THE RESETTLEMENT OF THE FAR EAST.
An unsettlement--Interference of Russia, Germany, and
France--China reduced to dependence--Disintegration
proceeds--France forces China to violate her treaties with
England--Russian approval--The loans pressed upon China--Russia
vetoes English loan, substituting a French one, Russia
standing security--Germany seizes Kiaochow--Russia seizes
Port-Arthur--England's remonstrance unheeded--A diplomatic
correspondence explained--British public aroused to importance of
the Far Eastern question--Call upon Government to take protective
action.
It would perhaps be in stricter accordance with facts to describe
what ensued on the Chinese collapse as a process of unsettlement than
resettlement, since no man now living is likely to see the end of the
dislocation effected by the transactions of 1895. The crude ingredients of
national policy, stripped of the international decencies with which they
were wont to be invested, were then thrown into the caldron; elementary
forces, naked and undisguised, confronted each other; and the scramble
which moderate men had hoped to see indefinitely postponed was entered
into with the zest of a Cornish wrecking raid. The officious interference
of quasi-friendly Powers to save the derelict empire from mutilation
proved, according to unvarying experience, a remedy which was worse than
the disease. Russia, Germany, and France proceeded to treat China as a
No Man's Land; disintegration was the order of the day. The example was,
of course, contagious. Other Powers, with no more substantial ground of
claim than was afforded by the defencelessness of China, began whetting
their knives to carve the moribund carcass.
A momentous transformation had been effected in a few months. China now
occupied the paradoxical position of a protected State without protection;
of a sovereign State shorn of the power of fulfilling her obligations.
To this impossible situation the Government itself had been an efficient
contributor. During the progress of the war China had, of her own motion,
thrown herself on the mercy of the world. Before all the Powers, great
and small, with whom she had intercourse, she humbled herself in the dust,
imploring them collectively, separately, or anyhow, to save her from her
relentless foe. She, the titular mistress of the world, grovelled thus at
the feet of Powers to whom she would not, even then, in plain words, have
conceded equality. And when assistance eventually came it was imposed on
her by external force. She could make no conditions.
The revolution which the revised treaty of Shimonoseki effected in the
international status of China was naturally first realised by those
who had brought it about. China ceased to be a free agent; she became a
vassal, and not to one Power only. And the intervening Powers lost no time
in demonstrating the fact, France taking the lead. Within two months of
the revision of the treaty of Shimonoseki the French Minister in Peking
compelled China to sign a treaty granting to France large territorial
concessions on which she had long had her eye, with commercial privileges
never before granted to any Power. But the stipulations of the French
convention were in open conflict with those of an existing treaty with
this country, inasmuch as they gave to France a portion of the Shan
States, which had been expressly reserved as a neutral zone in the treaty
between China and Great Britain. The British Minister, pointing this out
before the French treaty was concluded, protested against its signature.
The Ministers of the Yamên admitted the justice of his contention, nor
can it be said the protest was unheeded. With the Yamên it was a question
solely of the balance of power, and feeling that the French force was the
heaviest in the scale, they yielded to that and signed the treaty with
France in direct violation of that which they had previously signed with
Great Britain. As if to leave no ambiguity as to the true significance
of the change of status which had come over China, the Russian Minister
on the day following made a formal visit to the Tsungli-Yamên, with more
than the customary display, to congratulate the Chinese Ministers on what
they had done, and to assure them of the approval of his Government.
This novel application of the law of force threw out of gear the whole
system of Chinese national engagements, and was quite incompatible with
normal diplomatic relations. Formerly the struggle had lain between China
and all the Powers, her obligations to whom were observed in proportion
to the amount of coercion applied by, or to be apprehended from, each.
From this resulted a chronic demand for the fulfilment of agreements, and
constant reclamations for non-fulfilment. But now the native reluctance
to observe treaties was potentially reinforced by the action of foreign
Powers in not only condoning, but explicitly insisting upon, China's
violating her engagements.
It may be that this species of _force majeure_ was not wholly unwelcome to
the Chinese. It certainly widened the field for their favourite tactics
of playing off one foreign Power against another. A better answer than
heretofore was now available to all demands and remonstrances. "We should
for our part be most happy to do as you desire, but--what would Russia
say, what would France say?" Thus diplomacy in China at once degenerated
into a "tug of war" contest, China herself being merely the rope which
was pulled. She was virtually ruled out of the active management of her
own affairs and became the _corpus vile_ for rival aggressors.
Aggression sometimes assumed strange forms. One of the first which the
treaty of peace with Japan developed was a remarkable competition in
lending money to the Chinese. The indemnities to be paid to Japan were
heavy, and it was obvious that China must borrow. But before she had time
to take any step in that direction money was being thrust upon her. First
in the ranks were English loan-mongers, who had had some experience in
the business. Their negotiations were slow and halting; and when they
had at last concluded a contract it was only to be told that Russia
objected to the transaction, and required that China should borrow from
French capitalists, who were willing to lend on the guarantee of Russia.
The Chinese Government were absolutely passive, not willingly, but of
necessity; they had not asked for the guarantee which Russia volunteered,
and were quite willing to accept the loan of £16,000,000 sterling on
the English terms. But Russia simply insisted on their taking the French
money, under an ominous threat, while she herself stood security for the
solvency of China, thereby assuming the position of first mortgagee on the
revenues of that empire. That accomplished, Russia stipulated that China
should contract no further loan for a period of six months.
The precedent set by Russia and France of ignoring the Government of China
as an efficient factor in negotiations respecting her territory or her
obligations was followed to the letter by Germany when in November 1897
she took possession of the most important naval harbour on the Chinese
coast, with an adequate hinterland, carrying elastic rights extending over
an immense area of country. Admiral von Diedrichs reduced the question
of the acquisition to its very simplest expression. "Common-sense," he
submitted to the Chinese commandant, "must tell you on which side the
superior force lies, and therefore you would be wise to make way for me
without resistance." With the prize in her hands, Germany next demanded
a formal title to what she had seized, and instead of giving the German
Minister his passports the Chinese Government granted the request.
In this unceremonious manner was the new status of China embodied in
monumental facts. She was the common victim, having no power to bind or
loose save in accordance with the dictates of her masters. The Chinese
Government seemed to have abdicated sovereign functions.
After France and Germany it was Russia's turn to give tangible evidence of
the real ascendancy she had gained over the Chinese Imperial Government.
Hers was the only true mastery. The others might wrest provinces and
extort concessions from a prostrate Government, but Russia alone reached
the cerebral centre and controlled--so far as outward effect went--the
volition of the organism. Negotiations, partly revealed in 1895, showed
conclusively the scope and direction of her Chinese policy. It was
profound and practical, continuing on the lines that had proved so
successful in the past. The basis of it was an ostensible friendship for
China, out of which grew a protective alliance, and the peculiar kind of
partnership which had constituted the intermediate stage in the previous
great territorial acquisitions of Russia. The joint right of the two
Powers--to the exclusion of all others--to navigate the Amur and the
Songari, and the joint possession of the Usuri territory--"details to be
hereafter settled"--was now to be applied to the coast and harbours of
Liao-tung, of which Russia was to have the use, afterwards defined in a
treaty as the "usufruct." The gentlest methods were to be used, and so far
as mere phrases were concerned, a matter on which the Chinese always were
punctilious, the utmost consideration for their feelings was to be shown.
Russia had two immediate objects in view, both of cardinal importance
to her. The first was to obtain a terminus for the Great Siberian
Railway more southerly than Vladivostock, which could only be obtained
in Korean or Chinese territory. The second--the necessary corollary of
the first--was to bring the territory through which the railway should
run within the Russian administration. The sanction of China to a branch
of the Siberian Railway being carried through Manchuria to a terminus
on the Liao-tung littoral was formally given in conferences between
Li Hung-chang and the Czar on the occasion of the coronation at Moscow
in 1896. The details were afterwards developed in a way of which it is
probable the Chinese Government had little foresight; but it would have
made no difference, for to Russia nothing could be denied.
Out of these comprehensive projects of Russia--projects which belonged
to the very highest order of imperial statecraft--arose a strange unequal
duel between Russian and British diplomacy, which has also left its mark
on history. Her Majesty's Government and their agents abroad having been
found wanting in the matter of information during the upheaval of the Far
East, it appeared to be their _rôle_ to ignore and deny the facts upon
which other Powers were acting. In particular the whole Russian scheme
of utilising Chinese territory and controlling the Chinese Government was
discredited with considerable vehemence. The consequence of this attitude
of scepticism was that whatever Great Britain might resolve to do must be
done in the dark. Assured by their agents in the Far East that the bay
of Kiaochow was worthless, the British Government satisfied themselves
that Germany had made a poor bargain in taking it. Dismissing as a
phantasy the whole string of facts concerning Russia's plans, the British
Government exposed themselves to collision with those plans, and received
in consequence a series of diplomatic humiliations, entailing upon the
country permanent disadvantages of a most substantial kind. Towards the
end of 1898, soon after the German seizure of Kiaochow, a harbour which
had also proved a convenient winter rendezvous for the Russian fleet, the
announcement came from China that the latter had received permission from
the Chinese Government to winter at Port Arthur on the opposite coast
of Liao-tung. Thereupon a discussion was raised between London and St
Petersburg concerning the prospective designs of Russia. This discussion
was stamped from its origin with futility by previous communications with
the Russian Government, the purport of which was inferred from a speech by
Mr Balfour in February 1896. On that occasion he declared that the British
Government would not only not oppose, but would hail with satisfaction,
the acquisition by Russia of an ice-free port in the Pacific. As her
Majesty's Government held Russia to the pledge she gave in 1886 to
respect the integrity of the Korean coast, it followed that the ice-free
harbour contemplated by Mr Balfour could only be in Chinese territory,
which, as affecting the dominating power of Russia in the Far East, was
greatly in advance of what the occupation of a Korean harbour would have
been. Korea had been safe-guarded from encroachment because it was the
stepping-stone to China, but the Russian lodgment on the inner waters of
China itself deprived Korea of most of its strategical value. Hence Russia
kept silence when Mr Curzon stated in Parliament that the pledge held
good which preserved the integrity of Korea, a pledge which had lost its
significance. This acquiescence in Russia's taking an ice-free port on the
Chinese coast was in direct contradiction to other no less authoritative
statements of the British Government. As, for instance, the resolution
passed by the House of Commons, and accepted by the Government, pledging
them to maintain the integrity of China, followed by the statement by
the Under Secretary of State that the Liao-tung coast with its harbours
constituted an integral part of the Chinese dominions. It is obvious that
this confusion arose either from lack of information or lack of interest
in the subject, coupled in either case with absent-mindedness on the part
of the British Government. But these inconsistencies of the members of
the British Government made no difference to the steady prosecution of
the Russian plans, which were now developed with great rapidity. These
pretensions were signalised by two memorable incidents, following each
other so closely as to be practically simultaneous, in January 1898.
The first was a new loan to the Chinese under negotiation by British
financiers, to assist which her Majesty's Government was strongly urged
by the China merchants to give its guarantee to the lenders as Russia
had done in the case of the previous loan. On being asked by the Foreign
Office what securities it would be proper to demand from the Chinese
Government as the equivalent of such British guarantee, the British
Minister at Peking replied that one of the conditions should be the
opening of Talien-wan as a treaty port by the Chinese Government. Whether
he had considered in what way this concession was to benefit the position
of Great Britain was not disclosed. The proposal was promptly vetoed by
the Russian Government, whose ambassador in London urged strongly that
"if we insisted on making Talien-wan an open port we should be encroaching
on the Russian sphere of influence, and denying her in future that right
to the use of Port Arthur to which the progress of events had given her a
claim,"--adding, that without having any designs on the territory, "it was
generally admitted that Russia might claim a commercial _débouché_ upon
the open sea, and that in order to enjoy that advantage fully she ought
to be at liberty to make such arrangements with China as she could obtain
with respect to the commercial _régime_ which was to prevail there."
The second incident was that two British war-vessels which were anchored
in Port Arthur--where, of course, they had the same right to be as
any other foreign man-of-war--"made a bad impression" on the Russian
Government, and formed the subject of complaint to the British Secretary
of State. While denying the right of Russia to comment on the movements
of British ships in Chinese waters, Lord Salisbury nevertheless allowed
the vessels in question to depart, a movement which was reported with much
colour of truth in Peking and St Petersburg as having been made by the
order of Russia.
Thus within one month the exposition of the Russian designs was expanded
from the first assurance of Count Muravieff that the wintering of the
ships was merely for the temporary convenience of the fleet, to the
assertion of vague territorial rights over the coast and harbours of
Liao-tung. And Lord Salisbury observed with plaintive naïveté in the month
of March, that whereas his Government "had always looked with favour upon
the idea of Russia obtaining an ice-free port on the Pacific, Russia had
now given a most unfortunate extension to this policy." It appears that
the eyes of the British Government were not opened to the gravity of the
situation until Russia, alleging that an ice-free port on the Chinese
coast (no longer the Pacific) was a vital necessity to her, thereupon
took possession of Port Arthur and Talien-wan. The British Government
at the eleventh hour opposed the proceeding, for the reason that "the
influence of Russia over the Government of Peking will be so increased to
the detriment of that of her Majesty's Government, if the Russians are to
have a lease of Port Arthur and Talien-wan, that it seems desirable for
us to make some counter-move." Thus the British Government were brought
to see, when too late, what those interested in Far Eastern affairs had
been endeavouring to tell them years before; and there seems to be no
doubt that the final discovery of the truth was due to the efforts of one
or two persistent writers in the press during January and February 1898,
but chiefly to the action of a small independent section of the British
House of Commons led by Mr Yerburgh. On such trifling accidents do great
events sometimes hang, that it seems probable that had Mr Yerburgh's
movement taken effect three months earlier British ships would not have
been withdrawn from Port Arthur, neither would China have been ousted from
the possession of her only two naval harbours north of the Yangtze--at
least not just then. It would serve no good purpose to follow the various
explanations given by Ministers of the British Crown of their diplomatic
encounters with Russia. They will have little interest for the historian.
But a clear account of these transactions given in a letter to the
'Times,' May 19, 1898, may very well serve as a guide to future inquirers
into these matters:--
_The Legend of Talien-wan._
Before the recent diplomatic struggle in the Far East is allowed
to pass away from the public mind, may I be permitted to say a
few words on one of its aspects which seems to have received very
little attention?
The bad faith of the Russian Government has been strongly, and
not unreasonably, condemned; but no attempt has been made to
explain it, except on the popular hypothesis that a double dose of
original sin is normal in the Muscovite. It does not seem to have
occurred to any writer on the subject that the Russians themselves
may have a grievance, that they may have acted under a sense of
injury, or that, in their view, the good faith of the British
Government is not above reproach. I believe they are mistaken;
but it is none the less true that the chain of facts on which they
rely will well bear the interpretation they place upon it.
The great blot on the recently published "Correspondence
respecting the affairs of China" (No. 1, 1898) is that it takes
no account of its immediate _Vorgeschichte_. It relates to a
diplomatic struggle of which we last heard officially as far
back as 1887, when the Blue-book on Port Hamilton was published.
Since then many important things have happened, notably the
Chino-Japanese war and the intervention of Russia, France, and
Germany in the settlement of Shimonoseki. To ignore these events
is really to delude the public; for the chapter of Far Eastern
politics which begins with the German descent on Kiaochow is
little short of meaningless if the story of Shimonoseki is
passed over. Indeed the legend of Talien-wan itself belongs to
a policy which may easily be traced back half a century. It is,
however, not necessary for my purpose that I should go behind the
Shimonoseki intervention. What was the object of that transaction?
No one who has given any attention to Far Eastern affairs has
ever been under the slightest illusion on this point. The great
problem of Russian statesmanship since the foundation of the
empire has been to reach the open sea, first in the Baltic, then
in the Euxine and the Mediterranean, and, after the Crimean war,
in the Pacific. Since Muravieff and Nevelskoy opened the Amur
Russia has neglected no opportunity of pushing southward in order
to get beyond the line of winter ice, and every embarrassment
of China has been skilfully used by her to bring her nearer her
goal. We in England have consistently resisted this policy, and
in 1886 we thought to have finally defeated it when, by seizing
Port Hamilton, we extracted a pledge from Russia that she would
not occupy Korean territory "under any circumstances whatever."
To all outward seeming Russian expansion in the Far East was thus
stopped in the ice-bound harbour of Vladivostock. This, however,
was not the view of Russia herself. She was still confident that
an opportunity would be afforded her of realising her ambition,
for there were other harbours on the Pacific besides those of
Korea, and if the road to them was longer and more difficult,
Russian patience was equal to the task of covering it. In these
circumstances Japan, victorious in her war with China, claimed
and obtained the cession of the Liao-tung peninsula, and thus
threatened to shut the door for ever against Russian access to the
Pacific. The intervention of the Powers which Russia thereupon
organised was ostensibly directed to the protection of the
integrity and independence of China, but no intelligent politician
doubted at the time, or has doubted since, that its real aim was
to keep the Pacific door open for Russia.
Shortly after this event Lord Salisbury came into office. The
problem which then most urgently demanded his attention was that
of Armenia. Largely by its attitude in the Far East the Rosebery
Cabinet had left our relations with Russia in a distinctly
strained condition, and the one obvious remedy of the Armenian
horrors--the coercion of the Sultan--was blocked by Russia. Lord
Salisbury directed himself to the conciliation of Russia, wisely
recognising that nothing could be done in the Near East without
Russian goodwill and assistance. What were the means he employed?
I cannot say what private negotiations may have taken place
between the two Governments, but we seem to have a sufficiently
significant illustration of the direction in which the Premier
was disposed to make concessions to Russia in a speech delivered
by Mr Balfour at Bristol on February 3, 1896. In that speech a
British Minister announced for the first time that this country
would not oppose Russian expansion to the Pacific. "I, for my
part, frankly state," he said, "that, so far from regarding with
fear and jealousy a commercial outlet for Russia in the Pacific
Ocean which would not be ice-bound half the year, I should welcome
such a result as a distinct advance in this far-distant region."
This statement made a profound impression all over the world, as
well it might, seeing that it implied the abandonment of a policy
which had been consistently and vigilantly adhered to by Great
Britain from the time of Lord Clarendon to that of Lord Rosebery.
A few days after Mr Balfour's Bristol speech--on February 20--it
fell to Mr Curzon to explain in a negative way the scope of his
leader's pronouncement. An impression had got abroad that the new
policy implied the surrender of the pledge given by Russia in 1886
with regard to the occupation of Korean territory, and the Under
Secretary was asked in the House of Commons for his views on the
subject. Mr Curzon replied that "her Majesty's Government consider
that the pledge given by the Russian Government is still binding."
Was this a disavowal of the new Russophile policy. Obviously not:
for later in the year, at the Guildhall banquet, Lord Salisbury
made to Russia the friendliest overtures he has ever made in
public speech. At the same time he especially accentuated the
novelty of his attitude by asserting that "it is a superstition
of an antiquated diplomacy that there is any necessary antagonism
between Russia and Great Britain."
The position, then, of the Government was apparently this: they
had abandoned the traditional hostility of this country to Russian
expansion towards the ice-free Pacific on condition that it did
not trench on Korean territory. It followed, then, that they
were not disposed to offer any hindrance to the acquisition by
Russia of a port on Chinese territory, westward of the Korean
frontier--that is, somewhere between the mouth of the Yalu and
Port Arthur. This must be clear to anybody who cares to glance at
a map. The upshot of the speeches of Mr Balfour and Lord Salisbury
and of the statement of Mr Curzon was, in short, to invite Russia,
whenever she might feel so disposed, to plant the Russian flag
on the southern coast of Manchuria. This, at any rate, was the
view taken in Russia, and, for my part, I can see no escape from
it. It is not a little significant of the satisfaction caused in
Russia by this interpretation of the policy of Great Britain that,
on November 25, a fortnight after Lord Salisbury's speech, the
Tsar at last consented in principle to the British proposals for
coercing the Sultan of Turkey on the Armenian question.
Now we come to the events of last November, when Germany suddenly
swooped down on Kiaochow. This step is known to have been very
distasteful to the Russian Government. It was the first appearance
of a European Power in the northern waters of China, in a region
which Russia had persuaded herself was reserved for her own
domination. Long before the murder of the unfortunate German
missionaries in Shantung it was well known in St Petersburg that
Germany had her eyes on Kiaochow, and the Russian Minister at
Peking had more than once warned Li Hung-chang and urged him to
fortify the bay. The disappointment of Russia became intensified
when it was observed that the step taken by Germany, was not
resented in this country, and fears of an Anglo-German alliance
in the Far East began to possess the Russian mind. Then suddenly
there came the Talien-wan incident, and Russia found herself once
more confronted by the danger which had threatened her in the
treaty of Shimonoseki.
The real significance of the Talien-wan incident has never yet
been fully set forth. Had Talien-wan been made a treaty port, and
thus given more or less of an international status, Russia would
have been practically shut out for ever from the ice-free ocean.
The only stretch of coast on which she could obtain this outlet
was, as I have already shown, the southern coast of Manchuria
from the Korean frontier on the Yalu to Port Arthur. Now, if we
examine this coast-line carefully we shall find that there is only
one spot capable of being transformed into a commercial port, and
that is Talien-wan. The China Sea Directory (vol. iii.), published
by the Hydrographic Department of the Admiralty, gives us the
fullest particulars on this subject. It traces the coast-line in
microscopic detail and shows us that it has only five possible
harbours. The first, westward from the Yalu, is Taku-shan, the
approach to which is frozen during the winter months. The second
is Pi-tse-wo,--here the water is too shallow even for large junks.
The third is Yen-tao Bay, the anchorage of which is bad, and in
places dangerous. The fourth is Talien-wan, and the fifth Port
Arthur. Talien-wan has all the advantages which are absent from
the other ports. It is ice-free, spacious, well sheltered, with
excellent anchorage and considerable commercial possibilities. Is
it surprising that Russia should have felt aggrieved when it was
proposed to make Talien-wan a treaty port?
As a matter of fact, I believe Russia regarded this proposal
as an attempt to evade the assurance given by Mr Balfour in his
Bristol speech. She looked upon it as the design of a powerful
Anglo-German combination to exclude her for ever from the China
seas. It was to her mind a conspiracy of the most dangerous
kind, and she bent all her efforts to defeat it. When she had
defeated it she lost no time in securing her position. She took
Port Arthur as well as Talien-wan, for the simple reason that her
interpretation of the situation convinced her that a commercial
port overlooked by a great citadel in foreign hands would be a
vantage to her foes rather than a prize to herself. Can she be
altogether blamed for taking this view?
The mistake the Russian Government made was in attaching a
serious meaning to the casual blunders of our Government, and in
imagining that these blunders marked a connected purpose, if not
a consistent policy. They were not to know that the Russophile
passage in Mr Balfour's Bristol speech was a mere oratorical tag;
that our friendly attitude towards Germany at Kiaochow was only
a sort of amiable tolerance of an act the scope and consequence
of which we had not measured; and that our proposal to open
Talien-wan was made at the suggestion of our Minister at Peking,
who, of course, knew what he was about, while it was acquiesced in
at home by Ministers who simply did not know what they were doing.
That Sir Claude Macdonald designed the Talien-wan move as a check
to Russia I have no doubt; that Lord Salisbury never dreamed of
this aspect of it I am equally convinced.
However that may be, one thing, I think, is clear. The sense of
injury and the complaints of bad faith are not all on one side. In
diplomacy, as in most of the affairs in this world, it is a wise
rule not to believe your opponent to be as stupid as he looks.
Russia at any rate paid us this compliment during the recent
negotiations. The result, no doubt, is that she has overreached
us. But whose fault is it?
The Russian flag once hoisted over Port Arthur and Talien-wan (by what
nominal authority makes no difference whatever to the fact) placed the new
relation of China to the rest of the world beyond all discussion. China
did not willingly surrender her territory: she looked in vain for help,
but found none. She weighed in the balance the words and acts of one great
Power against the words and acts of another, and had no choice but to
place herself under authority of the strongest, finally and irrevocably.
That fact must be taken as the master-key to her subsequent policy in all
its phases.
These several events succeeding each other in close order awoke the
British public from their optimistic dream, and forced them to reflect
that there was after all something more in these Far Eastern readjustments
than had occurred to them when cheering on gallant little Japan to
the spoliation of China. The result obtained was certainly not that
which was contemplated either by the nation or the Government when
Great Britain settled down into her isolation. When the truth of the
situation had revealed itself to the public there was naturally a loud
call for something to be done to safeguard the commercial interests of
the country, if not to recover lost prestige; but the Government were as
far from having definite aims in China as they had ever been, and while
goading them to action, the public was scarcely in a position to advise
what that action should be. Neither had the Government, in spite of
all that had taken place, fully realised to what extent China had added
impotence to reluctance, for they continued to deal with China very much
as if the events of 1895 to 1898 had never happened. They were reluctant
to recognise the fact that Russia, in possession of the Liao-tung or
Kwan-tung peninsula and of the railway line connecting it with Siberia,
held a noose round the neck of the Peking Government, which she could
tighten or relax, conceal or parade, as circumstances required, and
that until some other Power or Powers were prepared to speak with equal
authority Russia must be paramount, not by virtue of any convention, but
as the outcome of accomplished facts.
Two measures adopted by Great Britain to rectify the preponderance of
Russia were the seizure, under a form of negotiation, of the harbour of
Weihai-wei and the forcing of money upon the Chinese by way of loan. The
value of these strokes of policy has not yet become apparent.
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