CHAPTER IX

GOVERNING ON NATIVE LINES

The fundamental principle aimed at by the Government in Northern Nigeria

is indirect administration, i.e. administration through the native

rulers of the communities, the Chiefs and their executives, under the

supervision and with the assistance of the Residents. That was the policy

laid down by Sir Frederick Lugard in a series of comprehensive Memoranda

which form not the least notable feature of the great work he carried out

during his tenure of office, a work entirely creative, be it remembered,

a work of which the value can but grow in public estimation as the sense

of perspective deepens with the years, and as additional information

supplies what in the early days of the occupation was largely lacking.

That was the policy Sir Frederick Lugard’s successor, Sir Percy Girouard,

found in being, not, indeed, unthreatened, but enthusiastically upheld

by the most experienced members of the Political Staff. He not only gave

it his full official support and checked certain leanings of an opposite

kind, but he brought to bear upon the situation a personal sympathy,

an illuminating and penetrative genius which popularized the policy in

quarters previously hostile or indifferent. Sir Henry Hesketh Bell has

loyally followed in the footsteps of his predecessors. That nothing

should be allowed to divert us from keeping on the same road is the

writer’s conviction, for what it may be worth, after several years’ study

at a distance and recent investigations on the spot.

A genuine and honest endeavour is being made not only to rule through

the native Chiefs, but to rule through them on native lines. Too much

importance can hardly be ascribed to the distinction. The success

already attained would be thrown away if policy were deflected in the

direction of substituting European for native ideas. If the native

machine is expected to perform functions for which it is unqualified,

the works get out of gear. If the Chiefs are called upon to exercise

their authority in enforcing measures essentially alien to the native

constitution, their prestige over the individual lapses. They become

mere puppets, and indirect rule breaks down. I hope to make clear what

the native constitution is, and what is meant by ruling on “native

lines.” The difficulties of improving and purifying when required a

native administration, without impairing its general efficiency, are

always considerable. In Northern Nigeria they are, for several reasons,

peculiarly so. If the result, so far, has shown the wisdom of the

original conception, it has been due to the determination and tact of the

senior Political Residents, and to the excellence of the native material.

Our task has been furthered by the administrative capacities of the

Fulani Emirs. Some were, indeed, found unfit and had to be removed, but

the majority are increasingly showing themselves not only capable but

quite indispensable to the work of government.

It would, however, be mischievous to conceal the fact that indirect

rule in the proper sense of the term, _i.e._ involving the preservation

of native law and custom, has to bear, in West Africa, the brunt of

constant and insidious assaults on the part of interested, or prejudiced,

or ill-informed opinion. This opposition is often quite honest and

quite easy to understand if the conditions are grasped. It is important

they should be grasped. Indirect rule is an obstacle to employment and

promotion in some branches of the service. It restricts the scope of

secretarial, judicial, police and military activities. It robs the

educated native barrister trained in English law, and the educated native

clerk, of a field for the exercise of their professions. It checks the

European capitalist in a hurry to push on “development.” The missionary

is apt to regard it as a stumbling-block to Christian propaganda.

Finally, there is the type of European who is racially biased against

the retention of any sort of control by the native in his own country.

Indirect rule, therefore, has very many enemies, and it cannot have

too many friends among the thinking public at home. So far as Northern

Nigeria is concerned, strenuous efforts will have to be put forward

by all who are convinced of the necessity of upholding indirect rule

therein, when the amalgamation of the two Protectorates is taken in

hand. That time cannot be far distant and the wind which blows from the

south is charged with many hostile particles. There would seem, then, to

be solid reasons for the public to appreciate the conditions, at once

severely practical, and of the moral order, which make the continuation

of the existing policy necessary to the welfare of the Northern

Protectorate.

Let us first consider geographical verities and ways and means.

Northern Nigeria is 255,000 square miles in extent and the territory is

divided into thirteen provinces. Of these provinces, Sokoto, the most

considerable in point of area, is nearly as large as Scotland and Wales;

Bornu is the size of Ireland; Kano is almost as large as Scotland;

Kontagora-Borgu is slightly larger than, and Bauchi and Muri the size

of, Greece; the Niger Province is as extensive as Servia; Yola is as

large as Denmark, and Nassarawa exceeds the area of Switzerland. It

is only by realizing space, by realizing that months of travel still

separate some provinces from others, that the expense, to say nothing

of other considerations, which would be entailed in gathering up all

the administrative threads of such a territory into the hands of a

staff of British officials can be understood. I have never heard it

suggested that the Lords of the Treasury parted enthusiastically with

the meagre sum allotted to Northern Nigeria. One cannot imagine that

their Lordships’ satisfaction would increase if they were presented

not with a bill of a quarter of a million but of two millions. The

single Province of Kano, which under the present system is supervised

by seventeen political officers, and more than pays its own way, would

require at least three hundred officials if direct rule were established,

or the prestige of the Emirs so weakened as to deprive them of all real

authority over the people, and this, exclusive of a swarm of native

officials who could not be done without in any case. That brings me to

my next point. Direct rule would, of necessity, involve an enormous,

directly paid, native staff. For its every action the Government would

be compelled to accept responsibility, and its members would, perforce,

be largely composed of the class of native—the most undesirable type, it

may be added—from which the policemen and soldiers are now recruited.

Putting aside the question of expenditure altogether, can any sane man,

disposed to look the facts squarely in the face and knowing anything

of the country, contemplate with equanimity the consequences of such a

_régime_? Then, assuming for purposes of argument the non-existence of

these impediments, where would lie the moral justification, let alone the

purely political expediency, of sweeping away the rule of the natural

rulers of the country?

Nigeria · 第 9 / 20 章