THE EXPANSION OF INTERCOURSE.
I. RUSSIA AND FRANCE ADVANCING.
Influx of treaty Powers--Diversion of Chinese foreign policy into
new channels--Aggrandisement of Russia--And France--At the expense
of China--Affecting whole policy of China for thirty years--The
rise of German influence--And Japanese.
Up to this stage the foreign relations of China have been traced from
what is practically a single point of view--the English--without sensible
distortion of their true proportions. But the events of 1857-60, and
the treaties by which they were crowned, introduced new factors and a
wider ramification of international connections. The arms of England
and France opened the door to an influx of Powers eager to reap where
they had not sown; and though the full effect was not realised till many
years later, the shifting of foreign intercourse from an essentially
Anglo-Chinese to a Sino-cosmopolitan basis became a potential reality
on the day that Peking surrendered to the Allies. Foreseeing such a
result, the negotiators of the treaties of 1858 advisedly refrained from
pressing the Chinese Government more than was essential to the freedom
of commerce, on the ground that other Powers less restrained than the
authors of the treaties by a sense of moral responsibility might take
undue advantage of concessions extorted from the vanquished. This
prevision has been borne out by events, for the original "three treaty
Powers" soon became thirteen, and the old solicitude for the conservation
of China was gradually discovered to be confined to the small minority
who had a substantial commercial stake in the country. With the increase
in their number there naturally also appeared diversity of interest,
scarce perceptible in the beginning, but ever widening with the progress
of events until at length a stage of violent antagonism in the policy of
the Powers was reached. The division among their enemies, which Chinese
statesmen have deplored their inability to compass, has thus been brought
about without their aid; but so far from realising the Chinese dream of
ruling the barbarians, the division has only exposed the empire to the
ravages of rival spoilers.
It is impossible to do more than glance at the several channels into
which the foreign relations of China have branched off since 1860. Yet
they intersect each other at so many points as to form a network which
can only be intelligently considered as a whole. The quasi-biographical
form of the present work may be appropriately dropped, so far as China
is concerned, with the beginning of 1870, when the more immediate subject
of it disappears from the stage of action to reappear as a perspicacious
critic surveying the scene from a distant but commanding standpoint.
Two developments of far-reaching importance found their proximate
starting-point, though not their origin, in the crisis which laid China
prostrate in 1858 and 1860. These were the extension of the Russian empire
to the Pacific Ocean, and the creation of that Asiatic empire which had
been the dream of France for two centuries. China being by these vast
territorial aggressions placed between the upper and the nether millstone,
the anticipated advance of the two Powers has exerted an influence on her
destiny scarcely less potent than the Japanese war itself, with which it
so effectively co-operated. The soldier-statesmen of Russia foreseeing,
what the war of 1854-55 was soon to demonstrate, that the sea route
to their Pacific possessions was at the mercy of the maritime Powers,
resolved to make a dash for a line of communication by land, and in
pursuance of this adventurous conception forced their way down the Amur
in spite of the feeble remonstrance of the Chinese wardens of the marches.
What was thus taken by the strong hand in 1854 was formally ceded in 1858,
when, first, the Amur province, with the free navigation of the river,
and, next, an undefined condominium in the Usuri province, were granted
by treaty to Russia. This was but a step towards the absolute cession, two
years later, of that territory, including the whole Manchurian sea-coast,
600 miles in length. These extensive cessions, giving Russia the command
of North-Eastern Asia, were extorted from China while _in extremis_ as a
direct result of the Anglo-French victories.
So with the French establishment in the south-eastern section of the
Continent. The expedition sent to the Far East in conjunction with that
of Great Britain was, on completion of its work in China, withdrawn to
Cochin-China, and, in an alliance of brief duration with Spain, invaded
that dependency of the empire of Annam--a vassal of China--and captured
Saigon. The Spanish partnership being thereupon dissolved, the French
empire of "Indo-China" was inaugurated with a free hand. Zeal for religion
was the motive of the invasion: "The emperor wished to put a stop to
the constantly recurring persecutions of Christians in Cochin-China, and
to secure them the efficacious protection of France." The record of the
phenomenal progress of the new French empire since the treaty of Saigon
in 1862 has been related by many eloquent pens. M. F. Garnier, the heroic
explorer; M. de Carné, his colleague; M. Lanier, M. Deschamps, M. de
Lanessan, and a host of enthusiastic French writers, have depicted in
glowing terms not only the process, but the motives and aspirations, of
the French "empire-builders."[21]
The pressure, latent and active, of these two powerful neighbours has
given its tone to the policy of China during thirty years, and in such a
way that her relations with the commercial nations who did not menace her
integrity have been relegated to a secondary place.
The new German influence in the Far East, which had its modest beginnings
in the treaties so reluctantly concluded by the Japanese and Chinese in
1861, has grown in importance _pari passu_ with the rapid development of
the German empire itself, ably seconded, it must always be allowed, by the
personal qualities of the Ministers who have been successively chosen to
represent the Fatherland at Peking and Tokio. The first resident Minister
to China was Baron Rehfues, who opened the Legation in Peking in 1866,
under the treaty of 1861.
Another nation destined to play a leading _rôle_ among the Powers in the
Western Pacific was during the same period rising like the sun in the
eastern sky. Nor was it very long before the nascent Power of Japan began
to make its weight felt in the conflicts and concerts of the Far Eastern
world.
It is obvious that under these various influences operating from without,
and the reflex action set up within the State itself, the character
of China as a political and diplomatic entity could not any longer
be what it had been in the years before the war. What had been simple
became complex; no international issue could be raised in an isolated
form; nor could China make any move, whether voluntary or involuntary,
without facing the critical observation of many interested parties.
This multiple responsibility to Powers by no means at one in their aims,
and each assuming over her a status of superiority, could have no other
effect than to reduce to nullity any efforts China might make either to
improve herself or please the Powers. It was impossible to please them
all. Decades before the Japanese war, more than one of them had offered
her armed assistance in thwarting the designs of a third,--which things
Chinese statesmen pondered in silence.
II. JAPAN AGGRESSIVE.
Extraordinary progress of Japan--Nation becomes restless--Invades
Formosa--Bought off by China.
The civil war in Japan had been fought with characteristic energy during
three years, when a revolution, the like of which was never before seen,
established the new empire on the double foundations of hereditary
monarchy and popular suffrage. The effect of the revolution was to
concentrate the whole strength of the State under the government of the
Mikado, and thus enable it to give free play to the widest ambitions. With
incredible rapidity the nation made itself efficient for every enterprise
of peace or war. The best that the Western world had to teach was eagerly
appropriated by a people just aroused from a long sleep, and anxious to
make up lost time. They went so fast, indeed, that onlookers shook their
heads, and their best friends would have applied the brake had it been
possible. But the nation was self-reliant, and in its first adolescence
it began to be aggressive.
Within six years of the revolution of 1868 an expedition was sent to
invade the Chinese island of Formosa. Through the good offices of Sir
Thomas Wade, British Minister in Peking, war between the two empires was
averted, and the Japanese forces withdrawn. They were virtually bought
off, a proceeding characterised by Sir H. Parkes as pusillanimous on
the part of the empire of China. The transaction really sealed the fate
of China, in advertising to the world that here was a rich empire which
was ready to pay, but not ready to fight. The euphemisms under which
the ransom was disguised deceived no one unless it were the Chinese
themselves. The vast cessions to Russia, incredible as they appeared, had
at least the palliation of a dire emergency, and verbal equivalents in
the shape of promises of deliverance therefrom. The submission to Japan,
on the other hand, was made in a time of comparative ease.
The incident had yet a further significance. The pretext of the Japanese
invasion was injuries done to shipwrecked Liuchiuans, a people whom China
till then and for some years later considered her own vassals, and who
had for centuries paid her regular tribute. Such an episode was therefore
a sure mark of imperial decadence;--a definite step, moreover, in the
downward process, to be followed not long after by the Japanese boldly
asserting a claim to the Liuchiu Islands, against which China could only
interpose an inarticulate protest. The meaning of these indications was
not likely to be lost either on the Japanese, who were more immediately
concerned, or on other less interested onlookers. And what has the
subsequent history of China been but a development of the symptoms?
III. KOREA OPENED.
Japan concludes commercial treaty with Korea--Establishes working
relations--Exciting jealousy in China--The suzerain--China replies
by opening Korea to the whole world.
The expanding life of Japan was soon to overflow in another direction.
The kingdom of Korea lay within twelve hours' steaming from the Japanese
coast: it had a historic and a mythical interest for Japan; it had been
the source of her culture as well as the scene of her conquests and
ultimate defeat. With the exception of piratical raids on the coast towns
of China, Korea was the only foreign field into which Japanese arms had
been carried, and the prowess of their peninsular heroes was cherished
as a sacred treasure by a people singularly tenacious of their heroic
legends. After an interval of three centuries the new Japan directed its
ambition to the scene of its medieval exploits; and the "hermit kingdom"
was at last dragged from its seclusion and forced to play an unwilling
part in the international game. The modern spirit had tempered the
military passion, commerce and industry supplied the ballast to adventure,
and instead of landing an army of 200,000 men, as they had done in 1592,
the Japanese, in 1876, re-established themselves in the peninsula through
the peaceable agency of a treaty of amity and commerce--a weapon newly
borrowed from the armoury of Europe. This movement of the Japanese was by
no means intended to "open" Korea--except to themselves. On the contrary,
it appears that that very astute people ingratiated themselves with
the king's Government by aiding, or professing to aid, them to keep the
country closed to all other nations.
But, like every other attempt to isolate an international question, the
exclusive effort of the Japanese not only failed, but resulted in opening
Korea instead of closing it. They could not lock themselves in: the key
was on the outside of the door. Although they disguised their feelings,
the Chinese authorities had been gravely disturbed by the attacks of the
French and the Americans on Korea in 1867 and 1871. The audacious advance
of the Japanese aroused them to the extent of considering the merits of a
counter-move; for Korea was the secular battle-ground between China and
Japan, the historic stepping-stone between the two countries. And Korea
was a vassal to China, if ever one State did occupy such a relation to
another. By old tradition, by effective conquest, by solemn engagement,
by regular tributary missions, by the prerogative of investiture, by
the obeisance of the sovereign before the Chinese envoys sent on great
occasions, by every kind of acknowledgment which the servant could render
to the master, was the suzerainty of China established.
China's relations to her tributaries was perhaps the best feature in
her imperial character. There was protection, nominal or real, but never
a shadow of domination. The ceremonial once settled, the most complete
independence was accorded to the vassal State, the imperial object being
never oppression or exploitation, but the girdling of the empire with a
cordon of contented States looking with filial eyes towards the Dragon
throne. Of these filial States Korea was the most important, on account
of its geographical position as commanding one of the main approaches
to the Middle Kingdom, or, as the king himself once expressed it in a
memorial to the emperor, as "the lips protecting the teeth." For China the
Korean peninsula has been a strategical stronghold, but its importance was
increased a hundredfold when the statesmen of Peking came to realise what
they had done in giving away the whole Manchurian sea-coast, leaving them
no outlet to the Sea of Japan excepting through Korea, which, moreover,
was studded all round with excellent harbours, useful to friends and
tempting to enemies.
The wise policy which the emperors had observed towards their tributaries
had borne valuable fruit in Korea. For two hundred years the Peking
Government had dealt so benignly with king and people as to have inspired
feelings of genuine affection combined with deep reverence for the "big
country." Whether collectively or individually, officially or privately,
the Chinese were warmly welcomed everywhere without ever abusing the
courtesy of their hosts--in marked contrast, it must be observed, to
the Japanese, whose record in Korea has been one of unbroken brutality,
producing a general feeling of aversion.
If anything, therefore, could excite the jealousy of Chinese statesmen, it
would be to see this filial dependency being tampered with by strangers,
more especially by their hereditary foes, the Japanese. Better all the
world in Korea with Japan excluded, than Japan in with the rest of the
world kept out. Slow of apprehension, and still slower of action, her
unpractical conservatism in high places reducible only by sap and mine,
China brooded over the Korean problem for some years before any result
of the incubation appeared. The conclusion eventually arrived at was to
neutralise the Japanese action by opening Korea to the whole world under
treaty. The realisation of this scheme was as usual placed in the hands of
Li Hung-chang, who on the one hand recommended the Korean king to conclude
commercial treaties with foreign Powers, and on the other encouraged the
latter to open negotiations. Hence the general opening of the country in
1882, with its train of tragic consequences.
The terms of the foreign treaties with Korea had not been thoroughly
thought out, and the very ambiguity was perpetuated which it was the
interest of China to clear away. The treaties purported to be made with an
independent State, whereas Korea was a vassal, and the inconsistency was
attempted to be remedied by a separate letter from the king to the Powers
with whom he had concluded treaties, declaring, notwithstanding, that the
Chinese emperor was his suzerain.
IV. THE FIRST IMPERIAL AUDIENCE--SUCCESSION OF KWANGHSU.
End of the minority of Emperor Tungchih--Audience of the foreign
Ministers in 1873--Under derogatory conditions--Death of the
young emperor--Empress regent's _coup d'état_ in selecting
successor--Her own nephew--Eighteen years' minority of Emperor
Kwanghsu.
An event looked forward to for twelve long years with patient expectation,
and with hope, lively at the beginning but fading away towards the end
of the period, that it would prove the sovereign remedy for the defects
of Chinese intercourse with the world, was the assumption of power by
the young emperor, who attained his majority in 1873. The diplomatic
body busied themselves greatly in preparations for their first audiences
with the sovereign to whom they were accredited. The Chinese on their
part were no less anxiously engaged in devising means of lightening
the blow to their prestige in consenting to receive foreigners at all,
while dispensing with the prescribed prostrations. Obliged to yield the
main point, the Court officials minimised its significance by imposing
sundry derogatory conditions as to the building in which the audience
was to be granted, and by the terms in which it was referred to in the
imperial decree, which represented the foreign Ministers as "imploring an
audience," and by other like devices.
The first to be admitted to the presence was the representative of Japan,
who held the rank of ambassador. Next came the resident Ministers of
Russia, the United States, Great Britain, France, and Holland, in a body;
and lastly, the French Minister separately, in order to convey the reply
of his Government to the mission of Chunghou respecting the Tientsin
massacre of 1870. The several letters of credence were placed on a table.
The emperor "seemed to be speaking" to Prince Kung, though no sound was
heard. The prince in his turn addressed a few words to the five Ministers,
in Chinese, purporting to be what the emperor had spoken in Manchu, and
the audience was at an end, the whole ceremony lasting about five minutes.
By long anticipation a superstitious halo had formed round the abstract
question of audience: it grew into a kind of fetish. Mr Lay shrewdly
observed that the object of the "resident Minister" clause in the
treaties had been misunderstood by foreigners in being regarded by them
as an end instead of only a means. Mr Wade, who was British Minister at
the time, made no such mistake; for though he consistently laid stress
on ceremonial, it was, as he has frequently explained, because with
the Chinese form was more than substance, and included it. A proper
regulation of official etiquette was in his estimation the principal key
to the remedy of material wrongs. From this point of view a five minutes'
audience of the Son of Heaven, even in dumb show and once a-year, was a
step of real importance. "The empire," wrote Mr Wade, "has for the first
time in its history broken with the tradition of isolated supremacy--not,
it may be, with a good grace, but still past recall; and while I would
anxiously deprecate a too sanguine estimate of its results, I am as little
disposed to undervalue the change that has been effected."
But whatever hopes of a practical kind were raised by this ceremonial
innovation were doomed to speedy extinction, for the emperor did not
survive to grant a second reception. He died within the year, and was
succeeded by another infant, involving a second minority much longer than
the preceding one. Eighteen years, in fact, elapsed between the first
imperial audience and the second.
The Emperor Tungchih, though but eighteen years of age, left a legend
behind him. The gossip of the capital assigned to him considerable
independence of character, and a certain audacity in breaking bounds
without the discreet chaperonage enjoyed by the Prince Siddhârtha in his
explorations beyond the palace precincts of King Suddhôdana. He was,
if common report belied him not, a true son of his mother in certain
respects, though of her masterful statecraft, and the qualities which
become a great monarch, he was too young to have given proofs. Leaving
no heir, the deficiency was promptly supplied by the resourcefulness of
the empress-mother. As the widow of the Emperor Hsienfêng and co-regent,
she adopted a posthumous heir to that monarch to replace his own son.
Her choice fell on the infant son of Prince Ch'un, the youngest brother
of Hsienfêng. The mother of the adopted child was the empress-regent's
own sister, and by thus enthroning her nephew the regent assured herself
another long lease of power. The proceeding was irregular, there being two
older brothers of Prince Ch'un alive and having sons. The nearest heir
was the infant grandson of Prince Tun, the fifth son of Tao-kuang, but
though Prince Tun himself had thirty years before been given in adoption
to an uncle, the claim of his descendants to the imperial inheritance
being thereby weakened, he seems never to have renounced his rights. At
the time of the decease of Tungchih there was so much apprehension of
disturbances in Peking, both on account of the succession and the form of
the regency, that the 'Times' (February 4, 1875) wrote, "A battle on this
question would seem almost inevitable, and notwithstanding the proverbial
slowness of the East in most things, in crises like the present aspirants
to Eastern thrones are wont to display both energy and readiness when the
moment arrives for a _coup d'état_."
The next in seniority of the sons of Tao-kuang was Prince Kung, whose
title was uncompromised by alienation, and he had a son eligible. Whatever
may have been the reasons for setting aside the claims of the two elder
brothers to occupy the Dragon throne, they were considered to have been
wrongfully set aside, and of this more will doubtless be heard in the
fulness of time. Since, for reasons well understood, no natural heir
to the present monarch can succeed him, there must be fresh recourse
to adoption when or before the necessity arises, and what influences,
native or alien, may then be concentrated on the imperial succession is
a speculation on which it would be profitless to enter.
The empress-regent's _coup d'état_ of January 1875, when on a bitterly
cold night her infant nephew was taken out of his warm bed, conveyed
into the palace, and proclaimed emperor the following morning, answered
the scheming lady's expectations, for she has ruled the Chinese empire
from that day to this. By the same stroke she was enabled to disembarrass
herself of her original confederate, Prince Kung, to whose ambition she
dealt a crushing blow in ousting his family from the succession. The two
had come to hate each other with more than common virulence; and now that
Prince Ch'un had been set on an unassailable pedestal as father of the
reigning sovereign, the regent placed her trust and confidence in him, and
shared with him the sweets of empire. Inasmuch, however, as the regent
was a woman, and her imperial brother-in-law neither a man of affairs
nor in a position to assume any outward share in the Government, it was
necessary to bring in a practical statesman to stand between them and the
outer world. This position of confidence was occupied for twenty years by
the grand secretary, Li Hung-chang.
FOOTNOTE:
[21] For an unvarnished narrative of both the French and the Russian
advances the reader cannot do better than consult Mr Gundry's
'China and her Neighbours,' Chapman & Hall, 1893.