Here were several ideas quite impossible of acceptance by North and

South in their then frame of mind and Russell himself believed them

certain to be refused by the North in any case. But he was eager to

present the question for Cabinet discussion hoping for a reversal of the

previous decision. Whether from pique or from conviction of the wisdom

of a change in British policy, he proposed to press for acceptance of

the French plan, with modifications. The news of Napoleon's offer and of

Russell's attitude, with some uncertainty as to that of Palmerston,

again brought Lewis into action and on November 7 he circulated another

memorandum, this time a very long one of some fifteen thousand words.

This was in the main an historical résumé of past British policy in

relation to revolted peoples, stating the international law of such

cases, and pointing out that Great Britain had never recognized a

revolted people so long as a _bona fide_ struggle was still going on.

Peace was no doubt greatly to be desired. "If England could, by

legitimate means, and without unduly sacrificing or imperilling her own

interests, accelerate this consummation, she would, in my opinion, earn

the just gratitude of the civilized world." But the question, as he had

previously asserted, was full of grave dangers. The very suggestion of a

concert of Powers was itself one to be avoided. "A conference of the

five great Powers is an imposing force, but it is a dangerous body to

set in motion. A single intervening Power may possibly contrive to

satisfy both the adverse parties; but five intervening Powers have first

to satisfy one another." Who could tell what divergence might arise on

the question of slavery, or on boundaries, or how far England might

find her ideals or her vital interests compromised[815]?

Here was vigorous resistance to Russell, especially effective for its

appeal to past British policy, and to correct practice in international

law. On the same day that Lewis' memorandum was circulated, there

appeared a communication in the _Times_ by "Historicus," on "The

International Doctrine of Recognition," outlining in briefer form

exactly those international law arguments presented by Lewis, and

advocating a continuation of the policy of strict neutrality.

"Historicus" was William Vernon Harcourt, husband of Lewis' stepdaughter

who was also the niece of Clarendon. Evidently the family guns were all

trained on Russell[816]. "Historicus" drove home the fact that premature

action by a neutral was a "hostile act" and ought to be resented by the

"Sovereign State" as a "breach of neutrality and friendship[817]."

Thus on receipt of the news of Napoleon's proposal the Cabinet crisis

was renewed and even more sharply than on October 23. The French offer

was not actually presented until November 10[818]. On the next two days

the answer to be made received long discussion in the Cabinet. Lewis

described this to Clarendon, prefacing his account by stating that

Russell had heard by telegram from Napier at St. Petersburg to the

effect that Russia would not join but would support English-French

proposals through her Minister at Washington, "provided it would not

cause irritation[819]."

"Having made this statement, Lord John proceeded to explain

his views on the question. These were, briefly, that the

recent successes of the Democrats afforded a most favourable

opportunity of intervention, because we should strengthen

their hands, and that if we refused the invitation of France,

Russia would reconsider her decision, act directly with

France, and thus accomplish her favourite purpose of

separating France and England. He therefore advised that the

proposal of France should be accepted. Palmerston followed

Lord John, and supported him, but did not say a great deal.

His principal argument was the necessity for showing sympathy

with Lancashire, and of not throwing away any chance of

mitigating it [_sic_].

"The proposal was now thrown before the Cabinet, who

proceeded to pick it to pieces. Everybody present threw a

stone at it of greater or less size, except Gladstone, who

supported it, and the Chancellor [Westbury] and Cardwell, who

expressed no opinion. The principal objection was that the

proposed armistice of six months by sea and land, involving a

suspension of the commercial blockade, was so grossly

unequal--so decidedly in favour of the South, that there was

no chance of the North agreeing to it. After a time,

Palmerston saw that the general feeling of the Cabinet was

against being a party to the representation, and he

capitulated. I do not think his support was very sincere: it

certainly was not hearty ... I ought to add that, after the

Cabinet had come to a decision and the outline of a draft had

been discussed, the Chancellor uttered a few oracular

sentences on the danger of refusing the French invitation,

and gave a strong support to Lord John. His support came

rather late ... I proposed that we should _tater le terrain_

at Washington and ascertain whether there was any chance of

the proposal being accepted. Lord John refused this. He

admitted there was no chance of an affirmative answer from

Washington. I think his principal motive was a fear of

displeasing France, and that Palmerston's principal motive

was a wish to seem to support him. There is a useful article

in to-day's _Times_ throwing cold water on the invitation. I

take for granted that Delane was informed of the result of

the Cabinet[820]."

Gladstone, writing to his wife, gave a similar though more brief

account:

"Nov. 11. We have had our Cabinet to-day and meet again

to-morrow. I am afraid we shall do little or nothing in the

business of America. But I will send you definite

intelligence. Both Lords Palmerston and Russell are _right._

Nov. 12. The United States affair has ended and not well.

Lord Russell rather turned tail. He gave way without

resolutely fighting out his battle. However, though we

decline for the moment, the answer is put upon grounds and in

terms which leave the matter very open for the future. Nov.

13. I think the French will make our answer about America

public; at least it is very possible. But I hope they may not

take it as a positive refusal, or at any rate that they may

themselves act in the matter. It will be clear that we concur

with them, that the war should cease. Palmerston gave to

Russell's proposal a feeble and half-hearted support[821]."

The reply to France was in fact immediately made public both in France

and in England. It was complimentary to the Emperor's "benevolent views

and humane intentions," agreed that "if the steps proposed were to be

taken, the concurrence of Russia would be extremely desirable" but

remarked that as yet Great Britain had not been informed that Russia

wished to co-operate, and concluded that since there was no ground to

hope the North was ready for the proposal it seemed best to postpone any

overture until there was a "greater prospect than now exists of its

being accepted by the two contending parties[822]." The argument of

Russell in the Cabinet had been for acceptance without Russia though

earlier he had stipulated her assistance as essential. This was due to

the knowledge already at hand through a telegram from Napier at St.

Petersburg, November 8, that Russia would refuse[823]. But in the answer

to France it is the attitude of Russia that becomes an important reason

for British refusal as, indeed, it was the basis for harmonious decision

within the British Cabinet. This is not to say that had Russia acceded

England also would have done so, for the weight of Cabinet opinion,

adroitly encouraged by Palmerston, was against Russell and the result

reached was that which the Premier wished. More important in his view

than any other matter was the preservation of a united Ministry and at

the conclusion of the American debate even Gladstone could write: "As to

the state of matters generally in the Cabinet, I have never seen it

smoother[824]."

Public opinion in England in the main heartily supported the Cabinet

decision. Hammond described it as "almost universal in this country

against interference[825]," an estimate justified if the more important

journals are taken into account but not true of all. The _Times_ of

November 13 declared:

"We are convinced that the present is not the moment for

these strong measures. There is now great reason to hope that

by means of their own internal action the Americans may

themselves settle their own affairs even sooner than Europe

could settle them for them. We have waited so long that it

would be unpardonable in us to lose the merit of our

self-denial at such a moment as this.... We quite agree with

Mr. Cobden that it would be cheaper to keep all Lancashire on

turtle and venison than to plunge into a desperate war with

the Northern States of America, even with all Europe at our

back. In a good cause, and as a necessity forced upon us in

defence of our honour, or of our rightful interests, we are

as ready to fight as we ever were; but we do not see our duty

or our interest in going blindfold into an adventure such as

this. We very much doubt, more over, whether, if Virginia

belonged to France as Canada belongs to England, the Emperor

of the French would be so active in beating up for recruits

in this American mediation league."

This was followed up two days later by an assertion that no English

statesman had at any time contemplated an offer of mediation made in

such a way as to lead to actual conflict with the United States[826]. On

the other hand the _Herald_, always intense in its pro-Southern

utterances, and strongly anti-Palmerston in politics, professed itself

unable to credit the rumoured Cabinet decision. "Until we are positively

informed that our Ministers are guilty of the great crime attributed to

them," the _Herald_ declared, "we must hope against hope that they are

innocent." If guilty they were responsible for the misery of Lancashire

(depicted in lurid colours):

"A clear, a sacred, an all-important duty was imposed upon

them; to perform that duty would have been the pride and

delight of almost any other Englishmen; and they, with the

task before them and the power to perform it in their

hands--can it be that they have shrunk back in craven

cowardice, deserted their ally, betrayed their country,

dishonoured their own names to all eternity, that they might

do the bidding of John Bright, and sustain for a while the

infamous tyranny of a Butler, a Seward, and a Lincoln[827]?"

In the non-political _Army and Navy Gazette_ the returned editor, W.H.

Russell, but lately the _Times_ correspondent in America, jeered at the

American uproar that might now be expected against France instead of

England: "Let the Emperor beware. The scarred veteran of the New York

Scarrons of Plum Gut has set his sinister or dexter eye upon him, and

threatens him with the loss of his throne," but the British public must

expect no lasting change of Northern attitude toward England and must be

ready for a war if the North were victorious[828]. _Blackwood's_ for

November, 1862, strongly censured the Government for its failure to act.

The _Edinburgh_ for January, 1863, as strongly supported the Ministry

and expanded on the fixed determination of Great Britain to keep out of

the war. _The Index_ naturally frothed in angry disappointment,

continuing its attacks, as if in hopes of a reversal of Ministerial

decision, even into the next year. "Has it come to this? Is England, or

the English Cabinet, afraid of the Northern States? Lord Russell might

contrive so to choose his excuses as not to insult at once both his

country and her ally[829]." An editorial from the _Richmond_ (Virginia)

_Whig_ was quoted with approval characterizing Russell and Palmerston as

"two old painted mummies," who secretly were rejoiced at the war in

America as "threatening the complete annihilation" of both sides, and

expressing the conviction that if the old Union were restored both North

and South would eagerly turn on Great Britain[830]. The explanation,

said _The Index_, of British supineness was simply the pusillanimous

fear of war--and of a war that would not take place in spite of the

bluster of Lincoln's "hangers-on[831]." Even as late as May of the year

following, this explanation was still harped upon and Russell "a

statesman" who belonged "rather to the past than to the present" was

primarily responsible for British inaction. "The nominal conduct of

Foreign Affairs is in the hands of a diplomatic Malaprop, who has never

shown vigour, activity, or determination, except where the display of

these qualities was singularly unneeded, or even worse than

useless[832]."

_The Index_ never wavered from its assumption that in the Cabinet

Russell was the chief enemy of the South. Slidell, better informed,

wrote: "Who would have believed that Earl Russell would have been the

only member of the Cabinet besides Gladstone in favour of accepting the

Emperor's proposition[833]?" He had information that Napoleon had been

led to expect his proposal would be accepted and was much irritated--so

much so that France would now probably act alone[834]. Gladstone's

attitude was a sorrow to many of his friends. Bright believed he was at

last weaned from desires for mediation and sympathetic with the answer

to France[835], but Goldwin Smith in correspondence with Gladstone on

American affairs knew that the wild idea now in the statesman's mind was

of offering Canada to the North if she would let the South go[836]--a

plan unknown, fortunately for Gladstone's reputation for good judgment,

save to his correspondent.

In general, as the weeks passed, the satisfaction grew both with the

public and in the Government that England had made no adventure of new

policy towards America. This satisfaction was strongly reinforced when

the first reports were received from Lyons on his arrival in America.

Reaching New York on November 8 he found that even the "Conservatives"

were much opposed to an offer of mediation at present and thought it

would only do harm until there was a change of Government in

Washington--an event still remote. Lyons himself believed mediation

useless unless intended to be followed by recognition of the South and

that such recognition was likewise of no value without a raising of the

blockade for which he thought the British Cabinet not prepared[837].

Lyons flatly contradicted Stuart's reports, his cool judgment of

conditions nowhere more clearly manifested than at this juncture in

comparison with his subordinate's excited and eager pro-Southern

arguments. Again on November 28 Lyons wrote that he could not find a

single Northern paper that did not repudiate foreign intervention[838].

In the South, when it was learned that France had offered to act and

England had refused, there was an outburst of bitter anti-British

feeling[839].

The Northern press, as Lyons had reported, was unanimous in rejection of

European offers of aid, however friendly, in settling the war. It

expressed no gratitude to England, devoting its energy rather to

animadversions on Napoleon III who was held to be personally

responsible. Since there had been no European offer made there was no

cause for governmental action. Seward had given Adams specific

instructions in case the emergency arose but there had been no reason to

present these or to act upon them and the crisis once past Seward

believed all danger of European meddling was over and permanently. He

wrote to Bigelow: "We are no longer to be disturbed by Secession

intrigues in Europe. They have had their day. We propose to forget

them[840]." This was a wise and statesmanlike attitude and was shared by

Adams in London. Whatever either man knew or guessed of the prelude to

the answer to France, November 13, they were careful to accept that

answer as fulfilment of Russell's declaration to Adams, October 23, that

Great Britain intended no change of policy[841].

So far removed was Seward's attitude toward England from that ascribed

to him in 1861, so calm was his treatment of questions now up for

immediate consideration, so friendly was he personally toward Lyons,

that the British Minister became greatly alarmed when, shortly after his

return to Washington, there developed a Cabinet controversy threatening

the retirement of the Secretary of State. This was a quarrel brought on

by the personal sensibilities of Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, and

directed at Seward's conduct of foreign affairs. It was quieted by the

tact and authority of Lincoln, who, when Seward handed in his

resignation, secured from Chase a similar offer of resignation, refused

both and in the result read to Chase that lesson of Presidential control

which Seward had learned in May, 1861. Lyons wrote of this controversy

"I shall be sorry if it ends in the removal of Mr. Seward. We are much

more likely to have a man less disposed to keep the peace than a man

more disposed to do so. I should hardly have said this two years

ago[842]." After the event of Seward's retention of office Russell

wrote: "I see Seward stays in. I am very glad of it[843]." This is a

remarkable reversal of former opinion. A better understanding of Seward

had come, somewhat slowly, to British diplomats, but since his action in

the _Trent_ affair former suspicion had steadily waned; his "high tone"

being regarded as for home consumption, until now there was both belief

in Seward's basic friendliness and respect for his abilities.

Thus Russell's ambitious mediation projects having finally dwindled to a

polite refusal of the French offer to join in a mere suggestion of

armistice left no open sores in the British relations with America. The

projects were unknown; the refusal seemed final to Seward and was indeed

destined to prove so. But of this there was no clear conception in the

British Cabinet. Hardly anyone yet believed that reconquest of the South

was even a remote possibility and this foretold that the day must some

time come when European recognition would have to be given the

Confederacy. It is this unanimity of opinion on the ultimate result of

the war in America that should always be kept in mind in judging the

attitude of British Government and people in the fall of 1862. Their

sympathies were of minor concern at the moment, nor were they much in

evidence during the Cabinet crisis. All argument was based upon the

expediency and wisdom of the present proposal. Could European nations

_now_ act in such a way as to bring to an early end a war whose result

in separation was inevitable? It was the hope that such action promised

good results which led Russell to enter upon his policy even though

personally his sympathies were unquestionably with the North. It was, in

the end, the conviction that _now_ was not a favourable time which

determined Palmerston, though sympathetic with the South, to withdraw

his support when Russell, through pique, insisted on going on. Moreover

both statesmen were determined not to become involved in the war and as

the possible consequences of even the "most friendly" offers were

brought out in discussion it became clear that Great Britain's true

policy was to await a return of sanity in the contestants[844].

For America Russell's mediation plan constitutes the most dangerous

crisis in the war for the restoration of the Union. Had that plan been

adopted, no matter how friendly in intent, there is little question that

Lewis' forebodings would have been realized and war would have ensued

between England and the North. But also whatever its results in other

respects the independence of the South would have been established.

Slavery, hated of Great Britain, would have received a new lease of

life--and by British action. In the Cabinet argument all parties agreed

that Lincoln's emancipation proclamation was but an incitement to

servile war and it played no part in the final decision. Soon that

proclamation was to erect a positive barrier of public opinion against

any future efforts to secure British intervention. Never again was there

serious governmental consideration of meddling in the American Civil

War[845].

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 734: Motley, _Correspondence_, II, 71. To his mother, March

16, 1862.]

[Footnote 735: _Ibid._, p. 81. Aug. 18, 1862.]

[Footnote 736: _The Index_ first appeared on May 1, 1862. Nominally a

purely British weekly it was soon recognized as the mouthpiece of the

Confederacy.]

[Footnote 737: _The Index_, May 15, 29, June 19 and July 31, 1862.]

[Footnote 738: e.g., the issue of Aug. 14, 1862, contained a long report

of a banquet in Sheffield attended by Palmerston and Roebuck. In his

speech Roebuck asserted: "A divided America will be a benefit to

England." He appealed to Palmerston to consider whether the time had not

come to recognize the South. "The North will never be our friends.

(Cheers.) Of the South you can make friends. They are Englishmen; they

are not the scum and refuse of Europe. (The Mayor of Manchester: 'Don't

say that; don't say that.') (Cheers and disapprobation.) I know what I

am saying. They are Englishmen, and we must make them our friends."]

[Footnote 739: All American histories treat this incident at much

length. The historian who has most thoroughly discussed it is C.F.

Adams, with changing interpretation as new facts came to light. See his

_Life of C.F. Adams_, Ch. XV; _Studies, Military and Diplomatic_, pp.

400-412; _Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity_, pp. 97-106; _A Crisis

in Downing Street_, Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, May, 1914, pp.

372-424. It will be made clear in a later chapter why Roebuck's motion

of midsummer, 1863, was unimportant in considering Ministerial policy.]

[Footnote 740: Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, p. 388.]

[Footnote 741: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1862-3. Pt. I, pp.

165-168.]

[Footnote 742: Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, p. 389. First

printed in Rhodes, VI, pp. 342-3, in 1899.]

[Footnote 743: _Ibid._, p. 390.]

[Footnote 744: See _ante_, p. 32.]

[Footnote 745: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, July 21, 1862.]

[Footnote 746: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Stuart, July 25, 1862.]

[Footnote 747: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Aug. 8, 1862.

Stoeckl's own report hardly agrees with this. He wrote that the

newspapers were full of rumours of European mediation but, on

consultation with Seward, advised that any offer at present would only

make matters worse. It would be best to wait and see what the next

spring would bring forth (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Aug. 9-21,

1862. No. 1566). Three weeks later Stoeckl was more emphatic; an offer

of mediation would accomplish nothing unless backed up by force to open

the Southern ports; this had always been Lyons' opinion also; before

leaving for England, Lyons had told him "we ought not to venture on

mediation unless we are ready to go to war." Mercier, however, was eager

for action and believed that if France came forward, supported by the

other Powers, especially Russia, the United States would be compelled to

yield. To this Stoeckl did not agree. He believed Lyons was right

(_Ibid._, Sept. 16-28, 1862. No. 1776).]

[Footnote 748: _Ibid._, Aug. 22, 1862. Sumner was Stuart's informant.]

[Footnote 749: _Ibid._, Sept. 26, 1862. When issued on September 22,

Stuart found no "humanity" in it. "It is cold, vindictive and entirely

political."]

[Footnote 750: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Aug. 24, 1862.]

[Footnote 751: The ignorance of other Cabinet members is shown by a

letter from Argyll to Gladstone, September 2, 1862, stating as if an

accepted conclusion, that there should be no interference and that the

war should be allowed to reach its "natural issue" (Gladstone Papers).]

[Footnote 752: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Sept. 18, 1862, fixes

the date of Russell's letter.]

[Footnote 753: Palmerston MS.]

[Footnote 754: Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 360.]

[Footnote 755: _Ibid._, p. 361. Sept. 17, 1862.]

[Footnote 756: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Sept. 18, 1862. This

is the first reference by Cowley in over three months to

mediation--evidence that Russell's instructions took him by surprise.]

[Footnote 757: Gladstone Papers.]

[Footnote 758: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Sept. 22, 1862.]

[Footnote 759: Russell Papers.]

[Footnote 760: Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 362. Sept. 23, 1862.]

[Footnote 761: Lyons Papers.]

[Footnote 762: Lyons Papers. Stuart to Lyons, Sept. 23, 1862.]

[Footnote 763: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, p. 76.]

[Footnote 764: See _ante_, p. 40.]

[Footnote 765: Adams, _A Crisis in Dooming Street_, p. 393, giving the

exact text paraphrased by Morley.]

[Footnote 766: Fitzmaurice, _Granville_, I, pp. 442-44, gives the entire

letter. Sept. 27, 1862.]

[Footnote 767: _Ibid._, p. 442. Oct. 1, 1862. Fitzmaurice attributes

much influence to Granville in the final decision and presumes that the

Queen, also, was opposed to the plan. There is no evidence to show that

she otherwise expressed herself than as in the acquiescent suggestion to

Russell. As for Granville, his opposition, standing alone, would have

counted for little.]

[Footnote 768: Russell Papers. A brief extract from this letter is

printed in Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 362.]

[Footnote 769: Palmerston MS.]

[Footnote 770: Brunow reported Russell's plan October 1, as, summarized,

(1) an invitation to France and Russia to join with England in offering

good services to the United States looking towards peace. (2) Much

importance attached to the adhesion of Russia. (3) Excellent chance of

success. (4) Nevertheless a possible refusal by the United States, in

which case, (5) recognition by Great Britain of the South if it seemed

likely that this could be done without giving the United States a just

ground of quarrel. Brunow commented that this would be "eventually" the

action of Great Britain, but that meanwhile circumstances might delay

it. Especially he was impressed that the Cabinet felt the political

necessity of "doing something" before Parliament reassembled (Russian

Archives, Brunow to F.O., London, Oct. 1, 1862 (N.S.). No. 1698.)

Gortchakoff promptly transmitted this to Stoeckl, together with a letter

from Brunow, dated Bristol, Oct. 1, 1862 (N.S.), in which Brunow

expressed the opinion that one object of the British Government was to

introduce at Washington a topic which would serve to accentuate the

differences that were understood to exist in Lincoln's Cabinet. (This

seems very far-fetched.) Gortchakoff's comment in sending all this to

Stoeckl was that Russia had no intention of changing her policy of

extreme friendship to the United States (_Ibid._, F.O. to Stoeckl, Oct.

3, 1862 (O.S.).)]

[Footnote 771: Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, pp. 438-9.]

[Footnote 772: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Sept. 30, 1862.]

[Footnote 773: _Ibid._, Cowley to Russell, Oct. 3, 1862.]

[Footnote 774: Even the _Edinburgh Review_ for October, 1862, discussed

recognition of the South as possibly near, though on the whole against

such action.]

[Footnote 775: Palmerston MS. Walpole makes Palmerston responsible for

the original plan and Russell acquiescent and readily agreeing to

postpone. This study reverses the roles.]

[Footnote 776: Russell Papers. Also see _ante_ p. 41. Stuart to Lyons.

The letter to Russell was of exactly the same tenor.]

[Footnote 777: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 6, 1862.

Lyons' departure had been altered from October n to October 25.]

[Footnote 778: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, p. 79. Morley calls this

utterance a great error which was long to embarrass Gladstone, who

himself later so characterized it.]

[Footnote 779: Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, p. 402.]

[Footnote 780: Bright to Sumner, October 10, 1862. Mass. Hist. Soc.

_Proceedings_, XLVI, p. 108. Bright was wholly in the dark as to a

Ministerial project. Much of this letter is devoted to the emancipation

proclamation which did not at first greatly appeal to Bright as a

wise measure.]

[Footnote 781: The _Times_, October 9 and 10, while surprised that

Gladstone and not Palmerston, was the spokesman, accepted the speech as

equivalent to a governmental pronouncement. Then the _Times_ makes no

further comment of moment until November 13. The _Morning Post_

(regarded as Palmerston's organ) reported the speech in full on October

9, but did not comment editorially until October 13, and then with much

laudation of Gladstone's northern tour but _with no mention whatever_ of

his utterances on America.]

[Footnote 782: Gladstone wrote to Russell, October 17, explaining that

he had intended no "official utterance," and pleaded that Spence, whom

he had seen in Liverpool, did not put that construction on his words

(Gladstone Papers). Russell replied, October 20. "... Still you must

allow me to say that I think you went beyond the latitude which all

speakers must be allowed when you said that Jeff Davis had made a

nation. Negotiations would seem to follow, and for that step I think the

Cabinet is not prepared. However we shall soon meet to discuss this very

topic" _(Ibid.)_]

[Footnote 783: Palmerston MS. Appended to the Memorandum were the texts

of the emancipation proclamation, Seward's circular letter of September

22, and an extract from the _National Intelligencer_ of September 26,

giving Lincoln's answer to Chicago abolitionists.]

[Footnote 784: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, 80, narrates the "tradition."

Walpole, _Twenty-five Years_, II, 57, states it as a fact. Also

_Education of Henry Adams_, pp. 136, 140. Over forty years later an

anonymous writer in the _Daily Telegraph_, Oct. 24, 1908, gave exact

details of the "instruction" to Lewis, and of those present. (Cited in

Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, pp. 404-5.) C.F. Adams,

_Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity_, Ch. III, repeats the tradition,

but in _A Crisis in Downing Street_ he completely refutes his earlier

opinion and the entire tradition. The further narrative in this chapter,

especially the letters of Clarendon to Lewis, show that Lewis acted

solely on his own initiative.]

[Footnote 785: Anonymously, in the _Edinburgh_, for April, 1861, Lewis

had written of the Civil War in a pro-Northern sense, and appears never

to have accepted fully the theory that it was impossible to reconquer

the South.]

[Footnote 786: Cited in Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, p. 407.]

[Footnote 787: Derby, in conversation with Clarendon, had characterized

Gladstone's speech as an offence against tradition and best practice.

Palmerston agreed, but added that the same objection could be made to

Lewis' speech. Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 267. Palmerston to Clarendon,

Oct. 20, 1862. Clarendon wrote Lewis, Oct. 24, that he did not think

this called for any explanation by Lewis to Palmerston, further proof of

the falsity of Palmerston's initiative. _Ibid._, p. 267.]

[Footnote 788: _The Index_, Oct. 16, 1862, warned against acceptance of

Gladstone's Newcastle utterances as indicating Government policy,

asserted that the bulk of English opinion was with him, but ignorantly

interpreted Cabinet hesitation to the "favour of the North and bitter

enmity to the South, which has animated the diplomatic career of Lord

Russell...." Throughout the war, Russell, to _The Index_, was the evil

genius of the Government.]

[Footnote 789: Palmerston MS.]

[Footnote 790: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 279.]

[Footnote 791: Palmerston MS.]

[Footnote 792: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863. _Commons_, Vol. I XII.

"Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States of North

America." Nos. 33 and 37. Two reports received Oct. 13 and 18, 1862.

Anderson's mission was to report on the alleged drafting of British

subjects into the Northern Army.]

[Footnote 793: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 18, 1862.]

[Footnote 794: Russell Papers. Clarendon to Russell, Oct. 19, 1862.]

[Footnote 795: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 20, 1862.]

[Footnote 796: Russell Papers. It is significant that Palmerston's

organ, the _Morning Post_, after a long silence came out on Oct. 21 with

a sharp attack on Gladstone for his presumption. Lewis was also

reflected upon, but less severely.]

[Footnote 797: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 265.]

[Footnote 798: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1862-3, Pt. I, p. 223.

Adams to Seward, Oct. 24, 1862. C. F. Adams in _A Crisis in Downing

Street_, p. 417, makes Russell state that the Government's intention was

"to adhere to the rule of perfect neutrality"--seemingly a more positive

assurance, and so understood by the American Minister.]

[Footnote 799: _The Index_, Oct. 23, 1862. "... while our people are

starving, our commerce interrupted, our industry paralysed, our Ministry

have no plan, no idea, no intention to do anything but fold their hands,

talk of strict neutrality, spare the excited feelings of the North, and

wait, like Mr. Micawber, for something to turn up."]

[Footnote 800: Russell Papers. To Russell.]

[Footnote 801: _Ibid._, To Russell, Oct. 24, 1862.]

[Footnote 802: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 24, 1862.]

[Footnote 803: Palmerston MS. Marked: "Printed Oct. 24, 1862."]

[Footnote 804: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, 84. Morley was the first to make

clear that no final decision was reached on October 23, a date hitherto

accepted as the end of the Cabinet crisis. Rhodes, IV, 337-348, gives a

résumé of talk and correspondence on mediation, etc., and places October

23 as the date when "the policy of non-intervention was informally

agreed upon" (p. 343), Russell's "change of opinion" being also

"complete" (p. 342). Curiously the dictum of Rhodes and others depends

in some degree on a mistake in copying a date. Slidell had an important

interview with Napoleon on October 28 bearing on an armistice, but this

was copied as October 22 in Bigelow's _France and the Confederate Navy_,

p. 126, and so came to be written into narratives of mediation

proposals. Richardson, II, 345, gives the correct date. Rhodes'

supposition that Seward's instructions of August 2 became known to

Russell and were the determining factor in altering his intentions is

evidently erroneous.]

[Footnote 805: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 265.]

[Footnote 806: _Ibid._, p. 266.]

[Footnote 807: Russell Papers. Palmerston to Russell, Oct. 24, 1862.

Palmerston was here writing of Italian and American affairs.]

[Footnote 808: Palmerston MS. Oct. 25, 1862.]

[Footnote 809: Russell Papers. To Russell.]

[Footnote 810: F.O., France, Vol. 1446. Cowley to Russell, Oct. 28,

1862. Cowley, like Lyons, was against action. He approved Drouyn de

Lhuys' "hesitation." It appears from the Russian archives that France

approached Russia. On October 31, D'Oubril, at Paris, was instructed

that while Russia had always been anxious to forward peace in America,

she stood in peculiarly friendly relations with the United States, and

was against any appearance of pressure. It would have the contrary

effect from that hoped for. If England and France should offer mediation

Russia, "being too far away," would not join, but might give her moral

support. (Russian Archives, F.O. to D'Oubril, Oct. 27, 1862 (O.S.). No.

320.) On the same date Stoeckl was informed of the French overtures, and

was instructed not to take a stand with France and Great Britain, but to

limit his efforts to approval of any _agreement_ by the North and South

to end the war. Yet Stoeckl was given liberty of action if (as

Gortchakoff did not believe) the time had assuredly come when both North

and South were ready for peace, and it needed but the influence of some

friendly hand to soothe raging passions and to lead the contending

parties themselves to begin direct negotiations (_Ibid._, F.O. to

Stoeckl, Oct. 27, 1862 (O.S.).)]

[Footnote 811: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, Oct. 29, 1862. Slidell's

full report to Benjamin is in Richardson, II, 345.]

[Footnote 812: F.O., France, Vol. 1446, No. 1236. Cowley thought neither

party would consent unless it saw some military advantage. (Russell

Papers. Cowley to Russell, Oct. 31, 1862.) Morley, _Gladstone_, II,

84-5, speaks of the French offer as "renewed proposals of mediation."

There was no renewal for this was the _first_ proposal, and it was not

one of mediation though that was an implied result.]

[Footnote 813: Russell Papers, Nov. 2, 1862. Monday, November 1862, was

the 10th not the 11th as Palmerston wrote.]

[Footnote 814: Palmerston MS. Nov. 3, 1862.]

[Footnote 815: Gladstone Papers. The memorandum here preserved has the

additional interest of frequent marginal comments by Gladstone.]

[Footnote 816: The letters of "Historicus" early attracted, in the case

of the _Trent_, favourable attention and respect. As early as 1863 they

were put out in book form to satisfy a public demand: _Letters by

Historicus on some questions of International Law_, London, 1863.]

[Footnote 817: The _Times_, Nov. 7, 1862. The letter was dated Nov. 4.]

[Footnote 818: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, Lords, Vol. XXIX. "Despatch

respecting the Civil War in North America." Russell to Cowley, Nov.

13, 1862.]

[Footnote 819: For substance of the Russian answer to France see _ante_,

p. 59, _note_ 4. D'Oubril reported Drouyn de Lhuys as unconvinced that

the time was inopportune but as stating he had not expected Russia to

join. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs was irritated at an article

on his overtures that had appeared in the _Journal de Petersbourg_, and

thought himself unfairly treated by the Russian Government. (Russian

Archives. D'Oubril to F.O., Nov. 15, 1862 (N.S.), Nos. 1908 and 1912.)]

[Footnote 820: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 268. The letter, as printed, is

dated Nov. 11, and speaks of the Cabinet of "yesterday." This appears to

be an error. Gladstone's account is of a two-days' discussion on Nov. 11

and 12, with the decision reached and draft of reply to France outlined

on the latter date. The article in the _Times_, referred to by Lewis,

appeared on Nov. 13.]

[Footnote 821: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, 85.]

[Footnote 822: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Lords_, Vol. XXIX.

"Despatch respecting the Civil War in North America." Russell to Cowley,

Nov. 13, 1862.]

[Footnote 823: F.O., Russia, Vol. 609, No. 407. Napier to Russell. The

same day Napier wrote giving an account of an interview between the

French Minister and Prince Gortchakoff in which the latter stated Russia

would take no chances of offending the North. _Ibid._, No. 408.]

[Footnote 824: Morley, _Gladstone_, II ,85. To his wife, Nov. 13, 1862.

Even after the answer to France there was some agitation in the Ministry

due to the receipt from Stuart of a letter dated Oct. 31, in which it

was urged that this was the most opportune moment for mediation because

of Democratic successes in the elections. He enclosed also an account of

a "horrible military reprisal" by the Federals in Missouri alleging that

_ten_ Southerners had been executed because of _one_ Northerner seized

by Southern guerillas. (Russell Papers.) The Russell Papers contain a

series of signed or initialled notes in comment, all dated Nov. 14. "W."

(Westbury?) refers to the "horrible atrocities," and urges that, if

Russia will join, the French offer should be accepted. Gladstone wrote,

"I had supposed the question to be closed." "C.W." (Charles Wood), "This

is horrible; but does not change my opinion of the course to be

pursued." "C.P.V." (C.P. Villiers) wrote against accepting the French

proposal, and commented that Stuart had always been a strong partisan of

the South.]

[Footnote 825: Lyons Papers. Hammond to Lyons, Nov. 15, 1862.]

[Footnote 826: The _Times_, Nov. 15, 1862.]

[Footnote 827: The _Herald_, Nov. 14, 1862. This paper was listed by

Hotze of _The Index_, as on his "pay roll." Someone evidently was trying

to earn his salary.]

[Footnote 828: Nov. 15, 1862. It is difficult to reconcile Russell's

editorials either with his later protestations of early conviction that

the North would win or with the belief expressed by Americans that he

was _constantly_ pro-Northern in sentiment, e.g., Henry Adams, in _A

Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 14l.]

[Footnote 829: _The Index_, Nov. 20, 1862, p. 56.]

[Footnote 830: _Ibid._, Jan. 15, 1863, p. 191.]

[Footnote 831: _Ibid._, Jan. 22, 1863, p. 201.]

[Footnote 832: _Ibid._, May 28, 1863, p. 72.]

[Footnote 833: Mason Papers. To Mason, Nov. 28, 1862.]

[Footnote 834: Pickett Papers. Slidell to Benjamin, Nov. 29, 1862. This

despatch is not in Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_,

and illustrates the gaps in that publication.]

[Footnote 835: Rhodes, IV, 347. Bright to Sumner, Dec. 6, 1862.]

[Footnote 836: Goldwin Smith told of this plan in 1904, in a speech at a

banquet in Ottawa. He had destroyed Gladstone's letter outlining it.

_The Ottawa Sun_, Nov. 16, 1904.]

[Footnote 837: Almost immediately after Lyons' return to Washington,

Stoeckl learned from him, and from Mercier, also, that England and

France planned to offer mediation and that if this were refused the

South would be recognized. Stoeckl commented to the Foreign Office:

"What good will this do?" It would not procure cotton unless the ports

were forced open and a clear rupture made with the North. He thought

England understood this, and still hesitated. Stoeckl went on to urge

that if all European Powers joined England and France they would be

merely tails to the kite and that Russia would be one of the tails. This

would weaken the Russian position in Europe as well as forfeit her

special relationship with the United States. He was against any _joint_

European action. (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Nov. 5-17, 1862,

No. 2002.) Gortchakoff wrote on the margin of this despatch: "Je trouve

son opinion très sage." If Stoeckl understood Lyons correctly then the

latter had left England still believing that his arguments with Russell

had been of no effect. When the news reached Washington of England's

refusal of the French offer, Stoeckl reported Lyons as much surprised

(_Ibid._, to F.O., Nov. 19-Dec. 1, 1862, No. 2170).]

[Footnote 838: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1832, _Commons_, Vol. LXXII,

"Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States of North

America." Nos. 47 and 50. Received Nov. 30 and Dec. 11. Mercier, who had

been Stuart's informant about political conditions in New York, felt

that he had been deceived by the Democrats. F.O., Am., Vol. 784, No. 38.

Confidential, Lyons to Russell, Jan. 13, 1863.]

[Footnote 839: F.O., Am., Vol. 840, No. 518. Moore (Richmond) to Lyons,

Dec. 4, 1862. Also F.O., Am., Vol. 844, No. 135. Bunch (Charleston) to

Russell, Dec. 13, 1862. Bunch wrote of the "Constitutional hatred and

jealousy of England, which are as strongly developed here as at the

North. Indeed, our known antipathy to Slavery adds another element to

Southern dislike."]

[Footnote 840: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, 579, Dec. 2, 1862. Bigelow

was Consul-General at Paris, and was the most active of the Northern

confidential agents abroad. A journalist himself, he had close contacts

with the foreign press. It is interesting that he reported the

Continental press as largely dependent for its American news and

judgments upon the British press which specialized in that field, so

that Continental tone was but a reflection of the British tone. _Ibid._,

p. 443. Bigelow to Seward, Jan. 7, 1862.]

[Footnote 841: Lyons placed a high estimate on Adams' abilities. He

wrote: "Mr. Adams shows more calmness and good sense than any of the

American Ministers abroad." (Russell Papers. To Russell, Dec.

12, 1862.)]

[Footnote 842: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 22. 1862.]

[Footnote 843: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Jan. 3, 1863.]

[Footnote 844: December 1, Brunow related an interview in which Russell

expressed his "satisfaction" that England and Russia were in agreement

that the moment was not opportune for a joint offer to the United

States. Russell also stated that it was unfortunate France had pressed

her proposal without a preliminary confidential sounding and

understanding between the Powers; the British Government saw no reason

for changing its attitude. (Russian Archives. Brunow to F.O., Dec. 1,

1862 (N.S.), No. 1998.) There is no evidence in the despatch that Brunow

knew of Russell's preliminary "soundings" of France.]

[Footnote 845: Various writers have treated Roebuck's motion in 1863 as

the "crisis" of intervention. In Chapter XIV the error of this will

be shown.]

CHAPTER XII

THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION

The finality of the British Cabinet decision in November, 1862, relative

to proposals of mediation or intervention was not accepted at the moment

though time was to prove its permanence. The British press was full of

suggestions that the first trial might more gracefully come from France

since that country was presumed to be on more friendly terms with the

United States[846]. Others, notably Slidell at Paris, held the same

view, and on January 8, 1863, Slidell addressed a memorandum to Napoleon

III, asking separate recognition of the South. The next day, Napoleon

dictated an instruction to Mercier offering friendly mediation in

courteous terms but with no hint of an armistice or of an intended

recognition of the South[847]. Meanwhile, Mercier had again approached

Lyons alleging that he had been urged by Greeley, editor of the _New

York Tribune_, to make an isolated French offer, but that he felt this

would be contrary to the close harmony hitherto maintained in

French-British relations. But Mercier added that if Lyons was

disinclined to a proposal of mediation, he intended to advise his

Government to give him authority to act alone[848]. Lyons made no

comment to Mercier but wrote to Russell, "I certainly desire that the

Settlement of the Contest should be made without the intervention

of England."

A week later the Russian Minister, Stoeckl, also came to Lyons desiring

to discover what would be England's attitude if Russia should act alone,

or perhaps with France, leaving England out of a proposal to the

North[849]. This was based on the supposition that the North, weary of

war, might ask the good offices of Russia. Lyons replied that he did not

think that contingency near and otherwise evaded Stoeckl's questions;

but he was somewhat suspicious, concluding his report, "I cannot quite

forget that Monsieur Mercier and Monsieur de Stoeckl had agreed to go to

Richmond together last Spring[850]." The day after this despatch was

written Mercier presented, February 3, the isolated French offer and on

February 6 received Seward's reply couched in argumentative, yet polite

language, but positively declining the proposal[851]. Evidently Lyons

was a bit disquieted by the incident; but in London, Napoleon's overture

to America was officially stated to be unobjectionable, as indeed was

required by the implications of the reply of November 13, to France.

Russell, on February 14, answered Lyons' communications in a letter

marked "Seen by Lord Palmerston and the Queen":

"Her Majesty's Government have no wish to interfere at

present in any way in the Civil War. If France were to offer

good offices or mediation, Her Majesty's Government would

feel no jealousy or repugnance to such a course on the part

of France alone[852]."

The writing of this despatch antedated the knowledge that France had

already acted at Washington, and does not necessarily indicate any

governmental feeling of a break in previous close relations with France

on the American question. Yet this was indubitably the case and became

increasingly evident as time passed. Russell's despatch to Lyons of

February 14 appears rather to be evidence of the effect of the debates

in Parliament when its sessions were resumed on February 5, for in both

Lords and Commons there was given a hearty and nearly unanimous support

of the Government's decision to make no overture for a cessation of the

conflict in America. Derby clearly outlined the two possible conditions

of mediation; first, when efforts by the North to subdue the South had

practically ceased; and second, if humane interests required action by

neutral states, in which case the intervening parties must be fully

prepared to use force. Neither condition had arrived and strict

neutrality was the wise course. Disraeli also approved strict neutrality

but caustically referred to Gladstone's Newcastle speech and sharply

attacked the Cabinet's uncertain and changeable policy--merely a party

speech. Russell upheld the Government's decision but went out of his way

to assert that the entire subjugation of the South would be a calamity

to the United States itself, since it would require an unending use of

force to hold the South in submission[853]. Later, when news of the

French offer at Washington had been received, the Government was

attacked in the Lords by an undaunted friend of the South, Lord

Campbell, on the ground of a British divergence from close relations

with France. Russell, in a brief reply, reasserted old arguments that

the time had "not yet" come, but now declared that events seemed to show

the possibility of a complete Northern victory and added with emphasis

that recognition of the South could justly be regarded by the North as

an "unfriendly act[854]."

Thus Parliament and Cabinet were united against meddling in America,

basing this attitude on neutral duty and national interests, and with

barely a reference to the new policy of the North toward slavery,

declared in the emancipation proclamations of September 22, 1862, and

January 1, 1863, Had these great documents then no favourable influence

on British opinion and action? Was the Northern determination to root

out the institution of slavery, now clearly announced, of no effect in

winning the favour of a people and Government long committed to a world

policy against that institution? It is here necessary to review early

British opinion, the facts preceding the first emancipation

proclamation, and to examine its purpose in the mind of Lincoln.

Before the opening of actual military operations, while there was still

hope of some peaceful solution, British opinion had been with the North

on the alleged ground of sympathy with a free as against a slave-owning

society. But war once begun the disturbance to British trade interests

and Lincoln's repeated declarations that the North had no intention of

destroying slavery combined to offer an excuse and a reason for an

almost complete shift of British opinion. The abolitionists of the North

and the extreme anti-slavery friends in England, relatively few in

number in both countries, still sounded the note of "slavery the cause

of the war," but got little hearing. Nevertheless it was seen by

thoughtful minds that slavery was certain to have a distinct bearing on

the position of Great Britain when the war was concluded. In May, 1861,

Palmerston declared that it would be a happy day when "we could succeed

in putting an end to this unnatural war between the two sections of our

North American cousins," but added that the difficulty for England was

that "_We_ could not well mix ourselves up with the acknowledgment of

slavery[855]...."

Great Britain's long-asserted abhorrence of slavery caused, indeed, a

perplexity in governmental attitude. But this looked to the final

outcome of an independent South--an outcome long taken for granted.

Debate on the existing moralities of the war very soon largely

disappeared from British discussion and in its place there cropped out,

here and there, expressions indicative of anxiety as to whether the war

could long continue without a "servile insurrection," with all its

attendant horrors.

On July 6, 1861, the _Economist_, reviewing the progress of the war

preparations to date, asserted that it was universally agreed no

restoration of the Union was possible and answered British fears by

declaring it was impossible to believe that even the American madness

could contemplate a servile insurrection. The friendly _Spectator_ also

discussed the matter and repeatedly. It was a mistaken idea, said this

journal, that there could be no enfranchisement without a slave rising,

but should this occur, "the right of the slave to regain his freedom,

even if the effort involve slaughter, is as clear as any other

application of the right of self-defence[856]." Yet English

abolitionists should not urge the slave to act for himself, since "as

war goes on and all compromise fails the American mind will harden under

the white heat and determine that the _cause_ of all conflict must

cease." That slavery, in spite of any declaration by Lincoln or Northern

denial of a purpose to attack it--denials which disgusted Harriet

Martineau--was in real fact the basic cause of the war, seemed to her as

clear as anything in reason[857]. She had no patience with English

anti-slavery people who believed Northern protestations, and she did

not express concern over the horrors of a possible servile insurrection.

Nevertheless this spectre was constantly appearing. Again the

_Spectator_ sought to allay such fears; but yet again also proclaimed

that even such a contingency was less fearful than the consolidation of

the slave-power in the South[858].

Thus a servile insurrection was early and frequently an argument which

pro-Northern friends were compelled to meet. In truth the bulk of the

British press was constant in holding up this bogie to its readers, even

going to the point of weakening its argument of the impossibility of a

Northern conquest of the South by appealing to history to show that

England in her two wars with America had had a comparatively easy time

in the South, thus postulating the real danger of some "negro Garibaldi

calling his countrymen to arms[859]." Nor was this fear merely a

pretended one. It affected all classes and partisans of both sides. Even

official England shared in it; January 20, 1862, Lyons wrote, "The

question is rapidly tending towards the issue either of peace and a

recognition of the separation, or a Proclamation of Emancipation and the

raising of a servile insurrection[860]." At nearly the same time

Russell, returning to Gladstone a letter from Sumner to Cobden,

expressed his sorrow "that the President intends a war of emancipation,

meaning thereby, I fear, a war of greater desolation than has been since

the revival of letters[861]." John Stuart Mill, with that clear logic

which appealed to the more intelligent reader, in an able examination of

the underlying causes and probable results of the American conflict,

excused the Northern leaders for early denial of a purpose to attack

slavery, but expressed complete confidence that even these leaders by

now understood the "almost certain results of success in the present

conflict" (the extinction of slavery) and prophesied that "if the

writers who so severely criticize the present moderation of the

Free-soilers are desirous to see the war become an abolition war, it is

probable that if the war lasts long enough they will be gratified[862]."

John Bright, reaching a wider public, in speech after speech, expressed

faith that the people of the North were "marching on, as I believe, to

its [slavery's] entire abolition[863]."

Pro-Southern Englishmen pictured the horrors of an "abolition war," and

believed the picture true; strict neutrals, like Lyons, feared the same

development; friends of the North pushed aside the thought of a "negro

terror," yet even while hoping and declaring that the war would destroy

slavery, could not escape from apprehensions of an event that appeared

inevitable. Everywhere, to the British mind, it seemed that emancipation

was necessarily a provocative to servile insurrection, and this belief

largely affected the reception of the emancipation proclamation--a fact

almost wholly lost sight of in historical writing.

Nor did the steps taken in America leading up to emancipation weaken

this belief--rather they appeared to justify it. The great advocate of

abolition as a weapon in the war and for its own sake was Charles

Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. He early

took the ground that a proclamation everywhere emancipating the slaves

would give to the Northern cause a moral support hitherto denied it in

Europe and would at the same time strike a blow at Southern resistance.

This idea was presented in a public speech at Worcester, Massachusetts,

in October, 1861, but even Sumner's free-soil friends thought him

mistaken and his expressions "unfortunate." By December, however, he

found at Washington a change in governmental temper and from that date

Sumner was constant, through frequent private conversations with

Lincoln, in pressing for action. These ideas and his personal activities

for their realization were well known to English friends, as in his

letters to Cobden and Bright, and to the English public in general

through Sumner's speeches, for Sumner had long been a well-known figure

in the British press[864].

Lincoln, never an "Abolitionist," in spite of his famous utterance in

the 'fifties that the United States could not indefinitely continue to

exist "half-slave and half-free," had, in 1861, disapproved and recalled

the orders of some of the military leaders, like Fremont, who without

authority had sought to extend emancipation to slaves within the lines

of their command. But as early as anyone he had foreseen the gradual

emergence of emancipation as a war problem, at first dangerous to that

wise "border state policy" which had prevented the more northern of the

slave states from seceding. His first duty was to restore the Union and

to that he gave all his energy, yet that emancipation, when the time was

ripe, was also in Lincoln's mind is evident from the gradual approach

through legislation and administrative act. In February, 1862, a Bill

was under discussion in Congress, called the "Confiscation Bill," which,

among other clauses, provided that all slaves of persons engaged in

rebellion against the United States, who should by escape, or capture,

come into the possession of the military forces of the United States,

should be for ever free; but that this provision should not be operative

until the expiration of sixty days, thus giving slave-owners opportunity

to cease their rebellion and retain their slaves[865]. This measure did

not at first have Lincoln's approval for he feared its effect on the

loyalists of the border states. Nevertheless he realized the growing

strength of anti-slavery sentiment in the war and fully sympathized with

it where actual realization did not conflict with the one great object

of his administration. Hence in March, 1862, he heartily concurred in a

measure passed rapidly to Presidential approval, April 16, freeing the

slaves in the District of Columbia, a territory where there was no

question of the constitutional power of the national Government.

From February, 1862, until the issue of the first emancipation

proclamation in September, there was, in truth, a genuine conflict

between Congress and President as to methods and extent of emancipation.

Congress was in a mood to punish the South; Lincoln, looking steadily

toward re-union, yet realizing the rising strength of anti-slavery in

the North, advocated a gradual, voluntary, and compensated emancipation.

Neither party spoke the word "servile insurrection," yet both realized

its possibility, and Seward, in foreign affairs, was quick to see and

use it as a threat. A brief summary of measures will indicate the

contest. March 6, Lincoln sent a message to Congress recommending that a

joint resolution be passed pledging the pecuniary aid of the national

Government to any state voluntarily emancipating its slaves, his avowed

purpose being to secure early action by the loyal border states in the

hope that this might influence the Southern states[866]. Neither the

House of Representatives nor the Senate were really favourable to this

resolution and the border states bitterly opposed it in debate, but it

passed by substantial majorities in both branches and was approved by

Lincoln on April 10. In effect the extreme radical element in Congress

had yielded, momentarily, to the President's insistence on an

olive-branch offering of compensated emancipation. Both as regards the

border states and looking to the restoration of the Union, Lincoln was

determined to give this line of policy a trial. The prevailing

sentiment of Congress, however, preferred the punitive Confiscation

Bill.

At this juncture General Hunter, in command of the "Department of the

South," which theoretically included also the States of South Carolina,

Georgia and Florida, issued an order declaring the slaves in these

states free. This was May 9, 1862. Lincoln immediately countermanded

Hunter's order, stating that such action "under my responsibility, I

reserve to myself[867]." He renewed, in this same proclamation, earnest

appeals to the border states, to embrace the opportunity offered by the

Congressional resolution of April 10. In truth, border state attitude

was the test of the feasibility of Lincoln's hoped-for voluntary

emancipation, but these states were unwilling to accept the plan.

Meanwhile pressure was being exerted for action on the Confiscation

Bill; it was pushed through Congress and presented to Lincoln for his

signature or veto. He signed it on July 12, _but did not notify that

fact to Congress until July 17._ On this same day of signature, July 12,

Lincoln sent to Congress a proposal of an Act to give pecuniary aid in

voluntary state emancipation and held a conference with the

congressional representatives of the border states seeking their

definite approval of his policy. A minority agreed but the majority were

emphatically against him. The Confiscation Bill would not affect the

border states; they were not in rebellion. And they did not desire to

free the slaves even if compensated[868].

Thus Lincoln, by the stubbornness of the border states, was forced

toward the Congressional point of view as expressed in the Confiscation

Bill. On the day following his failure to win the border state

representatives he told Seward and Welles who were driving with him,

that he had come to the conclusion that the time was near for the issue

of a proclamation of emancipation as a military measure fully within the

competence of the President. This was on July 13[869]. Seward offered a

few objections but apparently neither Cabinet official did more than

listen to Lincoln's argument of military necessity. Congress adjourned

on July 17. On July 22, the President read to the Cabinet a draft of an

emancipation proclamation the text of the first paragraph of which

referred to the Confiscation Act and declared that this would be

rigorously executed unless rebellious subjects returned to their

allegiance. But the remainder of the draft reasserted the ideal of a

gradual and compensated emancipation and concluded with the warning that

for states still in rebellion on January 1, 1863, a general emancipation

of slaves would be proclaimed[870]. All of the Cabinet approved except

Blair who expressed fears of the effect on the approaching November

elections, and Seward who, while professing sympathy with the indicated

purpose, argued that the time was badly chosen in view of recent

military disasters and the approach of Lee's army toward Washington. The

measure, Seward said, might "be viewed as the last measure of an

exhausted government, a cry for help; the government stretching forth

its hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching forth her hands to

the government. It will be considered our last _shriek_ on the retreat."

He therefore urged postponement until after a Northern victory. This

appealed to Lincoln and he "put the draft of the proclamation aside,

waiting for victory[871]."

Victory came in September, with McClellan's defeat of Lee at Antietam,

and the retreat of the Southern army toward Richmond. Five days later,

September 22, Lincoln issued the proclamation, expanded and altered in

text from the draft of July 22, but in substance the same[872]. The

loyal border states were not to be affected, but the proclamation

renewed the promise of steps to be taken to persuade them to voluntary

action. On January 1, 1863, a second proclamation, referring to that of

September 22, was issued by Lincoln "by virtue of the power in me vested

as commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States in time

of actual armed rebellion against the authority and Government of the

United States...." The states affected were designated by name and all

persons held as slaves within them "are, and henceforward shall be,

free...." "I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free to

abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defence...." "And

upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by

the Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate

judgment of mankind, and the gracious favour of Almighty God[873]."

Such were the steps, from December, 1861, when the radical Sumner began

his pressure for action, to September, 1862, when Lincoln's pledge of

emancipation was made. Did these steps indicate, as British opinion

unquestionably held, an intention to rouse a servile insurrection? Was

the Confiscation Bill passed with that purpose in view and had Lincoln

decided to carry it into effect? The failure of the slaves to rise is,

indeed, the great marvel of the Civil War and was so regarded not in

England only, but in America also. It was the expectation of the North

and the constant fear of the South. But was this, in truth, the

_purpose_ of the emancipation proclamation?

This purpose has been somewhat summarily treated by American

historians, largely because of lack of specific evidence as to motives

at the time of issue. Two words "military necessity" are made to cover

nearly the entire argument for emancipation in September, 1862, but in

just what manner the military prowess of the North was to be increased

was not at first indicated. In 1864, Lincoln declared that after the

failure of successive efforts to persuade the border states to accept

compensated emancipation he had believed there had arrived the

"indispensable necessity for military emancipation and arming the

blacks[874]." Repeatedly in later defence of the proclamation he urged

the benefits that had come from his act and asserted that commanders in

the field "believe the emancipation policy and the use of coloured

troops constitute the heaviest blow yet dealt to the rebellion[875]." He

added: "negroes, like other people, act upon motives. Why should they do

anything for us, if we will do nothing for them? If they stake their

lives for us, they must be prompted by the strongest motive, even the

promise of freedom."

There is no note here of stirring a servile insurrection; nor did

Lincoln ever acknowledge that such a purpose had been in his mind,

though the thought of such possible result must have been present--was,

indeed, present to most minds even without a proclamation of

emancipation. Lincoln's alleged purpose was simply to draw away slaves,

wherever possible, from their rebellious masters, thus reducing the

economic powers of resistance of the South, and then to make these

ex-slaves directly useful in winning the war. But after the war, even

here and there during it, a theory was advanced that an impelling motive

with the President had been the hope of influencing favourably foreign

governments and peoples by stamping the Northern cause with a high moral

purpose. In popular opinion, Lincoln came to be regarded as a

far-visioned statesman in anticipating that which ultimately came to

pass. This has important bearing on the relations of the United States

and Great Britain.

There is no doubt that nearly every Northern American had believed in

1860, that anti-slavery England would sympathize strongly with the

North. The event did not prove this to be the case, nor could the North

justly complain in the face of administration denials of an anti-slavery

purpose. The English Government therefore was widely upheld by British

opinion in regarding the struggle from the point of view of British

interests. Yet any Northern step antagonistic to the institution of

slavery compelled British governmental consideration. As early as

December, 1860, before the war began, Bunch, at Charleston, had reported

a conversation with Rhett, in which the latter frankly declared that the

South would expect to revive the African Slave Trade[876]. This was

limited in the constitution later adopted by the Confederacy which in

substance left the matter to the individual states--a condition that

Southern agents in England found it hard to explain[877]. As already

noted, the ardent friends of the North continued to insist, even after

Lincoln's denial, that slavery was the real cause of the American

rupture[878]. By September, 1861, John Bright was writing to his friend

Sumner that, all indications to the contrary, England would warmly

support the North if only it could be shown that emancipation was an

object[879]. Again and again he urged, it is interesting to note, just

those ideals of gradual and compensated emancipation which were so

strongly held by Lincoln. In this same month the _Spectator_ thought it

was "idle to strive to ignore the very centre and spring of all

disunion," and advised a "prudent audacity in striking at the cause

rather than at the effect[880]." Three weeks later the _Spectator_,

reviewing general British press comments, summed them up as follows:

"If you make it a war of emancipation we shall think you

madmen, and tell you so, though the ignorant instincts of

Englishmen will support you. And if you follow our counsel in

holding a tight rein on the Abolitionists, we shall applaud

your worldly wisdom so far; but shall deem it our duty to set

forth continually that you have forfeited all claim to the

_popular_ sympathy of England."

This, said the _Spectator_, had been stated in the most objectionable

style by the _Times_ in particular, which, editorially, had alleged that

"the North has now lost the chance of establishing a high moral

superiority by a declaration against slavery." To all this the

_Spectator_ declared that the North must adopt the bold course and make

clear that restoration of the Union was not intended with the old canker

at its roots[881].

Official England held a different view. Russell believed that the

separation of North and South would conduce to the extinction of slavery

since the South, left to itself and fronted by a great and prosperous

free North, with a population united in ideals, would be forced,

ultimately, to abandon its "special system." He professed that he could

not understand Mrs. Stowe's support of the war and thought she and

Sumner "animated by a spirit of vengeance[882]." If the South did yield

and the Union were restored _with_ slavery, Russell thought that

"Slavery would prevail all over the New World. For that reason I wish

for separation[883]." These views were repeated frequently by Russell.

He long had a fixed idea on the moral value of separation, but was

careful to state, "I give you these views merely as speculations," and

it is worthy of note that after midsummer of 1862 he rarely indulged in

them. Against such speculations, whether by Russell or by others, Mill

protested in his famous article in _Fraser's_, February, 1862[884].

On one aspect of slavery the North was free to act and early did so.

Seward proposed to Lyons a treaty giving mutual right of search off the

African Coast and on the coasts of Cuba for the suppression of the

African Slave Trade. Such a treaty had long been urged by Great Britain

but persistently refused by the United States. It could not well be

declined now by the British Government and was signed by Seward, April

8, 1862[885], but if he expected any change in British attitude as a

result he was disappointed. The renewal by the South of that trade might

be a barrier to British goodwill, but the action of the North was viewed

as but a weak attempt to secure British sympathy, and to mark the limits

of Northern anti-slavery efforts. Indeed, the Government was not eager

for the treaty on other grounds, since the Admiralty had never "felt any

interest in the suppression of the slave trade ... whatever they have

done ... they have done grudgingly and imperfectly[886]."

This was written at the exact period when Palmerston and Russell were

initiating those steps which were to result in the Cabinet crisis on

mediation in October-November, 1862. Certainly the Slave Trade treaty

with America had not influenced governmental attitude. At this juncture

there was founded, November, 1862, the London Emancipation Society, with

the avowed object of stirring anti-slavery Englishmen in protest against

"favouring the South." But George Thompson, its organizer, had been

engaged in the preliminary work of organization for some months and the

Society is therefore to be regarded as an expression of that small group

who were persistent and determined in assertion of slavery as the cause

and object of the Civil War, before the issue of Lincoln's

proclamation[887]. Thus for England as a whole and for official England

the declarations of these few voices were regarded as expressive of a

wish rather than as consistent with the facts. The moral uplift of an

anti-slavery object was denied to the North.

This being so did Lincoln seek to correct the foreign view by the

emancipation proclamation? There is some, but scant ground for so

believing. It is true that this aspect had at various times, though

rarely, been presented to the President. Carl Schurz, American Minister

at Madrid, wrote to Seward as early as September 14, 1861, strongly

urging the declaration of an anti-slavery purpose in the war and

asserting that public opinion in Europe would then be such in favour of

the North that no government would "dare to place itself, by declaration

or act, upon the side of a universally condemned institution[888]."

There is no evidence that Seward showed this despatch to Lincoln, but in

January, 1862, Schurz returned to America and in conversation with the

President urged the "moral issue" to prevent foreign intervention. The

President replied: "You may be right. Probably you are. I have been

thinking so myself. I cannot imagine that any European power would dare

to recognize and aid the Southern Confederacy if it became clear that

the Confederacy stands for slavery and the Union for freedom[889]." No

doubt others urged upon him the same view. Indeed, one sincere foreign

friend, Count Gasparin, who had early written in favour of the

North[890], and whose opinions were widely read, produced a second work

in the spring of 1862, in which the main theme was "slavery the issue."

The author believed emancipation inevitable and urged an instant

proclamation of Northern _intention_ to free the slaves[891].

Presumably, Lincoln was familiar with this work. Meanwhile Sumner

pressed the same idea though adding the prevalent abolition arguments

which did not, necessarily, involve thought of foreign effect. On the

general question of emancipation Lincoln listened, even telling Sumner

that he "was ahead of himself only a month or six weeks[892]."

Yet after the enactment of the "confiscation bill" in July, 1862, when

strong abolitionist pressure was brought on the President to issue a

general proclamation of emancipation, he reasserted in the famous reply

to Greeley, August 22, 1862, his one single purpose to restore the Union

"with or without slavery."

"If there be those who would not save the Union unless they

could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree

with them.

"If there be those who would not save the Union unless they

could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree

with them.

"_My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to

save or to destroy slavery_[893]."

Here seemed to be specific denial of raising a moral issue; yet unknown

to the public at the moment there had already been drafted and discussed

in Cabinet the emancipation proclamation. Greeley had presented

abolitionist demands essential to cement the North. A month later,

September 13, a delegation of Chicago clergymen came to Washington, had

an audience with Lincoln, presented similar arguments, but also laid

stress on the necessity of securing the sympathy of Europe. This was but

nine days before the first proclamation was issued, but Lincoln replied

much as to Greeley, though he stated, "I will also concede that

Emancipation would help us in Europe, and convince them that we are

incited by something more than ambition[894]." Immediately after the

event, September 24, making a short speech to a serenading party,

Lincoln said, "I can only trust in God I have made no mistake.... It is

now for the country and the world to pass judgment and, maybe, take

action upon it[895]." Over a year later, December 8, 1863, in his annual

message to Congress, he noted a "much improved" tone in foreign

countries as resulting from the emancipation proclamation, but dwelt

mainly on the beneficial effects at home[896].

Evidently there is slight ground for believing Lincoln to have been

convinced that foreign relations would be improved by the proclamation.

On the contrary, if he trusted Seward's judgment he may have _feared_

the effect on Europe, for such was Seward's prophecy. Here may have lain

the true meaning of Lincoln's speech of September 24--that it was now

for "the world to pass judgment and, maybe, take action upon it." After

all foreign policy, though its main lines were subject to the

President's control, was in the hands of Seward and throughout this

entire period of six months since the introduction of the Confiscation

Bill up to Lincoln's presentation of his draft proclamation to the

Cabinet in July, Seward had been using the threat of a servile

insurrection as a deterrent upon French-British talk of intervention. At

times Seward connected servile insurrection with emancipation--at

times not.

Seward had begun his career as Secretary of State with an appeal to

Europe on lines of old friendship and had implied, though he could not

state explicitly, the "noble" cause of the North. He had been met with

what he considered a "cold" and premature as well as unjustifiable

declaration of neutrality. From the first day of the conflict Lyons and

Mercier had been constant in representing the hardships inflicted by the

American war upon the economic interests of their respective countries.

Both men bore down upon the interruption of the cotton trade and Seward

kept repeating that Northern victories would soon release the raw

cotton. He expected and promised much from the capture of New Orleans,

but the results were disappointing. As time went on Seward became

convinced that material interests alone would determine the attitude and

action of Great Britain and France. But the stored supplies were on hand

in the South, locked in by the blockade and would be available when the

war was over _provided_ the war did not take on an uncivilized and

sanguinary character through a rising of the slaves. If that occurred

cotton would be burned and destroyed and cotton supply to Europe would

be not merely a matter of temporary interruption, but one of

long-continued dearth with no certainty of early resumption. Fearing the

growth in England, especially, of an intention to intervene, Seward

threatened a Northern appeal to the slaves, thinking of the threat not

so much in terms of an uncivilized and horrible war as in terms of the

material interests of Great Britain. In brief, considering foreign

attitude and action in its relation to Northern advantage--to the

winning of the war--he would use emancipation as a threat of servile

insurrection, but did not desire emancipation itself for fear it would

cause that very intervention which it was his object to prevent.

His instructions are wholly in line with this policy. In February, 1862,

the Confiscation Bill had been introduced in Congress. In April,

Mercier's trip to Richmond[897] had caused much speculation and started

many rumours in London of plans of mediation[898]. On May 28, Seward

wrote to Adams at great length and especially emphasized two points:

first that while diplomats abroad had hitherto been interdicted from

discussing slavery as an issue in the war, they were now authorized to

state that the war was, in part at least, intended for the suppression

of slavery, and secondly, that the North if interfered with by foreign

nations would be forced to have recourse to a servile war. Such a war,

Seward argued, would be "completely destructive of all European

interests[899]...." A copy of this instruction Adams gave to Russell on

June 20. Eight days later Adams told Cobden in reply to a query about

mediation that it would result in a servile war[900]. Evidently Adams

perfectly understood Seward's policy.

On July 13, Lincoln told Seward and Welles of the planned emancipation

proclamation and that this was his first mention of it to anyone. Seward

commented favourably but wished to consider the proposal in all its

bearings before committing himself[901]. The day following he

transmitted to agents abroad a copy of the Bill that day introduced into

Congress embodying Lincoln's plan for gradual and compensated

emancipation. This was prompt transmittal--and was unusual. Seward sent

the Bill without material comment[902], but it is apparent that this

method and measure of emancipation would much better fit in with his

theory of the slavery question in relation to foreign powers, than would

an outright proclamation of emancipation.

Meanwhile American anxiety as to a possible alteration in British

neutral policy was increasing. July 11, Adams reported that he had

learned "from a credible source" that the British Cabinet might soon

"take new ground[903]." This despatch if it reached Seward previous to

the Cabinet of July 22, presumably added strength to his conviction of

the inadvisability of now issuing the proclamation. In that Cabinet,

Seward in fact went much beyond the customary historical statement that

he advised postponement of the proclamation until the occurrence of a

Northern victory; he argued, according to Secretary of War Stanton's

notes of the meeting, "That foreign nations will intervene to prevent

the abolition of slavery for the sake of cotton.... We break up our

relations with foreign nations and the production of cotton for sixty

years[904]." These views did not prevail; Lincoln merely postponed

action. Ten days later Seward sent that long instruction to Adams

covering the whole ground of feared European intervention, which,

fortunately, Adams was never called upon to carry out[905]. In it there

was renewed the threat of a servile war if Europe attempted to aid the

South, and again it is the materialistic view that is emphasized. Seward

was clinging to his theory of correct policy.

Nor was he mistaken in his view of first reactions in governmental

circles abroad--at least in England. On July 21, the day before

Lincoln's proposal of emancipation in the Cabinet, Stuart in reviewing

military prospects wrote: "Amongst the means relied upon for weakening

the South is included a servile war[906]." To this Russell replied: "...

I have to observe that the prospect of a servile war will only make

other nations more desirous to see an end of this desolating and

destructive conflict[907]." This was but brief reiteration of a more

exact statement by Russell made in comment on Seward's first hint of

servile war in his despatch to Adams of May 28, a copy of which had been

given to Russell on June 20. On July 28, Russell reviewing Seward's

arguments, commented on the fast increasing bitterness of the American

conflict, disturbing and unsettling to European Governments, and wrote:

"The approach of a servile war, so much insisted upon by Mr.

Seward in his despatch, only forewarns us that another

element of destruction may be added to the slaughter, loss of

property, and waste of industry, which already afflict a

country so lately prosperous and tranquil[908]."

In this same despatch unfavourable comment was made also on the

Confiscation Bill with its punitive emancipation clauses. Stuart

presented a copy of the despatch to Seward on August 16[909]. On August

22, Stuart learned of Lincoln's plan and reported it as purely a

manoeuvre to affect home politics and to frighten foreign

governments[910]. Where did Stuart get the news if not from Seward,

since he also reported the latter's success in postponing the

proclamation?

In brief both Seward and Russell were regarding emancipation in the

light of an incitement to servile insurrection, and both believed such

an event would add to the argument for foreign intervention. The

_threat_ Seward had regarded as useful; the _event_ would be highly

dangerous to the North. Not so, however, did emancipation appear in

prospect to American diplomats abroad. Adams was a faithful servant in

attempting to carry out the ideas and plans of his chief, but as early

as February, 1862, he had urged a Northern declaration in regard to

slavery in order to meet in England Southern private representations

that, independence won, the South would enter upon a plan of gradual

emancipation to be applied "to all persons born after some specific

date[911]." Motley, at Vienna, frequently after February, 1862, in

private letters to his friends in America, urged some forward step on

slavery[912], but no such advice in despatches found its way into the

selected correspondence annually sent to print by Seward. Far more

important was the determination taken by Adams, less than a month after

he had presented to Russell the "servile war" threat policy of Seward,

to give advice to his chief that the chances of foreign intervention

would be best met by the distinct avowal of an anti-slavery object in

the war and that the North should be prepared to meet an European offer

of mediation by declaring that if made to extinguish slavery such

mediation would be welcome. This Adams thought would probably put an end

to the mediation itself, but it would also greatly strengthen the

Northern position abroad[913].

This was no prevision of an emancipation proclamation; but it was

assertion of the value of a higher "moral issue." Meanwhile, on July 24,

Seward still fearful of the effects abroad of emancipation, wrote to

Motley, asking whether he was "sure" that European powers would not be

encouraged in interference, because of material interests, by a Northern

attempt to free the slaves[914]. Motley's answer began, "A thousand

times No," and Adams repeated his plea for a moral issue[915]. September

25, Adams met Seward's "material interests" argument by declaring that

for Great Britain the chief difficulty in the cotton situation was not

scarcity, but uncertainty, and that if English manufacturers could but

know what to expect there would be little "cotton pressure" on the

Government[916]. Thus leading diplomats abroad did not agree with

Seward, but the later advices of Adams were not yet received when the

day, September 22, arrived on which Lincoln issued the proclamation. On

that day in sending the text to Adams the comment of Seward was brief.

The proclamation, he said, put into effect a policy the approach of

which he had "heretofore indicated to our representatives abroad," and

he laid emphasis on the idea that the main purpose of the proclamation

was to convince the South that its true interests were in the

preservation of the Union--which is to say that the hoped-for result was

the return of the South _with its slaves_[917]. Certainly this was far

from a truthful representation, but its purpose is evident. Seward's

first thought was that having held up the threat of servile insurrection

he must now remove that bogie. Four days later his judgment was

improved, for he began, and thereafter maintained with vigour, the "high

moral purpose" argument as evinced in the emancipation proclamation.

"The interests of humanity," he wrote to Adams, "have now become

identified with the cause of our country[918]...."

That the material interests of Great Britain were still in Seward's

thought is shown by the celerity with which under Lincoln's orders he

grasped at an unexpected opening in relation to liberated slaves. Stuart

wrote in mid-September that Mr. Walker, secretary of the colony of

British Guiana, was coming from Demerara to Washington to secure

additional labour for the British colony by offering to carry away

ex-slaves[919]. This scheme was no secret and five days after the issue

of the proclamation Seward proposed to Stuart a convention by which the

British Government would be permitted to transport to the West Indies,

or to any of its colonies, the negroes about to be emancipated. On

September 30, Adams was instructed to take up the matter at London[920].

Russell was at first disinclined to consider such a convention and

discussion dragged until the spring of 1864, when it was again proposed,

this time by Russell, but now declined by Seward. In its immediate

influence in the fall of 1862, Seward's offer had no effect on the

attitude of the British Government[921].

To Englishmen and Americans alike it has been in later years a matter

for astonishment that the emancipation proclamation did not at once

convince Great Britain of the high purposes of the North. But if it be

remembered that in the North itself the proclamation was greeted, save

by a small abolitionist faction, with doubt extending even to bitter

opposition and that British governmental and public opinion had long

dreaded a servile insurrection--even of late taking its cue from

Seward's own prophecies--the cool reception given by the Government, the

vehement and vituperative explosions of the press do not seem so

surprising. "This Emancipation Proclamation," wrote Stuart on September

23, "seems a brutum fulmen[922]." One of the President's motives, he

thought, was to affect public opinion in England. "But there is no

pretext of humanity about the Proclamation.... It is merely a

Confiscation Act, or perhaps worse, for it offers direct encouragement

to servile insurrections[923]." Received in England during the Cabinet

struggle over mediation the proclamation appears not to have affected

that controversy, though Russell sought to use it as an argument for

British action. In his memorandum, circulated October 13, Russell strove

to show that the purpose and result would be servile war. He dwelt both

on the horrors of such a war, and on its destruction of industry:

"What will be the practical effect of declaring emancipation,

not as an act of justice and beneficence, dispensed by the

Supreme Power of the State, but as an act of punishment and

retaliation inflicted by a belligerent upon a hostile

community, it is not difficult to foresee. Wherever the arms

of the United States penetrate, a premium will be given to

acts of plunder, of incendiarism, and of revenge. The

military and naval authorities of the United States will be

bound by their orders to maintain and protect the

perpetrators of such acts. Wherever the invasion of the

Southern States is crowned by victory, society will be

disorganized, industry suspended, large and small proprietors

of land alike reduced to beggary[924]."

The London newspaper press was very nearly a unit in treating the

proclamation with derision and contempt and no other one situation in

the Civil War came in for such vigorous denunciation. Citations setting

forth such comment have frequently been gathered together illustrative

of the extent of press condemnation and of its unity in vicious

editorials[925]. There is no need to repeat many of them here, but a few

will indicate their tone. The _Times_ greeted the news with an assertion

that this was a final desperate play by Lincoln, as hope of victory

waned. It was his "last card[926]," a phrase that caught the fancy of

lesser papers and was repeated by them. October 21, appeared the

"strongest" of the _Times_ editorials:

[Illustration: ABE LINCOLN'S LAST CARD; OR, ROUGE-ET-NOIR. _Reproduced

by permission of the Proprietors of "Punch"_]

"... We have here the history of the beginning of the end,

but who can tell how the pages will be written which are yet

to be filled before the inevitable separation is

accomplished? Are scenes like those which we a short time

since described from Dahomey yet to interpose, and is the

reign of the last PRESIDENT to go out amid horrible massacres

of white women and children, to be followed by the

extermination of the black race in the South? Is LINCOLN yet

a name not known to us as it will be known to posterity, and

is it ultimately to be classed among that catalogue of

monsters, the wholesale assassins and butchers of their kind?

"... We will attempt at present to predict nothing as to

what the consequence of Mr. Lincoln's new policy may be,

except that it certainly will not have the effect of

restoring the Union. It will not deprive Mr. Lincoln of the

distinctive affix which he will share with many, for the most

part foolish and incompetent, Kings and Emperors, Caliphs and

Doges, that of being LINCOLN--'the Last.'"

The _Times_ led the way; other papers followed on. The _Liverpool Post_

thought a slave rising inevitable[927], as did also nearly every paper

acknowledging anti-Northern sentiments, or professedly neutral, while

even pro-Northern journals at first feared the same results[928].

Another striking phrase, "Brutum Fulmen," ran through many editorials.

The _Edinburgh Review_ talked of Lincoln's "cry of despair[929]," which

was little different from Seward's feared "last shriek." _Blackwood's_

thought the proclamation "monstrous, reckless, devilish." It "justifies

the South in raising the black flag, and proclaiming a war without

quarter[930]." But there is no need to expand the citation of the

well-nigh universal British press pouring out of the wrath of heaven

upon Lincoln, and his emancipation proclamation[931].

Even though there can be no doubt that the bulk of England at first

expected servile war to follow the proclamation it is apparent that here

and there a part of this British wrath was due to a fear that, in spite

of denials of such influence, the proclamation was intended to arouse

public opinion against projects of intervention and _might so arouse

it_. The New York correspondent of the _Times_ wrote that it was

"promulgated evidently as a sop to keep England and France quiet[932],"

and on October 9, an editorial asserted that Lincoln had "a very

important object. There is a presentiment in the North that recognition

cannot be delayed, and this proclamation is aimed, not at the negro or

the South, but at Europe." _Bell's Weekly Messenger_ believed that it

was now "the imperative duty of England and France to do what they can

in order to prevent the possible occurrence of a crime which, if carried

out, would surpass in atrocity any similar horror the world has ever

seen[933]." "Historicus," on the other hand, asked: "What is that

solution of the negro question to which an English Government is

prepared to affix the seal of English approbation[934]?" Mason, the

Confederate Agent in London, wrote home that it was generally believed

the proclamation was issued "as the means of warding off recognition....

It was seen through at once and condemned accordingly[935]."

This interpretation of Northern purpose in no sense negatives the dictum

that the proclamation exercised little influence on immediate British

governmental policy, but does offer some ground for the belief that

strong pro-Southern sympathizers at once saw the need of combating an

argument dangerous to the carrying out of projects of mediation. Yet the

new "moral purpose" of Lincoln did not immediately appeal even to his

friends. The _Spectator_ deplored the lack of a clean-cut declaration in

favour of the principle of human freedom: "The principle asserted is

not that a human being cannot justly own another, but that he cannot own

him unless he is loyal to the United States." ... "There is no morality

whatever in such a decree, and if approved at all it must be upon its

merits as a political measure[936]." Two weeks later, reporting a public

speech at Liverpool by ex-governor Morehead of Kentucky, in which

Lincoln was accused of treachery to the border states, the _Spectator_,

while taking issue with the speaker's statements, commented that it was

not to be understood as fully defending a system of government which

chose its executive "from the ranks of half-educated mechanics[937]."

Similarly in America the emancipation proclamation, though loudly

applauded by the abolitionists, was received with misgivings. Lincoln

was disappointed at the public reaction and became very despondent,

though this was due, in part, to the failure of McClellan to follow up

the victory of Antietam. The elections of October and November went

heavily against the administration and largely on the alleged ground of

the President's surrender to the radicals[938]. The army as a whole was

not favourably stirred by the proclamation; it was considered at best as

but a useless bit of "waste paper[939]." In England, John Bright, the

most ardent public advocate of the Northern cause, was slow to applaud

heartily; not until December did he give distinct approval, and even

then in but half-hearted fashion, though he thought public interest was

much aroused and that attention was now fixed on January 1, the date set

by Lincoln for actual enforcement of emancipation[940]. In a speech at

Birmingham, December 18, Bright had little to say of emancipation;

rather he continued to use previous arguments against the South for

admitting, as Vice-President Stephens had declared, that slavery was the

very "corner-stone" of Southern institutions and society[941]. A few

public meetings at points where favour to the North had been shown were

tried in October and November with some success but with no great show

of enthusiasm. It was not until late December that the wind of public

opinion, finding that no faintest slave-rising had been created by the

proclamation began to veer in favour of the emancipation edict[942]. By

the end of the year it appeared that the Press, in holding up horrified

hands and prophesying a servile war had "overshot the mark[943]."

Soon the changing wind became a gale of public favour for the cause of

emancipation, nor was this lessened--rather increased--by Jefferson

Davis' proclamation of December 23, 1862, in which he declared that

Lincoln had approved "of the effort to excite a servile insurrection,"

and that therefore it was now ordered "all negro slaves captured in arms

be at once delivered over to the executive authorities of the respective

States to which they belong, to be dealt with according to the laws of

said State." This by state laws meant death to the slave fighting for

his freedom, even as a regular soldier in the Northern armies, and gave

a good handle for accusations of Southern ferocity[944].

Official opinion was not readily altered, Lyons writing in December that

the promised January proclamation might still mean servile war. He hoped

that neither Lincoln's proclamation nor Davis' threat of retaliation

would be carried into effect[945]. Russell regarded the January 1

proclamation as "a measure of war of a very questionable kind[946]."

But the British anti-slavery public, now recovered from its fears of an

"abolition war" was of another temper. Beginning with the last week of

December, 1862, and increasing in volume in each succeeding month, there

took place meeting after meeting at which strong resolutions were passed

enthusiastically endorsing the issue of the emancipation proclamation

and pledging sympathy to the cause of the North. The _Liberator_ from

week to week, listed and commented on these public meetings, noting

fifty-six held between December 30, 1862, and March 20, 1863. The

American Minister reported even more, many of which sent to him engraved

resolutions or presented them in person through selected delegations.

The resolutions were much of the type of that adopted at Sheffield,

January 10:

"_Resolved_: that this meeting being convinced that slavery

is the cause of the tremendous struggle now going on in the

American States, and that the object of the leaders of the

rebellion is the perpetuation of the unchristian and inhuman

system of chattel slavery, earnestly prays that the rebellion

may be crushed, and its wicked object defeated, and that the

Federal Government may be strengthened to pursue its

emancipation policy till not a slave be left on the American

soil[947]."

Adams quoted the _Times_ as referring to these meetings as made up of

"nobodies." Adams commented:

"They do not indeed belong to the high and noble class, but

they are just those nobodies who formerly forced their most

exalted countrymen to denounce the prosecution of the Slave

Trade by the commercial adventurers at Liverpool and Bristol,

and who at a later period overcame all their resistance to

the complete emancipation of the negro slaves in the British

dependencies. If they become once fully aroused to a sense of

the importance of this struggle as a purely moral question, I

feel safe in saying there will be an end of all effective

sympathy in Great Britain with the rebellion[948]."

Adams had no doubt "that these manifestations are the genuine expression

of the feelings of the religious dissenting and of the working classes,"

and was confident the Government would be much influenced by them[949].

The newspapers, though still editorially unfavourable to the

emancipation proclamation, accepted and printed communications with

increasing frequency in which were expressed the same ideas as in the

public meetings. This was even more noticeable in the provincial press.

Samuel A. Goddard, a merchant of Birmingham, was a prolific letter

writer to the _Birmingham Post_, consistently upholding the Northern

cause and he now reiterated the phrase, "Mr. Lincoln's cause is just and

holy[950]." In answer to Southern sneers at the failure of the

proclamation to touch slavery in the border states, Goddard made clear

the fact that Lincoln had no constitutional "right" to apply his edict

to states not in rebellion[951]. On the public platform no one equalled

the old anti-slavery orator, George Thompson, in the number of meetings

attended and addresses made. In less than a month he had spoken

twenty-one times and often in places where opposition was in evidence.

Everywhere Thompson found an aroused and encouraged anti-slavery

feeling, now strongly for the North[952].

Eight years earlier five hundred thousand English women had united in an

address to America on behalf of the slaves. Harriet Beecher Stowe now

replied to this and asked the renewed sympathy of her English sisters. A

largely signed "round robin" letter assured her that English women were

still the foes of slavery and were indignantly united against

suggestions of British recognition of the South[953]. Working class

Britain was making its voice heard in support of the North. To those of

Manchester, Lincoln, on January 19, 1863, addressed a special letter of

thanks for their earnest support while undergoing personal hardships

resulting from the disruption of industry caused by the war. "I cannot"

he wrote, "but regard your decisive utterances upon the question [of

human slavery] as an instance of sublime Christian heroism which has not

been surpassed in any age or in any country[954]." Nonconformist England

now came vigorously to the support of the North. Spurgeon, in London,

made his great congregation pray with him: "God bless and strengthen

the North; give victory to their arms[955]." Further and more general

expression of Nonconformist church sympathy came as a result of a letter

received February 12, 1863, from a number of French pastors and laymen,

urging all the Evangelical churches to unite in an address to Lincoln.

The London and Manchester Emancipation Societies combined in drawing up

a document for signature by pastors and this was presented for adoption

at a meeting in Manchester on June 3, 1863. In final form it was "An

Address to Ministers and Pastors of All Christian Denominations

throughout the States of America." There was a "noisy opposition" but

the address was carried by a large majority and two representatives,

Massie and Roylance, were selected to bear the message in person to the

brethren across the ocean[956]. Discussion arose over the Biblical

sanction of slavery. In the _Times_ appeared an editorial pleading this

sanction and arguing the _duty_ of slaves to refuse liberty[957].

Goldwin Smith, Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, replied in

a pamphlet, "Does the Bible sanction American Slavery[958]?" His

position and his skill in presentation made him a valuable ally to

the North.

Thus British anti-slavery circles, previously on the defensive, became

aroused and enthusiastic when Lincoln's January 1, 1863, proclamation

made good his pledge of the previous September: other elements of

opinion, and in all classes, were strengthened in like measure, and

everywhere the first expression of fear of a servile insurrection

largely disappeared. In truth, pro-Northern England went to such

lengths in its support of emancipation as to astound and alarm the

_Saturday Review_, which called these demonstrations a "carnival of

cant[959]." More neutral minds were perplexed over the practical

difficulties and might well agree with Schleiden who wrote in January,

1863, quoting Machiavelli: "What is more difficult, to make free men

slaves, or slaves free[960]?" But by the end of January the popular

approval of emancipation was in full swing. On the evening of the

twenty-ninth there took place in London at Exeter Hall, a great mass

meeting unprecedented in attendance and enthusiasm. The meeting had been

advertised for seven o'clock, but long before the hour arrived the hall

was jammed and the corridors filled. A second meeting was promptly

organized for the lower hall, but even so the people seeking admission

crowded Exeter Street and seriously impeded traffic in the Strand.

Outdoor meetings listened to reports of what was going on in the Hall

and cheered the speakers. The main address was made by the Rev. Newman

Hall, of Surrey Chapel. A few Southern sympathizers who attempted to

heckle the speakers were quickly shouted down[961].

The "carnival of cant," as the _Saturday Review_ termed it, was truly a

popular demonstration, stirred by anti-slavery leaders, but supported by

the working and non-enfranchised classes. Its first effect was to

restore courage and confidence to Northern supporters in the upper

classes. Bright had welcomed emancipation, yet with some misgivings. He

now joined in the movement and in a speech at Rochdale, February 3, on

"Slavery and Secession," gave full approval of Lincoln's efforts.

In 1862, shortly after the appearance of Spence's _American Union_,

which had been greeted with great interest in England and had influenced

largely upper-class attitude in favour of the South, Cairnes had

published his pamphlet, "Slave Power." This was a reasoned analysis of

the basis of slavery and a direct challenge to the thesis of

Spence[962]. England's "unnatural infatuation" for a slave power,

Cairnes prophesied, would be short-lived. His pamphlet began to be read

with more conviction by that class which until now had been coldly

neutral and which wished a more reassured faith in the Northern cause

than that stirred by the emotional reception given the emancipation

proclamation. Yet at bottom it was emancipation that brought this

reasoning public to seek in such works as that of Cairnes a logical

basis for a change of heart. Even in official circles, utterances

previously made in private correspondence, or in governmental

conversations only, were now ventured in public by friends of the North.

On April 1, 1863, at a banquet given to Palmerston in Edinburgh, the

Duke of Argyll ventured to answer a reference made by Palmerston in a

speech of the evening previous in which had been depicted the horrors of

Civil War, by asking if Scotland were historically in a position to

object to civil wars having high moral purpose. "I, for one," Argyll

said, "have not learned to be ashamed of that ancient combination of the

Bible and the sword. Let it be enough for us to pray and hope that the

contest, whenever it may be brought to an end, shall bring with it that

great blessing to the white race which shall consist in the final

freedom of the black[963]."

The public meetings in England raised high the hope in America that

governmental England would show some evidence of a more friendly

attitude. Lincoln himself drafted a resolution embodying the ideas he

thought it would be wise for the public meetings to adopt. It read:

"Whereas, while _heretofore_ States, and Nations, have

tolerated slavery, _recently_, for the first time in the

world, an attempt has been made to construct a new Nation,

upon the basis of, and with the primary, and fundamental

object to maintain, enlarge, and perpetuate human slavery,

therefore,

_Resolved_: that no such embryo State should ever be

recognized by, or admitted into, the family of Christian and

civilized nations; and that all Christian and civilized men

everywhere should, by all lawful means, resist to the utmost,

such recognition or admission[964]."

This American hope much disturbed Lyons. On his return to Washington, in

November, 1862, he had regarded the emancipation proclamation as a

political manoeuvre purely and an unsuccessful one. The administration

he thought was losing ground and the people tired of the war. This was

the burden of his private letters to Russell up to March, 1863, but does

not appear in his official despatches in which there was nothing to give

offence to Northern statesmen. But in March, Lyons began to doubt the

correctness of these judgments. He notes a renewed Northern enthusiasm

leading to the conferring of extreme powers--the so-called "dictatorship

measures"--upon Lincoln. Wise as Lyons ordinarily was he was bound by

the social and educational traditions of his class, and had at first not

the slightest conception of the force or effect of emancipation upon the

public in middle-class England. He feared an American reaction against

England when it was understood that popular meetings would have no

influence on the British Government.

"Mr. Seward and the whole Party calculate immensely on the

effects of the anti-slavery meetings in England, and seem to

fancy that public feeling in England is coming so completely

round to the North that the Government will be obliged to

favour the North in all ways, even if it be disinclined to do

so. This notion is unlucky, as it makes those who hold it,

unreasonable and presumptuous in dealing with us[965]."

* * * * *

Lincoln's plan of emancipation and his first proclamation had little

relation to American foreign policy. Seward's attitude toward

emancipation was that the _threat_ of it and of a possible servile war

might be useful in deterring foreign nations, especially Great Britain,

from intervening. But he objected to the carrying of emancipation into

effect because he feared it would _induce_ intervention. Servile war, in

part by Seward's own efforts, in part because of earlier British

newspaper speculations, was strongly associated with emancipation, in

the English view. Hence the Government received the September, 1862,

proclamation with disfavour, the press with contempt, and the public

with apprehension--even the friends of the North. But no servile war

ensued. In January, 1863, Lincoln kept his promise of wide emancipation

and the North stood committed to a high moral object. A great wave of

relief and exultation swept over anti-slavery England, but did not so

quickly extend to governmental circles. It was largely that England

which was as yet without direct influence on Parliament which so exulted

and now upheld the North. Could this England of the people affect

governmental policy and influence its action toward America? Lyons

correctly interpreted the North and Seward as now more inclined to press

the British Government on points previously glossed over, and in the

same month in which Lyons wrote this opinion there was coming to a head

a controversy over Britain's duty as a neutral, which both during the

war and afterwards long seemed to Americans a serious and distinctly

unfriendly breach of British neutrality. This was the building in

British ports of Confederate naval vessels of war.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 846: _Punch_, Nov. 22, 1862, has a cartoon picturing

Palmerston as presenting this view to Napoleon III.]

[Footnote 847: Rhodes, IV, p. 348.]

[Footnote 848: F.O., Am., Vol. 875. No. 80. Confidential. Lyons to

Russell, Jan. 27, 1863. This date would have permitted Mercier to be

already in receipt of Napoleon's instructions, though he gave no hint of

it in the interview with Lyons.]

[Footnote 849: Mercier had in fact approached Stoeckl on a joint offer

of mediation without England. Evidently Stoeckl had asked instructions

and those received made clear that Russia did not wish to be compelled

to face such a question. She did not wish to offend France, and an offer

without England had no chance of acceptance (Russian Archives, F.O. to

Stoeckl, Feb. 16, 1863 (O.S.)).]

[Footnote 850: F.O. Am., Vol. 876. No. 108. Confidential. Lyons to

Russell, Feb. 2, 1863.]

[Footnote 851: Rhodes, IV, p. 348.]

[Footnote 852: F.O., Am., Vol. 868, No. 86.]

[Footnote 853: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXIX, pp. 5-53, and 69-152.]

[Footnote 854: _Ibid._, pp. 1714-41. March 23, 1863.]

[Footnote 855: Ashley, _Palmerston_, II, 208-9. To Ellice, May 5, 1861.]

[Footnote 856: July 13, 1861.]

[Footnote 857: Harriet Martineau, _Autobiography_, p. 508, To Mrs.

Chapman, Aug. 8, 1861.]

[Footnote 858: Sept. 21, 1861.]

[Footnote 859: _Saturday Review_, Nov. 17, 1860.]

[Footnote 860: Russell Papers. To Russell.]

[Footnote 861: Gladstone Papers. Russell to Gladstone, Jan. 26, 1862.]

[Footnote 862: Article in _Fraser's Magazine_, Feb. 1862, "The Contest

in America."]

[Footnote 863: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CXLV, p. 387, Feb. 17, 1862.]

[Footnote 864: Pierce, _Sumner_, IV, pp. 41-48, and 63-69.]

[Footnote 865: Raymond, _Life, Public Services and State Papers of

Abraham Lincoln_, p. 243.]

[Footnote 866: _Ibid._, pp. 229-32.]

[Footnote 867: _Ibid._, p. 233, May 19, 1862.]

[Footnote 868: A Bill was in fact introduced July 16, 1862, on the lines

of Lincoln's "pecuniary aid" proposal of July 12, but no action was

taken on it.]

[Footnote 869: Welles, _Diary_, I, pp. 70-71.]

[Footnote 870: Abraham Lincoln, _Complete Works_, II, p. 213.]

[Footnote 871: Rhodes, IV, pp. 71-2.]

[Footnote 872: As issued September 22, the first paragraph refers to his

plan of securing legislation to aid compensated voluntary emancipation,

the next sets the date January 1, 1863, for completed emancipation of

slaves in states still in rebellion and the remaining paragraphs concern

the carrying out of the confiscation law. Lincoln, _Complete Works_, II,

pp. 237-8.]

[Footnote 873: Raymond, _State Papers of Lincoln_, 260-61.]

[Footnote 874: Rhodes, IV, p. 214.]

[Footnote 875: _Ibid._, p. 410. In letter, August 26, 1863, addressed to

a Springfield mass meeting of "unconditional Union men."]

[Footnote 876: American Hist. Rev., XVIII, pp. 784-7. Bunch to Russell,

Dec. 5, 1860.]

[Footnote 877: Southern Commissioners abroad early reported that

recognition of independence and commercial treaties could not be secured

unless the South would agree to "mutual right of search" treaties for

the suppression of the African Slave Trade. Davis' answer was that the

Confederate constitution gave him no authority to negotiate such a

treaty; indeed, denied him that authority since the constitution itself

prohibited the importation of negroes from Africa. For Benjamin's

instructions see Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, pp. 591-96.]

[Footnote 878: _Spectator_, May 4, 1861.]

[Footnote 879: Sept. 6, 1861. In Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, Vol.

XLVI, p. 95.]

[Footnote 880: Sept. 14, 1861.]

[Footnote 881: October 5, 1861.]

[Footnote 882: Lyons Papers. To Lyons, Oct. 26, 1861.]

[Footnote 883: _Ibid._, To Lyons, Nov. 2, 1861. The same ideas are

officially expressed by Russell to Lyons, March 7, 1861, and May 1,

1862. (F.O., Am., Vol. 818, No. 104, Draft; and _Ibid._, Vol. 819, No.

197, Draft.).]

[Footnote 884: See ante, p. 81.]

[Footnote 885: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1862-3, Pt. I, p. 65.]

[Footnote 886: Ashley, _Palmerston_, II, p. 227. Palmerston to Russell,

Aug. 13, 1862.]

[Footnote 887: Garrison, _Garrison_, IV, p. 66. Many distinguished names

were on the roster of the Society--Mill, Bright, Cobden, Lord Houghton,

Samuel Lucas, Forster, Goldwin Smith, Justin McCarthy, Thomas Hughes,

Cairns, Herbert Spencer, Francis Newman, the Rev. Newman Hall, and

others. Frederick W. Chesson was secretary, and very active in

the work.]

[Footnote 888: Schurz, _Speeches and Correspondence_, I, 190.]

[Footnote 889: Schurz, _Reminiscences_, II, 309.]

[Footnote 890: Gasparin, _The Uprising of a Great People_, 1861.]

[Footnote 891: Gasparin, _America before Europe_, Pt. V, Ch. III. The

preface is dated March 4, 1862, and the work went through three American

editions in 1862.]

[Footnote 892: Pierce, _Sumner_, IV, p. 63. No exact date, but Spring of

1862.]

[Footnote 893: Raymond, _State Papers of Lincoln_, p. 253.]

[Footnote 894: _Ibid._, p. 256.]

[Footnote 895: Rhodes, IV, p. 162.]

[Footnote 896: Lincoln's _Complete Works_, II, p. 454. But the

_after-comment_ by Lincoln as to purpose was nearly always in line with

an unfinished draft of a letter to Charles D. Robinson, Aug. 17, 1864,

when the specific object was said to be "inducing the coloured people to

come bodily over from the rebel side to ours." _Ibid._, p. 564.]

[Footnote 897: See _ante_, Ch. IX.]

[Footnote 898: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I, p. 83.

Adams to Seward, May 8, 1862.]

[Footnote 899: _Ibid._, pp. 101-105.]

[Footnote 900: _Ibid._, p. 122. Adams to Seward, July 3, 1862. In his

despatch Adams states the conversation to have occurred "last Saturday,"

and with an "unofficial person," who was sounding him on mediation. This

was Cobden.]

[Footnote 901: Welles, _Diary_, I, p. 70.]

[Footnote 902: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I, p. 135.]

[Footnote 903: _Ibid._, p. 133. To Seward. His informant was Baring.]

[Footnote 904: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 333.]

[Footnote 905: See _ante_, p. 35.]