One was struck by the remarkable unity that characterized the short
first period of the Russian Revolution of last March. One knew, however,
that there were two distinct sets of forces behind the movement,
operating through two kinds of organizations. There were first the
already existing and parliamentary institutions which had become
revolutionary in spirit and methods of action. On the other hand there
were the institutions produced by the revolution itself, emerging from
the chaos in the midst of which the other, already functioning bodies,
were trying to take a new and directing line. The most prominent of the
first type of institution was the Duma, the legislative parliament
of the old regime, and of the second type, the Petrograd Council of
Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies.
The Duma, however, was only one of several legal institutions that had
developed under the old regime, and represented the first stages of
parliamentary, popular government. There were the local provincial and
municipal councils, and also the officially recognized war-industry
committees, which had come to have semi-governmental functions.
Finally one could bring under this category, with a little forcing, the
cooperative societies, which had assumed enormous importance during the
two and a half years of war.
In these institutions we had self-government, and participation in
public affairs, and also the idea of cooperation between the various
classes and political tendencies--the idea of coalition. The election
law of the Duma provided for the representation of all group interests
of the community, and representation by an actual member of the group,
by a _bona fide_ peasant in the case of the peasantry. The seats in the
assembly were distributed specifically to landlords, manufacturers,
the smaller bourgeoisie, workmen, and peasants. The election law of the
local government bodies made similar provision for group representation.
On the war-industry committees, the workmen had elected representatives,
sitting with the representatives of the manufacturers and owners. In the
cooeperative movement the bourgeois-intellectual element had taken the
initiative, but had always emphasized the direct participation of the
workmen and peasants in the actual management of the societies, as the
theory of the movement demanded.
Thus the broader democratic classes of the country, the workmen and
peasants, were represented in the somewhat popular institutions that had
developed under the old regime. But the actual control was in the hands
of the less democratic elements--the landlords, the manufacturers, men
of the liberal professions, and of the so-called Intelligentsia class.
Most of these men were of liberal and democratic tendencies, but
they were in actual fact, as compared with the broader masses, of
the privileged classes. They had emphasized always the essentially
democratic character of the activity of the institutions in which
they were the leaders. They put particular stress on the fact that the
activities of the local provincial councils, for example, were
directed mainly toward the amelioration of conditions of life among the
peasantry. But the fact that the control over these institutions, even
in the cooperative movement (so far as independent control was
allowed by the bureaucracy of the old regime), was secured to the
less democratic elements of the community, did contradict the idea of
coalition, of the bringing together of all interests and forces. These
institutions had been permitted to exist and develop only because
they were controlled by the more conservative groups. The cooperative
societies represented more truly the idea of coalition. Here in the
cooperative movement the leaders of political liberalism had always
noted with relief that one was gradually attaining the end toward
which they knew they must work--the organic union between the so-called
Intelligentsia, and the "people," meaning the broader, democratic
classes.
When the anarchy resulting from the incompetence, stupidity and perhaps
treason of the old bureaucracy reached such an acute stage in the first
weeks of March that the leaders of the Russian public saw that some
action must be taken by some one, it was the Duma that assumed the
initiative, acting in a revolutionary manner, through an executive
committee. The municipal and provincial councils, organized in unions
for war-work, and the war-industry committees, turned without delay to
the revolutionary parliament, in which many of their leading workers
were members. The leaders of the cooeperative movement could not act with
such rapidity and precision. They had not been permitted to organize a
central committee, to coordinate the work of the thousands of small
and scattered societies. These first leaders of the revolution felt
justified in taking the initiative because they alone were organized.
Also they thought they could speak in the name of all classes, including
the most democratic, because the institutions through which they acted
did include representatives of all classes. To emphasize its special
anxiety that the more democratic groups feel their direct participation
in the movement of which it had taken the leadership, the Executive
Committee of the Duma not only accepted but encouraged the development
of the revolutionary institutions of the second category, of which the
first to emerge was the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
Deputies.
This Council was organized during the very first days of the revolution;
it was in fact the resurrection of a revolutionary body of the 1905
revolution. The Duma invited the Council to share its own convenient
quarters. Perhaps the invitation was an afterthought, for the workmen
and soldiers of Petrograd in revolt had gravitated toward the Duma,
had calmly entered and taken possession of the large corridors of the
palace. The Council was a strictly revolutionary, and a very democratic
body, composed of directly elected delegates from the factories and
garrison regiments of Petrograd. It immediately became the organizing
center for what came to be called the "revolutionary democracy," as
opposed to the "bourgeoisie."
The Executive Committee of the Duma consulted with the Council of
Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies on the composition of the proposed
Provisional Government, and on the political program to be announced.
For as we saw, it was the first thought of these leaders to secure
unity of action. They recognized that the Council did in fact represent
"revolutionary democracy," at least of Petrograd. As the workmen and
soldiers of Petrograd were completely out of hand, armed and fighting
on the streets, arresting officers, ministers and police, and showing a
tendency to start general and anarchic pillaging, the Duma leaders saw a
restraining authority in the Council of these same workmen and soldiers.
They therefore either did not wish, or did not dare, to object at the
time to the famous order No. 1 to the garrison of Petrograd, issued by
the Council, and not by the Executive Committee of the Duma. Many have
claimed that this particular order, which was extended to the front,
was responsible for the later demoralization of the whole Russian army.
Others, the leaders of revolutionary democracy, have insisted that this
order prevented the immediate and complete collapse of the whole army.
In preparing the slate for the new government, the Executive Committee
of the Duma selected one of the presiding officers of the Council,
Kerensky. When Miliukov, the Duma leader, announced the composition of
the new provisional government to the crowd, composed largely of workmen
and soldiers gathered in the main corridors of the Duma, he emphasized
the cooperation between Duma and Council, the consent of Kerensky to
enter the government, and also the fact that most of the members of the
new government had worked in and through institutions, in which peasants
and workmen also had been represented.
Though the word "coalition" was not used during the first weeks of the
revolution, one had constantly in mind the idea of "bringing together
all the vital forces of the country." In this last expression I quote
one of the first and most emphasized slogans of the revolution. But the
problem proved most difficult, complicated by the fact that one had to
solve at one and the same time two most stupendous tasks. One had to
consolidate the conquests of the revolution, and also prosecute the
war. The prosecution of the war required the acceptance of a strong
authority, vested in the Provisional Government. But naturally the
first aim of the revolution was to extend its ideas to the rest of the
country, for the actual overthrow of the old order had been largely
the work of Petrograd. The two tasks were closely associated with one
another, because one could not reorganize the country for the war until
the new ideas had taken root.
The first parliamentary leaders wished to use as the basis for carrying
out both tasks the old institutions, the municipal and provincial
councils, and the cooeperative societies, at the same time taking steps
gradually to democratize them. But the strictly revolutionary leaders
wished to democratize immediately, and put this forward as the first
object to be accomplished. So they demanded and promoted the organizing
of revolutionary democracy all over the country, through councils
of workmen, soldiers, and peasants, through army committees, land
committees, professional unions, and so forth. The champions of this
immediate democratization policy were almost exclusively members of the
various socialist parties, some of them representing the most extreme
views. The majority of them were not consciously striving to undermine
the authority of the Provisional Government. They recognized and in fact
advocated the compromise represented in the first group of leaders.
They trusted most of them, but wished at the same time to organize
revolutionary democracy, for self-protection for the moment, and perhaps
for self-assertion at a later date. But a minority of the socialist
leaders did not take this constructive line. From the very start they
professed to distrust the first Provisional Government, for they did
not believe in "coalition"--the co-operation between the various group
interests of the community. Their theory was that of class struggle;
they proclaimed this to be their aim, and worked to give to the
revolution this character. Though a minority, they were a very active
and energetic group, and tended to give the tone in the meetings and
resolutions of revolutionary democracy, thus dulling the spirit of
cooperation, which characterized the first period of the revolution.
The extremists wished a social revolution, "permanent revolution," class
struggle, and they agitated openly and with energy. The workmen and
soldiers of Petrograd had borne the brunt of the physical side of the
revolution. Only workmen and soldiers had been killed fighting for
the revolution during that first week. These particular groups were
therefore proclaimed the "pride and flower of the revolution," and
told that they must establish the dictatorship of the proletariat,
thus consolidating the conquests of the revolution, which should not be
allowed to remain a mere bourgeois affair.
The moderate, constructive socialists did not accept this extreme view,
but they nevertheless recognized the need for an effective organization
of revolutionary democracy all over the country, to ensure the adoption
of truly democratic policies. So they also set about to strengthen and
extend the councils and committees that had emerged with the revolution,
coordinating them in conferences and formal congresses. Much of the
activity along these lines was in fact of a constructive character.
But class and party considerations were always in the foreground at all
these congresses. Also the constructive socialists did not accept the
idea of a formal coalition at the beginning. They did not participate as
organizations in the first government. Kerensky was a socialist, but
he entered the first government as a member of the Duma, and not as the
representative of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies.
The resolution of a conference of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
Deputies, called during the fourth week of the revolution, summarizes
the attitude of revolutionary democracy toward the problem of the
moment. The full text of the resolution, given in a literal translation
to preserve as far as possible the style of the original, is an
interesting document:
"Whereas the Provisional Government, that was brought into power by the
overthrow of the autocracy, represents the interests of the liberal and
democratic bourgeoisie, but shows a tendency to follow the right line,
in the declaration published by it in agreement with the representatives
of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, therefore the
all-Russian Conference of Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies,
while insisting on the need of constant pressure being brought to
bear on the Provisional Government to arouse it to the most energetic
struggle with the counter-revolutionary forces, and to decisive measures
in the direction of an immediate democratization of the entire Russian
life, nevertheless recognizes that political expediency dictates support
of the Provisional Government by the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
Deputies _so long_ as the Provisional Government, in agreement with the
Council, moves inflexibly toward the consolidation of the conquests of
the revolution and the extension of these conquests."
The expression "so long as," emphasized in the translation of the
resolution, has been one of the most far-reaching of the formulae
produced by the revolution. Around this phrase has centered the struggle
of these last months. The extremists decided from the very start that
the condition had not been fulfilled. The more moderate socialists took
an attitude of constant watchfulness, and latent distrust.
"Revolutionary Democracy" could not be organized in a week or a
month, so for the first period it was represented by the revolutionary
democracy of Petrograd, through the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and
Soldiers' Deputies, supplemented by delegates from similar councils of
other cities, and by representatives from the army at the front. It was
more difficult to organize the peasants scattered through the country,
and not concentrated in barracks or factories. The workmen and soldiers
of Petrograd therefore assumed to represent all revolutionary democracy,
and they had the physical force behind them. They were there on the
spot, at the administrative and political center inherited from the
old regime, ready to act without delay when they decided that the
Provisional Government should no longer be supported. And the workmen
and soldiers of Petrograd were being won over gradually to the
extremists, the Bolsheviki.
As the Provisional Government was aiming first of all to preserve
social peace, adopting a policy of conciliation, it did not oppose the
supervision exercised by the Council. In fact it realized that only
recognition of such supervision would ensure any measure of common
action. The Duma committee had been asked to efface itself, for as
an institution of the old regime it aroused the suspicions of the
revolutionary bodies. The efficiency of the local government bodies was
sacrificed to the idea of immediate democratization. The establishment
of revolutionary committees all over the country, and in the army even,
was countenanced and accepted, though perhaps only because it was seen
that it could not be prevented except by repressive measures, to which
the first leaders were unwilling to resort. Perhaps also the latter
realized that physical force was not on their side.
The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies acted on the principle
of a direct mandate from the whole people. It issued orders to
revolutionary democracy, as we saw. It insisted on the exercise of a
real control, even on the right to countersign, as it were, some of the
orders of the Provisional Government. Then it definitely questioned the
policy and measures of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister
of War. When these two men were forced to resign, the other members
of the government demanded that revolutionary democracy share in the
responsibility of government, if it insisted on such a measure of
control. The Councils at first refused, but later agreed, and a frankly
and officially recognized coalition government was formed. Socialists
entered the government not only as members of their respective parties,
but as representatives of revolutionary democracy organized in the
Councils, which now contained delegates from the peasantry, hurriedly
brought in by a somewhat artificial system of representation.
The first Coalition Government drew up a program of policy. As this
program was somewhat vaguely worded, coalition in the strict and true
sense of the word was not secured. The socialists had entered the
coalition under pressure, as we saw. Some of them felt called upon to
justify the step in a statement, later discovered and made public, to
socialists of other countries. In the statement they explained that they
had entered the government, in order to "deepen and extend the class
struggle." And this is what some of them did actually start in to do,
using their authority and powers as ministers to turn the organs of
revolutionary democracy in this direction, promoting suspicion of and
antagonism toward the bourgeoisie. The socialist ministers also held
themselves directly responsible to the Councils. Finally the socialist
members of the government tried to force immediate decisions on
questions of a fundamental nature, which should be decided only by the
Constituent Assembly, thus not adhering to the program drawn up as the
basis for the coalition. The position of the non-socialist members of
the government therefore became untenable, and a whole group of them
resigned.
The resignation of the most influential bourgeois group of the first
Coalition Government coincided quite accidentally with an armed uprising
which the extremists, the Bolsheviki, had been planning for several
weeks. For the extremists were again putting forward their demand,
this time supported by armed force, that all the "capitalist" ministers
resign, and that all authority pass into the hands of the Councils. But
the Councils refused to take over authority, the constructive majority
replying that they would not accept the responsibility. In their
judgment only a government representing all the vital forces of the
country, that is a coalition government, could succeed. The moderate
socialists prevailed in the Councils, and a second coalition was formed,
this time under the presidency of a socialist, Kerensky. Some
weeks elapsed before the new government was finally organized. The
non-socialist groups were willing to enter a coalition government led
by a socialist, but only on a definite program, which would exclude all
fundamental legislation. Objection was raised also to certain individual
socialists, whose record in the first coalition government made one
doubt their willingness to adhere honestly to any coalition program.
This objection was withdrawn later; but the non-socialists gave
only their second-best men as members of the new government. The
non-socialists also had demanded that the Provisional Government be
absolutely independent, its members not responsible to any councils or
party committees. For the Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies
were as we saw exclusively socialistic, and had become mere party
bodies.
In the meantime the democratization of local government bodies was
going on apace, and very successfully in view of the chaotic conditions
produced by revolution and war. As the new local municipal and
provincial councils, elected by universal suffrage, began to convene,
the revolutionary committees and councils were expected gradually to
disappear. The elections for the Constituent Assembly were to take place
as soon as the new local governing bodies could verify and correct the
lists of voters. The Constituent Assembly was to replace definitely not
only all revolutionary councils and committees, but also the Duma,
which continued to exist legally, though without functioning. The
main objective of the constructive elements was to hold the situation
together until the Constituent Assembly could be convened; the date had
been advanced, even at a sacrifice of regularity in election procedure.
And a coalition government seemed to be the only possible solution,
despite the difficulties already encountered in applying the principle.
The councils, the land committees and the other organizations that had
come into existence with and in the course of the revolution were, as we
saw, almost exclusively socialist in their political affiliations.
This was true even of the peasant congresses, though it was generally
admitted that the bulk of the peasantry was not consciously socialistic.
Of all the revolutionary bodies the peasant councils were clearly the
least representative. This was particularly true of the first alleged
all-Russian Peasant Congress. The peasantry, the great mass of the
population, became articulate very slowly. The non-socialist groups were
striving to bring about a more true expression of peasant views;
and their moderate program was making headway, though they found
it difficult to compete with the extremists, who made most generous
promises. But the non-socialist groups were beginning to take a
stronger line, as they saw the experiments of the extremists lead to
disillusionment. They proposed to organize councils and congresses of
the non-socialist elements. This project was immediately branded as
counter-revolutionary by "revolutionary democracy." Perhaps to ward off
the contemplated move of the non-socialists, Kerensky issued a general
invitation for a state conference at Moscow of all parties, groups,
and organizations, at which the opinions of all could be expressed,
presumably for the guidance of the Coalition Government.
The Moscow Conference did in fact give to all organizations, Duma,
Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, the recently elected
local-government bodies, cooeperative and professional unions, in
fact every group, socialist and non-socialist, revolutionary and
pre-revolutionary institutions, the opportunity to express views.
The speeches did perhaps help the Coalition Government to sense the
situation with which it had to deal, though the Conference showed that
the Coalition Government was unstable, and that the extreme ideas of
the Bolsheviki had penetrated deeply in the broader masses. Again
the Bolsheviki attacked the principle of coalition, and demanded that
revolutionary democracy take over all authority.
Then came the Kornilov affair, which in its conception was an effort on
the part of the constructive groups, including the moderate socialists,
to discredit the extremists, and establish a stronger government, free
from party ties and party programs, representing a national movement
to organize "all the vital forces of the country," to use again the
phraseology of the revolution. But there was a misunderstanding, and
also perhaps it was premature--"revolutionary democracy" was not yet
sufficiently sobered to accept a program of common constructive effort.
The movement had the opposite effect; it split the country into two
openly hostile camps, and brought revolutionary democracy still more
under the influence of the extremists. The Coalition Government fell to
pieces, and a Directorate of Five, with almost dictatorial powers, still
headed by Kerensky, assumed authority.
The Bolsheviki now demanded the absolute and final renunciation of
the principle of coalition, and the formation of a purely socialistic
government. Kerensky and the constructive socialists refused to
participate in such a government, and opened negotiations with the
non-socialist leaders, to attempt once more the coalition form of
government. The extremists then sent out a call to "revolutionary
democracy" to meet in another conference, which they called a Democratic
Conference, as opposed to the State Conference of Moscow. They declared
that no bourgeois, counter-revolutionary group would be admitted to
the conference. Kerensky allowed the conference to meet. It passed
contradictory resolutions, first voting against the principle of a
coalition form of government, but later seeming to advocate and support
this principle. The moderate socialists fought hard for the coalition
idea, and Kerensky and his followers seemed at last to have won out. In
any case, at the beginning of October, Kerensky formed a third coalition
government, and convened a preliminary parliament in which all parties
were represented. This time a definitely outlined program, as the basis
for cooeperation, was accepted by the socialists, which made it possible
for the non-socialists to give their best men to the new combination.
The Provisional Government of October 8, at least the fifth since the
revolution, and the third Coalition Government, unquestionably brought
together the strongest and most representative group of men since the
revolution. The Bolsheviki declared their intention to break it up as
quickly as possible, and there was not much optimism in non-socialist
circles; one felt that it would not survive many weeks. But this third
Coalition Government gave a greater promise of success than any previous
attempt. There was hope that it would last, and hold the situation
together, at least until the Constituent Assembly could meet.
This hope was not realized, as we know, and the break-up of the
government came within a month, when the Bolsheviki at last accomplished
their long-planned armed uprising, and by force established what they
called the dictatorship of the proletariat. Acting on the very eve of
the opening of the Constituent Assembly, the elections for which were
already in progress, the Bolsheviki showed clearly their contempt for a
really national, popular form of government. The Bolshevik uprising was
followed by civil war. But this was the aim of the extremists, for they
were against social peace, cooperation, coalition, and were striving for
class war.
Until this last month the Russian Revolution, though marked by extreme
antagonisms, and much wrangling, was nevertheless comparatively peaceful
in character. There was no extensive violence, such as would justify
the use of the term "civil war." It was to avoid civil war that such
constant, and on the whole honest, efforts were made to "unite all
the vital forces of the country." For it was seen that civil war would
perhaps ruin the revolution, and in any case would eliminate Russia as
a factor in the war, and the constructive leaders constantly emphasized
that on the successful outcome of the war depended also the success of
the revolution. But the efforts of the more constructive and moderate
groups failed. This very short outline of the attempts to solve the
problems with which revolutionary Russia was confronted by applying the
principle of coalition gives an interpretation of the recent events in
Russia from another angle. In any case one has tried to point out the
forces in conflict during these last months, perhaps suggesting one of
many possible issues from the present chaos.