FIRST MISSION TO CHINA. TIENTSIN.
ADVANCE TO THE PEIHO--TAKING OF THE FORTS--THE PEIHO RIVER--
TIENTSIN--NEGOTIATIONS--THE TREATY--THE RIGHT OF SENDING A MINISTER TO
PEKIN--RETURN SOUTHWARD--SAILS FOR JAPAN.
The establishment of the principle of direct communication with the
Imperial Government at the capital had always been regarded as one of the
most important objects of Lord Elgin's mission. When, therefore, in reply
to his letter addressed to the Prime Minister, there came an answer from a
provincial officer, he returned it at once, and wrote again to the Prime
Minister, pointing out that, by refusing to correspond with him directly,
the Minister had broken the existing treaty, by which it was agreed that
'Her Britannic Majesty's Chief High Officer shall correspond with the
Chinese High Officers, both at the capital and in the provinces, under the
term "communication;"' and announcing that he should proceed at once to the
North, in order that he might place himself in more immediate communication
with the High. Officers of the Imperial Government at the capital.
Accordingly, he arranged with Baron Gros that they should meet in the Gulf
of Pecheli, at the mouth of the Peiho, backed by their respective fleets,
and with the moral support of the presence of the Russian and American
Plenipotentiaries.
In carrying out these plans everything depended, in his judgment, on acting
promptly; and he was therefore most desirous that the supporting force
should collect at once at the appointed spot, and that it should include a
considerable number of gunboats of light draught, capable of passing over
the mud-banks which form a bar at the mouth of the Peiho river. In this,
however, he was disappointed, and many weeks elapsed before any vigorous
measures could be taken. The delay, as may be supposed, caused him much
annoyance and anxiety at the time; and he especially regretted it
afterwards, because it prevented him from personally visiting Pekin, as he
might have done at this time under circumstances peculiarly favourable; and
thus left the delicate question of access to the capital to be settled by
his successor, with no such advantage.[1]
[Sidenote: Advance to the Peiho.]
_H.M.S. 'Furious,' at sea.--April 11th_.--Here we are, gliding through
the smoothest possible sea, with a gentle wind, and this time
favourable, which relieves us of all the smoke and ashes of the
funnel,--an advantage for our eyes as well as conducive to our
comfort. We are in the midst of the Yellow Sea, going about eight
knots, dragging a gunboat astern to save her coal. This is the only
gunboat I have got. I trust, both on private and public grounds, that
we may succeed, because otherwise the consummation might be put off
for a year, or at least till the autumn, and God knows what might
happen in the interval. The Russian Plenipotentiary, with his own
small vessel--dragging behind him, however, a junk well laden with
coals and provisions--sailed the day before me. I followed on the 10th
(yesterday). The French and American are to follow. It is amusing to
see how we play our parts. Putiatine and I are always together,
visiting every port, looking into everything with our own eyes. Our
colleagues, with their big ships, arrive sooner or later at the great
places of rendezvous.
[Sidenote: Aground.]
_April 13th, Nine P.M._--We had an adventure this afternoon. I was on
the paddle-box bridge watching, as we passed between the town of Tung-
Chow Foo (a long wall, as it seemed, stretching for about four miles,
with a temple at the nearest end) and the island of Meantau, when I
felt a shock,--and, behold! we were aground. Our gunboat, which we
towed, not being able to check its speed at a moment's notice, ran
foul of us, and we both suffered a little in the scuffle. We got off
in about two hours. On the whole, I am rather glad that we have a
gunboat with us, for if anything serious did happen, it would be
rather awkward, under existing circumstances, to be cast on the coast
of China. It is as well to have two strings to one's bow.
_April 14th._--This morning it was thick and pretty rough. It is now
(4 P.M.) very bright and comparatively smooth. We have seen no land
to-day, nor, indeed, anything but sea and a few junks. Shall we meet
any vessels at the rendezvous? A few hours will tell.
[Sidenote: The rendezvous.]
_April 15th._--We saw, at about 5 P.M. yesterday, Russian at anchor,
and went towards her, but were afterwards obliged to remove to some
distance, as we had not water enough where she is. While we were going
to our berth, the 'Pique' came in sight. So here we are--'Pique'
'Furious' and 'Slaney' (gunboat), in an open sea, land not even
risible. Captain Osborn started off this morning, in the gunboat, to
sound and find out what chance we have of getting over the bar at the
mouth of the Peiho. Putiatine came on board this morning. He has sent
to the shore a note announcing his arrival. I am not disposed to do
anything of the kind. The best plan, as it appears to me, is to move
steadily up the river as soon as we can get ever the bar, and let the
Chinese stop us if they dare. Putiatine says that he will follow me,
if I pass without any resistance being offered, but that he must not
go first, as his Government forbids him to provoke hostilities. This
division of labour suits me very well.
_April 19th._--I have nothing to write about. You may imagine what it
is to be at anchor in this gulf with nothing to do.... If I had had my
gunboats, I might have been up the Peiho ere this. I might perhaps
have brought the Emperor to his senses.... Meanwhile Reed is arrived.
Gros is last, but he is bringing his Admiral and force with him.
_April 21st._--Gros arrived last evening. He is very well disposed, and
ready to act with me. The French Admiral may be expected any day. We
are going to make a communication to Pekin to invite a Plenipotentiary
to meet us here, as we cannot go up to Tientsin.
About a week afterwards the bar was crossed; but it was not until three
more weeks had passed that the forts at the mouth of the river were taken,
in order to secure the passage of the Envoys up to Tientsin.
[Sidenote: Taking of the forts.]
_May 21st._--I have spent during the last three weeks the worst time I
have passed since 1849, and really I have not been capable of writing.
The forts were taken yesterday. The Chinese had had several weeks to
prepare, and their moral was greatly raised by our hesitations and
delays. The poor fellows even stood at their guns and fired away
pretty steadily. But as they hardly ever hit, it is of very little
consequence how much they fire. As soon as our men landed they
abandoned the forts and ran off in all directions. We have hardly had
any loss, I believe; but the French, who blundered a good deal with
their gunboats, and then contrived to get blown up by setting fire to
a powder magazine, have suffered pretty severely. I fancy that we have
got almost all the artillery which the Chinese Empire possesses in
this quarter.... This affair of yesterday, in a strategical point of
view was a much more creditable affair than the taking of Canton. Our
gunboats and men appear to have done well, and though they were
opposed to poor troops, still they were troops, and not crowds of
women and children, who were the victims of the bombardment at Canton.
_May 22nd._--Would that you had been a true prophet! Yet there is
something of inspiration in your writing on the 1st of March: 'I was
fancying you even now, perhaps, ascending the Peiho with a train of
gunboats!'
_May 23rd._--These wretched Chinese are for the most part unarmed.
When they are armed, they have no notion of directing their firearms.
They are timorous, and without either tactics or discipline. I will
venture to say that twenty-four determined men, with revolvers and a
sufficient number of cartridges, might walk through China from one end
to another.
_May 25th._--No news since I began this letter, except a vague report
that the Admirals are moving up the river slowly, meeting with no
resistance, rather a friendly reception, from the people. I am
surprised that we have not yet heard anything from Pekin. I hope the
Emperor will not fly to Tartary, because that would be a new
perplexity. I am not quite in such bad spirits as last week, because
at least now there is some chance of our getting this miserable war
finished, and thus of my obtaining my liberty again.... We ought to
have a mail from England any day.... Changes of Government have this
inconvenience, that of course the new-comers cannot possibly take time
to read over previous correspondence, so that they must be but
partially informed on many points,... but no doubt at this distance it
is practically impossible for Government to give instructions, and all
the responsibility must rest on the agent on the spot. At this moment,
when I am moving up to Pekin, I am receiving the despatches of the
Government commenting upon the Canton proceedings, and asking me: What
do you intend to do next?
_May 27th._--I have been pacing the deck looking at the dancing waves
sparkling under a bright full moon. It is the third time, I think,
that I have seen it since I have been in this gulf. I had a message
last night late from the Admiral, stating that he is within two miles
of Tientsin! I sent Frederick up that he might see what is going on,
and let me know when I ought to advance. I had also a communication
from the Chinese Plenipotentiaries, but it was not of much importance.
I do not think that these poor, timorous people have any notion of
resisting. I only trust that they may make up their minds to concede
what is requisite at once, and enable us all to have done with it.
_May 28th._--The last news from Canton shows that the kind of panic
which had been, in my opinion most needlessly, got up, is subsiding,
and the General has sent up a few men--for which I ought to thank him,
as he had only been asked whether he could supply any if wanted.
_May 29th._--I have a short despatch from the new Government, giving
me latitude to do anything I choose if I will only finish the affair.
Meanwhile Frederick writes from Tientsin to recommend me to proceed
thither, and I intend to be off this afternoon. There appears to be on
the part of the Chinese no attempt at resistance, but on the other
hand no movement to treat. This passivity is, of course, our danger,
and it is one which slowness on our part tends to increase. However,
we must hope for the best.
[Sidenote: On the Peiho.]
[Sidenote: Tientsin.]
_Yamun, Tientsin.--May 30th._--Only look at my date, does it not
astonish you? I hardly yet realise to myself where I am. I started at
about 4.30 P.M. yesterday from the 'Furious,' crossed the bar, at the
forts at the entrance of the river, picked up Gros and the French
mission, whose vessel could not get on, and moved on to this place.
The night was lovely--a moon nearly full. The banks, perfectly flat
and treeless at first, became fringed with mud villages, silent as the
grave, and trees standing like spectres over the stream. There we went
ceaselessly on through this silvery silence, panting and breathing
flame. Through the night-watches, when no Chinaman moves, when the
junks cast anchor, we laboured on, cutting ruthlessly and recklessly
through the waters of that glancing and startled river, which, until
within the last few weeks, no stranger keel had ever furrowed! Whose
work are we engaged in, when we burst thus with hideous violence and
brutal energy into these darkest and most mysterious recesses of the
traditions of the past? I wish I could answer that question in a
manner satisfactory to myself. At the same time, there is certainly
not much to regret in the old civilisation which we are thus
scattering to the winds. A dense population, timorous and pauperised,
such would seem to be its chief product. I passed most of the night on
deck, and at about 4 A.M. we reached a point in the centre of the
suburb of Tientsin, at which the Great Canal joins the Tientsin or
Peiho river. There I found the Admirals, Frederick, &c. Frederick had
got this yamun for us, half of which I have had to give to my French
colleague. It consists of a number of detached rooms, scattered about
a garden. I have installed myself in the joss-house, my bedroom being
on one side, and my sitting-room on the other, of the idol's altar. We
have a letter informing us that the Emperor has named two great
Officers of State to come here and treat, and our Admirals are in very
good humour, so that matters look well for the present.
_June 1st._--I found my joss-house so gloomy and low, that I have
returned to my first quarter in the garden, on a mound overlooking the
river. It consists, of a single room, part of which is screened off by
a curtain for a bedroom. It is hot during the day, but nothing much to
complain of. I took a walk yesterday. The country is quite flat,
cultivated in wheat, millet, &c. Instead of the footpaths of the
southern parts of China, there are roads for carriages, and wheeled
carts dragged by mules in tandem going along them. I have not been in
the town, but some of the party were there this morning, and one had
his pocket picked, which is a proof of civilisation. They say it is a
poor place, the people stupid-looking and curious, but not as yet
unfriendly.
_June 4th._--I am to have an interview with the Chinese
Plenipotentiaries to-day. I devoutly hope it may lead to a speedy and
satisfactory pacific settlement; but I am sending to Hong-Kong for
troops, in order to be prepared for all eventualities. In sum, my
policy has resulted in this:--I have complete military command of the
capital of China, without having broken off relations with the neutral
Powers, and without having interrupted, for a single day, our trade at
the different ports of the empire.
[Sidenote: Negotiations.]
_Tientsin.--June 5th_--After sending off your letter yesterday, I went
to have my first official interview with the Chinese
Plenipotentiaries. I made up my mind, disgusting as the part is to me,
to act the _rôle_ of the 'uncontrollably fierce barbarian,' as we are
designated in some of the confidential reports to the Chinese
Government which have come into our hands. These stupid people, though
they cannot resist, and hardly even make a serious attempt to do so,
never yield anything except under the influence of fear; and it is
necessary therefore to make them feel that one is in earnest, and that
they have nothing for it but to give way. Accordingly I got a guard of
150 marines and the band of the 'Calcutta,' and set off with all my
suite in chairs, _tambour battant_ for the place of rendezvous. It was
about two-and-a-half miles off, and the heat of the sun very great.
The road carried us through several narrow streets of the suburb, then
across a plain, till we reached a temple at which the
Plenipotentiaries were awaiting us. A dense crowd of Chinese men--I
saw not one woman--lined the route. Curiosity chiefly was depicted on
their countenances; some looked frightened; but I observed no symptoms
of ill-will. At the entrance of the temple were two blind musicians,
playing something like squeaking bagpipes. This was the Chinese band.
We marched in with all our force, which drew up in a sort of court
before an open verandah, where refreshments were set out, and the
dignitaries awaited us. I was received by the Imperial Commissioner,
and conducted to a seat at a small table covered with little plates of
sweetmeats, &c. One of the Chinese Plenipotentiaries sat on either
side of me. It was a very pretty scene, and the place was decorated in
very good taste with flowers, &c. As my neighbours showed no
disposition to talk, I began by asking after their health and that of
the Emperor. They then said that they had received the Emperor's
orders to come down to treat of our affairs. I answered, that although
I was much grieved by the neglect of the Prime Minister to answer the
letters I had addressed to him, yet as they had on their cards stated
that they had 'full powers,' I had consented to have this interview in
order that we might compare our powers, and see whether we could treat
together. I told them that I had brought mine, and I at once exhibited
them, giving them a translation of the documents. They said they had
not powers of the same kind, but a decree of the Emperor appointing
them, and they brought out a letter which was wrapped up in a sheet of
yellow paper. The chief Plenipotentiary rose and raised the paper
reverentially over his head before unfolding it. I thought the terms
of this document rather ambiguous, besides which I was desirous to
produce a certain effect; so when it had been translated to me, I said
that I was not sufficiently satisfied with it to be able to say on the
spot whether I could treat with them or not; that I would, if they
pleased, take a copy of it and consider the matter; but that I would
not enter upon business with them at present. So saying I rose, moved
to the front of the stage, and ordered the escort to move and the
chairs to be brought. This put the poor people into a terrible
fluster. They made great efforts to induce me to sit down again, but I
acted the part of the 'uncontrollably fierce' to perfection, and set
off for my abode. I had hardly reached it when I received two cards
from my poor mandarins, thanking me for having gone so far to meet
them, &c.
_June 12th._--I have gone through a good deal since we parted.
Certainly I have seen more to disgust me with my fellow-countrymen
than I saw during the whole course of my previous life, since I have
found them in the East among populations too timid to resist and too
ignorant to complain. I have an instinct in me which loves
righteousness and hates iniquity, and all this keeps me in a perpetual
boil.
[Sidenote: Treaty signed.]
_June 29th._--I have not written for some days, but they have been
busy ones.... We went on fighting and bullying, and getting the poor
Commissioners to concede one point after another, till Friday the
25th, when we had reason to believe all was settled, and that the
signature was to take place on the following day.... On Friday
afternoon, however, Baron Gros came to me with a message from the
Russian and American Ministers, to induce me to recede from two of my
demands--1. A resident minister at Pekin; and, 2. Permission to our
people to trade in the interior of China; because, as they said, the
Chinese Plenipotentiaries had told them that they had received a
decree from the Emperor, stating that they should infallibly lose
their heads if they gave way on these points.... The resident minister
at Pekin I consider far the most important matter gained by the
Treaty; the power to trade in the interior hardly less so.... I had at
stake not only these important points in my treaty, for which I had
fought so hard, but I know not what behind. For the Chinese are such
fools, that it was impossible to tell, if we gave way on one point,
whether they would not raise difficulties on every other. I sent for
the Admiral; gave him a hint that there was a great opportunity for
England; that all the Powers were deserting me on a point which they
had _all_, in their original applications to Pekin, demanded, and
which they all intended to claim if I got it; that therefore we had it
in our power to claim our place of priority in the East, by obtaining
this when others would not insist on it? Would he back me?... This was
the forenoon of Saturday, 26th. The Treaty was to be signed in the
evening. I may mention, as a proof of the state of people's minds,
that Admiral Seymour told me that the French Admiral had urged him to
dine with him, assuring him that no Treaty would be signed that day!
Well, I sent Frederick to the Imperial Commissioners, to tell them
that I was indignant beyond all expression at their having attempted
to communicate with me through third parties; that I was ready to sign
at once the Treaty as it stood; but that, if they delayed or
retracted, I should consider negotiations at an end, go to Pekin, and
demand a great deal more, &c.... Frederick executed this most
difficult task admirably, and at 6 P.M. I signed the Treaty of
Tientsin.... I am now anxiously waiting some communication from Pekin.
Till the Emperor accepts the Treaty, I shall hardly feel safe. Please
God he may ratify without delay! I am sure that I express the wish
just as much in the interest of China as in ours. Though I have been
forced to act almost brutally, I am China's friend in all this.
[Sidenote: Articles of the Treaty.]
It may be well here to recapitulate the chief articles of the Treaty thus
concluded, which may be briefly summed up as follows:--
The Queen of Great Britain to be at liberty, if she see fit, to appoint an
Ambassador, who may reside permanently at Pekin, or may visit it
occasionally, at the option of the British Government;
Protestants and Roman Catholics to be alike entitled to the protection of
the Chinese authorities;
British subjects to be at liberty to travel to all parts of the interior,
under passports issued by their Consuls;
British ships to be at liberty to trade upon the Great River (Yangtze);
Five additional ports to be opened to trade;
The Tariff fixed by the Treaty of Nankin to be revised;
British subjects to have the option of clearing their goods of all transit
duties by payment of a single charge, to be calculated as nearly as
possible at the rate of 2-1/2 per cent. _ad valorem_;
The character 'I' (Barbarian) to be no longer applied in official documents
to British subjects;
The Chinese to pay 2,000,000 taels (about 650,000_l._) for losses at
Canton, and an equal sum for the expenses of the war.
[Sidenote: Reasons for moderation.]
[Sidenote: Right of sending an ambassador,]
In bringing this Treaty to a conclusion Lord Elgin might have said of
himself as truly as of the brother who had so ably helped him in arranging
its terms, that he 'felt very sensibly the painfulness of the position of a
negotiator, who has to treat with persons who yield nothing to reason and
everything to fear, and who are at the same time profoundly ignorant both
of the subjects under discussion and of their own real interests.' Moreover
he had constantly to recollect that, under the 'most favoured nation'
clause, every concession made to British subjects would be claimed by the
subjects, or persons calling themselves the subjects, of other Powers, by
whom they were only too likely to be employed for the promotion of
rebellion and disorder within the empire, or for the establishment of
privileged smuggling and piracy along its coasts and up its rivers. In all
these circumstances he saw grounds for exercising forbearance and
moderation; and his forbearance and moderation were rewarded by the
readiness with which the Emperor sanctioned the Treaty, and the amicable
manner in which its details were subsequently settled. One exception there
was to this moderation on his part, and to this readiness on theirs; viz.
his insisting, against the earnest remonstrances of the Imperial
Commissioners, backed by the intercession of the Russian and American
envoys, on the right of sending an ambassador to Pekin. But it was an
exception of that kind which is said to prove the rule; for the stipulation
was one which could not lead to abuses, and which would be conducive, as he
believed, in the highest decree to the true interests of both the
contracting parties. He was convinced that so long as the system of
entrusting the conduct of foreign affairs to a Provincial Government
endured, there could be no security for the maintenance of pacific
relations. On the one hand the Provincial Governors were entirely without
any sentiment of nationality, caring for nothing but the interests of their
own provinces: nor were they in a position to exercise any independence of
judgment, their lives and fortunes being absolutely at the disposal of a
jealous Government, so that it was generally their most prudent course to
allow any abuses to pass unnoticed rather than risk their heads by
reporting unwelcome truths. On the other Land the central Government, in
which alone a national feeling and an independent judgment were to be
looked for, was profoundly ignorant on all questions of foreign policy, and
must continue to be so as long as the Department for Foreign Affairs was
established in the provinces. For these reasons he regarded the principle
that a British minister might henceforth reside at Pekin, and hold direct
intercourse with imperial ministers at the capital, as being, of all the
concessions in the Treaty, the one pregnant with the most important
consequences.[2]
[Sidenote: to be kept in reserve.]
But, the right once secured, he was very desirous that it should be
exercised with all possible consideration for the long-cherished prejudices
of the Chinese on the subject, who looked forward with the utmost horror to
the invasion of their capital by foreign ministers, with, their wives and
establishments; these latter being, as it appeared, in their eyes more
formidable than the ministers themselves. Accordingly, when the Imperial
Commissioners addressed to him a very temperate and respectful
communication, urging that the exercise of the Treaty-right in question
would be of serious prejudice to China, mainly because, in the present
crisis of her domestic troubles it would tend to cause a loss of respect
for their Government in the minds of her subjects, he gladly forwarded
their memorial to the Government in England, supporting it with the strong
expression of his own opinion, that 'if Her Majesty's Ambassador should be
properly received at Pekin when the ratifications were exchanged next year,
it would be expedient that Her Majesty's Representative in China should be
instructed to choose a place of residence elsewhere than at Pekin, and to
make his visits either periodical, or only as frequent as the exigencies of
the public service might require.' With much shrewdness he pointed out that
the actual presence of a minister hi a place so uncongenial, especially
during the winter months, when the thermometer falls to 40° below zero,
might possibly be to the Mandarin mind less awe-inspiring than the
knowledge of the fact that he had the power to take up his abode there
whenever the conduct of the Chinese Government gave occasion; and that thus
the policy which he recommended would 'leave in the hands of Her Majesty's
Government, to be wielded at its will, a moral lever of the most powerful
description to secure the faithful observance of the Treaty in all time to
come.'
[Sidenote: Return southward.]
_At Sea, Gulf of Pecheli.--July 5th_.--At last I am actually off--on
my way home? May I hope that it is so? I got on Sunday the Emperor's
assent to the Treaty, in the form in which I required it; sent
immediately down to stop the troops, and set off myself on Tuesday at
noon for the Gulf. We sailed yesterday afternoon, with the intention,
if possible, of seeing the great Wall of China on our way to Shanghae,
but we have not been very successful, and have now put about, and are
moving southwards.... Frederick is going home with the Treaty, and I
proceed _via_ Japan....
_July 14th._--Frederick embarks to-night, and sails to-morrow morning
at four. I shall not know all that I lose, publicly and privately, by
his departure, till he is gone....
_Shanghae, Sunday, July 18th._--I have just returned from church. Such
an ordeal I never went through. If a benevolent lady, sitting behind
me, had not taken compassion on me, and handed me a fan, I think I
should have fainted.... Everyone says that the heat here surpasses
that felt anywhere else. They also affirm that this is an exceptional
season.
_July 19th._--Writing has been an almost impossible task during these
few last days. The only thing I have been able to do has been to find
a doorway, or some other place, through which a draught was making its
way, and to sit there reading.... In sending Frederick away, I have
cut off my right arm, but I think, on the whole, it was better that he
should take the Treaty home,... and of course he is better able than
anyone else to explain what has been the real state of affairs
here.... It is impossible to acknowledge too strongly the obligation I
am under to him for the way in which he has helped me in my
difficulties.
[Sidenote: Yeh]
_July 21st._--As for Yeh, I cannot say very much for him; but the
account given of him by the Captain of the 'Inflexible,' who took him
to Calcutta, differs as widely as possible from that of the _Times'_
Correspondent. He was very courteous and considerate, civil to
everybody, and giving no trouble. I suppose that there is no doubt of
the fact that he executed a vast number of rebels, and I, certainly,
who disapprove of all that sort of thing, am not going to defend that
proceeding. But it is fair to say that rebels are parricides by
Chinese law, and that, in so far as we can judge, nothing could have
been more brutal or more objectless than this Chinese rebellion. They
systematically murdered all--men, women, and children--of the dominant
race, and their supporters, on whom they could lay their hands.
Certain Americans and Europeans took them up at first because they
introduced a parody of some Christian doctrines into their
manifestoes. But these gentlemen are now, I think, heartily ashamed of
the sympathy which they gave them.
_July 26th._--I heard yesterday a good piece of news. The Emperor has
named my friends, the Imperial Commissioners, to come down here to
settle the tariff, &c. This, I think, proves that the Emperor has made
up his mind to accept the Treaty and carry it out. I hope also that it
will enable me to settle the Canton affair.
A few days later, finding that some weeks must elapse before the Imperial
Commissioners could arrive, he sailed for Nagasaki, in order to turn the
interval to account by endeavouring to negotiate a treaty with the Japanese
Government in accordance with the instructions which he had received when
leaving England.
[1] Those who remember the somewhat angry discussion which, arose
afterwards about this delay, its causes and its consequences, may be
struck with the fact that the subject is scarcely alluded to in any of
the extracts here given. The omission is intentional: Lord Elgin's
friends having no desire to rate up an extinct controversy which he
would have been the last to wish to see revived, and respecting which,
they have nothing to add to--as they have nothing to withdraw from--
what he himself stated in the House of Lords on February 21, 1860.
[2] Another article of the Treaty, though of less importance in
itself, has been brought by recent events into so much prominence that
it may be desirable to give in full the views of its author respecting
it. In his despatch of July 12, having mentioned, as one of the
principal commercial advantages obtained by British subjects, the
settlement of the vexed question of the transit duties, he proceeds:--
This subject presented considerable difficulty. As duties of octroi
are levied universally in China, on native as well as foreign
products, and as canals and roads are kept up at the expense of the
Government, it seemed to be unreasonable to require that articles,
whether of foreign or native production, by the simple process of
passing into the hands of foreigners, should become entitled to the
use of roads and canals toll-free, and should, moreover, be
relieved altogether from charges to which they would be liable if
the property of natives. On the other hand, experience had taught
us the inconvenience of leaving the amount of duties payable under
the head of transit-duties altogether undetermined. By requiring
the rates of transit-duty to be published at each port; and by
acquiring for the British subject the right to commute the said
duties for a payment of 2-1/2 per cent. on the value of his goods
(or rather, to speak more correctly, for the payment of a specific
duty calculated at that rate), I hope that I have provided for the
latter as effectual a guarantee against undue exactions on this head
as can be obtained without an entire subversion, of the financial
system of China.