
alarmed by the advance guard of the 13th Division, which, having
moved up from Rosseln, was now near to Forbach itself. He had become
apprehensive of being turned on both flanks, for Laveaucoupet was, at
that moment, engaged in a desperate, although a partially successful
strife against the Germans in the Giffert Wald. The flank attack on
the Forbacher Berg, skilfully conducted, drove back the adversary,
yet could not be carried far, because he was still strong and it was
growing dusk. In like manner, Stiring itself was only captured in part.
On the other hand, so vehement a rush was made upon the Giffert Wald
that the French once more penetrated its coverts. Practically, however,
the battle had been decided. General Frossard, receiving no support
from Bazaine’s divisions, greatly disturbed by the news that the head
of a hostile column was close to Forbach, unable to oust the Germans
from the Red Hill or effectively repel their onsets on the Metz road
had, half an hour before a footing on the Forbacher Berg was won, given
orders for a retreat upon Sarreguemines, so that the furious outburst
of French valour in the Giffert Wald was only the expiring flash of a
finely-sustained engagement, and the forerunner of a retrograde night
march.
Indeed, General Frossard is entitled to any credit which may accrue
from the stoutness with which he held his main position until
nightfall. He himself assigns the march of Von Golz from Rosseln upon
Forbach as the reason for his retreat. Having been obliged to leave
the heights north-west of Forbach practically undefended, in order
to support Vergé in Stiring-Wendel, he lost, or thought he had lost,
control over the high road and railway to Metz, and felt bound to
retire eccentrically upon Sarreguemines, a movement which it is not
easy to comprehend. It is true that the guns of Von Golz, firing from
the hills above Forbach, drove back a train bringing reinforcements
from St. Avold, but a couple of miles to the rear was Metman’s entire
division; and it was from and not towards this succour that the main
body of the French took their way. The most astonishing fact connected
with this battle is that during the whole day three of Bazaine’s
divisions were each within about nine miles of the battlefield. It
was not the Marshal’s fault that not one assisted the commander of
the 2nd Corps. Each had been directed to do so, but none succeeded.
General Montaudon did, indeed, move out from Sarreguemines, but halted
after covering a few miles. General de Castagny, as soon as he heard
the guns, and without waiting for orders, marched his division from
Puttelange; but, unluckily for him, the sound led him into the hills,
where the dense woods and vales obstructed the passage of the sound.
Hearing nothing he returned to Puttelange, but no sooner had he got
there than the roar of artillery, more intense than ever, smote his
ear. The ready veteran at once set out afresh, this time following the
route which would have brought him into the heart of the Spicheren
position. He was too late; night came on apace, the distant tumult died
down, he endeavoured to communicate with Frossard, but his messenger
only found Metman, who, coming on from Marienthal, had halted at
Bening, and did not move upon Forbach until nearly dark. Thus were
three strong divisions wasted, and a force which would have given
the French victory, spent the day in wandering to and fro or in weak
hesitation. General de Castagny was the only officer who really did
his utmost to support the 2nd Corps; for Metman awaited orders, and
they came too late. During the night, or early in the morning, they
all, except De Castagny, who was called up to St. Avold, assembled near
Puttelange, wearied and disgusted with their fruitless exertions; and
there they were joined by the 2nd Corps.
The Germans bivouacked on the field. They had had in action
twenty-seven battalions and ten batteries, and the day’s irregular
and confused fighting had cost them in killed and wounded a loss of
no fewer than 223 officers and 4,648 men; while the French lost 249
officers and 3,829 men, including more than two thousand prisoners.
The great disproportion is due to the fact that the Germans were the
assailants and that throughout the day and on all points they fought
the battle with relatively small groups, parts of the 7th, 8th, and 3rd
Corps, which arrived in succession on the scene. That the victory was
not more complete must be ascribed to the improvised character of the
conflict. Both Woerth and Spicheren were accidental combats due to the
initiative of subordinate officers, a practice which has its dangers;
but the success attained in each case is a striking proof that the
discipline and training of all ranks in the German Army had created a
living organism which could be trusted to work by itself.