enter into negotiations with foreign powers for co-operation in
recognition of the Confederacy. Roebuck argued that the South had in
fact established its independence and that this was greatly to England's
advantage since it put an end to the "threatening great power" in the
West. He repeated old arguments based on suffering in Lancashire--a
point his opponents brushed aside as no longer of dangerous
concern--attacked British anti-slavery sentiment as mere hypocrisy and
minimized the dangers of a war with the North, prophesying an easy
victory for Great Britain. Then, warmed to the real attack on the
Government Roebuck related at length his interview with Napoleon,
claiming to have been commissioned by the Emperor to urge England to
action and asserting that since Baron Gros had been instructed to apply
again to the British Cabinet it must be evident that the Ministry was
concealing something from Parliament. Almost immediately, however, he
added that Napoleon had told him no formal French application could be
renewed to Great Britain since Russell had revealed to Seward, through
Lyons, the contents of a former application.
Thus following the usual pro-Southern arguments, now somewhat
perfunctorily given, the bolt against the Government had been shot with
all of Roebuck's accustomed "vigour" of utterance[1089]. Here was direct
attack; that it was a futile one early became evident in the debate.
Lord Robert Montagu, while professing himself a friend of the South, was
sarcastic at the expense of Roebuck's entrance into the field of
diplomacy, enlarged upon the real dangers of becoming involved in the
war, and moved an amendment in favour of continued British neutrality.
Palmerston was absent, being ill, but Gladstone, for the Government,
while carefully avoiding expressions of sympathy for either North or
South, yet going out of his way to pass a moral judgment on the disaster
to political liberty if the North should wholly crush the South, was
positive in assertion that it would be unwise to adopt either Roebuck's
motion or Montagu's amendment. Great Britain should not _commit_ herself
to any line of policy, especially as military events were "now
occurring" which might greatly alter the whole situation, though "the
main result of the contest was not doubtful." Here spoke that element of
the Ministry still convinced of ultimate Southern success.
If Gladstone's had been the only reply to Roebuck he and his friends
might well have thought they were about to secure a ministerial change
of front. But it soon appeared that Gladstone spoke more for himself
than for the Government. Roebuck had made a direct accusation and in
meeting this, Layard, for the Foreign Office, entered a positive and
emphatical denial, in which he was supported by Sir George Grey, Home
Secretary, who added sharp criticism of Roebuck for permitting himself
to be made the channel of a French complaint against England. It early
became evident to the friends of the South that an error in tactics had
been committed and in two directions; first, in the assertion that a new
French offer had been made when it was impossible to present proof of
it; and second, in bringing forward what amounted to an attempt to
unseat the Ministry without previously committing the Tories to a
support of the motion. Apparently Disraeli was simply letting Roebuck
"feel out" the House. The only member of the Tory party strongly
supporting him was Lord Robert Cecil, in a speech so clearly a mere
party one that it served to increase the strength of ministerial
resistance. Friends of the North quickly appreciated the situation and
in strong speeches supported the neutrality policy of the Government.
Forster laid stress upon the danger of war and the strength of British
emancipation sentiment as did Bright in what was, read to-day, the most
powerful of all his parliamentary utterances on the American war. In
particular Bright voiced a general disbelief in the accuracy of
Roebuck's report of his interview with Napoleon, called upon his
"friend" Lindsay for his version[1090] of the affair, and concluded by
recalling former speeches by Roebuck in which the latter had been fond
of talking about the "perjured lips" of Napoleon. Bright dilated upon
the egotism and insolence of Roebuck in trying to represent the Emperor
of France on the floor of the House of Commons. The Emperor, he
asserted, was in great danger of being too much represented in
Parliament[1091].
The result of this first day's debate on June 30 was disconcerting to
Southern friends. It had been adjourned without a vote, for which they
were duly thankful. Especially disconcerting was Slidell's refusal to
permit the citation of Mocquard's note in proof of Roebuck's assertions.
Mason wrote:
"I have your note of 29th ult. You will see in the papers of
to-day the debate in the House last night, at which I was
present, and will have seen what in the H.L. Lord Russell
said in reply to Lord Campbell. Thus the French affair
remains in a 'muss,' unless the Emperor will show his hand
_on paper_, we shall never know what he really means, or
derive any benefit from his private and individual
revelations. As things now stand before the public, there can
be but one opinion, i.e., that he holds one language in
private communications, though 'with liberty to divulge,'
and another to his ambassador here. The debate is adjourned
to to-morrow night, when Lindsay will give in his
explanation. It would be uncivil to say that I have no
confidence in the Emperor, but certainly what has come from
him so far can invite only distrust[1092]."
As in Parliament, so in the public press, immediate recognition of the
Confederacy received little support. The _Times_, while sympathetic with
the purpose was against Roebuck's motion, considering it of no value
unless backed up by force; to this the _Times_ was decidedly
opposed[1093]. Of like opinion was the _Economist_, declaring that
premature recognition was a justifiable ground for a declaration of war
by the North[1094]. July 2, Roebuck asked when the debate was to be
renewed and was told that must wait on Palmerston's recovery and return
to the House. Bright pressed for an immediate decision. Layard
reaffirmed very positively that no communication had been received from
France and disclosed that Napoleon's alleged complaint of a British
revelation to Seward of French overtures was a myth, since the document
in question had been printed in the _Moniteur_, thus attracting Seward's
attention[1095]. Thus Roebuck was further discredited. July 4, Spence
wrote strongly urging the withdrawal of the motion:
"I have a letter from an eminent member of the House and
great friend of the South urging the danger of carrying Mr.
Roebuck's motion to a vote. It is plain it will be defeated
by a great majority and the effect of this will encourage the
North and distress our friends. It will also strengthen the
minority of the Cabinet in favour of the North....
"The fact is the ground of the motion, which was action on
the part of France, has failed us--and taken shape which
tells injuriously instead of being the great support....
"If a positive engagement were made by Mr. Disraeli to
support the motion it would alter the question entirely. In
the absence of this I fear the vote would be humiliating and
would convey an impression wholly delusive, for the members
are 10 to 1 in favour of the South and yet on this point the
vote might be 5 to 1 against Southern interests[1096]."
On July 6, Palmerston was back in the House and Roebuck secured an
agreement for a resumption of the debate on "Monday next[1097]."
Meantime many powerful organs of the French press had taken up the
matter and were full of sharp criticism of Napoleon's supposed policy
and actions as stated by Roebuck. The effect in England was to create a
feeling that Napoleon might have difficulty in carrying out a
pro-Southern policy[1098]. Palmerston, wishing to avoid further
discussion on Napoleon's share in providing fuel for the debate, wrote
in a very conciliatory and pleasant way to Roebuck, on July 9:
"Perhaps you will allow me thus privately to urge upon you,
and through you upon Mr. Lindsay, the expediency of dropping
altogether, whether your debate goes on or not, all further
mention or discussion of what passed between you and Mr.
Lindsay on the one hand, and the Emperor of the French on the
other. In truth the whole proceeding on this subject the
other day seems to me to have been very irregular. The
British Parliament receives messages and communications from
their own sovereign, but not from the sovereigns of other
countries...."
"No good can come of touching again upon this matter, nor
from fixing upon the Emperor a mistake which amid the
multiplicity of things he has to think of he may be excused
for making. I am very anxious that neither you nor Mr.
Lindsay should mention those matters any more, as any
discussion about them must tend to impair the good relations
between the French and English Governments. Might I ask you
to show this note to Mr. Lindsay, your fellow
traveller[1099]."
The next day, in the Commons, Sir James Ferguson appealed to Roebuck to
withdraw his motion altogether as inexpedient, because of the
uncertainty of events in America and as sure to be defeated if pressed
to a vote. Palmerston approved this suggestion and urged that if the
debate be continued speakers should refrain from all further mention of
the personal questions that had been raised, since these were not proper
matters for discussion in the House and were embarrassing to the French
Emperor. But Palmerston's skill in management was unavailing in this
case and the "muss" (as Mason called it) was continued when Lindsay
entered upon a long account of the interview with Napoleon, renewed the
accusations of Russell's "revelations" to Seward and advised Roebuck not
to withdraw his motion but to postpone it "until Monday." The _Scotia_,
he said was due and any moment news from America might change the
governmental policy. Again the fat was in the fire. Palmerston sharply
disavowed that news would change policy. Kinglake thought Roebuck's
actions should be thoroughly investigated. Forster eagerly pressed for
continuation of the debate. There was a general criticism of Roebuck's
"diplomacy," and of Lindsay's also. Northern friends were jubilant and
those of the South embarrassed and uncertain. Gregory believed that the
motion should be withdrawn "in the interest of the South," but Lord
Robert Cecil renewed Lindsay's advice to wait "until Monday" and this
was finally done[1100].
All England was in fact eagerly waiting for news from America. Lee's
advance was known to have passed by Washington, but no reports were yet
at hand of the battle which must determine this first great offensive
campaign by the South. July 9, the _Times_ predicted, editorially, that
Lee was about to capture Washington and that this event would be met by
a great cry of joy and relief in the North, now weary of the war and
eager to escape from the despotism of Lincoln's administration[1101].
Nevertheless the _Times_, while still confident of Lee's victorious
advance and of the welcome likely to be accorded him in the North, came
out strongly on July 13 in an appeal to Roebuck to withdraw his motion,
arguing that even if he were successful Great Britain ought to make no
hurried change of policy[1102]. On this day, the thirteenth, Roebuck
moved the discharge of his motion in a speech so mild as to leave the
impression that "Tear 'em" had his tail between his legs but, Lindsay,
his feelings evidently injured by the aspersions cast upon his own
"amateur diplomacy," spoke at much length of the interview with Napoleon
and tried to show that on a previous occasion he had been, in fact,
"employed" by the Government. Palmerston was pithy and sarcastic in
reply. Lindsay, he said, had "employed" himself. He hoped that this
would be the "last time when any member of this House shall think it his
duty to communicate to the British House of Commons that which may have
passed between himself and the Sovereign of a foreign country[1103]."
The entire debate on Roebuck's motion was a serious blow to the cause of
the South in Parliament. Undertaken on a complete misunderstanding of
the position of Tory leaders, begun with a vehemence that led its mover
into tactical error, it rapidly dwindled to a mere question of personal
veracity and concluded in sharp reproof from the Government. No doubt
the very success (so it seemed at the moment) of Southern arms, upon
which Roebuck counted to support his motion was, in actual effect, a
deterrent, since many Southern sympathizers thought Great Britain might
now keep hands off since the South was "winning anyway." There is no
evidence that Russell thought this, or that he was moved by any
consideration save the fixed determination to remain neutral--even to
the extent of reversing a previous decision as to the powers of the
Government in relation to Southern ship-building.
Roebuck withdrew his motion, not because of any imminent Southern
victory, but because he knew that if pressed to a vote it would be
overwhelmingly defeated. The debate was the last one of importance on
the topics of mediation or recognition[1104]. News of Lee's check at
Gettysburg reached London on July 16, but was described by the _Times_
two days later as virtually a Southern victory since the Northern army
had been compelled to act wholly on the defensive. In the same issue it
was stated of Vicksburg, "it is difficult to see what possible hope
there can be of reducing the city[1105]." But on July 20, full news of
the events of July 4, when Vicksburg fell and Lee began his retreat from
Gettysburg, was received and its significance acknowledged, though
efforts were made to prove that these events simply showed that neither
side could conquer the other[1106]. In contradiction of previous
assertions that "another Vicksburg" might easily be set up to oppose
Northern advance in the west there was now acknowledgment that the
capture of this one remaining barrier on the Mississippi was a great
disaster to the South. _The Index_, forgetful that it was supposedly a
British publication, declared: "The saddest news which has reached _us_
since the fall of New Orleans is the account of the surrender of
Vicksburg. The _very day_ on which the capitulation took place renders
the blow heavier[1107]."
"The fall of Vicksburg," wrote Spence, "has made me ill all the week,
never yet being able to drive it off my mind[1108]." Adams reported that
the news had caused a panic among the holders of the Cotton Loan bonds
and that the press and upper classes were exceedingly glad they had
refused support of Roebuck's motion[1109].
If July, 1863, may in any way be regarded as the "crisis" of Southern
effort in England, it is only as a despairing one doomed to failure from
the outset, and receiving a further severe set-back by the ill-fortune
of Lee's campaign into Pennsylvania. The real crisis of governmental
attitude had long since passed. Naturally this was not acknowledged by
the staunch friends of the South any more than at Richmond it was
acknowledged (or understood) that Gettysburg marked the crisis of the
Confederacy. But that the end of Southern hope for British intervention
had come at Richmond, was made clear by the action of Benjamin, the
Confederate Secretary of State. On August 4, he recalled Mason, writing
that the recent debates in Parliament showed the Government determined
not to receive him:
"Under these circumstances, your continued residence in
London is neither conducive to the interests nor consistent
with the dignity of this Government, and the President
therefore requests that you consider your mission at an end,
and that you withdraw, with your secretary, from
London[1110]."
A private letter accompanying the instruction authorized Mason to remain
if there were any "marked change" in governmental attitude, but since
the decision of the Ministry to seize the Laird Rams had been made
public at nearly the same moment when this instruction was received,
September 15, Mason could hardly fail to retire promptly. Indeed, the
very fact of that seizure gave opportunity for a dramatic exit though
there was no connection between Benjamin's instruction and the stopping
of Confederate ship-building in England. The real connection was with
the failure of the Gettysburg campaign and the humiliating collapse of
Roebuck's motion. Even the _Times_ was now expanding upon the "serious
reverses" of the South and making it clearly understood that England
"has not had and will not have the slightest inclination to intervention
or mediation, or to take any position except that of strict
neutrality[1111]."
Mason at once notified Slidell of his receipt of the recall instruction
and secured the latter's approval of the communication he proposed
making to Russell[1112]. A general consultation of Southern agents took
place and Mason would have been vexed had he known how small was the
regard for his abilities as a diplomat[1113]. _The Index_ hastened to
join in a note already struck at Richmond of warm welcome to France in
her conquest of Mexico, reprinting on September 17, an editorial from
the _Richmond Enquirer_ in which it was declared, "France is the only
Power in the world that has manifested any friendly feeling towards the
Confederacy in its terrible struggle for independence." Evidently all
hope was now centred upon Napoleon, a conclusion without doubt
distasteful to Mason and one which he was loth to accept as final.
On September 21, Mason notified Russell of his withdrawal very nearly
in the words of Benjamin's instruction. The news was at once made
public, calling out from the _Times_ a hectoring editorial on the folly
of the South in demanding recognition before it had won it[1114]. In
general, however, the press took a tone apparently intended to "let
Mason down easily," acknowledging that his act indicated a universal
understanding that Great Britain would not alter her policy of strict
neutrality, but expressing admiration for the courage and confidence of
the South[1115]. September 25, Russell replied to Mason with courtesy
but also with seeming finality:
"I have on other occasions explained to you the reasons which
have induced Her Majesty's Government to decline the
overtures you allude to, and the motives which have hitherto
prevented the British Court from recognizing you as the
accredited Minister of an established State.
"These reasons are still in force, and it is not necessary to
repeat them.
"I regret that circumstances have prevented my cultivating
your personal acquaintance, which, in a different state of
affairs, I should have done with much pleasure and
satisfaction[1116]."
Thus Mason took his exit. Brief entrances upon the stage in England were
still to be his, but the chief rôle there was now assigned to others and
the principal scenes transferred to France. That Mason did not fully
concur in this as final, easily as it was accepted by Slidell, is
evident from his later correspondence with Lindsay and Spence. He
regarded the question of British recognition of the South as mainly an
English political question, pinning his hopes on a Tory overthrow of
Palmerston's Ministry. This he believed to depend on the life of the
Prime Minister and his anxious inquiries as to the health of Palmerston
were frequent. Nothing in his instructions indicated a desired course of
action and Mason after consulting Slidell and, naturally, securing his
acquiescence, determined to remain in Europe waiting events.
If the South was indignant at British inaction the North was
correspondingly pleased and after the seizure of the Laird Rams was
officially very friendly--at least so Lyons reported[1117]. In this same
private letter, however, Lyons ventured a strong protest against a
notion which now seems to have occurred to Russell of joint action by
England, France and Spain to withdraw belligerent rights _to the North_,
unless the United States formally "concede to their enemy the status of
a Belligerent for all _international_ purposes." Why or how this idea
came to be taken up by Russell is uncertain. Possibly it was the result
of irritation created by the persistence of Seward in denying that the
war was other than an effort to crush rebellious subjects--theory
clearly against the fact yet consistently maintained by the American
Secretary of State throughout the entire war and constantly causing
difficulties in relations with neutral countries. At any rate Lyons was
quick to see the danger. He wrote:
"Such a declaration might produce a furious outburst of wrath
from Government and public here. It cannot, however, be
denied that the reasoning on which the Declaration would be
founded would be incontrovertible, and that in the end
firmness answers better with the Americans than coaxing. But
then England, France and Spain must be really firm, and not
allow their Declaration to be a _brutum fulmen_. If on its
being met, as it very probably would be, by a decided refusal
on the part of the United States, they did not proceed to
break up the Blockade, or at all events to resist by force
the exercise of the right of visit on the high seas, the
United States Government and people would become more
difficult to deal with than ever. I find, however, that I am
going beyond my own province, and I will therefore add only
an excuse for doing so[1118]."
Lyons followed this up a week later by a long description of America's
readiness for a foreign war, a situation very different from that of
1861. America, he said, had steadily been preparing for such a
contingency not with any desire for it but that she might not be caught
napping[1119]. This was written as if merely an interesting general
speculation and was accompanied by the assurance, "I don't think the
Government here at all desires to pick a quarrel with us or with any
European Power--but the better prepared it is, the less manageable it
will be[1120]." Nevertheless, Lyons' concern over Russell's motion of
withdrawing belligerent rights to the North was great, and his
representations presumably had effect, for no more was heard of the
matter. Russell relieved Lyons' mind by writing, November 21:
"I hope you continue to go on quietly with Seward. I think
this is better than any violent demonstrations of friendship
which might turn sour like beer if there should be a
thunder-storm.
"But I am more and more persuaded that amongst the Powers
with whose Ministers I pass my time there is none with whom
our relations ought to be so frank and cordial as the United
States[1121]."
If relations with the North were now to be so "frank and cordial," there
was, indeed, little remaining hope possible to English friends of the
South. Bright wrote to Sumner: "Neutrality is agreed upon by all, and I
hope a more fair and friendly neutrality than we have seen during the
past two years[1122]." George Thompson, at Exeter Hall, lauding Henry
Ward Beecher for his speech there, commented on the many crowded open
public meetings in favour of the North as compared with the two
pro-Southern ones in London, slimly and privately attended[1123].
Jefferson Davis, in addressing the Confederate Congress, December 7, was
bitter upon the "unfair and deceptive conduct" of England[1124]. Adams,
by mid-December, 1863, was sure that previous British confidence in the
ultimate success of the South was rapidly declining[1125].
Such utterances, if well founded, might well have portended the
cessation of further Southern effort in England. That a renewal of
activity soon occurred was due largely to a sudden shift in the military
situation in America and to the realization that the heretofore largely
negative support given to the Southern cause must be replaced by
organized and persistent effort. Grant's victorious progress in the West
had been checked by the disaster to Rosencrans at Chicamauga, September
18, and Grant's army forced to retrace its steps to recover
Chattanooga. It was not until November 24 that the South was compelled
to release its grip upon that city. Meanwhile in the East, Lee, fallen
back to his old lines before Richmond, presented a still impregnable
front to Northern advance. No sudden collapse, such as had been
expected, followed the Southern defeats at Vicksburg and Gettysburg.
Again the contest presented the appearance of a drawn battle. Small
wonder then that McHenry, confident in his statistics, should now
declare that at last cotton was to become in truth King[1126], and count
much upon the effect of the arguments advanced in his recently published
book[1127]. Small wonder that Southern friends should hurry the
organization of the "Southern Independence Association." Seeking a
specific point of attack and again hoping for Tory support they first
fixed their attention on the new trial of the _Alexandra_, on appeal
from the decision by the Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer. On
December 4, Lindsay wrote to Mason that he had daily been "journeying to
town" with the "old Chief Baron" and was confident the Government would
again be defeated--in which case it would be very open to attack for the
seizure of the Rams also. Nevertheless he was emphatic in his caution to
Mason not to place too high a hope on any change in Government policy or
on any expectation that the Tories would replace Palmerston[1128].
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1041: Trollope, _North America_, I, p. 124.]
[Footnote 1042: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Jan. 3, 1863. Liverpool.]
[Footnote 1043: The _Index_, Jan. 29, 1863, p. 217. The active agent in
control of the _Index_ was Henry Hotze, who, in addition to managing
this journal, used secret service funds of the Confederacy to secure the
support of writers in the London press. He was in close touch with all
the Southern agents sent to Europe at various times, but appears never
to have been fully trusted by either Mason or Slidell. In 1912-13 I made
notes from various materials originating with Hotze, these being then in
the possession of Mr. Charles Francis Adams. These materials were (1) a
letter and cash book marked "C.S.A. Commercial Agency, London"; (2) a
copy despatch book, January 6, 1862, to December 31, 1864; (3) a copy
letter-book of drafts of "private" letters, May 28, 1864, to June 16,
1865. All these materials were secured by Mr. Adams from Professor J.F.
Jameson, who had received them from Henry Vignaud. Since Mr. Adams'
death in 1915 no trace of these Hotze materials has been found. My
references, then, to "Hotze Papers," must rest on my notes, and
transcripts of many letters, taken in 1912-13. Describing his activities
to Benjamin, Hotze stated that in addition to maintaining the _Index_,
he furnished news items and _editorials_ to various London papers, had
seven paid writers on these papers, and was a pretty constant
distributor of "boxes of cigars imported from Havana ... American
whiskey and other articles." He added: "It is, of course, out of the
question to give vouchers." (Hotze Papers MS. Letter Book. Hotze to
Benjamin, No. 19, March 14, 1863.) In Hotze's cash book one of his
regular payees was Percy Gregg who afterwards wrote a history of the
Confederacy. Hotze complained that he could get no "paid writer" on
the _Times_.]
[Footnote 1044: See _ante_, Ch. XI.]
[Footnote 1045: Lyons Papers, Feb. 14, 1863.]
[Footnote 1046: Mason Papers, March 18, 1863.]
[Footnote 1047: Pickett Papers. Slidell to Benjamin, No. 34, May 3,
1863. This despatch is omitted by Richardson.]
[Footnote 1048: Schwab, _The Confederate States of America_ gives the
best analysis and history of Southern financing.]
[Footnote 1049: It is possible that a few were disposed of to
contractors in payment for materials.]
[Footnote 1050: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, Sept. 27, 1862.]
[Footnote 1051: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, Oct. 2, 1862.]
[Footnote 1052: Slidell's daughter was engaged to be married to
Erlanger's son.]
[Footnote 1053: Slidell himself wrote: "I should not have gone so far in
recommending these propositions ... had I not the best reason to believe
that even in anticipation of its acceptance the very strongest influence
will be enlisted in our favour." (Richardson, II, p. 340. To Benjamin,
Oct. 28, 1862.)]
[Footnote 1054: Schwab, _The Confederate States of America_, pp. 30-31.
Schwab is in error in stating that Erlanger himself went to Richmond,
since it appears from Slidell's letters that he was in constant contact
with Erlanger in Paris during the time the "agents" were in Richmond.]
[Footnote 1055: Richardson, II, 399-401, Jan. 15, 1863.]
[Footnote 1056: _Ibid_, p. 420. Mason to Benjamin, Feb. 5, 1863.]
[Footnote 1057: Mason Papers, Jan. 23, 1863.]
[Footnote 1058: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, Feb. 15, 1863.]
[Footnote 1059: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, Feb. 23, 1863, and Mason to
Slidell, Feb. 24, 1863.]
[Footnote 1060: Schwab, p. 33.]
[Footnote 1061: _Ibid._, p. 33. In France permission to advertise the
loan was at first refused, but this was changed by the intervention of
the Emperor.]
[Footnote 1062: Richardson, II, p. 457. To Benjamin, March 21, 1863.]
[Footnote 1063: Mason's _Mason_, p. 401. To Benjamin, March 30, 1863.]
[Footnote 1064: MS. Thesis, by Walter M. Case, for M.A. degree at
Stanford University: _James M. Mason--Confederate Diplomat_ (1915). I am
much indebted to Mr. Case's Chapter V: "Mason and Confederate Finance."]
[Footnote 1065: No evidence has been found to support this. Is not the
real reason for the change to be found in British Governmental
intentions known or suspected? March 27 was the day of the Parliamentary
debate seemingly antagonistic to the North: while March 31, on the other
hand, the _Alexandra_ case was referred to the Law Officers, and April 4
they recommend her seizure, which was done on April 5. It is to be
presumed that rumours of this seeming face-about by the Government had
not failed to reach the bond market.]
[Footnote 1066: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, April 3, 1863.]
[Footnote 1067: _Ibid._, Spence to Mason, May 9, 1863. This letter was
written a month after the event at Mason's request for an exact
statement of what had occurred.]
[Footnote 1068: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 1069: Schwab, pp. 39-44. Schwab believes that Erlanger &
Company "are certainly open to the grave suspicion of having themselves
been large holders of the bonds in question, especially in view of the
presumably large amount of lapsed subscriptions, and of having quietly
unloaded them on the unsuspecting Confederate agents when the market
showed signs of collapsing" (p. 35). Schwab did not have access to
Spence's report which gives further ground for this suspicion.]
[Footnote 1070: A newspaper item that Northern ships had run by
Vicksburg sent it down; Lee's advance into Pennsylvania caused a
recovery; his retreat from Gettysburg brought it so low as thirty per
cent. discount.]
[Footnote 1071: After the war was over Bigelow secured possession of and
published an alleged list of important subscribers to the loan in which
appeared the name of Gladstone. He repeated this accusation--a serious
one if true, since Gladstone was a Cabinet member--in his
_Retrospections_ (I, p. 620), and the story has found place in many
writings (e.g., G.P. Putnam, _Memoirs_, p. 213). Gladstone's emphatic
denial, calling the story a "mischievous forgery," appears in Morley,
_Gladstone_, II, p. 83.]
[Footnote 1072: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXX, pp. 776-838.]
[Footnote 1073: See _ante_, p. 155.]
[Footnote 1074: The _Index_, May 28, 1863, pp. 72-3.]
[Footnote 1075: The _Times_, June 1, 1863.]
[Footnote 1076: The _Index_, June 4, 1863.]
[Footnote 1077: Chesney, _Military View of Recent Campaigns in Maryland
and Virginia_, London, 1863.]
[Footnote 1078: _Army and Navy Gazette_, June 6, 1863.]
[Footnote 1079: Lyons Papers, May 30, 1863.]
[Footnote 1080: Callahan, _Diplomatic History of the Southern
Confederacy_, p. 184. Callahan's Chapter VIII, "The Crisis in England"
is misnamed, for Roebuck's motion and the whole plan of "bringing in the
Tories" never had a chance of succeeding, as, indeed, Callahan himself
notes. His detailed examination of the incident has unfortunately misled
some historians who have derived from his work the idea that the
critical period of British policy towards America was Midsummer, 1863,
whereas it occurred, in fact, in October-November, 1862 (e.g., Schmidt,
"Wheat and Cotton during the Civil War," pp. 413 _seq_. Schmidt's thesis
is largely dependent on placing the critical period in 1863).]
[Footnote 1081: Mason Papers. To Slidell.]
[Footnote 1082: Callahan, pp. 184-5.]
[Footnote 1083: _Ibid._, p. 186. To Benjamin.]
[Footnote 1084: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 27, 1863. Mason
wrote: "The question of veracity is raised."]
[Footnote 1085: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, June 29, 1863.]
[Footnote 1086: _Ibid._, To Slidell.]
[Footnote 1087: _Ibid._, To Mason. "Monday eve." (June 29, 1863.)]
[Footnote 1088: Callahan, 186; and Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXI, p. 1719.]
[Footnote 1089: Punch's favourite cartoon of Roebuck was of a terrier
labelled "Tear 'em," worrying and snarling at his enemies.]
[Footnote 1090: Bright and Lindsay had, in fact, long been warm friends.
They disagreed on the Civil War, but this did not destroy their
friendship.]
[Footnote 1091: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXI, pp. 1771-1842, for debate of
June 30. Roebuck's egotism was later related by Lamar, then in London on
his way to Russia as representative of the South. A few days before the
debate Lamar met Roebuck at Lindsay's house and asked Roebuck whether he
expected Bright to take part in the debate. "No, sir," said Roebuck
sententiously, "Bright and I have met before. It was the old story--the
story of the swordfish and the whale! No, sir! Mr. Bright will not cross
swords with me again." Lamar attended the debate and saw Roebuck given
by Bright the "most deliberate and tremendous pounding I ever
witnessed." (_Education of Henry Adams_, pp. 161-2.)]
[Footnote 1092: Mason Papers. To Slidell, July 1, 1863.]
[Footnote 1093: July 1, 1863.]
[Footnote 1094: July 4, 1863.]
[Footnote 1095: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXII, pp. 67-73.]
[Footnote 1096: Mason Papers. To Mason, July 4, 1863. In fact Disraeli,
throughout the Civil War, favoured strict neutrality, not agreeing with
many of his Tory colleagues. He at times expressed himself privately as
believing the Union would not be restored but was wise enough to refrain
from such comment publicly. (Monypenny, _Disraeli_, IV, p. 328.)]
[Footnote 1097: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXII, p. 252.]
[Footnote 1098: _The Index_ felt it necessary to combat this, and on
July 9 published a "letter from Paris" stating such criticisms to be
negligible as emanating wholly from minority and opposition papers. "All
the sympathies of the French Government have, from the outset, been with
the South, and this, quite independently of other reasons, dictated the
line which the opposition press has consistently followed; the Orleanist
_Debats_, Republican _Siècle_, The Palais Royal _Opinion_, all join in
the halloo against the South."]
[Footnote 1099: Palmerston MS. July 9, 1863.]
[Footnote 1100: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXII, 554 _seq_., July 10, 1863.]
[Footnote 1101: In the same issue appeared a letter from the New York
correspondent of the _Times_, containing a similar prediction but in
much stronger terms. For the last half of the war the _Times_ was badly
served by this correspondent who invariably reported the situation from
an extreme anti-Northern point of view. This was Charles Mackay who
served the _Times_ in New York from March, 1862, to December, 1865.
(Mackay, _Forty Years' Recollections_, II, p. 412.) Possibly he had
strict instructions. During this same week Lyons, writing privately to
Russell, minimized the "scare" about Lee's advance. He reported that
Mercier had ordered up a war-ship to take him away if Washington should
fall. Lyons cannily decided such a step for himself inadvisable, since
it would irritate Seward and in case the unexpected happened he could no
doubt get passage on Mercier's ship. When news came of the Southern
defeat at Gettysburg and of Grant's capture of Vicksburg, Lyons thought
the complete collapse of the Confederacy an imminent possibility. Leslie
Stephen is a witness to the close relations of Seward and Lyons at this
time. He visited Washington about a month after Gettysburg and met
Seward, being received with much cordiality as a _verbal_ champion in
England of the North. (He had as yet published no signed articles on the
war.) In this conversation he was amused that Seward spoke of the
friendly services of "Monkton Mill," as a publicist on political
economy. (Maitland, _Leslie Stephen_, p. 120.)]
[Footnote 1102: In this issue a letter from the New York correspondent,
dated July 1, declared that all of the North except New England, would
welcome Lee's triumph: "... he and Mr. Jefferson Davis might ride in
triumph up Broadway, amid the acclamations of a more enthusiastic
multitude than ever assembled on the Continent of America." The New York
city which soon after indulged in the "draft riots" might give some
ground for such writing, but it was far fetched, nevertheless--and New
York was not the North.]
[Footnote 1103: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXII, 661 _seq_. Ever afterwards
Roebuck was insistent in expressions of dislike and fear of America. At
a banquet to him in Sheffield in 1869 he delivered his "political
testament": "Beware of Trades Unions; beware of Ireland; beware of
America." (Leader, _Autobiography and Letters of Roebuck_, p. 330.)]
[Footnote 1104: May 31, 1864, Lindsay proposed to introduce another
recognition motion, but on July 25 complained he had had no chance to
make it, and asked Palmerston if the Government was not going to act.
The reply was a brief negative.]
[Footnote 1105: The _Times_, July 18, 1863.]
[Footnote 1106: The power of the _Times_ in influencing public opinion
through its news columns was very great. At the time it stood far in the
lead in its foreign correspondence and the information printed
necessarily was that absorbed by the great majority of the British
public. Writing on January 23, 1863, of the mis-information spread about
America by the _Times_, Goldwin Smith asserted: "I think I never felt so
much as in this matter the enormous power which the _Times_ has, not
from the quality of its writing, which of late has been rather poor, but
from its exclusive command of publicity and its exclusive access to a
vast number of minds. The _ignorance_ in which it has been able to keep
a great part of the public is astounding." (To E.S. Beesly. Haultain,
_Correspondence of Goldwin Smith_, p. 11.)]
[Footnote 1107: _The Index_, July 23, 1863, p. 200. The italics are
mine. The implication is that a day customarily celebrated as one of
rejoicing has now become one for gloom. No _Englishman_ would be likely
to regard July 4 as a day of rejoicing.]
[Footnote 1108: Mason Papers. To Mason, July 25, 1863.]
[Footnote 1109: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 329.
Adams to Seward, July 30, 1863.]
[Footnote 1110: Mason, _Mason_, p. 449.]
[Footnote 1111: Sept. 4, 1863. The _Times_ was now printing American
correspondence sharply in contrast to that which preceded Gettysburg
when the exhaustion and financial difficulties of the North were dilated
upon. Now, letters from Chicago, dated August 30, declared that, to the
writer's astonishment, the West gave every evidence that the war had
fostered rather than checked, prosperity. (Sept. 15, 1863.).]
[Footnote 1112: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, Sept. 14 and 15, 1863.
Slidell to Mason, Sept. 16, 1863.]
[Footnote 1113: McRea wrote to Hotze, September 17, 1863, that in his
opinion Slidell and Hotze were the only Southern agents of value
diplomatically in Europe (Hotze Correspondence). He thought all others
would soon be recalled. Slidell, himself, even in his letter to Mason,
had the questionable taste of drawing a rosy picture of his own and his
family's intimate social intercourse with the Emperor and the Empress.]
[Footnote 1114: Sept. 23, 1863.]
[Footnote 1115: e.g., _Manchester Guardian_, Sept. 23, 1863, quoted in
_The Index_, Sept. 24, p. 343.]
[Footnote 1116: Mason's _Mason_, p. 456.]
[Footnote 1117: Russell Papers. To Russell, Oct. 26, 1863.]
[Footnote 1118: _Ibid._, Lyons wrote after receiving a copy of a
despatch sent by Russell to Grey, in France, dated October 10, 1863.]
[Footnote 1119: F.O., Am., 896. No. 788. Confidential. Lyons to Russell,
Nov. 3, 1863. "It seems, in fact, to be certain that at the commencement
of a war with Great Britain, the relative positions of the United States
and its adversary would be very nearly the reverse of what they would
have been if a war had broken out three or even two years ago. Of the
two Powers, the United States would now be the better prepared for the
struggle--the coasts of the United States would present few points open
to attack--while the means of assailing suddenly our own ports in the
neighbourhood of this country, and especially Bermuda and the Bahamas,
would be in immediate readiness. Three years ago Great Britain might at
the commencement of a war have thrown a larger number of trained troops
into the British Provinces on the continent than could have been
immediately sent by the United States to invade those provinces. It
seems no exaggeration to say that the United States could now without
difficulty send an Army exceeding in number, by five to one, any force
which Great Britain would be likely to place there."]
[Footnote 1120: _Ibid._, Private. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 3, 1863.]
[Footnote 1121: Lyons Papers. To Lyons.]
[Footnote 1122: Rhodes, IV, p. 393. Nov. 20, 1863.]
[Footnote 1123: _The Liberator_, Nov. 27, 1863. I have not dwelt upon
Beecher's tour of England and Scotland in 1863, because its influence in
"winning England" seems to me absurdly over-estimated. He was a gifted
public orator and knew how to "handle" his audiences, but the majority
in each audience was friendly to him, and there was no such "crisis of
opinion" in 1863 as has frequently been stated in order to exalt
Beecher's services.]
[Footnote 1124: Dodd, _Jefferson Davis_, p. 319. The words are Dodd's.]
[Footnote 1125: State Department, Eng., Vol. 84, No. 557. Adams to
Seward, Dec. 17, 1863.]
[Footnote 1126: Hotze Correspondence. McHenry to Hotze, Dec. 1, 1863.]
[Footnote 1127: McHenry, _The Cotton Trade_, London, 1863. The preface
in the form of a long letter to W.H. Gregory is dated August 31, 1863.
For a comprehensive note on McHenry see C.F. Adams in Mass. Hist. Soc.
_Proceedings_, March, 1914, Vol. XLVII, 279 _seq_.]
[Footnote 1128: Mason Papers.]
CHAPTER XV
THE SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE ASSOCIATION
Northern friends in England were early active in organizing public
meetings and after the second emancipation proclamation of January 1,
1863, these became both numerous and notable. Southern friends,
confident in the ultimate success of the Confederacy and equally
confident that they had with them the great bulk of upper-class opinion
in England, at first thought it unnecessary to be active in public
expressions aside from such as were made through the newspapers. Up to
November, 1862, _The Index_ records no Southern public meeting. But by
the summer of 1863, the indefatigable Spence had come to the conclusion
that something must be done to offset the efforts of Bright and others,
especially in the manufacturing districts where a strong Northern
sympathy had been created. On June 16, he wrote to Mason that on his
initiative a Southern Club had been organized in Manchester and that
others were now forming in Oldham, Blackburn and Stockport. In
Manchester the Club members had "smashed up the last Abolitionist
meeting in the Free Trade Hall":
"These parties are not the rich spinners but young men of
energy with a taste for agitation but little money. It
appears to my judgment that it would be wise not to stint
money in aiding this effort to expose cant and diffuse the
truth. Manchester is naturally the centre of such a move and
you will see there are here the germs of important work--but
they need to be tended and fostered. I have supplied a good
deal of money individually but I see room for the use of £30
or £40 a month or more[1129]."
The appeal for funds (though Spence wrote that he would advance the
required amounts on the chance of reimbursement from the Confederate
secret service fund) is interesting in comparison with the contributions
willingly made by Bright's friends. "Young men of energy with a taste
for agitation but little money" reveals a source of support somewhat
dubious in persistent zeal and requiring more than a heavy list of
patrons' names to keep up a public interest. Nevertheless, Spence
succeeded, for a short time, in arousing a show of energy. November 24,
1863, Mason wrote to Mann that measures were "in progress and in course
of execution" to hold public meetings, memorialize Parliament, and form
an association for the promotion of Southern independence "under the
auspices of such men as the Marquis of Lothian, Lord Robert Cecil, M.P.,
Lord Wharncliffe, Lord Eustace Cecil, Messrs. Haliburton, Lindsay,
Peacocke, Van Stittart, M.P., Beresford Hope, Robert Bourke, and
others[1130]...." A fortnight later, Spence reported his efforts and
postulated that in them, leading to European intervention, lay the
principal, if not the only hope, of Southern independence--a view never
_publicly_ acknowledged by any devoted friend of the South:
"The news is gloomy--very, and I really do not see how the
war is to be worked out to success without the action of
Europe. That is stopped by our Government but there is a
power that will move the latter, if it can only be stirred
up, and that, of course, is public opinion. I had a most
agreeable and successful visit to Glasgow upon a requisition
signed by the citizens. The enemy placarded the walls and
brought all their forces to the meeting, in which out of
4,000 I think they were fully 1,000 strong, but we beat them
completely, carrying a resolution which embraced a memorial
to Lord Palmerston. We have now carried six public meetings,
Sheffield, Oldham, Stockport, Preston, Ashton, Glasgow. We
have three to come off now ready, Burnley, Bury,
Macclesfield, and others in preparation. My plan is to work
up through the secondary towns to the chief ones and take the
latter, Liverpool, Manchester, London, etc., as we come upon
the assembling of Parliament.... By dint of perseverance I
think we shall succeed. The problem is simply to convert
latent into active sympathy. There is ample power on our side
to move the Cabinet--divided as it is, if we can only arouse
that power. At any rate the object is worth the
effort[1131]."
In the month of November, _The Index_ began to report these meetings. In
nearly all, Northern partisans were present, attempted to heckle the
speakers, and usually presented amendments to the address which were
voted down. Spence was given great credit for his energy, being called
"indefatigable":
"The commencement of the session will see Parliament flooded
with petitions from every town and from every mill throughout
the North. A loud protest will arise against the _faineant_
policy which declines to interfere while men of English blood
are uselessly murdering each other by thousands, and while
England's most important manufacture is thereby ruined.... It
remains to be seen whether the voice of the North will have
any effect upon the policy of the Government[1132]."
By "the North" was meant the manufacturing districts and an explanation
was made of the difficulty of similar efforts in London because it was
really a "congeries of cities," with no such solidarity of interests as
characterized "the North[1133]." Without London, however, the movement
lacked driving force and it was determined to create there an
association which should become the main-spring of further activities.
Spence, Beresford Hope, and Lord Eustace Cecil were made a committee to
draft a plan and preliminary address. Funds were now forthcoming from
the big blockade-running firms
"Some time ago I saw friend Collie, who had made a terrific
sum of money, and told him he must come out for the cause in
proportion thereto. To this he responded like a brick, I was
near saying, but I mean Briton--by offering at once to devote
a percentage of cotton out of each steamer that runs the
blockade, to the good of the cause. He has given me at once
£500 on account of this--which I got to-day in a cheque and
have sent on to Lord Eustace Cecil, our treasurer. Thus, you
see, we are fairly afloat there[1134]."
Yet Spence was fighting against fear that all this agitation was too
late:
"Nevertheless it is not to be disguised that the evil tidings
make uphill work of it--very. Public opinion has quite veered
round to the belief that the South will be exhausted. The
_Times_ correspondent's letters do great harm--more
especially Gallenga's--who replaced Chas. Mackay at New York.
I have, however, taken a berth for Mackay by Saturday's boat,
so he will soon be out again and he is dead for our
side[1135]."
Again Spence asserted the one great hope to be in European intervention:
"I am now clear in my own mind that unless we get Europe to
move--or some improbable convulsion occur in the North--the
end will be a sad one. It seems to me therefore, impossible
that too strenuous an effort can be made to move our
Government and I cannot understand the Southerners who say:
'Oh, what can you make of it?' I have known a man brought
back to life two hours after he seemed stone-dead--the
efforts at first seemed hopeless, but in case of life or
death what effort should be spared[1136]?"
The Manchester Southern Club was the most active of those organized by
Spence and was the centre for operations in the manufacturing districts.
On December 15, a great gathering (as described by _The Index_) took
place there with delegates from many of the near-by towns[1137]. Forster
referred to this and other meetings as "spasmodic and convulsive efforts
being made by Southern Clubs to cause England to interfere in American
affairs[1138]," but the enthusiasm at Manchester was unquestioned and
plans were on foot to bombard with petitions the Queen, Palmerston,
Russell and others in authority, but more especially the members of
Parliament as a body. These petitions were "in process of being signed
in every town and almost in every cotton-mill throughout the
district[1139]." It was high time for London, if it was desired that she
should lead and _control_ these activities, to perfect her own Club.
"Next week," wrote Lindsay, on January 8, 1864, it would be
formally launched under the name of "The Southern Independence
Association[1140]," and would be in working order before the
reassembling of Parliament.
The organization of meetings by Spence and the formation of the Southern
Independence Association were attempts to do for the South what Bright
and others had done earlier and so successfully for the North. Tardily
the realization had come that public opinion, even though but slightly
represented in Parliament, was yet a powerful weapon with which to
influence the Government. Unenfranchised England now received from
Southern friends a degree of attention hitherto withheld from it by
those gentry who had been confident that the goodwill of the bulk of
their own class was sufficient support to the Southern cause. Early in
the war one little Southern society had indeed been organized, but on so
diffident a basis as almost to escape notice. This was the _London
Confederate States Aid Association_ which came to the attention of Adams
and his friends in December, 1862, through the attendance at an early
meeting of one, W.A. Jackson ("Jefferson Davis' ex-coachman"), who
reported the proceedings to George Thompson. The meeting was held at 3
Devonshire Street, Portland Place, was attended by some fifty persons
and was addressed by Dr. Lempriere. A Mr. Beals, evidently an unwelcome
guest, interrupted the speaker, was forcibly ejected by a policeman and
got revenge by arranging a demonstration against Mason (who was
present), confronting him, on leaving the house, with a placard showing
a negro in chains[1141]. There was no "public effort" contemplated in
such a meeting, although funds were to be solicited to aid the South.
Adams reported the Association as a sort of Club planning to hold
regular Wednesday evening meetings of its members, the dues being a
shilling a week and the rules providing for loss of membership for
non-attendance[1142].
Nothing more is heard of this Association after December, 1862. Possibly
its puerilities killed it and in any case it was not intended to appeal
to the public[1143]. But the launching of the Southern Independence
Association betokened the new policy of constructive effort in London to
match and guide that already started in the provinces. A long and
carefully worded constitution and address depicted the heroic struggles
of the Confederates and the "general sympathy" of England for their
cause; dwelt upon the "governmental tyranny, corruption in high places,
ruthlessness in war, untruthfulness of speech, and causeless animosity
toward Great Britain" of the North; and declared that the interests of
America and of the world would be best served by the independence of the
South. The effect of a full year's penetration in England of Lincoln's
emancipation proclamation is shown in the necessity felt by the framers
of this constitution to meet that issue. This required delicate handling
and was destined to cause some heart-burnings. The concluding section of
the constitution read:
"The Association will also devote itself to the cultivation
of kindly feelings between the people of Great Britain and of
the Confederate States; and it will, in particular, steadily
but kindly represent to the Southern States, that recognition
by Europe must necessarily lead to a revision of the system
of servile labour, unhappily bequeathed to them by England,
in accordance with the spirit of the age, so as to combine
the gradual extinction of slavery with the preservation of
property, the maintenance of the civil polity, and the true
civilization of the negro race[1144]."
The Association was unquestionably armed with distinguished guns of
heavy calibre in its Committee and officers, and its membership fee (one
guinea annually) was large enough to attract the élite, but it remained
to be seen whether all this equipment would be sent into action. As yet
the vigour of the movement was centred at Manchester and even there a
curious situation soon arose. Spence in various speeches, was declaring
that the "Petition to Parliament" movement was spreading rapidly. 30,000
at Ashton, he said, had agreed to memoralize the Government. But on
January 30, 1864, Mason Jones, a pro-Northern speaker in the Free Trade
Hall at Manchester, asked why Southern public meetings had come to
a halt. "The Southerners," he declared, "had taken the Free Trade Hall
in the outset with that intention and they were obliged to pay the rent
of the room, though they did not use it. They knew that their
resolutions would be outvoted and that amendments would pass against
them[1145]." There must have been truth in the taunt for while _The
Index_ in nearly every issue throughout the middle of 1864 reports great
activity there, it does not give any account of a public meeting. The
reports were of many applications for membership "from all quarters,
from persons of rank and gentlemen of standing in their respective
counties[1146]."
Just here lay the weakness of the Southern Independence Association
programme. It _did_ appeal to "persons of rank and gentlemen of
standing," but by the very fact of the flocking to it of these classes
it precluded appeal to Radical and working-class England--already
largely committed to the cause of the North. Goldwin Smith, in his
"Letter to a Whig Member of the Southern Independence Association," made
the point very clear[1147]. In this pamphlet, probably the strongest
presentation of the Northern side and the most severe castigation of
Southern sympathizers that appeared throughout the whole war, Smith
appealed to old Whig ideas of political liberty, attacked the
aristocracy and the Church of England, and attempted to make the
Radicals of England feel that the Northern cause was their cause.
Printing the constitution and address of the Association, with the list
of signers, he characterized the movement as fostered by "men of title
and family," with "a good sprinkling of clergymen," and as having for
its object the plunging of Great Britain into war with the North[1148].
It is significant, in view of Mason Jones' taunt to the Southern
Independence Association at Manchester, that _The Index_, from the end
of March to August, 1864, was unable to report a single Southern public
meeting. The London Association, having completed its top-heavy
organization, was content with that act and showed no life. The first
move by the Association was planned to be made in connection with the
_Alexandra_ case when, as was expected, the Exchequer Court should
render a decision against the Government's right to detain her. On
January 8, 1864, Lindsay wrote to Mason that he had arranged for the
public launching of the Association "next week," that he had again seen
the Chief Baron who assured him the Court would decide "that the
Government is entirely wrong":
"I told him that if the judgment was clear, and if the
Government persisted in proceeding further, that our
Association (which he was pleased to learn had been formed)
would take up the matter in Parliament and out of it, for if
we had no right to seize these ships, it was most unjust that
we should detain them by raising legal quibbles for the
purpose of keeping them here till the time arrived when the
South might not require them. I think public opinion will go
with us on this point, for John Bull--with all his
failings--loves fair play[1149]."
It is apparent from the language used by Lindsay that he was
thinking of the Laird Rams and other ships fully as much as of the
_Alexandra_[1150], and hoped much from an attack on the Government's
policy in detaining Southern vessels. Earl Russell was to be made to
bear the brunt of this attack on the reassembling of Parliament. In an
_Index_ editorial, Adams was pictured as having driven Russell into a
corner by "threats which would not have been endured for an hour by a
Pitt or a Canning"; the Foreign Secretary as invariably yielding to the
"acknowledged mastery of the Yankee Minister":
"Mr. Adams' pretensions are extravagant, his logic is
blundering, his threats laughable; but he has hit his mark.
We can trace his influence in the detention of the
_Alexandra_ and the protracted judicial proceedings which
have arisen out of it; in the sudden raid upon the rams at
Birkenhead; in the announced intention of the Government to
alter the Foreign Enlistment Act of this country in
accordance with the views of the United States Cabinet. When
one knows the calibre of Mr. Adams one feels inclined to
marvel at his success. The astonishment ceases when one
reflects that the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs is
Earl Russell[1151]."
But when, on February 23, the debate on the Laird Rams occurred[1152],
the Tory leaders, upon whom Lindsay and others depended to drive home
the meaning of the _Alexandra_ decision, carefully avoided urging the
Government to change its policy and contented themselves with an
effort, very much in line with that initiated by _The Index_, to
belittle Russell as yielding to a threat. Adams was even applauded by
the Tories for his discretion and his anxiety to keep the two countries
out of war. The Southern Independence Association remained quiescent.
Very evidently someone, presumably Derby or Disraeli, had put a quietus
on the plan to make an issue of the stoppage of Southern ship-building.
Russell's reply to his accusers was but a curt denial without going into
details, in itself testimony that he had no fear of a party attack on
the _policy_ of stopping the ships. He was disgusted with the result of
the _Alexandra_ trial and in conversation with Adams reflected upon "the
uncertainty and caprice incident everywhere to the administration of
justice[1153]."
As between Russell and Seward the waters formerly troubled by the stiff
manner and tone of the one statesman and the flamboyance of the other
were now unusually calm. Russell was less officious and less eager to
protest on minor matters and Seward was less belligerent in language.
Seward now radiated supreme confidence in the ultimate victory of the
North. He had heard rumours of a movement to be made in Parliament for
interposition to bring the war to an end by a reunion of North and South
on a basis of Abolition and of a Northern assumption of the Confederate
debts. Commenting on this to Lyons he merely remarked that the Northern
answer could be put briefly as: (1) determination to crush rebellion by
force of arms and resentment of any "interposition"; (2) the slaves were
already free and would not be made the subject of any bargain; (3) "As
to the Confederate debt the United States, Mr. Seward said, would never
pay a dollar of it[1154]." That there was public animosity to Great
Britain, Lyons did not deny and reported a movement in Congress for
ending the reciprocity treaty with Canada but, on Seward's advice, paid
no attention to this, acknowledging that Seward was very wise in
political manipulation and depending on his opposition to the
measure[1155]. Some alarm was indeed caused through a recurrence by
Seward to an idea dating back to the very beginning of the war of
establishing ships off the Southern ports which should collect duties on
imports. He told Lyons that he had sent a special agent to Adams to
explain the proposal with a view to requesting the approval of Great
Britain. Lyons urged that no such request be made as it was sure to be
refused, interpreting the plan as intended to secure a British
withdrawal of belligerent rights to the South, to be followed by a bold
Northern defiance to France if she objected[1156]. Adams did discuss the
project with Russell but easily agreed to postpone consideration of it
and in this Seward quietly acquiesced[1157]. Apparently this was less a
matured plan than a "feeler," put out to sound British attitude and to
learn, if possible, whether the tie previously binding England and
France in their joint policy toward America was still strong. Certainly
at this same time Seward was making it plain to Lyons that while opposed
to current Congressional expressions of antagonism to Napoleon's Mexican
policy, he was himself in favour, once the Civil War was ended, of
helping the republican Juarez drive the French from Mexico[1158].
For nearly three years Russell, like nearly all Englishmen, had held a
firm belief that the South could not be conquered and that ultimately
the North must accept the bitter pill of Southern independence. Now he
began to doubt, yet still held to the theory that even if conquered the
South would never yield peaceful obedience to the Federal Government.
As a reasoning and reasonable statesman he wished that the North could
be made to see this.
"... It is a pity," he wrote to Lyons, "the Federals think it
worth their while to go on with the war. The obedience they
are ever likely to obtain from the South will not be quiet or
lasting, and they must spend much money and blood to get it.
If they can obtain the right bank of the Mississippi, and New
Orleans, they might as well leave to the Confederates
Charleston and Savannah[1159]."
This was but private speculation with no intention of urging it upon the
United States. Yet it indicated a change in the view held as to the
warlike _power_ of the North. Similarly the _Quarterly Review_, long
confident of Southern success and still prophesying it, was
acknowledging that "the unholy [Northern] dream of universal empire"
must first have passed[1160]. Throughout these spring months of 1864,
Lyons continued to dwell upon the now thoroughly developed readiness of
the United States for a foreign war and urged the sending of a military
expert to report on American preparations[1161]. He was disturbed by the
arrogance manifested by various members of Lincoln's Cabinet, especially
by Welles, Secretary of the Navy, with whom Seward, so Lyons wrote,
often had difficulty in demonstrating the unfortunate diplomatic bearing
of the acts of naval officers. Seward was as anxious as was Lyons to
avoid irritating incidents, "but he is not as much listened to as he
ought to be by his colleagues in the War and Navy Departments[1162]."
Such an act by a naval officer, defiant of British authority and
disregardful of her law, occurred in connection with a matter already
attracting the attention of the British public and causing some anxiety
to Russell--the alleged securing in Ireland of enlistments for the
Northern forces. The war in America had taken from the ranks of industry
in the North great numbers of men and at the same time had created an
increased demand for labour. But the war had also abruptly checked, in
large part, that emigration from Europe which, since the middle
'forties, had been counted upon as a regular source of labour supply,
easily absorbed in the steady growth of productive enterprise. A few
Northern emissaries of the Government early sent abroad to revive
immigration were soon reinforced by private labour agents and by the
efforts of steamship companies[1163]. This resulted in a rapid
resumption of emigration in 1863, and in several cases groups of
Irishmen signed contracts of such a nature (with non-governmental
agents) that on arrival in America they were virtually black-jacked into
the army. The agents thereby secured large profits from the sums offered
under the bounty system of some of the Eastern states for each recruit.
Lyons soon found himself called upon to protest, on appeal from a few of
these hoodwinked British citizens, and Seward did the best he could to
secure redress, though the process was usually a long one owing to
red-tape and also to the resistance of army officers.
As soon as the scheme of "bounty profiteers" was discovered prompt steps
were taken to defeat it by the American Secretary of State. But the few
cases occurring, combined with the acknowledged and encouraged agents of
_bona fide_ labour emigration from Ireland, gave ground for accusations
in Parliament that Ireland was being used against the law as a place of
enlistments. Russell had early taken up the matter with Adams,
investigation had followed, and on it appearing that no authorized
Northern agent was engaged in recruiting in Ireland the subject had been
dropped[1164]. There could be and was no objection to encourage labour
emigration, and this was generally recognized as the basis of the sudden
increase of the numbers going to America[1165]. But diplomatic and
public quiescence was disturbed when the United States war vessel
_Kearsarge_, while in port at Queenstown, November, 1863, took on board
fifteen Irishmen and sailed away with them. Russell at once received
indirectly from Mason (who was now in France), charges that these men
had been enlisted and in the presence of the American consul at
Queenstown; he was prompt in investigation but before this was well
under way the _Kearsarge_ sailed into Queenstown again and landed the
men. She had gone to a French port and no doubt Adams was quick to give
orders for her return. Adams was soon able to disprove the accusation
against the consul but it still remained a question whether the
commander of the vessel was guilty of a bold defiance of British
neutrality. On March 31, 1864, the Irishmen, on trial at Cork, pleaded
guilty to violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, but the question of
the commander's responsibility was permitted to drop on Adams' promise,
April 11, of further investigation[1166].
The _Kearsarge_ case occurred as Parliament was drawing to a close in
1863, and at a time when Southern efforts were at low ebb. It was not,
therefore, until some months later when a gentleman with a shady past,
named Patrick Phinney, succeeded in evading British laws and in carrying
off to America a group of Irishmen who found themselves, unwillingly,
forced into the Northern army, that the two cases were made the subject
of a Southern and Tory attack on Russell. The accusations were sharply
made that Russell was not sufficiently active in defending British law
and British honour[1167], but these were rather individual accusations
than concerted and do not indicate any idea of making an issue with the
Government[1168]. Whenever opportunity arose some inquiry up to July,
1864, would be made intended to bring out the alleged timidity of
Russell's policy towards the North--a method then also being employed on
many other matters with the evident intention of weakening the Ministry
for the great Tory attack now being organized on the question of
Danish policy.
In truth from the beginning of 1864, America had been pushed to one side
in public and parliamentary interest by the threatening Danish question
which had long been brewing but which did not come into sharp prominence
until March. A year earlier it had become known that Frederick VII of
Denmark, in anticipation of a change which, under the operations of the
Salic law, would come at his death in the constitutional relations of
Denmark to Schleswig-Holstein, was preparing by a new "constitutional
act" to secure for his successor the retention of these districts. The
law was enacted on November 13, 1863, and Frederick VII died two days
later. His successor, Christian IX, promptly declared his intention to
hold the duchies in spite of their supposed desire to separate from
Denmark and to have their own Prince in the German Confederation. The
Federal Diet of the Confederation had early protested the purpose of
Denmark and Russell had at first upheld the German arguments but had
given no pledges of support to anyone[1169]. But Palmerston on various
occasions had gone out of his way to express in Parliament his favour
for the Danish cause and had used incautious language even to the point
of virtually threatening British aid against German ambitions[1170]. A
distinct crisis was thus gradually created, coming to a head when
Prussia, under Bismarck's guiding hand, dragging Austria in with her,
thrust the Federal Diet of the Confederation to one side, and assumed
command of the movement to wrest Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark.
This occurred in February, 1864, and by this time Palmerston's
utterances, made against the wish of the majority of his Cabinet
colleagues (though this was not known), had so far aroused the British
public as to have created a feeling, widely voiced, that Great Britain
could not sit idly by while Prussia and Austria worked their will on
Denmark. There was excellent ground for a party attack to unseat the
Ministry on the score of a humiliating "Danish policy," at one time
threatening vigorous British action, then resorting to weak and
unsuccessful diplomatic manoeuvres. For three months the Government
laboured to bring about through a European council some solution that
should both save something for Denmark and save its own prestige.
Repeatedly Palmerston, in the many parliamentary debates on Denmark,
broke loose from his Cabinet colleagues and indulged in threats which
could not fail to give an excellent handle to opponents when once it
became clear that the Ministry had no intention of coming in arms to the
defence of the Danish King.
From February to June, 1864, this issue was to the fore. In its earlier
stages it did not appear to Southern sympathizers to have any essential
bearing on the American question, though they were soon to believe that
in it lay a great hope. Having set the Southern Independence Association
on its feet in London and hoping much from its planned activities,
Lindsay, in March, was momentarily excited over rumours of some new move
by Napoleon. Being undeceived[1171] he gave a ready ear to other
rumours, received privately through Delane of the _Times_, that an
important Southern victory would soon be forthcoming[1172]. Donoughmore,
the herald of this glad news also wrote:
"Our political prospects here are still very uncertain. The
Conference on the Danish question will either make or mar
the Government. If they can patch up a peace they will remain
in office. If they fail, out they go[1173]."
Here was early expressed the real hope of one faction of extreme
Southern friends in the Danish question. But Lindsay had not yet made
clear where he stood on a possible use of a European situation to affect
the cause of the South. Now, as always, he was the principal confidant
and friend of Mason in England, but he was on ordinary political
questions not in sympathy with Tory principles or measures. He was soon
disgusted with the apathy of the London Independence Association and
threatened to resign membership if this organization, started with much
trumpeting of intended activity, did not come out boldly in a public
demand for the recognition of the South[1174]. He had already let it be
known that another motion would be made in Parliament for mediation and
recognition and was indignant that the Association did not at once
declare its adherence. Evidently there were internal difficulties.
Lindsay wrote Mason that he retained membership only to prevent a break
up of the Association and had at last succeeded in securing a meeting of
the Executive Committee when his proposed parliamentary resolution would
be considered. The Manchester Association was much more alert and ready
to support him. "The question is quite ripe _for fresh agitation_ and
from experience I find that that agitation _must_ be started by a debate
in Parliament. No notice is taken of lectures or speeches in the
provinces[1175]."
Before any move was made in Parliament letters to the newspapers began
anew to urge that the Ministry should be pressed to offer mediation in
America. They met with little favourable response. The _Times_, at the
very end of Lindsay's effort, explained its indifference, and recited
the situation of October-November, 1862, stating that the question had
then been decided once for all. It declared that Great Britain had "no
moral right to interfere" and added that to attempt to do so would
result in filling "the North with the same spirit of patriotism and
defiance as animated the invaded Confederates[1176]." Thus support to
Lindsay was lacking in a hoped-for quarter, but his conferences with
Association members had brought a plan of modified action the essential
feature of which was that the parliamentary motion must not be made a
_party_ one and that the only hope of the South lay in the existing
Government. This was decidedly Lindsay's own view though it was clearly
understood that the opportuneness of the motion lay in ministerial
desire for and need of support in its Danish policy. Lindsay expected to
find Palmerston more complaisant than formerly as regards American
policy and was not disappointed. He wrote to Mason on May 27:
"I received in due course your note of the 23rd. In a matter
of so much importance I shall make no move in the House in
regard to American affairs without grave consideration. I am
therefore privately consulting the friends of the South. On
this subject we had a meeting of our lifeless association on
Monday last and on the same subject we are to have another
meeting next Monday; but differences of opinion exist there
as well as elsewhere, as to the advisability of moving at
present. Some say 'move'--others, 'postpone'--but the news by
the _Scotia_ to-morrow will regulate to a considerable extent
our course of action. One thing is now clear to me that the
motion must _not_ be a party one, and that the main point
will be to get the Government to go with _whoever_ brings
forward the motion, for as you are aware I would rather see
the motion in other hands than mine, as my views on the
American question are so well known. As no competent member
however seems disposed to move or rather to incur the
responsibility, I sent to inquire if it would be agreeable
to Lord Palmerston to see me on American affairs and on the
subject of a motion to be brought forward in the House. He
sent word that he would be very glad to see me, and I had,
therefore, a long meeting with him alone last night, the
result of which was that if I brought forward a motion
somewhat as follows, on the third of June, he would likely be
prepared _to accept it_, though he asked if I would see him
again after the _Scotia_ arrived. The motion we talked about
was to this _effect_--'That the House of Commons deeply
regretting the great loss of life and the sufferings of the
people of the United States and the Confederate States of
North America by the continuance of the war which has been so
long waged between them, trust that Her Majesty's Government
will avail itself of the earliest opportunity of mediating in
conjunction with the other powers of Europe to bring about a
cessation of hostilities.'"
Lindsay had suggested to Palmerston that it was desirable for Mason to
return to England and have a conference with the Premier. To this
Palmerston gave a ready consent but, of course, no invitation. Lindsay
strongly urged Mason to come over:
_I think much good will follow your meeting Lord Palmerston.
It will lead to other meetings_; and besides in other matters
I think if you came here, you might _at present_ prove of
much service to the South[1177]."
Meanwhile the difference within the Southern Independence Association
permitted the coming forward of a minor London organization called _The
Society for Promoting the Cessation of Hostilities in America_. A letter
was addressed by it to Members of Parliament urging that the time had
come for action:
"215 _Regent Street,
London, W.
May 28th_, 1864.
"SIR,
"The Society which has the honour to present to you the
accompanying pamphlet, begs to state that there now exists in
Great Britain and Ireland a strong desire to see steps taken
by the Government of this country in concert with other
Powers, to bring about peace on a durable basis between the
belligerents in North America.
"I am directed by the Committee to express a hope that you
will, before the Session closes, support a motion in
Parliament to this effect; and should you desire to see
evidence of the feeling of a large portion of the country in
this matter, I shall be most happy to lay it before
you[1178]."
Whether Lindsay, vexed with the delays of the Association, had stirred
the Society to action, is not clear, but the date of this letter,
following on the day after the interview with Palmerston, is suggestive.
The pressure put on Mason to come to London was not at first successful.
Mason had become fixed in the opinion, arrived at in the previous fall,
that there was no favour to be expected from Palmerston or Russell and
that the only hope rested in their overthrow. Against this idea Lindsay
had now taken definite ground. Moreover, Mason had been instructed to
shake the dust of England from off his shoes with no official authority
to return. Carefully explaining this last point to Lindsay he declined
to hold an interview with Palmerston, except on the latter's invitation,
or at least suggestion:
"Had the suggestion you make of an interview and conversation
with Lord Palmerston originated with his Lordship I might not
have felt myself prohibited by my instructions from at once
acceding to it, but as it has the form only of his assent to
a proposition from you I must with all respect decline it.
"Although no longer accredited by my Government as Special
Commissioner to Great Britain, I am yet in Europe with full
powers, and therefore, had Lord Palmerston expressed a desire
to see me as his own act (of course unofficially, and even
without any reason assigned for the interview) I should have
had great pleasure in complying with his request[1179]."
The explanation of disinclination to come was lengthy, but the last
paragraph indicated an itching to be active in London again. Lindsay
renewed his urgings and was not only hopeful but elated over the seeming
success of his overtures to the Government. He had again seen Palmerston
and had now pushed his proposal beyond the timid suggestion of overtures
when the opportune moment should arrive to a definite suggestion of
recognition of the Confederacy:
"I reasoned on the _moral_ effect of recognition, considering
that the restoration of the Union, which was utterly
hopeless, was the object which the North had in view, etc.,
etc. This reasoning appeared to produce a considerable
effect, for he appears now to be very open to conviction. He
again said that in his opinion the subjugation of the South
could not be effected by the North, and he added that he
thought the people of the North were becoming more and more
alive to the fact every day."
Lindsay's next step was to be the securing of an interview with Russell
and if he was found to be equally acquiescent all would be
plain sailing:
"Now, if by strong reasoning in a quiet way, and by stern
facts we can get Lord R. to my views, I think I may say that
all difficulty so far as our Cabinet is concerned, _is at an
end_. I hope to be able to see Lord Russell alone to-morrow.
He used to pay some little attention to any opinions I
ventured to express to him, and I am _not_ without hope. I
may add that I was as frank with Lord Palmerston as he has
been pleased to be with me, and I told him at parting to-day,
that my present intention was not to proceed with the Motion
at least for 10 days or a fortnight, unless he was prepared
to support me. He highly commended this course, and seemed
much gratified with what I said. The fact is, _sub rosa_, it
is clear to me that _no_ motion will be carried unless it is
supported by the Government for it is clear that Lord Derby
is resolved to leave the responsibility with the Executive,
and therefore, _in the present state of matters_, it would
seriously injure the cause of the South to bring forward any
motion which would not be carried."
Lindsay then urges Mason to come at once to London.
"Now apart altogether from you seeing Lord Palmerston, I must
earnestly entreat you to come here. Unless you are much
wanted in Paris, your visit here, as a private gentleman, can
do no harm, and _may, at the present moment, be of great
service to your country_[1180]."
Palmerston's willingness to listen to suggestions of what would have
amounted to a complete face-about of British policy on America, his
"gratification" that Lindsay intended to postpone the parliamentary
motion, his friendly courtesy to a man whom he had but recently rebuked
for a meddlesome "amateur diplomacy," can be interpreted in no other
light than an evidence of a desire to prevent Southern friends from
joining in the attack, daily becoming more dangerous, on the
Government's Danish policy. How much of this Lindsay understood is not
clear; on the face of his letters to Mason he would seem to have been
hoodwinked, but the more reasonable supposition is, perhaps, that much
was hoped from the governmental necessity of not alienating supporters.
The Danish situation was to be used, but without an open threat. In
addition the tone of the public press, for some time gloomy over
Southern prospects, was now restored to the point of confidence and in
this the _Times_ was again leading[1181]. The Society for Promoting the
Cessation of Hostilities in America quickly issued another circular
letter inviting Members of Parliament to join in a deputation to call on
Palmerston to urge action on the lines of Lindsay's first overture.
Such a deputation would represent "more than 5,000 members and the
feeling of probably more than twenty millions of people." It should not
be a deputation "of parties" but representative of all groups in
Parliament:
"The Society has reason to believe that the Premier is
disposed to look favourably upon the attempt here
contemplated and that the weight of an influential deputation
would strengthen his hands[1182]."
This proposal from the Society was now lagging behind Lindsay's later
objective--namely, direct recognition. That this was felt to be
unfortunate is shown by a letter from Tremlett, Honorary Secretary of
the Society, to Mason. He wrote that the _Southern Independence
Association_, finally stirred by Lindsay's insistence, had agreed to
join the Society in a representation to Palmerston but had favoured some
specific statement on recognition. Palmerston had sent word that he
favoured the Society's resolution but not that of the Association, and
as a result the joint letter of the two organizations would be on the
mild lines of Lindsay's original motion:
"Although this quite expresses the object of our Society,
still I do not think the 'Independence Association' ought to
have 'ratted' from its principles. It ought not to have
consented to ignore the question which it was instituted to
bring before Parliament--that of the Independence of the
Confederacy--and more than that, the ambiguous ending of the
resolution to be submitted is not such as I think ought to be
allowed. You know the resolution and therefore I need only
quote the obnoxious words 'That Her Majesty's Government will
avail itself of the earliest opportunity of mediating, etc.'
"This is just leaving the Government where they have been all
along. They have always professed to take 'the earliest
opportunity' but of which they are to be the judges[1183]!"
Evidently there was confusion in the ranks and disagreement among the
leaders of Southern friends. Adams, always cool in judgment of where lay
the wind, wrote to Seward on this same day that Lindsay was delaying his
motion until the receipt of favourable news upon which to spring it.
Even such news, Adams believed, would not alter British policy unless it
should depict the "complete defeat and dispersion" of Northern
forces[1184]. The day following the _Times_ reported Grant to be meeting
fearful reverses in Virginia and professed to regard Sherman's easy
advance toward Atlanta as but a trap set for the Northern army in the
West[1185]. But in reality the gage of battle for Southern advantage in
England was fixed upon a European, not an American, field. Mason
understood this perfectly. He had yielded to Lindsay's insistence and
had come to London. There he listened to Lindsay's account of the
interview (now held) with Russell, and June 8 reported it to Slidell:
"Of his intercourse with Lord Russell he reports in substance
that his Lordship was unusually gracious and seemed well
disposed to go into conversation. Lord Russell agreed that
the war on the part of the United States was hopeless and
that neither could union be restored nor the South brought
under the yoke.... In regard to Lindsay's motion Lord Russell
said, that he could not _accept_ it, but if brought up for
discussion his side would _speak_ favourably of it. That is
to say they would commend it if they could not vote for it."
This referred to Lindsay's original motion of using the "earliest
opportunity of mediation," and the pleasant reception given by Russell
scarcely justified any great hope of decided benefit for the South. It
must now have been fairly apparent to Lindsay, as it certainly was to
Mason, that all this complaisance by Palmerston and Russell was but
political manipulation to retain or to secure support in the coming
contest with the Tories. The two old statesmen, wise in parliamentary
management, were angling for every doubtful vote. Discussing with
Lindsay the prospects for governmental action Mason now ventured to
suggest that perhaps the best chances of success lay with the Tories,
and found him unexpectedly in agreement:
"I told Lindsay (but for his ear only) that Mr. Hunter,
editor of the _Herald_, had written to Hotze about his
connection with Disraeli, and he said at once, that if the
latter took it up in earnest, it could not be in better hands
and would carry at the expense of the Ministry and that he
would most cheerfully and eagerly yield him the _pas_.
Disraeli's accession, as you remember, was contingent upon
our success in Virginia--and agreeing entirely with Lindsay
that the movement could not be in better hands and as there
were but 10 days before his motion could again come, I
thought the better policy would be for the present that he
should be silent and to await events[1186]."
Slidell was less sceptical than was Mason but agreed that it might best
advantage the South to be rid of Russell:
"If Russell can be trusted, which to me is very doubtful,
Lindsay's motion must succeed. Query, how would its being
brought forward by Disraeli affect Russell's action--if he
can be beaten on a fair issue it would be better for us
perhaps than if it appeared to be carried with his qualified
assent[1187]."
But Mason understood that Southern expectation of a change in British
policy toward America must rest (and even then but doubtfully) on a
change of Government. By June 29 his personal belief was that the Tory
attack on the Danish question would be defeated and that this would "of
course postpone Lindsay's projected motion[1188]." On June 25, the
Danish Conference had ended and the Prussian war with Denmark was
renewed. There was a general feeling of shame over Palmerston's bluster
followed by a meek British inaction. The debate came on a vote of
censure, July 8, in the course of which Derby characterized governmental
policy as one of "meddle and muddle." The censure was carried in the
Lords by nine votes, but was defeated in the Commons by a ministerial
majority of eighteen. It was the sharpest political crisis of
Palmerston's Ministry during the Civil War. Every supporting vote was
needed[1189].
Not only had Lindsay's motion been postponed but the interview with
Palmerston for which Mason had come to London had also been deferred in
view of the parliamentary crisis. When finally held on July 14, it
resolved itself into a proud and emphatic assertion by Mason that the
South could not be conquered, that the North was nearly ready to
acknowledge it and that the certainty of Lincoln's defeat in the coming
Presidential election was proof of this. Palmerston appears to have
said little.
"At the conclusion I said to him in reply to his remark, that
he was gratified in making my acquaintance, that I felt
obliged by his invitation to the interview, but that the
obligation would be increased if I could take with me any
expectation that the Government of Her Majesty was prepared
to unite with France, in some act expressive of their sense
that the war should come to an end. He said, that perhaps, as
I was of opinion that the crisis was at hand, it might be
better to wait until it had arrived. I told him that my
opinion was that the crisis had passed, at least so far as
that the war of invasion would end with the campaign[1190]."
Reporting the interview to Slidell in much the same language, Mason
wrote:
"My own impressions derived from the whole interview are,
that [while] P. is as well satisfied as I am, that the
separation of the States is final and the independence of the
South an accomplished fact, the Ministry fears to move under
the menaces of the North[1191]."
Slidell's comment was bitter:
"I am very much obliged for your account of your interview
with Lord Palmerston. It resulted very much as I had
anticipated excepting that his Lordship appears to have said
even less than I had supposed he would. However, the time has
now arrived when it is comparatively of very little
importance what Queen or Emperor may say or think about us. A
plague, I say, on both your Houses[1192]."
Slidell's opinion from this time on was, indeed, that the South had
nothing to expect from Europe until the North itself should acknowledge
the independence of the Confederacy. July 21, _The Index_ expressed much
the same view and was equally bitter. It quoted an item in the _Morning
Herald_ of July 16, to the effect that Mason had secured an interview
with Palmerston and that "the meeting was satisfactory to all parties":
"The withdrawal of Mr. Lindsay's motion was, it is said, the
result of that interview, the Premier having given a sort of
implied promise to support it at a more opportune moment;
that is to say, when Grant and Sherman have been defeated,
and the Confederacy stand in no need of recognition."
In the same issue _The Index_ described a deputation of clergymen,
noblemen, Members of Parliament "and other distinguished and influential
gentlemen" who had waited upon Palmerston to urge mediation toward a
cessation of hostilities in America. Thus at last the joint project of
the Southern Independence Association and of the Society for Promoting
the Cessation of Hostilities in America had been put in execution
_after_ the political storm had passed and not before--when the
deputation might have had some influence. But the fact was that no
deputation, unless a purely party one, could have been collected before
the conclusion of the Danish crisis. When finally assembled it "had no
party complexion," and the smiling readiness with which it received
Palmerston's jocular reply indicating that Britain's safest policy was
to keep strictly to neutrality is evidence that even the deputation
itself though harassed by Lindsay and others into making this
demonstration, was quite content to let well enough alone. Not so _The
Index_ which sneered at the childishness of Palmerston:
"... He proved incontestably to his visitors that, though he
has been charged with forgetting the vigour of his prime, he
can in old age remember the lessons of his childhood, by
telling them that
They who in quarrels interpose
Will often wipe a bloody nose (laughter)--
a quotation which, in the mouth of the Prime Minister of the
British Empire, and on such an occasion, must be admitted as
not altogether unworthy of Abraham Lincoln himself[1193]."
Spence took consolation in the fact that Mason had at last come into
personal contact with Palmerston, "even now at his great age a charming
contrast to that piece of small human pipe-clay, Lord Russell[1194]."
But the whole incident of Lindsay's excited efforts, Mason's journey to
London and interview with Palmerston, and the deputation, left a bad
taste in the mouth of the more determined friends of the South--of those
who were Confederates rather than Englishmen. They felt that they had
been deceived and toyed with by the Government. Mason's return to London
was formally approved at Richmond but Benjamin wrote that the argument
for recognition advanced to Palmerston had laid too much stress on the
break-down of the North. All that was wanted was recognition which was
due the South from the mere facts of the existing situation, and
recognition, if accorded, would have at once ended the war without
intervention in any form[1195]. Similarly _The Index_ stated that
mediation was an English notion, not a Southern one. The South merely
desired justice, that is, recognition[1196]. This was a bold front yet
one not unwarranted by the military situation in midsummer of 1864, as
reported in the press. Sherman's western campaign toward Atlanta had but
just started and little was known of the strength of his army or of the
powers of Southern resistance. This campaign was therefore regarded as
of minor importance. It was on Grant's advance toward Richmond that
British attention was fixed; Lee's stiff resistance, the great losses of
the North in battle after battle and finally the settling down by Grant
to besiege the Southern lines at Petersburg, in late June, 1864, seemed
to indicate that once again an offensive in Virginia to "end the war"
was doomed to that failure which had marked the similar efforts of each
of the three preceding years.
Southern efforts in England to alter British neutrality practically
ended with Lindsay's proposed but undebated motion of June, 1864, but
British confidence in Southern ability to defend herself indefinitely, a
confidence somewhat shattered at the beginning of 1864--had renewed its
strength by July. For the next six months this was to be the note harped
upon in society, by organizations, and in the friendly press.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1129: Mason Papers.]
[Footnote 1130: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 1131: _Ibid._, Spence to Mason, Dec. 7, 1863.]
[Footnote 1132: _The Index_, Dec. 10, 1863, p. 518.]
[Footnote 1133: The success of pro-Northern meetings in London was
ignored. Lord Bryce once wrote to C.F. Adams, "My recollection is that
while many public meetings were held all over Great Britain by those who
favoured the cause which promised the extinction of Slavery, no open
(i.e., non-ticket) meeting ever expressed itself on behalf of the South,
much as its splendid courage was admired." (Letter, Dec. 1, 1913, in
Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, Vol. XLVII, p. 55.) No doubt many of
these pro-Southern meetings were by ticket, but that many were not is
clear from the reports in _The Index_.]
[Footnote 1134: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Dec. 17, 1863.]
[Footnote 1135: _Ibid._, The _weight_ of the _Times_ is here evident
even though Goldwin Smith's statement, made in a speech at Providence,
R.I., in 1864, be true that the London _Daily Telegraph_, a paper not
committed to either side in America, had three times the circulation of
the _Times_. (_The Liberator_, Sept. 30, 1864.) Smith's speech was made
on the occasion of receiving the degree of LL.D. from Brown University.]
[Footnote 1136: _Ibid._, That Mason did contribute Confederate funds to
Spence's meetings comes out in later correspondence, but the amount is
uncertain.]
[Footnote 1137: _The Index_, Dec. 17, 1863, p. 532. "The attendance of
representatives was numerous, and the greatest interest was manifested
throughout the proceedings. Manchester was represented by Mr. W. R.
Callender (Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee), and by Messrs.
Pooley, J. H. Clarke, T. Briggs, Rev. Geo. Huntington, Rev. W.
Whitelegge, Messrs. Armstrong, Stutter, Neild, Crowther, Stenhouse,
Parker, Hough, W. Potter, Bromley, etc. Mr. Mortimer Collins, the
Secretary of the Association, was also present. The districts were
severally represented by the following gentlemen: Stockport--Messrs.
Constantine and Leigh; Rochdale--Mr. Thos. Staley; Bradford--Mr. J.
Leach; Hyde--Messrs. Wild and Fletcher; Glossop--Mr. C. Schofield;
Oldham--Messrs. Whittaker, Steeple, and Councillor Harrop; Delf and
Saddleworth--Mr. Lees, J.P.; Macclesfield--Messrs. Cheetham and Bridge;
Heywood--Mr. Fairbrother; Middleton--Mr. Woolstencroft; Alderley
(Chorley)---Mr. J. Beesley, etc., etc."]
[Footnote 1138: So reported by _The Index_, Jan. 14, 1864, p. 20, in
comment on speeches being made by Forster and Massie throughout
Lancashire.]
[Footnote 1139: _The Index_, Jan. 14, 1864, p. 22.]
[Footnote 1140: Mason Papers. To Mason.]
[Footnote 1141: _The Liberator_, Dec. 26, 1862, giving an extract from
the London _Morning Star_ of Dec. 4, and a letter from George Thompson.]
[Footnote 1142: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. 1, p. 18.
Adams to Seward, Dec. 18, 1862, enclosing a pamphlet issued by the
Association.]
[Footnote 1143: Its appeal for funds was addressed in part to women.
"Fairest and best of earth! for the sake of violated innocence, insulted
virtue, and the honour of your sex, come in woman's majesty and
omnipotence and give strength to a cause that has for its object the
highest human aims--the amelioration and exaltation of humanity."]
[Footnote 1144: _The Index_, Jan. 14, 1864, p. 23. The committee of
organization was as follows:--
The Most Noble the Marquis of Lothian,
The Most Noble the Marquis of Bath,
The Lord Robert Cecil, M.P.,
The Lord Eustace Cecil,
The Right Honourable Lord Wharncliffe.
The Right Honourable Lord Campbell,
The Hon. C. Fitzwilliam, M.P.,
The Honourable Robt. Bourke,
Edward Akroyd, Esq., Halifax,
Colonel Greville, M.P.,
W.H. Gregory, Esq., M.P.,
T.C. Haliburton, Esq., M.P.,
A.J.B. Beresford Hope, Esq.,
W.S.Lindsay, Esq., M.P.,
G.M.W. Peacocke, Esq., M.P.,
Wm. Scholefield, Esq., M.P.,
James Spence, Esq., Liverpool,
William Vansittart, Esq., M.P.
* * * * *
Chairman: A.J.B. Beresford Hope, Esq.
Treasurer: The Lord Eustace Cecil.
]
[Footnote 1145: _The Liberator_, Feb. 26, 1864.]
[Footnote 1146: _The Index_, March 17, 1864, p. 174. An amusing reply
from an "historian" inclined to dodge is printed as of importance. One
would like to know his identity, and what his "judicial situation" was.
"An eminent Conservative historian writes as follows: 'I hesitate to
become a member of your Association from a doubt whether I should take
that open step to which my inclinations strongly prompt me, or adhere to
the neutrality in public life to which, as holding a high and
responsible judicial situation in this country, I have hitherto
invariably confined myself. And after mature consideration I am of
opinion that it will be more decorous to abide in this instance by my
former rule. I am the more inclined to follow this course from the
reflection that by not appearing in public as an advocate of the
Southern States, I shall be able to serve their cause more effectually
in my literary character. And the printing of a new edition of my
'History' (which is now going on) will afford me several opportunities
of doing so, of which I shall not fail gladly to avail myself.'"]
[Footnote 1147: Printed, London, 1864.]
[Footnote 1148: At the time a recently-printed work by a clergyman had
much vogue: "The South As It Is, or Twenty-one Years' Experience in the
Southern States of America." By Rev. T.D. Ozanne. London, 1863. Ozanne
wrote: "Southern society has most of the virtues of an aristocracy,
increased in zest by the democratic form of government, and the freedom
of discussion on all topics fostered by it. It is picturesque,
patriarchal, genial. It makes a landed gentry, it founds families, it
favours leisure and field sports; it develops a special class of
thoughtful, responsible, guiding, and protecting minds; it tends to
elevation of sentiment and refinement of manners" (p. 61). Especially he
insisted the South was intensely religious and he finally dismissed
slavery with the phrase: "The Gospel of the Son of God has higher
objects to attain than the mere removal of one social evil" (p. 175).]
[Footnote 1149: Mason Papers.]
[Footnote 1150: The _Alexandra_, as a result of the Court's decision,
was again appealed, but on an adverse decision was released, proceeded
to Nassau, where she was again libelled in the Vice-Admiralty Court of
the Bahamas, and again released. She remained at Nassau until the close
of the war, thus rendering no service to the South. (Bernard,
pp. 354-5.)]
[Footnote 1151: Feb. 4, 1864, p. 73.]
[Footnote 1152: See Ch. XIII.]
[Footnote 1153: State Department, Eng. Adams to Seward, April 7, 1864.]
[Footnote 1154: F.O., Am., Vol. 944, No. 81. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 1,
1864.]
[Footnote 1155: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 9, 1864.]
[Footnote 1156: F.O., Am., Vol. 944, No. 98. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 12,
1864.]
[Footnote 1157: _Ibid._, Vol. 946, No. 201. Lyons to Russell, March 22,
1864.]
[Footnote 1158: _Ibid._, Vol. 945, No. 121. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 23,
1864.]
[Footnote 1159: Lyons Papers, April 23, 1864.]
[Footnote 1160: April, 1864.]
[Footnote 1161: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April 19, 1864, and
F.O., Am., Vol. 948, No. 284. Lyons to Russell, April 25, 1864. A
Captain Goodenough was sent to America and fully confirmed
Lyons' reports.]
[Footnote 1162: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, May 9, 1864. The tone
of the _New York Herald_ might well have given cause for anxiety. "In
six months at the furthest, this unhappy rebellion will be brought to a
close. We shall then have an account to settle with the Governments that
have either outraged us by a recognition of what they call 'the
belligerent rights' of the rebels, or by the active sympathy and aid
which they have afforded them. Let France and England beware how they
swell up this catalogue of wrongs. By the time specified we shall have
unemployed a veteran army of close upon a million of the finest troops
in the world, with whom we shall be in a position not only to drive the
French out of Mexico and to annex Canada, but, by the aid of our
powerful navy, even to return the compliment of intervention in European
affairs." (Quoted by _The Index_, July 23, 1863, p. 203.)]
[Footnote 1163: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, p. 563, states that great
efforts were made by the Government to stimulate immigration both to
secure a labour supply and to fill up the armies. Throughout and even
since the war the charge has been made by the South that the foreign
element, after 1862, preponderated in Northern armies. There is no way
of determining the exact facts in regard to this for no statistics were
kept. A Memorandum prepared by the U.S. War Department, dated July 15,
1898, states that of the men examined for physical fitness by the
several boards of enrolment, subsequent to September 1, 1864 (at which
time, if ever, the foreign element should have shown preponderance), the
figures of nativity stood: United States, 341,569; Germany, 54,944;
Ireland, 50,537; British-America, 21,645; England, 16,196; and various
other countries no one of which reached the 3,500 mark. These statistics
really mean little as regards war-time immigration since they do not
show _when_ the foreign-born came to America; further, from the very
first days of the war there had been a large element of American
citizens of German and Irish birth in the Northern armies. Moreover, the
British statistics of emigration, examined in relation to the figures
given above, negative the Southern accusation. In 1861, but 38,000
subjects of Great Britain emigrated to the United States; in 1862,
48,000; while in 1863 the number suddenly swelled to 130,000, and this
figure was repeated in 1864. In each year almost exactly two-thirds were
from Ireland. Now of the 94,000 from Ireland in 1863, considering the
number of Irish-American citizens already in the army, it is evident
that the bulk must have gone into labour supply.]
[Footnote 1164: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Commons_, LXXII.
"Correspondence with Mr. Adams respecting enlistment of British
subjects."]
[Footnote 1165: The _Times_, Nov. 21, 1863. Also March 31, 1864.]
[Footnote 1166: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1864, _Commons_, LXII.
"Correspondence respecting the Enlistment of British seamen at
Queenstown." Also "Further Correspondence," etc.]
[Footnote 1167: For facts and much correspondence on the Phinney case
see _Parliamentary Papers_, 1864, _Commons_, LXII. "Correspondence
respecting the Enlistment of British subjects in the United States
Army." Also "Further Correspondence," etc.]
[Footnote 1168: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXIV, p. 628, and CLXXV, p. 353,
and CLXXVI, p. 2161. In the last of these debates, July 28, 1864, papers
were asked for on "Emigration to America," and readily granted by the
Government.]
[Footnote 1169: Walpole, _History of Twenty-five Years_, Vol. I, Ch.
VI.]
[Footnote 1170: In the Cabinet, Palmerston (and to some extent Russell)
was opposed by Granville and Clarendon (the latter of whom just at this
time entered the Cabinet) and by the strong pro-German influence of the
Queen. (Fitzmaurice, _Granville_, I, Ch. XVI.)]
[Footnote 1171: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, March 13, 1864.]
[Footnote 1172: This came through a letter from Donoughmore to Mason,
April 4, 1864, stating that it was private information received by
Delane from Mackay, the _Times_ New York correspondent. The expected
Southern victory was to come "in about fourteen days." (Mason Papers.)]
[Footnote 1173: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 1174: Mason Papers. Lindsay to Beresford Hope, April 8, 1864.]
[Footnote 1175: _Ibid._, Lindsay to Mason, May 10, 1864.]
[Footnote 1176: July 18, 1864.]
[Footnote 1177: Mason Papers.]
[Footnote 1178: Sample letter in Mason Papers.]
[Footnote 1179: Mason Papers. Mason to Lindsay, May 29, 1864.]
[Footnote 1180: _Ibid._, Lindsay to Mason, May 30, 1864.]
[Footnote 1181: Editorials of May 28 and 30, 1864, painted a dark
picture for Northern armies.]
[Footnote 1182: Mason Papers. Sample letter, June I, 1864. Signed by
F.W. Tremlett, Hon. Sec.]
[Footnote 1183: _Ibid._, Tremlett to Mason, June 2, 1864.]
[Footnote 1184: State Department, Eng., Vol. 86, No. 705. Adams to
Seward, June 2, 1864.]
[Footnote 1185: June 3, 1864.]
[Footnote 1186: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 8, 1864. Mason
wrote to Benjamin that Disraeli had said "to one of his friends and
followers" that he would be prepared to bring forward some such motion
as that prepared by Lindsay. (Mason's _Mason_, p. 500. To Benjamin, June
9, 1864.) Evidently the friend was Hunter.]
[Footnote 1187: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, June 9, 1864.]
[Footnote 1188: _Ibid._, Mason to Slidell, June 29, 1864.]
[Footnote 1189: Walpole, _History of Twenty-five Years_, Vol. I, Ch.
VI.]
[Footnote 1190: Mason's _Mason_, p. 507. Mason to Benjamin, July 14,
1864.]
[Footnote 1191: Mason Papers, July 16, 1864.]
[Footnote 1192: _Ibid._, To Mason, July 17, 1864.]
[Footnote 1193: _The Index_, July 21, 1864, p. 457.]
[Footnote 1194: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, July 18, 1864.]
[Footnote 1195: Richardson, II, pp. 672-74. Benjamin to Mason, Sept. 20,
1864.]
[Footnote 1196: July 21, 1864.]
CHAPTER XVI
BRITISH CONFIDENCE IN THE SOUTH
After three years of great Northern efforts to subdue the South and of
Southern campaigns aimed, first, merely toward resistance, but later
involving offensive battles, the Civil War, to European eyes, had
reached a stalemate where neither side could conquer the other. To the
European neutral the situation was much as in the Great War it appeared
to the American neutral in December, 1916, at the end of two years of
fighting. In both wars the neutral had expected and had prophesied a
short conflict. In both, this had proved to be false prophecy and with
each additional month of the Civil War there was witnessed an increase
of the forces employed and a psychological change in the people whereby
war seemed to have become a normal state of society. The American Civil
War, as regards continuity, numbers of men steadily engaged, resources
employed, and persistence of the combatants, was the "Great War," to
date, of all modern conflicts. Not only British, but nearly all foreign
observers were of the opinion by midsummer of 1864, after an apparent
check to Grant in his campaign toward Richmond, that all America had
become engaged in a struggle from which there was scant hope of
emergence by a decisive military victory. There was little knowledge of
the steady decline of the resources of the South even though Jefferson
Davis in a message to the Confederate Congress in February, 1864, had
spoken bitterly of Southern disorganization[1197]. Yet this belief in
stalemate in essence still postulated an ultimate Southern victory, for
the function of the Confederacy was, after all, to _resist_ until its
independence was recognized. Ardent friends of the North in England both
felt and expressed confidence in the outcome, but the general attitude
of neutral England leaned rather to faith in the powers of indefinite
Southern resistance, so loudly voiced by Southern champions.
There was now one element in the situation, however, that hampered these
Southern champions. The North was at last fully identified with the
cause of emancipation; the South with the perpetuation of slavery. By
1864, it was felt to be impossible to remain silent on this subject and
even in the original constitution and address of the Southern
Independence Association a clause was adopted expressing a hope for the
gradual extinction of slavery[1198]. This brought Mason some
heartburnings and he wrote to Spence in protest, the latter's reply
being that he also agreed that the South ought not to be offered
gratuitous advice on what was purely "an internal question," but that
the topic was full of difficulties and the clause would have to stand,
at least in some modified form. At Southern public meetings, also, there
arose a tendency to insert in resolutions similar expressions. "In
Manchester," Spence wrote, "Mr. Lees, J.P., and the strongest man on the
board, brought forward a motion for an address on this subject. I went
up to Manchester purposely to quash it and I did so effectually[1199]."
Northern friends were quick to strike at this weakness in Southern
armour; they repeatedly used a phrase, "The Foul Blot," and by mere
iteration gave such currency to it that even in Southern meetings it was
repeated. _The Index_, as early as February, 1864, felt compelled to
meet the phrase and in an editorial, headed "The Foul Blot," argued the
error of Southern friends. As long as they could use the word "blot" in
characterization of Southern slavery, _The Index_ felt that there could
be no effective British push for Southern independence and it asserted
that slavery, in the sense in which England understood it, did not exist
in the Confederacy.