INVASION IN EARNEST.
The first blow struck in the war—for the parade at Saarbrück does not
deserve the name of a blow—was delivered on the Lauter by the Crown
Prince. The French Army in Alsace, commanded by Marshal MacMahon, had
been collected at Strasburg from the garrisons in the Eastern region.
At first it consisted of the 1st Corps, which included four infantry
divisions, troops of the Line, to which were added, before the end of
July, three regiments of Zouaves, and three of native Algerians, which
were distributed among the French infantry brigades. There were three
brigades of cavalry, ninety-six guns, and twenty-four mitrailleuses,
the Emperor’s pet arm. The Divisional Commanders were Ducrot, Abel
Douay, Raoult, and Lartigue; and the horsemen were under the orders
of Duhesme. The 7th Corps, nominally at Belfort, under Félix Douay,
actually distributed in several places, one division being at Lyons,
another at Colmar, was also within the command of MacMahon; so that,
on the 4th of August, he was at the head of two Corps, one of which
was many miles distant from his head-quarters. He had, however, moved
forward with Ducrot and Raoult to Reichshofen and Lartigue to Hagenau,
while Abel Douay was pushed still further northward at Wissembourg,
which he reached on the 3rd, but with a portion only of his troops.
In fact, at that date, the army of MacMahon was strung out between
the Lauter and Lyons, and even the portion which may be described as
concentrated, consisted of fragments posted or on the march between
Wissembourg and Hagenau. That very morning, the 1st Division of the 7th
Corps started by railway from Colmar to join the Marshal. It was upon
this scattered array that the Crown Prince was advancing. MacMahon, who
had intended to assume the offensive himself on the 7th of August, did
not know how near and how compact was the host of his foes. Abel Douay,
established on the Lauter, was obliged to part with several battalions
to keep up his communications, through Lembach, with the main body. He
sent out a party on the evening of the 3rd, and early on the 4th, yet
each returned bearing back the same report—they had seen and learned
nothing of the enemy. Indeed, it would be difficult to find a single
instance in which the researches of the French were thrust far enough
to touch the Germans, all their reconnoitring excursions being carried
on in a routine and perfunctory manner. Nevertheless, they had a strong
force of cavalry in Alsace as well as Lorraine; but it was mostly in
the rear, rarely much, never far in front. On the other hand, the Baden
horsemen had looked, unseen themselves, into the French cavalry camp at
Selz, and the scouts on the hills had signalled the successive arrival
of battalions and artillery at Wissembourg. It must be stated, however,
that the Germans did not know, precisely, until they came in contact
with them, what forces were in, or were within reach of Wissembourg.
The object of the German forward movement was two-fold—if MacMahon had
crossed the Vosges to join the Emperor, Strasburg was to be invested,
and the rest of the Third Army was to pass through the hills to the
Saar and effect a junction with the Second. If the Marshal were
still east of the hills, then he was to be assailed wherever found.
Consequently, the whole Army was set in motion, but it was by a gift
of fortune, who, however, rarely favours the imprudent, that they were
enabled to defeat the division exposed to their onset. At four and six
in the morning, the Corps moved out on a broad front stretching from
the hills to the Rhine. Bothmer’s Bavarians, on the right, marched
direct on Wissembourg, followed by the other divisions of the Bavarian
Army. Next in order, to the left, came the 5th Corps, which was
directed upon Altenstadt; the 11th, which pushed through the Bien Wald;
and the Badeners, whose object was Lauterbourg; while the remainder of
the Army was still far to the rear.
_The Combat on the Lauter._
Wissembourg, a picturesque old town, standing upon the Lauter at a
point where it enters the plain, is defended by walls not armed with
guns, and surrounded by deep ditches filled from the stream, one arm
of which curves through the place. There were three gates. Under the
archway of the northern, named after the town of Hagenau, passed the
great road from Strasburg, which, turning to the eastward, quitted
the ramparts by the gate of Landau. The western gate, a mere entrance
cut through the wall, having in advance a small lunette, received the
road from Pirmasens. It took its name from the fort of Bitsche, but
the track from that place came down the folded hills by the Col du
Pigeonnier, or Dove-cote Neck, and joined the Strasburg highway just
outside the Hagenau gate. Beyond the walls were factories, pottery
fields, and mills; above and below were the once famous Lines of the
Lauter thrown up on, and following the right bank of the stream
through the forest to Lauterbourg; while on the foot-hills were vines,
which do not add to the beauty of any scene, and hop-gardens; and here
and there the usual rows of stiff trees bordering, yet not shading,
the roads. Distant about a mile or so to the eastward is a spur of the
Vosges, the Geisberg, thrust into the plain, falling steeply towards
it, and crowned by a substantial château, seated above terraces
difficult of access. From this elevation were visible, spread out like
a map, the woodlands stretching towards the Rhine, the roads to the
east and south, and the town, with its railway station, now silent,
near the gate of Landau.
As Abel Douay had only available about eight thousand troops, he
could not defend the approaches through the Bien Wald, or prevent a
turning movement round his right flank. Still, had he not been under
a delusion respecting the proximity of the enemy, he could and would
have destroyed the few bridges over the Lauter, and so disposed his
troops as not to be surprised. But his scouts had reported that the
foe was not near, and thus, when the Bavarian advance appeared on the
hills at eight o’clock and opened fire from a battery, the French
soldiers were engaged in the ordinary routine of camp labours. Startled
by the guns, they ran to their arms with alacrity; but an encounter
begun under such conditions is always disadvantageous to the assailed.
General Douay, an able soldier, came to a rapid decision. He placed two
battalions in the town, another with a battery at the railway station,
and posted the rest and twelve guns on the slopes of the Geisberg.
The walls and ditches of the town, the railway buildings, and part of
the Lauter Lines, brought the Bavarians to a stand, and the combat of
small arms and artillery on this point continued amid the vineyards
and hop-grounds, while the German centre and Left were swinging round
through the forest. The operation occupied considerable time, as two
hours passed by, from the firing of the first gun, before the leading
battalions of the 5th Corps were brought into play. At length, they
came into action against the railway station, and as the 11th Corps had
also developed an attack on the Geisberg from the east, it was evident
that the combat could not last long. The combined efforts of the
Bavarians and the Prussians, after severe fighting and some loss, drove
the French out of the station, and captured the town, together with a
battalion of the French regiment of the Line, the 74th, which was cut
off, and forced to surrender. The assailants had penetrated by the
gates after they had been broken in by artillery, and thus the town was
won. It was really the strong pivot of the defence, and its resistance
delayed the onset upon the Geisberg for some time. In the meantime,
General Abel Douay had been killed by the explosion of the ammunition
attached to a mitrailleuse battery; and the command had devolved upon
General Pellé.
The whole stress of the action now fell upon the Geisberg and its
castle. The height was steep, the building pierced for musketry and
strong enough to resist anything but cannon-shot. The front was
approached by successive terraces, and there was a hop-garden near
by on the Altenstadt road. The main body of the French and all their
artillery, except one disabled gun which had been captured after a
sharp fight, were on the hills to the south, threatened every moment
on their right flank by the development of the 11th Corps which had
entered the area of battle. The little garrison in the castle made a
stout resistance, slew many of the assailants, who swarmed upon all
sides, and compelled the more daring among them to seek shelter at
the foot of the walls. Then the Germans with great labour brought up
in succession four batteries, by whose fire alone they could hope to
master the obstinate defenders who had manned even the tiled roof with
riflemen. Surrounded, threatened with the weight of twenty-four guns,
and seeing their comrades outside in full retreat, the garrison which
had done its uttermost, surrendered as prisoners of war. They were two
hundred, had killed and wounded enemies amounting to three-fourths of
their own number, and had seriously injured General von Kirchbach,
the commander of the 5th Corps. When the castle had fallen the French
retired altogether. Making only one show of resistance they disappeared
among the hills, and what is remarkable were not pursued, for the Crown
Prince riding up, halted all the troops and even the cavalry who were
in full career on the track of the enemy. The Germans lost in killed
and wounded no fewer than 1,550 officers and men; but the French loss
is not exactly known. They left behind, however, nearly a thousand
unwounded prisoners, their camp, and one gun.
It may fairly be said of this combat, especially considering they were
surprised and greatly outnumbered, that the French sustained their old
renown as fighting men and that the first defeat, although severe,
reflected no discredit on the soldiers of the 1st Corps. By no chance
could they have successfully withstood the well-combined and powerful
onsets of their more numerous adversaries. Nevertheless, the death
of Douay, the defeat, and the disorganization of the division had a
profound moral effect, keenly felt at Metz and more keenly in Hagenau
and Reichshofen. Marshal MacMahon called for instant aid from the 7th
Corps; and the Emperor, moved by the news, decided to send him the
5th Corps, which General de Failly was at once ordered to assemble at
Bitsche and then move up the great road to Reichshofen. In the German
head-quarters and camps, on the contrary, there was rejoicing and that
natural accession of confidence in the breasts of the soldiers now
pressing towards the Saar which springs up in fuller vigour than ever
when they learn that their common standard has floated victoriously
over the first foughten field. The First and Second Armies were still
distant from the rocky steeps and thick woods where they also were
to gain the day; but the Third Army, which, by the way, was a fair
representative of South and North Germany, had actually crossed the
frontier, had penetrated into Alsace, through woods and field-works and
over streams renowned in story, and had inflicted a sharp defeat upon
the Gallic troops, whose rulers had challenged the Teutons to wager of
battle.
It is admitted that, on the evening of August 4th, the Germans had lost
touch of the adversary. The reason was that the 4th Cavalry Division,
which had been ordered up by the Crown Prince early in the day, had
found the roads blocked by an Infantry Corps, and the vexatious delay
prevented the horsemen from reaching the front before nightfall. So
difficult is it to move dense masses of men, horses, and guns, in
accurate succession through a closed country, along cross-roads and
field-lanes. The few squadrons at hand were not strong enough to
pursue on the several roads which radiate from Wissembourg, and the
defect could not be remedied until the next day. It was known that
the fugitives could not have followed the southern roads, yet there
were hostile troops in that direction, and it was surmised that they
must have retreated into the highlands by the western track, yet they
might have traversed another way, lying under the foot of the hills.
On the 5th of August, the cavalry, starting out at daylight, soon
gathered up accurate information. General von Bernhardi, with a brigade
of Uhlans, rode forward on the highway, into the Hagenau forest,
where he was stopped by a broken bridge guarded by infantry; but he
heard the noise of trains, the whistling of engines, and, of course,
inferred the movement of troops; while on the east, nearer the Rhine,
the squadrons sent in that direction were turned back both by infantry
and barricaded roads. Towards the west, a squadron of Uhlans crossed
the Sauer at Gunstett, a place we shall soon meet again; while Colonel
Schauroth’s Hussars found the bridge at Woerth broken, were fired on
by guns and riflemen, and saw large bodies in motion on the heights
beyond the stream. Hence it was inferred that the army of MacMahon was
in position about Reichshofen, an inference confirmed by the reports
from the Bavarians who had marched on Lembach, from the 5th Corps whose
leading columns attained Preuschdorf, with outposts towards Woerth, and
from the Badeners on the left, who found the enemy retiring westward.
At night, the Crown Prince’s Army had not wholly crossed the frontier.
In front, were Hartmann’s Bavarians at Lembach, the 5th Corps before
Woerth, the 11th, on the railway as far as Surburg; the Badeners
on their left rear behind the Selz; Von der Tann’s Bavarians at
Ingolsheim, and the head-quarters and 4th Cavalry Division at Soultz,
otherwise Sulz. The 6th Corps—having one division at Landau, formed a
reserve. MacMahon’s troops, except Conseil-Dumesnil’s division of the
7th Corps, near Hagenau, were all in position between Morsbronn and
Neehwiller behind the Sulz and the Sauer, a continuous line of water
which separated the rival outposts. The Emperor had placed the 5th
Corps at the disposal of MacMahon, yet he finally detained one-half of
Lapasset’s division at Saareguemines, and drew it to himself; while
that of Guyot de Lespart was sent, on the 6th, towards Niederbronn,
and Goze’s, not wholly assembled at Bitsche on the 5th, remained with
General de Failly, who, at no moment in the campaign—such was his
ill-fortune—had his entire Corps under his orders.
_French Position on the Saar._
We may now revert to the positions occupied by the rivals on both
banks of the Saar, in order to complete the survey of an extensive
series of operations which stretched without a break, in a military
sense, from the Rhine opposite Rastadt, towards the confluence of
the Saar and Moselle. If the German Head-Quarter Staff at Mainz,
considering how well it was served, and what pains were taken to
acquire information, remained in some doubt as to the positions and
projects of the Imperialists, at Metz, ill-served and hesitating, all
was bewilderment and conjecture. Neither the Emperor Napoleon, nor his
chief adviser Marshal Lebœuf, seemed capable of grasping the situation
now rapidly becoming perilous to them; they had, indeed, fallen under
an influence which tells so adversely on inferior minds—dread of the
adversary’s combinations; and, perplexed by the scraps of intelligence
sent in from the front, they adopted no decisive resolution, but waited
helplessly on events. No serious attempt was made to concentrate the
Army in a good position where it could fight, or manœuvre, or retreat,
although, as General Frossard and Marshal Bazaine both state such a
central defensive position had been actually studied and marked out,
in 1867. Whether the occupation of the country between Saareguemines
and Œtingen would have produced a favourable effect on the campaign or
not, it would have prevented the Army from being crushed in detail,
and have given another turn to the war. But there was no firmness nor
insight at Metz. The orders issued by the Emperor look like the work
of an amateur who had read much of war, but who possessed neither the
instincts of the born soldier, nor the indefatigable industry and
business-like skill of a man who, thrust into an unwonted employment,
compelling him to face hard realities, endeavours to cope with them by
a steady and intelligent application of the principles of common sense.
On the morning of the 4th, the Emperor did no more than shift his left
wing a little nearer to his centre, by bringing General de Ladmirault
into closer contact with Marshal Bazaine, leaving Frossard in front
of Saarbrück, and directing De Failly to assemble two divisions at
Bitsche, and report to Marshal MacMahon. The notion prevailing in
the Imperial head-quarters was, that the Germans designed to march
upon Nancy, which was not their plan at all, and that the 7th Corps,
reported to be on the march from Treves, might make an offensive
movement to protect Saarlouis, forgetting, as Frossard observes, that
their rule was concentration and not isolated operations; and that
the railroad from Saarbrück afforded the only serious inlet into
Lorraine. In the evening the news of Abel Douay’s defeat and “wound,”
not death, reached Metz, and created alarm, but did not cause any
serious modification of the Imperial plans. The next day the Emperor,
still retaining the supreme direction of the Army, and keeping the
Guard to himself, formally handed over the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Corps to
Marshal Bazaine, “for military operations only;” and the 1st, 5th,
partly at Bitsche, and 7th, mainly at Belfort, to Marshal MacMahon.
The incomplete 6th Corps, under Marshal Canrobert, had not yet moved
out from the camp at Chalons. Thus, there were practically two Corps
remote from the decisive points, and one in an intermediate position,
so handled by the Imperial Commander as to be useless. Not only was
the force called out for war scattered over an extensive area, but—and
the fact should be borne in mind—the fortresses were without proper
and effective garrisons, and, what was equally important, they had no
adequate stores of provisions, arms, and munitions; while the great
works at Metz itself, upon which such reliance had been placed, were
far from being in a defensive condition. Early on the 5th, in answer to
a suggestion from Frossard, who was always urging concentration, the
Emperor directed him, yet not until the 6th, to fix his head-quarters
at Forbach, and draw his divisions round about in such a manner
that, when ordered, he might remove his head-quarters to St. Avold;
instructions which left him in doubt, and inspired him with anxiety.
During the evening, however, acting on his own discretion, he thought
it fit to place his troops in fresh positions, somewhat to the rear
on the uplands of Spicheren, with one division, upon higher ground in
the rear, yet that step, though an improvement, did not remove his
apprehension respecting his left flank, which had been weakened by the
withdrawal of Montaudon’s division of the 3rd Corps to Saareguemines.
General Frossard has been much censured, but he was a man of real
ability, and almost the only general who, from first to last, always
took the precaution of covering his front with field works.
_German Position on the Saar._
We have indicated, in the preceding chapter, the stages attained by the
First and Second German Armies on the 4th; and have now only to repeat,
for the sake of clearness, a summary of their array on the evening of
the 5th. The several Corps of the Second were still moving up towards
the Saar. The 4th Corps was at Einöd and Homburg, the Guard near
Landstuhl; the 9th about Kaiserslautern, and the 12th a march to the
rear. Further westward, the 10th halted at Cusel, and the 3rd was in
its front, between St. Wendel and Neunkirchen. The First Army remained
in the villages where it was located on the 4th, that is the 7th and
8th between Lebach and Steinweiler, with one division of the incomplete
First Corps at Birkenfeld. On the evening of that day, however, General
Steinmetz issued an order of movement for the next, which carried
the leading columns of the 7th and 8th close to Saarbrück, and, as
a consequence, brought on the battle of Spicheren, the narrative of
which sanguinary and spirited fight will fall into its natural place
later on. As the main current of the campaign flowed Metzward, it will
be convenient to recount, first, the operations of the Crown Prince’s
Army, which though in a measure subsidiary, produced more telling and
decisive effects upon the fortunes of the French, than the engagement
which broke down their foremost line of battle on the Saar.