KING COTTON
For two weeks there was no lightening of Southern depression in England.
But on June 28 McClellan had been turned back from his advance on
Richmond by Lee, the new commander of the Army of Virginia, and the much
heralded Peninsular campaign was recognized to have been a disastrous
failure. Earlier Northern victories were forgotten and the campaigns in
the West, still progressing favourably for the North, were ignored or
their significance not understood. Again, to English eyes, the war in
America approached a stalemate. The time had come with the near
adjournment of Parliament when, if ever, a strong Southern effort must
be made, and the time seemed propitious. Moreover by July, 1862, it was
hoped that soon, in the cotton districts, the depression steadily
increasing since the beginning of the war, would bring an ally to the
Southern cause. Before continuing the story of Parliamentary and private
efforts by the friends of the South it is here necessary to review the
cotton situation--now rapidly becoming a matter of anxious concern to
both friend and foe of the North and in less degree to the
Ministry itself.
"King Cotton" had long been a boast with the South. "Perhaps no great
revolution," says Bancroft, "was ever begun with such convenient and
soothing theories as those that were expounded and believed at the time
of the organization of the Confederacy.... In any case, hostilities
could not last long, for France and Great Britain must have what the
Confederacy alone could supply, and therefore they could be forced to
aid the South, as a condition precedent to relief from the terrible
distress that was sure to follow a blockade[654]." This confidence was
no new development. For ten years past whenever Southern threats of
secession had been indulged in, the writers and politicians of that
section had expanded upon cotton as the one great wealth-producing
industry of America and as the one product which would compel European
acquiescence in American policy, whether of the Union, before 1860, or
of the South if she should secede. In the financial depression that
swept the Northern States in 1857 _De Bow's Review_, the leading
financial journal of the South, declared: "The wealth of the South is
permanent and real, that of the North fugitive and fictitious. Events
now transpiring expose the fiction, as humbug after humbug
explodes[655]." On March 4, 1858, Senator Hammond of South Carolina,
asked in a speech, "What would happen if no cotton was furnished for
three years? I will not stop to depict what everyone can imagine, but
this is certain: England would topple headlong and carry the whole
civilized world with her save the South. No, you dare not make war on
cotton. No power on earth dares make war upon it. Cotton _is_
King[656]." Two years later, writing before the elections of 1860 in
which the main question was that of the territorial expansion of
slavery, this same Southern statesman expressed himself as believing
that "the slave-holding South is now the controlling power of the
world.... Cotton, rice, tobacco and naval stores command the world; and
we have sense enough to know it, and are sufficiently Teutonic to carry
it out successfully[657]."
These quotations indicative of Southern faith in cotton might be
amplified and repeated from a hundred sources.
Moreover this faith in the possession of ultimate power went hand in
hand with the conviction that the South, more than any other quarter of
the world, produced to the benefit of mankind. "In the three million
bags of cotton," said a writer in _De Bow's Review_, "the slave-labour
annually throws upon the world for the poor and naked, we are doing more
to advance civilization ... than all the canting philanthropists of New
England and Old England will do in centuries. Slavery is the backbone of
the Northern commercial as it is of the British manufacturing
system[658]...." Nor was this idea unfamiliar to Englishmen. Before the
Civil War was under way Charles Greville wrote to Clarendon:
"Any war will be almost sure to interfere with the cotton
crops, and this is really what affects us and what we care
about. With all our virulent abuse of slavery and
slave-owners, and our continual self-laudation on that
subject, we are just as anxious for, and as much interested
in, the prosperity of the slavery interest in the Southern
States as the Carolinan and Georgian planters themselves, and
all Lancashire would deplore a successful insurrection of the
slaves, if such a thing were possible[659]."
On December 20, 1860, South Carolina led the march in secession.
Fifteen days earlier the British consul at Charleston, Bunch, reported a
conversation with Rhett, long a leader of the Southern cause and now a
consistent advocate of secession, in which Rhett developed a plan of
close commercial alliance with England as the most favoured nation,
postulating the dependence of Great Britain on the South for
cotton--"upon which supposed axiom, I would remark," wrote Bunch, "all
their calculations are based[660]." Such was, indeed, Southern
calculation. In January, 1861, _De Bow's Review_ contained an article
declaring that "the first demonstration of blockade of the Southern
ports would be swept away by the English fleets of observation hovering
on the Southern coasts, to protect English commerce, and especially the
free flow of cotton to English and French factories.... A stoppage of
the raw material ... would produce the most disastrous political
results--if not a revolution in England. This is the language of English
statesmen, manufacturers, and merchants, in Parliament and at cotton
associations' debates, and it discloses the truth[661]."
The historical student will find but few such British utterances at the
moment, and these few not by men of great weight either in politics or
in commerce. The South was labouring under an obsession and prophesied
results accordingly. So strong was this obsession that governmental
foreign policy neglected all other considerations and the first
Commission to Europe had no initial instructions save to demand
recognition[662]. The failure of that Commission, the prompt British
acquiescence in the blockade, were harsh blows to Southern confidence
but did not for a long time destroy the faith in the power of cotton. In
June, 1861, Bunch wrote that there was still a firm belief that "Great
Britain will make any sacrifice, even of principle or of honour, to
prevent the stoppage of the supply of cotton," and he enclosed a copy of
an article in the _Charleston Mercury_ of June 4, proclaiming: "The
cards are in our hands, and we intend to play them out to _the
bankruptcy of every cotton factory in Great Britain and France, or the
acknowledgment of our independence_[663]." As late as March, 1862, Bunch
was still writing of this Southern faith in cotton and described the
newly-made appointment of Benjamin as Secretary of State as partly due
to the fact that he was the leader of the "King Cotton" theory of
diplomacy[664]. It was not until the war was well nigh over that British
persistence in neutrality, in spite of undoubted hardships caused by the
lack of cotton, opened Southern eyes. Pollard, editor of a leading
Richmond newspaper, and soon unfriendly to the administration of
Jefferson Davis, summed up in _The Lost Cause_ his earlier criticisms of
Confederate foreign policy:
"'Cotton,' said the Charleston _Mercury_, 'would bring
England to her knees.' The idea was ludicrous enough that
England and France would instinctively or readily fling
themselves into a convulsion, which their great politicians
saw was the most tremendous one of modern times. But the
puerile argument, which even President Davis did not hesitate
to adopt, about the power of 'King Cotton,' amounted to this
absurdity: that the great and illustrious power of England
would submit to the ineffable humiliation of acknowledging
its dependency on the infant Confederacy of the South, and
the subserviency of its empire, its political interests and
its pride, to a single article of trade that was grown in
America[665]!"
But irrespective of the extremes to which Southern confidence in cotton
extended the actual hardships of England were in all truth serious
enough to cause grave anxiety and to supply an argument to Southern
sympathizers. The facts of the "Lancashire Cotton Famine" have
frequently been treated by historians at much length[666] and need here
but a general review. More needed is an examination of some of the
erroneous deductions drawn from the facts and especially an examination
of the extent to which the question of cotton supply affected or
determined British governmental policy toward America.
English cotton manufacturing in 1861 held a position of importance
equalled by no other one industry. Estimates based on varying statistics
diverge as to exact proportions, but all agree in emphasizing the
pre-eminent place of Lancashire in determining the general prosperity of
the nation. Surveying the English, not the whole British, situation it
is estimated that there were 2,650 factories of which 2,195 were in
Lancashire and two adjacent counties. These employed 500,000 operatives
and consumed a thousand million pounds of cotton each year[667]. An
editorial in the _Times_, September 19, 1861, stated that one-fifth of
the entire English population was held to be dependent, either directly
or indirectly, on the prosperity of the cotton districts[668], and
therefore also dependent on the source of supply, the Confederate South,
since statistics, though varying, showed that the raw cotton supplied
from America constituted anywhere from 78 to 84 per cent. of the total
English importation[669].
The American crop of 1860 was the largest on record, nearly 4,000,000
bales, and the foreign shipments, without question hurried because of
the storm-cloud rising at home, had been practically completed by April,
1861. Of the 3,500,000 bales sent abroad, Liverpool, as usual, received
the larger portion[670]. There was, then, no immediate shortage of
supply when war came in America, rather an unusual accumulation of raw
stocks, even permitting some reshipment to the Northern manufacturing
centres of America where the scarcity then brought high prices. In
addition, from December, 1860, to at least April, 1861, there had been
somewhat of a slump in demand for raw cotton by British manufacturers
due to an over-production of goods in the two previous years. There had
been a temporary depression in 1856-57 caused by a general financial
crisis, but early in 1858 restored confidence and a tremendous demand
from the Far East--India especially--set the mills running again on full
time, while many new mills were brought into operation. But by May,
1860, the mills had caught up with the heavy demands and the rest of the
year saw uncertainty of operations and brought expressions of fear that
the "plunge" to produce had been overdone. Manufactured stocks began to
accumulate, and money was not easy since 1860 brought also a combination
of events--deficient grain harvest at home, withdrawal of gold from
England to France for investment in French public works, demand of
America for gold in place of goods, due to political uncertainties
there--which rapidly raised the discount rate from two and one half per
cent. in January, 1860, to six in December. By the end of April, 1861,
the Board of Trade Returns indicated that the cotton trade was in a
dangerous situation, with large imports of raw cotton and decreased
exports of goods[671]. The news of war actually begun in America came as
a temporary relief to the English cotton trade and in the prospect of
decreased supply prices rose, saving many manufacturers from impending
difficulties. A few mills had already begun to work on part-time because
of trade depression. The _immediate_ effect of Lincoln's blockade
proclamation was to check this movement, but by October it had again
begun and this time because of the rapid increase in the price of raw
cotton as compared with the slower advance of the price of goods[672].
In substance the principal effect of the War on the English cotton trade
for the first seven or eight months was felt, not in the manufacturing
districts but in the Liverpool speculative and importing markets of raw
cotton. Prices rose steadily to over a shilling a pound in October,
1861. On November 23 there was a near panic caused by rumours of British
intervention. These were denounced as false and in five days the price
was back above its previous figure. Then on November 27 came the news
of the _Trent_ and the market was thrown into confusion, not because of
hopes that cotton would come more freely but in fear that war with
America would cause it to do so. The Liverpool speculators breathed
freely again only when peace was assured. This speculative British
interest was no cause for serious governmental concern and could not
affect policy. But the manufacturing trade was, presumably, a more
serious anxiety and if cotton became hard, or even impossible to obtain,
a serious situation would demand consideration.
In the generally accepted view of a "short war," there was at first no
great anticipation of real danger. But beginning with December, 1861,
there was almost complete stoppage of supply from America. In the six
months to the end of May, 1862, but 11,500 bales were received, less
than one per cent. of the amount for the same six months of the previous
year[673]. The blockade was making itself felt and not merely in
shipments from the South but in prospects of Southern production, for
the news came that the negroes were being withdrawn by their masters
from the rich sea islands along the coast in fear of their capture by
the Northern blockading squadrons[674]. Such a situation seemed bound in
the end to result in pressure by the manufacturers for governmental
action to secure cotton. That it did not immediately do so is explained
by Arnold, whose dictum has been quite generally accepted, as follows:
"The immediate result of the American war was, at this time,
to relieve the English cotton trade, including the dealers in
the raw material and the producers and dealers in
manufactures, from a serious and impending difficulty. They
had in hand a stock of goods sufficient for the consumption
of two-thirds of a year, therefore a rise in the price of the
raw material and the partial closing of their establishments,
with a curtailment of their working expenses, was obviously
to their advantage. But to make their success complete, this
rise in the price of cotton was upon the largest stock ever
collected in the country at this season. To the cotton trade
there came in these days an unlooked for accession of wealth,
such as even it had never known before. In place of the hard
times which had been anticipated, and perhaps deserved, there
came a shower of riches[675]."
This was written of the situation in December, 1861. A similar analysis,
no doubt on the explanations offered by his English friends, of "the
question of cotton supply, which we had supposed would speedily have
disturbed the level of their neutral policy" was made by Mason in March,
1862. "Thus," he concluded, "it is that even in Lancashire and other
manufacturing districts no open demonstration has been made against the
blockade[676]." Manufactures other than cotton were greatly prospering,
in particular those of woollen, flax, and iron. And the theory that the
cotton lords were not, in reality, hit by the blockade--perhaps profited
by it--was bruited even during the war. _Blackwood's Magazine_, October,
1864, held this view, while the _Morning Post_ of May 16, 1864, went to
the extent of describing the "glut" of goods in 1861, relieved just in
the nick of time by the War, preventing a financial crash, "which must
sooner or later have caused great suffering in Lancashire."
Arnold's generalization has been taken to prove that the _immediate_
effect of the Civil War was to save the cotton industry from great
disaster and that there _immediately_ resulted large profits to the
manufacturers from the increased price of stocks on hand. In fact his
description of the situation in December, 1861, as his own later pages
show, was not applicable, so far as manufacturers' profits are
concerned, until the later months of 1862 and the first of 1863. For
though prices might be put up, as they were, goods were not sold in any
large quantities before the fall of 1862. There were almost no
transactions for shipments to America, China, or the Indies[677].
Foreign purchasers as always, and especially when their needs had just
been abundantly supplied by the great output of 1858-60, were not keen
to place new orders in a rising and uncertain market. The English
producers raised their prices, but they held their goods, lacking an
effective market. The importance of this in British foreign policy is
that at no time, until the accumulated goods were disposed of, was there
likely to be any trade eagerness for a British intervention in America.
Their only fear, says Arnold, was the sudden opening of Southern ports
and a rush of raw cotton[678], a sneer called out by the alleged great
losses incurred and patriotically borne in silence. Certainly in
Parliament the members from Lancashire gave no sign of discontent with
the Government policy of neutrality for in the various debates on
blockade, mediation, and cotton supply but one Member from Lancashire,
Hopwood, ever spoke in favour of a departure from neutrality, or
referred to the distress in the manufacturing districts as due to any
other cause than the shortage in cotton caused by the war[679].
But it was far otherwise with the operatives of Lancashire. Whatever the
causes of short-time operation in the mills or of total cessation of
work the situation was such that from October, 1861, more and more
operatives were thrown out of employment. As their little savings
disappeared they were put upon public poor relief or upon private
charity for subsistence. The governmental statistics do not cover,
accurately, the relief offered by private charity, but those of public
aid well indicate the loss of wage-earning opportunity. In the so-called
"Distressed Districts" of Lancashire and the adjoining counties it
appears that poor relief was given to 48,000 persons in normal times,
out of a total population of 2,300,000. In the first week of November,
1861, it was 61,207, and for the first week of December, 71,593;
thereafter mounting steadily until March, 1862, when a temporary peak of
113,000 was reached. From March until the first week in June there was a
slight decrease; but from the second week of June poor relief resumed an
upward trend, increasing rapidly until December, 1862, when it reached
its highest point of 284,418. In this same first week of December
private relief, now thoroughly organized in a great national effort, was
extended to 236,000 people, making a grand total at high tide of
distress of over 550,000 persons, if private relief was not extended to
those receiving public funds. But of this differentiation there is no
surety--indeed there are evidences of much duplication of effort in
certain districts. In general, however, these statistics do exhibit the
great lack of employment in a one-industry district heretofore enjoying
unusual prosperity[680].
The manufacturing operative population of the district was estimated at
between 500,000 and 600,000. At the time of greatest distress some
412,000 of these were receiving either public or private aid, though
many were working part-time in the mills or were engaged on public
enterprises set on foot to ease the crisis. But there was no starvation
and it is absurd to compare the crisis to the Irish famine of the
'forties. This was a _cotton_ famine in the shortage of that commodity,
but it was not a _human_ famine. The country, wrote John Bright, was
passing through a terrible crisis, but "our people will be kept alive by
the contributions of the country[681]." Nevertheless a rapid change from
a condition of adequate wage-earning to one of dependence on charity--a
change ultimately felt by the great bulk of those either directly or
indirectly dependent upon the cotton industry--might have been expected
to arouse popular demonstrations to force governmental action directed
to securing cotton that trade might revive. That no such popular effect
was made demands careful analysis--to be offered in a later chapter--but
here the _fact_ is alone important, and the fact was that the operatives
sympathized with the North and put no pressure on the Cabinet. Thus at
no time during the war was there any attempt from Lancashire, whether of
manufacturers or operatives, to force a change of governmental
policy[682].
As the lack of employment developed in Lancashire public discussion and
consideration were inevitably aroused. But there was little talk of
governmental interference and such as did appear was promptly met with
opposition by the leading trade journals. July 13, 1861, the _Economist_
viewed the cotton shortage as "a _temporary_ and an _immediate_ one....
We have--on our hypothesis--to provide against the stoppage of our
supply for _one_ year, and that the very _next_ year." Would it _pay_,
asked Bright, to break the blockade? "I don't think myself it would be
cheap ... at the cost of a war with the United States[683]." This was
also the notion of the London _Shipping Gazette_ which, while
acknowledging that the mill-owners of England and France were about to
be greatly embarrassed, continued: "_But we are not going to add to the
difficulty by involving ourselves in a naval war with the Northern
States_[684]...." The _Times_ commented in substance in several issues
in September, 1861, on the "wise policy of working short-time as a
precaution against the contingencies of the cotton supply, and of the
glutted state of distant markets for manufactured goods[685]." October
12, the _Economist_ acknowledged that the impatience of some mill-owners
was quite understandable as was talk of a European compulsion on America
to stop an "objectless and hopeless" quarrel, but then entered upon an
elaborate discussion of the principles involved and demonstrated why
England ought not to intervene. In November Bright could write: "The
notion of getting cotton by interfering with the blockade is abandoned
apparently by the simpletons who once entertained it, and it is accepted
now as a fixed policy that we are to take no part in your
difficulties[686]." Throughout the fall of 1861 the _Economist_ was
doing its best to quiet apprehensions, urging that due to the "glut" of
manufactured goods short-time must have ensued anyway, pointing out that
now an advanced price was possible, and arguing that here was a
situation likely to result in the development of other sources of supply
with an escape from the former dependence on America. In view of the
actual conditions of the trade, already recounted, these were appealing
arguments to the larger manufacturers, but the small mills, running on
short order supplies and with few stocks of goods on hand were less
easily convinced. They were, however, without parliamentary influence
and hence negligible as affecting public policy. At the opening of the
new year, 1862, Bright declared that "with the spinners and
manufacturers and merchants, I think generally there is no wish for any
_immediate_ change[687]."
Bright's letter of November, 1861, was written before news of the
_Trent_ reached England: that of January, 1862, just after that
controversy had been amicably settled. The _Trent_ had both diverted
attention from cotton and in its immediate result created a general
determination to preserve neutrality. It is evident that even without
this threat of war there was no real cotton pressure upon the
Government. With Northern successes in the spring of 1862 hopes were
aroused that the war would soon end or that at least some cotton
districts would be captured to the relief of England. Seward held out
big promises based on the capture of New Orleans, and these for a time
calmed governmental apprehensions, though by midsummer it was clear that
the inability to secure the country back of the city, together with the
Southern determination to burn their cotton rather than see it fall into
the hands of the enemy, would prevent any great supply from the
Mississippi valley[688]. This was still not a matter of _immediate_
concern, for the Government and the manufacturers both held the opinion
that it was not lack of cotton alone that was responsible for the
distress and the manufacturers were just beginning to unload their
stocks[689]. But in considering and judging the attitude of the British
public on this question of cotton it should always be remembered that
the great mass of the people sincerely believed that America was
responsible for the distress in Lancashire. The error in understanding
was more important than the truth.
In judging governmental policy, however, the truth as regards the causes
of distress in England is the more important element. The "Cotton Lords"
did not choose to reveal it. One must believe that they intentionally
dwelt upon the war as the sole responsible cause. In the first important
parliamentary debate on cotton, May 9, 1862, not a word was said of any
other element in the situation, and, it is to be noted, not a word
advocating a change in British neutral policy[690]. It is to be noted
also that this debate occurred when for two months past, the numbers on
poor relief in Lancashire were temporarily decreasing[691], and the
general tone of the speakers was that while the distress was serious it
was not beyond the power of the local communities to meet it. There was
not, then, in May, any reason for grave concern and Russell expressed
governmental conviction when he wrote to Gladstone, May 18, "We must, I
believe, get thro' the cotton crisis as we can, and promote inland works
and railroads in India[692]." Moreover the Southern orders to destroy
cotton rather than permit its capture and export by the North
disagreeably affected British officials[693]. Up to the end of August,
1862, Russell, while writing much to Lyons on England's necessity for
cotton, did not do so in a vein indicative of criticism of Northern
policy nor in the sense that British distress demanded special official
consideration. Such demands on America as were made up to this time came
wholly from France[694].
It was not then cotton, primarily, which brought a revival in July of
the Southern attack on the Government through Parliament[695]. June had
seen the collapse of Lindsay's initial move, and Palmerston's answer to
Hopwood, June 13, that there was no intention, at present, to offer
mediation, appeared final. It was not cotton, but McClellan's defeat,
that produced a quick renewal of Lindsay's activities. June 30, Hopwood
had withdrawn his motion favouring recognition but in doing so asked
whether, "considering the great and increasing distress in the country,
the patient manner in which it has hitherto been borne, and the
hopelessness of the termination of hostilities, the Government intend to
take any steps whatever, either as parties to intervention or otherwise,
to endeavour to put an end to the Civil War in America?" This was
differently worded, yet contained little variation from his former
question of June 13, and this time Palmerston replied briefly that the
Government certainly would like to mediate if it saw any hope of success
but that at present "both parties would probably reject it. If a
different situation should arise the Government would be glad to
act[696]." This admission was now seized upon by Lindsay who, on July
11, introduced a motion demanding consideration of "the propriety of
offering mediation with the view of terminating hostilities," and
insisted upon a debate.
Thus while the first week of June seemed to have quieted rumours of
British mediation, the end of the month saw them revived. Adams was
keenly aware of the changing temper of opinion and on June 20 presented
to Russell a strong representation by Seward who wrote "under the
President's instructions" that such recurrent rumours were highly
injurious to the North since upon hopes of foreign aid the South has
been encouraged and sustained from the first day of secession. Having
developed this complaint at some length Seward went on to a brief
threat, containing the real meat of the despatch, that if foreign
nations did venture to intervene or mediate in favour of the South, the
North would be forced to have recourse to a weapon hitherto not used,
namely to aid in a rising of the slaves against their masters. This was
clearly a threat of a "servile war" if Great Britain aided the South--a
war which would place Britain in a very uncomfortable position in view
of her anti-slavery sentiments in the past. It is evidence of Adams'
discretion that this despatch, written May 28, was held back from
presentation to Russell until revived rumours of mediation made the
American Minister anxious[697]. No answer was given by Russell for over
a month, a fact in itself indicative of some hesitancy on policy. Soon
the indirect diplomacy of Napoleon III was renewed in the hope of
British concurrence. July 11, Slidell informed Mason that Persigny in
conversation had assured him "that this Government is now more anxious
than ever to take prompt and decided action in our favour." Slidell
asked if it was impossible to stir Parliament but acknowledged that
everything depended on Palmerston: "that august body seems to be as
afraid of him as the urchins of a village school of the birch of their
pedagogue[698]."
Unquestionably Persigny here gave Slidell a hint of private instructions
now being sent by Napoleon to Thouvenel who was on a visit to London.
The Emperor telegraphed "Demandez au gouvernement anglais s'il ne croit
pas le moment venu de reconnaître le Sud[699]." Palmerston had already
answered this question in Parliament and Thouvenel was personally very
much opposed to the Emperor's suggestion. There were press rumours that
he was in London to bring the matter to a head, but his report to
Mercier was that interference in America was a very dangerous matter and
that he would have been "badly received" by Palmerston and Russell if he
had suggested any change in neutral policy[700].
In spite of this decided opposition by the French Minister of Foreign
Affairs it is evident that one ground for renewed Southern hopes was the
knowledge of the Emperor's private desires. Lindsay chose his time well
for on July 16 the first thorough report on Lancashire was laid before
Parliament[701], revealing an extremity of distress not previously
officially authenticated, and during this week the papers were full of
an impending disaster to McClellan's army. Lyons, now in London, on his
vacation trip, was concerned for the future mainly because of cotton,
but did not believe there was much danger of an immediate clash with
America[702]. But the great Southern argument of the moment was the
Northern military failure, the ability of the South to resist
indefinitely and the hopelessness of the war. On the morning of July 18
all London was in excitement over press statements that the latest news
from America was not of McClellan's retreat but of the capture of his
entire army.
Lindsay's motion was set for debate on this same July 18. Adams thought
the story of McClellan's surrender had been set afloat "to carry the
House of Commons off their feet in its debate to-night[703]." The
debate itself may be regarded as a serious attempt to push the Ministry
into a position more favourable to the South, and the arguments advanced
surveyed the entire ground of the causes of secession and the
inevitability of the final separation of North and South. They need but
brief summary. Lindsay, refusing to accede to appeals for postponement
because "the South was winning anyway," argued that slavery was no
element in the conflict, that the Southern cause was just, and that
England, because of her own difficulties, should mediate and bring to a
conclusion a hopeless war. He claimed the time was opportune since
mediation would be welcomed by a great majority in the North, and he
quoted from a letter by a labouring man in Lancashire, stating, "We
think it high time to give the Southern States the recognition they so
richly deserve."
Other pro-Southern speakers emphasized Lancashire distress. Gregory
said: "We should remember what is impending over Lancashire--what want,
what woe, what humiliation--and that not caused by the decree of God,
but by the perversity of man. I leave the statistics of the pauperism
that is, and that is to be, to my honourable friends, the
representatives of manufacturing England." No statistics were
forthcoming from this quarter for not a representative from Lancashire
participated in the debate save Hopwood who at the very end upbraided
his fellow members from the district for their silence and was
interrupted by cries of "Divide, Divide." Lindsay's quoted letter was
met by opponents of mediation with the assertion that the operatives
were well known to be united against any action and that they could be
sustained "in luxury" from the public purse for far less a cost than
that of a war with America.
But cotton did not play the part expected of it in this debate. Forster
in a very able speech cleverly keeping close to a consideration of the
effect of mediation on _England_, advanced the idea that such a step
would not end the war but would merely intensify it and so prolong
English commercial distress. He did state, however, that intervention
(as distinct from mediation) would bring on a "servile war" in America,
thus giving evidence of his close touch with Adams and his knowledge of
Seward's despatch of May 28. In the main the friends of the North were
content to be silent and leave it to the Government to answer Lindsay.
This was good tactics and they were no doubt encouraged to silence by
evidence early given in the debate that there would be no positive
result from the motion. Gregory showed that this was a real _attack_ on
the Government by his bitter criticisms of Russell's "three months"
speech[704].
At the conclusion of Gregory's speech Lindsay and his friends, their
immediate purpose accomplished and fearing a vote, wished to adjourn the
debate indefinitely. Palmerston objected. He agreed that everyone
earnestly wished the war in America to end, but he declared that such
debates were a great mistake unless something definite was to follow
since they only served to create irritation in America, both North and
South. He concluded with a vigorous assertion that if the Ministry were
to administer the affairs of the nation it ought to be trusted in
foreign affairs and not have its hands tied by parliamentary expressions
of opinion at inopportune moments. Finally, the South had not yet
securely established its independence and hence could not be recognized.
This motion, if carried, would place England on a definite side and thus
be fatal to any hope of successful mediation or intervention in the
future. Having now made clear the policy of the Government Palmerston
did not insist upon a division and the motion was withdrawn[705].
On the surface Lindsay's effort of July 18 had resulted in ignominious
failure. Lyons called it "ill-timed.... I do not think we know here
sufficiently the extent of the disaster [to McClellan] to be able to
come to any conclusion as to what the European Powers should do." But
the impression left by the debate that there was a strong parliamentary
opinion in favour of mediation made Lyons add: "I suppose Mercier will
open full cry on the scent, and be all for mediation. I am still afraid
of any attempt of the kind[706]." Very much the same opinion was held by
Henry Adams who wrote, "the pinch has again passed by for the moment and
we breathe more freely. But I think I wrote to you some time ago that if
July found us still in Virginia, we could no longer escape interference.
I think now that it is inevitable." A definite stand taken by the North
on slavery would bring "the greatest strength in this running
battle[707]."
In spite of surface appearances that the debate was "ill-timed" the
"pinch" was not in fact passed as the activities of Slidell and Mason
and their friends soon indicated. For a fortnight the Cabinet, reacting
to the repeated suggestions of Napoleon, the Northern defeats, and the
distress in Lancashire, was seriously considering the possibility of
taking some step toward mediation. On July 16, two days before the
debate in the Commons, Slidell at last had his first personal contact
with Napoleon, and came away from the interview with the conviction that
"if England long persists in her inaction he [Napoleon] would be
disposed to act without her." This was communicated to Mason on July
20[708], but Slidell did _not_ as yet see fit to reveal to Mason that in
the interview with Napoleon he had made a definite push for separate
action by France, offering inducements on cotton, a special commercial
treaty, and "alliances, defensive, and offensive, for Mexican affairs,"
this last without any authority from Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary
of State. On July 23 Slidell made a similar offer to Thouvenel and left
with him a full memorandum of the Southern proposal[709]. He was
cautioned that it was undesirable his special offer to France should
reach the ears of the British Government--a caution which he transmitted
to Mason on July 30, when sending copies of Benjamin's instructions, but
still without revealing the full extent of his own overtures
to Napoleon.
[Illustration: JOHN SLIDELL (_From Nicolay and Hay's "Life of Abraham
Lincoln": The Century Co. New York_)]
In all this Slidell was still exhibiting that hankering to pull off a
special diplomatic achievement, characteristic of the man, and in line,
also, with a persistent theory that the policy most likely to secure
results was that of inducing France to act alone. But he was repeatedly
running against advice that France must follow Great Britain, and the
burden of his July 20 letter to Mason was an urging that a demand for
recognition be now made simultaneously in Paris and London. Thouvenel,
not at all enthusiastic over Slidell's proposals, told him that this was
at least a prerequisite, and on July 23, Slidell wrote Mason the demand
should be made at once[710]. Mason, on the advice of Lindsay,
Fitzgerald, and Lord Malmesbury, had already prepared a request for
recognition, but had deferred making it after listening to the debate of
July 18[711]. Now, on July 24, he addressed Russell referring to their
interview of February, 1862, in which he had urged the claims of the
Confederacy to recognition and again presented them, asserting that the
subsequent failure of Northern campaigns had demonstrated the power of
the South to maintain its independence. The South, he wrote, asked
neither aid nor intervention; it merely desired recognition and
continuation of British neutrality[712]. On the same day Mason also
asked for an interview[713], but received no reply until July 31, when
Russell wrote that no definite answer could be sent until "after a
Cabinet" and that an interview did not seem necessary[714].
This answer clearly indicates that the Government was in uncertainty. It
is significant that Russell took this moment to reply at last to
Seward's protestations of May 28[715], which had been presented to him
by Adams on June 20. He instructed Stuart at Washington that his delay
had been due to a "waiting for military events," but that these had
been indecisive. He gave a résumé of all the sins of the North as a
belligerent and wrote in a distinctly captious spirit. Yet these sins
had not "induced Her Majesty's Government to swerve an inch from an
impartial neutrality[716]." Here was no promise of a continuance of
neutrality--rather a hint of some coming change. At least one member of
the Cabinet was very ready for it. Gladstone wrote privately:
"It is indeed much to be desired that this bloody and
purposeless conflict should cease. From the first it has been
plain enough that the whole question was whether the South
was earnest and united. That has now for some months been
demonstrated; and the fact thus established at once places
the question beyond the region even of the most brilliant
military successes[717]...."
Gladstone was primarily influenced by the British commercial situation.
Lyons, still in England, and a consistent opponent of a change of
policy, feared this commercial influence. He wrote to Stuart:
"...I can hardly anticipate any circumstances under which I
should think the intervention of England in the quarrel
between the North and South advisable....
"But it is very unfortunate that no result whatever is
apparent from the nominal re-opening of New Orleans and other
ports. And the distress in the manufacturing districts
threatens to be so great that a pressure may be put upon the
Government which they will find it difficult to resist[718]."
In Parliament sneers were indulged in by Palmerston at the expense of
the silent cotton manufacturers of Lancashire, much to the fury of
Cobden[719]. Of this period Arnold later sarcastically remarked that,
"The representatives of Lancashire in the Houses of Parliament did not
permit the gaieties of the Exhibition season wholly to divert their
attention from the distress which prevailed in the home county[720]."
Being refused an interview, Mason transmitted to Russell on August 1 a
long appeal, rather than a demand, for recognition, using exactly those
arguments advanced by Lindsay in debate[721]. The answer, evidently
given after that "Cabinet" for whose decision Russell had been waiting,
was dated August 2. In it Russell, as in his reply to Seward on July 28,
called attention to the wholly contradictory statements of North and
South on the status of the war, which, in British opinion, had not yet
reached a stage positively indicative of the permanence of Southern
independence. Great Britain, therefore, still "waited," but the time
might come when Southern firmness in resistance would bring
recognition[722]. The tone was more friendly than any expressions
hitherto used by Russell to Southern representatives. The reply does not
reveal the decision actually arrived at by the Ministry. Gladstone wrote
to Argyll on August 3 that "yesterday" a Cabinet had been held on the
question "to move or not to move, in the matter of the American Civil
War...." He had come away before a decision when it became evident the
prevailing sentiment would be "nothing shall be done until both parties
are desirous of it." Gladstone thought this very foolish; he would have
England approach France and Russia, but if they were not ready, wait
until they were. "Something, I trust, will be done before the hot
weather is over to stop these frightful horrors[723]."
All parties had been waiting since the debate of July 18 for the
Cabinet decision. It was at once generally known as "no step at present"
and wisdom would have decreed quiet acquiescence. Apparently one
Southern friend, on his own initiative, felt the need to splutter. On
the next day, August 4, Lord Campbell in the Lords moved for the
production of Russell's correspondence with Mason, making a very
confused speech. "Society and Parliament" were convinced the war ought
to end in separation. At one time Campbell argued that reconquest of the
South was impossible; at another that England should interfere to
prevent such reconquest. Again he urged that the North was in a
situation where she could not stop the war without aid from Europe in
extricating her. Probably the motion was made merely to draw from
Russell an official statement. Production of the papers was refused.
Russell stated that the Government still maintained its policy of strict
neutrality, that if any action was to be taken it should be by all the
maritime powers and that if, in the parliamentary recess, any new policy
seemed advisable he would first communicate with those powers. He also
declared very positively that as yet no proposal had been received from
any foreign power in regard to America, laying stress upon the "perfect
accord" between Great Britain and France[724].
Mason commented on this speech that someone was evidently lying and
naturally believed that someone to be Russell. He hoped that France
would promptly make this clear[725]. But France gave no sign of lack of
"perfect accord." On the contrary Thouvenel even discouraged Slidell
from following Mason's example of demanding recognition and the formal
communication was withheld, Mason acquiescing[726]. Slidell thought new
disturbances in Italy responsible for this sudden lessening of French
interest in the South, but he was gloomy, seeing again the frustration
of high hopes. August 24 he wrote Benjamin:
"You will find by my official correspondence that we are
still hard and fast aground here. Nothing will float us off
but a strong and continued current of important successes in
the field.
I have no hope from England, because I am satisfied that she
desires an indefinite prolongation of the war, until the
North shall be entirely exhausted and broken down.
Nothing can exceed the selfishness of English statesmen
except their wretched hypocrisy. They are continually casting
about their disinterested magnaminity and objection of all
other considerations than those dictated by a high-toned
morality, while their entire policy is marked by egotism and
duplicity. I am getting to be heartily tired of Paris[727]."
On August 7 Parliament adjourned, having passed on the last day of the
session an Act for the relief of the distress in Lancashire by
authorizing an extension of powers to the Poor Law Guardians. Like
Slidell and Mason pro-Northern circles in London thought that in August
there had come to a disastrous end the Southern push for a change in
British policy, and were jubilant. To be sure, Russell had merely
declared that the time for action was "not yet" come, but this was
regarded as a sop thrown to the South. Neither in informed Southern nor
Northern circles outside the Cabinet was there any suspicion, _except by
Adams_, that in the six months elapsed since Lindsay had begun his
movement the Ministry had been slowly progressing in thoughts of
mediation.
In fact the sentiment of the Cabinet as stated by Gladstone had been
_favourable_ to mediation when "both parties were ready for it" and that
such readiness would come soon most Members were convinced. This was a
convenient and reasonable ground for postponing action but did not
imply that if the conviction were unrealized no mediation would be
attempted. McClellan, driven out of the Peninsula, had been removed, and
August saw the Northern army pressed back from Virginia soil. It was now
Washington and not Richmond that seemed in danger of capture. Surely the
North must soon realize the futility of further effort, and the reports
early in July from Washington dilated upon the rapid emergence of a
strong peace party.
But the first panic of dismay once past Stuart sent word of enormous new
Northern levies of men and of renewed courage[728]. By mid-August,
writing of cotton, he thought the prospect of obtaining any quantity of
it "seems hopeless," and at the same time reported the peace
party fast losing ground in the face of the great energy of the
Administration[729]. As to recognition, Stuart believed: "There is
nothing to be done in the presence of these enormous fresh levies, but
to wait and see what the next two months will bring forth[730]." The
hopes of the British Ministry based on a supposed Northern weariness of
the war were being shattered. Argyll, having received from Sumner a
letter describing the enthusiasm and determination of the North, wrote
to Gladstone:
"It is evident, whatever may be our opinion of the prospects
of 'the North' that they do not yet, at least, feel any
approach to such exhaustion as will lead them to admit of
mediation[731]...."
To this Gladstone replied:
"I agree that this is not a state of mind favourable to
mediation; and I admit it to be a matter of great difficulty
to determine when the first step ought to be taken; but I
cannot subscribe to the opinion of those who think that
Europe is to stand silent without limit of time and witness
these horrors and absurdities, which will soon have consumed
more men, and done ten times more mischief than the Crimean
War; but with the difference that there the end was
uncertain, here it is certain in the opinion of the whole
world except one of the parties. I should be puzzled to point
out a single case of dismemberment which has been settled by
the voluntary concession of the stronger party without any
interference or warning from third powers, and as far as
principle goes there never was a case in which warning was so
proper and becoming, because of the frightful misery which
this civil conflict has brought upon other countries, and
because of the unanimity with which it is condemned by the
civilized world[732]."
The renewal of Northern energy, first reports of which were known to
Russell early in August, came as a surprise to the British Ministry.
Their progress toward mediation had been slow but steady. Lindsay's
initial steps, resented as an effort in indirect diplomacy and not
supported by France officially, had received prompt rejection
accompanied by no indication of a desire to depart from strict
neutrality. With the cessation in late June of the Northern victorious
progress in arms and in the face of increasing distress in Lancashire,
the second answer to Lindsay was less dogmatic. As given by Palmerston
the Government desired to offer mediation, but saw no present hope of
doing so successfully. Finally the Government asked for a free hand,
making no pledges. Mason might be gloomy, Adams exultant, but when
August dawned plans were already on foot for a decided change. The
secret was well kept. Four days after the Cabinet decision to wait on
events, two days after Russell's refusal to produce the correspondence
with Mason, Russell, on the eve of departure for the Continent, was
writing to Palmerston:
"Mercier's notion that we should make some move in October
agrees very well with yours. I shall be back in England
before October, and we could then have a Cabinet upon it. Of
course the war may flag before that.
"I quite agree with you that a proposal for an armistice
should be the first step; but we must be prepared to answer
the question on what basis are we to negotiate[733]?"
The next movement to put an end to the war in America was to come, not
from Napoleon III, nor from the British friends of the South, but from
the British Ministry itself.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 654: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 204.]
[Footnote 655: _De Bow's Review_, Dec., 1857, p. 592.]
[Footnote 656: Cited in Adams, _Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity_,
p. 66.]
[Footnote 657: _Ibid._, p. 64.]
[Footnote 658: Cited in Smith, _Parties and Slavery_, 68. A remarkable
exposition of the "power of cotton" and the righteousness of slavery was
published in Augusta, Georgia, in 1860, in the shape of a volume of nine
hundred pages, entitled _Cotton is King, and Pro-Slavery Arguments_.
This reproduced seven separate works by distinguished Southern writers
analysing Slavery from the point of view of political economy, moral and
political philosophy, social ethics, political science, ethnology,
international law, and the Bible. The purpose of this united publication
was to prove the rightfulness, in every aspect, of slavery, the
prosperity of America as based on cotton, and the power of the United
States as dependent on its control of the cotton supply. The editor was
E.N. Elliot, President of Planters' College, Mississippi.]
[Footnote 659: Jan. 26, 1861. Cited in Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, p.
237.]
[Footnote 660: _Am. Hist. Rev._, XVIII, p. 785. Bunch to Russell. No.
51. Confidential. Dec. 5, 1860. As here printed this letter shows two
dates, Dec. 5 and Dec. 15, but the original in the Public Record Office
is dated Dec. 5.]
[Footnote 661: pp. 94-5. Article by W.H. Chase of Florida.]
[Footnote 662: Rhett, who advocated commercial treaties, learned from
Toombs that this was the case. "Rhett hastened to Yancey. Had he been
instructed to negotiate commercial treaties with European powers? Mr.
Yancey had received no intimation from any source that authority to
negotiate commercial treaties would devolve upon the Commission. 'What
then' exclaimed Rhett, 'can be your instructions?' The President, Mr.
Yancey said, seemed to be impressed with the importance of the cotton
crop. A considerable part of the crop of last year was yet on hand and a
full crop will soon be planted. The justice of the cause and the cotton,
so far as he knew, he regretted to say, would be the basis of diplomacy
expected of the Commission" (Du Bose, _Life and Times of Yancey_, 599).]
[Footnote 663: F.O., Am., Vol. 780. No. 69. Bunch to Russell, June 5,
1861. Italics by Bunch. The complete lack of the South in industries
other than its staple products is well illustrated by a request from
Col. Gorgas, Chief of Ordnance to the Confederacy, to Mason, urging him
to secure _three_ ironworkers in England and send them over. He wrote,
"The reduction of ores with coke seems not to be understood here" (Mason
Papers. Gorgas to Mason, Oct. 13, 1861).]
[Footnote 664: F.O., Am., Vol. 843. No. 48. Confidential. Bunch to
Russell, March 19, 1862.]
[Footnote 665: p. 130]
[Footnote 666: The two principal British works are: Arnold, _The History
of the Cotton Famine_, London, 1864; and Watts, _The Facts of the Cotton
Famine_, Manchester, 1866. A remarkable statistical analysis of the
world cotton trade was printed in London in 1863, by a Southerner
seeking to use his study as an argument for British mediation. George
McHenry, _The Cotton Trade_.]
[Footnote 667: Scherer, _Cotton as a World Power_, pp. 263-4.]
[Footnote 668: Lack of authentic statistics on indirect interests make
this a guess by the _Times_. Other estimates run from one-seventh to
one-fourth.]
[Footnote 669: Schmidt, "Wheat and Cotton During the Civil War," p. 408
(in _Iowa Journal of History and Politics_, Vol. 16), 78.8 per cent.
(Hereafter cited as Schmidt, _Wheat and Cotton_.) Scherer, _Cotton as a
World Power_, p. 264, states 84 per cent, for 1860. Arnold, _Cotton
Famine_, pp. 36-39, estimates 83 per cent.]
[Footnote 670: Great Britain ordinarily ran more than twice as many
spindles as all the other European nations combined. Schmidt, _Wheat and
Cotton_, p. 407, _note_.]
[Footnote 671: This Return for April is noteworthy as the first
differentiating commerce with the North and the South.]
[Footnote 672: These facts are drawn from Board of Trade Reports, and
from the files of the _Economist_, London, and _Hunt's Merchants
Magazine_, New York. I am also indebted to a manuscript thesis by T.P.
Martin, "The Effects of the Civil War Blockade on the Cotton Trade of
the United Kingdom," Stanford University. Mr. Martin in 1921 presented
at Harvard University a thesis for the Ph.D degree, entitled "The
Influence of Trade (in Cotton and Wheat) on Anglo-American Relations,
1829-1846," but has not yet carried his more matured study to the Civil
War period.]
[Footnote 673: Adams, _Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity_, p. 89.]
[Footnote 674: F.O., Am., Vol. 843. No. 10. Bunch to Russell, Jan. 8,
1862. Bunch also reported that inland fields were being transformed to
corn production and that even the cotton on hand was deteriorating
because of the lack of bagging, shut off by the blockade.]
[Footnote 675: Arnold, _Cotton Famine_, p. 81.]
[Footnote 676: Richardson, II, 198. Mason to Hunter, March 11, 1862.]
[Footnote 677: Parliamentary Returns, 1861 and 1862. _Monthly Accounts
of Trade and Navigation_ (in _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Commons_.
Vol. LV, and 1863, _Commons_, Vol. LXV).]
[Footnote 678: Arnold, _Cotton Famine_, pp. 174 and 215.]
[Footnote 679: In 1861 there were 26 Members from Lancashire in the
Commons, representing 14 boroughs and 2 counties. The suffrage was such
that only 1 in every 27 of the population had the vote. For all England
the proportion was 1 in 23 (Rhodes, IV, 359). _Parliamentary Papers_,
1867-8, _Lords_, Vol. XXXII, "Report on Boundaries of Boroughs and
Counties of England."]
[Footnote 680: The figures are drawn from (1) Farnall's "Reports on
Distress in the Manufacturing Districts," 1862. _Parliamentary Papers,
Commons_, Vol. XLIX, Pt. I, 1863. _Ibid._, Vol. LII, 1864; and (2) from
"Summary of the Number of Paupers in the Distressed Districts," from
November, 1861, to December, 1863. _Commons_, Vol. LII. Farnall's
reports are less exact than the _Summary_ since at times Liverpool is
included, at times not, as also six small poor-law unions which do not
appear in his reports until 1864. The _Summary_ consistently includes
Liverpool, and fluctuates violently for that city whenever weather
conditions interfered with the ordinary business of the port. It is a
striking illustration of the narrow margin of living wages among the
dockers of Liverpool that an annotation at the foot of a column of
statistics should explain an increase in one week of 21,000 persons
thrown on poor relief to the "prevalence of a strong east wind" which
prevented vessels from getting up to the docks.]
[Footnote 681: Trevelyan, _Bright_, p. 309. To Sumner, Dec. 6, 1862.]
[Footnote 682: The historians who see only economic causes have
misinterpreted the effects on policy of the "cotton famine." Recently,
also, there has been advanced an argument that "wheat defeated
cotton"--an idea put forward indeed in England itself during the war by
pro-Northern friends who pointed to the great flow of wheat from the
North as essential in a short-crop situation in Great Britain. Mr.
Schmidt in "The Influence of Wheat and Cotton on Anglo-American
Relations during the Civil War," a paper read before the American
Historical Association, Dec. 1917, and since published in the _Iowa
Journal of History and Politics_, July, 1918, presents with much care
all the important statistics for both commodities, but his conclusions
seem to me wholly erroneous. He states that "Great Britain's dependence
on Northern wheat ... operated as a contributing influence in keeping
the British government officially neutral ..." (p. 423), a cautious
statement soon transformed to the positive one that "this fact did not
escape the attention of the English government," since leading journals
referred to it (p. 431). Progressively, it is asserted: "But it was
Northern wheat that may well be regarded as the decisive factor,
counterbalancing the influence of cotton, in keeping the British
government from recognizing the Confederacy" (p. 437). "That the wheat
situation must have exerted a profound influence on the government ..."
(p. 438). And finally: "In this contest wheat won, demonstrating its
importance as a world power of greater significance than cotton" (p.
439). This interesting thesis has been accepted by William Trimble in
"Historical Aspects of the Surplus Food Production of the United States,
1862-1902" (_Am. Hist. Assoc. Reports_, 1918, Vol. I, p. 224). I think
Mr. Schmidt's errors are: (1) a mistake as to the time when recognition
of the South was in governmental consideration. He places it in
midsummer, 1863, when in fact the danger had passed by January of that
year. (2) A mistake in placing cotton and wheat supply on a parity,
since the former could not be obtained in quantity from _any_ source
before 1864, while wheat, though coming from the United States, could
have been obtained from interior Russia, as well as from the maritime
provinces, in increased supply if Britain had been willing to pay the
added price of inland transport. There was a real "famine" of cotton;
there would have been none of wheat, merely a higher cost. (This fact, a
vital one in determining influence, was brought out by George McHenry in
the columns of _The Index_, Sept. 18, 1862.) (3) The fact, in spite of
all Mr. Schmidt's suppositions, that while cotton was frequently a
subject of governmental concern in _memoranda_ and in private notes
between members of the Cabinet, I have failed to find one single case of
the mention of wheat. This last seems conclusive in negation of Mr.
Schmidt's thesis.]
[Footnote 683: Speech at Rochdale, Sept. 1, 1861. Cited in _Hunt's
Merchants Magazine_, Vol. 45, pp. 326-7.]
[Footnote 684: _Ibid._, p. 442.]
[Footnote 685: e.g., The _Times_, Sept. 19, 1861.]
[Footnote 686: To Sumner, Nov. 20, 1861. Mass Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_,
XLVI, p. 97.]
[Footnote 687: _Ibid._, Jan. 11, 1862. Vol. XLV, p. 157.]
[Footnote 688: F.O., Am., Vol. 843. No. 85. Bunch to Russell, June 25,
1862. He reported a general burning of cotton estimating the amount so
destroyed as nearly one million bales.]
[Footnote 689: Rhodes, III, p. 503, leaves the impression that England
was at first unanimous in attributing the cotton disaster to the War.
Also, IV, p. 77. I think this an error. It was the general public belief
but not that of the well informed. Rhodes, Vol. IV, p. 364, says that it
was not until January, 1863, that it was "begun to be understood" that
famine was not wholly caused by the War, but partly by glut.]
[Footnote 690: Hansard, 3d. Ser., CLXVI, pp. 1490-1520. Debate on "The
Distress in the Manufacturing Districts." The principal speakers were
Egerton, Potter, Villiers and Bright. Another debate on "The Cotton
Supply" took place June 19, 1862, with no criticism of America. _Ibid._,
CLXVII, pp. 754-93.]
[Footnote 691: See _ante_, p. 12.]
[Footnote 692: Gladstone Papers.]
[Footnote 693: F.O., Am., Vol. 843. No. 73. Bunch to Russell, May 12,
1862. A description of these orders as inclusive of "foreign owned"
cotton of which Bunch asserted a great stock had been purchased and
stored, waiting export, by British citizens. Molyneaux at Savannah made
a similar report. _Ibid._, Vol. 849. No. 16. To Russell, May 10, 1862.]
[Footnote 694: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, pp. 214-18.]
[Footnote 695: Arnold, _Cotton Famine_, p. 228, quotes a song in the
"improvised schoolrooms" of Ashton where operatives were being given a
leisure-time education. One verse was:
"Our mules and looms have now ceased work, the Yankees are
the cause. But we will let them fight it out and stand by
English laws; No recognizing shall take place, until the war
is o'er; Our wants are now attended to, we cannot ask for
more."
]
[Footnote 696: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXVII, p. 1213.]
[Footnote 697: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Further
Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States." No. 1.
Reed. June 21, 1862.]
[Footnote 698: Mason Papers.]
[Footnote 699: Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, 352. The exact
length of Thouvenel's stay in London is uncertain, but he had arrived by
July 10 and was back in Paris by July 21. The text of the telegram is in
a letter to Flahault of July 26, in which Thouvenel shows himself very
averse to any move which may lead to war with America, "an adventure
more serious than that of Mexico" (_Ibid._, p. 353).]
[Footnote 700: _Ibid._, p. 349. July 24, 1862. See also résumé in
Walpole, _History of Twenty-five Years_, II, 55.]
[Footnote 701: Farnall's First Report. _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862,
_Commons_, Vol. XLIX.]
[Footnote 702: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Stuart, July 5, 1862.
"Public opinion will not allow the Government to do more for
the North than maintain a strict neutrality, and it may not
be easy to do that if there comes any strong provocation from
the U.S. ..."
"However, the real question of the day is cotton...."
"The problem is of how to get over _this next_ winter. The
prospects of the manufacturing districts are very gloomy."
"...If you can manage in any way to get a supply of cotton
for England before the winter, you will have done a greater
service than has been effected by Diplomacy for a century;
but nobody expects it."
]
[Footnote 703: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 166. To his son, July 18,
1862. He noted that the news had come by the _Glasgow_ which had sailed
for England on July 5, whereas the papers contained also a telegram from
McClellan's head-quarters, dated July 7, but "the people here are fully
ready to credit anything that is not favourable." Newspaper headings
were "Capitulation of McClellan's Army. Flight of McClellan on a
steamer." _Ibid._, 167. Henry Adams to C.F. Adams, Jr., July 19.]
[Footnote 704: Gregory introduced a ridiculous extract from the _Dubuque
Sun_, an Iowa paper, humorously advocating a repudiation of all debts to
England, and solemnly held this up as evidence of the lack of financial
morality in America. If he knew of this the editor of the small-town
American paper must have been tickled at the reverberations of
his humour.]
[Footnote 705: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. CLXVIII, pp. 511-549, for the entire
debate.]
[Footnote 706: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Stuart, July 19, 1862.]
[Footnote 707: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, pp. 168-9. To Charles
Francis Adams, Jr., July 19, 1862.]
[Footnote 708: Mason Papers. The larger part of Slidell's letter to
Mason is printed in Sears, "A Confederate Diplomat at the Court of
Napoleon III," _Am. Hist. Rev._, Jan., 1921, p. 263. C.F. Adams, "A
Crisis in Downing Street," Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, May, 1914, p.
379, is in error in dating this letter April 21, an error for which the
present writer is responsible, having misread Slidell's difficult
hand-writing.]
[Footnote 709: Richardson, II, pp. 268-289. Slidell to Benjamin, July
25, 1862. It is uncertain just when Mason learned the details of
Slidell's offer to France. Slidell, in his letter of July 20, wrote:
"There is an important part of our conversation that I will give you
through Mr. Mann," who, apparently, was to proceed at once to London to
enlighten Mason. But the Mason Papers show that Mann did not go to
London, and that Mason was left in the dark except in so far as he could
guess at what Slidell had done by reading Benjamin's instructions, sent
to him by Slidell, on July 30. These did _not_ include anything on
Mexico, but made clear the plan of a "special commercial advantage" to
France. In C.F. Adams, "A Crisis in Downing Street," p. 381, it is
stated that Benjamin's instructions were written "at the time of
Mercier's visit to Richmond"--with the inference that they were a result
of Mercier's conversation at that time. This is an error. Benjamin's
instructions were written on April 12, and were sent on April 14, while
it was not until April 16 that Mercier reached Richmond. To some it will
no doubt seem inconceivable that Benjamin should not have informed
Mercier of his plans for France, just formulated. But here, as in
Chapter IX, I prefer to accept Mercier's positive assurances to Lyons at
their face value. Lyons certainly so accepted them and there is nothing
in French documents yet published to cast doubt on Mercier's honour,
while the chronology of the Confederate documents supports it.]
[Footnote 710: Mason Papers.]
[Footnote 711: _Ibid._, Mason to Slidell, July 18 and 19.]
[Footnote 712: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Lords_, Vol. XXIX.
"Correspondence with Mr. Mason respecting Blockade and Recognition."
No. 7.]
[Footnote 713: _Ibid._, No. 8.]
[Footnote 714: _Ibid._, No. 9.]
[Footnote 715: See _ante_, p. 18.]
[Footnote 716: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Further
Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States." No. 2.
Russell to Stuart, July 28, 1862.]
[Footnote 717: Gladstone Papers. To Col. Neville, July 26, 1862.]
[Footnote 718: Lyons Papers. July 29, 1862.]
[Footnote 719: Malmesbury, _Memoirs of an Ex-Minister_, II, p. 276. July
31, 1862.]
[Footnote 720: Arnold, _Cotton Famine_, p. 175.]
[Footnote 721: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Lords_, Vol. XXIX.
"Correspondence with Mr. Mason respecting Blockade and Recognition."
No. 10.]
[Footnote 722: _Ibid._, No. 11.]
[Footnote 723: Gladstone Papers. Also Argyll, _Autobiography_, II, p.
191.]
[Footnote 724: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXVIII, p. 1177 _seq_.]
[Footnote 725: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, Aug. 5, 1862.]
[Footnote 726: F.O., France, Vol. 1443. No. 964. Cowley to Russell, Aug.
8, 1862. Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, Aug. 20, 1862. Mason to
Slidell, Aug. 21.]
[Footnote 727: Richardson, II, p. 315.]
[Footnote 728: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, July 7, 1862.]
[Footnote 729: _Ibid._, To Russell, Aug. 18, 1862.]
[Footnote 730: _Ibid._, Aug. 26. Stuart's "nothing to be done" refers,
not to mediation, but to his idea in June-July that the time was ripe
for recognition. He was wholly at variance with Lyons on
British policy.]
[Footnote 731: Gladstone Papers. Aug. 26, 1862.]
[Footnote 732: _Ibid._, Aug. 29, 1862.]
[Footnote 733: Palmerston MS. Aug. 6, 1862.]
CHAPTER XI
RUSSELL'S MEDIATION PLAN
The adjournment of Parliament on August 7 without hint of governmental
inclination to act in the American Civil War was accepted by most of the
British public as evidence that the Ministry had no intentions in that
direction. But keen observers were not so confident. Motley, at Vienna,
was keeping close touch with the situation in England through private
correspondence. In March, 1862, he thought that "France and England have
made their minds up to await the issue of the present campaign"--meaning
McClellan's advance on Richmond[734]. With the failure of that campaign
he wrote: "Thus far the English Government have resisted his
[Napoleon's] importunities. But their resistance will not last
long[735]." Meanwhile the recently established pro-Southern weekly, _The
Index_, from its first issue, steadily insisted on the wisdom and
necessity of British action to end the war[736]. France was declared
rapidly to be winning the goodwill of the South at the expense of
England; the British aristocracy were appealed to on grounds of close
sympathy with a "Southern Aristocracy"; mediation, at first objected to,
in view of the more reasonable demand for recognition, was in the end
the chief object of _The Index_, after mid-July, when simple recognition
seemed impossible of attainment[737]. Especially British humiliation
because of the timidity of her statesmen, was harped upon and any public
manifestation of Southern sympathy was printed in great detail[738].
The speculations of Motley, the persistent agitation of _The Index_ are,
however, no indication that either Northern fears or Southern hopes were
based on authoritative information as to governmental purpose. The plan
now in the minds of Palmerston and Russell and their steps in furthering
it have been the subject of much historical study and writing. It is
here proposed to review them in the light of all available important
materials, both old and new, using a chronological order and with more
citation than is customary, in the belief that such citations best tell
the story of this, the most critical period in the entire course of
British attitude toward the Civil War. Here, and here only, Great
Britain voluntarily approached the danger of becoming involved in the
American conflict[739].
Among the few who thought the withdrawal of Lindsay's motion, July 18,
and the Prime Minister's comments did _not_ indicate safety for the
North stood Adams, the American Minister. Of Palmerston's speech he
wrote the next day in his diary: "It was cautious and wise, but enough
could be gathered from it to show that mischief to us in some shape will
only be averted by the favour of Divine Providence or our own efforts.
The anxiety attending my responsibility is only postponed[740]." At this
very moment Adams was much disturbed by his failure to secure
governmental seizure of a war vessel being built at Liverpool for the
South--the famous _Alabama_--which was soon completed and put to sea but
ten days later, July 29. Russell's delay in enforcing British
neutrality, as Adams saw it, in this matter, reinforcing the latter's
fears of a change in policy, had led him to explain his alarm to Seward.
On August 16 Adams received an instruction, written August 2, outlining
the exact steps to be taken in case the feared change in British policy
should occur. As printed in the diplomatic documents later presented to
Congress this despatch is merely a very interesting if somewhat
discursive essay on the inevitability of European ruminations on the
possibility of interference to end the war and argues the unwisdom of
such interference, especially for Great Britain's own interests. It does
not read as if Seward were alarmed or, indeed, as if he had given
serious consideration to the supposed danger[741]. But this conveys a
very erroneous impression. An unprinted portion of the despatch very
specifically and in a very serious tone, instructs Adams that if
approached by the British Government with propositions implying
a purpose:
"To dictate, or to mediate, or to advise, or even to solicit
or persuade, you will answer that you are forbidden to
debate, to hear, or in any way receive, entertain or
transmit, any communication of the kind.... If you are asked
an opinion what reception the President would give to such a
proposition, if made here, you will reply that you are not
instructed, but you have no reason for supposing that it
would be entertained."
This was to apply either to Great Britain alone or acting in conjunction
with other Powers. Further, if the South should be "acknowledged" Adams
was immediately to suspend his functions. "You will perceive," wrote
Seward, "that we have approached the contemplation of that crisis with
the caution which great reluctance has inspired. But I trust that you
will also have perceived that the crisis has not appalled us[742]."
This serious and definite determination by the North to resent any
intervention by Europe makes evident that Seward and Lincoln were fully
committed to forcible resistance of foreign meddling. Briefly, if the
need arose, the North would go to war with Europe. Adams at least now
knew where he stood and could but await the result. The instruction he
held in reserve, nor was it ever officially communicated to Russell. He
did, however, state its tenor to Forster who had contacts with the
Cabinet through Milner-Gibson and though no proof has been found that
the American determination was communicated to the Ministry, the
presumption is that this occurred[743]. Such communication could not
have taken place before the end of August and possibly was not then made
owing to the fact that the Cabinet was scattered in the long vacation
and that, apparently, the plan to move _soon_ in the American War was as
yet unknown save to Palmerston and to Russell.
Russell's letter to Palmerston of August 6, sets the date of their
determination[744]. Meanwhile they were depending much upon advices from
Washington for the exact moment. Stuart was suggesting, with Mercier,
that October should be selected[745], and continued his urgings even
though his immediate chief, Lyons, was writing to him from London strong
personal objections to any European intervention whatever and especially
any by Great Britain[746]. Lyons explained his objections to Russell as
well, but Stuart, having gone to the extent of consulting also with
Stoeckl, the Russian Minister at Washington, was now in favour of
straight-out recognition of the Confederacy as the better measure. This,
thought Stoeckl, was less likely to bring on war with the North than an
attempt at mediation[747]. Soon Stuart was able to give notice, a full
month in advance of the event, of Lincoln's plan to issue an
emancipation proclamation, postponed temporarily on the insistence of
Seward[748], but he attached no importance to this, regarding it as at
best a measure of pretence intended to frighten the South and to
influence foreign governments[749]. Russell was not impressed with
Stuart's shift from mediation to recognition. "I think," he wrote, "we
must allow the President to spend his second batch of 600,000 men before
we can hope that he and his democracy will listen to reason[750]." But
this did not imply that Russell was wavering in the idea that October
would be a "ripe time." Soon he was journeying to the Continent in
attendance on the Queen and using his leisure to perfect his great
plan[751].
Russell's first positive step was taken on September 13. On that date
he wrote to Cowley in Paris instructing him to sound Thouvenel,
_privately_[752], and the day following he wrote to Palmerston
commenting on the news just received of the exploits of Stonewall
Jackson in Virginia, "it really looks as if he might end the war. In
October the hour will be ripe for the Cabinet[753]." Similar reactions
were expressed by Palmerston at the same moment and for the same
reasons. Palmerston also wrote on September 14:
"The Federals ... got a very complete smashing ... even
Washington or Baltimore may fall into the hands of the
Confederates."
"If this should happen, would it not be time for us to
consider whether in such a state of things England and France
might not address the contending parties and recommend an
arrangement upon the basis of separation[754]?"
Russell replied:
"... I agree with you that the time is come for offering
mediation to the United States Government, with a view to the
recognition of the independence of the Confederates. I agree
further that, in case of failure, we ought ourselves to
recognize the Southern States as an independent State. For
the purpose of taking so important a step, I think we must
have a meeting, of the Cabinet. The 23rd or 30th would suit
me for the meeting[755]."
The two elder statesmen being in such complete accord the result of the
unofficial overture to France was now awaited with interest. This,
considering the similar unofficial suggestions previously made by
Napoleon, was surprisingly lukewarm. Cowley reported that he had held a
long and serious conversation with Thouvenel on the subject of mediation
as instructed by Russell on the thirteenth and found a disposition "to
wait to see the result of the elections" in the North. Mercier
apparently had been writing that Southern successes would strengthen the
Northern peace party. Thouvenel's idea was that "if the peace party
gains the ascendant," Lincoln and Seward, both of whom were too far
committed to listen to foreign suggestions, would "probably be set
aside." He also emphasized the "serious consequences" England and France
might expect if they recognized the South.
"I said that we might propose an armistice without mediation,
and that if the other Powers joined with us in doing so, and
let it be seen that a refusal would be followed by the
recognition of the Southern States, the certainty of such
recognition by all Europe must carry weight with it."
Thouvenel saw some difficulties, especially Russia.
"...the French Government had some time back sounded that of
Russia as to her joining France and England in an offer of
mediation and had been met by an almost scornful refusal...."
"It appears also that there is less public pressure here for
the recognition of the South than there is in England[756]."
Thouvenel's lack of enthusiasm might have operated as a check to Russell
had he not been aware of two circumstances causing less weight than
formerly to be attached to the opinions of the French Secretary for
Foreign Affairs. The first was the well-known difference on American
policy between Thouvenel and Napoleon III and the well-grounded
conviction that the Emperor was at any moment ready to impose his will,
if only England would give the signal. The second circumstance was still
more important. It was already known through the French press that a
sharp conflict had arisen in the Government as to Italian policy and all
signs pointed to a reorganization of the Ministry which would exclude
Thouvenel. Under these circumstances Russell could well afford to
discount Thouvenel's opinion. The extent to which he was ready to
go--much beyond either the offer of mediation, or of armistice evidently
in Cowley's mind--is shown by a letter to Gladstone, September 26.
"I am inclined to think that October 16 may be soon enough
for a Cabinet, if I am free to communicate the views which
Palmerston and I entertain to France and Russia in the
interval between this time and the middle of next month.
These views had the offer of mediation to both parties in the
first place, and in the case of refusal by the North, to
recognition of the South. Mediation on the basis of
separation and recognition accompanied by a declaration of
neutrality[757]."
The perfected plan, thus outlined, had resulted from a communication to
Palmerston of Cowley's report together with a memorandum, proposed to be
sent to Cowley, but again _privately_[758], addressed to France alone.
Russell here also stated that he had explained his ideas to the Queen.
"She only wishes Austria, Prussia and Russia to be consulted. I said
that should be done, but we must consult France first." Also enclosed
was a letter from Stuart of September 9, reporting Mercier as just
returned from New York and convinced that if advantage were not taken of
the present time to do exactly that which was in Russell's mind, Europe
would have to wait for the "complete exhaustion" of the North[759].
Russell was now at home again and the next day Palmerston approved the
plans as "excellent"; but he asked whether it would not be well to
include Russia in the invitation as a compliment, even though "she might
probably decline." As to the other European powers the matter could wait
for an "after communication." Yet that Palmerston still wished to go
slowly is shown by a comment on the military situation in America:
"It is evident that a great conflict is taking place to the
north-west of Washington, and its issue must have a great
effect on the state of affairs. If the Federals sustain a
great defeat, they may be at once ready for mediation, and
the iron should be struck while it is hot. If, on the other
hand, they should have the best of it, we may wait awhile and
see what may follow[760]...."
Thus through Palmerston's caution Russia had been added to France in
Russell's proposed memorandum and the communication to Cowley had not
been sent off immediately--as the letter to Gladstone of September 26
indicates. But the plan was regarded as so far determined upon that on
September 24 Russell requested Lyons not to fix, as yet, upon a date for
his departure for America, writing, "M. Mercier is again looking out for
an opportunity to offer mediation, and this time he is not so much out
in his reckoning[761]." Curiously Mercier had again changed his mind and
now thought a proposal of an armistice was the best move, being
"particularly anxious that there should be no mention of the word
_separation_," but of this Russell had, as yet, no inkling[762]. With
full approval of the plan as now outlined, Palmerston wrote to
Gladstone, September 24, that he and Russell were in complete agreement
that an offer of mediation should be made by the three maritime powers,
but that "no actual step would be taken without the sanction of the
Cabinet[763]." Two days later Russell explained to Gladstone the exact
nature of the proposal[764], but that there was even now no thoroughly
worked out agreement on the sequence of steps necessary is shown by
Palmerston's letter to Gladstone of the twenty-fourth, in which is
outlined a preliminary proposal of an armistice, cessation of blockade,
and negotiation on the basis of separation[765].
Other members of the Cabinet were likewise informed of the proposed
overture to France and Russia and soon it was clear that there would be
opposition. Granville had replaced Russell in attendance upon the Queen
at Gotha. He now addressed a long and careful argument to Russell
opposing the adventure, as he thought it, summing up his opinion in
this wise:
"...I doubt, if the war continues long after our recognition
of the South, whether it will be possible for us to avoid
drifting into it."
"...I have come to the conclusion that it is premature to
depart from the policy which has hitherto been adopted by you
and Lord Palmerston, and which, notwithstanding the strong
antipathy to the North, the strong sympathy with the South,
and the passionate wish to have cotton, has met with such
general approval from Parliament, the press, and the
public[766]."
But Granville had little hope his views would prevail. A few days later
he wrote to Lord Stanley of Alderley:
"I have written to Johnny my reasons for thinking it
decidedly premature. I, however, suspect you will settle to
do so! Pam, Johnny, and Gladstone would be in favour of it;
and probably Newcastle. I do not know about the others. It
appears to me a great mistake[767]."
Opportunely giving added effect to Granville's letter there now arrived
confused accounts from America of the battles about Washington and of a
check to the Southern advance. On September 17 there had been fought the
battle of Antietam and two days later Lee, giving up his Maryland
campaign, began a retreat through the Shenandoah valley toward the old
defensive Southern lines before Richmond. There was no pursuit, for
McClellan, again briefly in command, thought his army too shattered for
an advance. Palmerston had been counting on a great Southern victory and
was now doubtful whether the time had come after all for European
overtures to the contestants. October 2 he wrote Russell:
"MY DEAR RUSSELL,
"I return you Granville's letter which contains much
deserving of serious consideration. There is no doubt that
the offer of Mediation upon the basis of Separation would be
accepted by the South. Why should it not be accepted? It
would give the South in principle the points for which they
are fighting. The refusal, if refusal there was, would come
from the North, who would be unwilling to give up the
principle for which they have been fighting so long as they
had a reasonable expectation that by going on fighting they
could carry their point. The condition of things therefore
which would be favourable to an offer of mediation would be
great success of the South against the North. That state of
things seemed ten days ago to be approaching. Its advance has
been lately checked, but we do not yet know the real course
of recent events, and still less can we foresee what is about
to follow. Ten days or a fortnight more may throw a clearer
light upon future prospects.
"As regards possible resentment on the part of the Northerns
following upon an acknowledgment of the Independence of the
South, it is quite true that we should have less to care
about that resentment in the spring when communication with
Canada was open, and when our naval force could more easily
operate upon the American coast, than in winter when we are
cut off from Canada and the American coast is not so safe.
"But if the acknowledgment were made at one and the same time
by England, France and some other Powers, the Yankees would
probably not seek a quarrel with us alone, and would not like
one against a European Confederation. Such a quarrel would
render certain and permanent that Southern Independence the
acknowledgment of which would have caused it.
"The first communication to be made by England and France to
the contending parties might be, not an absolute offer of
mediation but a friendly suggestion whether the time was not
come when it might be well for the two parties to consider
whether the war, however long continued, could lead to any
other result than separation; and whether it might not
therefore be best to avoid the great evils which must
necessarily flow from a prolongation of hostilities by at
once coming to an agreement to treat upon that principle of
separation which must apparently be the inevitable result of
the contest, however long it may last.
"The best thing would be that the two parties should settle
details by direct negotiation with each other, though perhaps
with the rancorous hatred now existing between them this
might be difficult. But their quarrels in negotiation would
do us no harm if they did not lead to a renewal of war. An
armistice, if not accompanied by a cessation of blockades,
would be all in favour of the North, especially if New
Orleans remained in the hands of the North.
"The whole matter is full of difficulty, and can only be
cleared up by some more decided events between the contending
armies...."
PALMERSTON[768]."
Very evidently Palmerston was experiencing doubts and was all in favour
of cautious delay. American military events more than Granville's
arguments influenced him, but almost immediately there appeared a much
more vigorous and determined opponent within the Cabinet. Cornewall
Lewis was prompt to express objections. October 2, Russell transmitted
to Palmerston a letter of disapproval from Lewis. Russell also,
momentarily, was hesitating. He wrote:
"This American question must be well sifted. I send you a
letter of G. Lewis who is against moving ..."
"My only doubt is whether we and France should stir if Russia
holds back. Her separation from our move would ensure the
rejection of our proposals. But we shall know more by the
16th. I have desired a cabinet to be summoned for that day,
but the summons will not go out till Saturday. So if you wish
to stop it, write to Hammond[769]."
From this it would appear that Russia had been approached[770] but that
Russell's chief concern was the attitude of France, that his proposed
private communication to Cowley had been despatched and that he was
waiting an answer which might be expected before the sixteenth. If so
his expectations were negatived by that crisis now on in the French
Ministry over the Italian question prohibiting consideration of any
other matter. On October 15 Thouvenel was dismissed, but his formal
retirement from office did not take place until October 24. Several
Ministers abroad, among them Flahault, at London, followed him into
retirement and foreign affairs were temporarily in confusion[771]. The
Emperor was away from Paris and all that Cowley reported was that the
last time he had seen Thouvenel the latter had merely remarked that "as
soon as the Emperor came back the two Governments ought to enter into a
serious consideration of the whole question[772]...." Cowley himself was
more concerned that it was now becoming clear France, in spite of
previous protestations, was planning "colonizing" Mexico[773].
Up to the end of September, therefore, the British Government, while
wholly confident that France would agree in any effort whatsoever that
England might wish to make, had no recent assurances, either official or
private, to this effect. This did not disturb Russell, who took for
granted French approval, and soon he cast aside the hesitation caused by
the doubts of Granville, the opposition of Lewis, and the caution of
Palmerston. Public opinion was certainly turning toward a demand for
Ministerial action[774]. Two days of further consideration caused him to
return to the attack; October 4 he wrote Palmerston:
"I think unless some miracle takes place this will be the
very time for offering mediation, or as you suggest,
proposing to North and South to come to terms.
"Two things however must be made clear:
(i) That we propose separation,
(ii) That we shall take no part in the war unless attacked
ourselves[775]."
How Russell proposed to evade a war with an angry North was not made
clear, but in this same letter notice was given that he was preparing a
memorandum for the Cabinet. Russell was still for a mediation on lines
of separation, but his uncertainty, even confusion, of mind became
evident but another two days later on receipt of a letter from Stuart,
written September 23, in which he and Mercier were now all for a
suggestion of armistice, with no mention of separation[776]. Russell
now thought:
"If no fresh battles occur, I think the suggestion might be
adopted, tho' I am far from thinking with Mercier that the
North would accept it. But it would be a fair and defensible
course, leaving it open to us to hasten or defer recognition
if the proposal is declined. Lord Lyons might carry it over
on the 25th[777]."
British policy, as represented by the inclinations of the Foreign
Secretary, having started out on a course portending positive and
vigorous action, was now evidently in danger of veering far to one side,
if not turning completely about. But the day after Russell seemed to be
considering such an attenuation of the earlier plan as to be content
with a mere suggestion of armistice, a bomb was thrown into the already
troubled waters further and violently disturbing them. This was
Gladstone's speech at Newcastle, October 7, a good third of which was
devoted to the Civil War and in which he asserted that Jefferson Davis
had made an army, was making a navy, and had created something still
greater--a nation[778]. The chronology of shifts in opinion would, at
first glance, indicate that Gladstone made this speech with the
intention of forcing Palmerston and Russell to continue in the line
earlier adopted, thus hoping to bolster up a cause now losing ground.
His declaration, coming from a leading member of of the Cabinet, was
certain to be accepted by the public as a foreshadowing of governmental
action. If Jefferson Davis had in truth created a nation then early
recognition must be given it. But this surmise of intentional pressure
is not borne out by any discovered evidence. On the contrary, the truth
is, seemingly, that Gladstone, in the north and out of touch, was in
complete ignorance that the two weeks elapsed since his letters from
Palmerston and Russell had produced any alteration of plan or even any
hesitation. Himself long convinced of the wisdom of British intervention
in some form Gladstone evidently could not resist the temptation to make
the good news known. His declaration, foreshadowing a policy that did
not pertain to his own department, and, more especially, that had not
yet received Cabinet approval was in itself an offence against the
traditions of British Cabinet organization. He had spoken without
authorization and "off his own bat."
The speculative market, sensitive barometer of governmental policy,
immediately underwent such violent fluctuations as to indicate a general
belief that Gladstone's speech meant action in the war. The price of raw
cotton dropped so abruptly as to alarm Southern friends and cause them
to give assurances that even if the blockade were broken there would be
no immediate outpouring of cotton from Southern ports[779]. On the other
hand, Bright, staunch friend of the North, _hoped_ that Gladstone was
merely seeking to overcome a half-hearted reluctance of Palmerston and
Russell to move. He was sore at heart over the "vile speech" of "your
old acquaintance and friend[780]." The leading newspapers while at first
accepting the Newcastle speech as an authoritative statement and
generally, though mildly, approving, were quick to feel that there was
still uncertainty of policy and became silent until it should be made
clear just what was in the wind[781]. Within the Cabinet it is to be
supposed that Gladstone had caused no small stir, both by reason of his
unusual procedure and by his sentiments. On Russell, however much
disliked was the incursion into his own province, the effect was
reinvigoration of a desire to carry through at least some portion of the
plan and he determined to go on with the proposal of an armistice. Six
days after Gladstone's speech Russell circulated, October 13, a
memorandum on America[782].
This memorandum asserted that the South had shown, conclusively, its
power to resist--had maintained a successful defensive; that the notion
of a strong pro-Northern element in the South had been shown to be
wholly delusive; that the emancipation proclamation, promising a freeing
of the slaves in the sections still in rebellion on January 1, 1863, was
no humanitarian or idealistic measure (since it left slavery in the
loyal or recognized districts) and was but an incitement to servile
war--a most "terrible" plan. For these reasons Russell urged that the
Great Powers ought seriously to consider whether it was not their duty
to propose a "suspension of arms" for the purpose of "weighing calmly
the advantages of peace[783]." This was a far cry from mediation and
recognition, nor did Russell indicate either the proposed terms of an
armistice or the exact steps to be taken by Europe in bringing it about
and making it of value. But the memorandum of October 13 does clearly
negative what has been the accepted British political tradition which is
to the effect that Palmerston, angered at Gladstone's presumption and
now determined against action, had "put up" Cornewall Lewis to reply in
a public speech, thereby permitting public information that no Cabinet
decision had as yet been reached. Lewis' speech was made at Hereford on
October 14. Such were the relations between Palmerston and Russell that
it is impossible the former would have so used Lewis without notifying
Russell, in which case there would have been no Foreign Office
memorandum of the thirteenth[784]. Lewis was, in fact, vigorously
maintaining his objections, already made known to Russell, to _any_ plan
of departure from the hitherto accepted policy of neutrality and his
speech at Hereford was the opening gun of active opposition.
Lewis did not in any sense pose as a friend of the North. Rather he
treated the whole matter, in his speech at Hereford and later in the
Cabinet as one requiring cool judgment and decision on the sole ground
of British interests. This was the line best suited to sustain his
arguments, but does not prove, as some have thought, that his Cabinet
acknowledgment of the impossibility of Northern complete victory, was
his private conviction[785]. At Hereford Lewis argued that everyone must
acknowledge a great war was in progress and must admit it "to be
undecided. Under such circumstances, the time had not yet arrived when
it could be asserted in accordance with the established doctrines of
international law that the independence of the Southern States had been
established[786]." In effect Lewis gave public notice that no Cabinet
decision had yet been reached, a step equally opposed to Cabinet
traditions with Gladstone's speech, since equally unauthorized, but
excusable in the view that the first offence against tradition had
forced a rejoinder[787]. For the public Lewis accomplished his purpose
and the press refrained from comment, awaiting results[788]. Meanwhile
Palmerston, who must finally determine policy, was remaining in
uncertainty and in this situation thought it wise to consult,
indirectly, Derby, the leader of the opposition in Parliament. This was
done through Clarendon, who wrote to Palmerston on October 16 that Derby
was averse to action.
"He said that he had been constantly urged to _go in for_
recognition and mediation, but had always refused on the
ground that recognition would merely irritate the North
without advancing the cause of the South or procuring a
single bale of cotton, and that mediation in the present
temper of the Belligerents _must_ be rejected even if the
mediating Powers themselves knew what to propose as a fair
basis of compromise; for as each party insisted upon having
that which the other declared was vitally essential to its
existence, it was clear that the war had not yet marked out
the stipulations of a treaty of peace.... The recognition of
the South could be of no benefit to England unless we meant
to sweep away the blockade, which would be an act of
hostility towards the North[789]."
More than any other member of the Cabinet Lewis was able to guess,
fairly accurately, what was in the Premier's mind for Lewis was
Clarendon's brother-in-law, and "the most intimate and esteemed of his
male friends[790]." They were in constant communication as the Cabinet
crisis developed, and Lewis' next step was taken immediately after
Palmerston's consultation of Derby through Clarendon. October 17, Lewis
circulated a memorandum in reply to that of Russell's of October 13. He
agreed with Russell's statement of the facts of the situation in
America, but added with sarcasm:
"A dispassionate bystander might be expected to concur in the
historical view of Lord Russell, and to desire that the war
should be speedily terminated by a pacific agreement between
the contending parties. But, unhappily, the decision upon any
proposal of the English Government will be made, not by
dispassionate bystanders, but by heated and violent
partisans; and we have to consider, not how the proposal
indicated in the Memorandum ought to be received, or how it
would be received by a conclave of philosophers, but how it
is likely to be received by the persons to whom it would be
addressed."
Lincoln's emancipation proclamation, Lewis admitted, presumably was
intended to incite servile war, but that very fact was an argument
against, not for, British action, since it revealed an intensity of
bitterness prohibitory of any "calm consideration" of issues by the
belligerents. And suppose the North did acquiesce in an armistice the
only peaceful solution would be an independent slave-holding South for
the establishment of which Great Britain would have become intermediary
and sponsor. Any policy except that of the continuance of strict
neutrality was full of dangers, some evident, some but dimly visible as
yet. Statesmanship required great caution; "... looking to the probable
consequences," Lewis concluded, "of this philanthropic proposition, we
may doubt whether the chances of evil do not preponderate over the
chances of good, and whether it is not--
'Better to endure the ills we have
Than fly to others which we know not of[791].'"
At the exact time when Lewis thus voiced his objections, basing them on
the lack of any sentiment toward peace in America, there were received
at the Foreign Office and read with interest the reports of a British
special agent sent out from Washington on a tour of the Western States.
Anderson's reports emphasized three points:
(1) Emancipation was purely a war measure with no thought of
ameliorating the condition of the slaves once freed;
(2) Even if the war should stop there was no likelihood of securing
cotton for a long time to come;
(3) The Western States, even more then the Eastern, were in favour of
vigorous prosecution of the war and the new call for men was being met
with enthusiasm[792].
This was unpromising either for relief to a distressed England or for
Northern acceptance of an armistice, yet Russell, commenting on
Clarendon's letter to Palmerston, containing Derby's advice, still
argued that even if declined a suggestion of armistice could do no harm
and might open the way for a later move, but he agreed that recognition
"would certainly be premature at present[793]." Russell himself now
heard from Clarendon and learned that Derby "had been constantly urged
to press for recognition and mediation but he had always refused on the
ground that the neutral policy hitherto pursued by the Government was
the right one and that if we departed from it we should only meet with
an insolent rejection of our offer[794]." A long conference with Lyons
gave cause for further thought and Russell committed himself to the
extent that he acknowledged "we ought not to move _at present_ without
Russia[795]...." Finally, October 22, Palmerston reached a decision for
the immediate present, writing to Russell:
"Your description of the state of things between the two
parties is most comprehensive and just. I am, however, much
inclined to agree with Lewis that at present we could take no
step nor make any communication of a distinct proposition
with any advantage."
* * * * *
"All that we could possibly do without injury to our position
would be to ask the two Parties not whether they would agree
to an armistice but whether they might not turn their
thoughts towards an arrangement between themselves. But the
answer of each might be written by us beforehand. The
Northerners would say that the only condition of arrangement
would be the restoration of the Union; the South would say
their only condition would be an acknowledgment by the North
of Southern Independence--we should not be more advanced and
should only have pledged each party more strongly to the
object for which they are fighting. I am therefore inclined
to change the opinion on which I wrote to you when the
Confederates seemed to be carrying all before them, and I am
very much come back to our original view of the matter, that
we must continue merely to be lookers-on till the war shall
have taken a more decided turn[796]."
By previous arrangement the date October 23 had been set for a Cabinet
to consider the American question but Russell now postponed it, though a
few members appeared and held an informal discussion in which Russell
still justified his "armistice" policy and was opposed by Lewis and the
majority of those present. Palmerston did not attend, no action was
possible and technically no Cabinet was held[797]. It soon appeared that
Russell, vexed at the turn matters had taken, was reluctant in yielding
and did not regard the question as finally settled. Yet on the afternoon
of this same day Adams, much disturbed by the rumours attendant upon the
speeches of Gladstone and Lewis, sought an explanation from Russell and
was informed that the Government was not inclined at present to change
its policy but could make no promises for the future[798]. This appeared
to Adams to be an assurance against _any_ effort by Great Britain and
has been interpreted as disingenuous on Russell's part. Certainly Adams'
confidence was restored by the interview. But Russell was apparently
unconvinced as yet that a suggestion of armistice would necessarily lead
to the evil consequences prophesied by Lewis, or would, indeed, require
any departure from a policy of strict neutrality. On the one side
Russell was being berated by pro-Southerners as weakly continuing an
outworn policy and as having "made himself the laughing-stock of Europe
and of America[799];" on the other he was regarded, for the moment, as
insisting, through pique, on a line of action highly dangerous to the
preservation of peace with the North. October 23 Palmerston wrote his
approval of the Cabinet postponement, but declared Lewis' doctrine of
"no recognition of Southern independence until the North had admitted
it" was unsound[800]. The next day he again wrote: "... to talk to the
belligerents about peace at present would be as useless as asking the
winds during the last week to let the waters remain calm[801]."
This expression by Palmerston on the day after the question apparently
had come to a conclusion was the result of the unexpected persistence of
Russell and Gladstone. Replying to Palmerston's letter of the
twenty-third, Russell wrote: "As no good could come of a Cabinet, I put
it off. But tho' I am quite ready to agree to your conclusions for the
present, I cannot do so for G. Lewis' reasons...."
"G. Lewis besides has made a proposition for me which I never
thought of making. He says I propose that England and France
and perhaps some one Continental power should ask America to
suspend the war. I never thought of making such a proposal.
"I think if Russia agreed Prussia would. And if France and
England agreed Austria would. Less than the whole five would
not do. I thought it right towards the Cabinet to reserve any
specific proposition. I am not at all inclined to adopt G.
Lewis' invention.
"I have sent off Lyons without instructions, at which he is
much pleased[802]."
Russell was shifting ground; first the proposal was to have been made by
England and France; then Russia was necessary; now "less than five
powers would not do." But whatever the number required he still desired
a proposal of armistice. On October 23, presumably subsequent to the
informal meeting of Cabinet members, he drew up a brief memorandum in
answer to that of Lewis on October 17, denying that Lewis had correctly
interpreted his plan, and declaring that he had always had "in
contemplation" a step by the five great powers of Europe. The
advisability of trying to secure such joint action, Russell asserted,
was all he had had in mind. _If_ the Cabinet had approved this
advisability, and the powers were acquiescent, _then_ (in answer to
Lewis' accusation of "no look ahead") he would be ready with definite
plans for the negotiation of peace between North and South[803]. Thus by
letter to Palmerston and by circulation of a new memorandum Russell gave
notice that all was not yet decided. On October 24, Gladstone also
circulated a memorandum in reply to Lewis, urging action by England,
France and Russia[804].
Russell's second memorandum was not at first taken seriously by his
Cabinet opponents. They believed the issue closed and Russell merely
putting out a denial of alleged purposes. Clarendon, though not a member
of the Cabinet, was keeping close touch with the situation and on
October 24 wrote to Lewis:
"Thanks for sending me your memorandum on the American
question, which I have read with great satisfaction. Johnny
[Russell] always loves to do something when to do nothing is
prudent, and I have no doubt that he hoped to get support in
his meddling proclivities when he called a Cabinet for
yesterday; but its postponement _sine die_ is probably due to
your memorandum. You have made so clear the idiotic position
we should occupy, either in having presented our face
gratuitously to the Yankee slap we should receive, or in
being asked what practical solution we had to propose after
an armistice had been agreed to at our suggestion, that no
discussion on the subject would have been possible, and the
Foreign Secretary probably thought it would be pleasanter to
draw in his horns at Woburn than in Downing Street[805]."
On October 26, having received from Lewis a copy of Russell's
newly-circulated paper, Clarendon wrote again:
"The Foreign Secretary's _blatt_ exhibits considerable
soreness, for which you are specially bound to make
allowance, as it was you who procured abortion for him. He
had thought to make a great deal of his colt by Meddler out
of Vanity, and you have shown his backers that the animal was
not fit to start and would not run a yard if he did. He is
therefore taken back to the country, where he must have a
deal more training before he can appear in public again."
* * * * *
"I should say that your speech at Hereford was nearly as
effective in checking the alarm and speculation caused by
Gladstone's speech, as your memorandum was in smashing the
Foreign Secretary's proposed intervention, and that you did
so without in the smallest degree committing either the
Government or yourself with respect to the future[806]."
In effect Clarendon was advising Lewis to pay no attention to Russell's
complaining rejoinder since the object desired had been secured, but
there was still one element of strength for Russell and Gladstone which,
if obtained, might easily cause a re-opening of the whole question.
This was the desire of France, still unexpressed in spite of indirect
overtures, a silence in part responsible for the expression of an
opinion by Palmerston that Napoleon's words could not be depended upon
as an indication of what he intended to do[807]. On the day this was
written the French ministerial crisis--the real cause of Napoleon's
silence--came to an end with the retirement of Thouvenel and the
succession of Drouyn de Lhuys. Russell's reply to Palmerston's assertion
of the folly of appealing now to the belligerents was that "recognition"
was certainly out of the question for the present and that "it should
not take place till May Or June next year, when circumstances may show
pretty clearly whether Gladstone was right[808]." But this yielding to
the Premier's decision was quickly withdrawn when, at last, Napoleon and
his new Minister could turn their attention to the American question.
On October 27 Cowley reported a conversation with the Emperor in which
American affairs were discussed. Napoleon hoped that England, France and
Russia would join in an offer of mediation. Cowley replied that he had
no instructions and Napoleon then modified his ideas by suggesting a
proposal of armistice for six months "in order to give time for the
present excitement to calm down[809]...." The next day Cowley reported
that Drouyn de Lhuys stated the Emperor to be very anxious to "put an
end to the War," but that he was himself doubtful whether it would not
be better to "wait a little longer," and in any case if overtures to
America were rejected Russia probably would not join Great Britain and
France in going on to a recognition of the South[810]. All this was
exactly in line with that plan to which Russell had finally come and if
officially notified to the British Government would require a renewed
consideration by the Cabinet. Presumably Napoleon knew what had been
going on in London and he now hastened to give the needed French push.
October 28, Slidell was summoned to an audience and told of the
Emperor's purpose, acting with England, to bring about an
armistice[811]. Three days later, October 31, Cowley wrote that he had
now been officially informed by Drouyn de Lhuys, "by the Emperor's
orders" that a despatch was about to be sent to the French Ministers in
England and Russia instructing them to request joint action by the three
powers in suggesting an armistice of six months _including a suspension
of the blockade_, thus throwing open Southern ports to European
commerce[812].
Napoleon's proposal evidently took Palmerston by surprise and was not
regarded with favour. He wrote to Russell:
"As to the French scheme of proposals to the United States,
we had better keep that question till the Cabinet meets,
which would be either on Monday 11th, or Wednesday 12th, as
would be most convenient to you and our colleagues. But is
it likely that the Federals would consent to an armistice to
be accompanied by a cessation of Blockades, and which would
give the Confederates means of getting all the supplies they
may want?"
* * * * *
"Then comes the difficulty about slavery and the giving up of
runaway slaves, about which we could hardly frame a proposal
which the Southerns would agree to, and people of England
would approve of. The French Government are more free from
the shackles of principle and of right and wrong on these
matters, as on all others than we are. At all events it would
be wiser to wait till the elections in North America are over
before any proposal is made. As the Emperor is so anxious to
put a stop to bloodshed he might try his hand as a beginning
by putting down the stream of ruffians which rolls out from
that never-failing fountain at Rome[813]."
But Russell was more optimistic, or at least in favour of some sort of
proposal to America. He replied to Palmerston:
"My notion is that as there is little chance of our good
offices being accepted in America we should make them such as
would be creditable to us in Europe. I should propose to
answer the French proposal therefore by saying,
"That in offering our good offices we ought to require both
parties to consent to examine, first, whether there are any
terms upon which North and South would consent to restore the
Union; and secondly, failing any such terms, whether there
are any terms upon which both would consent to separate.
"We should also say that if the Union is to be restored it
would be essential in our view, that after what has taken
place all the slaves should be emancipated, compensation
being granted by Congress at the rate at which Great Britain
emancipated her slaves in 1833.
"If separation takes place we must be silent on the trend of
slavery, as we are with regard to Spain and Brazil.
"This is a rough sketch, but I will expand it for the
Cabinet.
"It will be an honourable proposal to make, but the North and
probably the South will refuse it[814]."