THE MURDER OF MR MARGARY, 1875--CHEFOO CONVENTION, 1876--RATIFICATION,
1885.
I. THE MURDER OF MR MARGARY, 1875.
Efforts to reach China from Burma--Expedition under Colonel
Browne--Mr Margary appointed interpreter--Meets party at
Bhamo--Precedes them into China, and is assassinated at
Manwyne--Discussion thereon with the Chinese Government--Tsên
Yü-ying, Governor of Yunnan--British Minister charges him with the
murder--Demands his arraignment--Sends commission from Peking to
Yunnan to take evidence--Unsuccessful.
Ever since the conquest of British Burma, and more especially since the
treaty concluded with the King of Burma in 1862, political and commercial
speculation had been busied with the mountainous country which divides
it from the empire of China. The fact that next to nothing was known
of that wild region, combined with the prospect of reopening the old
caravan route which had been some time closed by disturbances among the
frontier tribes and by Chinese insurgents, constituted a great stimulus to
exploration. To this end projects were from time to time considered by the
Indian Government--sometimes at the instance of enthusiastic officials,
sometimes urged by the superior authority of the British Government under
pressure from mercantile bodies in England. South-western China, however,
was as jealously guarded from intrusion as the sea-coast had been, and no
progress was made in penetrating its mystery.
After the failure of an exploring expedition under Colonel Edward B.
Sladen in 1868, the Indian Government, in furtherance of the wishes of the
Government at home, sanctioned yet another attempt six years later, though
with decided misgivings as to any successful issue. Arrangements were
made during 1874, and the expedition, under Colonel Horace Browne, was
despatched from Burma _viâ_ Bhamo in the beginning of 1875. The British
Minister in China had been asked for his co-operation, and in particular
he was requested to furnish Colonel Browne with a competent interpreter.
It was arranged that this official, armed with a Chinese passport issued
by the Government at Peking, should make his own way through China from
the coast and join Colonel Browne at Bhamo.
The choice of her Majesty's Minister fell upon one of the most promising
officers in the consular service, Mr Augustus Raymond Margary, who
proceeded from Shanghai by way of the Yangtze to the province of Yunnan,
and in five months accomplished his perilous pioneering journey with
perfect success, arriving on the 17th of January at the rendezvous, where
he was received with the warmest feelings by Colonel Browne and his party,
and with surprise and admiration by the Burmese.
On being joined by Mr Margary, the mission prepared to start from Bhamo
towards China. Everything seemed auspicious for the expedition. On
arriving at the Burmese frontier, however, the party were met by sinister
rumours of armed opposition to their passage through the Kakhyen hills.
Margary, having just come safely through these districts, volunteered
to proceed alone to ascertain the truth of the reports which they had
heard. How he was treacherously assassinated at Manwyne, the first city
within the Chinese border, and how Colonel Browne's mission was assailed
and driven back by armed bands, has been told by Dr John Anderson in 'A
Narrative of the two Expeditions to Western China' of 1868 and 1875, and
by Sir Rutherford Alcock, the sympathetic editor of Mr Margary's 'Letters
and Journals,' as well as in numerous Government publications.
It became then a question of the gravest import to fix the guilt of
this treachery, and to consider what means could be adopted for avenging
the death of a young Englishman within Chinese territory, and bearing a
passport from the Government of Peking. "Whether it be Burmese, Kakhyens,
Shan tribes, or Chinese that are in question, it is impossible we can
accept a defeat of this nature, brought on, too, by our own spontaneous
acts," was the conclusion of Sir Rutherford Alcock. Governments which
resorted to the assassination of individuals under their own safe conduct
must be deterred, by persuasion or by force, from the use of such tactics.
The demand for redress which was made direct to the Tsungli-Yamên was
followed by a wrangling and evasive discussion as to the conditions on
which the passport had been granted. These, it must be admitted, had
not been so definitely stated as they might have been. Passports, as Mr
Wade, then Minister in Peking, explained, were granted in two forms--for
"business," meaning trade, or for "pleasure," rendered in Chinese "tour
or travel." It was in the latter form that the passport for Colonel
Browne was applied for, and the Chinese made a plausible defence of their
position on this narrow ground, asserting that the subsequent declaration
that the mission was intended to open a trade route through Chinese
provinces, where they alleged no trading rights for foreigners existed,
could not be covered by a passport granted for pleasure.
The voluminous discussion on international rights which followed, although
academical in form and irrelevant to the question at issue, betrayed the
animus of the Chinese Government in regard to commercial concessions in
the interior; but it is possible that the true motive for the repulse
of Colonel Browne's expedition, of which Mr Margary's murder was but an
incident, lay deeper. Europeans are accustomed to make light of oriental
suspicions, and the idea that Colonel Browne's party was the vanguard of
a hostile force to be treacherously introduced into Chinese territory
under passport may seem too fantastic to have been entertained in good
faith. Yet if we consider on what trivial grounds even the civilised
Powers of Europe will at times suspect each other of the most grandiose
designs, and how often the suspicion is justified, we need not dismiss
as incredible the fact that, in a frontier province which had recently
been the scene of a formidable rebellion, an armed escort accompanying a
foreign tourist party should have caused sincere misgivings in the minds
of the authorities. Nor do the facts of the case exclude the possibility
of such suspicions being suggested from without, even if they did not
arise spontaneously within. Apart from these special considerations, the
chances of success would probably have been greater if the mission had
started from the Chinese side, where the right of travel and exploration
had already been established.
The verbal polemic over the conditions of the passport did not, however,
touch the matter in hand, which was the murder of a British official for
whom the Chinese Government, both imperial and provincial, were expressly
responsible. It is not necessary at this day to pronounce judgment on
the identity of the actual criminal. The murder was the result of a
conspiracy in which Chinese and Burmese were both implicated. They were
alike interested in preventing the passage of the mission, and the strong
opposition of the Burma Government was not unknown to Mr Margary, for he
had noted it in his Journal.
The King of Burma, the father of the well-known Theebaw, was a learned
pandit and a devout Buddhist, as severe in regard to heretics as the
crowned heads of Europe were in the days of the Inquisition. The Court of
Ava, in its claims to obeisance from foreigners, was almost as exacting as
the Son of Heaven himself, and the priests lorded it over the community
with the arrogance of a pampered caste. Thus foreign intercourse was
heavily hampered, and a good understanding rendered almost impossible.
Fears for their prerogatives must have inspired the royal and priestly
coterie with aversion to that restless element which was always trying to
"open up" other people's country and to explore trade routes. Hence the
motive for obstructing the passage of a foreign expedition between Burma
and China was as strong on the Burmese as on the Chinese side.
Tsên Yü-ying, the Chinese governor, held an exceptionally strong position
in his province, and the officials stood very much in awe of him. Though
not a pure Chinese, having been born in the mountains of Kwangsi, of
aboriginal parentage on one side, his personal prestige was very great.
A fighting man from his youth, he had acquired an immense reputation in
suppressing the Mohammedan rebellion in Yunnan. This he did in oriental
style, extirpating the rebels so far as he could, root and branch. To save
the trouble of burying many thousands of old people and children, he had
them drowned in the Tali Lake. The military commander who was told off for
this pleasing duty palliated the massacre, when in after years narrating
these occurrences, by saying there were not really 10,000 but only 3000
thrown into the lake. This official had remonstrated with the governor
against the sentence, saying that such severity was not in accordance with
Tao li (principle); but Tsên replied, "You have nothing to do with Tao
li; you must conform to the Leu li" (Penal Code).
Tsên Yü-ying was therefore something greater than an ordinary provincial
governor, and wielded something more than the authority belonging to
his office. Not only was he responsible, as all governors are, for what
was done within his government, but it is difficult to conceive of any
important incident occurring there without his personal sanction. But
which was the leader in the plot, whether the acting-governor Tsên Yü-ying
or the King of Burma, is comparatively unimportant; suffice it that her
Majesty's Minister fixed, on grounds which satisfied himself, though of
course on inferential evidence only, the instigation of the crime on the
governor-general Tsên Yü-ying; and whether the direct guilt were brought
home to him or not, there could be no question about his responsibility
under the Chinese principle of administration. "From the governor-general
downwards they are each and all individually and collectively held
responsible for all that may happen in the limits of their jurisdiction."
Accordingly, after much preliminary discussion, Mr Wade demanded that
that high official should be censured for neglect of duty, and, on later
information, that he should be brought for trial to Peking. To this
demand the Peking Government refused to listen, and after feigning for
many months to have no knowledge of what had taken place, they produced a
report from the governor-general himself inculpating certain subordinates,
of whom he seemed willing to make a nominal sacrifice. This report was so
openly mendacious that Sir Thomas Wade threatened to haul down his flag
if it were published.
Unluckily for the successful prosecution of the demand for the arraignment
of the viceroy, the British Minister became entangled in a cat's-cradle of
negotiations for the revision of the treaty of Tientsin, with which the
Yunnan outrage got so mixed up that the different questions never could
be, or at any rate never were, separated again. Throwing the net is the
tactical device in which the Chinese excel. The demand for reparation
for the murder was alternately put forward, modified, and withdrawn
according as the general propositions were shuffled about, and thus the
effect of a concentrated attack on the essential point was lost. The
minister on his own showing found himself in a succession of dilemmas,
while the Chinese defensive position was clear throughout: it was to
refuse everything, evade when direct refusal was dangerous, and in short
to baffle all attempts of the British Minister to get to close quarters
with the question. Sir Thomas Wade was several times brought by these
elusive tactics to the point of threatening withdrawal of the Legation,
which in itself the Chinese would have welcomed as a householder might
the "positively last visit" of a tax-collector, but for the ulterior
consequences to be apprehended.
After many months of fruitless labour Sir Thomas Wade resolved to send
a commission of his own to Yunnan to collect evidence as to Margary's
murder. His right to do so was at first contested by the Chinese; but
after considering the matter, and getting the best advice at their
command, they assented, and named High Commissioners to meet the British
officials. The Hon. T. G. Grosvenor, secretary of Legation, was detached
for this duty, assisted by two of the most competent men in the consular
service--Mr Colborn Baber and Mr Arthur Davenport. On the Chinese side
were appointed the viceroy of the Hu Kwang, Li Han-chang, elder brother
of Li Hung-chang, another official to whom Sir Thomas Wade objected
strongly, but in vain, and Tsên Yü-ying himself, the inculpated party.
The promises made to the British Minister before he would allow the
mission to set out were broken as soon as it was fairly on its way, and
Sir Thomas Wade had serious thoughts of recalling it, foreseeing that
it was destined merely to waste time. What possible hope, indeed, could
there be of isolated foreigners collecting evidence in a distant city
against the high provincial officials? No evidence was taken. The British
Commissioner was simply presented with the original report, to which was
added the so-called "confession" of thirteen savages "kidnapped to do
duty as prisoners at the bar." These savages could not speak Chinese, nor
was their language understood by any one in the viceregal court; it was
evident that they had never been near the scene of the crime, nor did they
look in the least like men who were pleading guilty to a capital charge.
The motive of the Chinese in yielding to the appointment of the British
commission, after refusing their assent to it, only occurred to Sir Thomas
Wade when they recommended that Mr Grosvenor should remain in Yunnan
until the case was closed. No coercive measures, they calculated, would
be taken against them while these hostages remained in their hands. From
first to last the only question that occupied the mind of the Chinese
Government was whether force would be applied or not. And if they read--as
of course they did--the English newspapers of the day they would see that
the contingency of war was dwelt upon throughout the year 1875 as the
sole alternative to the condign punishment of the Governor-General of
Yunnan-Kweichow. This was, indeed, from time to time directly threatened
by Sir Thomas Wade, and he had applied for the Flying Squadron to come on
from India to support his demands. When at last, after eighteen months'
struggle, he abandoned the negotiations, and "abruptly left Peking" for
Shanghai in order to be in direct telegraphic communication with the
Home Government, he wrote, "I had, in the last fortnight, again and again
threatened either to remove the Legation or to recommend to her Majesty's
Government the extremest measure of coercion unless I had secured a very
moderate form of reparation."
When Prince Kung realised the fact that the British Minister had actually
left the capital he became suddenly serious, and sent after him to
say there had been a misunderstanding, which would have been cleared
away if he had only waited. At the same time the prince had recourse
to his foreign adviser, the Inspector-General of Customs, who stood
to the Government somewhat in the relation of a "medicine-man." The
inspector-general had taken an active part, both direct and indirect, in
the comedy of the preceding eighteen months--whether as an ally or an
opponent of the British Minister seems not to have been quite clear to
the comprehension of the latter.
An imperial decree was immediately despatched to the Grand Secretary,
Li Hung-chang, instructing him to detain the British Minister on his
way through Tientsin, in order to confer with him on the Margary case.
This proposal Sir Thomas Wade declined on several grounds: among others,
that at a previous stage of the negotiations the promises made by Li
Hung-chang had been repudiated by the Peking Government. This effort to
stop him at Tientsin having failed, Mr Hart was despatched in hot haste
after Sir Thomas Wade to Shanghai, ostensibly to discuss the "commercial
question," but really to induce the British Minister to re-enter the
arena of negotiation,[22] in which the Chinese felt themselves safe. Sir
Thomas, therefore, consented to meet a special commissioner, but without
committing himself as to the scope of the intended conference. The High
Commissioner was Li Hung-chang, and the place of meeting Chefoo, the
locality being selected by Sir Thomas Wade himself. There was concluded
the famous Chefoo Convention.
II. CHEFOO CONVENTION, 1876.
Negotiations with Li Hung-chang at Chefoo--Mr Hart
assisting--Sir Thomas Wade hurried into making an unsatisfactory
settlement--Chefoo convention analysed--Net result an increase
in the customs dues--Criticised by the merchants.
It was in the month of September, the summer not yet over, during which
season the sea air and fine beach of Chefoo made it at that time the
best health resort for the China coast. Visitors from Peking occasionally
varied their summer residence at the Western Hills by spending a few weeks
at Chefoo, and in 1876 there were several members of the diplomatic body
taking their holiday at the watering-place, the meeting of the British
and Chinese plenipotentiaries constituting for them an added attraction.
Sir Thomas Wade had originally no intention of concluding a formal
convention, nor had he authority for closing the Yunnan question without
further reference to his Government; but circumstances proved too
strong for him to keep to his resolution. He, in fact, found himself in
such a position of difficulty as is perhaps best described by the word
"cornered"--the advantage of the game having passed entirely to the
other side. The Chinese commissioner was powerfully reinforced by the
inspector-general, supported by the local commissioner of customs for
Chefoo; and the neutrality of those of the diplomatic body who were on
the spot was believed to be benevolent to the Chinese. The "co-operative
policy" of Mr Burlingame's day had for the time being at least lapsed,
and particularist views among the Powers or their representatives began
to prevail. The British Minister, deeming the matter in dispute with
the Chinese a purely British concern, did not hold it incumbent on him
to hamper his negotiations by daily consultations with his colleagues,
who on their part resented his reticence, claiming it as a right that,
considering how their national interests might be affected by the result,
they should be kept informed of the progress of the negotiations.
Sir Thomas Wade admits that, among other considerations, it was the
impatience of these colleagues of his to see the discussion definitely
terminated which induced him to close the case without waiting for further
instructions from his Government.
It must be borne in mind that the problem before the Chinese High
Commissioner had never varied: it was the extremely simple one, how to
screen the ex-governor Tsên Yü-ying, whether guilty or innocent, without
encountering a British armed force. The fate of the negotiations depended
entirely on the probable movement of the Flying Squadron, which was lying
at Talien-wan, a hundred miles off. No greater service could have been
rendered to the Chinese Government than to assure the High Commissioner
that he had nothing to fear from the British ships. The foreign Ministers
who were present had their Intelligence Departments in full activity, and
they had a shrewd notion of the limitations of the Flying Squadron, which
they were free to communicate to the Chinese plenipotentiary. They were
aware that the time--September 1876--was not opportune for the British
Government to embark on distant enterprises of indefinite possibilities.
From one source or another the assurance was given to the Chinese
negotiator, and once convinced, on whatever evidence, that the British
guns would fire nothing but salutes, Li Hung-chang felt himself master of
the situation. It then became his turn to force a settlement, and he at
once assumed a peremptory tone with the British Minister, notifying him
that he would leave Chefoo on a certain day, convention or no convention.
Sir Thomas Wade had, or thought he had, no choice but to capitulate to
superior force. Pressed by his diplomatic colleagues, as has been said, as
well as by the expressed desire of his own Government to get the tedious
matter settled, he had to accept the best agreement he could get, and the
Chefoo convention was the result.
The fear of coercion being eliminated, the negotiation became reduced
to a custom-house affair like the treaty revision of 1869, the Chinese
seizing the occasion to renew their former efforts to obtain an increase
of revenue from foreign trade. Instead of adding to the import duty on
foreign merchandise as in 1869, they now proposed to extend the area
of internal taxation, and in particular they prepared the way for an
indefinite increase in the opium revenue. This was the substantial part
of the convention. New ports were opened in harmony with the scheme.
A clause referring to residence at Chungking in Szechuan provided that
British merchants would not be allowed to reside there so long as no
steamers had access to the port. When, under this contingent clause, it
was attempted to make the conditional permission effective by sending
steamers to the port, the Chinese Government offered opposition, and the
right was abandoned by Great Britain.
As for the Yunnan affair, the settlement of it gravitated to the form
which had been universally condemned. "Do not let the nation lay itself
open to the contempt of an Asiatic people by accepting money for life
treacherously taken by official order," wrote Sir R. Alcock in July
1875. But "the series of bad precedents" was once more followed, and
"blood-money was accepted for the life of a British subject."
It was thought important to publish far and wide the terms of settlement,
and a proclamation with Sir T. Wade's _imprimatur_ was posted throughout
the country. It was remarked, however, that this proclamation embodied the
very falsities against the publication of which the British Minister had
previously protested under threat of breaking off diplomatic relations.
The guilt of notoriously innocent parties was assumed in it, but their
pardon granted on the fictitious ground that the evidence against them
would not suffice to convict by the processes of British law.
A separate article provided for a mission of exploration by way of
Szechuan and Tibet in the following year.
A subject on which Sir Thomas Wade had long set his heart was an
improvement in the terms of intercourse between foreign and Chinese
officials, with a view of putting an end to the habitual assumption
of superiority of the Chinese. This was treated in a few empty words
providing that the Tsungli-Yamên should invite foreign representatives to
consider with them a code of etiquette, a clause imposing no obligation
whatever on either party.
Another question which had greatly occupied the minds of both the
British Government and its successive representatives ever since 1833
was the establishment of a code of laws to regulate the civil and
criminal relations between foreigners and Chinese at the treaty ports
and elsewhere. This had formed a feature in the supplementary convention
of 1869, the undertaking in which did not, however, extend beyond the
general terms that "it is further agreed that England and China shall in
consultation draw up a commercial code."
Strongly approving, however, of the abstract idea that China should adopt
a written code of commercial law as a first step towards a general legal
reform, Sir T. Wade nevertheless uttered a useful caution to those ardent
reformers who see in a good code of laws a panacea for either national
or international grievances. "No nation," he says, "worked harder at its
legislation than China; but in the way of justice there are at least
two serious impediments--an ignorance which renders due appreciation
of the value of evidence, especially in criminal cases, impossible; and
a dishonesty that would be fatal to the administration of any laws, no
matter how enlightened." He illustrates this by relating an instance of
the obstinate nature of the _chose jugée_ in China.
In a case [he says] the termination of which is just announced
at Peking, we have a woman wrongly convicted, on a confession
extorted from her by torture, of the murder of a husband who
died a natural death, the injustice being so patent that the
fellow-provincials of the accused appealed to Peking. Orders
being issued for a rehearing of the case, the former decision
was affirmed in the province, and this a second and again a third
time. The proceedings were then removed to Peking; and it is in
the end established that magistrates of districts, prefects of
departments, the governor of the province, and the high officer
charged with the public instruction of the province, who had been
specially commissioned to rehear the case, have all more or less
combined to conceal the delinquency of the first authority who
heard it; with whose guilt the rest, his seniors, had associated
themselves either through carelessness or from a corrupt motive.
These proceedings lasted over two years.
One point, however, was definitively gained in connection with
jurisprudence, the recognition of the British Supreme Court as a means of
discharging treaty obligations.
The convention as a whole was subjected to the same kind of criticism
as that of 1869 had been. The Chambers of Commerce pointed out that it
sanctioned Chinese exactions which had been up to that time consistently
resisted as violations of the treaty of Tientsin. Imposts, condemned by
the Chinese themselves,[23] which were to be abolished altogether by
the terms of the Alcock convention, were by the Chefoo agreement not
only recognised as lawful, but the area of their levy, within which
the taxes were to be freed from all restrictions whether as to their
amount or incidence, greatly extended. It would appear, therefore, said
the merchants, "better to revert to the clear and simple provisions of
the treaty of Tientsin, and insist on their being carried out without
evasion." So far, they say, from simplifying the question of the taxation
of foreign goods, the obliquely worded clauses in the Chefoo convention
tend to quite the opposite result. "New elements of obscurity have
been introduced, and if twenty years have been spent wrangling over the
comparatively simple wording of the Tientsin treaty, it is to be feared
that no person now living will see the end of the controversies which will
rage over the indefinite arrangement set forth in the Chefoo convention."
Opium was also for the first time introduced into a treaty, for the
purpose of increasing the Chinese revenue from it and of making the
maritime customs, supported by the British Government, the agent for its
collection. The Chinese had always been at liberty to levy what internal
taxation they pleased on opium; but, said the Chamber of Commerce, for
the "English Government to make itself even indirectly answerable for the
collection from Chinese of an impost of indefinite amount, varying at each
port according to the caprice or the necessities of local authorities who
are not even specified, would surely be to introduce a most inconvenient
precedent." The convention was left for nine years unratified by the
British Government. It could not be ratified because, among other reasons,
five of the treaty Powers took the same objection as the British and other
merchants had taken to the curtailment of the area of exemption from
inland taxation--in other words, to the legal sanction extended by the
agreement to unlimited exactions of the Chinese tax-collectors which had
up till then been resisted as illegal.
During the eight years following the signature of the Chefoo convention
incessant discussion and agitation on the subject of the duties on opium
and general merchandise kept the British Legation in Peking, and in a
lesser degree the Foreign Office at home, in full activity. The question
was turned over in all its aspects, threshed out on this side and on
that, and numerous schemes were proposed for readjusting the imposts. The
British Minister displayed the utmost ingenuity in evolving variations
on the central theme, in which ethical, political, and sentimental
considerations played their part, but without advancing the solution of
the problem. The problem was altogether too simple for such recondite
treatment. The Chinese throughout all the tortuous disquisitions pressed
towards the one object of a substantial increase in their revenue, by
whatever means it might be arrived at; and eventually they attained their
object, as those generally do who concentrate their attention on a single
point.
III. THE RATIFICATION, 1885.
Ratification postponed--Tedious discussion during nine
years--Chinese claiming large increase in opium duty--Ultimately
granted--By agreement signed in 1885--Hongkong and Macao made
stations for collecting opium duties.
The convention simmered for nine years before its final ratification.
The two Governments skirmished in the air all that time, misconceiving
each other's aims and avoiding close quarters. The policy of Great
Britain with regard to opium had been fatally deflected by unpractical
considerations. The article had been placed by the trade regulations
appended to the treaty in the exceptional position of being excluded
from the privilege accorded to all other merchandise of exemption from
inland taxation by payment of a fixed charge. The Chinese authorities
were therefore at liberty to tax the article in transit to any extent
they pleased. For reasons connected with their own administration, this
unlimited power of taxation in transit was not deemed sufficient to
produce the desired amount of revenue, and they were intent on supplying
the deficiency by an enhanced import tariff. The difference between
the two forms of taxation was that the inland duty was collected in a
Chinese sieve, while the import duty was levied with the formalities of
a banker's counter. Naturally, therefore, the Chinese Government missed
no opportunity of pressing for an increase on the tariff fixed by treaty.
It was the main object sought by them in the unratified convention of
1869. Failing then, they renewed their efforts in the Chefoo convention of
1876, seeking the same end by an inverted process, like taking a sea-fort
from the land side. Instead of reviving the discredited proposal, they
effected a turning movement by extending the area of the inland dues
until it included the port of landing. Why, having full licence over the
whole empire, a few acres added to their tax-collecting province should
have been deemed of such vital importance is not perhaps at first sight
self-evident. The reason was that under the proposed system the machinery
of the Imperial maritime customs could be employed in collection, with
the protection of the foreign consuls.
The concession was set forth in cryptic form in the convention, but the
Chinese knew very well what interpretation they intended to give to the
clause. That intention remained unaltered, though tactics varied. By the
light of the vague and pointless correspondence carried on for seven years
with the British Government they saw their way to advancing considerably
beyond the position gained by the convention. They consequently raised
their demands in proportion as they found the British Government yielding,
until eventually they reached a vantage-ground where they could safely
unmask and make direct for their object, an increase in the import tariff
pure and simple. Eighty taels were added to the thirty allowed by the old
treaty, and the opium duty was thus really trebled at a stroke.
The negotiations which led up to the convention are chiefly interesting
as showing how easily the Foreign Office was chased from cover to cover
by the Chinese Minister. Having once got the enemy "on the run," the
Marquis Tsêng did not relax his pursuit until, notwithstanding one or two
rear-guard actions, he capitulated without conditions.
After seven years of active deliberation the definitive diplomatic
conference was opened by Lord Granville in January 1883. As a preliminary,
the basis of the negotiations was rigidly defined by Mr (now Lord) Currie,
in accordance with the Chefoo convention, thus: the regulation of the
_likin_ taxation, and specification of the barriers at which collections
were to be made.
But, as we have hinted, the Chinese aspirations had in the mean time
far transcended the scope of any provision of any treaty. No longer
content with regulating _likin_, their first step in the conference
was to induce Lord Granville to abandon the preliminary stipulation
he had so carefully laid down. The Chinese Minister proposed a general
commutation rate, uniform at all the ports, supporting the claim by sundry
specious arguments. The _likin_ barriers had been a chronic grievance
of the merchants. The marquis held out a prospect of their abolition as
a consequence of the single-payment commutation of inland dues on which
he was intent. It is a feature of Chinese bargains of every description
that something definite should be conceded on the one side, and something
indefinite promised on the other,--the "bird in the hand" invariably for
the Chinese. There was nothing surprising, therefore, in the time-honoured
formula being employed in these diplomatic interchanges.
In moving from his base, Lord Granville, of course, ceded everything; but
he made a final stand at the amount, declaring that "he could not agree
that the _likin_ payment should be fixed at more than 70 taels"; moreover,
that he "would require full information as to the guarantees which would
be given that opium would not be subject to any further payment while in
transit." One such guarantee was already provided for in the convention,
which stipulates "that the nationality of the person possessing or
carrying the merchandise would be immaterial." This was deemed of great
importance to trade, because since it was not always possible for a
foreign owner, or even a deputy of his own race, to accompany a parcel of
goods into the interior, the permission for Chinese to accompany them was
essential to the working of the transit business. The contention of the
merchant had always been, that the exemption from dues was a privilege
attaching to the goods, and not to the temporary owner or transport agent.
On the other hand, as the goods could not speak, the option of sending
either a native or a foreigner at the merchant's own choice was considered
a useful check on illicit exactions.
The confident manner in which the marquis brushed away both of Lord
Granville's ultimata showed how well he had profited by his experience of
Foreign Office diplomacy. To Lord Granville's maximum of 70 taels (the sum
actually agreed upon with the Chinese Government) the marquis said he was
sorry, but his instructions did not permit of his accepting less than 80
taels per pecul. It is not customary to ask for proofs of good faith from
ambassadors acting "on instructions," and Lord Granville simply yielded
the point, while entering a mild protest against being forced by a Chinese
_non possumus_.
And the right of the foreigner to accompany his goods, on which so much
stress had been laid, was disposed of with exquisite assurance by the
Chinese Minister, who was confident that such a mere detail "would not
be allowed to stand in the way of a settlement," notwithstanding that it
involved a reversal of the Chefoo convention.
And as to the guarantees for fulfilment, the Marquis Tsêng was sure that
"the strongest guarantee would consist in the moral obligation" on the
part of the Chinese Government to carry out arrangements of their own
proposing. Thus, by sheer persistence, the Chinese gained every point,
securing not only a threefold duty on opium, but the assistance of her
Majesty's Government in its collection, for that was the meaning of
transferring the levy from the interior to the seaport. The agreement,
concluded by Lord Granville in June, was signed by Lord Salisbury in July
1885, under the title of an "Additional Article to the Chefoo Convention."
It is right to add, on the authority of recent observers, that the
convention has worked smoothly, no complaints being heard of inland
exactions in contravention of its terms. It thus appears that the moral
guarantee on which the Marquis Tsêng spoke so confidently was after all
of some validity. But as the only source from which complaints could come
would be those foreign agents who were by the terms of the convention
expressly excluded from conveying or accompanying opium into the country,
the negative evidence is not absolutely conclusive.
It would have been most interesting to gain from so enlightened a
Minister as Tsêng some insight into the causes of the continual friction
and recrimination which attend the operation of the commercial articles
in the Chinese treaties, but his despatches have reference only to the
question of the moment. "The Imperial Government," he says, "have often
been held responsible for the friction caused in working arrangements but
ill-adapted to the state of the country, and which a better knowledge of
its internal conditions would have shown to those who framed them are
incapable of execution." "The present scheme," he intimates, "being in
harmony with existing institutions," may be expected to work smoothly.
Existing institutions, therefore, are opposed to local taxation and in
favour of single commutations. When, however, a different thesis has
to be sustained, we are assured by other authorities that "existing
institutions" claim arbitrary, variable, and unlimited taxation of goods
in transit for the benefit of the provincial exchequers, and that it is
the attempt to commute these by a payment at the port which is the true
cause of the friction and disputation.
The natural corollary followed the ratification of the Chefoo convention.
The desire of the Chinese Government, cherished for nearly thirty years,
to establish a customs station in Hongkong was virtually consummated
in the following year. The trade of the colony had been vexed by a
perpetual blockade by so-called revenue cruisers which harried every
native vessel entering or leaving the harbour. The hope of getting the
investment relaxed may have induced the acquiescence of the colony in
any alternative. The Chinese sought to grip the opium supply by the neck,
which could only be done by their obtaining control over the harbour of
Hongkong. This was conceded, and a customs station was established on the
Chinese side of the anchorage, while an office was opened in the city of
Victoria.
There was a second "neck" to the opium supply--Macao. The arrangement
made with Hongkong without a corresponding agreement with Macao would
have merely driven the trade from the one to the other. Overtures were
therefore made to the Portuguese, who, unlike the English, were offered a
valuable consideration for admitting the control of the Chinese customs
into their waters. They then obtained for the first time a treaty of
independent sovereignty for the colony.
The effect of all these negotiations and arrangements, whether intended or
not, was to stimulate the cultivation of Chinese opium to a high degree,
and this, according to the impartial testimony of an ex-German Minister,
is, apart from the increase to the Chinese revenue, the net result of the
anti-opium agitation.
[Illustration]
FOOTNOTES:
[22] "Experience shows us that in the eyes of the Chinese negotiation
is a sign of weakness."--Sir F. BRUCE.
[23] "_Likin_ is in its nature an oppressive institution only
continued in force owing to the necessity of providing resources
to meet the army expenditure in the north-west."--'Peking
Gazette,' January 18, 1875.