THE OUTCOME.
I. THE SITUATION IN PEKING.
A magnified repetition of experiences in Canton--Chinese
unchanged--International usages inapplicable.
Since the foregoing chapters were put into the printer's hands the Far
Eastern Question has reached a crisis in which its ruling factors have
been suddenly exposed in their nakedness. But the searchlight now thrown
upon them casts a blacker shadow on the unilluminated portions of the
field. The events of 1900, while revealing the landmarks of past foreign
relations with China, have deepened the obscurity of all that concerns
the future of the Chinese State itself, as well as of the position of the
foreign Powers in relation to it and to one another. International comity
is seen to have made no progress in sixty years; on the contrary, the
gulf that divides China from the world yawns wider than ever, of which a
striking example is afforded by the telegrams lately exchanged between
the Chinese and the German Emperors. They speak in tongues unknown to
one another and are mutually unintelligible, so that they have no common
ground but that of brute force. Intercourse imposed on them against their
will and conscience has resulted, naturally enough, in exhibiting the
Chinese as the enemies of the human family.
The capture of the Taku forts and the occupation of Peking by foreign
troops were but a repetition of similar incidents forty years before; and
it is instructive to observe how closely the lines of the old precedents
have been followed. Prisoners taken treacherously, or envoys held as
hostages; the threat to kill them if foreign troops menaced the capital;
the devices to arrest the advance of the Allied forces; the proposal to
negotiate only when the Chinese case became desperate; the ineradicable
belief in the credulity of foreigners; and the flight of the Court when
all other expedients failed,--were but another rehearsal, with variations,
of previous performances at Canton, Nanking, and Peking. The parallel is
completed by the efforts of foreign Powers to coax the emperor back to his
capital. Nothing has been changed, only the scale has been magnified, and
the civilised world, instead of one or two Powers, has become directly
interested in the catastrophe. Official intercourse with China has
thus continued on the lines on which it began. The first British envoy
was treated as a malefactor, imprisoned, his letters were intercepted,
his communications cut off, his servants withdrawn; he was guarded and
threatened by armed men posted at his door, and reduced to dangerous
subterfuges in order to get a message conveyed to his countrymen outside.
Canton in 1834 was simply Peking in 1900, in embryo. A naval force was
required to relieve Lord Napier from his perilous situation then,[33] as a
combined naval and military force has been required to relieve the foreign
Ministers in Peking now. The cycle has been completed. Every link in the
chain connecting the opening with the closing incidents of diplomatic
intercourse has been, on one side at least, homogeneous. Whatever and
whoever may have altered, the Chinese certainly have not. Commissioner
Lin, Viceroy Yeh, Prince Tuan, the empress-dowager, and all wielding
authority, whether in name or not, have been true to the Chinese ideal.
They have all alike been blind to the consequences of their acts, which
have throughout been characterised by the strategy of fools--momentary
success followed by overwhelming reverses, resulting at each succeeding
encounter in a further invasion of the frontiers of their political
independence.
The crisis has been sufficiently prolonged to enable the world to perceive
what the Chinese mean by the term negotiation. To them it signifies what
it has always done, a palaver to gain time, to hoodwink an opponent,
to escape from a threatened danger, to purchase immunity by promises; a
device to manage, or, as they themselves express it, "to soothe and bridle
barbarians." As little now as at any former period can they conceive the
idea of a fair bargain between equals. They but temporise as with a savage
or a dangerous beast. "Get rid of the barbarians" is their unvarying
_mot d'ordre_, and it matters but little to them what instruments are
employed in carrying it out. The office is one from which every statesman
instinctively shrinks, since if he fails in taming the barbarians his
case is referred to the Board of Punishments, and if he succeeds he incurs
the contempt of all classes for the concessions by which he has purchased
peace. It is hardly possible for him in any case to escape degradation.
Be it therefore Lin, Kishen, Kiying, Yeh, Kweiliang, Wênsiang, Chunghou,
Li Hung-chang, or any one else, Chinese negotiators, whatever their
apparent success in averting a danger, are morally certain to come to a
bad end; and for the reason which caused the failure of Lord Napier in
1834, the impossibility of reconciling two principles which are wholly
incompatible. As negotiation under such conditions can only be nugatory,
a lengthened experience has made it clear that neither the negotiator
nor the negotiation avails anything, but solely the manner in which the
Chinese are held to their engagements, even when imposed on them by force,
and the strictness with which the common duties of civilised nations are
exacted from them, with or without written agreements.
One feature in the recent Peking episode distinguishes it from previous
experiences. A Government communicating with foreign Powers through its
own envoys, doling out through them garbled information, while isolating
the envoys of those same Powers within its capital, and planning, and
if not doing its best to effect, their extermination, at least openly
approving the attempt, is surely unexampled in human history. The
proposal of such a Government, on the failure of its plans to "negotiate
for peace," would be the most sardonic of practical jokes if we could
disconnect it from the evidence implied in the proposal of the estimate
of foreign nations which is ingrained in the Chinese moral constitution.
Obviously, however, such a Government has placed itself beyond the pale
of international relations, and it is hardly possible to conceive any
restoration of the old or evolution of a new _régime_ which can place
China in the rank of civilised Powers.
We are, in fact, thrust back on the conclusion arrived at by Lord Napier
in 1834: "That Government is not in a position to be dealt with or treated
by civilised nations according to the same rules as are acknowledged and
practised among themselves." Yet, instead of being treated with less, the
Chinese Government has received greater consideration than is accorded by
one Western State to another. Prerogatives implying superiority have been
conceded to it by consent of all the foreign Powers--a false principle
which has now produced its natural result.
The usages of Western Courts, therefore, being wholly inapplicable in
China, no matter what Government may rule there, international relations
of the European type must be, as they have hitherto been, an illusory
ideal, and some new form of intercourse, corresponding more closely to
the realities of the case, must take the place of that which has proved so
totally unworkable. Should foreign nations, by reason of differences among
themselves or the magnitude of the problem, hesitate to act up to this
view of the situation, the continuance of a status which is essentially
false to the facts must lead to some still more tragic catastrophe than
any that has yet taken place.
II. THE CHRONIC CAUSE.
Hostility of Government and people--Fostered by immunity--Cause of
animosity as set forth by Chinese--Incitements to outrage--Chinese
press calumnies--Compared with European--Effect on the Chinese of
international vituperation.
It must be admitted that the attitude of the Chinese has been quite
consistent: from first to last they have resisted the foreign impact
_per fas et nefas_, using such weapons as they could command, while
avoiding, according to their lights, the risk of reprisals. Their lights
have indeed deceived them, their resistance has failed, and their methods
stand condemned. But it is beside the question to inveigh against their
barbarity, for "what is bred in the bone comes out in the flesh," and in
human relations there are permanent facts which have to be accepted, like
the skin of the Ethiopian and the spots of the leopard. Since foreigners
have, for their own purposes, broken into a hornet's nest, it is idle for
them to prescribe the manner of retaliation unless they are prepared to go
through with their aggression and to enforce obedience to their own canon.
The constant feature in all Chinese attacks on foreigners has been the
immunity from punishment of the real instigators. Massacres of foreigners
have been condoned, for the blood-money exacted for them was no punishment
to criminals who did not contribute to the payment. All attempts on the
part of foreign agents to make guilty officials responsible for their
outrages have been frustrated by the Government, who have invariably held
the persons of officials exempt from punishment at the instance of, or
for injuries done to, foreigners. In Chinese eyes injury to foreigners
is meritorious in the abstract, and to be rewarded rather than punished.
Foreign Powers have in practice acquiesced in this fatal principle, for
though on rare occasions they have successfully insisted on the removal
of some obnoxious official, the Government have taken care to nullify
the penalty by promoting him to a better post. The various attempts that
have been made by foreign representatives to collect evidence to support
a legal charge against the instigators of outrages have been baffled by
the inflexible determination of the Government to shield the official as
well as the non-official leaders of riots. The foreign method of seeking
redress, being thus foredoomed to failure, is obviously not suited to the
circumstances.
But while foreigners were pursuing their object by a hopeless path, the
Chinese administration itself provided the simpler and more efficacious
remedy of holding the chief authority of every province responsible for
misgovernment, as well as for crimes and misdemeanours committed within
his district. In the words of Sir Rutherford Alcock, "Each province
constitutes a separate state in its administration; to compensate
for this the emperor can appoint and remove every official, from the
Governor-General downwards, at his pleasure. And they are each and all
individually and collectively held responsible for all that may happen
in the limits of their jurisdiction." By the custom of the country,
therefore, the guilt of the highest official is assumed whenever any
disturbance of the peace takes place or crime is committed within his
government. He may transfer it, if he can, and ferret out evidence in
his own exculpation; but errors of judgment, pleas of good intentions,
and palliatives of that kind are not admitted, and not offered. Why
foreigners have never appealed to this fundamental principle of Chinese
administration, and have preferred relying on their own crude procedure
and strange methods of collecting evidence while practically acquiescing
in the immunity of Chinese officials, has never been satisfactorily
explained. For it is only in matters concerning foreigners that the
persons of Chinese officials are held sacred. The Government have
no scruples with regard even to the highest in rank when they make
themselves obnoxious to the powers that be. Degradation, deprivation,
chains, imprisonment, and the headsman's broadsword, are ever ready to
vindicate the majesty of the law when the Court awards the penalty. But
foreigners are treated as outside the law, which is the gravamen of the
Chinese offence against them. The constitution of the country afforded
them a clear ground for demanding that the traditional principle of
responsibility should be put in force for their protection. It was, in
fact, applied spontaneously by Li Hung-chang in the province of which
he was viceroy, with the result that Chihli was exempt from outrages
on foreigners for nearly a quarter of a century. Why was the system
not extended to all the provinces of the empire? Had not the foreign
representatives the natural right of demanding the benefit of Chinese
institutions, or did they consider their exotic substitute as preferable?
A wrong road can never lead to a right destination; sins of omission
and commission have alike to be atoned for, and the cost accumulates
at compound interest. The result of sparing prefects and governors the
consequences of the evil deeds permitted within their jurisdiction is that
the Western Powers are now confronted with the more serious dilemma of
sparing the throne itself and tolerating the continuance of anti-foreign
outrages, or of doing stern justice towards the guilty even though the
heavens should fall. A retrospective glance over the history of sixty
years might help towards a solution even of this momentous problem. Have
the sacrifices of principle that have hitherto been made in order to save
the empire, or the dynasty, been efficacious to these ends? The answer of
history is No; on the contrary, they have accelerated the ruin of both.
The provoking cause of recent outbreaks against foreigners in all
parts of the Chinese empire may be gathered from the proceedings of
the conspirators, from their placards and lampoons, and from their
secret correspondence. The keynote of all these is general detestation
of foreigners, special enmity to Christianity and its accessories, and
aversion to the symbols of material progress. Hatred of foreigners now
shows itself as a passion which binds the provinces together as nothing
else has ever been known to do. Their expulsion is a cause which is
held to justify the vilest deeds done in its name. Nor is the present
state of things a growth of yesterday. The ferment has been working for
forty years--to go no further back--with many sporadic outbreaks to
mark its progress. It was not nipped in the bud, as it might perhaps
have been. Exhibitions of ill-feeling had been habitually disregarded
by foreigners, who in their readiness to blame each other for provoking
them, were accustomed to repel obvious explanations, and to go far afield
for theories which would exonerate themselves at the expense of their
neighbours. If stones were thrown or abusive epithets shouted, "It was
only the children." Only the children! As if more conclusive testimony to
any prevailing sentiment were possible.[34] In Peking itself the foreign
Ministers set the example of palliating these abuses, and the only wonder
is that the fire has smouldered so long without bursting into flame.
During thirty years--to speak only of the recent period--missionaries
in the interior have encountered the growing hostility of the people,
which they have ascribed, perhaps too exclusively, to the machinations of
"literati and gentry," forgetting that the torch would be applied in vain
to a substance that was not inflammable.
Not that the machinations of the official and literary classes of the
country are by any means to be held of little account, for they have
been the most potent factor in fomenting and directing the passions
of the people. What corresponds in China to a newspaper press has been
constantly employed in vilifying the character and execrating the designs
of foreigners, and holding them up continually to the contempt and hatred
of the Chinese people. There was no effective means of contradicting the
calumnies which were daily poured forth from every centre of population.
Attempts have, indeed, been made by special counterblasts in the form
of missionary publications in the chief citadel of hostility, and in a
less polemic form in the periodicals in the Chinese language conducted by
foreigners, yet these have had little more effect on the popular beliefs
than a leading article in the 'Times' has upon the flood of anti-English
literature that is poured out every day from Continental journals. From
an observation of the calumnies which are so unquestioningly accepted
by European populations we may partly judge of the effect of a constant
stream of the same class of vituperative literature among the still more
ignorant people of China. The features of both are the same. In Europe, as
in China, there is no crime that the lowest savages have ever committed
which is not attributed, with impassioned eloquence and with the finest
literary skill, to those who are held up to the popular animosity. In
Europe, as in China, the ruling powers encourage the virulence of the
press. In countries where the Government exercises direct control, and in
others where the connection is less official, extravagances are permitted
which can serve no other purpose than that of making the objects of
the invective so odious that a quarrel with them is rendered popular in
advance. European Governments thus play with fire, as the Chinese have
done, but in the case of the latter the incendiary policy has worked out
its logical result.
Nor should it be forgotten that since, in these days, the Chinese have
the fullest access to European literature, the calumnies of one nation
by another are calculated to confirm their conviction of the turpitude of
all. Neither is their armoury confined to the international amenities of
the Western press. The charges habitually, and as a matter of course, made
against their own countrymen by British writers and speakers would justify
a stranger people, already predisposed thereto, in forming the worst
opinion of English character. During the saturnalia of a general election,
when the fountains of the great deep are broken up, no baseness, no
falsity, no treachery, is too gross to be attributed, not to the rabble,
but to the chosen leaders of the people. Such things being circulated
throughout the world, preserved in indelible ink, can the enemies of the
British nation, or at least the prejudiced Chinese, be greatly blamed for
accepting the character of our people on such unimpeachable evidence?
Should we not judge them on analogous testimony? From whatever sources
they gather their ideas, however,--whether from the study of foreign
newspapers, from their own observation of the ways of foreign men and
women, or from the gross libels published by their literati,--there is no
reason to doubt that the unfavourable opinion which the Chinese entertain
of foreigners is held by them in good faith.
III. IMMEDIATE PROVOCATION.
Shock of the Japanese war--European spoliation of
China--Anarchy apprehended therefrom--Reminiscence of Taiping
rebellion--Proposals for moderating foreign inroads--Lawlessness
of foreign Powers--Chinese yield to force but nurse
resentment--The missionary irritant.
What has caused the chronic anti-foreign movement to swell suddenly to
imperial dimensions, and to explode simultaneously in the capital and in
distant provinces, is a larger question than we can attempt to answer.
As contributory causes, however, there are certain facts lying on the
surface of foreign relations which are too suggestive to be passed over.
The Japanese war of 1894-95, and the train of events following it, noted
in a previous chapter, struck at the vital centre of the Chinese empire.
Foreigners of all nations applied force to China, not to defend person
or property, but to divide up the empire in disregard of the Government
and the people, both assumed to be moribund. The partition of China was
discussed in the Western press as a matter in which the Government and
natives of the country had no concern. Open doors, spheres of influence,
concessions, protectorates--the various modes in which the Chinese oyster
was to be cooked and served--were treated solely as questions of rivalry
and preponderance between the Western Powers. The people were not indeed
ignored, for the aggressors reckoned on them as their most valuable
asset, the raw material of prospective armies, the source of labour supply
for excavations and earthworks, and of the payable traffic for railways
and other exotic enterprises. But there is more in human nature than a
capacity to dig or obey a drill-sergeant, and it is precisely the elements
which were disregarded by political, financial, and industrial adventurers
which have risen up in judgment against them. The grandiose pronouncements
of the foreign press during the last two or three years were by no means
lost on the Chinese Government. These writings showed that the ambitions
of foreign countries had no limits, while the gratification of them was
absolutely incompatible with the retention of any semblance of independent
authority by the rulers of the country.
Reasoning after the fact, and from effect to cause, is apt to be
fallacious, but when the circuit is completed by the joining of prediction
with realisation, some confidence may be felt in the soundness of
the conclusion. Those who have observed the condition of China with
a sympathetic eye have been for years labouring under the deepest
apprehension for the peace of the country. The Japanese war accentuated
this feeling, and the subsequent ruthless proceedings of the Western
Powers deepened the apprehension. As the forces of aggression could in
nowise be restrained, anxious, but inadequate and altogether ineffectual,
attempts were made to avert their worst effects. Warnings were not
wanting that "dangers which might have slept for generations to come
had been suddenly brought within the range of practical politics, and
that unless measures of precaution were taken in time, what happened in
1894-95 would sooner or later happen again, ... that the Chinese Empire
would be brought to the verge of disruption; for all the forces, external
and internal, which make for anarchy would be let loose, and the empire
would be powerless alike to resist dismemberment by the aggressive Powers
or the subversion of authority by internal upheaval." The paper from
which we quote, doubtless one of many such drawn up in 1896, goes on to
say: "However desirous some, or even all, of the Great Powers might be
of saving China from dissolution, they would be paralysed by their own
jealousies, and they would perhaps be more concerned to avert a general
war among themselves than to prevent calamity in China. A crisis might
thus arise more direful in its consequences than the chronic crisis in
the Ottoman Empire, and a reign of havoc would follow in which millions
would perish where the loss of thousands now excites the indignation of
the civilised world.[35] No circumstances would be wanting to intensify
the horror, for it would not be even civil war, but promiscuous rapine
as aimless and as uncontrollable as a forest fire. A generation has
scarcely passed since China was desolated by the scourge of the Taiping
rebellion, which is thought to have destroyed a population equal to that
of a first-class European State; and a new outbreak of the like kind
would be more hopeless, inasmuch as the factors which were eventually
brought into play to extinguish the conflagration in 1862-64 would now
be wanting, or would be rendered inoperative by the complex circumstances
above indicated."
The spectre was anarchy, the provocatives aggression and dismemberment;
and the permanent interests of international commerce were appealed to
to avert the calamities foreshadowed. "Dismemberment, from the point
of view of the general interests of trade, would be little better than
anarchy." Severe pressure was being put on the Chinese Government--even
in 1896, when these and similar forebodings were uttered--to permit
free communication by steam and rail, and the development of the mineral
resources of their country. It was from such sources that the immediate
danger to the integrity of the territory and the peace of the State was
apprehended, while, on the other hand, the need for the innovations was
freely granted. "The Chinese having neither men nor appliances capable
of undertaking either the construction or management of railways, must
be wholly dependent on foreigners for their inauguration. This state of
things, fully recognised on all sides, has led speculators and promoters
of all nations to besiege the Chinese authorities with offers of the
means of construction and with demands for concessions. But considering
the relative positions of China and the Western nations, it cannot
but be admitted that the Chinese have done well to refuse to listen
to such proposals. Rival concessionaires working under the ægis of
extra-territoriality in the interior would be the axe at the root of the
tree of China's integrity."
The problem of preserving the independence and integrity of China,
while permitting the opening of the interior of the country to foreign
enterprise, was felt to be one of the gravest importance, not to be
settled by the clamour either of rival concession-hunters or the intrigue
of rival States. "Inland residence," wrote Sir Rutherford Alcock, in 1868,
"will bring weakness to the nation and death to the Government, and must
eventuate in greater anarchy than has yet been seen.... Right of residence
in the interior is hardly compatible with an extra-territorial clause."
The essential condition of safety for the country was evidently,
therefore, to bar the acquisition of territorial rights by any foreign
Government or company. With this view it was urged that at least the
ownership and control of railways and mines should be retained in the
hands of the Government itself, under a competent organisation in which
foreign skill and experience should be effectively represented. As
the then existing railway line of 200 miles was of such a character, a
development of the same system was recommended for the larger schemes
which were thought to be impending. The foreign Powers were urged
to assist China in putting her house in order and in adapting her
administration to the exigencies of the time.
Such were among the proposals made in 1896, and not disapproved by
the Powers to which they were addressed. But common action thereon by
foreigners was hindered by mutual rivalry and distrust, while the Chinese
Government on its part showed neither inclination nor capacity--any more
than it had ever done--to meet its difficulties by comprehensive measures.
It preferred the ancient system of resisting, in detail and in secret, the
advances of foreigners,--a policy of traps and snares and entanglements.
Possibly the paralysis of despair had already reached the nerve centres
of Chinese statesmanship, or the desperate scheme of a general expulsion
of foreigners had begun to fascinate the leading spirits. Certain it is
no practical _rapprochement_ was effected, or even seriously attempted,
between the contending forces.
Meantime, however, the invaders would brook no delay,--they had no
time for temporising tactics. The "ugly rush" began--syndicate rivalled
syndicate, and Government Government, in dividing up the _corpus vile_.
Within twelve months of the period just referred to Germany led the way
in the dismemberment of China by cutting off a slice of Shantung; Russia
promptly followed in Liaotung; then Great Britain took Weihai-wei as a
set-off, and assumed an interest in the central zone keener than that
of the Chinese Government itself. Other Powers followed with imperious
demands for portions of Chinese territory, on no ground whatever
except that China was weak. Every law save the law of the strongest
was suspended. Justice and mercy were thrown to the winds. And yet the
orgies of spoliation were followed by no change in the outward forms of
diplomatic relations with the Chinese Government. Foreign representatives
continued to negotiate as if the power of that Government remained intact,
though to assume, for one purpose, that there was neither sentient
organism nor sovereign authority in China, and for another, that the
Government retained its full competence,[36] was obviously to bring chaos
into their intercourse. As a consequence, diplomatic correspondence
with China since 1898--the British share of which, so far as has been
published, extends to a thousand pages--is but a harvest of Dead Sea
Fruit.
But Chinese relations being a compound of courtesy and force on the
part of foreign Powers, it is not difficult to divine which of the two
must be the dominant factor. Though they bowed their heads in morose
silence before their conquerors, Chinese statesmen retained sufficient
vitality to discriminate between platonic diplomacy and the "mailed
fist," yielding in all things to menace, in nothing to argument. To
seize territory, under this _régime_, presented less difficulty than to
obtain redress for trivial injuries. Aggressive Powers were respected
according to the measure of their aggression, while those who concerned
themselves with the preservation of the empire met with no recognition
whatever. British schemes were thwarted at every point, while other
Powers ran riot throughout the territory. For this reason the Chinese
Government collectively, and individual mandarins, have been stigmatised
as anti-British, as if to be so were a blot upon their escutcheons. No
doubt they are; but to assume on that account that the Chinese rulers
are pro-Russian, pro-French, or pro-German is more than the premisses
seem to warrant. History and tradition are alike opposed to such an
idea. That peculiar kind of patriot, the friend of every country but
his own, is not much in evidence in China. The vainest and most jealous
nation on earth was not likely in a moment to suppress its self-love,
invert its whole character, and welcome an army of foreign adventurers,
no matter of what nationality, who came in the guise not of servants but
masters. And, setting sentiment aside, the Chinese were not blind to the
material consequences of the foreign schemes which were pressed on them,
but were as keenly alive to the danger of intrusting railway and mining
enterprises to foreigners as they had always shown themselves to be
when their military and naval armaments were concerned. The memorials of
provincial authorities clearly prove this. If, therefore, they admitted
the disruptive agency into their country, it was from no love of the
interlopers, but solely by way of submission to superior force, and under
the same mental reservation with which they had subscribed to all their
previous treaty engagements.
The chronic missionary irritant mentioned in previous chapters had been
steadily spreading, and the hostility evoked by it as steadily increasing.
Christianity being the only character in which foreigners had presented
themselves to the view of the masses, the extirpation of it stood in the
forefront of the anti-foreign programme. The disasters which the governing
classes had always apprehended from the extension of foreign missions had
suddenly assumed the form of a concrete reality. All that its opponents
had for generations foretold became fact: their administration was being
undermined, their traditions set at nought, their very territory wrenched
from them in the name of the foreign religion. Propagandism was finally
unmasked by the German Emperor in the uncompromising manner characteristic
of that potentate. The Name that is above every name was openly made
subservient to the lust of conquest. China saw at last that she was really
doomed through the instrumentality of the religion which she had engaged
herself to tolerate.
IV. THE DYNASTIC FACTOR.
Irregularity of the succession--Defensive position of the
empress-dowager--Cantonese reformers influence emperor--Regent's
alarm, vengeance and reaction--The new heir-apparent.
Ever since the _coup d'état_ in January 1875, whereby the empress-regent
by her own fiat placed her infant nephew on the throne of her deceased
son, to the exclusion of more legitimate heirs, the dynastic question
has been regarded by Chinese patriots as a certain source of future
trouble.[37] The imperial dignity was not the only matter involved in the
succession, but a vast amount of property also, and so many members of
the imperial clan were interested in the result that it was deemed certain
that the partisans of legitimacy would lie in wait for an opportunity of
enforcing the claims of the rightful heir. As it is customary to attribute
the acts of statesmen to personal motives, it has never been doubted that
the interest of the empress-regent in setting the reigning emperor on the
throne was sufficiently explained by her own lust of power. We know what
is done, but do not always know what is prevented, and in the case of
the families of both the elder brothers who were passed over, there may
have been practical as well as judicial reasons to justify even a _coup
d'état_ which supplanted them. From what has recently been revealed of
the character of Prince Tuan, for example, the exclusion of his progeny
may possibly have been a providential deliverance.
Be these things as they may, however, and be her ulterior motives what
they may, the solicitude of the empress-regent has been constantly
directed to protecting the weak point in her dynastic defences. The
childlessness of the present emperor, as well as the misfortunes of
the empire since he assumed the reins of power in 1889, of course added
indefinitely to her anxiety, while at the same time serving to keep alive
the pretensions of the elder branches.
Speaking, as we have done throughout, only of what is apparent, the
succession question was brought to the point of incandescence by certain
events in 1898. Great and justifiable discontent had arisen in the
provinces with the manner in which the affairs of the empire had been
conducted, resulting in humiliation and calamity. The idea of doing
something to stem the tide of misgovernment by enforcing the lessons
of recent misfortune was freely discussed. But the Chinese have not
discovered any method of remedying grievances except insurrections
in one form or another, on a small or on a large scale. A movement of
this character has been on foot in the Canton province ever since the
Japanese war. These revolutionary conspiracies have indeed been so well
organised, and so powerfully supported, that once, if not oftener, the
provincial city of Canton has narrowly escaped capture. The agitation has
been directed nominally against the Manchu Government. Whether directly
associated with the insurrectionary propaganda or not, another body
afterwards challenged public notice under the name of Reformers. As in the
case of the insurrectionary movement, many Government officials secretly
gave their adhesion to the cause, and inspired the leaders with confidence
in the ultimate success of their schemes.
Reform had been preached continuously to China from every foreign pulpit
for forty years. "Reform or perish" was the regular formula--words so
easily written that no resident, tourist, publicist, foreign official,
or any one with a pen or a tongue, refrained from reiterating them
continually. Individually every Chinese official with whom foreigners came
in contact joined in the cry. But though the general demand was unanimous,
there was diversity in the details, and in such a case the details were
everything. A dozen writers, each insisting on the necessity of thorough
reform, would postulate separately some indispensable preliminary to any
reform whatsoever. These indispensable preliminaries, added together,
would have left nothing for the substantive portion of the programme; by
them Chinese administration would have been renovated from top to bottom.
Such was the difficulty which friends and critics experienced in knowing
where to begin in their efforts to reduce the general to the particular.
In 1898, however, a bold attempt was made to launch a comprehensive scheme
of reform by imperial fiat. A Cantonese named Kang Yu-wei, backed by a
body of opinion,--of the extent and value of which different estimates may
be formed, "financed," of course, as popular leaders must be,--obtained
the ear of the emperor, and induced him to promulgate a budget of edicts
of startling novelty. Being deemed revolutionary, they excited alarm
in the Imperial Court. What were the specific grounds of alarm may be
easily surmised. Foreigners who refer it exclusively to the question of
reform may possibly take as partial a view of this as they have done of
other Court movements. What is known is, that the empress-regent, always
ready to strike when her interest or her schemes have been threatened,
pounced on the unfortunate emperor, and by force of will and the parental
authority which counts for so much in China, and in virtue of the Great
Seal which she had reserved when handing over her trust, made him revoke
his revolutionary edicts, hunted out his dangerous counsellors and
punished them as traitors. The embers of reform were thus for the time
ruthlessly stamped out. Of the ethics of these proceedings it is needless
to speak: not ethics but strength decided the issue; nature's primeval law
was not suspended in favour of the adventurous spirits who flew at such
high game. A reaction against all reform naturally set in, and the old
struggle was renewed: between conservation and revolution, viewed from
the Chinese Court side; between purity and corruption, viewed from that
of the Reformers.
But the quarrel cannot be restricted to so simple an issue as either of
these. The question between the Reformers and the Court was complicated by
sundry important considerations. In the first place, the capture of the
Emperor by Kang Yu-wei was directly inspired by the teaching of foreign
missionaries. In the second place, the movement originated in the same
southern provinces whence the Taiping rebellion itself had sprung, and
where conspiracies against the Government had been active since 1895.
And thirdly, the reform agitation was ostentatiously patronised by the
foreign, or at least by the English, press, while the leaders of the
insurgents found a safe asylum, if not an effective base of operations,
in Hongkong and in foreign countries. Taking these circumstances
together, therefore, whatever may be thought of the intrinsic merits
of the double agitation, it could scarcely be expected that the Powers
which saw themselves so seriously menaced should draw any such fine
distinction between the ostensible objects of the reformers and of the
revolutionaries, as to regard the one with complacency while suppressing
the other. The most abject of governments and the most timid of animals
will resist to the death an attack which threatens their existence. There
would be nothing unnatural, therefore, in the resentment of the Imperial
Government against its disaffected people being, by the process which
is so familiar to us in family quarrels, temporarily diverted from the
domestic to the foreign enemy, against whom the combined hostility of all
parties in the Chinese State might, for the time being, be concentrated.
Without, however, attempting to assign their relative values to all or
any of these factors in the question, it seems evident that the events of
1898 revealed the elements of a drama in which the contending factions in
the Court were forced to show their colours. The course of the conflict
during the year and a half following the autumn of 1898 has probably
been obscured rather than elucidated by the contradictory reports and
fluctuating comments which have been so freely disseminated with but
slight regard to the authenticity of their origin. But the nomination of
a grandson of Prince Tun as heir-apparent, which was decreed in January
1900, looks like a belated, if not compulsory, recognition of the prior
claims of that Princes family, and a confession that the Emperor Kwanghsu
has kept the rightful heir twenty-five years out of his inheritance;
for the grandson now selected possesses no right which the grandson set
aside in 1875 did not possess. The relations of Prince Tuan, the father
of the emperor designate, with the empress-regent are as obscure as
the intricacies of palace politics usually are to contemporary foreign
observers. Fortunately, however (in one sense), the cross-currents and
undercurrents of the Court, the question who are confederates and who
rivals, who betrayers and who betrayed, in the imperial camp, are matters
which have to a great extent been deprived of their significance. Under
normal conditions the dynastic imbroglio might have had a perturbing
influence on the policy of foreign Powers, but the explosion of last
summer has relegated all such domestic questions to a secondary place.
When the correspondent of the 'Times' could report that there was "no
Government" in Peking, the _personnel_ of that Government lost its
practical interest. The old order, with its sins and sorrows, has indeed
passed away, but to find a substitute for it is a problem that will tax
the wisdom as well as the forbearance of the world. The anarchy which
has been so long dreaded is actually upon us, and the prospective horrors
of it are assuredly not lessened by the outbreak being signalised in the
capital rather than in the provinces.
V. THE CHINESE OUTBREAK.
Chinese methods of expelling foreigners--Secret societies--The
Boxers.
Considering as a whole, therefore, the succession of crushing blows which
during the past six years have been dealt against the integrity of China
by open enemies and dissimulating friends, we may conceive, at least
partially, the hatred of foreigners which exists in the country. In this
case we are not driven to assume any wide difference between the Chinese
and races more nearly allied to ourselves, nor need we seek to account
for their demonstrations by defects in their moral or religious training.
Had even the whole population of China been miraculously converted to
Christianity, as suggested by Sir Robert Hart ('Fortnightly Review,'
November 1900), it is not permissible to assume that they would have
continued turning the other cheek to so many smiters. If we suppose the
case of any Western nation subjected to the experiences through which
the Chinese have had to pass at the hands of foreign dictators, the mode
in which it would act may afford us some measure by which to gauge the
excesses of the Chinese.
The origin and organisation of the recent outbreak will no doubt be a
topic of discussion for some time to come, and it is not within our
province to anticipate the final verdict on it. But, as in certain
contagious diseases which become constitutional, the angry symptoms first
show themselves at the point of infection, it is interesting to note
that the German sphere in Shantung enjoys the distinction of being the
cradle of the principal agency producing the cataclysm. The prominence
suddenly attained by the Boxer movement is probably fortuitous, due to
its casual connection with high personages. Secret societies are nothing
new, nor societies of divers sorts which have scarcely the pretence of
secrecy. As weeds spring up where cultivation is neglected, these social
growths may be considered in the light of spontaneous efforts to occupy
ground left vacant by the constituted Government,--a sort of excrescence
of autonomy rising and falling according as the administration is less or
more efficient. The members of these societies may be ascetics who follow
strict rules of living, defenders of popular rights, or mere "bullies"
who may be hired. They bear virtuous titles, but it is safe to assume that
the ostensible object of the associations is in practice invariably lost
in schemes of a different complexion. Sometimes in collision, at other
times in collusion, with the established Government, these societies are
a mobile factor, a sort of shifting ballast, always to be reckoned with
in the Chinese economy.
As the Boxers are an athletic corps, drilled and exercised, it was
natural to inquire, when their imposing force stood revealed, how
such a formidable movement could have been organised among the Chinese
people without the fact becoming known to the foreign residents in the
country. One answer is, that those who saw what was going on and warned
their countrymen were decried as alarmists, and then held their peace.
The wisest were but little wiser than their neighbours, for as weather
prophets easily forecast the character of the following season, while
they are at fault as regards that of the next twenty-four hours, so those
who are able to predict with confidence the remote future in China are
often the most blind to the nearer future which is reckoned by days or
months. But incredulity was excusable in the present case, for the extent
and apparent suddenness of the movement were really unprecedented. Such a
force has not been mobilised and kept in the field in a militant condition
without immense effort and liberal supplies, for though pillage might
go far, it would not go all the way in supporting so large a body for
any length of time. The junction of the Boxers with imperial troops, the
relations of the commanders to members of the imperial family, and the
influence of the movement on the question of the dynastic succession, are
all matters on which light will be welcome; for as no military invasion
of the territory has ever called forth such a general enthusiasm of
resistance, interesting, indeed, will be the discovery of the real genesis
of a rising at once spontaneous and aggressive.
The most practical observation, however, that foreign nations have been
forced to make during the crisis is that, whatever might have been the
separate designs of those who presided over the general movement, the
rallying flag of the combination was the extermination of foreigners.
That was the pretext which, for the time being at least, reconciled
all antagonisms and satisfied all consciences. It seemed as if the
long-accumulated hatred of the Chinese had gathered to a head, and its
whole force had been concentrated in one supreme effort to sweep the
aliens throughout the empire into the sea. That elaborate preparation had
been made to carry this into effect seems to be placed beyond doubt, the
rulers of China evidently conceiving that the effort would be successful.
The excuse put forward in palliation of an anti-crusade headed by the
highest personages in the empire bears an interesting family resemblance
to the apology usually made for rebels. Being beguiled by false prophets,
they believed they would succeed;[38] and success would have justified the
venture. The facts are such as no subsequent negotiations, no treaties,
no modifications of government, no reform, no professions of any kind,
can ever explain away.
VI. THE CRUX.
Concert of foreign Powers unstable--Divergent aims--Aggressive
and non-aggressive Powers--Unpromising outlook--The progress of
Russia the only permanent element.
If conflicting forces in China have been united in an effort to expel
the foreigners, so the non-Chinese world has been forced into temporary
agreement in order to extinguish a conflagration which endangered all
interests. But the Powers assembled to execute judgment and restore order
in China present a picturesque diversity of ulterior aims. Their unity
can hardly, therefore, be expected to survive the emergency which gave it
birth. After the storm has passed--if it does pass--the permanent policy
of the several Powers may be expected to resume its normal sway. Of the
character of these different policies we are not left in doubt, for in the
history of the past six years it has been revealed in overt acts bearing
a higher authority than the most solemn official manifestoes.
The principal Powers concerned may be ranged in three groups--the
aggressive, the non-aggressive, and the absorbent. Under the first
must be ranked Japan, France, and Germany. Facts which cannot lie have
proved that these three Powers have long cherished designs upon the
territory of China. No doubt they flatter themselves with the belief
that their rule over such portions of Chinese soil as may come under
their control would be a blessing to mankind, an opinion which it would
serve no good purpose to controvert. And they reckon that, in addition
to the higher civilisation which they propose to confer on the Chinese
people and Government, they will secure material advantages for their
own populations. The ruling characteristic, however, of this policy is
that it is factitious, adventurous, and ideal, in search of interests
to defend rather than framed for the defence of interests existing. It
is essentially, therefore, an aggressive policy, though, in a sense,
also progressive. Dividing the world into communities to be conquered
and nations who are fitted to conquer them, it represents the primeval
moving power in ethnic evolution. But it is a policy quite unsuited for
co-operation, and the attempt to yoke together Governments, certain of
whom are moved empirically by facts as they exist and as they arise,
and others by the desire of creating facts, ends--as all concerts
of antagonistic interests must end--most likely in explosion. A safe
calculation may be made as to the action of a non-aggressive Power,
under given circumstances, as the action of a man of business may be
approximately inferred from obvious considerations of pecuniary advantage.
But in the case of States with ideal policies, like France and Germany,
no such forecast can be made. This radical divergence between the aims of
the Powers who are called upon to decree the fate of China must render a
sincere agreement between them, under any circumstances, impossible; and
if the policy of one of them should happen to be directed by a political
genius ambitious of distinction, the course of the whole would be subject
to aberrations incalculable. It is true that the Governments which have
marked out for themselves these extensive plans of aggression may begin
to perceive that their proceedings in China have been somewhat in advance
of any justification, also that they have been reckoning without their
host, and that to found and maintain empires in further Asia may put a
strain upon their resources out of proportion to the material gains to
be derived from the enterprise. Perceiving that their "vaulting ambition
may o'erleap itself" and land them on the off-side of the horse, they may
show themselves willing, for the moment, to attenuate the significance
of their previous energy. The discovery that the conquest of China
involves something more than a military promenade may induce them to
make professions which, however sincere for the time being, accord but
indifferently with established facts. In the procession of history,
however, it is the facts and not the words which ultimately prevail.
And this is the only canon by which it is safe to interpret the
apocalyptic exchange of notes just announced between Great Britain and
Germany, whose significance, like that of the conversation of a Chinese,
lies in the things which are not said. Considered as a convention, it
must be classed with those elastic bargains of which several examples
occur in the preceding narrative, in which one party has a definite
aim and the other not, and which is therefore destined to be employed
exclusively to the advantage of the former. _Vigilantibus non dormientibus
servit lex._ Without knowing what secret inducements led to such a
declaration of policy between Great Britain and Germany it is impossible
to assign a value to it. Its most authoritative expositors in the German
press rejoice in the fact that it pins Great Britain down to the only
policy which she has ever pursued, or ever will,--a policy in which her
public utterances have throughout coincided with her overt acts,--that,
namely, of opening Chinese and all other markets not for herself but
for the whole world on equal terms. An agreement, however, which does
not arrest French encroachments in the south, Russian appropriations in
the north, nor German exclusive exploitations in Shantung or elsewhere,
contributes little to that maintenance of the integrity of China which is
its professed object. Neither the world at large nor China herself will
benefit greatly by a verbal restriction on the one Power to whom the "open
door" and the integrity of China are articles of political religion and
of undeviating practice. And the clause which solemnly reserves to the
two parties the right of consulting together in certain contingencies
gives to the transaction a very platonic character. But a covenant whose
meaning is veiled is always a hazardous operation, even in private life,
where the power of definite interpretation lies with the more aggressive
of the two parties.
* * * * *
The non-aggressive Powers may be defined as those whose citizens have
established in the country a substantial position, which their Governments
have been slow to protect. The principal representatives of this group
are Great Britain and the United States, whose interests in China have
many times been defined as commercial, and not territorial. They have
acted consistently on the conviction that there is no country in the
world where conquest for the sake of commerce was less justifiable than
in China, which possesses a large population inured to labour, accustomed
to the luxuries of a civilised society, and with unsurpassed aptitude
for business. No special credit is due to the two Anglo-Saxon nations for
their recognition of these circumstances, except in so far as it indicates
an intelligent appreciation of their own interests. They desire, as an
ordinary trader or manufacturer would, that a good customer may be kept
on his legs, and that a promising inheritance shall not be alienated
from the next generation of their merchants. Their policy, however, being
essentially passive and conservative, suffers from the defects of these
qualities, and is liable to be overborne by the more energetic action of
the Powers which we have ventured to place in the aggressive class.
* * * * *
There remains the third group, which consists of one member, and that is
Russia. Although Russia is in effect more aggressive than all the others
put together, her annexations have been conducted under a different
formula from those of Germany, France, or Japan. It is not merely that she
has avoided hostilities, and effected her purpose by patient and adroit
diplomacy, but that her acquisitions of Chinese territory have not been
of the "wild-cat" order, but genuine integral additions to her existing
possessions. The expansion of Russia, whether a matter to be deplored
or applauded, is at any rate a natural growth, unduly forced at times,
but steady and progressive. It is the shadow of this secular advance of
Russia that covers the whole Far Eastern situation, and has in fact done
so for nearly fifty years. The character of her progress could not be
better described, even with the lights we now possess, than it was by Sir
Rutherford Alcock as far back as 1855. With rare clearness of vision and
firmness of touch he thus foretold the position which Russia was destined
to occupy in the Far East:--
China has long been impotent. Russia has within the last few
years, by force of diplomacy, appropriated half the province
of Manchuria, the ancient patrimony of the reigning dynasty,
and with it the command of the river Amur. If this other great
Leviathan ... has not yet swallowed the whole empire, it can only
be that, great as are its capacities, there are limits imposed by
nature to the powers of deglutition and digestion in the largest
boa-constrictor or predatory animal yet discovered. In the mean
time the danger is more immediate and menacing to Europe than
to China, perhaps; for Russia has at Sakhalin, the mouth of the
Amur, and the adjoining coasts of the Western continent, laid the
foundation for a position as menacing to European commerce as any
now existing at the opposite extremity in the Baltic. Stretching
with giant arms across the whole breadth of Northern Asia and
Europe from fastnesses at each end, Asiatic hordes, directed by
Western genius and science, are held in leash, ready to let slip
over the fair and fertile south of both continents. The wealthiest
regions of both Europe and Asia are at once threatened by this
modern colossus.... China, India, and the kingdoms of Southern
Europe form but the three different stages of invading progress.
Long before the whole of such a gigantic scheme of rule and
conquest can have its accomplishment in China--the most helpless
as well as the richest of all the victims--Russia will be enabled
to reap the first-fruits and take instalments of the larger and
more distant spoil, by controlling the trade of Northern China
and the rich European trade so recently developed in its seas.
Russia alone has a policy independent at once of accidents, autocrats,
shifting governing bodies, and of all personalities, weak or strong.
With the accumulated force of past achievements, an unbroken tradition,
and great military forces massed on a frontier which is no frontier,
Russia among the other Powers now masquerading in the Far East is as the
iron vessel floating among the earthenware pots. Russian publicists, in
order to strengthen the dominant position to which they aspire, have been
proclaiming with increasing insistency that they are the only nation who
can deal with the Chinese Question because they are themselves an Asiatic
people. They justify this pretension by their primitive Asiatic military
ethics, and it is an instructive spectacle to see their forces massacring
Chinese populations wholesale while their diplomatists are ostentatiously
shielding those in high places from the just consequences of their
crimes. The German Emperor has said many clever and some foolish things,
but perhaps he never did a wiser one than in making over his schemes of
vengeance to his august ally, for the work is more becoming to an Asiatic
than a Teutonic people.
* * * * *
From an areopagus composed of these incongruous elements great
achievements are expected, but the comparison between the end and the
means inspires little confidence as to the result. The task itself is
gigantic enough to appal the boldest political experimenter that ever
lived, while its complexity involves insoluble contradictions. China,
the very Government itself, has been guilty of outrages against foreign
nations such as no nation can forgive another. The foreign Powers have
been openly and persistently defied--their people massacred throughout
the empire. Yet the nations so hated and flouted assume that they
have a mission to fulfil in setting up a stable Government in China, a
Government to be created for their own convenience, with which they may
in future negotiate,--a puppet Government, therefore, yet one which is to
maintain peace and good order throughout a vast empire by the prestige
of its authority over a loyal and devoted people. As buttresses to the
stability of the new _régime_, "the loyal southern viceroys," as they
are termed--loyal to whom, or to what?--deriving authority, it is to be
presumed, from the Government which is to be patronised by foreigners, are
expected to meet the convenience of the dictators and prevent anarchy in
the provinces. In short, the subjective Chinaman, as we have ventured to
call the fabulous animal so often evolved from Western consciousness, is
once more to be brought on the scene, and do everything that is expected
of him.
A puppet Government is an intelligible thing, but of a puppet pulled by
a dozen strings no clear conception can be formed. Such, however, has
been the anomalous history of foreign relations with China, that the
identical state of things now threatening has not been absent from the
minds of observers for a whole generation. The missionary question alone
was thought likely to result in a deadlock between China and the Powers.
More than thirty years ago Sir Rutherford Alcock was impressed with the
destructive effect of "each treaty Power dictating to the Government and
coercing its officers in their jurisdiction wherever Christians were
concerned." This, he thought, "would tend to paralyse and bring into
contempt the executive, leading to a process of disintegration fatal to
the existence of the Empire." What was then thought applicable to the
missionary field now affects the whole range of international intercourse
and of Chinese government. We are, in fact, confronted by two anarchies
of most serious portent--anarchy in the administration of China, and
anarchy among the foreign Powers who are so active in that country. From
the beginning of the intervention to protect the Legations anarchy among
the Allies has been the predominant feature: it was that which frustrated
effective action in June, and led to such severe loss and suffering.
Anarchy alone can account for the lawless proceedings at Tientsin,
Peking, and on the Chinese coast, which on any other hypothesis would be a
disgrace to civilisation. Anarchy has characterised all the utterances of
the Western Powers. Beginning at the wrong end with great swelling words
full of sound and fury, the Powers who assumed to lead have gradually
toned down their threats as they obtained more light on the situation
and on their own incapacity to deal with it. The latest expression of
this incapacity is the Anglo-German Agreement, already referred to, which
perpetuates the fallacy of excluding the Chinese factor from the China
question. Yet out of, even by means of, this confusion it is expected that
order may be established in China! _Similia similibus!_
* * * * *
In this desperate imbroglio the ultimate advantage will no doubt fall
to those members of the unnatural coalition who have the clearest views
and the firmest resolution in giving effect to them. The dubious and
vacillating Powers frittering away their political forces, espousing every
contradiction in succession, and turning in weariness from the disgusting
scenes in which they will have reluctantly participated, will in all
probability leave the path open for their neighbours who have steadier
aims and fewer scruples.
Russia has been in real, though not nominal or legal, possession of
Manchuria since 1896. She has absorbed in times past many stony deserts
and barren solitudes, but in Manchuria she has for the first time
acquired a rich territory with an all-important sea-base and a virile
population, whereby her dominant position in Eastern Asia has been
rendered inexpugnable. China lies at her feet. Obviously, therefore,
her interests in that empire are not only distinct from, but opposed to,
those of every other Power: for while they may desire (1) to support an
efficient government and keep the empire of China on its legs, and (2) to
cut off slices of the territory for their own use,--two contradictory and
mutually destructive policies,--Russia has no need to be anxious, either
as to the efficiency of any Chinese Government or as to her own ulterior
interests in the territory. The looser the substance to be absorbed the
more painless will be the process of absorption. Once established in
strength in Manchuria, disorder on her frontier may afford the perhaps not
unwelcome opportunity of restoring order on her own terms,--of, in fact,
continuing the process by which Siberia with Central and North-Eastern
Asia have, in the course of two hundred years, been gradually incorporated
into the Russian Empire. "It may well be doubted," wrote Sir Rutherford
Alcock in 1868, "if this vast empire (of China) is not too large to be
any longer governed from Peking. It is impossible to conceive a more
disadvantageous site for the capital." Disadvantageous, perhaps, to
China, whose centre of gravity lies a thousand miles to the south; but
not disadvantageous to a Power whose strength is consolidated five hundred
miles to the north.[39]
And the veto which Russia has exercised over the acts of the Chinese
Government since 1895, whereby she has been able, at her pleasure, to
frustrate the enterprises of other Powers, is not likely to fall into
abeyance when that Government has been prostrated by its own folly. For
the weaker the Chinese Government becomes the greater will be its need of
correction and guidance. But we have only to imagine half-a-dozen Powers,
each aspiring, and some of them fully resolved, to exercise their special
veto over the proposals of the others, to realise the tragic complexity
of the international problems which now present themselves for solution.
A government holding together three hundred millions of people ripened
for rebellion, potentially at war with the rest of the world, and yet
governing under multiple tutelage--such is the prospect before us. Of
all the legacies which the nineteenth bequeaths to the twentieth century,
there is none more portentous than that of the sick giant of the Far East.
[Illustration]
FOOTNOTES:
[33] See vol. i. p. 38.
[34] Mr Freeman-Mitford, in 'The Attaché at Peking,' recently
published, tells the following good story illustrative of this
(p. 168). M. de Mas, the Spanish Minister, happening to be at
the house of Hêng-Chi, and knowing that he had a little son of
whom he was inordinately proud, thought it would be a very pretty
compliment if he asked to see the little boy, who was accordingly
produced, sucking his thumb after the manner of his years. Him his
father ordered to pay his respects to M. de Mas--that is to say,
shake his united fists at him in token of salutation; instead of
which the child, after long silence and much urging, taking his
thumb deliberately out of his mouth roared out "Kwei-tzŭ" (devils)
at the top of his voice and fled.
[35] Referring to the massacre of Armenian Christians, with regard
to which Germany took up a very different attitude from that now
assumed towards China--a circumstance, by the way, which serves
to reduce the "Christian" factor in the present intervention to
its proper value.
[36] Or, as M. Paul Boell expresses it, "Traitant la Chine tantôt
comme un pouvoir tout à fait formidable, tantôt comme une
puissance nègre de septième ordre."
[37] Kwanghsu, being first cousin to the deceased Emperor Tungchih,
could not, according to Chinese usage, be his heir. In adopting
him, therefore, as posthumous heir to the previous Emperor
Hsienfêng, his uncle, the Regent left her own son, the Emperor
Tungchih, without an heir, promising to supply the want from
the future offspring of Kwanghsu, or by some other adoption; but
against this procedure strong protests were made. The arrangement,
however, conferred upon the Dowager-Empress, as the widow of
Hsienfêng, the authority of a mother over his heir, a circumstance
which to a large extent accounts for the filial deference the
reigning emperor has always paid to his adoptive mother.
[38] Thirty years ago the great Nanking viceroy, Tsêng Kwo-fan,
assured the Government in a memorial to the throne that if the
question of treaty revision could not be satisfactorily arranged
with foreigners, he had forces enough under his orders to drive
them all into the sea.
[39] The question of removing the capital to a more convenient site
has been discussed academically--by foreigners--for many years,
their view being that Nanking would be the most suitable. No doubt
a central point open to the sea would be more convenient for the
maritime Powers, but that is evidently not an advantage which
commends itself to the Chinese themselves. During the Japanese war
their strategists urged the removal of the Court from Peking to
Signan fu in Shensi, simply on the ground of the inaccessibility
of the latter site. The transport was prepared and the Emperor
was ready, but the Empress-Dowager vetoed the project.