"... It is truly horrible to reduce human beings to the

condition of cattle, to breed them, to sell them, and

otherwise dispose of them, as cattle. But is it defending

such practices to say that the South does none of these

things, but that on the contrary, both in theory and in

practice, she treats the negro as a fellow-creature, with a

soul to be saved, with feelings to be respected, though in

the social order in a subordinate place, and of an

intellectual organization which requires guardianship with

mutual duties and obligations? This system is called slavery,

because it developed itself out of an older and very

different one of that name, but for this the South is not

to blame.

* * * * *

"But of this the friends of the South may be assured, that so

long as they make no determined effort to relieve the

Southern character from this false drapery, they will never

gain for it that respect, that confidence in the rectitude of

Southern motives, that active sympathy, which can alone evoke

effective assistance.... The best assurance you can give that

the destinies of the negro race are safe in Southern hands

is, not that the South will repent and reform, but that she

has consistently and conscientiously been the friend and

benefactor of that race.

* * * * *

"It is, therefore, always with pain that we hear such

expressions as 'the foul blot,' and similar ones, fall from

the lips of earnest promoters of Confederate Independence. As

a concession they are useless; as a confession they are

untrue.... Thus the Southerner may retort as we have seen

that an Englishman would retort for his country. He might say

the South is proud, and of nothing more proud than this--not

that she has slaves, but that she has treated them as slaves

never were treated before, that she has used power as no

nation ever used it under similar circumstances, and that she

has solved mercifully and humanely a most difficult problem

which has elsewhere defied solution save in blood. Or he

might use the unspoken reflection of an honest Southerner at

hearing much said of 'the foul blot': 'It was indeed a dark

and damnable blot that England left us with, and it required

all the efforts of Southern Christianity to pale it as it now

is[1200].'"

In 1862 and to the fall of 1863, _The Index_ had declared that slavery

was not an issue in the war; now its defence of the "domestic

institution" of the South, repeatedly made in varying forms, was

evidence of the great effect in England of Lincoln's emancipation

edicts. _The Index_ could not keep away from the subject. In March,

quotations were given from the _Reader_, with adverse comments, upon a

report of a controversy aroused in scientific circles by a paper read

before the Anthropological Society of London. James Hunt was the author

and the paper, entitled "The Negro's Place in Nature," aroused the

contempt of Huxley who criticized it at the meeting as unscientific and

placed upon it the "stigma of public condemnation." The result was a

fine controversy among the scientists which could only serve to

emphasize the belief that slavery was indeed an issue in the American

War and that the South was on the defensive. Winding up a newspaper duel

with Hunt who emerged rather badly mauled, Huxley asserted "the North is

justified in any expenditure of blood or treasure which shall eradicate

a system hopelessly inconsistent with the moral elevation, the political

freedom, or the economical progress of the American people[1201]...."

Embarrassment caused by the "Foul Blot" issue, the impossibility to many

sincere Southern friends of accepting the view-point of _The Index_,

acted as a check upon the holding of public meetings and prevented the

carrying out of that intensive public campaign launched by Spence and

intended to be fostered by the Southern Independence Association. By the

end of June, 1864, there was almost a complete cessation of Southern

meetings, not thereafter renewed, except spasmodically for a brief

period in the fall just before the Presidential election in

America[1202]. Northern meetings were continuous throughout the whole

period of the war but were less frequent in 1864 than in 1863. They were

almost entirely of two types--those held by anti-slavery societies and

religious bodies and those organized for, or by, working men. An

analysis of those recorded in the files of _The Liberator_, and

in the reports sent by Adams to Seward permits the following

classification[1203]:

YEAR. NUMBER. CHARACTER.

ANTI-SLAVERY

AND RELIGIOUS WORKING-MEN.

1860 3 3 -

1861 7 7 -

1862 16 11 5

1863 82 26 56

1864 21 10 11

1865 5 4 1

Many persons took part in these meetings as presiding officers or as

speakers and movers of resolutions; among them those appearing with

frequency were George Thompson, Rev. Dr. Cheever, Rev. Newman Hall, John

Bright, Professor Newman, Mr. Bagley, M.P., Rev. Francis Bishop, P.A.

Taylor, M.P., William Evans, Thomas Bayley Potter, F.W. Chesson and

Mason Jones. While held in all parts of England and Scotland the great

majority of meetings were held in London and in the manufacturing

districts with Manchester as a centre. From the first the old

anti-slavery orator of the 'thirties, George Thompson, had been the most

active speaker and was credited by all with having given new life to the

moribund emancipation sentiment of Great Britain[1204]. Thompson

asserted that by the end of 1863 there was a "vigilant, active and

energetic" anti-slavery society in almost every great town or

city[1205]. Among the working-men, John Bright was without question the

most popular advocate of the Northern cause, but there were many others,

not named in the preceding list, constantly active and effective[1206].

Forster, in the judgment of many, was the most influential friend of the

North in Parliament, but Bright, also an influence in Parliament,

rendered his chief service in moulding the opinion of Lancashire and

became to American eyes their great English champion, a view attested

by the extraordinary act of President Lincoln in pardoning, on the

appeal of Bright, and in his honour, a young Englishman named Alfred

Rubery, who had become involved in a plot to send out from the port of

San Francisco, a Confederate "privateer" to prey on Northern

commerce[1207].

This record of the activities of Northern friends and organizations, the

relative subsidence of their efforts in the latter part of 1864, thus

indicating their confidence in Northern victory, the practical cessation

of public Southern meetings, are nevertheless no proof that the bulk of

English opinion had greatly wavered in its faith in Southern powers of

resistance. The Government, it is true, was better informed and was

exceedingly anxious to tread gently in relations with the North, the

more so as there was now being voiced by the public in America a

sentiment of extreme friendship for Russia as the "true friend" in

opposition to the "unfriendly neutrality" of Great Britain and

France[1208]. It was a period of many minor irritations, arising out of

the blockade, inflicted by America on British interests, but to these

Russell paid little attention except to enter formal protests. He

wrote to Lyons:

"I do not want to pick a quarrel out of our many just causes

of complaint. But it will be as well that Lincoln and Seward

should see that we are long patient, and do nothing to

distract their attention from the arduous task they have so

wantonly undertaken[1209]."

Lyons was equally desirous of avoiding frictions. In August he thought

that the current of political opinion was running against the

re-election of Lincoln, noting that the Northern papers were full of

expressions favouring an armistice, but pointed out that neither the

"peace party" nor the advocates of an armistice ever talked of any

solution of the war save on the basis of re-union. Hence Lyons strongly

advised that "the quieter England and France were just at this moment

the better[1210]." Even the suggested armistice was not thought of, he

stated, as extending to a relaxation of the blockade. Of military

probabilities, Lyons professed himself to be no judge, but throughout

all his letters there now ran, as for some time previously, a note of

warning as to the great power and high determination of the North.

But if the British Government was now quietly operating upon the theory

of an ultimate Northern victory, or at least with the view that the only

hope for the South lay in a Northern weariness of war, the leading

British newspapers were still indulging in expressions of confidence in

the South while at the same time putting much faith in the expected

defeat of Lincoln at the polls. As always at this period, save for the

few newspapers avowedly friendly to the North and one important daily

professing strict neutrality--the _Telegraph_--the bulk of the

metropolitan press took its cue, as well as much of its war news, from

the columns of the _Times_. This journal, while early assuming a

position of belief in Southern success, had yet given both sides in the

war fair accuracy in its reports--those of the New York correspondent,

Mackay, always excepted. But from June, 1864, a change came over the

_Times_; it was either itself deceived or was wilfully deceiving its

readers, for steadily every event for the rest of the year was coloured

to create an impression of the unlimited powers of Southern resistance.

Read to-day in the light of modern knowledge of the military situation

throughout the war, the _Times_ gave accurate reports for the earlier

years but became almost hysterical; not to say absurd, for the last year

of the conflict. Early in June, 1864, Grant was depicted as meeting

reverses in Virginia and as definitely checked, while Sherman in the

West was being drawn into a trap in his march toward Atlanta[1211]. The

same ideas were repeated throughout July. Meanwhile there had begun to

be printed a series of letters from a Southern correspondent at Richmond

who wrote in contempt of Grant's army.

"I am at a loss to convey to you the contemptuous tone in

which the tried and war-worn soldiers of General Lee talk of

the huddled rabble of black, white, and copper-coloured

victims (there are Indians serving under the Stars and

Stripes) who are at times goaded up to the Southern lines....

The truth is that for the first time in modern warfare we are

contemplating an army which is at once republican and

undisciplined[1212]."

At the moment when such effusions could find a place in London's leading

paper the facts of the situation were that the South was unable to

prevent almost daily desertions and was wholly unable to spare soldiers

to recover and punish the deserters. But on this the _Times_ was either

ignorant or wilfully silent. It was indeed a general British sentiment

during the summer of 1864, that the North was losing its power and

determination in the war[1213], even though it was unquestioned that the

earlier "enthusiasm for the slave-holders" had passed away[1214]. One

element in the influence of the _Times_ was its _seeming_ impartiality

accompanied by a pretentious assertion of superior information and

wisdom that at times irritated its contemporaries, but was recognized as

making this journal the most powerful agent in England. Angry at a

_Times_ editorial in February, 1863, in which Mason had been berated for

a speech made at the Lord Mayor's banquet, _The Index_ declared:

"Our contemporary is all things to all men. It not only

shouts with the largest crowd, according to the Pickwickian

philosophy, but with a skill and daring that command

admiration, it shouts simultaneously with opposite and

contending crowds. It is everybody's _Times_[1215]."

Yet _The Index_ knew, and frequently so stated, that the _Times_ was at

bottom pro-Southern. John Bright's medium, the _Morning Star_, said:

"There was something bordering on the sublime in the tremendous audacity

of the war news supplied by the _Times_. Of course, its prophecies were

in a similar style. None of your doubtful oracles there; none of your

double-meaning vaticinations, like that which took poor Pyrrhus

in[1216]." In short, the _Times_ became for the last year of the war the

Bible of their faith to Southern sympathizers, and was frequent in its

preachments[1217].

There was one journal in London which claimed to have equal if not

greater knowledge and authority in military matters. This was the weekly

_Army and Navy Gazette_, and its editor, W.H. Russell, in 1861 war

correspondent in America of the _Times_, but recalled shortly after his

famous letter on the battle of Bull Run, consistently maintained after

the war had ended that he had always asserted the ultimate victory of

the North and was, indeed, so pro-Northern in sentiment that this was

the real cause of his recall[1218]. He even claimed to have believed in

Northern victory to the extent of re-union. These protestations after

the event are not borne out by the columns of the _Gazette_, for that

journal was not far behind the _Times_ in its delineation of incidents

unfavourable to the North and in its all-wise prophecies of Northern

disaster. The _Gazette_ had no wide circulation except among those in

the service, but its _dicta_, owing to the established reputation of

Russell and to the specialist nature of the paper, were naturally quite

readily accepted and repeated in the ordinary press. Based on a correct

appreciation of man power and resources the _Gazette_ did from time to

time proclaim its faith in Northern victory[1219], but always in such

terms as to render possible a hedge on expressed opinion and always with

the assertion that victory would not result in reunion. Russell's most

definite prophecy was made on July 30, 1864:

"The Southern Confederacy, like Denmark, is left to fight by

itself, without even a conference or an armistice to aid it;

and it will be strange indeed if the heroism, endurance, and

resources of its soldiers and citizens be not eventually

dominated by the perseverance and superior means of the

Northern States. Let us repeat our profession of faith in the

matter. We hold that the Union perished long ago, and that

its component parts can never again be welded into a

Confederacy of self-governing States, with a common

executive, army, fleet, and central government. Not only

that. The principle of Union itself among the non-seceding

States is so shocked and shattered by the war which has

arisen, that the fissures in it are likely to widen and

spread, and to form eventually great gulfs separating the

Northern Union itself into smaller bodies. But ere the North

be convinced of the futility of its efforts to substitute the

action of force for that of free will, we think it will

reduce the Southern States to the direst misery[1220]...."

Such occasional "professions of faith," accompanied by sneers at the

"Confederate partisanship" of the _Times_[1221] served to differentiate

the _Gazette_ from other journals, but when it came to description and

estimate of specific campaigns there was little to choose between them

and consequently little variance in the effect upon the public. Thus a

fortnight before his "profession of faith," Russell could comment

editorially on Sherman's campaign toward Atlanta:

"The next great Federal army on which the hopes of the North

have so long been fixed promises to become a source of

fearful anxiety. Sherman, if not retreating, is certainly not

advancing; and, if the Confederates can interfere seriously

with his communications, he must fall back as soon as he has

eaten up all the supplies of the district.... All the

enormous advantages possessed by the Federals have been

nullified by want of skill, by the interference of Washington

civilians, and by the absence of an animating homogeneous

spirit on the part of their soldiery[1222]."

Hand in hand with war news adverse to the North went comments on the

Presidential election campaign in America, with prophecies of Lincoln's

defeat. This was indeed but a reflection of the American press but the

citations made in British papers emphasized especially Northern

weariness of Lincoln's despotism and inefficiency. Thus, first printed

in _The Index_, an extract from a New York paper, _The New Nation_, got

frequent quotation:

"We have been imposed upon long enough. The ruin which you

have been unable to accomplish in four years, would certainly

be fully consummated were you to remain in power four years

longer. Your military governors and their provost-marshals

override the laws, and the _echo of the armed heel rings

forth as dearly now in America as in France or Austria. You

have encroached upon our liberty without securing victory,

and we must have both_[1223]."

It was clearly understood that Northern military efforts would have an

important bearing on the election. The _Times_ while expressing

admiration for Sherman's boldness in the Atlanta campaign was confident

of his defeat:

"... it is difficult to see how General Sherman can escape a

still more disastrous fate than that which threatened his

predecessor. He has advanced nearly one hundred and fifty

miles from his base of operations, over a mountainous

country; and he has no option but to retreat by the same line

as he advanced. This is the first instance of a Federal

general having ventured far from water communications. That

Sherman has hitherto done so with success is a proof of both

courage and ability, but he will need both these qualities in

a far greater degree if he is forced to retreat[1224]."

And W.H. Russell, in the _Gazette_, included Grant in the approaching

disaster:

"The world has never seen anything in war so slow and fatuous

as Grant's recent movements, except it be those of Sherman.

Each is wriggling about like a snake in the presence of an

ichneumon. They both work round and round, now on one flank

and then on the other, and on each move meet the unwinking

eye of the enemy, ready for his spring and bite. In sheer

despair Grant and Sherman must do something at last. As to

shelling! Will they learn from history? Then they will know

that they cannot shell an army provided with as powerful

artillery as their own out of a position.... The Northerners

have, indeed, lost the day solely owing to the want of

average ability in their leaders in the field[1225]."

On the very day when Russell thus wrote in the _Gazette_ the city of

Atlanta had been taken by Sherman. When the news reached England the

_Times_ having declared this impossible, now asserted that it was

unimportant, believed that Sherman could not remain in possession and,

two days later, turned with vehemence to an analysis of the political

struggle as of more vital influence. The Democrats, it was insisted,

would place peace "paramount to union" and were sure to win[1226].

Russell, in the _Gazette_, coolly ignoring its prophecy of three weeks

earlier, now spoke as if he had always foreseen the fall of Atlanta:

"General Sherman has fully justified his reputation as an

able and daring soldier; and the final operations by which he

won Atlanta are not the least remarkable of the series which

carried him from Chattanooga ... into the heart of

Georgia[1227]."

But neither of these political-military "expert" journals would

acknowledge any benefit accruing to Lincoln from Sherman's success. Not

so, however, Lyons, who kept his chief much better informed than he

would have been if credulous of the British press. Lyons, who for some

time had been increasingly in bad health, had sought escape from the

summer heat of Washington in a visit to Montreal. He now wrote correctly

interpreting a great change in Northern attitude and a renewed

determination to persevere in the war until reunion was secured.

Lincoln, he thought, was likely to be re-elected:

"The reaction produced by the fall of Atlanta may be taken as

an indication of what the real feelings of the people in the

Northern States are. The vast majority of them ardently

desire to reconquer the lost territory. It is only at moments

when they despair of doing this that they listen to plans for

recovering the territory by negotiation. The time has not

come yet when any proposal to relinquish the territory can be

publicly made[1228]."

The _Times_, slowly convinced that Atlanta would have influence in the

election, and as always clever above its contemporaries in the delicate

process of face-about to save its prestige, arrived in October at the

point where it could join in prediction of Lincoln's re-election. It did

so by throwing the blame on the Democratic platform adopted at the party

convention in Chicago, which, so it represented, had cast away an

excellent chance of success by declaring for union first and peace

afterwards. Since the convention had met in August this was late

analysis; and as a matter of fact the convention platform had called for

a "cessation of bloodshed" and the calling of a convention to restore

peace--in substance, for an armistice. But the _Times_[1229] now assumed

temporarily a highly moral and disinterested pose and washed its hands

of further responsibility; Lincoln was likely to be re-elected:

For ourselves we have no particular reason to wish it

otherwise. We have no very serious matter of complaint that

we are aware of against the present Government of America.

Allowance being made for the difficulties of their position,

they are conducting the war with a fair regard to the rights

of neutral nations. The war has swept American commerce from

the sea, and placed it, in great measure, in our hands; we

have supplied the loss of the cotton which was suddenly

withdrawn from us; the returns of our revenue and our trade

are thoroughly satisfactory, and we have received an

equivalent for the markets closed to us in America in the

vast impulse that has been given towards the development of

the prosperity of India. We see a great nation, which has not

been in times past sparing of its menaces and predictions of

our ruin, apparently resolved to execute, without pause and

without remorse, the most dreadful judgments of Heaven upon

itself. We see the frantic patient tearing the bandages from

his wounds and thrusting aside the hand that would assuage

his miseries, and every day that the war goes on we see less

and less probability that the great fabric of the Union will

ever be reconstructed in its original form, and more and more

likelihood that the process of disintegration will extend far

beyond the present division between North and South.... Were

we really animated by the spirit of hostility which is always

assumed to prevail among us towards America, we should view

the terrible spectacle with exultation and delight, we should

rejoice that the American people, untaught by past

misfortunes, have resolved to continue the war to the end,

and hail the probable continuance of the power of Mr. Lincoln

as the event most calculated to pledge the nation to a steady

continuance in its suicidal policy. But we are persuaded that

the people of this country view the prospect of another four

years of war in America with very different feelings. They

are not able to divest themselves of sympathy for a people of

their own blood and language thus wilfully rushing down the

path that leadeth to destruction[1230].

Sherman's capture of Atlanta did indeed make certain that Lincoln would

again be chosen President, but the _Times_ was more slow to acknowledge

its military importance, first hinting and then positively asserting

that Sherman had fallen into a trap from which he would have difficulty

in escaping[1231]. The _Gazette_ called this "blind partisanship[1232],"

but itself indulged in gloomy prognostications as to the character and

results of the Presidential election, regarding it as certain that

election day would see the use of "force, fraud and every mechanism

known to the most unscrupulous political agitation." "We confess," it

continued, "we are only so far affected by the struggle inasmuch as it

dishonours the Anglo-Saxon name, and diminishes its reputation for

justice and honour throughout the world[1233]." Again official England

was striking a note far different from that of the press[1234]. Adams

paid little attention to newspaper utterances, but kept his chief

informed of opinions expressed by those responsible for, and active in

determining, governmental policy. The autumn "season for speeches" by

Members of Parliament, he reported, was progressing with a very evident

unanimity of expressions, whether from friend or foe, that it was

inexpedient to meddle in American affairs. As the Presidential election

in America came nearer, attention was diverted from military events.

Anti-slavery societies began to hold meetings urging their friends in

America to vote for Lincoln[1235]. Writing from Washington, Lyons, as

always anxious to forestall frictions on immaterial matters, wrote to

Russell, "We must be prepared for demonstrations of a '_spirited foreign

policy_' by Mr. Seward, during the next fortnight, for electioneering

purposes[1236]." Possibly his illness made him unduly nervous, for four

days later he was relieved to be asked by Seward to "postpone as much as

possible all business with him until after the election[1237]." By

November 1, Lyons was so ill that he asked for immediate leave, and in

replying, "You will come away at once," Russell added that he was

entirely convinced the United States wished to make no serious

difficulties with Great Britain.

"... I do not think the U.S. Government have any

ill-intentions towards us, or any fixed purpose of availing

themselves of a tide of success to add a war with us to their

existing difficulties. Therefore whatever their bluster and

buncome may be at times, I think they will subside when the

popular clamour is over[1238]."

In early November, Lincoln was triumphantly re-elected receiving 212

electoral votes to 21 cast for McClellan. No disturbances such as the

_Gazette_ had gloomily foretold attended the event, and the tremendous

majority gained by the President somewhat stunned the press. Having

prophesied disorders, the _Gazette_ now patted America on the back for

her behaviour, but took occasion to renew old "professions of faith"

against reunion:

"Abraham Lincoln II reigns in succession to Abraham Lincoln

I, the first Republican monarch of the Federal States, and so

far as we are concerned we are very glad of it, because the

measure of the man is taken and known.... It is most

creditable to the law-abiding habits of the people that the

elections ... passed off as they have done.... Mr. Lincoln

has four long years of strife before him; and as he seems

little inclined to change his advisers, his course of action,

or his generals, we do not believe that the termination of

his second period of government will find him President of

the United States[1239]."

The _Times_ was disinclined, for once, to moralize, and was cautious in

comment:

"Ever since he found himself firmly established in his

office, and the first effervescence of national feeling had

begun to subside, we have had no great reason to complain of

the conduct of Mr. Lincoln towards England. His tone has been

less exacting, his language has been less offensive and, due

allowance being made for the immense difficulties of his

situation, we could have parted with Mr. Lincoln, had such

been the pleasure of the American people, without any vestige

of ill-will or ill-feeling. He has done as regards this

country what the necessities of his situation demanded from

him, and he has done no more[1240]."

This was to tread gently; but more exactly and more boldly the real

reaction of the press was indicated by _Punch's_ cartoon of a phoenix,

bearing the grim and forceful face of Lincoln, rising from the ashes

where lay the embers of all that of old time had gone to make up the

_liberties_ of America[1241].

During the months immediately preceding Lincoln's re-election English

friends of the South had largely remained inactive. Constantly twitted

that at the chief stronghold of the _Southern Independence Association_,

Manchester, they did not dare to hold a meeting in the great Free Trade

Hall[1242], they tried ticket meetings in smaller halls, but even there

met with opposition from those who attended. At three other places,

Oldham, Ashton, and Stockport, efforts to break the Northern hold on the

manufacturing districts met with little success[1243], and even, as

reported in the _Index_, were attended mainly by "magistrates, clergy,

leading local gentry, manufacturers, tradesmen, and cotton operatives,"

the last named being also, evidently, the last considered, and

presumably the least represented[1244]. The Rev. Mr. Massie conducted

"follow up" Northern meetings wherever the Southern friends ventured an

appearance[1245]. At one town only, Oldham, described by _The Index_ as

"the most 'Southern' town in Lancashire," was a meeting held at all

comparable with the great demonstrations easily staged by pro-Northern

friends. Set for October 31, great efforts were made to picture this

meeting as an outburst of indignation from the unemployed. Summoned by

handbills headed "_The Crisis! The Crisis! The Crisis!_" there

gathered, according to _The Index_ correspondent, a meeting "of between

5,000 and 6,000 wretched paupers, many of whom were women with children

in their arms, who, starved apparently in body and spirit as in raiment,

had met together to exchange miseries, and ask one another what was to

be done." Desperate speeches were made, the people "almost threatening

violence," but finally adopting a resolution now become so hackneyed as

to seem ridiculous after a description intended to portray the misery

and the revolutionary character of the meeting:

"That in consequence of the widespread distress that now

prevails in the cotton districts by the continuance of the

war in America, this meeting is desirous that Her Majesty's

Government should use their influence, together with France

and other European powers, to bring both belligerents

together in order to put a stop to the vast destruction of

life and property that is now going on in that unhappy

country[1246]."

No doubt this spectacular meeting was organized for effect, but in truth

it must have overshot the mark, for by October, 1864, the distress in

Lancashire was largely alleviated and the public knew it, while

elsewhere in the cotton districts the mass of operative feeling was with

the North. Even in Ireland petitions were being circulated for signature

among the working men, appealing to Irishmen in America to stand by the

administration of Lincoln and to enlist in the Northern armies on the

ground of emancipation[1247]. Here, indeed, was the insuperable barrier,

in the fall of 1864, to public support of the South. Deny as he might

the presence of the "foul blot" in Southern society, Hotze, of _The

Index_, could not counteract that phrase. When the Confederate Congress

at Richmond began, in the autumn of 1864, seriously to discuss a plan

of transforming slaves into soldiers, putting guns in their hands, and

thus replenishing the waning man-power of Southern armies, Hotze was

hard put to it to explain to his English readers that this was in fact

no evidence of lowered strength, but rather a noble determination on the

part of the South to permit the negro to win his freedom by bearing arms

in defence of his country[1248].

This was far-fetched for a journal that had long insisted upon the

absolute incapacity of the black race. Proximity of dates, however,

permits another interpretation of Hotze's editorial of November 10, and

indeed of the project of arming the slaves, though this, early in the

spring of 1865, was actually provided for by law. On November 11,

Slidell, Mason and Mann addressed to the Powers of Europe a

communication accompanying a Confederate "Manifesto," of which the

blockade had long delayed transmissal. This "Manifesto" set forth the

objects of the Southern States and flatly demanded recognition:

"'All they ask is immunity from interference with their

internal peace and prosperity and to be left in the

undisturbed enjoyment of their inalienable rights of life,

liberty and the pursuit of happiness which their common

ancestry declared to be the equal heritage of all parties to

the Social compact[1249].'"

Russell replied, November 25:

"Great Britain has since 1783, remained, with the exception

of a short period, connected by friendly relations with both

the Northern and the Southern States. Since the commencement

of the Civil War which broke out in 1861, Her Majesty's

Government have continued to entertain sentiments of

friendship equally for the North and for the South; of the

causes of the rupture Her Majesty's Government have never

presumed to judge; they deplored the commencement of this

sanguinary struggle, and anxiously look forward to the period

of its termination. In the meantime they are convinced that

they best consult the interests of peace, and respect the

rights of all parties by observing a strict and impartial

Neutrality. Such a Neutrality Her Majesty has faithfully

maintained and will continue to maintain[1250]."

If _The Index_ did indeed hope for results from the "Manifesto," and had

sought to bolster the appeal by dilating on a Southern plan to "let the

slaves win their freedom," the answer of Russell was disappointing. Yet

at the moment, in spite of the effect of Lincoln's re-election, the

current of alleged expert military opinion was again swinging in favour

of the South. The _Times_ scored Russell's answer, portraying him as

attempting to pose as "Our Mutual Friend":

"The difficulty, of course, was to be polite to the

representatives of the Confederate States without appearing

rude to the United States; and, on the other hand, to

acknowledge the authority of the United States without

affronting the dignity of the Confederates. Between these two

pitfalls Lord Russell oscillates in his letter, and now puts

his foot a little bit in the hole on one side, and then, in

recovering himself gets a little way into the hole on the

other side. In this way he sways to and fro for a minute or

two, but rights himself at last, and declares he has hitherto

stood upright between the two pitfalls, and he will continue

to do so.... Lord Russell seems to be in danger of forgetting

that _neuter_ does not mean _both_, but _neither_, and that

if, therefore, he would maintain even in words a strict

neutrality it is necessary to avoid any demonstrations of

friendship to either belligerent[1251]."

This was harsh criticism, evincing a _Times_ partisanship justifying

the allegations of the _Gazette_, but wholly in line with the opinion to

which the _Times_ was now desperately clinging that Grant had failed and

that Sherman, adventuring on his spectacular "march to the sea" from

Atlanta, was courting annihilation. Yet even Northern friends were

appalled at Sherman's boldness and discouraged by Grant's slowness. The

son of the American Minister could write, "Grant moves like the iron

wall in Poe's story. You expect something tremendous, and it's only a

step after all[1252]."

The _Times_ was at least consistent in prophecies until the event

falsified them; the _Gazette_ less so. Some six weeks after having

acclaimed Sherman's generalship in the capture of Atlanta[1253], the

_Gazette's_ summary of the military situation was that:

"... if the winter sees Grant still before Petersburg, and

Sherman unable to hold what he has gained in Georgia, the

South may be nearer its dawning day of independence than

could have been expected a few weeks ago, even though

Wilmington be captured and Charleston be ground away

piecemeal under a distant cannonade. The position of the

Democrats would urge them to desperate measures, and the

wedge of discord will be driven into the ill-compacted body

which now represents the Federal States of North

America[1254]."

But on December 17, W.H. Russell again changed his view and foretold

with accuracy Sherman's movements toward Savannah. Not so the _Times_,

privately very anxious as to what Sherman's campaign portended, while

publicly belittling it. December 2, it was noted that Sherman had not

been heard from for weeks, having left Atlanta with 50,000 men. December

5, his objective was stated to be Savannah, and while the difficulties

to be encountered were enumerated, no prophecy was indulged in. But on

December 22, Sherman's move was called a "desperate" one, forced by his

inability to retreat _northward_ from Atlanta:

"If we turn to military affairs, we are informed that the

great feature of the year is Sherman's expedition into

Georgia. We are not yet able to say whether Sherman will

succeed in escaping the fate of Burgoyne; but we know that

his apparent rashness is excused by the fact that Sherman was

unable to return on the way by which he came; so that the

most remarkable feature of the war, according to the

President, is the wild and desperate effort of an

out-manoeuvred General to extricate himself from a position

which, whatever effect it may have had on the election,

should never, on mere military grounds, have been occupied at

all[1255]."

This was followed up four days later by a long and careful review of

Sherman's whole western campaign, concluding with the dictum that his

sole object now was to escape to some undefended point on the coast

where he could be rescued by the Northern navy. The war had taken a

definite turn in favour of the South; it was impossible to conceive that

Sherman would venture to attack Savannah:

"For the escape or safety of Sherman and his army it is

essential he should reach Beaufort, or some neighbouring

point on the sea-coast as rapidly as possible. Delay would be

equivalent to ruin, and he will do nothing to create

it[1256]."

Rarely, if ever, did the _Times_, in its now eager and avowed

championship so definitely commit itself in an effort to preserve

British confidence in the Southern cause[1257]. Even friends of the

North were made doubtful by the positiveness of prediction indulged in

by that journal whose opinions were supposed to be based on superior

information. Their recourse was to a renewal of "deputations" calling on

the American Minister to express steady allegiance to the Northern

cause[1258], and their relief was great when the news was received that

Savannah had fallen, December 20, without a struggle. The _Times_

recorded the event, December 29, but with no comment save that Southern

prospects were less rosy than had been supposed. Then ensued a long

silence, for this time there was no possibility of that editorial

wiggling about the circle from excuses for misinterpretation to a

complacent resumption of authoritative utterance.

For the editor, Delane, and for wise Southern sympathizers the fall of

Savannah was a much harder blow than the mere loss of prestige to the

_Times_[1259]. Courage failed and confidence in the South

waned--momentarily almost vanished. Nearly two weeks passed before the

_Times_ ventured to lift again the banner of hope, and even then but

half-heartedly.

"The capture of the city completes the history of Sherman's

march, and stamps it as one of the ablest, certainly one of

the most singular military achievements of the war.

"... The advantage gained for the Federal cause by the

possession of Savannah is yet to be shown. To Sherman and his

army 'the change of base' is indisputably a change for the

better. Assuming that his position at Atlanta was as

desperate as shortness of supplies and an interrupted line of

retreat could make it, the command of a point near the

sea-coast and free communication with the fleet is obviously

an improvement. At the least the army secures full means of

subsistence, and a point from which further operations may be

commenced. On the other hand, the blow, as far as the

Confederate Government is concerned, is mitigated by the fact

that Savannah has been little used as a seaport since the

capture of Fort Pulaski by the Federals at an early stage

of the war.

"... But the fall of the city is a patent fact, and it would

be absurd to deny that it has produced an impression

unfavourable to the _prestige_ of the Confederacy[1260]."

Far more emphatic of ultimate Northern victory was the picture

presented, though in sarcasm, by the _Times_ New York correspondent,

printed in this same issue:

"No disappointments, however fast they may follow on the

heels of each other, can becloud the bright sunshine of

conceit and self-worship that glows in the heart of the

Yankee. His country is the first in the world, and he is the

first man in it. Knock him down, and he will get up again,

and brush the dirt from his knees, not a bit the worse for

the fall. If he do not win this time, he is bound to win the

next. His motto is 'Never say die.' His manifest destiny is

to go on--prospering and to prosper--conquering and to

conquer."

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1197: Dodd, _Jefferson Davis_, p. 233.]

[Footnote 1198: See _ante_, p. 192.]

[Footnote 1199: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Jan. 22, 1864.]

[Footnote 1200: _The Index_, Feb. 18, 1864, p. 105.]

[Footnote 1201: _The Index_, March 24, 1864, p. 189, quoting the

_Reader_ for March 19.]

[Footnote 1202: The first Southern meeting in England I have found

record of was one reported in the _Spectator_, Nov. 16, 1861, to honour

Yancey on his arrival. It was held by the _Fishmongers of London_.

Yancey was warmly received and appealed to his hosts on the ground that

the South was the best buyer of English goods.]

[Footnote 1203: The 134 meetings here listed represent by no means all

held, for Goldwin Smith estimated at least 500 after the beginning of

1862. (_The Civil War in America_, London, 1866.) The list may be

regarded as an analysis of the more important, attracting the attention

of _The Liberator_ and of Adams.]

[Footnote 1204: At a banquet given to Thompson in 1863 he was declared

by Bright to have been the "real liberator of the slaves in the English

colonies," and by P.A. Taylor as, by his courage "when social obloquy

and personal danger had to be incurred for the truth's sake," having

rendered great services "to the cause of Abolition in America."]

[Footnote 1205: _The Liberator_, Jan. 15, 1864. Letter to James Buffum,

of Lynn, Dec. 10, 1863.]

[Footnote 1206: Goldwin Smith's pamphlet: "The Civil War in America: An

Address read at the last meeting of the Manchester Union and

Emancipation Society" (held on January 26, 1866), pays especial tribute

to Thomas Bayley Potter, M.P., stating "you boldly allied yourself with

the working-men in forming this association." Smith gives a five-page

list of other leading members, among whom, in addition to some Northern

friends already named, are to be noted Thomas Hughes, Duncan McLaren,

John Stuart Mill. There are eleven noted "Professors," among them

Cairnes, Thorold Rogers, and Fawcett. The publicity committee of this

society during three years had issued and circulated "upwards of four

hundred thousand books, pamphlets, and tracts." Here, as previously, the

activities of Americans in England are not included. Thus George Francis

Train, correspondent of the _New York Herald_, made twenty-three

speeches between January, 1861, and March, 1862. ("Union Speeches in

England.")]

[Footnote 1207: For text of Lincoln's pardon see Trevelyan, _Bright_, p.

296. Lincoln gave the pardon "especially as a public mark of the esteem

held by the United States of America for the high character and steady

friendship of the said John Bright...." The names of leading friends of

the South have been given in Chapter XV.]

[Footnote 1208: This was a commonplace of American writing at the time

and long after. A Rev. C.B. Boynton published a book devoted to the

thesis that England and France had united in a "policy" of repressing

the development of America and Russia (_English and French Neutrality

and the Anglo-French Alliance in their relations to the United States

and Russia_, Cincinnati, C.F. Vest & Co., 1864). Boynton wrote: "You

have not come to the bottom of the conduct of Great Britain, until you

have touched that delicate and real foundation cause--we are too large

and strong a nation" (Preface, p. 3). The work has no historical

importance except that it was thought worth publication in 1864.]

[Footnote 1209: Lyons Papers. July 16, 1864. Copy.]

[Footnote 1210: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Aug. 23, 1864.]

[Footnote 1211: June 3, 1864.]

[Footnote 1212: The _Times_, August 4, 1864. Letters dated June 27 and

July 5, 1864.]

[Footnote 1213: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, p. 126. Henry Adams to

his brother, May 13, 1864. "The current is dead against us, and the

atmosphere so uncongenial that the idea of the possibility of our

success is not admitted."]

[Footnote 1214: _Ibid._, p. 136. Henry Adams to his brother, June 3,

1864.]

[Footnote 1215: _The Index_, Feb. 19, 1863, p. 265.]

[Footnote 1216: This was written immediately after the battles of

Vicksburg and Gettysburg, but the tone complained of was much more

marked in 1864.]

[Footnote 1217: The _Times_ average of editorials on the Civil War ran

two in every three days until May, 1864, and thereafter one in every

three days.]

[Footnote 1218: Russell wrote to John Bigelow, March 8, 1865: "You know,

perhaps, that, as I from the first maintained the North must win, I was

tabooed from dealing with American questions in the _Times_ even after

my return to England, but _en revanche_ I have had my say in the _Army

and Navy Gazette_, which I have bought, every week, and if one could be

weak and wicked enough to seek for a morbid gratification amid such

ruins and blood, I might be proud of the persistence with which I

maintained my opinions against adverse and unanimous sentiment"

(Bigelow, _Retrospections_, Vol. II, p. 361). Also on June 5, 1865,

Russell wrote in his diary: "...had the _Times_ followed my advice, how

different our position would be--not only that of the leading journal,

but of England. If ever I did State service, it was in my letters from

America." (Atkins, _Life of W.H. Russell_, Vol. II, p. 115.) See also

Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, pp. 344-45. Russell was editor of the

_Gazette_ on its first appearance as a weekly, January 6, 1860, but left

it to go to America. On his return he settled down to his editorial task

in November, 1862, and thereafter, throughout the war, the _Gazette_ may

be regarded as reflecting his views. His entire letters from America to

the _Times_ constitute a most valuable picture of the months preceding

the outbreak of war, but the contempt poured on the Northern army for

its defeat at Bull Run made Russell much disliked in the North. This

dislike was bitterly displayed in a pamphlet by Andrew D. White ("A

Letter to William Howard Russell, LL.D., on passages in his 'Diary North

and South'"), published in London in 1863.]

[Footnote 1219: June 25, 1864.]

[Footnote 1220: The _Army and Navy Gazette_, July 30, 1864.]

[Footnote 1221: _Ibid._, June 25, 1864.]

[Footnote 1222: _Ibid._, July 16, 1864. Similar articles and editorials

might be quoted from many of the more important papers, but the _Times_

and the _Gazette_ will suffice as furnishing the keynote. I have not

examined in detail the files of the metropolitan press beyond

determining their general attitude on the Civil War and for occasional

special references. Such examination has been sufficient, however, to

warrant the conclusion that the _weight_ of the _Times_ in influencing

opinion was very great. Collating statistics given in:

(1) Grant's _The Newspaper Press_; (2) in a speech in

Parliament by Edward Banes in 1864 (Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXV,

p. 295); and (3) in _Parliamentary Papers_, 1861, _Commons_,

Vol. XXXIV, "Return of the Registered Newspapers in the

United Kingdom ... from 30 June, 1860, to 30 June, 1861," the

following facts of circulation are derived:

(A) _Daily Papers_:

(1) _The Telegraph_ (evening), 150,000 (neutral).

(2) _The Standard_ (morning and evening), 130,000 (Southern).

Under the same management was also _The Herald_ (morning), but with

small circulation (Southern).

(3) The _Times_ (morning), 70,000 (Southern). Grant says: "The

prestige of the _Times_ was remarkable. The same articles appearing

in other papers would not produce the same effect as in the _Times_."

Of Delane, the editor, Grant declared "His name is just as

well-known ... throughout the civilized world as that of any of our

European kings.... The _Times_ may, indeed, be called the Monarch

of the Press." (Grant, II, p. 53.)

(4) _The Morning Advertiser_ (circulation uncertain, probably 50,000),

but very largely taken in the trades, in public-houses, and in the

Clubs (neutral).

(5) _The Daily News_ (morning), 6,000 (Northern).

(6) _The Morning Star_, 5,500 (but with evening edition 10,000)

(Northern). Grant says that contrary to general belief, John Bright

was never a shareholder but at times raised money to meet deficits.

_The Star_ was regarded as an _anti-British paper_ and was very unpopular.

(7) _The Morning Post_, 4,500 (Southern). It was regarded as

Palmerston's organ.

(8) _The Morning Chronicle_. Very small circulation in the 'sixties

(neutral).

(B) _Weekly Papers._--No approximate circulation figures are available,

but these papers are placed by Grant in supposed order of subscribers.

(1) _Reynolds' Weekly_. Circulation upwards of 350,000. A penny

paper, extreme Liberal in politics, and very popular in the manufacturing

districts (Northern).

(2) _John Bull_ (Southern). "The country squire's paper."

(3) _The Spectator_ (Northern).

(4) _The Saturday Review_ (Southern).

(5) _The Economist_ (Neutral).

(6) _The Press and St. James' Chronicle_. Small circulation (Southern).

In addition to British newspapers listed above as Northern in sentiment

_The Liberator_ names for Great Britain as a whole _Westminster

Review, Nonconformist, British Standard, Birmingham Post, Manchester

Examiner, Newcastle Chronicle, Caledonian Mercury, Belfast Whig_, and some

few others of lesser importance. (_Liberator_, June 30, 1863.)

The attitude of the _Manchester Guardian_ seemed to _The Liberator_ to

be like that of the _Times_.

]

[Footnote 1223: _The Index_, April 14, 1864, p. 231.]

[Footnote 1224: August 8, 1864.]

[Footnote 1225: Sept. 3, 1864.]

[Footnote 1226: Sept. 20 and 22, 1864.]

[Footnote 1227: Sept. 24, 1864.]

[Footnote 1228: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Sept. 16, 1864.]

[Footnote 1229: General McClellan, the nominee of the convention,

modified this in his letter of acceptance.]

[Footnote 1230: Oct. 10, 1864.]

[Footnote 1231: Nov. 10, 1864.]

[Footnote 1232: Nov. 12, 1864.]

[Footnote 1233: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 1234: According to _The Index_, the French press was more

divided than was the London press in portrayal of military events in

America. The _Siècle_ and the _Opinion Nationale_ pictured Sherman as

about to capture Atlanta. Readers of the _Constitutionel, Patrie,

Moniteur_, and _La France_ "know quite well that Sherman has neither

occupied the centre, the circumference, nor, indeed, any part of the

defences of Atlanta; and that he was completely defeated by General Hood

on July 22." (_Index_, Aug. 18, 1864, p. 522.) The Paris correspondent

wrote, October 19, after the news was received of Sheridan's campaign in

the Shenandoah Valley:

"The _Siècle_ is triumphant. According to this humanitarian journal,

whose sole policy consists in the expression of a double hatred, part of

which it bestows on the priests, and part on the slave-dealers, the

American contest has assumed its last phase, the Confederates are

running in breathless haste to demand pardon, and true patriotism is at

last to meet with its reward. This great and noble result will be due to

the Northern generals, _who have carried military glory to so high a

pitch without at the same time compromising American Democracy!_

"Your readers will doubtless consider that the writer of the above lines

undertakes to speak on a subject of which he knows nothing; but what

will they say of a writer who, in the same journal, thus expresses

himself relative to the issues of the coming election?

'Lincoln being elected, the following will be the results: The South

will lose courage and abandon the contest; the lands reduced to

barrenness by servile labour will be again rendered productive by the

labour of the freeman; the Confederates, _who know only how to fight,

and who are supported by the sweat of others_, will purify and

regenerate themselves by the exercise of their own brains and of their

own hands....'

"These strange remarks conclude with words of encouragement to the

robust-shouldered, iron-fronted, firm-lipped Lincoln, and prayers for

the welfare of the American brethren.

"You will not easily credit it, but this article--a very masterpiece of

delirium and absurdity--bears the signature of one of the most eminent

writers of the day, M. Henri Martin, the celebrated historian of France.

(_Index_, Oct. 20, 1864, p. 667.)

A week later _The Index_ was vicious in comment upon the "men and money"

pouring out of _Germany_ in aid of the North. German financiers, under

the guise of aiding emigration, were engaged in the prosperous business

of "selling white-skinned Germans to cut Southern throats for the

benefit, as they say, of the poor blacks." (Oct. 27, 1864, p. 685.) This

bitter tone was indulged in even by the Confederate Secretary of State.

Benjamin wrote to Slidell, September 20, 1864, that France was wilfully

deceiving the South by professions of friendship. The President, he

stated, "could not escape the painful conviction that the Emperor of the

French, knowing that the utmost efforts of this people are engrossed in

the defence of their homes against an atrocious warfare waged by greatly

superior numbers, has thought the occasion opportune for promoting his

own purposes, at no greater cost than a violation of his faith and duty

toward us." (Richardson, II, p. 577.)]

[Footnote 1235: e.g., Meeting of Glasgow Union and Emancipation Society,

Oct. 11, 1864. (_The Liberator_, Nov. 4, 1864.)]

[Footnote 1236: Russell Papers, Oct. 24, 1864.]

[Footnote 1237: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, Oct. 28, 1864.]

[Footnote 1238: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Nov. 19, 1864. Lyons

reached London December 27, and never returned to his post in America.

Lyons' services to the friendly relations of the United States and Great

Britain were of the greatest. He upheld British dignity yet never gave

offence to that of America; he guarded British interests but with a wise

and generous recognition of the difficulties of the Northern Government.

No doubt he was at heart so unneutral as to hope for Northern success,

even though at first sharing in the view that there was small

possibility of reunion, but this very hope--unquestionably known to

Seward and to Lincoln--frequently eased dangerous moments in the

relations with Great Britain, and was in the end a decided asset to the

Government at home.]

[Footnote 1239: Nov. 26, 1864.]

[Footnote 1240: Nov. 22, 1864.]

[Footnote 1241: The gradual change in _Punch's_ representation of a

silly-faced Lincoln to one which bore the stamp of despotic ferocity is

an interesting index of British opinion during the war. By 1864 those

who watched his career had come to respect Lincoln's ability and power

though as yet wholly unappreciative of his still greater qualities.]

[Footnote 1242: _The Liberator_, Sept. 23, 1864. Letter from T.H. Barker

to Garrison, August 27, 1864.]

[Footnote 1243: _Ibid._, Nov. 4, 1864.]

[Footnote 1244: _The Index_, Sept. 29, 1864, p. 618, describing the

meeting at Ashton.]

[Footnote 1245: _The Liberator_, Nov. 4, 1864.]

[Footnote 1246: _The Index_, Nov. 3, 1864, p. 699.]

[Footnote 1247: _The Liberator_, Nov. 4, 1864.]

[Footnote 1248: _The Index_, Nov. 10, 1864, p. 713.]

[Footnote 1249: F.O., Am., Vol. 975. Slidell, Mason and Mann to Russell,

Nov. 11, 1864, Paris. Replies were received from England, France, Sweden

and the Papal States. (Mason Papers, Mason to Slidell, Jan. 4, 1865).]

[Footnote 1250: F.O., Am., Vol. 975. Draft. Russell to the

"Commissioners of the so-called Confederate States," Nov. 25, 1864.]

[Footnote 1251: Dec. 1, 1864.]

[Footnote 1252: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, p. 207. Henry Adams to

his brother, Oct. 21, 1864.]

[Footnote 1253: See _ante_, p. 233.]

[Footnote 1254: Nov. 12, 1864.]

[Footnote 1255: Dec. 22, 1864.]

[Footnote 1256: Dec. 26, 1864. But this was in reality a mere "keeping

up courage" editorial. See Ch. XVIII, p. 300.]

[Footnote 1257: That this was very effective championship is shown by

Henry Adams' letter to his brother, Dec. 16, 1864. (_A Cycle of Adams'

Letters_, II, p. 232.) "Popular opinion here declares louder than ever

that Sherman is lost. People are quite angry at his presumption in

attempting such a wild project. The interest felt in his march is

enormous, however, and if he arrives as successfully as I expect, at the

sea, you may rely upon it that the moral effect of his demonstration on

Europe will be greater than that of any other event of the war."]

[Footnote 1258: State Department, Eng, Adams to Seward, Dec. 16, 1864.

Adams expressed to Seward doubts as to the propriety of his receiving

such deputations and making replies to them. _The Index_ (Dec. 22, 1864,

p. 808) was "indignant" that Adams should presume to "hector and

threaten" England through his replies. But Adams continued to receive

deputations.]

[Footnote 1259: Delane's position on the Civil War and the reasons for

the importance of Savannah to him, personally, are described in

Ch. XVIII.]

[Footnote 1260: Jan. 9, 1865.]

CHAPTER XVII

THE END OF THE WAR

"I think you need not trouble yourself about England. At this

moment opinion seems to have undergone a complete change, and

our people and indeed our Government is more moderately

disposed than I have ever before known it to be. I hear from

a member of the Government that it is believed that the

feeling between our Cabinet and the Washington Government has

been steadily improving[1261]."

Thus wrote Bright to Sumner in the last week of January, 1865. Three

weeks later he again wrote in reassurance against American rumours that

Europe was still planning some form of intervention to save the South:

"_All parties and classes_ here are resolved on a strict

neutrality[1262]...." This was a correct estimate. In spite of a

temporary pause in the operations of Northern armies and of renewed

assertions from the South that she "would never submit," British opinion

was now very nearly unanimous that the end was near. This verdict was

soon justified by events. In January, 1865, Wilmington, North Carolina,

was at last captured by a combined sea and land attack. Grant, though

since midsummer, 1864, held in check by Lee before Petersburg, was yet

known to be constantly increasing the strength of his army, while his

ability to strike when the time came was made evident by the freedom

with which his cavalry scoured the country about the Confederate

capital, Richmond--in one raid even completely encircling that city.

Steadily Lee's army lost strength by the attrition of the siege, by

illness and, what was worse, by desertion since no forces could be

spared from the fighting front to recover and punish the deserters.

Grant waited for the approach of spring, when, with the advance

northwards of the army at Savannah, the pincers could be applied to Lee,

to end, it was hoped, in writing _finis_ to the war.

From December 20, 1864, to February 1, 1865, Sherman remained in

Savannah, renewing by sea the strength of his army. On the latter date

he moved north along the coast, meeting at first no resistance and

easily overrunning the country. Columbia, capital of South Carolina, was

burned. Charleston was evacuated, and it was not until March, in North

Carolina, that any real opposition to the northward progress was

encountered. Here on the sixteenth and the nineteenth, Johnston, in

command of the weak Southern forces in North Carolina, made a desperate

effort to stop Sherman, but without avail, and on March 23, Sherman was

at Goldsboro, one hundred and sixty miles south of Richmond, prepared to

cut off the retreat of Lee when Grant should at last take up an

energetic offensive.

In the last week of March, Grant began cutting off supplies to Richmond,

thus forcing Lee, if he wished still to protect the Southern capital, to

come out of his lines at Petersburg and present an unfortified front.

The result was the evacuation of Petersburg and the abandonment of

Richmond, Jefferson Davis and his Government fleeing from the city on

the night of April 2. Attempting to retreat southwards with the plan of

joining Johnston's army, Lee, on April 9, found his forces surrounded at

Appomattox and surrendered. Nine days later, on April 18, Johnston

surrendered to Sherman at Durham, North Carolina. It was the end of the

war and of the Confederacy.

[Illustration: THE AMERICAN GLADIATORS-HABET! _Reproduced by permission

of the Proprietors of "Punch"_]

The rapidity with which Southern resistance in arms crumbled in 1865

when once Sherman and Grant were under way no doubt startled foreign

observers, but in British opinion, at least, the end had been foreseen

from the moment Sherman reached the sea at Savannah. The desperate

courage of the South was admired, but regarded as futile. Equally

desperate and futile was the last diplomatic effort of the Confederate

agents in Europe, taking the form of an offer to abolish slavery in

return for recognition. The plan originated with Benjamin, Southern

Secretary of State, was hesitatingly approved by Davis[1263], and was

committed to Mason for negotiation with Great Britain. Mason, after his

withdrawal from London, had been given duplicate powers in blank for any

point to which emergencies might send him, thus becoming a sort of

Confederate Commissioner at Large to Europe. Less than any other

representative abroad inclined to admit that slavery was other than a

beneficent and humane institution, it was felt advisable at Richmond not

only to instruct Mason by written despatch, but by personal messenger

also of the urgency of presenting the offer of abolition promptly and

with full assurance of carrying it into effect. The instruction was

therefore entrusted to Duncan F. Kenner, of Louisiana, and he arrived in

Paris early in March, 1865, overcame Mason's unwillingness to carry such

an offer to England, and accompanied the latter to London.

The time was certainly not propitious, for on the day Mason reached

London there came the news of the burning of Columbia and the evacuation

of Charleston. Mason hesitated to approach Palmerston, but was pressed

by Kenner who urged action on the theory that Great Britain did not wish

to see a reconstruction of the Union[1264]. Slidell, in Paris, on

receiving Mason's doubts, advised waiting until the Emperor had been

consulted, was granted an interview and reported Napoleon III as ready

as ever to act if England would act also, but as advising delay until

more favourable news was received from America[1265]. But Mason's

instructions did not permit delay; he must either carry them out or

resign--and Kenner was at his elbow pressing for action. On March 13,

therefore, Mason wrote to Palmerston asking for a private interview and

was promptly granted one for the day following.

Both personal disinclination to the proposal of abolition and judgment

that nothing would come of it made Mason cautious in expressing himself

to Palmerston. Mason felt that he was stultifying his country in

condemning slavery. Hence in roundabout language, "with such form of

allusion to the _concession_ we held in reserve, as would make him

necessarily comprehend it[1266]," and turning again and again to a

supposed "latent, undisclosed obstacle[1267]" to British recognition,

Mason yet made clear the object of his visit. The word slavery was not

mentioned by him, but Palmerston promptly denied that slavery in the

South had ever been, or was now, a barrier to recognition; British

objections to recognition were those which had long since been stated,

and there was nothing "underlying" them. On March 26, Mason called on

the Earl of Donoughmore, a Tory friend of the South with whom he had

long been in close touch, and asked whether he thought Palmerston's

Government could be induced by a Southern abolition of slavery to

recognize the Confederacy. The reply was "that the time had gone by

now...." This time the words "slavery" and "abolition" were spoken

boldly[1268], and Donoughmore was positive that if, in the midsummer of

1863, when Lee was invading Pennsylvania, the South had made its present

overture, nothing could have prevented British recognition. The opinion

clashed with Mason's own conviction, but in any case no more was to be

hoped, now, from his overture. Only a favourable turn in the war could

help the South.

There was no public knowledge in London of this "last card" Southern

effort in diplomacy, though there were newspaper rumours that some such

move was on foot, but with a primary motive of restoring Southern

fighting power by putting the negroes in arms. British public attention

was fixed rather upon a possible last-moment reconciliation of North and

South and a restored Union which should forget its domestic troubles in

a foreign war. Momentarily somewhat of a panic overcame London society

and gloomy were the forebodings that Great Britain would be the chosen

enemy of America. Like rumours were afloat at Washington also. The

Russian Minister, Stoeckl, reported to his Government that he had

learned from "a sure source" of representations made to Jefferson Davis

by Blair, a prominent Unionist and politician of the border state of

Maryland, looking to reconstruction and to the sending by Lincoln of

armies into Canada and Mexico. Stoeckl believed such a war would be

popular, but commented that "Lincoln might change his mind[1269]

to-morrow." In London the _Army and Navy Gazette_ declared that Davis

could not consent to reunion and that Lincoln could not offer any other

terms of peace, but that a truce might be patched up on the basis of a

common aggression against supposed foreign enemies[1270]. Adams pictured

all British society as now convinced that the end of the war was near,

and bitter against the previous tone and policy of such leaders of

public opinion as the _Times_, adding that it was being "whispered about

that if the feud is reconciled and the Union restored, and a great army

left on our hands, the next manifestation will be one of hostility to

this country[1271]."

The basis of all this rumour was Blair's attempt to play the mediator.

He so far succeeded that on January 31, 1865, Lincoln instructed Seward

to go to Fortress Monroe to meet "commissioners" appointed by Davis. But

Lincoln made positive in his instructions three points:

(1) Complete restoration of the Union.

(2) No receding on emancipation.

(3) No cessation of hostilities "short of an end of the war,

and the disbanding of all forces hostile to the Government."

A few days later the President decided that his own presence was

desirable and joined his Secretary of State in the "Hampton Roads

Conference" of February 3. It quickly appeared that the Confederates did

indeed hope to draw the North into a foreign war for a "traditional

American object," using the argument that _after_ such a war restoration

of the Union would be easily accomplished. The enemy proposed was not

Great Britain but France, and the place of operations Mexico. There was

much discussion of this plan between Seward and Stephens, the leading

Southern Commissioner, but Lincoln merely listened, and when pressed for

comment stuck fast to his decision that no agreement whatever would be

entered into until the South had laid down its arms. The Southerners

urged that there was precedent for an agreement in advance of cessation

of hostilities in the negotiations between Charles I and the Roundheads.

Lincoln's reply was pithy: "I do not profess to be posted in history. On

all such matters I turn you over to Seward. All I distinctly recollect

about the case of Charles I is that he lost his head in the end[1272]."

When news of the holding of this conference reached England there

occurred a panic on the Stock Exchange due to the uncertainty created by

the prospect of an immediate end of the American War. "The

consternation," wrote Adams, "was extraordinary[1273]." What did the

United States intend to do? "The impression is now very general that

peace and restoration at home are synonymous with war with this

country." There existed an "extraordinary uneasiness and indefinite

apprehension as to the future." So reported Adams to Seward; and he

advised that it might be well for the United States "to consider the

question how far its policy may be adapted to quiet this disturbance";

due allowance should be made for the mortification of those leaders who

had been so confident of Southern victory and for expressions that might

now fall from their lips; it was possible that reassurances given by the

United States might aid in the coming elections in retaining the

Government in power--evidently, in Adams' opinion, a result to be

desired[1274].

Adams' advice as to the forthcoming elections was but repetition of that

given earlier and with more emphasis[1275]. Apparently Seward was then

in no mood to act on it, for his reply was distinctly belligerent in

tone, recapitulating British and Canadian offences in permitting the

enemy to use their shores, and asserting that the measures now proposed

of abrogating the reciprocity treaty of 1854 with Canada and the

agreement of 1817 prohibiting armaments on the Great Lakes, were but

defensive measures required to protect American soil[1276]. These

matters Adams had been instructed to take up with Russell, but with

discretion as to time and he had ventured to postpone them as

inopportune. Professing entire agreement with the justice of Seward's

complaints he nevertheless wrote that to press them "at this moment

would be only playing into the hands of the mischief-makers, and

disarming our own friends[1277]." The day before this was written home

Seward, at Washington, on March 8, recalled his instruction as to the

agreement of 1817, stating that Russell might be informed the United

States had no intention of increasing its armaments on the Great

Lakes[1278].

Thus there were incidents offering ground for a British excitement over

a prospective war with America, even though no such intention was

seriously entertained by the North. The British Government did not share

this fear, but Delane, of the _Times_, kept it alive in the public mind,

and indeed was sincere in efforts to arouse his readers to the danger.

"I do not know what grounds Delane has for it," wrote W.H. Russell to

his American friend Bigelow, "but he is quite sure Uncle Samuel is about

to finish off the dreadful Civil War with another war with us scarcely

less horrible[1279]." Governmental circles, however, belittled the

agitation. Burnley, temporarily representing England at Washington, was

assured by Seward, and so reported, that all these rumours of a foreign

war were of Southern origin, had in fact been actually elaborated at the

Hampton Roads Conference, but were perfectly understood by the North as

but part of the Southern game, and that the Southern offer had been

flatly refused[1280]. In a parliamentary debate in the Commons on March

13, arising out of governmental estimates for military expenditures in

Canada, opportunity was given for a discussion of relations with

America. A few Members gave voice to the fear of war, but the general

tone of the debate was one of confidence in the continuance of peaceful

relations. Bright, in a vigorous and witty speech, threw right and left

criticisms of Parliament, the Press, and individuals, not sparing

members of the Government, but expressed the utmost confidence in the

pacific policy of Lincoln. As one known to be in close touch with

America his words carried weight[1281]. Palmerston gave assurances that

the present relations between the two Governments were perfectly

friendly and satisfactory. The effect of the debate, reported Adams, was

to quiet the panic[1282], yet at the same time England was now awake to

and somewhat alarmed by, America's "prodigious development of physical

power during the war." To quiet this, Adams recommended "prudence and

moderation in tone[1283]."

Thus the actual cessation of hostilities in America and the possible

effect of this event on foreign relations had been for some time

anticipated and estimated in Great Britain[1284]. The news of Lee's

surrender, therefore, caused no great surprise since the _Times_ and

other papers had been preparing the public for it[1285]. Newspaper

comment on the event followed closely that of the _Times_, rendering

honour to the militant qualities of the South and to Lee, but writing

_finis_ to the war:

"Such is the end of the great army which, organized by the

extraordinary genius of one man, aided by several other

commanders of eminent ability, has done such wonders in this

war. Not even the Grand Army of Napoleon himself could count

a series of more brilliant victories than the force which,

raised chiefly from the high-spirited population of Virginia,

has defeated so many invasions of the State, and crushed the

hopes of so many Northern generals. Chief and soldiers have

now failed for the first and last time. They were victorious

until victory was no longer to be achieved by human valour,

and then they fell with honour[1286]."

The people of the North, also, were complimented for their slowly

developed but ultimate ability in war, and especially for "a patience, a

fortitude, and an energy which entitle them to rank among the very first

of military nations[1287]." No one remained to uphold the Southern

banner in Europe save the Confederate agents, and, privately, even they

were hopeless. Mason, it is true, asserted, as if bolstering his own

courage, that "this morning's" news did not mean an overwhelming

disaster; it could not be wholly true; even if true it must mean peace

on the basis of separation; finally, "5th. _I know_ that no terms of

peace would be accepted that did not embrace independence." But at the

conclusion of this letter he acknowledged:

"I confess that all this speculation rests on, what I assume,

that Lee surrendered only in expectation of a peace derived

from his interview with Grant--and that no terms of peace

would be entertained that did not rest on

_independence_[1288]."

But Slidell saw more clearly. He replied:

"I cannot share your hopefulness. We have seen the beginning

of the end. I, for my part, am prepared for the worst. With

Lee's surrender there will soon be an end to our regular

organized armies and I can see no possible good to result

from a protracted guerilla warfare. We are crushed and must

submit to the yoke. Our children must bide their time for

vengeance, but you and I will never revisit our homes under

our glorious flag. For myself I shall never put my foot on a

soil from which flaunts the hated Stars and Stripes.... I am

sick, sick at heart[1289]."

The news of Lee's surrender arrived at the same moment with that of a

serious injury to Seward in a runaway accident, and in its editorial on

the end of the war the _Times_ took occasion to pay a tribute to the

statesman whom it had been accustomed to berate.

"There seems to be on the part of President Lincoln a desire

to conciliate vanquished fellow-citizens. Under the guidance

of Mr. Seward, who has creditably distinguished himself in

the Cabinet by his moderate counsels, and whose life will, we

trust, be spared at this crisis to the Union, he may by

gentle measures restore tranquillity, and perhaps, before his

term of office expires, calm in some degree the animosities

which have been raised by these years of war[1290]."

Nor was this insincere, for Seward had, first in the estimate of British

statesmen, more slowly in the press and with the public, come to be

regarded in an aspect far different from that with which he was

generally viewed in 1861. There was real anxiety at the reports of

Seward's accident, but when, in less than a week, there was received

also the news of the assassination of Lincoln and of the brutal attack

on Seward, all England united in expressions of sympathy and horror.

"Few events of the present century," wrote Adams, "have created such

general consternation and indignation[1291]."

In Ford's Theatre on the evening of April 14, Lincoln was shot by Booth,

a fanatical Southerner, who had gained entrance to the box where the

President was sitting. Lincoln died early the next morning. On the same

evening, at about ten o'clock, an unknown man was admitted to Seward's

house on the plea that he had a message from the physician, passed

upstairs, but was stopped by Seward's son at the door of the sick room.

Beating the son into semi-unconsciousness with a revolver which had

missed fire, the stranger burst open the door, attacked the Secretary as

he lay in bed with a bowie-knife, slashing at his throat, until Seward

rolled off the bed to the floor. Seward's throat was "cut on both sides,

his right cheek nearly severed from his face"; his life was saved,

probably, because of an iron frame worn to support the jaw fractured in

the runaway accident nine days before[1292]. The assailant fought his

way out of the house and escaped. For some days Seward's life was

despaired of, whether from his injuries or from shock.

These tragic occurrences were the outcome of a revengeful spirit in the

hearts of a few extreme Southerners, and in no sense represented the

feeling of the South. It was inevitable, however, that abroad so

horrible a crime should react both to the detriment of the Confederacy

and to the advantage of the North. Sympathy with the North took the form

of a sudden exaltation of the personality of Lincoln, bringing out

characterizations of the man far different from those which had been his

earlier in the war. The presence of a "rural attorney" in the

Presidential office had seemed like the irony of fate in the great

crisis of 1861. Even so acute an observer as Lyons could then write,

"Mr. Lincoln has not hitherto given proof of his possessing any natural

talents to compensate for his ignorance of everything but Illinois

village politics. He seems to be well meaning and conscientious, in the

measure of his understanding, but not much more[1293]." But Lyons was no

more blind than his contemporaries, for nearly all characterizations,

whether American or foreign, were of like nature.

But the slow progress of the years of war had brought a different

estimate of Lincoln--a curious blending of admiration for the growth of

his personal authority and for his steadiness of purpose, with criticism

of his alleged despotism. Now, with his death, following so closely the

collapse of the Confederacy, there poured out from British press and

public a great stream of laudation for Lincoln almost amounting to a

national recantation. In this process of "whitening Abraham's tomb," as

a few dyed-in-the-wool Southern sympathizers called it, _Punch_ led the

way in a poem by Tom Taylor:

"_You_ lay a wreath on murdered Lincoln's bier,

_You_, who with mocking pencil wont to trace,

Broad for the self-complacent British sneer,

His length of shambling limb, his furrowed face."

* * * * *

"Yes, he had lived to shame me from my sneer,

To lame my pencil and confute my pen--

To make me own this hind of princes peer,

This rail-splitter a true-born king of men[1294]."

Less emotional than most papers, but with a truer estimate of Lincoln,

stood the _Times_. Severely reprobating the act of Booth and prophesying

a disastrous effect in the treatment of the conquered South, it

proceeded:

"Starting from a humble position to one of the greatest

eminence, and adopted by the Republican party as a

make-shift, simply because Mr. Seward and their other

prominent leaders were obnoxious to different sections of

the party, it was natural that his career should be watched

with jealous suspicion. The office cast upon him was great,

its duties most onerous, and the obscurity of his past career

afforded no guarantee of his ability to discharge them. His

shortcomings moreover were on the surface. The education of a

man whose early years had been spent in earning bread by

manual labour had necessarily been defective, and faults of

manner and errors of taste repelled the observer at the

outset. In spite of these drawbacks, Mr. Lincoln slowly won

for himself the respect and confidence of all. His perfect

honesty speedily became apparent, and, what is, perhaps, more

to his credit, amid the many unstudied speeches which he was

called upon from time to time to deliver, imbued though they

were with the rough humour of his early associates, he was in

none of them betrayed into any intemperance of language

towards his opponents or towards neutrals. His utterances

were apparently careless, but his tongue was always under

command. The quality of Mr. Lincoln's administration which

served, however, more than any other to enlist the sympathy

of bystanders was its conservative progress. He felt his way

gradually to his conclusions, and those who will compare the

different stages of his career one with another will find

that his mind was growing throughout the course of it."

* * * * *

"The gradual change of his language and of his policy was

most remarkable. Englishmen learnt to respect a man who

showed the best characteristics of their race in his respect

for what is good in the past, acting in unison with a

recognition of what was made necessary by the events of

passing history[1295]."

This was first reaction. Two days later, commenting on the far warmer

expressions of horror and sympathy emanating from all England, there

appeared another and longer editorial:

"If anything could mitigate the distress of the American

people in their present affliction, it might surely be the

sympathy which is expressed by the people of this country. We

are not using the language of hyperbole in describing the

manifestation of feeling as unexampled. Nothing like it has

been witnessed in our generation.... But President Lincoln

was only the chief of a foreign State, and of a State with

which we were not infrequently in diplomatic or political

collision. He might have been regarded as not much more to us

than the head of any friendly Government, and yet his end has

already stirred the feelings of the public to their

uttermost depths."

* * * * *

"... a space of twenty-four hours has sufficed not only to

fill the country with grief and indignation, but to evoke

almost unprecedented expressions of feeling from constituted

bodies. It was but on Wednesday that the intelligence of the

murder reached us, and on Thursday the Houses of Lords and

Commons, the Corporation of the City of London, and the

people of our chief manufacturing towns in public meeting

assembled had recorded their sentiments or expressed their

views. In the House of Lords the absence of precedent for

such a manifestation was actually made the subject of remark.

"That much of this extraordinary feeling is due to the

tragical character of the event and the horror with which the

crime is regarded is doubtless true, nor need we dissemble

the the fact that the loss which the Americans have sustained

is also thought our own loss in so far as one valuable

guarantee for the amity of the two nations may have been thus

removed. But, upon the whole, it is neither the possible

embarrassment of international relations nor the infamous

wickedness of the act itself which has determined public

feeling. The preponderating sentiment is sincere and genuine

sympathy--- sorrow for the chief of a great people struck

down by an assassin, and sympathy for that people in the

trouble which at a crisis of their destinies such a

catastrophe must bring. Abraham Lincoln was as little of a

tyrant as any man who ever lived. He could have been a tyrant

had he pleased, but he never uttered so much as an

ill-natured speech.... In all America there was, perhaps, not

one man who less deserved to be the victim of this revolution

than he who has just fallen[1296]."

The Ministry did not wait for public pressure. Immediately on receipt

of the news, motions were made, April 27, in both Lords and Commons for

an address to the Queen, to be debated "Monday next," expressing "sorrow

and indignation" at the assassination of Lincoln[1297]. April 28,

Russell instructed Bruce to express at Washington that "the Government,

the Parliament, and the Nation are affected by a unanimous feeling of

abhorrence of the criminals guilty of these cowardly and atrocious

crimes, and sympathy for the Government and People of the United

States[1298]...." Russell wrote here of both Lincoln and Seward. The

Queen wrote a personal letter of sympathy to Mrs. Lincoln. Already Bruce

had written from Washington that Lincoln "was the only friend of the

South in his party[1299]," and he was extremely anxious that Seward's

recovery might be hastened, fearing the possibility of Sumner's

assumption of the Secretaryship of State. "We miss terribly the

comparative moderation of Lincoln and Seward[1300]."

[Illustration: BRITANNIA SYMPATHISES WITH COLUMBIA. _Reproduced by

permission of the Proprietors of "Punch"_]

The American Minister naturally became the centre toward which the

public outpouring of sympathy was directed. "The excitement in this

country has been deep and wide, spreading through all classes of

society. My table is piled high with cards, letters and

resolutions[1301]...." Indeed all the old sources of "addresses" to

Adams on emancipation and many organizations having no professed

interest in that subject now sent to him resolutions--the emancipation

societies, of horror, indignation, and even accusation against the

South; the others of sympathy, more moderate in tone, yet all

evincing an appreciation of the great qualities of Lincoln and of the

justice of the cause of the North, now victorious. Within two weeks

Adams reported over four hundred such addresses from Emancipation

Societies, Chambers of Commerce, Trades Unions, municipalities,

boroughs, churches, indeed from every known type of British

organizations[1302].

On May 1 the motion for the address to the Crown came up for debate. In

the Lords, Russell emphasized the kindly and forgiving qualities of

Lincoln as just those needed in America, and now lost by his death.

Derby, for the Opposition, expressed the horror of the world at Booth's

act, joined in expressions of sympathy to the United States, but

repeated the old phrase about the "North fighting for empire, the South

for independence," and hinted that the unusual step now being taken by

Parliament had in it a "political object," meaning that the motion had

been introduced in the hope of easing American irritation with Great

Britain[1303]. It was not a tactful speech, but Derby's lieutenant in

the Commons, Disraeli, saved his party from criticism by what was

distinctly the most thoughtful and best-prepared utterance of the day.

Palmerston was ill. The Government speech was made by Grey, who

incautiously began by asserting that the majority of the people of Great

Britain had always been on the side of the North and was met by cries of

"No, no" and "Hear, hear." Disraeli concluded the debate. He said:

"There are rare instances when the sympathy of a nation

approaches those tenderer feelings that generally speaking,

are supposed to be peculiar to the individual, and to form

the happy privilege of private life; and this is one. Under

all circumstances we should have bewailed the catastrophe at

Washington; under all circumstances we should have shuddered

at the means by which it was accomplished. But in the

character of the victim, and even in the accessories of his

last moments there is something so homely and so innocent

that it takes as it were the subject out of all the pomp of

history and the ceremonial of diplomacy; it touches the heart

of nations, and appeals to the domestic sentiment of mankind.

"Sir, whatever the various and varying opinions in this

House, and in the country generally on the policy of the late

President of the United States, on this, I think, all must

agree, that in one of the severest trials which ever tested

the moral qualities of man, he fulfilled his duty with

simplicity and strength. Nor is it possible for the people of

England, at such a moment, to forget that he sprang from the

same fatherland, and spoke the same mother tongue.

"When such crimes are perpetrated the public mind is apt to

fall into gloom and perplexity; for it is ignorant alike of

the causes and the consequences of such deeds. But it is one

of our duties to reassure the country under unreasoning panic

or despondency. Assassination has never changed the history

of the world....

"In expressing our unaffected and profound sympathy with the

citizens of the United States at the untimely end of their

elected Chief, let us not, therefore, sanction any feeling of

depression, but rather let us express a fervent hope that

from out the awful trials of the last four years, of which

not the least is this violent demise, the various populations

of North America may issue elevated and chastened; rich in

that accumulated wisdom, and strong in that disciplined

energy which a young nation can only acquire in a protracted

and perilous struggle. Then they will be enabled not merely

to renew their career of power and prosperity, but they will

renew it to contribute to the general happiness of mankind.

It is with these feelings, Sir, that I second the Address to

the Crown[1304]."

Lincoln's assassination served to bring out not only British popular

sympathy, but also the certitude that the war was over and the North

victorious. But officially the Government had not yet recognized this.

Even as early as January, 1865, Seward had returned to the old proposal

that the nations of Europe should withdraw their recognition of

Southern belligerent rights[1305], and in March he had asked Stoeckl,

the Russian Minister, whether Russia would not lead in the suggestion of

this measure to England and France[1306]. Meanwhile Sherman's army was

rapidly advancing northward and reports were arriving of its pillagings

and burnings. March 20, Gregory asked in the Commons whether the

Government was taking any steps to prevent the destruction of British

property and received from Layard an evasive reply. Merely a "confident

hope" had been expressed to the United States that "every facility will

be given" to British subjects to prove ownership of property[1307].

Evidently the Government was not eager to raise irritating questions at

a moment when all eyes were strained to observe the concluding events

of the war.

Then came the news of Lee's surrender and of the assassination of

Lincoln, with the attack on Seward, already incapacitated from active

duties. Seward's illness delayed American pressure on England--a

fortunate circumstance in the relations with Great Britain in that it

gave time for a clearer appreciation of the rapidity and completeness of

the collapse of the South. May 15, Lord Houghton asked whether the

Government did not intend, in view of recent events in America, "to

withdraw the admission of belligerent rights conceded to the so-called

Confederate States." Russell promptly objected to the form of the

question: England had not "conceded" any rights to the South--she had

merely issued a proclamation of neutrality after Lincoln had declared

the existence of a war by proclaiming a blockade. England had had no

other recourse, unless she chose to refuse recognition of the blockade,

and this would have drawn her into the war. As to a withdrawal of the

neutrality proclamation this must wait upon official announcement from

the United States that the war was at an end. Texas was still in arms

and Galveston still blockaded, and for this section the United States

would no doubt continue to exercise on neutral vessels a belligerent

right of search. It followed that if Great Britain did prematurely

withdraw her proclamation of neutrality and the United States searched a

British vessel, it would be the exercise of a right of search in time of

peace--an act against which Great Britain would be bound to make

vigorous protest. Hence England must wait on American action proclaiming

the end of the war. Russell concluded by expressing gratification at the

prospect of peace[1308].

But matters were not to take this orderly and logical course. Seward,

though still extremely weak and confined to his home, was eager to

resume the duties of office, and on May 9 a Cabinet was held at his

house. A week later Bruce wrote to Russell in some anxiety that America

was about to _demand_ the withdrawal by Great Britain of belligerent

rights to the South, that if Great Britain would but act before such a

demand was made it would serve to continue the existing good feeling in

America created by the sympathy over Lincoln's death, and especially,

that there was a decided danger to good relations in the fact that

Confederate cruisers were still at large. He urged that orders should be

sent to stop their presence in British colonial ports securing coal and

supplies[1309]. Three days later Bruce repeated his warning[1310]. This

was, apparently, a complication unforeseen at the Foreign Office. In any

case Russell at once made a complete face-about from the policy he had

outlined in reply to Lord Houghton. On May 30 he instructed Cowley in

Paris to notify France that England thought the time had arrived for

recognition that the war was ended and laid special stress upon the

question of Confederate cruisers still at sea and their proper treatment

in British ports[1311]. Thus having given to France notice of his

intention, but without waiting for concurrent action, Russell, on June

2, issued instructions to the Admiralty that the war was ended and

stated the lines upon which the Confederate cruisers were to be

treated[1312]. Here was prompt, even hurried, action though the only

additional event of war in America which Russell could at the moment

cite to warrant his change of policy was the capture of Jefferson Davis.

On the same day Russell wrote to Bruce stating what had been done and

recognizing the "re-establishment of peace within the whole territory of

which the United States, before the commencement of the civil war, were

in undisturbed possession[1313]."

This sudden shift by the Government did not escape Derby's caustic

criticism. June 12, he referred in Parliament to Houghton's previous

inquiry and Russell's answer, asking why the Government had not stuck to

its earlier position and calling attention to the fact that the United

States, while now proclaiming certain ports open to trade, yet specified

others as still closed and threatened with punishment as pirates, any

vessel attempting to enter them. Derby desired information as to what

the Government had done about this remarkable American proclamation.

Russell, "who was very imperfectly heard," answered that undoubtedly it

was embarrassing that no "regular communication" had been received from

America giving notice of the end of the war, but that the two

Confederate cruisers still at sea and the entrance of one of them to

various Australian ports had compelled some British action. He had

consulted Adams, who had no instructions but felt confident the United

States would soon formally declare the end of the war. The "piracy

proclamation" was certainly a strange proceeding. Derby pushed for an

answer as to whether the Government intended to let it go by unnoticed.

Russell replied that a despatch from Bruce showed that "notice" had been

taken of it. Derby asked whether the papers would be presented to

Parliament; Russell "was understood to reply in the affirmative[1314]."

Derby's inquiry was plainly merely a hectoring of Russell for his quick

shift from the position taken a month earlier. But the very indifference

of Russell to this attack, his carelessness and evasion in reply,

indicate confidence that Parliament was as eager as the Government to

satisfy the North and to avoid friction. The only actual "notice" taken

by Bruce at Washington of the "piracy proclamation" was in fact, to

report it to Russell, commenting that it was "unintelligible" and

probably a mere attempt to frighten foreign ship-owners[1315]. Russell

instructed Bruce not to ask for an explanation since Galveston had been

captured subsequent to the date of the proclamation and there was

presumably no port left where it could be applied[1316].

In truth the actual events of the closing days of the war had outrun

diplomatic action by America. Scattered Southern forces still in the

field surrendered with an unexpected rapidity, while at Washington all

was temporarily in confusion upon the death of Lincoln and the illness

of Seward. Bruce's advice had been wise and the prompt action of Russell

fortunate. Seward at once accepted Russell's notification of June 2 as

ending British neutrality. While again insisting upon the essential

injustice of the original concession of belligerent rights to the South,

and objecting to some details in the instructions to the Admiralty, he

yet admitted that normal relations were again established and

acknowledged that the United States could no longer exercise a right of

search[1317]. July 4, Russell presented this paper to Parliament,

reading that portion in which Seward expressed his pleasure that the

United States could now enter again upon normal relations with Great

Britain[1318]. Two days later Russell wrote to Bruce that he had not

expected Seward to acknowledge the rightfulness of England's neutrality

position, pointed out that his Admiralty instructions were misunderstood

and were less objectionable than appeared and concluded by the

expression of a hope for the "establishment of a lasting and intimate

friendship between the two nations[1319]."

* * * * *

Great Britain, wrote the Russian Minister in Washington in January,

1860, was about to experience one of those "strokes of fortune" which

occurred but rarely in the history of nations, in the approaching

dissolution of the American Union. She alone, of all the nations of the

world, would benefit by it in the expansion of her power, hitherto

blocked by the might of the United States. Broken into two or more

hostile pieces America would be at the mercy of England, to become her

plaything. "The Cabinet of London is watching attentively the internal

dissensions of the Union and awaits the result with an impatience which

it has difficulty in disguising." Great Britain would soon, in return

for cotton, give recognition to the South and, if required, armed

support. For this same cotton she would oppose emancipation of the

slaves. The break-up of the Union was no less than a disaster for all

nations save England, since hitherto the "struggle" between England and

the United States "has been the best guarantee against the ambitious

projects and political egotism of the Anglo-Saxon race[1320]."

This prophecy, made over a year in advance of events, was repeated

frequently as the crisis in America approached and during the first two

years of the war. Stoeckl was not solitary in such opinion. The French

Minister of Foreign Affairs held it also--and the French Emperor puzzled

himself in vain to discover why Great Britain, in furtherance of her own

interests, did not eagerly accept his overtures for a vigorous joint

action in support of the South[1321].

The preceding chapters of this work will have shown how unfounded was

such prophecy. Stoeckl was behind the times, knowing nothing,

apparently, of that positive change in British policy in the late

'fifties which resulted in a determination to cease opposition to the

expansion of American power. Such opposition was then acknowledged to

have been an error and in its place there sprang into being a conviction

that the might of America would tend toward the greatness of England

itself[1322]. In the months preceding the outbreak of the Civil War all

British governmental effort was directed toward keeping clear of the

quarrel and toward conciliation of the two sections. No doubt there were

those in Great Britain who rejoiced at the rupture between North and

South, but they were not in office and had no control of British policy.

The war once begun, the Government, anxious to keep clear of it, was

prompt in proclaiming neutrality and hastened this step for fear of

maritime complications with that one of the belligerents, the North,

which alone possessed a naval force. But the British Ministry, like that

of every other European state, believed that a revolution for

independence when undertaken by a people so numerous and powerful as

that of the South, must ultimately succeed. Hence as the war dragged on,

the Ministry, pressed from various angles at home, ventured, with much

uncertainty, upon a movement looking toward mediation. Its desire was

first of all for the restoration of world peace, nor can any other

motive be discovered in Russell's manoeuvres. This attempt, fortunately

for America and, it may be believed, for the world, was blocked by cool

heads within the Ministry itself. There was quick and, as it proved,

permanent readjustment of policy to the earlier decision not to meddle

in the American crisis.

This very failure to meddle was cause of great complaint by both North

and South, each expectant, from divergent reasons, of British sympathy

and aid. The very anger of the North at British "cold neutrality" is

evidence of how little America, feeling the ties of race and sentiment,

could have understood the mistaken view-point of diplomats like Stoeckl,

who dwelt in realms of "reasons of state," unaffected by popular

emotions. Aside from race, which could be claimed also by the South, the

one great argument of the North in appeal to England lay in the cry of

anti-slavery. But the leaders of the North denied its pertinence. Itself

unsympathetic with the emotions of emancipation societies at home, the

British Government settled down by the end of 1862 to a fixed policy of

strict neutrality.

In all this the Government but pursued that line which is the business

of Governments--the preservation of the prosperity and power of the

state. With the unexpected prolongation of the war and the British

recognition of the Northern "will to conquer" there came, as is evident

from a scrutiny of Russell's diplomatic tone and acts, a growing belief

that the North might after all succeed in its purpose, at least of

subjugating the South. This would mean the possibility of continuing

that policy of friendship for a united America which had been determined

upon in the 'fifties. Here was no special sympathy, but merely a cool

calculation of benefits to Great Britain, but there can be no question

that the general attitude of the Government by midsummer of 1863 was

distinctly favourable to a restored Union. A "friendly neutrality" began

to replace a "cold neutrality."

But it is the business of Governments not merely to guard national

interests and prosperity; they also must guard their own authority and

seek to remain in political power. Here emancipation, never greatly

stirring the leaders, whether Whig or Tory, exercised an increasing

pressure by the force of public approval. It made impossible any attempt

to overthrow the Ministry on the score of non-interference in America,

or of favouritism toward the North. It gave to an enthusiastic and

vociferous section of the British public just ground for strong support

of Lincoln and his cause, and in some degree it affected

governmental attitude.

There was, however, another question, much more vital than emancipation

in its relation to British home politics, that ran like a constant

thread through the whole pattern of British public attitude toward

America. It had always been so since the days of the American revolution

and now was accentuated by the American war. This was the question of

the future of democracy. Was its fate bound up with the result of that

war? And if so where lay British interest? Always present in the minds

of thoughtful Englishmen, appearing again and again through each

changing phase of the war, this question was so much a constant that to

have attempted discussion of it while other topics were being treated,

would have resulted in repetition and confusion. It is therefore made

the subject of a separate and concluding chapter.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1261: Bright to Sumner, Jan. 26, 1865 (Mass. Hist. Soc.

_Proceedings_, XLVI, p. 132).]

[Footnote 1262: To Sumner, Feb. 17, 1865 (_Ibid._, p. 133).]

[Footnote 1263: Dodd, _Jefferson Davis_, p. 343]

[Footnote 1264: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, March 4, 1865.]

[Footnote 1265: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, March 5 and 6, 1865.]

[Footnote 1266: _Ibid._, Mason to Slidell, March 15, 1865.]

[Footnote 1267: Mason to Benjamin, March 31, 1865. (Richardson, II, pp.

709-17.)]

[Footnote 1268: _Ibid._, p. 717.]

[Footnote 1269: Russian Archives. Stoeckl to F.O., Jan. 24, 1865. No.

187. It is interesting that just at this time Gortchakoff should have

sent to Stoeckl the copy of a memorandum by one, C. Catacazy, employé of

the Foreign Office and long-time resident in the United States, in which

was outlined a plan of a Russian offer of mediation. The memorandum

specified that such an offer should be based on the idea that the time

had come for a complete restoration of the Union and argued that both

North and South regarded Russia as a special friend; it was Russia's

interest to see the Union restored as a balance to Great Britain.

Gortchakoff's comment was favourable, but he left it wholly to Stoeckl's

judgment and discretion to act upon the plan. (Russian Archives. F.O. to

Stoeckl, Feb. 6, 1865.)]

[Footnote 1270: Feb. 4, 1865.]

[Footnote 1271: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, 254. To his son, Feb.

10, 1865.]

[Footnote 1272: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, pp. 410-14.]

[Footnote 1273: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, 256. To his son, Feb.

17, 1865.]

[Footnote 1274: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1865-66, Pt. I, p. 182.

Adams to Seward, Feb. 23, 1865.]

[Footnote 1275: _Ibid._, p. 112. Adams to Seward, Feb. 2, 1865.]

[Footnote 1276: _Ibid._, p. 180. Seward to Adams, Feb. 21, 1865.]

[Footnote 1277: _Ibid._, p. 199. Adams to Seward, March 9, 1865.]

[Footnote 1278: _Ibid._, p. 197. Seward to Adams, March 8, 1865.]

[Footnote 1279: March 8, 1865. (Bigelow, _Retrospections_, II, p. 361.)]

[Footnote 1280: Russell Papers. Burnley to Russell, Feb. 23 and March

13, 1865.]

[Footnote 1281: "The speech of Mr. Bright is universally admitted to

have been one of the most brilliant specimens of his peculiar style of

oratory. In its reminiscences, equally unwelcome to both sides of the

House, it was yet received after the fashion of an unpleasant medicine,

which has the aid of a strong and savoury medium to overwhelm the

nauseous taste." (_U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1865-66, Pt. I, p. 246.

Adams to Seward, March 16, 1865.)]

[Footnote 1282: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 1283: _Ibid._, p. 262. Adams to Seward, March 24, 1865. Adams

wrote of his own situation that it "seems at last to be getting easy and

comfortable, so far as freedom from anxiety is concerned." (_A Cycle of

Adams' Letters_, II, p. 258. To his son, March 24, 1865.)]

[Footnote 1284: Bruce, who succeeded Lyons at Washington, reached New

York on April 7. His first letter to Russell from Washington, dated

April 14, stated that America was certainly preparing to oust Maximilian

in Mexico, and that even the Southern prisoners were eager to join the

United States troops in an expedition for this purpose.

(Russell Papers.)]

[Footnote 1285: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1865-66, Part II, p. 323.

Adams to Seward, April 20, 1865.]

[Footnote 1286: April 24, 1865.]

[Footnote 1287: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 1288: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, April 23, 1865.]

[Footnote 1289: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, April 26, 1865.]

[Footnote 1290: April 24, 1865.]

[Footnote 1291: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1865-66, Pt. I, p. 331.

Adams to Seward, April 28, 1865.]

[Footnote 1292: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 417.]

[Footnote 1293: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April 9, 1861.]

[Footnote 1294: May 6, 1865.]

[Footnote 1295: April 27, 1865.]

[Footnote 1296: April 29, 1865.]

[Footnote 1297: Hansard, 3d. Ser., CLXXVIII, pp. 1073 and 1081.]

[Footnote 1298: _Parliamentary Papers, 1865, Commons_, Vol. LVII.

"Correspondence respecting the Assassination of the late President of

the United States."]

[Footnote 1299: Russell Papers. Bruce to Russell, April 18, 1865.]

[Footnote 1300: _Ibid._, April 24, 1865.]

[Footnote 1301: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, 267. Charles Francis

Adams to his son, April 28, 1865.]

[Footnote 1302: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1865-66_, Pt. I, pp. 344,

361. Adams to Hunter, May 4 and May 11, 1865.]

[Footnote 1303: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXVIII, p. 1219.]

[Footnote 1304: _Ibid._, pp. 1242-46.]

[Footnote 1305: Russell Papers. Burnley to Russell, Jan. 16, 1865.]

[Footnote 1306: Russian Archives. Stoeckl to F.O., March 1-13, 1865. No.

523. Stoeckl was opposed to this.]

[Footnote 1307: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXVII, p. 1922.]

[Footnote 1308: _Ibid._, CLXXIX, p. 286.]

[Footnote 1309: F.O., Am., Vol. 1018. No. 297. Bruce to Russell, May 16,

1865.]

[Footnote 1310: _Ibid._, No. 303. Bruce to Russell, May 19, 1865.]

[Footnote 1311: _Parliamentary Papers, 1865, Commons_, Vol. LVII.

"Further Correspondence respecting the Cessation of Civil War in North

America." No. 10.]

[Footnote 1312: _Ibid._, "Correspondence respecting the Cessation of

Civil War in North America."]

[Footnote 1313: _Ibid._, "Further Correspondence respecting the

Cessation of Civil War in North America." No. 9.]

[Footnote 1314: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXX, pp. 1-6.]

[Footnote 1315: _Parliamentary Papers, 1865, Commons_, Vol. LVII.

"Correspondence respecting President's Proclamation of 22nd May, 1865."

Bruce to Russell, May 26, 1865.]

[Footnote 1316: _Ibid._, June 16, 1865.]

[Footnote 1317: _Ibid._, "Further Correspondence respecting the

Cessation of Civil War in North America." No. 9. Seward to Bruce, June

19, 1865.]

[Footnote 1318: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXX, p. 1143.]

[Footnote 1319: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1865, _Commons_, Vol. LVII.

"Further Correspondence respecting the Cessation of Civil War in North

America." No. 10.]

[Footnote 1320: Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Dec. 23, 1859/Jan. 4,

1860. No. 146.]

[Footnote 1321: _Ibid._, Stoeckl to F.O., Jan. 17-29, 1861. No. 267. He

reports that he has seen a confidential letter from Thouvenel to Mercier

outlining exactly his own ideas as to England being the sole gainer by

the dissolution of the Union.]

[Footnote 1322: For an analysis of this change see _The Cambridge

History of British Foreign Policy_, Vol II, p. 277, which also quotes a

remarkable speech by Disraeli.]