CHAPTER XXXV

EGYPT

1884

I.

At the close of 1883 the destruction of Hicks's army had made clear to

all that the Soudan was, for the time at least, lost to Egypt; and close

upon this disaster in the central region had followed defeats on the Red

Sea coast. But Egyptian garrisons were holding out at Sinkat, some fifty

miles from the port of Suakim, and at Tokar, only twenty miles from the

coast. In October, 1883, a small force sent to relieve Sinkat was cut up

by the Dervishes under Osman Digna; in November, a larger column of 500,

accompanied by the British Consul, was utterly routed in an attempt to

reach Tokar. General Baker, with his newly formed gendarmerie, was then

ordered to Suakim. He desired to enlist the services of Zebehr Pasha, a

famous leader of men, but a former dealer in slaves. To this the British

authorities objected, and Zebehr was not sent. Baker went, attempted

with 3,500 troops to reach Tokar, and on February 2nd, 1884, lost 2,000

of them near the wells of El Teb. Both Tokar and Sinkat soon after fell

into the hands of the Dervishes.

Long before this event, the evacuation of the Soudan had been decreed. A

peremptory mandate from the British Government was sent to Cherif Pasha,

the Egyptian Prime Minister, who, as he had intimated that he would do,

resigned rather than be responsible for giving up so vast a possession.

On January 8th, Nubar took office to carry out the prescribed policy.

But the problem was how to get away the garrisons, and, since England

had ordered evacuation, the Egyptian Government looked to England for

assistance.

'On January 16th I noted: "Baring wants to make us send a British

officer to conduct the retreat from Khartoum. I have written to Lord

Granville to protest." Baring had been pressing for an answer to his

suggestion named above. I had all along fought against the "Hicks

Expedition," and this seemed a consequence. The Egyptian Government

had resigned, and the sole supporter of the abandonment policy among

the Egyptians in Egypt was the Khedive himself; but Nubar was sent

for, and accepted office (with a number of cyphers) to carry it into

effect. On January 10th Lord Granville had telegraphed to Baring,

without my knowledge, "Would Gordon or Wilson be of use?" [Footnote:

Colonel Sir Charles Wilson. See his _Life_, by Sir Charles Watson,

p. 244.] On the 11th Baring replied, "I do not think that the

services of Gordon or Wilson can be utilized at present"; and after

a reply had been received I saw the telegrams. The earlier Gordon

suggestions by Granville, now revealed by E. Fitzmaurice from the

Granville Papers, and expounded in Cromer's (1908) book, were never

before the Cabinet. [Footnote: Life of Lord Granville, vol. ii., pp.

381, 382.]

'On the 14th Lord Granville telegraphed to Baring: "Can you give

further information as to prospects of retreat from (? for) army and

residents at Khartoum, and measures taken? Can anything more be

done?" Power, our Consular Agent at Khartoum, had also been told

that he might leave. On January 16th Baring telegraphed: "The

Egyptian Government would feel obliged if Her Majesty's Government

would send out at once a qualified British officer to go to Khartoum

with full powers, civil and military, to conduct the retreat." Lord

Granville then telegraphed for Gordon, and on the 18th I was

summoned suddenly to a meeting at the War Office in Hartington's

room, at which were present, before I arrived, Hartington, Lord

Granville and Lord Northbrook, and Colonel Gordon. Gordon said that

he believed that the danger at Khartoum had been "grossly

exaggerated," and that the two Englishmen there had "lost their

heads"; he would be able to bring away the garrisons without

difficulty. We decided that he should go to Suakim to collect

information and report on the situation in the Soudan. This was the

sole decision taken, but it was understood that if he found he could

get across he should go on to Berber. Gordon started at night on the

same day.

'On January 22nd the first subject mentioned was that of Egyptian

finance, a Rothschild loan for six months being suggested, but

nothing settled. The Cabinet approved our action in sending Gordon.

But they had before them a great deal more than what we had

done--namely, what he had done himself. On his road between London

and Brindisi he had prepared a series of decrees which he

telegraphed to us and which we telegraphed to Baring. In these he

announced the restoration to the various Sultans of the Soudan of

their independence, and he made the Khedive say: "I have

commissioned General Gordon, late Governor-General of the Soudan, to

proceed there as my representative, and to arrange with you" (the

peoples of the Soudan) "for the evacuation of the country and the

withdrawal of my troops." He then made the Khedive appoint him

"Governor-General for the time necessary to accomplish the

evacuation." He also telegraphed to the Hadendowa and Bishareen

Arabs of the desert between Suakim and Berber, directing them to

meet him at Suakim, and saying that he should be there in fourteen

days. In sending these we told Baring: "Suggestions made by Gordon.

We have no local knowledge sufficient to judge. You may settle

terms, and act upon them at once, as time presses, or after

consultation with him." Mr. Gladstone did not object, although

strongly opposed to our undertaking responsibility in the Soudan,

because Gordon still spoke in every sentence of conducting the

evacuation; but reading his proclamations in the light of his

subsequent change of mind, and desire to stay in Khartoum and be

supported by force, it seems clear that he had deceived us and did

not really mean evacuation. This, however, could not yet be seen

from the words he used. I wrote to Lord Granville on January 22nd,

to point out that in addition to the danger in the Soudan, which had

been foreseen, there was a risk that Gordon might get himself

carried off alive into the desert by some of the Arab chiefs that he

was to meet, and that in that case we should have to send an

expedition after him.

'On January 31st there was a meeting at the War Office about Egypt

between Hartington, Lord Granville, Edmond Fitzmaurice and myself.

As the facts about Gordon were beginning to be misrepresented in the

Press, Lord Granville set them down in writing. [Footnote: See _Life

of Gladstone_, vol. iii., pp. 152-155; Life of Granville, vol. ii.,

pp. 381-385 and 512, where a letter from Lord Cromer on General

Gordon's instructions is printed; and chap. xvi. ('Gordon, and the

Soudan') in _The Development of the European Nations, 1870-1900_, by

Dr. J. Holland Rose.] It had been stated, and was afterwards

repeated by Justin McCarthy in his history, that the mission on

which we sent Gordon "was in direct opposition to his own ideas. He

was not in favour of the abandonment of the Soudan or the evacuation

of Khartoum." It had also been said that the whole mission had been

forced upon us by the Press--i.e., by Stead, in the _Pall Mall

Gazette_. Lord Granville gave me a memorandum saying that Gordon had

acknowledged that the statements in the _Pall Mall_ were "not

accurate." Lord Granville went on to say that he did not think that

Gordon could be said to have "changed his mind. It appeared in his

conversation with Wolseley on the Tuesday that he (Gordon) was not

decided in his opinion, and that he was as likely to recommend one

course as another.... I told him that we would not send him out to

re-open the whole question, and he then declared himself ready to go

out merely to help in the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan.

He is not remarkably precise in conversation, though I found him

much more so than Wolseley had led me to expect."

'Lord Granville had previously written to me on this point: "The

papers seem to think that Gordon is a new discovery by the

Government under pressure of the Press. It happens that I consulted

Malet on the subject months ago. But after communicating with Cherif

he sent me an unfavourable reply. I subsequently consulted Baring,

who agreed with Cherif that it was best not to do so. I consulted

him again after the change of Ministry, with the same result. On the

other hand Gordon was in Syria, having declared before leaving

England that he would not enter the Egyptian service. It was only on

his return to England that I heard indirectly that, although he had

no wish to go, he would willingly obey the orders of Her Majesty's

Government and act under the instructions of Sir Evelyn Baring and

the orders of General Stephenson. Having got the full concurrence of

Sir E. Baring by telegraph, the matter was arranged."

'The fact was that it was Wolseley, Gordon's friend, who suggested

that he should be sent and who induced him to go; but Wolseley's

account of the matter could not, I fear, be trusted, as he is more

inclined to attack Gladstone than to let out anything which in the

light of subsequent events might be unpleasant to himself.

'Edmond Fitzmaurice had drawn up an elaborate memorandum for our

meeting at the War Office, which I have, with my own corrections. He

thought that the public was hostile to us on four grounds: our

non-interference to stop Hicks; [Footnote: General Hicks advanced

west of the Nile, contrary to the views of Lord Dufferin, who wished

him to limit his advance to the province lying between the

bifurcation of the Blue and White Nile. See the _Life of Dufferin_,

by Alfred Lyall, vol. ii., pp. 56, 57.] our failure to withdraw the

garrisons of Khartoum and of the Equatorial Provinces in time to

avoid disaster; our failure to relieve Sinkat; and, on the other

hand, our decision to force the Egyptians to evacuate the Soudan in

the face of defeat, a decision which had overturned Cherif Pasha.

With regard to Hicks, we could only tell the truth, which was that

our policy was to limit, not extend, the sphere of our

responsibilities in Egypt; that we followed the advice we got, which

was either for doing exactly what we did, or for a moderate support

of Hicks, which latter we declined. Our opponents were prophesying

after the event. We should have taken a great responsibility had we

absolutely forbidden the Egyptian Government to make use of their

own troops (not including any portion of the army officered by

English officers under Sir Evelyn Wood for the defence of Lower

Egypt) to crush the Mahdi. Hicks had at first defeated the Mahdi in

every encounter and cleared him out of the whole country east of the

Nile. [Footnote: Hicks Pasha complained that directly Lord Dufferin

had left Cairo for Constantinople, he ceased to received adequate

support from the Egyptian Government (_Life of Dufferin_. vol. ii.,

p. 55).] The main point, however, and that of present importance,

was our forcing upon the Egyptians the policy of evacuating the

Soudan after Hicks's defeat. Fitzmaurice wrote: "The Soudan could

not be held without the assistance of England, and it is not a

British interest to hold the Soudan.... The cost of the Soudan is

one of the causes which ruin the Egyptian Treasury." Edmond

Fitzmaurice then went on to explain in his memorandum the reasons

which had forced us to wait until January 4th before we had told the

Egyptian Government as to withdrawal from the interior of the

Soudan, including Khartoum--"that the Ministers must carry out the

advice offered them, or forfeit their places."

'On January 9th we had been told from Khartoum that, if a retreat

was ordered at once, it could be safely effected; and it was on the

next day, the 10th, that we offered the services of Colonels Gordon

and Sir Charles Wilson, which were declined. It was not till January

16th that we were able to induce the Egyptians, even under their new

withdrawal Government, to ask for a British officer, and on the 18th

Gordon was sent. Gordon, however--who had left us to go to Suakim,

and for whom we had drawn up a route from Suakim to Berber, in case

he should go forward, and negotiated with the tribes for his free

passage, and of whom we had telegraphed to Baring, "He does not wish

to go to Cairo"--went to Cairo, "at Baring's" suggestion. He did not

even land at Alexandria, but he was stopped by Baring at Port Said

when on his way to Suakim, Baring sending Sir Evelyn Wood to meet

him. Baring had already given orders, through Nubar, to commence the

evacuation. Gordon had telegraphed to us requesting us to send

Zebehr Pasha to Cyprus--that is, arbitrarily to arrest him and

deport him. Yet, when he reached Cairo, at his own wish he had had

an interview with this very man, and shortly afterwards he

telegraphed to us, asking leave to take him to Khartoum and to make

him virtually Governor of the Soudan, which, indeed, would have been

entirely outside our power; for Forster, supported by the Anti-

Slavery Society and the Conservatives, would at once have upset us

in the House of Commons and reversed the policy. Wolseley had

already begun to press as early as the 23rd for the sending of an

expedition via Suakim and Berber.

'On January 26th Gordon had left for Khartoum without any

communication with us upon the question whether he should go, and

the last thing we had from him before he started was a memorandum in

which, among other things, he said of the Soudan: "Few men can stand

its fearful monotony and deadly climate." He insisted on absolute

authority, and Stewart, who was with him, did the same for him, and,

backing up his chief's arguments at this moment against Zebehr, said

that Zebehr's return would undoubtedly be a misfortune to the

Soudanese, and also a direct encouragement to the slave trade.

'On February 1st we received a telegram from Baring, telling us that

Gordon had taken with him proclamations of evacuation, and other

proclamations less direct, with authority to issue those which he

thought best; but "he fully understands that he is to carry out the

policy of evacuation, in which he expressed to me his entire

agreement. I have sent home by last mail my instructions to him,

which leave no doubt on this point, and which were drafted at his

request and with his full approval.... There is no sort of

difference between his views and those entertained by Nubar Pasha

and myself." Here ended our responsibility, because it must be

remembered that Gordon at Khartoum was entirely outside our reach,

and openly told us that he should not obey our orders when he did

not choose to do so. From this moment we had only to please

ourselves as to whether we should disavow him and say that he was

acting in defiance of instructions, and must be left to his fate, or

whether we should send an expedition to get him out.

'Doubtless "we" wavered between these two opinions. Mr. Gladstone

from the first moment that Gordon broke his orders was for the

former view. Lord Hartington from the first moment was for the

latter. Chamberlain and I supported Hartington, although we fully

recognized Gordon's violations of his orders in much of his action

at Khartoum, where he changed the policy agreed upon with Baring and

with us to that expressed by him in the words, "Smash the Mahdi."

Many members of the Cabinet went backwards and forwards in their

opinion, but the circumstances were of incredible difficulty, and it

must be remembered that we were not sure of being allowed to carry

out either policy; and not only was it difficult to decide which of

the two was right, but it was also difficult to decide whether

either policy was possible--that is to say, whether the one adopted

would not be immediately upset by a Parliamentary vote. The Liberal

party in the House of Commons was divided on the matter, the Whigs

generally wishing for an expedition, and the Radicals being hot for

immediate abandonment of the Soudan, which meant abandonment of

Gordon. The Conservatives were divided; most of them probably wished

for an expedition, but they were afraid to say so; and Randolph

Churchill, whose strength at this time was immense, was in full

agreement with Labouchere and Wilfrid Lawson, and was denouncing the

retention of the Soudan as a violation of the principles of freedom.

'Gordon on his way up and on his arrival at Khartoum issued

extraordinary proclamations. Arriving there alone, but with

incredible prestige, he was hailed as father of the people; he

burned the taxation books and the whips upon the public place; he

released the prisoners from the gaol; he sent away the commander of

the garrison with the words, "Rest assured you leave this place as

safe as Kensington Park." He declared the Mahdi "Sultan of

Kordofan." Gordon, of all men in the world, sanctioned slavery by

another written document; and he then asked us to send the arch

slave-driver Zebehr to his help, which we thought on Baring's

truthful opinion of the moment that we ought not to do, and which we

certainly could not have done. I thought and still think that Gordon

had lost his senses, as he had done on former critical occasions in

his life; but the romantic element in his nature appealed to me,

and, while I could not but admit that he had defied every

instruction which had been given to him, I should have sent an

expedition to bring him out, although thinking it probable that when

Wolseley reached him he would have refused to come.'

While Gordon was on his way to Khartoum, which he reached on February

18th, the defeat at El Teb had occurred, and the question arose as to

what should be done in the Eastern Soudan.

'On February 6th the Cabinet met twice, and at our second meeting it

was decided to send marines to Suakim.

'On Thursday, February 7th, I visited the Admiralty with Pauncefote

in order to take in hand the defence of the Red Sea coast against

the Arabs, and then I went to the War Office, where I met

Hartington, Northbrook, Wolseley, and Cooper Key, in order to

concert steps. When I passed through the Secretary's room after the

meeting, and stayed for a moment to talk with Hobart and Fleetwood

Wilson, the Duke of Cambridge (whose room opened into theirs, and

who had evidently been lying in wait for me) rushed out and carried

me off into his room, and made much of me, with an enthusiastic

desire to help an expedition. At night, Hartington, Chamberlain, and

I met in Hartington's room and decided to press for relief of

Gordon.

'On February 8th Chamberlain wrote to me, "I should like to

telegraph to Baring, 'If you think that employment of British troops

could relieve beleaguered garrisons in Soudan without danger, you

are authorized to concert measures with Evelyn Wood.'" A Cabinet was

called at the wish of Hartington, Chamberlain, and myself, for this

day upon this point. Hartington, Harcourt, Northbrook, Carlingford,

Chamberlain, and I, were for asking Gordon if a demonstration at

Suakim would help him. Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, very strong

the other way, broke up the meeting sooner than agree.'

'Gordon had acted as Governor-General of the Soudan without having

told us that he had accepted this appointment, and we had had to ask

on February 4th a question which had been answered by Baring on the

5th, to the effect that Gordon had "at his own request" been

appointed Governor-General. On February 6th Baring had telegraphed

stating that Gordon had said that it was possible he might go to the

Mahdi and not be heard of for two months, as the Mahdi might keep

him as a hostage for Zebehr. On the same day we telegraphed to

Baring approving his having told Gordon that there would be the

strongest objections to his placing himself in the Mahdi's power. On

February 7th we received a despatch by post from Baring in which he

informed us that, while Gordon would probably ask for Zebehr, "it

would certainly not be desirable to send him ... for he is

manifestly animated by a feeling of deep resentment against General

Gordon." At the same time Baring forwarded a shorthand report of the

meeting between Gordon, Zebehr, Baring, Stewart, Colonel Watson, Sir

Evelyn Wood, and Nubar, at which Zebehr had told Gordon that he had

entrusted his son to him, "and told you he was thenceforth your son.

He was only sixteen years of age.... I entrusted my son to you....

But you killed my son whom I entrusted to you. He was as your own

son." _Gordon_: "Well, well, I killed my own son. There is an end of

it." _Zebehr_: "And then you brought my wives and women and children

in chains to Khartoum, a thing which for my name in the Soudan was

most degrading."

'By the same mail we received a despatch from Baring in which he

made it clear that Gordon's instructions had Gordon's full approval.

"He expressed to me his entire concurrence in the instructions. The

only suggestion he made was in connection with the passage in which,

speaking of the policy of abandoning the Soudan, I had said, 'I

understand also that you entirely concur in the desirability of

adopting this policy.' General Gordon wished that I should add the

words 'and that you think it should on no account be changed.' These

words were accordingly added."

'Between this Cabinet and the next we received, on February 9th, a

telegram from Baring to the effect that he was sending home a letter

from Gordon to the King of the Belgians in which he urged the king

to appoint him Governor of the Equatorial Provinces, Gordon's idea

being to go there from Khartoum; and Baring stated his own view that

we should forbid Gordon to go south of Khartoum. In his letter,

which was dated February 1st, Gordon said that the King of the

Belgians had told him that he would take over the Provinces with the

troops in them, when Gordon had been at Brussels immediately before

we sent him out; but not one word had Gordon ever breathed of this;

and when we first heard of it he was virtually beyond our reach,

seated, when our answer arrived, at Khartoum, and little disposed to

listen to us, although on some points, for a few days, he pretended

to listen.

'On February 12th Baring telegraphed that he hoped that "H.M.G. will

not change any of the main points of their policy"; but, as will be

seen a little later, Baring soon changed his own, adopting the new

policy of Gordon, and pressing it upon us.

'On February 12th it was decided, against Mr. Gladstone, to send an

expedition to the Red Sea Coast.

'On February 13th we had before us a statement which had been made

the previous day by Randolph Churchill, to the effect that in the

summer of 1883 General Gordon had offered to go to the Soudan, and

that the Government had telegraphed to him accepting his offer, and

then written to him declining it. Lord Granville instructed me to

say that the whole story was one gigantic concoction. I then asked

Hartington if he knew anything about it; and Lord Wolseley

ultimately discovered that Randolph Churchill had confused the Congo

with the Nile, an amusing example of his harum-scarum recklessness.

Gordon had telegraphed from Syria in October for leave to accept

service under the King of the Belgians on the Congo, and the

Commander-in-Chief had replied by telegraph that the Secretary of

State declined to sanction his employment. In transmission the word

"declines" was changed into "decides," which exactly reversed its

sense, so that Gordon had received a confirming letter consistent

with the telegram as sent, but exactly reversing the sense of the

telegram as received. He had told the story which Churchill had

heard, but altered from one side of Africa to the other.'

On February 14th Sir Charles made effective use of this blunder in the

debate upon the vote of censure concerning Egypt. It was a debating

speech which, he himself notes, 'had extraordinary success.' Lord

Randolph Churchill had been more than usually aggressive, and Sir

Charles hammered him with detailed facts. [Footnote: He comments on the

20th on the opinions expressed to him as to his powers of debate: 'This

is a curious position for a man who has no natural gift of speech. I can

remember when I was the worst speaker that ever spoke at all.'] The

debate on this vote of censure, occasioned by the fall of Sinkat,

occupied the House for five days. The motion was defeated by forty-nine.

'On February 14th I found that Lord Granville had not answered an

important question from Baring about Wood's Egyptians which had been

received by us on the 13th, and that because he had not seen it. We

had started a red label as a danger-signal for pressing notes; but

Lord Granville's room was full of red-labelled notes not touched.'

He records his remonstrances with Lord Granville as to the non-

employment of Sir Evelyn Wood's Egyptians. On February 18th there was a

Cabinet 'partly upon this subject. It was decided to send reinforcements

to Egypt.'

'On February 21st there was another Cabinet which again discussed

the Egyptian question and decided to send Wood's Egyptians to

Assouan. On the 15th Gordon had reassured us by telling us that all

communication between Cairo and the Soudan would be finally at an

end within three months' (that is, that evacuation would be easily

carried out). 'On February 18th we had heard that on the 17th Gordon

had issued a proclamation saying that the Government would not

interfere with the buying and selling of slaves; and this telegram,

having got out from Cairo, produced a storm in England. On the 19th

there occurred another matter which was considered by the Cabinet at

the same time--the absolute refusal of Admiral Hewett, and very

proper refusal, to issue a proclamation calling on the chiefs from

Suakim to go peacefully to meet Gordon at Khartoum, inasmuch as the

Admiral knew "that English troops are about to be sent against the

people in question." The issue of this proclamation had been

recommended by Wolseley, who thinks that Governments exist for the

purpose of deceiving enemies in war for the benefit of generals.

'On the same day, February 19th, we had received a telegram which

had been sent off from Khartoum by Gordon on the 18th, asking that

Zebehr should be sent to the Soudan, "be made K.C.M.G., and given

presents." This was backed by Stewart, so far as that he said that

someone should be sent, adding that he was not sure whether Zebehr

was the best man. It was clear from Gordon's proposed conditions

that Zebehr was to be free to prosecute the slave trade. In another

memorandum on the same day Gordon said that we must "give a

commission to some man and promise him the moral support of

H.M.G.... It may be argued that H.M.G. would thus be giving ...

moral support to a man who will rule over a slave state.... This

nomination of my successor must ... be direct from Her Majesty's

Government.... As for the man, H.M.G. should select one above all

others, namely Zebehr." Baring now backed this opinion up, so that

we were face to face with an absolute change of front on the part of

Gordon and Baring, and a partial change of front on the part of

Stewart. On the other hand, Baring, at the same time when he told us

to appoint Zebehr, added: "I am quite certain that Zebehr hates

Gordon bitterly, and that he is very vindictive. I would not on any

account risk putting Gordon in his power.... He is, to my personal

knowledge, exceedingly untruthful.... I cannot recommend his being

promised the moral support of Her Majesty's Government. He would

scarcely understand the phrase, and, moreover, I do not think he

would attach importance to any support which was not material.... I

doubt the utility of making conditions. Zebehr would probably not

observe them long." Baring further proposed that Zebehr should be

given money, and he left us to judge of the effect of the whole

scheme on public opinion in England. Colonel Watson, who had been

present at the meeting between Zebehr and Gordon, informed us that

to let Gordon and Zebehr be together in the Soudan "would entail the

death of either one or other of them." On the 21st Gordon

telegraphed to the newspapers explaining away his slave trade

proclamation, but its terms were even worse than could have been

gathered from the first summary, which was all that we had received.

'On February 21st we received the text of Gordon's proclamation,

which contained the words, "I confer upon you these rights, that

henceforth none shall interfere with your property," and spoke with

apparent regret of "severe measures taken by Government for the

suppression of slave traffic, and seizure and punishment of all

concerned."

'On February 26th there was a meeting of Mr. Gladstone, Hartington,

Childers, Chamberlain, Dodson, and myself, to approve a telegram

from Hartington to General Graham; [Footnote: General Graham was in

command of the expedition to Suakim.] and on the next day again, the

27th, a meeting of Lord Granville, Hartington, Northbrook, and

myself, which decided to invite the Turk to show himself at the Red

Sea ports. On the 29th there was a Cabinet at which it was decided

that the Turk must approve our future ruler of the Soudan, and that

British troops were to go as far as Assouan if Baring thought it

necessary.

'On February 27th Gordon had frightened us out of our senses by

telegraphing that, having put out his programme of peace, and

allowed time to elapse, he was now sending out his troops to show

his force; and another telegram from him said: "Expedition starts at

once to attack rebels." On the same day he telegraphed that he had

issued a proclamation "that British troops are now on their way, and

in a few days will reach Khartoum." It was very difficult to know

what to do with this amazing lie: solemnly to point out to him by

telegraph that it was a lie was hardly of much use with a man of

Gordon's stamp; and what was done was to send a strong private

telegram to Baring to communicate with him about it, but the result

was not encouraging, for it was the first ground for the desperate

quarrel which Gordon afterwards picked with Baring, and for his

charge against Baring of inciting the Government to drive him to his

death.

'On the next day, February 28th, Gordon, having heard that Zebehr

was refused, telegraphed his policy of smashing up the Mahdi, which,

however, he seemed inclined to attempt with a most inadequate force.

"Mahdi must be smashed up. Mahdi is most unpopular, and with care

and time could be smashed.... If you decide on smashing Mahdi, then

send another hundred thousand pounds, and send 200 Indian troops to

Wady Haifa, and an officer to Dongola under pretence to look out

quarters for troops.... At present it would be comparatively easy to

destroy Mahdi." Gordon had also telegraphed to Baring to recommend

that 3,000 black Egyptian troops should be kept in the Soudan, and

completely throwing over the evacuation policy. Baring added for

himself: "There are obviously many contradictions in General

Gordon's different proposals"; but he went on to express his

agreement in Gordon's new policy, strongly supported the selection

of Zebehr, and sneered at us for having regard to uninstructed

opinion in England. On the same day Gordon telegraphed: "If a

hundred British troops were sent to Assouan or Wady Halfa, they

would run no more risk than Nile tourists, and would have the best

effect." At the same time Baring said: "I certainly would not risk

sending so small a body as 100 men." It will be seen in how great a

difficulty the Government were placed; but Baring's position was, in

fact, as difficult as our own. We were evidently dealing with a wild

man under the influence of that climate of Central Africa which acts

even upon the sanest men like strong drink.

'On the same day Gordon telegraphed to us completely changing his

ground about Suakim. He had previously prevented our doing anything

except trying to relieve the towns blockaded, but on March 1st told

us to do something to draw the Hadendowa down to Suakim. On the 2nd,

General Graham having beaten the Arabs at Teb, the Admiral asked us

to send more troops and to threaten Osman Digna's main force, a

suggestion which concurred with Gordon's. And on March 5th the

Cabinet met and decided that, while it was impossible to send Zebehr

to the Soudan, General Graham was to be allowed to attack Osman

Digna's main force.... Chamberlain then suggested that I should go

to Egypt: Hartington evidently thought that somebody should go, and

thought he had better go himself. Lord Granville would not have

either, as might have been expected.... I suggested a way out of the

Zebehr difficulty, and wrote to Chamberlain: "If I were sent out to

do this, I believe I should get away the forces from the interior

and have Zebehr elected, entirely without our action, by the

Notables at Khartoum. On the whole, this would do if we did not do

it. This would, in my opinion, be improved by Turkish approval under

Turkish suzerainty, but that you do not like." Chamberlain answered:

"Perhaps we cannot help having Zebehr, but surely we ought not to

promote him, directly or indirectly; not only because he is a slave-

hunter, but also because he will probably attack Egypt sooner or

later, and very likely with the help of our subsidy." I replied: "I

am quite clear that we must not set up Zebehr, but if we retire we

cannot prevent his election by the Notables; and they would elect

him." In the meantime Gordon had completely thrown over Baring's

suggestion that Zebehr should be sent (but so sent that he and

Gordon should not be in the Soudan together) by telegraphing that

the combination at Khartoum of Zebehr and himself was "an absolute

necessity," and that it would be "absolutely necessary" for him to

stay at Khartoum with Zebehr for four months; and Stewart had now

completely come over to Gordon's policy about Zebehr personally. On

the other hand, Baring and the military authorities in Egypt were

unanimously opposed to the idea of sending a small British force to

Wady Halfa.

'On March 7th it was decided to give an inland district to the

Abyssinians, but not to offer them a port (which was what they

wanted), on account of its not being ours to give away from the

Turks. The Cabinet would not hear of receiving a Turkish

Commissioner at Cairo.

'On March 11th we further considered pressing demands from Gordon

and Baring for Zebehr. Mr. Gladstone had taken to his bed, but was

known to be strongly in favour of sending Zebehr. The Cabinet were

unanimous the other way, and Hartington was sent to see Mr.

Gladstone, we waiting till he returned. When he came back, he

laconically stated what had passed as follows: "He thinks it very

likely that we cannot make the House swallow Zebehr, but he thinks

he could." Morley has told this, but the words which he took

verbally from me are less good. [Footnote: _Life of Gladstone_, vol.

iii., p. 159.] Baring on the 6th had recommended a further attack on

Osman Digna, which he thought might open the Berber route. On the

9th we received Gordon's replies to our telegrams of the 5th,

showing that he had done nothing towards the evacuation of Khartoum

except by sending away the sick. He admitted that it was possible

that "Zebehr, who hates the tribes, did stir up the fires of revolt,

in hopes that he would be sent to quell it. It is the irony of fate

that he will get his wish if sent up." On the same day Baring

informed us that it was clear that Gordon now had no influence

outside Khartoum, and that he contemplated the despatch of British

troops. The Anti-Slavery Society had strongly protested against the

employment of Zebehr, and they pointed out to us the records of

murders "in which this man has stood the foremost and the principal

actor.... Countenance ... of such an individual by the British

Government would be a degradation for England and a scandal to

Europe." W. E. Forster, amid loud cheers from the Conservatives,

protested in advance in the House of Commons against the policy of

sending Zebehr. On March 11th we had received in the morning from

Baring twelve telegrams from Gordon, of the most extraordinary

nature, which Baring had answered: "I am most anxious to help and

support you in every way, but I find it very difficult to understand

exactly what it is you want." Besides deciding that Zebehr could not

be sent, the Cabinet changed its mind about the employment of Turks

in the Red Sea, and decided that they could not be allowed to go

there at present.

'On March 13th the matter was again considered by a Cabinet, which

was not called a Cabinet as Mr. Gladstone was in bed and Chamberlain

was at Birmingham, and on the 14th we met again, still retaining our

opinion; and on Sunday, the 16th, Mr. Gladstone at last unwillingly

gave up Zebehr as impossible. [Footnote: _Life of Granville_, vol.

ii., p. 388.]

'I had been at this time working out the facts connected with the

two routes to Khartoum in case an expedition should be sent, and had

made up my own mind in favour of the Nile route; Wolseley still

being the other way.

'On March 17th, I wrote to Lord Northbrook to protest against a

proclamation which had been issued by the Admiral and General at

Suakim offering a reward for Osman Digna, and I wrote also to

Hartington upon the same subject, stating that I would not defend

it, and that if it were "not disapproved, and the disapproval made

public, I cannot remain a member of the Government." Northbrook

would not admit that he had disapproved it, but Hartington did, and

also informed me that Northbrook had telegraphed. Lord Granville

agreed with me that the proclamation was not defensible, and it was

as a fact withdrawn, although the Admiral was very angry.

'Mr. Gladstone had gone down to Coombe, near Wimbledon. On March

22nd we held a Cabinet without him.... Harcourt was now writing to

me in favour of the view "that we must get out of Egypt as soon as

possible at any price. The idea of our administering it or of the

Egyptian army defending it is equally out of the question." On the

25th we had another Cabinet without Mr. Gladstone. Turning to

Gordon, we decided that a force was not to be sent to Berber; but I

noted in my diary: "It will _have_ to be sent next autumn, I

believe"; but when I said to Berber, it must be remembered, of

course, that there were two ways of reaching Berber, and Lord

Hartington, Brett, and I, now turned steadily to the consideration

of which of those two ways should be taken. It will be remembered

that we already had a report in print as to the Suakim-Berber route.

[Footnote: See p. 33; 'We had drawn up a route from Suakim to

Berber.'] We now obtained from Wolseley a general report, which was

afterwards printed and circulated to the Cabinet on April 8th. Lord

Wolseley, preparing for the sending of a military force to Khartoum

this autumn, stated that his force must be exclusively British, for

he doubted whether the very best of our Indian regiments could stand

the charges of the Arabs, besides which our natives took the field

encumbered with followers. Lord Roberts, who was not given to

boasting, told me, long afterwards, that he, on the other hand, was

sure that he could have marched from Suakim to the Nile and Khartoum

with an exclusively Indian force. It is the case that our best

Gurkha troops have sometimes stood when white troops have run.

Wolseley had now come round to a boat expedition, which I had been

for a long time urging, upon information which I had obtained for

myself from the Admiralty, and which was afterwards printed by the

Foreign Intelligence Committee at the Admiralty, and circulated to

the Cabinet in April, a further document upon the subject being

circulated to the Cabinet in May. It must be remembered that the

date of passing the cataracts was settled for us by the high Nile,

and that there was only one time of year at which the expedition

could be safely sent.

'The Cabinet of March 25th further decided that Graham must soon be

brought away from Suakim.

'On the next evening, March 26th, when the Ministers were dining

with the Speaker, we received a very unpleasant telegram from

Baring, pointing, we thought, to a possible resignation unless it

was promised to send an expedition to Khartoum. I suggested the

following answer: "We adhere to our instructions of the 25th, 160

Secret. We cannot send an expedition now, and entertain the gravest

objection to contemplating an expedition in the autumn." This answer

was rejected in favour of one suggested by Mr. Gladstone and Lord

Granville. Our telegram 160 Secret had been an absolute refusal, and

my additional words had been intended by me slightly to open the

door, which was as much as I could hope that the Cabinet would do.

But the telegram actually sent on March 28th (165 Secret, extended

in 191) was to the effect that we were unable to alter the

instructions, and it was accompanied by two long despatches,

virtually written by Harcourt, and afterwards laid before

Parliament, explaining our reasons for not sending Zebehr and for

not sending an expedition. Gordon had been communicating with us

with difficulty, as the telegraph was broken from time to time, but

he had told us that if he was to evacuate Khartoum he wished to

resign his commission and to take all his steam vessels and stores

to the equatorial provinces, "which he would consider under the King

of the Belgians." This Baring had told him he must not do. Baring

had rejected every possible alternative except the sending of

Zebehr, and Zebehr we could not have sent. In discussing the

question of an expedition to Khartoum, Baring had told us that

Gordon was "not in any immediate danger. He has provisions for six

months." Gordon himself had telegraphed: "As I have been

inconsistent about Zebehr, it is my fault, and I should bear the

blame if Zebehr is sent, and should put up with the inconvenience if

he is not." He had himself told us that he had provisions for six

months, but had after this informed us that provisions were still

coming in freely to Khartoum--as late as after March 15th, a week

later than the date at which he had told us that he had six months'

provisions in the town. I had made up my mind that we must send an

expedition, but I did not agree with Baring that it was physically

possible to send an expedition at this moment, and thought that if

sent at high Nile it would be in time. On the 23rd, after Gordon's

defeat, by treachery and shooting, of the two black Pashas, Gordon

telegraphed: "I think we are now safe, and that as the Nile rises we

shall account for the rebels." This we received on March 31st.

'On March 27th there was a Cabinet without Chamberlain, who was

listening to George Russell's speech which I had got him leave to

make, and without Mr. Gladstone, who was still ill. The Cabinet

decided against an expedition to Khartoum, but the Chancellor' (Lord

Selborne) 'gave us to understand that he should resign if one were

not sent in the autumn, and Harcourt intimated that he should resign

if one were sent. Lord Granville observed that no Cabinet could last

a day if it was to be exposed to going to pieces on differences as

regards the future. Harcourt proposed to "clear out" of Egypt

immediately. Lord Granville won an easy victory over him by proving

that only three weeks ago he had wanted to take Egypt under our

protection. Harcourt then said that as long ago as November, 1883,

he had spoken in favour of clearing out. "Yes," said Lord Granville,

"so you did; but I said three weeks ago."

'On March 29th there was a Cabinet at Coombe Warren. Mr. Gladstone

seemed pretty well, and had at least one good laugh. He still

regretted Zebehr. The Cabinet considered Gordon, what we should do

with slavery at Suakim, and House of Commons business.'

About this date the main body of the British troops was withdrawn from

Suakim in accordance with the decision of March 25th. They had inflicted

defeats on Osman Digna at El Teb, and again at Tamanieb; many Dervishes

and not a few English had been killed, but no effect of moment had been

produced, and the road to Berber was not opened.

A new complication now arose. Egypt was presented with Europe's total

claims for the losses to Europeans in the burnings at Alexandria. They

amounted to four millions and a half. How was this demand to be met?

Under the Law of Liquidation established in 1880, Egypt could not borrow

without the consent of the five Powers who had constituted the

Commission of Liquidation. The demand presented to Egypt had to be

considered by the one Power which was now _de facto_ supreme in Egypt.

'On April 2nd there was an important Cabinet called on Egyptian

finance. It began, of course, on something else. We discussed the

future of Suakim; the replies to be given in the House on the next

day as to Gordon; and then Childers' views upon Egyptian finance;

while we were considering these, there came a letter from Northcote

with the questions that he intended to put on the next day'

(questions which could only be answered by a full statement of

policy on all the points of the Egyptian problem). 'After going back

to this, we went on again to finance, and decided to call a

conference of the Great Powers to alter the Law of Liquidation. Mr.

Gladstone had unwillingly consented to meet the Powers by proposing

to reduce the charge for the British army; and he was anxious to get

the money for the British taxpayer out of a borrowing operation on

the future value of the Canal Shares. Chamberlain and I decided that

if he did this the Tories would declare that Mr. Gladstone had

become a pensioner on the bounty of Lord Beaconsfield. There was

some talk at this Cabinet as to whether we should guarantee the

Egyptian debt, to which I was opposed. Chamberlain had at one time

been friendly to such an operation, but had now "gone round" on the

ground that we could not "carry it against the Tories and the

Radicals." "Is there anything else?" said Chamberlain to Mr.

Gladstone as the Cabinet was breaking up. "No," said Mr. Gladstone,

"we have done our Egyptian business and we are an Egyptian

Government."'

II.

From this time forward the 'Egyptian Government' at Westminster had two

main subjects of concern--the question of extricating Gordon with the

garrisons, and the question of dealing with the international situation,

partly diplomatic and partly financial. France, increasingly unfriendly

to Great Britain, was above all unfriendly in regard to Egypt: while

Bismarck, doing his best to foment this quarrel, was at the same time

weakening Great Britain by menaces in Africa and Australasia, and the

danger of a Russian advance in Central Asia hung like a thundercloud

over the whole situation. [Footnote: Sir Charles wrote to Mr. Brett on

November 15th, 1884: 'I told Herbert Bismarck when he was here that it

was very silly of his father to get in the way of our Egypt plans, for

France would not go to war about them, and therefore, after threatening,

he would have to look on and see the things he had threatened against

done quietly.']

There were three groups of opinion in the Government in regard to the

Soudan. The first was for an expedition which should carry with it the

consequence of occupation more or less prolonged. Another was against

any expedition and in favour of immediate evacuation. A third section--

including Sir Charles Dilke and Mr. Chamberlain--accepted the need of an

expedition, but was determined that occupation should not follow. It was

incumbent on this last-named group to suggest a positive policy, and

Dilke, as will be seen, had his plan ready. There was a further decision

to be taken. When once an expedition was in contemplation, the route and

the character of the expedition had to be fixed. On this matter also Sir

Charles had early formed a resolve, but neither he nor anyone else could

pin the Cabinet to a clear course of action.

'At this time' (April 2nd) 'Chamberlain wrote to me of Egypt: "Once

more Hartington, and you and I, are at opposite poles. For one, I do

not mean to be forced any further in the direction of protectorate."

'Although they would not admit it, the Cabinet were rapidly coming

round at this time to an autumn Gordon expedition, and Chamberlain

wrote to me: "I believe it will come to this in the end"; while

Northbrook was in favour of an expedition. I then made up a list

from private information showing that six of us were favourable to

an expedition, as against five the other way--several members having

made no statement either way. Those for an expedition were

Hartington, Northbrook, the Chancellor (Lord Selborne), Derby,

Chamberlain, and myself; and those against it, Mr. Gladstone, Lord

Granville, Harcourt, Kimberley, and Dodson. On April 21st, Egypt was

discussed without decision, though with the note by me: "The

majority now begin to see that an October expedition is certain."

'On the 23rd a Cabinet ... considered the possibility of reaching

Berber.... After the Cabinet of April 23rd, I advocated a naval

expedition by the Nile on the ground that the Admiralty were likely

to do the thing better than the War Office. [Footnote: A review by

Sir Charles in the _Athenæum_ of October 24th, 1908, deals with the

_Life of Lord Northbrook_, by Sir Bernard Mallet, and his allusions

to Lord Northbrook's consideration, as early as April, of a 'rescue

and retire' expedition by the Nile route for the autumn, 'it being

assumed that the boats then ordered could not pass the various

cataracts before High Nile.' See _Life of Lord Northbrook_, pp.

185-186. A review by Sir Charles of March 28th, 1908, in the same

paper, of _Modern Egypt_, by the Earl of Cromer, also deals with

Lord Northbrook's pressure for a Nile Expedition in March, 1884.] On

April 28th, Berber, Khartoum, and Gordon, on which there was nothing

new, but Hartington insisted on a large and important military

expedition.'

'On April 29th Baring had now come over about Egypt, and attended a

Cabinet to state his views. I saw him privately, and settled with

him the details for a possible Nile expedition "small and early."

The difficulty was at the sixth cataract. He also broached to me his

scheme for a new control by the four Powers already represented on

the Caisse de la Dette--namely, England, France, Austria, and Italy,

with an English president.'

'At the next Cabinet there was a proposal by Hartington that there

should be a vote of thanks to Sir Gerald Graham and Admiral Hewett

for the Suakim expedition--a proposal which the Cabinet rejected,

having had quite enough of votes of thanks on the former occasion

when Wolseley and Beauchamp Seymour were in question. The next

matter was what we should say about our Law of Liquidation

Conference, on which there arose an awkward question as to what

should happen in the probable case of the representatives of the

Powers not being unanimous. There was every reason to suppose that

the French would not agree to anything, and precedents went to show

that unanimity was necessary to render valid the decisions of a

conference. Indeed, there was no precedent as regards questions of

principle which told the other way; and at the Congress of Berlin

Prince Bismarck had stated, as recorded in the first protocol, that

as regarded substantive proposals it was an incontestable principle

that the minority should not be bound to acquiesce in a vote of a

majority.

'Then came the consideration of the action to be taken by the

Egyptian Government towards Mr. O'Kelly, M.P., [Footnote: Mr. James

O'Kelly, then M.P. for Koscommon, a very adventurous war

correspondent. He died in 1916.] Parnell's friend, who had been

trying to join the Mahdi. We next considered Lord Salisbury's

relations towards Tewfik as Khedive, as affected by the violent

attacks of many Conservative members, put up by Broadley, upon

Tewfik's character. Randolph Churchill had made a most ferocious

series of attacks upon the Khedive, without one atom of truth in

them. It is a curious example of his forgetful flightiness, that

when, a few years later, he went to Egypt, he was struck with wonder

at the Khedive's refusal to receive him. The terms of the French

acceptance of our invitation to the Conference were discussed, as

were the House of Commons questions as to Gordon, and the offer of

Mr. Guy Dawnay, M.P., to go as a messenger to Gordon at his own

cost. Then followed the internal condition of Egypt, as to which

Baring's views were stated by me; then Harrar; then the employment

of negroes or Turks for the Egyptian army; then the Turks at Suakim;

then the Somali coast.

'On the same day I had an interview with the ex-Khedive Ismail, who

had gone downhill. He always had a certain difficulty in collecting

his ideas and putting them into words, but on this occasion it went

farther than I had previously known. He wished to impress on me the

necessity for defending Egypt against the Mahdi at some given point

upon the Nile, when occurred that incident of his continually

working up to the name of the place and forgetting it. [Footnote:

See Chapter XXX., Vol. I., p. 487.]

'On May 5th there was a Cabinet. We considered the vote of censure

as to Gordon, and decided that time must be given for it; and I then

had some correspondence with Northbrook across the table as to an

expedition. I said: "Northbrook, I should be glad to know all you

know against the Nile route. Ismail, who knows all about it, thinks

it quite possible." Northbrook replied: "My objections are

uncertainty of getting steamers up at all (we know nothing of the

140 miles beyond Wady Halfa), and necessity of assistance from

natives, which may not be given. Key" (Sir Cooper Key) "is in rather

a delicate position, as he does not like to go against Wolseley,

whose opinion is for the Nile, and the responsibility is with the

W.O."

'On May 7th there was another Cabinet. It was decided that Nubar

need not be brought to London for the Conference, that a fresh place

in some other unhappy portion of the world must be found for

Clifford Lloyd; [Footnote: A Resident Magistrate who had come

violently into collision with the Nationalists in Ireland, and who

had also proved himself a storm centre in Egypt, as he afterwards

did in Mauritius.] and one was found, and he again fought with the

local authorities as he had fought in Ireland and in Egypt. With

regard to the attitude of France, it was decided that we could not,

so long as we remained in Egypt, put up with a new international

control. It was decided to bring the Turks to Suakim, although this

decision was afterwards reversed. We then wasted much of our time on

the consideration of what should be our attitude on the vote of

censure which was pending in the House. Harcourt had drawn an

amendment for Mr. Gladstone on which they had agreed. Chamberlain

and I had agreed to support a mere negative, and we talked the

others over....

'On May 11th Fitzmaurice wrote to me complaining that no definite

instructions had been given him with regard to the conduct of the

Gordon debate' (on the vote of censure), [Footnote: See _Hansard_,

vol. cclxxxviii., 3rd series, debate of May 13th, 1884] 'as was

usual in such important cases, but stating that he expected me to

speak. On the next day, May 12th, I learnt that Hartington had

refused to speak, although he was finally made to do so by Mr.

Gladstone. On Tuesday, May 13th, I made a good speech from 12.10 to

1.10 a.m.--too late for the reporters. "The debate has (I noted in

my diary) been the best I ever heard. Mr. Gladstone was not so good

as usual, while Hartington and I were neither better nor worse than

usual. But Churchill, Forster, Cowen, John Morley, and Beach, all

spoke far above their usual level; and the rest were good. A

memorable debate, which I do not expect to see excelled for interest

and fire, and I am glad to have had the honour to wind it up for the

Liberal party." Afterwards I noted that it "does not read well."

'On May 14th Cabinet again decided that Nubar must not come over for

the Conference; discussed internal affairs of Egypt, then the

Conference again; and then called in Sir Evelyn Baring and discussed

with him the same matters of Clifford Lloyd, Nubar, Conference, the

Turks and the Red Sea ports, what was to be said to Waddington about

the Conference, and the detail of a scheme of Childers upon Egyptian

finance, which was extraordinarily unpopular with the Cabinet.

'On May 17th at noon there was a full Cabinet (Spencer being

present), and a long one. The first matter discussed was the Queen

and Conference, [Footnote: Proposed Conference of the Powers on the

Law of Liquidation.] and a strong objection on the part of Mr.

Gladstone to tell Parliament anything about the Conference.

Chamberlain wrote to me on this: "What a queer twist this objection

of Mr. G. is!" To which I replied: "I really wish he would have gone

to Coombe for this lovely day and let us go on without him. He has

wasted an hour and a half. Mr. G. will fight a whole day in Cabinet

to avoid telling Parliament something, and then after all will tell

them twice as much in reply to Ashmead Bartlett." On this

Chamberlain wrote:

"Here lies Mr. G., who has left us repining,

While he is, no doubt, still engaged in refining;

And explaining distinctions to Peter and Paul,

Who faintly protest that distinctions so small

Were never submitted to saints to perplex them,

Until the Prime Minister came up to vex them."

[Footnote: These were notes passed during the sitting of the Cabinet. On

Mr. Gladstone's inconvenient habit of giving information at question

time, see Vol. I., pp. 307, 384, 459, 535; and _infra_, p. 118.]

'The Cabinet decided to send a telegram to Gordon through Zebehr, in

order to obtain safe conveyance for it, offering free use of money

among the tribes.

'To Grant Duff I wrote on May 17th: "The Queen is much against our

arrangements with France. If we 'let them out' we spoil them, and if

we don't we shall be condemned for a 'secret negotiation with France

by a moribund Cabinet.' Yet, though we look very wrong, we _are_

right."'

'On the 19th it was decided that the Nile was to be patrolled by the

Navy as far as Wady Halfa.'

This was in the direction of the military policy which Sir Charles

favoured, but in which he was not to succeed. His diplomatic proposals

now have to be considered.

'At this time I sent a box round the Cabinet as to the

neutralization of Egypt, Northbrook assenting. In a minute dated May

22nd, Lord Northbrook wrote: "I am disposed to think it would be

wise to propose at once an international guarantee of the neutrality

of Egypt, (1) It would give a substance and solidity to the French

assurances." (To Grant Duff I wrote on the 22nd: "We have got from

France an engagement not to go to Egypt when we come away, and never

at any future time, except by the authority of Europe.") "(2)

Without it I hardly see a chance of escaping from annexation.... All

the circumstances of Egypt ... point to this solution, and ... the

release of Egypt from the Soudan makes the solution possible."

Chamberlain wrote: "I agree entirely with Dilke and Northbrook. (1)

As to the intrinsic importance of such a proposal. If adopted it

secures every essential British interest, and promises relief from

the intolerable burden of a continued occupation. I am strongly in

favour of making the proposal at once. It will give a real guarantee

to the Powers of our good faith and intention to clear out of the

country. (2) I attach great importance to it as forming a definite

policy.... To make Egypt the 'Belgium of the East' is an object

easily popularized. The phrase will carry the proposal." Kimberley

wrote: "I agree with Northbrook and Dilke. The neutralization of

Egypt will be a gain in itself, irrespective altogether of the

question of its internal administration. It would also ... render it

easy to establish a firm domestic Government in so far as it would

put an end to the rivalries ... which exercise a very disturbing

influence on all Egyptian affairs.--K." This minute received the

support of the signatures of the Chancellor, Harcourt, and Childers.

Lord Derby wrote: "I agree so entirely with the views of Lord

Northbrook and Sir Charles Dilke that I need add nothing to what

they have written. There is only one alternative in the long-run;

guaranteed neutrality or annexation.--D., May 23." Carlingford also

agreed, but Hartington strongly dissented; and although Lord

Granville agreed with us, Hartington's dissent was so fierce that he

succeeded in preventing Mr. Gladstone from expressing an opinion,

and the view taken by ten members of the Cabinet remained without

effect.

'... On May 24th, the next matter discussed was the neutralization

of Egypt, which Mr. Gladstone decided, in face of Hartington's

minute, was "not to be immediately proposed."' [Footnote: The offer

of neutralization was, however, made. See _infra_, Chapter XXXVIII.,

pp. 94, 97.]

'We then returned to our old business of Waddington and the

Conference. Mr. Gladstone next complained that he had been

catechized in the House of Commons on Monday, May 19th, as to

whether he "told most lies on Monday or on Thursday." We then

discussed the desirability of making a statement in the House as to

the number of years that our troops would remain in Egypt;

Northbrook and Hartington suggesting either five years or three

years from January, 1885, and Carlingford suggesting one year, in

which he was supported by the Prime Minister and myself; but three

years prevailed. Next came Morocco; and then a Gordon

expedition--Mr. Gladstone speaking strongly against it.

'On May 27th there was a Cabinet before the Whitsuntide recess. It

was decided what statement was to be made to Parliament about the

Conference. Lord Granville had told Waddington that we should not

stay more than five years in Egypt at the outside, and Hartington,

who himself had been willing to limit our stay to three years, now

fought violently against a limitation even to five. Chamberlain

wrote to me: "As usual--the question having been twice settled,

Hartington, in a minority of one, raises the whole question again.

It is direct, unmitigated, and unconcealed obstruction." We then

discussed the expedition to Khartoum and the making of a Suakim-

Berber railway, but it was decided that orders were not yet to be

given. On the next day Mr. Gladstone, who had gone to Hawarden,

wrote:

'"My Dear Northbrook,

'"I have received and read this morning Sir Cooper Key's very

interesting paper on an expedition to Khartoum. I write, however, to

suggest that it would be a great advantage if two suggestions it

contains were to be fully examined and developed. (1) The _small_

river expedition which he thinks practicable. (2) The small desert

expedition from Korosko to which he also adverts as an auxiliary

method.... Clear as is the case for the railway from Suakim, as

against the large expedition by the Nile, in every other view it is

attended with the most formidable difficulties of a moral and

political kind ... whether the 'turning of the first sod' of a

Soudan railway will not be the substitution for an Egyptian

domination there, of an English domination ... more unnatural, more

costly, more destructive, and altogether without foundation in

public right. It would be an immense advantage that the expedition

(should one be needed) should be one occupying little time, and

_leaving no trace behind it_.

'"Yours sincerely,

'"W. E. Gladstone."

'Of this letter a copy was made by Edward Hamilton, and enclosed to

me with an autograph letter from Mr. Gladstone.

'On May 31st I had received a further letter from Mr. Gladstone

about the Soudan expedition, in which he said: "Suakim and Berber

route has utterly beaten Nile route for a large expedition.... But

the question of a small expedition has hardly yet been touched,

while some believe Gordon is or will be free, and there need be no

expedition at all." I sent this letter to Lord Northbrook, and to

Lord Hartington, pointing out that Colonel Sartorius had written a

letter to the papers in favour of an expedition of a thousand picked

men armed with repeating rifles; and after receiving replies, I

wrote to Mr. Gladstone on June 4th that I had not had much

encouragement from Hartington and Northbrook, the fact being that

Hartington was determined on giving Wolseley his big job. [Footnote:

See _Life of Granville_, vol. ii., p. 395.]

'On June 6th Lord Granville called a meeting to ask us whether,

Waddington having now agreed to all our demands, we could devise

some plan of getting out of them. He said that for his own part he

should not have asked the question, but that Hartington had

suggested it.... He said: "I must rather complain of Hartington's

conduct--from so intimate a friend. If it had been Dodson I should

have been very angry." After such an introduction, the meeting could

hardly come to a conclusion favourable to Hartington's views.

'On June 9th Sir Henry Ponsonby came to see me before the Cabinet,

wishing to talk to me before he spoke to any other member, as the

Queen thought that I was the most in agreement with her views, which

was not the case, as regarded evacuation. He discussed with me two

points: First the term of years, as to which I explained that, under

the agreement, if at the end of three and a half years any one Power

thought we had better stay, and we ourselves wished to stay, then we

could stay. It was not my wish that we should. Secondly, as to the

union of Bulgaria and East Roumelia, about which I did not care, and

as to which I suggested that the Queen should propose to Lord

Granville to take counsel with Austria. [Footnote: The union took

place in 1885.] At the Cabinet which followed we discussed the words

of our promise to lay our French agreements before Parliament, and

also our answer as to the Turks and Suakim. The French having

written us a disagreeable despatch, we agreed that they must be made

to take it back.

'On the next day, June 10th, there was a Cabinet to begin the

railway from Suakim. and to consider the draft despatch to

Waddington, and as the Government at this time was not very strong,

it was decided to leave for our successors a Cabinet minute upon the

subject of our relations at this time with France. After the Cabinet

I had to see Mr. Gladstone from Lord Granville upon the question

whether we should insist on a casting vote on the Caisse. Mr.

Gladstone, against the unanimous opinion of the Cabinet, replied:

"No, not to the point of breaking off."'

On June 12th Sir Charles made two notes in his Diary of that date:

'I think that if Mr. Gladstone was to stay in, and live on, we

should come as regards Egypt to evacuation and neutralization. Under

the Tories, or under Hartington, the _status quo_ may be tried for a

long time.'

'When Bismarck offered Egypt to Dizzy, it was in order to embroil

England with France.'

III.

From this point onwards in the Memoir the focus of the Egyptian question

changes; attention is centred on the diplomatic questions arising out of

the financial problem.

As between England and France the issue concerned itself with the

proposal to pay less than the promised interest on previously existing

loans. The French view, expressed through M. Barrère, the French agent

in Egypt, was that interest need not be reduced; the alternative view

was that the bondholders must make a sacrifice of part of their

interest, at any rate for some period of years, in return for the better

security they were obtaining.

'On July 3rd Barrère called and explained to me a scheme of his on

Egyptian finance, in which he was now highly skilled, having been

French Agent in Egypt for some time. I put the matter before Lord

Granville, who sent it to Mr. Gladstone and Childers. Barrère argued

that it was not necessary to reduce interest, or, to use the slang

of the moment, to "cut the coupon." We called a meeting of the

Commons Ministers, and Chamberlain announced that he should resign

if the coupon were not cut.

'July 18th, 1884.--We had virtually decided on declaring Egypt

bankrupt in order to force the hands of the French, but Waddington,

at a meeting with Childers, had broached a plan, which had

originally been suggested by the Germans, for a temporary reduction

of interest, to be reconsidered at the end of a certain number of

years.' (These proposals were discussed at the Conference, which met

in the latter half of July, held seven sittings, and then broke down

without arriving at a conclusion on August 1st.) 'The question now

raised was--at the end of what number of years? The French said

three, and we decided to propose ten; but with a willingness to take

six or even five; we advancing 4 1/2 millions instead of 8, or, in

other words, leaving out the indemnities due by Egypt. If this

arrangement failed, then we were to fall back on bankruptcy.

Harcourt was much against declaring bankruptcy, and in favour of the

policy of "scuttle." Hartington was against bankruptcy, and for

paying the differences ourselves; so as to force us into annexation.

Spencer, Childers, Chamberlain, and I, were for bankruptcy or for a

strong threat of bankruptcy.

'On July 21st there was a meeting of members of the Cabinet after

questions, at which Mr. Gladstone, Lord Granville, Hartington,

Harcourt, Childers, and I, were present. The French had backed out

of their proposals, and we considered a new scheme of Childers's to

put all administrative charges in Egypt before interest of debt, a

scheme which it was certain that the French would refuse. Harcourt

was again violent against bankruptcy, which he announced he thought

grossly "illegal," as if there were such a thing as illegality in

such affairs.

'On August 2nd there was a full Cabinet, every member being present,

and we had to consider whether, the Conference having broken down,

Baring should go back to Egypt or remain at the Foreign Office and

continue to advise us. Lord Granville proposed that he should

remain, and that Malet should go to Egypt. Chamberlain proposed that

Goschen should go. Childers proposed J. K. Cross. [Footnote:

Under-Secretary for India.] Dufferin was mentioned; then Lord

Granville proposed Northbrook. All other names were immediately

withdrawn, and Northbrook took time to consider, but evidently meant

to go, and decided, I think, in the course of the same evening.

Baring was then called in, and we once more began to chop straw by

considering the "ulterior consequences" of the collapse of the

Conference--i.e., bankruptcy. Lastly, Gordon was dealt with, and

it was decided that a supplementary estimate should be proposed,

with the understanding that we should spend more if it was wanted. I

wrote to Chamberlain: "We always have two subjects--(a) Conference,

(b) Gordon." And he wrote back: "The first always taking up two or

three hours; and the second five minutes at the fag end of

business."

'On August 3rd I noted "we are going to send Northbrook to Egypt to

put down Barrère."

'On August 5th we considered the instructions to Northbrook, or

rather whether he should have any at all, and if so, what they

should be. Northbrook read us a scheme which he had written, which

attempted to conciliate Turkey and Italy, so as to have great naval

strength in the Mediterranean and to prevent all chance of a sudden

occupation of Egypt by France. We were to express our continued

determination not to annex. We were to stay five years at the

request of the Sultan. We were again to propose to the Powers those

arrangements with regard to the Canal which we had proposed already.

We were to pay the indemnities in stock; and the next coupon in

full; and we were to promise for the future not less than 4 per

cent, on privileged stocks, and not less than 3 per cent, on the

Unified debt, while we were in Egypt. Indian troops were to hold

Massowah. Harcourt, in reply, read a written counter-statement,

again proposing to "scuttle," and again threatening us that we

should have war with France. Hartington again spoke for a guarantee

by us of the whole Egyptian debt. After Hartington's observations

the discussion was, as usual, adjourned. Chamberlain and I decided

that we would ask for our old term of three and a half years'

occupation, as against Northbrook's five. Next came Gordon, and

Hartington proposed that we should embody some militia.

'On August 6th there was another Cabinet, and the first question was

that of Northbrook's scheme. Lord Granville agreed to a temporary

use of Turkish troops provided that they were to leave Egypt when we

left. Chamberlain would not agree, and wished to stick to

Northbrook's phrase only inviting "co-operation." This view

prevailed, and it was decided that if the Turks proposed to send a

commissioner, we were to refuse. But the question of troops was

really left open for more discussion. Next came the question of an

advance of nearly a million which had been made by Rothschild to

Egypt, and we asked him, as a favour to ourselves, to let it run,

which was all he wanted us to do. Northbrook, who is not strong, had

been a good deal fatigued with the discussion on his scheme, and

instead of sleeping (his usual practice at a Cabinet) on this

occasion fainted, and we had to get up and look after him at this

point.

'On August 26th I received a letter from Hartington, saying that

Northbrook was going to Osborne at the end of the week, and starting

for Egypt from there. Hartington told me he was coming up to meet

him, and he afterwards wrote to me to fix an appointment at the War

Office on the 29th. This I kept. Northbrook was deplorably weak. He

had returned from Rosebery's completely under the influence of Mr.

Gladstone's pro-French views. [Footnote: At Dalmeny Lord Northbrook

"met Mr. and Mrs. Gladstone." See Life of Lord Northbrook, p. 190.]

He had settled to spend a day at Walmer, and had telegraphed to Lord

Lyons to meet him there. His plan now was to ask the French

Government to send a man to Egypt in order that he and the Frenchman

might settle matters together. Hartington and I pointed out to him

that the Frenchman's instructions from his Government must either be

to refuse all reduction of interest, or to consent to it upon

obtaining from us a better political position than that given to

France by the Anglo-French agreement. We explained to him that it

would be impossible for us to tolerate such proposals. I wrote to

Chamberlain a full account of the interview.

'September 22nd_.--We decided with reference to Egyptian finance

that Chamberlain should write a strong letter to Lord Granville

protesting against any British advance to Egypt, unless accompanied

by a cutting of the coupon. He did so, and on September 25th sent me

a copy, and I sent the copy to Childers, and wrote myself to Lord

Granville. On the 27th I received a memorandum from Chamberlain as

to Lord Granville, Lord Derby, and Bismarck.

'Chamberlain's memorandum was a fierce denunciation of the

principles laid down in Northbrook's despatch No. 4, dated September

13th, and received September 22nd.' [Footnote: Lord Northbrook had

arrived in Egypt.]

Controversy now raged over Lord Northbrook's scheme, and added to the

difficulties of the Cabinet, which was divided on the question of

lowering or not lowering the rate of interest.

'On 19th November the second matter mentioned was Northbrook's

scheme, against which I fought hard.... I pointed out that early in

April, when Mr. Gladstone had wished to borrow on the future value

of the Canal shares, that proposal had not been accepted, and we

laid down the principle that it was for the bondholders to make

sacrifices. On July 3rd we had decided that the coupon must be

"cut." On July 18th the whole Cabinet had taken the same view except

Harcourt and the Chancellor, and four members--Childers, Spencer,

Chamberlain, and I--had advocated distinct bankruptcy. On August 2nd

we had seen Baring to lay our plans for bankruptcy. On August 5th

Northbrook himself had proposed a reduction of the interest. On

August 29th there had been a general agreement to the same effect.

Northbrook's policy had enormously sent up Egyptian stocks. After my

strong observations the opinions stood: Mr. Gladstone, Childers,

Chamberlain, Harcourt, Trevelyan, and Dilke against Northbrook's

scheme; for it, Lord Granville, the Chancellor, Hartington, Spencer,

Kimberley, Derby, Carlingford, and Northbrook himself. All the Lords

on one side, curiously enough, and all the Sirs and Mr.'s on the

other; eight to six against us. But I noted: "Mr. Gladstone is so

strong that we shall win." "As we did."' [Footnote: Letter from Sir

Charles to Mr. Brett (afterwards Lord Esher):

Local Government Board,

Whitehall,

_November_ 19_th_, 1884.

'_My_ policy has always been bankruptcy and stand the shot, and if

we had stuck to that we should have had no trouble with the Powers;

but indiscretions have made that difficult. It is not pleasant to be

called in too late. I quite agree in your general view, but how can

the bondholder be got to make sacrifices without his consent?']

'At the meeting of the Cabinet of December 2nd, Egyptian finance

again came up. We were informed that Prince Bismarck suggested oral

communications among ambassadors. For this Malet proposed Paris, and

we replied Berlin.'

IV.

During this time the Government continued to waver as to the Soudan

expedition.

On June 21st

'with regard to Gordon it was decided to wait ten days before

settling anything, and to see whether we heard from him in reply to

the silly questions which had been asked.'

On June 27th came the definitive news that Berber had fallen on May

26th. On July 5th

'We discussed the Egyptian army of the future, and then the question

of whether we should send an expedition to Khartoum, as to which we

again could come to no decision; Mr. Gladstone still opposing.'

Dilke, backed by Chamberlain, was still pressing the military solution

which he favoured. On July 16th

'Hartington on this occasion gave up the Berber-Suakim route, and

pressed for a decision as to an immediate expedition by the Nile. He

was supported by the Chancellor, Northbrook, Carlingford, and

Dodson. Mr. Gladstone, Harcourt, and Childers opposed.

'Chamberlain and I opposed a large expedition by the Nile, and

supported a small expedition, under the control of the navy, with a

body of picked men. Baring was called in about the police in Egypt,

and his views in support of Nubar were approved. Nubar was to have

his own way in the appointment of Inspectors of Police in Egypt.'

'On July 22nd we found that Mr. Gladstone had again taken up Zebehr,

and was anxious to send him to Khartoum in order to avoid a British

expedition.

'On July 25th there was a full Cabinet, Spencer being present, which

first discussed the Conference and then the Gordon expedition, for

which for the first time a large majority of the Cabinet pronounced.

The issue was narrowed down to that of sending some sort of British

force to or towards Dongola; and this was supported by Hartington,

the Chancellor, Derby, Northbrook, Spencer, Carlingford, Dodson,

Chamberlain, and me, while on the other side were only Mr.

Gladstone, Harcourt, and Kimberley. Lord Granville said nothing. By

the stoutness of their resistance the three for the moment prevailed

over the nine.

'On July 31st a storm was brewing about Gordon, and Harcourt went

about declaring that the Government would break up upon the

question. On the next day, August 1st, a way out of the difficulty

was found in an agreement that we should ask for a small vote of

credit, which we were to use or not as should be thought right

later.'

It must be remembered that communications with Gordon were now

interrupted, though occasionally renewed, and this added to the

confusion.

'On September 17th we received a telegram from Gordon which looked

as though he were perfectly mad, although some of the other

telegrams from him sent at the same time were sane enough.'

Since Parliament had risen and the Cabinet scattered, preparations had

been going on apace.

'When Hartington came to me on September 15th he told me that he had

already spent "£750,000 out of the £300,000" for the Gordon

expedition.' [Footnote: 'On August 9th Lord Hartington again asked

us for permission to embody militia or call out a portion of the

First-Class Army Reserve.']

'On October 4th Chamberlain had written strongly against Wolseley's

great expedition, Harcourt was still opposing the whole thing. After

this meeting of the Cabinet Northbrook wrote to Gordon a long letter

based on the Cabinet decision. He stated that the expedition under

Wolseley was not sent for the purpose of defeating the Mahdi, but

only of enabling the Egyptian garrison of Khartoum, the civil

employees and their families, with Gordon, to return to Egypt. He

offered the Grand Cross of the Bath' (to Gordon) 'as from the Queen

personally. He explained our refusal of Zebehr, and he suggested the

placing at Khartoum of the Mudir of Dongola. It was easy, however,

to write to Gordon, but it was not easy to get the letters to him;

and we had to attempt even to send them by Tripoli and the desert.'

[Footnote: As to the last communications with Gordon, see _Life of

Granville_, vol. ii., pp. 397-399. Besides the authorities already

quoted, the Parliamentary Papers Nos. 2, 6, 12, 13, and 25, for

1884, may be referred to.]

That is the last detailed reference to Gordon in the Memoir until

February 5th, 1885, when the news of the fall of Khartoum reached

London. The matter had passed out of the hands of the Cabinet into those

of the soldiers.

This comment in the Diary may fitly end this chapter:

'On February 20th I noted (conversation, I think, not printed), Lord

Acton says of Gladstone: "Cannot make up my mind whether he is not

wholly unconscious when working himself up to a change of position.

After watching him do it, I think that he is so. He lives completely

in what for the moment he chooses to believe."'