CHAPTER X

THE REMOVAL OF THE SOUTHERN INDIANS

It was not by chance that the Jacksonian period made large contribution

to the working out of the ultimate relations of the red man with his

white rival and conqueror. Jackson was himself an old frontier soldier,

who never doubted that it was part of the natural order of things that

conflict between the two peoples should go on until the weaker was

dispossessed or exterminated. The era was one in which the West guided

public policy; and it was the West that was chiefly interested in

further circumscribing Indian lands, trade, and influence. In Jackson's

day, too, the people ruled; and it was the adventurous, pushing,

land-hungry common folk who decreed that the red man had lingered long

enough in the Middle West and must now move on.

The pressure of the white population upon the Indian lands was felt

both in the Northwest and in the Southwest; but the pressure was

unevenly applied in the two sections. North of the Ohio there was

simply one great glacier-like advance of the white settlers, driving

westward before it practically all of the natives who did not perish in

the successive attempts to roll back the wave of conquest upon the

Alleghanies. The redskins were pushed from Ohio into Indiana, from

Indiana into Illinois, from Illinois and Wisconsin into Iowa and

Minnesota; the few tribal fragments which by treaty arrangement

remained behind formed only insignificant "islands" in the midst of the

fast-growing flood of white population.

In the South the great streams of migration were those that flowed down

the Ohio, filling the back lands on each side, and thence down the

Mississippi to its mouth. Hence, instead of pressing the natives

steadily backward from a single direction, as in the North, the whites

hemmed them in on east, west, and north; while to the southward the

Gulf presented a relentless barrier. Powerful and populous tribes were

left high and dry in Georgia, Tennessee, and Alabama--peoples who in

their day of necessity could hope to find new homes only by long

migrations past the settled river districts that lay upon their western

frontiers.

Of these encircled tribes, four were of chief importance: the Creeks,

the Cherokees, the Choctaws, and the Chickasaws. In 1825 the Creeks

numbered twenty thousand, and held between five and six million acres

of land in western Georgia and eastern Alabama. The Cherokees numbered

about nine thousand and had even greater areas, mainly in northwestern

Georgia, but to some extent also in northeastern Alabama and

southeastern Tennessee. The Choctaws, numbering twenty-one thousand,

and the Chickasaws, numbering thirty-six hundred, together held upwards

of sixteen million acres in Mississippi--approximately the northern

half of the State--and a million and a quarter acres in western

Alabama. The four peoples thus numbered fifty-three thousand souls, and

held ancestral lands aggregating over thirty-three million acres, or

nearly the combined area of Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

Furthermore, they were no longer savages. The Creeks were the lowest in

civilization; but even they had become more settled and less warlike

since their chastisement by Jackson in 1814. The Choctaws and

Chickasaws lived in frame houses, cultivated large stretches of land,

operated workshops and mills, maintained crude but orderly governments,

and were gradually accepting Christianity. Most advanced of all were

the Cherokees. As one writer has described them, they "had horses and

cattle, goats, sheep, and swine. They raised maize, cotton, tobacco,

wheat, oats, and potatoes, and traded with their products to New

Orleans. They had gardens, and apple and peach orchards. They had built

roads, and they kept inns for travelers. They manufactured cotton and

wool. . . . One of their number had invented an alphabet for their

language. They had a civil government, imitated from that of the United

States." Under these improved conditions all of the tribes were growing

in numbers and acquiring vested rights which it would be increasingly

difficult to deny or to disregard.

A good while before Jackson entered the White House the future of these

large, settled, and prosperous groups of red men began to trouble the

people of Georgia, Alabama, and other Southern States. The Indians made

but little use of the major part of their land; vast tracts lay

untrodden save by hunters. Naturally, as the white population grew and

the lands open for settlement became scarcer and poorer, the rich

tribal holdings were looked upon with covetous eyes. In the decade

following the War of 1812, when cotton cultivation was spreading

rapidly over the southern interior, the demand that they be thrown open

for occupation to white settlers became almost irresistible.

Three things, obviously, could happen. The tribes could be allowed to

retain permanently their great domains, while the white population

flowed in around them; or the lands could be opened to the whites under

terms looking to a peaceful intermingling of the two peoples; or the

tribes could be induced or compelled to move en masse to new homes

beyond the Mississippi. The third plan was the only one ever considered

by most people to be feasible, although it offered great difficulties

and was carried out only after many delays.

The State which felt the situation most keenly was Georgia, partly

because there an older and denser population pressed more eagerly for

new lands, partly--it must be admitted--because lands obtained by

cession were, under the practice of that State, distributed among the

people by lottery. The first move in this direction was to dispossess

the Creeks. As far back as 1802, when Georgia made her final cession of

western lands to United States, the latter agreed to extinguish the

Indian title to lands within the State whenever it could be done

"peaceably and on reasonable terms." This pledge the Georgians never

allowed the federal authorities to forget. After 1815 several large

tracts were liberated. But by that date the State wanted unbroken

jurisdiction over all of the territory within her limits, and her

complaints of laxness on the part of the Federal Government in bringing

this about became no less frequent than vigorous.

Near the close of his Administration President Monroe sent two

commissioners to procure a general cession; and at Indian Spring a

treaty was concluded in which the Creeks ceded practically all of their

lands between the Flint and the Chattahoochee rivers. The Senate

ratified the treaty, and the Georgians were elated. But investigation

showed that the Creeks who stood behind the agreement represented only

an insignificant fraction of the nation, and President Adams refused to

allow Troup, the irate Georgian Governor, to proceed with the intended

occupation until further negotiations should have taken place. Stormy

exchanges of views followed, in the course of which the Governor more

than once reminded Adams that Georgia was "sovereign on her own soil."

But in 1826 and 1827 treaties were obtained finally extinguishing Creek

titles in the State. Land west of the Mississippi was promised to all

Creeks who would go there.

The problem of the Cherokees was more difficult. By a series of

treaties beginning in 1785 the United States had recognized this people

as a nation, capable of making peace and war, of owning the lands

within its boundaries, and of governing and punishing its own citizens

by its own laws. At the close of Jefferson's second Administration the

tribe seriously considered moving west of the Mississippi, and shortly

after the War of 1812 most of the northern members resident in

Tennessee took the long-deferred step. The refusal of the Georgia

members to go with the Tenneseeans disappointed the land-hungry whites,

and from that time the authorities of the State labored incessantly

both to break down the notion that the Cherokees were a "nation" to be

dealt with through diplomatic channels, and to extend over them, in

effect, the full sovereignty of the State. In December, 1828, the

Legislature took the bold step of enacting that all white persons in

the Cherokee territory should be subject to the laws of Georgia; that

after June 1, 1830, all Indians resident in this territory should be

subject to such laws as might be prescribed for them by the State; and

that after this date all laws made by the Cherokee Government should be

null and void.

When Jackson became President he found on his desk a vigorous protest

against this drastic piece of legislation. But appeal to him was

useless. He was on record as believing, in common with most

southwesterners, that Georgia had a rightful jurisdiction over her

Indian lands; and his Secretary of War, Eaton, was instructed to say to

the Cherokee representatives that their people would be expected either

to yield to Georgia's authority or to remove beyond the Mississippi. In

his first annual message, on December 8, 1829, the President set forth

the principles that guided him from first to last in dealing with the

Indian problem. It would be greatly to the interest of the Indians

themselves, he said, to remove to the ample lands that would be set

apart for them permanently in the West, where each tribe could have its

own home and its own government, subject to no control by the United

States except for the maintenance of peace on the frontier and among

the tribes. Forcible removal was not to be contemplated; that would be

cruel and unjust. But every effort was to be made to bring about a

voluntary migration. One thing was to be clearly understood: any tribe

or group that chose to remain in Georgia must submit to the laws of the

State and yield its claim to all land which had not been improved. The

President was not indifferent to the well-being of the red men; but he

refused to recognize the Cherokees as a "nation" having "rights" as

against either Georgia or the United States. A few weeks after the

message was received Congress passed a bill creating an Indian

reservation beyond the Mississippi and appropriating five hundred

thousand dollars to aid in the removal of such Indians as should choose

to accept the offer of the Government.

The outlook for the Cherokees was now dark. Both the executive and

legislative branches of the Federal Government were committed to a

policy which offered only the alternatives of removal or subjection;

and, thus encouraged, the Georgia Legislature voted to proceed with the

extension of the full authority of the State over both the Cherokees

and the Creeks after June 1, 1830. To make matters worse, the discovery

of gold in the northeastern corner of the State in 1829 brought down

upon the Cherokee lands a horde of scrambling, lawless fortune seekers,

numbered already in 1830 by the thousand. None the less, the Cherokee

opposition stiffened. The Indian legislative council voted that all who

accepted lands beyond the Mississippi and settled on them should

forfeit their tribal membership, that those who sold their individual

property to emigrate should be flogged, and that those who voted to

sell a part or all of the tribal possessions should be put to death.

One resource remained to be exhausted in defense of the Indian claims;

this was the courts. But here again things went unfavorably. After many

delays a test case, Cherokee Nation vs. State of Georgia, was placed

upon the docket of the Supreme Court. The bill set forth the plaintiff

to be "the Cherokee Nation of Indians, a foreign State, not owning

allegiance to the United States, nor to any State of this union, nor to

any prince, potentate, or State other than their own," and it asked

that the Court declare null the Georgia Acts of 1828 and 1829 and

enjoin the Georgia officials from interfering with Cherokee lands,

mines, and other property, or with the persons of Cherokees on account

of anything done by them within the Cherokee territory. The Indians

were represented before the Court by two attorneys, one of them being

William Wirt; Georgia employed no counsel. The opinion of the Court as

announced at the January term, 1831, by Chief Justice Marshall was that

while the Cherokee nation was a State and had uniformly been dealt with

as such by the Federal Government since 1789, it was not a "foreign

State" within the meaning of the Constitution, and therefore was not

entitled to sue in that character in the courts of the United States.

"If it be true," the decision concluded, "that wrongs have been

inflicted and that still greater are to be apprehended, this is not the

tribunal which can redress the past or prevent the future. The motion

for an injunction is denied."

The case was thus thrown out of court. Yet the Cherokees were

recognized as a "domestic, dependent" nation, and there was nothing in

the decision to indicate that the extension of the laws of Georgia over

them was valid and constitutional. Indeed, in a second case that came

up shortly, Worcester vs. State of Georgia, the Court strongly backed

up the Indians' contention. Worcester was a Presbyterian missionary who

was imprisoned for violation of a Georgia statute forbidding white

persons to reside in the Cherokee territory without a license. The case

was appealed to the Supreme Court, and in the decision of March 10,

1832, Marshall affirmed the status of the Cherokees as a "nation"

within whose territory "the laws of Georgia can have no force, and

which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but with the

assent of the Cherokees themselves or in conformity with treaties and

with the acts of Congress." The statute was accordingly declared to be

unconstitutional and Worcester was ordered to be discharged.

This ought to have been enough to protect the Cherokees in their

rights. But it was not, and for two reasons: the contempt of Georgia

for the Court's opinions, and the refusal of Jackson to restrain the

State in its headstrong course. Already the state authorities had

refused to take notice of a writ of error to the Supreme Court sued out

in December, 1830, in behalf of a condemned Cherokee, Corn Tassel, and

had permitted the execution of the unfortunate redskin. The state court

now refused to issue a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of Worcester,

and the prisoner was held--precisely as if the law under which he was

convicted had been pronounced constitutional--until he was pardoned by

the Governor a year later.

This action on the part of the State was, of course, nothing less than

nullification. Yet Jackson did not lift a finger. "John Marshall has

made his decision," he is reported to have said; "now let him enforce

it." The South Carolinians were quick to seize upon the inconsistencies

of the situation. Nullification in their State was apparently one

thing; in Georgia, quite another. The very fact, however, that the

Georgians had successfully defied the federal Supreme Court did much to

encourage their neighbors in a course of similar boldness. Jackson's

leniency toward Georgia has never been wholly explained. He was

undoubtedly influenced by his sympathy with the purpose of the State to

establish its jurisdiction over all lands within its borders.

Furthermore he cherished an antipathy for Marshall which even led him

to refuse in 1835 to attend a memorial meeting in the great jurist's

honor. But these considerations do not wholly cover the case. All that

the historian can say is that the President chose to take notice of the

threats and acts of South Carolina and to ignore the threats and acts

of Georgia, without ever being troubled by the inconsistency of his

course. His political career affords many such illustrations of the

arbitrary and even erratic character of his mind.

Meanwhile the great Indian migration was setting in. Emulating the

example of Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi extended their laws over

all of the Indian lands within their boundaries; and in all parts of

the South the red folk--some of them joyously, but most of them

sorrowfully--prepared to take up their long journey. In 1832 the Creeks

yielded to the United States all of their remaining lands east of the

Mississippi. By the spring of 1833 the Choctaws and Chickasaws had done

the same thing and were on their way westward. Only the Cherokees

remained, and in his message of December 3, 1833, Jackson reiterated

his earlier arguments for their removal. Realizing that further

resistance was useless, a portion of the tribe signified its readiness

to go. The remainder, however, held out, and it was only at the close

of 1835 that the long-desired treaty of cession could be secured. All

Cherokee lands east of the Mississippi were now relinquished to the

United States, which agreed to pay five million dollars for them, to

provide an adequate home in the new Indian Territory created by

Congress during the preceding year, and to bear all the costs of

removing the tribe thither.

It was not alone the South, however, that witnessed widespread

displacements of Indian populations in the Jacksonian period. How the

Black Hawk War of 1832 grew out of, and in turn led to, removals in the

remoter Northwest has been related in another volume in this series. π

And, in almost every western State, surviving Indian titles were

rapidly extinguished. Between 1829 and 1837 ninety-four Indian

treaties, most of them providing for transfers of territory, were

concluded; and before Jackson went out of office he was able to report

to Congress that, "with the exception of two small bands living in Ohio

and Indiana, not exceeding fifteen hundred persons, and of the

Cherokees, all of the tribes on the east side of the Mississippi, and

extending from Lake Michigan to Florida, have entered into engagements

which will lead to their transplantation." With little delay the

Cherokees, too, were added to this list, although a group of

irreconcilables resisted until 1838, when they were forcibly ejected by

a contingent of United States troops under General Winfield Scott.

π See The Old Northwest, by Frederic Austin Ogg (in The Chronicles of

America).

All of this was done not without strong protest from other people

besides the Indians. Some who objected did so for political effect.

When Clay and Calhoun, for example, thundered in the Senate against the

removal treaties, they were merely seeking to discredit the

Administration; both held views on Indian policy which were

substantially the same as Jackson's. But there was also objection on

humanitarian grounds; and the Society of Friends and other religious

bodies engaged in converting and educating the southern tribes used all

possible influence to defeat the plan of removal. On the whole,

however, the country approved what was being done. People felt that the

further presence of large, organized bodies of natives in the midst of

a rapidly growing white population, and of tribes setting themselves up

as quasi-independent nations within the bounds of the States, was an

anomaly that could not last; and they considered that, distressing as

were many features of the removals, both white man and red man would

ultimately be better off.

The Reign of Andrew Jackson: A Chronicle of the Frontier in Politics · 第 10 / 11 章