reached the island of Amboina, where they besieged the Portuguese
fort there for two months, but were unable to take it. They made an
alliance with the natives before leaving against the Portuguese. The
Dutch fleet consisted of three vessels, and was sent out by the Dutch
East India Company for trading purposes.
The first expedition of Paul van Caerden (the Blancardo of the Spanish
accounts) occupied December 21, 1599--October 11, 1601, and was sent
out by the Nouvelle Compagnie des Brabançons. The fleet--four vessels
in all--left Holland in charge of Admiral Pierre Both. In their
company sailed four vessels of the old company, but they separated
almost immediately. They all went by way of the Cape of Good Hope. At
Bantam in Java two vessels of the four were sent, under command of van
Caerden, to trade for pepper. The two ships coasted the shore of the
island of Sumatra, stopping at various places, without much success,
on account of the tricks of the natives in their trade, until they
reached Achem in the northern part of the island. There they had
trouble with the natives which was instigated by a Portuguese priest,
and after seizing some pepper, which act they justified, returned
to Bantam in Java, where their cargo was completed. Van Caerden lost
twenty-seven men on this voyage, but brought back ten others who had
been held prisoners at Achem.
The second voyage of van Neck, or Nek (June 28, 1600--July 15, 1604),
followed, as the preceding expedition, the African route to Bantam,
where it met two Dutch vessels of the new trading company. The fleet of
six vessels had separated by common consent, October 10, 1600, in order
to facilitate their trade. Van Neck in the vessels with him, skirted
Celebes, and went to Ternate, where he was cordially received by the
natives. There the usual troubles with the Portuguese began, which
ended in an indecisive naval battle. Shortly after, the Dutch left for
China, leaving six men to watch their interests among the natives. "On
the nineteenth [of August] they anchored near the island of Coyo,
one of the Philippines. There they sent a small boat ashore. Its crew
learned that the inhabitants were savages, who paid tribute to the
Spaniards. On the twenty-second they anchored near another large island
of the Philippines, whose name cannot be found on the maps. It was
called Langhairs-eiland, or Longhair Island, because its inhabitants
wore their hair long, and hanging below the shoulders." September 20
they reached the Chinese coast, and on the twenty-seventh sighted "a
large city, built almost like Spanish cities," which they found to be
Macao. There unfortunate encounters with the Portuguese lost the Dutch
some men; and failing in their efforts there, they went to Patane,
where they traded some pepper. Thence the return voyage to Holland by
way of the Cape of Good Hope was made. The other three vessels of his
fleet arrived six weeks later. As consorts to van Neck's six vessels
two other vessels had left Holland on the same date, also sent by
the new trading company. After several mutinies they reached Sumatra,
whence after troubles with the king of Achem, the two vessels left,
leaving twelve of their men prisoners. The efforts of the latter to
escape were fruitless and even the efforts (in 1602) of one of the
vessels of Admiral Heemskerk, commander of a Dutch trading fleet,
were unable to rescue the prisoners.
April 5, 1601, a Dutch fleet of five vessels, under Wolphart Harmansan,
set out with another fleet under Jaques van Heemskerk. On May 8, the
two fleets separated, the former reaching the Bantam channel December
26, 1601. Several naval encounters with the Portuguese fleet under
Andrea Furtado de Mendoza resulted in partial victory for the Dutch,
who, after refitting at Bantam, took their course through the Moluccas,
and then returned to Bantam and Holland, reaching that country,
April 4, 1603.
Georges Spilberg left Holland May 5, 1601, with three vessels. Rounding
the cape, he cruised along until reaching Ceylon, whence he went
to Sumatra in September of 1602. At Sumatra he joined some English
vessels, and all remained together, and opposed the Portuguese. April
3, 1603, the Dutch and English left Sumatra and went to Java. At Bantam
they were joined by Admiral Wybrant Waarwyk with nine vessels. On June
30, Admiral Heemskerk anchored at the same place with a Portuguese
prize. After effecting their trade, the vessels returned to Holland,
and Spilberg reached that country May 24, 1604.
Corneille de Veen, in command of nine vessels, sailed from Holland
June 17, 1602, and was joined at sea by three others. April 15, 1603,
Sumatra was sighted, and the fleet anchored at Bantam in Java on the
twenty-ninth. Thence part of the fleet sailed for China. The fleet
captured near Macao a Portuguese vessel richly laden. They also
fought with a Siamese vessel, mistaking it for an enemy. Leaving
Bantam finally on their homeward trip, on January 27, 1604, they
reached Holland the thirtieth of August.
The expedition under Wybrandt van Waarwyk marked a new progression
in Dutch trading in Eastern seas. His expedition established
Bantam in Java more fully as the chief Dutch trading-post and
base of supplies. The number of vessels at his command (fifteen)
enabled him to despatch them in different directions to pursue their
trade. The hostility to, and competition with, the Portuguese became
more marked, and the entrance into India (through Ceylon), Siam,
and China, more pronounced. This expedition left Holland July 17,
1602, being joined on the nineteenth by other vessels. Near the
Cape of Good Hope three vessels separated with orders to proceed
directly to Achem in Sumatra. At that place they met three vessels,
which had left Holland May 30, 1602, and whose commander Sebald de
Weert received commission from Waarwyk as vice-admiral of the six
vessels. After negotiations at Achem, the six vessels established
relations and promised assistance against the Portuguese, in Ceylon,
but they almost ended by the massacre of the vice-admiral and a number
of his men. Engagements with the Portuguese through these seas,
and more or less successful attempts at trading and establishing
themselves marked the progress of these vessels, until the return of
three of them to Holland in the latter part of 1604. The main body of
the fleet had experiences about similar to the above vessels, singly
and in company, cruising through the East Indian seas, trading for
pepper, cinnamon, silks, and other products. The Moluccas and the
Philippines were generally given a wide berth, the Dutch seeking to
establish themselves fully on portions of the mainland and in Sumatra
and Java. François Wittert, who was later commander of a fleet, was
made chief commissary at Bantam and given detailed instructions. The
admiral finally reached Holland June 4, 1607, with several vessels.
The expedition in charge of Etienne van der Hagen (or Haagen), that
set out from Holland late in 1603 and early in 1604, had also decisive
results that more completely established the Dutch power in the East
Indies. This expedition was destined to come more intimately in contact
with the Portuguese and Spaniards than any former expedition. From
this time and even before, the Dutch expeditions overlapped, and
Dutch vessels in the Eastern seas were by no means rare. This fleet
(the second voyage of van der Hagen) comprised twelve vessels and
twelve hundred men. Its course was by way of Goa, Calicut, Cochin,
and Ceylon, to Sumatra and Java, reaching the post at Bantam December
31, 1604. There, shortly after, some English vessels were met. On
January 17, 1605, the principal vessels of the fleet left for the
Moluccas. February 21, they anchored at Amboina, where they were about
to storm the Portuguese fort, when the commander capitulated. "After
several conferences between the Portuguese commander's deputies
and the admiral, it was resolved that all the unmarried Portuguese
should retire, and that those married could be free to remain, if
they took the oath of allegiance to the States-general and to Prince
Maurice. Each one was allowed to take his gun or musket, but all
the cannon, ammunition, and arms of the king were to remain in the
fort." The admiral and fifty men went to the captured fort, where
they ran up the Dutch colors. The fort and island had contained six
hundred Portuguese. Forty-six Portuguese families remained and took
the oath. "This victory was considerable, not only because of its
slight cost, no blood having been shed, but because this place and
this island were of great importance." Thence five Dutch vessels went
to Tidore, where the Portuguese lost two vessels in a sea fight. Then
the Portuguese fort was attacked, which was taken May 19, 1605, with
a loss of two Dutchmen and seventy-three Portuguese. The Portuguese,
five hundred in number, took the boats offered them and set out for
the Philippines. "By this last victory, the Portuguese were driven
from all the Moluccas, and had nothing more there, except a small
fort in the island of Soler, near Timer." The conquered fort was
destroyed. Meanwhile other vessels of the fleet cruised about Sumatra,
Java, Malacca, and neighboring places, trading and seeking to check
the Portuguese. Shortly after June of 1607, the Spaniards, two hundred
and fifty in number, attacked one of the Dutch and Ternatan forts,
but were repulsed. On the desertion of the Tidore fort by the Dutch,
seven hundred Spaniards returned to it. Thus the Dutch continued to
strengthen their hold throughout the Indies.
The expedition under command of Admiral Corneille Matelief (1605-1608)
was remarkable chiefly for its siege of Malacca, and later its
manipulations in the Moluccas and in China. The fleet was composed of
eleven vessels and one thousand three hundred and fifty-seven men,
and cost 1,952,282 livres. Great trouble was experienced by the
admiral in the intoxication and excesses of his men, which led to
insubordination, during the entire course of the expedition. Also in
all parts he met a great unwillingness among the natives for work and
the coming to definite conclusions, the latter exercising duplicity
and at times treachery in their dealings with the Dutch. On March
22, 1606, the fleet sighted Sumatra, after hearing of the successes
in Amboina and Tidore. Going to the mainland they made agreements
or treaties with the king of Johore, clause ten of which reads:
"Neither of the two parties shall make peace with the king of Spain,
without the consent of the other." The succeeding siege of Malacca
resulted in failure, and on August 24, 1606, the Dutch retired after
losing two of their ships. The Portuguese were in charge of Andrea
Furtado de Mendoza. On the return of the Dutch to Sumatra and Java,
they met the great Portuguese fleet consisting of eighteen galleons,
four galleys, one caravel, and twenty-three fustas, with over three
thousand men--the largest fleet ever seen in the Indias--and in
the combat captured and destroyed four galleons, although with
some considerable loss to themselves. The Portuguese prisoners
taken formed lengthy material for debates between the Portuguese
and Dutch. On December 6, 1606, the admiral determined to go to the
Moluccas with six vessels, and to send the others to Achem to load
cargo for Holland. Reaching those islands after anchoring at Bantam,
the Dutch negotiated with the natives for their aid against the
Spaniards garrisoned in Ternate and Tidore. At Amboina, the admiral
"learned that the soldiers of the garrison were living there in great
debauchery, and that they became intoxicated, and nearly every man had
his concubine. On that account the inhabitants were greatly shocked
and were losing all their affection for the Dutch. They said that the
Portuguese married women among them, by which the two nations were
united. But since there were no marriages with the Dutch, the two races
could not be bound by affection." Besides the natives wished settlers
and not new men continually, whom they did not know. In consequence
the Dutch were permitted to marry the native women. Skirmishes with
the Spaniards resulted in little gain for the Dutch, and finally the
fleet sailed for China, after passing among a few of the Philippines,
where they entered into various relations and had various adventures,
trying ever to establish a fixed trade. Thence the vessels went in
different directions and on different missions toward the Dutch base
at Bantam. At Bantam Admiral Paul van Caerden anchored on January 5,
1608, to whom Matelief communicated the necessity of first attending
to Molucca affairs, giving him also information and advice concerning
those islands and the Dutch and Spaniards there. Shortly after Admiral
Matelief returned to Holland, where he anchored on September 2,
1608. Admiral Matelief drew up while on this expedition a good résumé
of Dutch aspirations in the East Indies that shows the compelling
motive in their expeditions thither. This memorial is as follows.
* * * * *
Memoir by Admiral C. Matelief, on the subject of the condition and
the commerce of the Indies
When I consider the condition of our country, and the wars that afflict
it, on the part of an enemy so powerful as Albert of Austria, who
is sustained by the house of Austria, and by his own house of Spain,
it seems to me that one cannot be more assured of the prosperity of
affairs in the Indias, than by leaving them solely in the hands of
the directors [of the trading company].
The Spaniards and the Portuguese are our adversaries. More than a
century ago they began to establish themselves there. They have gained
an entrance into several countries, where they have fortresses, many
men, and an established government. Consequently they are enabled to
attend to their business with greater certainty and by more convenient
methods than we, for we have to bring men from Holland, who become
weakened by the fatigues of the voyage, while the subjects of the
Portuguese, who live in the country, are fresh and full of health.
For, although the Portuguese have an insufficient number of men in
the Indias, to attend to all matters that arise, and at the same
time defend themselves against our nation, they can send men there
much easier than we. Vessels from Portugal are obliged to go only as
far as Goa, where their men disembark and rest. Then they form their
fleets from them; and the other Spaniards who come from the Manilles
do the same.
If, then, we would also establish ourselves advantageously and solidly
in the Indias, we must necessarily have some station, where we may
be received and free, on our arrival from Holland. This would be the
means of great profits. Refreshments could be found there ready for the
crews and for the vessels. That would increase our reputation among the
Indian princes, who as yet have not dared repose entire confidence in
us. The natives are sufficiently convinced that the Dutch are a good
race, and more gentle and tractable than the Spaniards. "But," they
say, "what good does that do us? The Dutch come here in passing, and
only while on their journey. As soon as their vessels are laden, they
return. After that we are abandoned to the Spaniards and Portuguese,
against whom we are powerless to defend ourselves. They come to pounce
upon us, because we have traded with the Dutch, their enemies. On the
other hand, if we attach ourselves to the Spanish, they, at least,
protect us in our needs. On the contrary, although the Dutch should
come with forces sufficient to protect us, we fear nothing from
them; they do not treat us as enemies. Even though we trade with the
Portuguese, the Dutch allow us to live quietly, and we have only to
be careful of those who molest us. Consequently our best plan is to
favor the Portuguese, lest they annihilate us."
Such are the reflections of all the Indians. Besides the Portuguese do
their best to persuade them that we have no forces, that we are but
a rabble, who scarcely have fixed habitations in our own country,
and quite far from being able to make lasting settlements in the
Indias. As for them, they are established there with men who wish to
live there. Therefore it is necessary for us to seek means by which
to gain the Indians, and make them understand that we have forces,
and wish also to become established among them. If not, one must
recognize that our affairs will prosper ill.
The commerce of the Indias consists chiefly: 1. In pepper, which
is loaded at Bantam, Jahor, Patane, Queda, and Achin; 2. in cloves,
which are loaded at Amboina and the Moluccas; 3. in nutmeg and mace,
or the rind of the nutmeg, which are loaded at Banda; 4. in the
commerce of Cambaie; 5. in the commerce of the Coromandel coast;
6. in the commerce of both the Chinese and Japanese coasts.
If the commerce of each of these is not managed by one nation, whether
the Portuguese or others, it will happen that one will destroy the
other. It will cause the price of merchandise in the Indias to advance,
and a low price will be paid for them in Europe.
However, in regard to pepper, it is impossible for us to get the
commerce all to ourselves; for, besides the Portuguese, the English
have also undertaken the navigation to Bantam. They have their
trading-posts and houses, and are trading there peacefully, while we
are at war against the Portuguese. We defend Bantam and the English
together, while they enjoy there the profits that cost them neither
defenses, blood, nor any annoyance.
[The king of Bantam is too young to negotiate with, and too much
money would be spent uselessly. For the natives throughout the Indies
would not hesitate to violate any treaty in any peril or to their
own profit.]
Besides we are at peace with the English, and it would be unjust to
try to find means to exclude them from a commerce which they have
already commenced. But measures can easily be taken to prevent them
from entering into the commerce of other spices. In regard to pepper,
we would have to make it serve as a ballast. By this means we could
give it so cheaply that the other nations, finding scarcely any profit
in it longer, would be obliged to cease trading in it themselves,
without counting on our part our profits from the other merchandise.
For, according to my opinion, we could easily attract all the commerce
of nutmegs and mace. For this purpose, instead of seizing Banda,
and building a fort there, which would cost considerable, and give
us a bad reputation among the Indian princes, the following is what
I think that we should do.
As the king of Macassar is a powerful prince, whose country is densely
populated, and well supplied with rice and all manner of food; and as
he furnishes them to Malacca and Banda: it would be necessary to make
a treaty with him, and to send him three vessels with two hundred men
for his country. This number, together with the Macassar men, would be
sufficient to attack Banda, and we would promise the king to deliver
it into his hands, without claiming any recompense for this aid,
except that no other nation but our own could load merchandise there,
and that the nutmegs and mace would be taken annually at a fixed price,
namely, at the selling price at the time of the expedition.
[Matelief is certain that the king of Macassar will acquiesce,
and would also probably be willing to build a trading-house for
the Dutch. Other conditions for the security of Banda might also be
imposed in the treaty.]
Of the clove-trade, it is very difficult for us to render ourselves
masters. We have the product of Amboina, Luho, and Cambelo; but not
that yielded by the Moluccas. The only means of obtaining it is to
drive the Spaniards from Ternate, and it can easily be imagined that
the task is not easy. However I shall not hesitate to write here my
thought concerning the matter.
The thing does not appear impossible to me, if one wishes to build on a
firm foundation. This would require a return to the Malacca affair. For
had the Portuguese lost Malacca, they could not easily go from Goa to
reënforce the Moluccas; and I do not think there would be much trouble
in preventing the sending of supplies to Ternate from the Manilles.
First, we should have to send three or four vessels to the king of
Mindanao, whose country is densely inhabited, and who, as report
runs, can launch fifty caracoas. All this fleet would go to Panama or
Panati [i.e., Panay] which is near the Manilles, and where there is
a place named Otting [i.e., Oton], guarded by but eighteen Spanish
soldiers with about the same number of other inhabitants, so that
in all there are but forty whites. This place would be destroyed,
or if the blacks of Mindanao wished to keep it, it would be given
them, for it is a country abounding in rice and several other foods,
which are transported to Ternate.
Thence I would suggest going directly to the Manilles to destroy
all the vessels in their ports, so that they could not aid
Ternate. Immediately a vessel of one hundred and sixty or two hundred
tons would be sent back to Mindanao, which would cross with the king's
caracoas to the strait of Tagima, to capture the vessels that should
try still to go to Ternate, because there is no other route. After
capturing one or two of them, no other vessels would dare to try it,
so that Ternate would perish from famine. For did we try at present
to overpower the island by force, I believe that the Spaniards could
fortify it so strongly, and have so many men there, that large armies
would be required to drive them out.
It would be difficult for them to provide Ternate with cloth, for the
little taken there now is brought by the Chinese to the Manilles. This
want of cloth would not fail to trouble the inhabitants, and it would
have to be sent from Malacca, and that could not be done easily. If
a galley could also be taken to Ternate, it would greatly annoy the
Spaniards....
The commerce of China depends moreover upon Malacca. If the Portuguese
were driven from that place, the Chinese would have to give up that
traffic....
The commerce of cotton stuffs at Coromandel is of great importance,
for all the inhabitants of the Indias dress in those stuffs, and must
have them at any price. There are different styles for each nation,
according to their taste, and they make them so in different places
... If Malacca were taken from the Portuguese, they would have no
further favorable opportunity for the trade in cloth....
If no means are found to besiege Malacca again, the Portuguese might
make use of their fustas to hinder our trade with Coromandel. For,
since this entire coast is low, and the fustas draw but little
water, they could always station themselves between the shore and our
vessels. Besides it is very dangerous for vessels to anchor there. If
the enemy is spry, he could carry the news to Goa in one week, whence
they could easily despatch their fleets against us.
It is certain that, if the Portuguese could be driven from Malacca,
they would have to renounce trade on the Coromandel coast; for
they would have no safe course, should they wish to get cloth,
and they could gain nothing, for the expense would overbalance the
profit. Consequently, I believe that all the commerce of the Portuguese
in the East Indies depends on Malacca, and that, in order to cut it,
one must take that place.
After that, there is no doubt that the inhabitants of Bantam would
not be reasonable, when they would see us in fixed establishments,
and would understand that since the English had no other commerce in
the Indias than that of pepper, they would not care to make frequent
voyages, or great expenses. The pepper of Jambeo, Andragyri, and
other points, that is taken to Bantam, would be taken to Malacca,
where, also, cloth for the return cargo would be found.
I have not learned whether the Portuguese have any strength at
Bengale. All whom I have heard speak of that country say that a good
commerce can be obtained there....