THE "TRENT"
The _Trent_ affair seemed to Great Britain like the climax of American
arrogance[399]. The Confederate agents sent to Europe at the outbreak of
the Civil War had accomplished little, and after seven months of waiting
for a more favourable turn in foreign relations, President Davis
determined to replace them by two "Special Commissioners of the
Confederate States of America." These were James M. Mason of Virginia,
for Great Britain, and John Slidell of Louisiana, for France. Their
appointment indicated that the South had at last awakened to the need of
a serious foreign policy. It was publicly and widely commented on by the
Southern press, thereby arousing an excited apprehension in the North,
almost as if the mere sending of two new men with instructions to secure
recognition abroad were tantamount to the actual accomplishment of
their object.
Mason and Slidell succeeded in running the blockade at Charleston on the
night of October 12, 1861, on the Confederate steamer _Theodora_[400],
and arrived at New Providence, Nassau, on the fourteenth, thence
proceeded by the same vessel to Cardenas, Cuba, and from that point
journeyed overland to Havana, arriving October 22. In the party there
were, besides the two envoys, their secretaries, McFarland and Eustis,
and the family of Slidell. On November 7 they sailed for the Danish
island of St. Thomas, expecting thence to take a British steamer for
Southampton. The vessel on which they left Havana was the British
contract mail-packet _Trent_, whose captain had full knowledge of the
diplomatic character of his passengers. About noon on November 8 the
_Trent_ was stopped in the Bahama Channel by the United States sloop of
war, _San Jacinto_, Captain Wilkes commanding, by a shot across the
bows, and a boarding party took from the _Trent_ Mason and Slidell with
their secretaries, transferred them to the _San Jacinto_, and proceeded
to an American port. Protest was made both by the captain of the _Trent_
and by Commander Williams, R.N., admiralty agent in charge of mails on
board the ship[401]. The two envoys also declared that they would yield
only to personal compulsion, whereupon hands were laid upon shoulders
and coat collars, and, accepting this as the application of _force_,
they were transferred to the _San Jacinto's_ boats. The scene on the
_Trent_, as described by all parties, both then and later, partakes of
the nature of comic opera, yet was serious enough to the participants.
In fact, the envoys, especially Slidell, were exultant in the conviction
that the action of Wilkes would inevitably result in the early
realization of the object of their journey--recognition of the South,
at least by Great Britain[402]. Once on board the _San Jacinto_ they
were treated more like guests on a private yacht, having "seats at the
captain's table," than as enemy prisoners on an American war-ship.
Captain Wilkes had acted without orders, and, indeed, even without any
recent official information from Washington. He was returning from a
cruise off the African coast, and had reached St. Thomas on October 10.
A few days later, when off the south coat of Cuba, he had learned of the
Confederate appointment of Mason and Slidell, and on the twenty-eighth,
in Havana harbour, he heard that the Commissioners were to sail on the
_Trent_. At once he conceived the idea of intercepting the _Trent_,
exercising the right of search, and seizing the envoys, in spite of the
alleged objections of his executive officer, Lieutenant Fairfax. The
result was that quite without authority from the United States Navy
Department, and solely upon his own responsibility, a challenge was
addressed to Britain, the "mistress of the seas," certain to be accepted
by that nation as an insult to national prestige and national pride not
quietly to be suffered.
The _San Jacinto_ reached Fortress Monroe on the evening of November 15.
The next day the news was known, but since it was Saturday, few papers
contained more than brief and inaccurate accounts and, there being then
few Sunday papers, it was not until Monday, the eighteenth, that there
broke out a widespread rejoicing and glorification in the Northern
press[403]. America, for a few days, passed through a spasm of
exultation hard to understand, even by those who felt it, once the first
emotion had subsided. This had various causes, but among them is evident
a quite childish fear of the acuteness and abilities of Mason and
Slidell. Both men were indeed persons of distinction in the politics of
the previous decades. Mason had always been open in his expressed
antipathy to the North, especially to New England, had long been a
leader in Virginia, and at the time of the Southern secession, was a
United States Senator from that State. Slidell, a Northerner by birth,
but early removed to Louisiana, had acquired fortune in business there,
and had for nearly twenty years been the political "boss" of one faction
of the Democratic Party in New Orleans and in the State. With much
previous experience in diplomacy, especially that requiring intrigue and
indirect methods (as in the preliminaries of the Mexican War), and
having held his seat in the United States Senate until the withdrawal of
Louisiana from the Union, he was, of the two men, more feared and more
detested, but both were thoroughly obnoxious to the North. Merely on the
personal side their capture was cause for wide rejoicing[404].
Surprise was also an element in the American elation, for until the news
of the capture was received no portion of the public had given serious
thought to any attempt to stop the envoys. Surprise also played its part
when the affair became known in England, though in official circles
there had been some warning. It had already been reported in the British
press that Mason and Slidell had run the blockade at Charleston, were in
Cuba, and were about to set sail for England on the Confederate steamer
_Nashville_, but the British Government, considering that the envoys
might perhaps sail rather on the West India Mail Steamer for
Southampton, became much concerned over a possible American interference
with that vessel. On November 9 Hammond sent an urgent enquiry to the
Advocate-General stating the situation, calling attention to the
presence at Southampton of an American war-vessel, and asking whether
this vessel, or any other American man-of-war, "would be entitled to
interfere with the mail steamer if fallen in with beyond the territorial
limits of the United Kingdom, that is beyond three miles from the
British Coast."
[Illustration: _Photo: Handy, Washington_ JAMES M. MASON]
"Whether for instance she might cause the West India Mail
Steamer to bring to, might board her, examine her Papers,
open the Mail Bags and examine the contents thereof, examine
the luggage of passengers, seize and carry away Messrs. Mason
and Slidell in person, or seize their Credentials and
Instructions and Despatches, or even put a Prize Crew on
board the West India Steamer and carry her off to a Port of
the United States; in other words what would be the right of
the American Cruiser with regard to her passengers and crew
and lawful papers and correspondence on board our packet on
the assumption that the said packet was liable to capture and
confiscation on the ground of carrying enemies' despatches;
would the Cruiser be entitled to carry the packet and all and
everything in her back to America or would she be obliged to
land in this Country or in some near port all the people and
all the unseizable goods[405]?"
Hammond further stated that Russell was anxious to have an immediate
reply, inasmuch as the mail packet was due to arrive in Southampton on
November 12. The opinion of the law officer consulted is best given in
Palmerston's own words in a letter to Delane, Editor of the _Times_:
"_94 Piccadilly,
November 11, 1861_.
"MY DEAR DELANE,
"It may be useful to you to know that the Chancellor, Dr.
Lushington, the three Law Officers, Sir G. Grey, the Duke of
Somerset, and myself, met at the Treasury to-day to consider
what we could properly do about the American cruiser come, no
doubt, to search the West Indian packet supposed to be
bringing hither the two Southern envoys; and, much to my
regret, it appeared that, according to the principles of
international law laid down in our courts by Lord Stowell,
and practised and enforced by us, a belligerent has a right
to stop and search any neutral not being a ship of war, and
being found on the high seas and being suspected of carrying
enemy's despatches; and that consequently this American
cruiser might, by our own principles of international law,
stop the West Indian packet, search her, and if the Southern
men and their despatches and credentials were found on board,
either take them out, or seize the packet and carry her back
to New York for trial. Such being the opinion of our men
learned in the law, we have determined to do no more than to
order the _Phaeton_ frigate to drop down to Yarmouth Roads
and watch the proceedings of the American within our
three-mile limit of territorial jurisdiction, and to prevent
her from exercising within that limit those rights which we
cannot dispute as belonging to her beyond that limit.
"In the meanwhile the American captain, having got very drunk
this morning at Southampton with some excellent brandy, and
finding it blow heavily at sea, has come to an anchor for the
night within Calshot Castle, at the entrance of the
Southampton river.
"I mention these things for your private information.
Yours sincerely,
PALMERSTON[406]."
Not completely satisfied with this decision as reported to Delane, and
sincerely anxious to avert what he foresaw would be a difficult
situation, Palmerston took the unusual step of writing to Adams on the
next day, November 12, and asking for an interview. His note took Adams
by surprise, but he promptly waited upon Palmerston, and was told of the
latter's disturbance at the presence of the American ship _James Adger_,
Captain Marchand commanding, in Southampton Harbour, with the alleged
purpose of stopping the British West India steamer and intercepting the
journey of Mason and Slidell. Palmerston stated that he "did not pretend
to judge absolutely of the question whether we had a right to stop a
foreign vessel for such a purpose as was indicated," and he urged on
Adams the unwisdom of such an act in any case. "Neither did the object
to be gained seem commensurate with the risk. For it was surely of no
consequence whether one or two more men were added to the two or three
who had already been so long here. They would scarcely make a difference
in the action of the Government after once having made up its
mind[407]."
The interview with Adams, so Palmerston wrote to Delane on the same day,
November 12, was reassuring:
"MY DEAR DELANE,
"I have seen Adams to-day, and he assures me that the
American paddle-wheel was sent to intercept the _Nashville_
if found in these seas, but not to meddle with any ship under
a foreign flag. He said he had seen the commander, and had
advised him to go straight home; and he believed the steamer
to be now on her way back to the United States. This is a
very satisfactory explanation.
Yours sincerely,
PALMERSTON[408]."
In fact, neither Adams' diary nor his report to Seward recorded quite
the same statement as that here attributed to him by Palmerston, and
this became later, but fortunately after the question of the _Trent_ had
passed off the stage, a matter of minor dispute. Adams' own statement
was that he had told Palmerston the _James Adger_ was seeking to
intercept the _Nashville_ and "had no instruction" to interfere with a
British Packet--which is not the same as saying that she already had
instructions "not to meddle with any ship under a foreign flag[409]."
But in any case, it would appear that the British Government had been
warned by its legal advisers that if that which actually happened in the
case of the _Trent_ should occur, English practice, if followed, would
compel acquiescence in it[410]. This is not to say that a first legal
advice thus given on a problematical case necessarily bound the
Government to a fixed line of action, but that the opinion of the
Government was one of "no help for it" if the case should actually arise
is shown by the instructions to Lyons and by his reaction. On November
16, Hammond wrote to Lyons stating the opinion of the Law Officers that
"we could do nothing to save the Packet being interfered with outside
our three miles; so Lord Palmerston sent for Adams, who assured him that
the American [the _James Adger_] had no instructions to meddle with any
ship under English colours ... that her orders were not to endeavour to
take Mason and Slidell out of any ship under foreign colours[411]." On
receipt of this letter subsequent to the actual seizure of the envoys,
Lyons hardly knew what to expect. He reported Hammond's account to
Admiral Milne, writing that the legal opinion was that "Nothing could be
done to save the Packet's being interfered with outside of the Marine
league from the British Coast"; but he added, "I am not informed that
the Law Officers decided that Mason and Slidell might be taken out of
the Packet, but only that we could not prevent the Packet's being
interfered with," thus previsioning that shift in British legal opinion
which was to come _after_ the event. Meanwhile Lyons was so uncertain as
to what his instructions would be that he thought he "ought to maintain
the greatest reserve here on the matter of the _Trent_[412]."
This British anxiety and the efforts to prevent a dangerous complication
occurred after the envoys had been seized but some two weeks before that
fact was known in London. "Adams," wrote Russell, "says it was all a
false alarm, and wonders at our susceptibility and exaggerated
notions[413]." But Russell was not equally convinced with Adams that the
North, especially Seward, was so eager for continued British
neutrality, and when, on November 27, the news of Captain Wilkes' action
was received, Russell and many others in the Cabinet saw in it a
continuation of unfriendly Northern policy now culminating in a direct
affront. Argyll, the most avowed friend of the North in the Cabinet, was
stirred at first to keen resentment, writing "of this wretched piece of
American folly.... I am all against submitting to any clean breach of
International Law, such as I can hardly doubt this has been[414]." The
Law Officers now held that "Captain Wilkes had undertaken to pass upon
the issue of a violation of neutrality on the spot, instead of sending
the _Trent_ as a prize into port for judicial adjudication[415]." This
was still later further expanded by an opinion that the envoys could not
be considered as contraband, and thus subject to capture nor the _Trent_
as having violated neutrality, since the destination of the vessel was
to a neutral, not to an enemy port[416]. This opinion would have
prohibited even the carrying of the _Trent_ into an American port for
trial by a prize court.
But the British Government did not argue the matter in its demand upon
the United States. The case was one for a quick demand of prompt
reparation. Russell's instruction to Lyons, sent on November 30, was
couched in coldly correct language, showing neither a friendly nor an
unfriendly attitude. The seizure of the envoys was asserted to be a
breach of international law, which, it was hoped, had occurred without
orders, and Lyons was to demand the restoration of the prisoners with an
apology. If Seward had not already offered these terms Lyons was to
propose them, but as a preliminary step in making clear the British
position, he might read the instruction to Seward, leaving him a copy
of it if desired[417]. In another instruction of the same date Russell
authorized a delay of seven days in insisting upon an answer by Seward,
if the latter wished it, and gave Lyons liberty to determine whether
"the requirements of Her Majesty's Government are substantially complied
with[418]." And on December 1, Russell writing privately to Lyons
instructed him, while upholding English dignity, to abstain from
anything like menace[419]. On November 30, also, the Government
hurriedly sent out orders to hold the British Fleet in readiness, began
preparations for the sending of troops to Canada, and initiated
munitions and supply activities. Evidently there was at first but faint
hope that a break in relations, soon to be followed by war, was to be
avoided[420].
It has long been known to history, and was known to Adams almost
immediately, that the first draft of the instruction to Lyons was
softened in language by the advice of Prince Albert, the material point
being the expression of a hope that the action of Captain Wilkes was
unauthorized[421]. That instruction had been sent previous to the
receipt of a report from Lyons in which, very fearful of results, he
stated that, waiting instructions, he would preserve a strict
silence[422]. Equally anxious was Cowley at Paris, who feared the
realization of Seward's former "foreign war panacea." "I wish I could
divest myself of the idea that the North and South will not shake hands
over a war with us[423]." Considering the bitterness of the quarrel in
America this was a far-fetched notion. The efforts promptly made by the
Confederate agents in London to make use of the _Trent_ affair showed
how little Cowley understood the American temper. Having remained very
quiet since August when Russell had informed them that Great Britain
intended remaining strictly neutral[424], they now, on November 27 and
30, renewed their argument and application for recognition, but received
in reply a curt letter declining any official communication with them
"in the present state of affairs[425]."
The delay of at least three weeks imposed by methods of transportation
before even the first American reaction to the British demand could be
received in London gave time for a lessening of excitement and a more
careful self-analysis by British statesmen as to what they really felt
and desired. Gladstone wrote: "It is a very sad and heart-sickening
business, and I sincerely trust with you that war may be averted[426]."
Argyll hurried home from the Continent, being much disturbed by the tone
of the British press, and stating that he was against standing on
technical grounds of international law. "War with America is such a
calamity that we must do all we can to avoid it. It involves not only
ourselves, but all our North American colonies[427]." But war seemed to
both men scarcely avoidable, an opinion held also by Cornewall
Lewis[428] and by Clarendon, the latter standing at the moment in a
position midway between the Whig and Tory parties[429]. Yet Russell,
with more cause than others to mistrust Seward's policy, as also
believing that he had more cause, personally, to resent it, was less
pessimistic and was already thinking of at least postponing immediate
hostilities in the event of an American refusal to make just recompense.
On December 16 he wrote to Palmerston: "I incline more and more to the
opinion that if the answer is a reasoning, and not a blunt offensive
answer, we should send once more across the Atlantic to ask
compliance.... I do not think the country would approve an immediate
declaration of war. But I think we must abide by our demand of a
restoration of the prisoners.... Lyons gives a sad account of Canada.
Your foresight of last year is amply justified[430]." And on December 20
he wrote, "Adams' language yesterday was entirely in favour of yielding
to us, if our tone is not too peremptory.... If our demands are
refused, we must, of course, call Parliament together. The sixth
of February will do. In any other case we must decide according to
circumstances[431]."
Thus Russell would not have Great Britain go to war with America without
the sanction of Parliament, and was seeking reasons for delay. He was
reacting, in fact, to a more sobering second thought which was
experienced also by nearly everyone, save the eager British
"Southerner," in public and in newspaper circles. The first explosion of
the Press, on receipt of the news of the _Trent_, had been a terrific
one. The British lion, insulted in its chosen field of supremacy, the
sea, had pawed the air in frenzy though at first preserving a certain
slow dignity of motion. Customary "strong leader-writing" became
vigorous, indeed, in editorial treatment of America and in demand for
the prompt release of the envoys with suitable apology. The close touch
of leading papers with Governmental opinion is well shown, as in the
_Times_, by the day-to-day editorials of the first week. On November 28
there was solemn and anxious consideration of a grave crisis with much
questioning of international law, which was acknowledged to be doubtful.
But even if old British practice seemed to support Captain Wilkes, the
present was not to be controlled by a discarded past, and "essential
differences" were pointed out. This tone of vexed uncertainty changed to
a note of positive assurance and militant patriotism on November 30 when
the Government made its demand. The _Times_ up to December 2, thought it
absolutely certain that Wilkes had acted on authorization, and devoted
much space to Seward as the evil genius of American warlike policy
toward England. The old "Duke of Newcastle story" was revamped. But on
December 2 there reached London the first, very brief, American news of
the arrival of the _San Jacinto_ at Fortress Monroe, and this contained
a positive statement by Wilkes that he had had no orders. The _Times_
was sceptical, but printed the news as having an important bearing, if
true, and, at the same time, printed communications by "Justicia" and
others advising a "go slowly" policy[432]. Yet all British papers
indulged in sharp reflections on American insults, displayed keen
resentment, and demanded a prompt yielding to the Governmental demand.
An intelligent American long resident in London, wrote to Seward on
November 29: "There never was within memory such a burst of feeling as
has been created by the news of the boarding of [the Trent]. The people
are frantic with rage, and were the country polled, I fear 999 men out
of a thousand would declare for immediate war. Lord Palmerston cannot
resist the impulse if he would." And another American, in Edinburgh,
wrote to his uncle in New York: "I have never seen so intense a feeling
of indignation exhibited in my life. It pervades all classes, and may
make itself heard above the wiser theories of the Cabinet
officers[433]." If such were the British temper, it would require
skilful handling by even a pacific-minded Government to avoid war. Even
without belligerent newspaper utterances the tone of arrogance as in
_Punch's_ cartoon, "You do what's right, my son, or I'll blow you out of
the water," portended no happy solution. Yet this cartoon at least
implied a hope of peaceful outcome, and that this was soon a general
hope is shown by the prompt publicity given to a statement from the
American General, Winfield Scott, in Paris, denying that he had said the
action of Captain Wilkes had been decided upon at Washington before he
sailed for Europe, and asserting that no orders were given to seize the
envoys on board any British or foreign vessel[434]. Nevertheless, Adams,
for the moment intensely aroused, and suspicious of the whole purpose of
British policy, could write to his friend Dana in Boston: "The
expression of the past summer might have convinced you that she [Great
Britain] was not indifferent to the disruption of the Union. In May she
drove in the tip of the wedge, and now you can't imagine that a few
spiders' webs of a half a century back will not be strong enough to hold
her from driving it home. Little do you understand of this fast-anchored
isle[435]."
There can be no doubt that one cause of a more bitter and sharper tone
in the British press was the reception of the counter-exultation of the
American press on learning of the detention and the exercise of "right
of search" on a British ship. The American public equally went "off its
head" in its expressions. Writing in 1911, the son of the American
Minister to Great Britain, Charles Francis Adams, jun., in 1861, a young
law-student in Boston, stated: "I do not remember in the whole course of
the half-century's retrospect ... any occurrence in which the American
people were so completely swept off their feet, for the moment losing
possession of their senses, as during the weeks which immediately
followed the seizure of Mason and Slidell[436]." There were evident two
principal causes for this elation. The North with much emotion and high
courage entering in April, 1861, upon the task of restoring the Union
and hoping for quick success, had now passed through a wearisome six
months with no evident progress towards its object. Northern failure had
developed a deep mortification when, suddenly and unexpectedly, a bold
naval captain, on his own initiative, appeared to have struck a real
blow at the South. His action seemed to indicate that the fighting
forces of the North, if free from the trammels of Washington red tape,
could, and would, carry on energetic war. Certainly it was but a slight
incident to create such Northern emotion, yet the result was a sudden
lifting from despondency to elation.
But almost equally with this cause of joy there operated on American
minds the notion that the United States had at last given to Great
Britain a dose of her own medicine in a previous era--had exercised upon
a British ship that "right of search" which had been so keenly resented
by America as to have become almost a _permanent_ cause of a sense of
injury once received and never to be forgotten. There was no clear
thinking about this; the obnoxious right of search in times of peace for
vagrant seamen, the belligerent right exercised by Britain while America
was a neutral, the practice of a "right of visit" claimed by Britain as
necessary in suppression of the African Slave Trade--all were confused
by the American public (as they are still in many history textbooks to
this day), and the total result of this mixing of ideas was a general
American jubilation that the United States had now revenged herself for
British offences, in a manner of which Great Britain could not
consistently complain. These two main reasons for exultation were shared
by all classes, not merely by the uninformed mob of newspaper readers.
At a banquet tendered Captain Wilkes in Boston on November 26, Governor
Andrews of Massachusetts called Wilkes' action "one of the most
illustrious services that had made the war memorable," and added "that
there might be nothing left [in the episode] to crown the exultation of
the American heart, Commodore Wilkes fired his shot across the bows of
the ship that bore the British lion at its head[437]."
All America first applauded the act, then plunged into discussion of its
legality as doubts began to arise of its defensibility--and wisdom. It
became a sort of temporarily popular "parlour game" to argue the
international law of the case and decide that Great Britain could have
no cause of complaint[438]. Meanwhile at Washington itself there was
evidenced almost equal excitement and approval--but not, fortunately, by
the Department responsible for the conduct of foreign relations.
Secretary of the Navy Welles congratulated Wilkes on his "great public
service," though criticizing him for not having brought the _Trent_ into
port for adjudication. Congress passed a joint resolution, December 2,
thanking Wilkes for his conduct, and the President was requested to give
him a gold medal commemorative of his act. Indeed, no evidence of
approbation was withheld save the formal approval and avowal of national
responsibility by the Secretary of State, Seward. On him, therefore, and
on the wisdom of men high in the confidence of the Cabinet, like Sumner,
Lyons pinned his faint hope of a peaceful solution. Thoroughly alarmed
and despondent, anxious as to the possible fate of Canada[439], he
advised against any public preparations in Canada for defence, on the
ground that if the _Trent_ affair did blow over it should not appear
that we ever thought it an insult which would endanger peace[440]. This
was very different from the action and attitude of the Government at
home, as yet unknown to Lyons. He wisely waited in silence, advising
like caution to others, until the receipt of instructions. Silence, at
the moment, was also a friendly service to the United States.
The earliest American reactions, the national rejoicing, became known to
the British press some six days after its own spasm of anger, and three
days after the Government had despatched its demand for release of the
prisoners and begun its hurried military preparations. On December 3 the
_Times_ contained the first summary of American press outpourings. The
first effect in England was astonishment, followed by renewed and more
intense evidences of a belligerent disposition. Soon, however, there
began to appear a note of caution and more sane judgment of the
situation, though with no lessening of the assertion that Britain had
suffered an injury that must be redressed. The American frenzy of
delight seemingly indicated a deep-seated hostility to Britain that gave
pause to British clamour for revenge. On December 4 John Bright made a
great speech at Rochdale, arguing a possible British precedent for
Wilkes' act, urging caution, lauding American leadership in democracy,
and stating his positive conviction that the United States Government
was as much astonished as was that of Great Britain by the attack on the
_Trent._[441] To this the _Times_ gave a full column of report on
December 5 and the day following printed five close-type columns of the
speech itself. Editorially it attacked Bright's position, belittling the
speech for having been made at the one "inconspicuous" place where the
orator would be sure of a warm welcome, and asking why Manchester or
Liverpool had not been chosen. In fact, however, the _Times_ was
attempting to controvert "our ancient enemy" Bright as an apostle of
democracy rather than to fan the flames of irritation over the _Trent_,
and the prominence given to Bright's speech indicates a greater
readiness to consider as hopeful an escape from the existing crisis.
After December 3 and up to the ninth, the _Times_ was more caustic about
America than previously. The impression of its editorials read to-day is
that more hopeful of a peaceful solution it was more free to snarl. But
with the issue of December 10 there began a series of leaders and
communications, though occasionally with a relapse to the former tone,
distinctly less irritating to Americans, and indicating a real desire
for peace[442]. Other newspapers either followed the _Times_, or were
slightly in advance of it in a change to more considerate and peaceful
expressions. Adams could write to Seward on December 6 that he saw no
change in the universality of the British demand for satisfaction of the
"insult and injury thought to be endured," but he recognized in the next
few days that a slow shift was taking place in the British temper and
regretted the violence of American utterances. December 12, he wrote to
his son in America: "It has given us here an indescribably sad feeling
to witness the exultation in America over an event which bids fair to be
the final calamity in this contest...." Great Britain "is right in
principle and only wrong in point of consistency. Our mistake is that we
are donning ourselves in her cast-off suit, when our own is better worth
wearing[443]." His secretarial son was more vehement: "Angry and hateful
as I am of Great Britain, I still can't help laughing and cursing at the
same time as I see the accounts of the talk of our people. What a bloody
set of fools they are! How in the name of all that's conceivable could
you suppose that England would sit quiet under such an insult. _We_
should have jumped out of our boots at such a one[444]."
The British Cabinet members were divided in sentiments of hope or
pessimism as to the outcome, and were increasingly anxious for an
honourable escape from a possible situation in which, if they trusted
the observations of Lyons, they might find themselves aiding a slave as
against a free State. On November 29, Lyons had written a long account
of the changes taking place in Northern feeling as regards slavery. He
thought it very probable that the issue of emancipation would soon be
forced upon Lincoln, and that the American conflict would then take on a
new and more ideal character[445]. This letter, arriving in the midst of
uncertainty about the _Trent_ solution, was in line with news published
in the British papers calling out editorials from them largely in
disapproval[446]. Certainly Russell was averse to war. If the prisoners
were not given up, what, he asked, ought England then to do? Would it be
wise to delay hostilities or to begin them at once?
"An early resort to hostilities will enable us at once to raise the
blockade of the South, to blockade the North, and to prevent the egress
of numerous ships, commissioned as privateers which will be sent against
our commerce." But then, there was Canada, at present not defensible. He
had been reading Alison on the War of 1812, and found that then the
American army of invasion had numbered but 2,500 men. "We may now expect
40 or 50,000[447]." Two days later he wrote to Gladstone that if America
would only "let the Commissioners free to go where they pleased," he
would be satisfied. He added that in that case, "I should be very glad
to make a treaty with the U.S., giving up our pretensions of 1812 and
securing immunity to persons not in arms on board neutral vessels or to
persons going bona fide from one neutral port to another. This would be
a triumph to the U.S. in principle while the particular case would be
decided in our favour[448]."
On Saturday, December 14, the Prince Consort died. It was well-known
that he had long been a brake upon the wheel of Palmerston's foreign
policy and, to the initiated, his last effort in this direction--the
modification of the instruction to Lyons on the _Trent_--was no secret.
There is no evidence that his death made any change in the British
position, but it was true, as the American Minister wrote, that "Now
they [the British public] are beginning to open their eyes to a sense of
his value. They discover that much of their political quietude has been
due to the judicious exercise of his influence over the Queen and the
Court, and they do not conceal their uneasiness as to the future without
him[449]." The nation was plunged into deep mourning, but not to
distraction from the American crisis, for on the day when all papers
were black with mourning borders, December 16, they printed the news of
the approval of Wilkes by the United States Congress, and gave a summary
of Lincoln's message of December 2, which, to their astonishment, made
no mention of the _Trent_ affair. The Congressional approval caused
"almost a feeling of consternation among ourselves," but Lincoln's
silence, it was argued, might possibly be taken as a good omen, since it
might indicate that he had as yet reached no decision[450]. Evidently
there was more real alarm caused by the applause given Wilkes by one
branch of the government than by the outpourings of the American press.
The next day several papers printed Lincoln's message in full and the
_Times_ gave a long editorial analysis, showing much spleen that he had
ignored the issue with Great Britain[451]. On the eighteenth this
journal also called attention, in a column and a half editorial, to the
report of the American Secretary of War, expressing astonishment, not
unmixed with anxiety, at the energy which had resulted in the increase
of the army to 700,000 men in less than nine months. The _Times_
continued, even increased, its "vigour" of utterance on the _Trent_, but
devoted most of its energy to combating the suggestions, now being made
very generally, advocating a recourse to arbitration. This would be
"weak concession," and less likely to secure redress and peace for the
future, than an insistence on the original demands.
Statesmen also were puzzled by Lincoln's silence. Milner Gibson wrote
that "even though Lyons should come away, I think the dispute may after
all be settled without war[452]." Cornewall Lewis thought the "last mail
from America is decidedly threatening, not encouraging[453]." But on
December 19, Adams was at last able to give Russell official assurance
that Wilkes had acted without authorization. Russell at once informed
Lyons of this communication and that he had now told Adams the exact
terms of his two instructions to Lyons of November 30. He instructed
Lyons to accept in place of an apology an explanation that Wilkes'
action was unauthorized--a very important further British modification,
but one which did not reach Lyons until after the conclusion of the
affair at Washington[454]. Meanwhile a notable change had taken place in
American public expressions. It now regarded "the Wilkes affair
unfavourably, and would much prefer it had not occurred at all[455]," a
reaction without question almost wholly caused by the knowledge of the
British demand and the unanimous support given it by the British
public[456]. On Great Britain the alteration in the American tone
produced less effect than might have been expected, and this because of
the persistent fear and suspicion of Seward. His voice, it was felt,
would in the end be the determining one, and if British belief that he
had long sought an occasion for war was correct, this surely was the
time when he could be confident of popular support. Thurlow Weed,
Seward's most intimate political adviser, was now in London and
attempted to disabuse the British public through the columns of the
_Times_. His communication was printed, but his assertion that Seward's
unfriendly utterances, beginning with the "Newcastle story," were
misunderstood, did not convince the _Times_, which answered him at
length[457], and asserted its belief "... that upon his ability to
involve the United States in a war with England, Mr. Seward has staked
his official, and, most probably, also his political existence." The
Duke of Newcastle's report of Seward's remarks, wrote George Peabody
later, "has strongly influenced the Government in war preparations for
several months past[458]." Adams himself, though convinced that Seward's
supposed animosity "was a mistake founded on a bad joke of his to the
Duke of Newcastle," acknowledged that: "The Duke has, however,
succeeded in making everybody in authority here believe it[459]." Surely
no "joke" to an Englishman ever so plagued an American statesman; but
British Ministers founded their suspicions on far more serious reasons,
as previously related[460].
As time passed without an answer from America, British speculation
turned to estimates of the probable conditions of a war. These were not
reassuring since even though postulating a British victory, it appeared
inevitable that England would not escape without considerable damage
from the American navy and from privateers. Americans were "a powerful
and adventurous people, strong in maritime resources, and participating
in our own national familiarity with the risks and dangers of the
deep[461]." Englishmen must not think that a war would be fought only on
the shores of America and in Canada. The legal question was re-hashed
and intelligent American vexation re-stated in three letters printed in
the _Daily News_ on December 25, 26 and 27, by W. W. Story, an artist
resident in Rome, but known in England as the son of Justice Story,
whose fame as a jurist stood high in Great Britain[462]. By the last
week of the year Adams felt that the Ministry, at least, was eager to
find a way out: "The Government here will not press the thing to an
extreme unless they are driven to it by the impetus of the wave they
have themselves created[463]." He greatly regretted the death of the
Prince Consort who "believed in the policy of conciliating the United
States instead of repelling them." On December 27, Adams wrote Seward:
"I think the signs are clear of a considerable degree of reaction." He
also explained the causes of the nearly unanimous European support of
England in this contention: "Unquestionably the view of all other
countries is that the opportunity is most fortunate for obtaining new
and large modifications of international law which will hereafter
materially restrain the proverbial tendency of this country on the
ocean[464]."
Adams' estimate was correct. Even the _Morning Post_, generally accepted
as Palmerston's organ[465], and in the _Trent_ crisis the most
'vigorous' of all metropolitan journals, commented upon the general
public hope of a peaceful solution, but asked on December 30, "... can a
Government [the American] elected but a few months since by the popular
choice, depending exclusively for existence on popular support, afford
to disappoint the popular expectation? The answer to this question must,
we fear, be in the negative...." The _Post_ (thereby Palmerston?) did
indeed, as later charged, "prolong the excitement," but not with its
earlier animosity to America. The very fact that the _Post_ was accepted
as Palmerston's organ justified this attitude for it would have been
folly for the Government to announce prematurely a result of which there
was as yet no definite assurance. Yet _within_ the Cabinet there was a
more hopeful feeling. Argyll believed Adams' statement to Russell of
December 19 was practically conclusive[466], and Adams himself now
thought that the prevalent idea was waning of an American plan to
inflict persistent "indignities" on Britain: "at least in this case
nothing of the kind had been intended[467]." Everyone wondered at and
was vexed with the delay of an answer from America, yet hopefully
believed that this indicated ultimate yielding. There could be no
surety until the event. Russell wrote to Palmerston on January 7, "I
still incline to think Lincoln will submit, but not until the clock is
59 minutes past 11. If it is war, I fear we must summon Parliament
forthwith[468]."
The last moment for reply was indeed very nearly taken advantage of at
Washington, but not to the full seven days permitted for consideration
by Russell's November thirtieth instructions to Lyons. These were
received on December 18, and on the next day Lyons unofficially
acquainted Seward with their nature[469]. The latter expressed
gratification with the "friendly and conciliatory manner" of Lyons and
asked for two days' time for consideration. On Saturday, December 21,
therefore, Lyons again appeared to make a formal presentation of demands
but was met with a statement that the press of other business had
prevented sufficient consideration and was asked for a further two days'
postponement until Monday. Hence December 23 became the day from which
the seven days permitted for consideration and reply dated. In the
meantime, Mercier, on December 21, had told Seward of the strong support
given by France to the British position.
The month that had elapsed since the American outburst on first learning
of Wilkes' act had given time for a cooling of patriotic fever and for a
saner judgment. Henry Adams in London had written to his brother that if
the prisoners were not given up, "this nation means to make war." To
this the brother in America replied "this nation doesn't[470]," an
answer that sums up public determination no matter how loud the talk or
deep the feeling. Seward understood the change and had now received
strong warnings from Adams and Weed in London, and from Dayton in
Paris[471], but these were not needed to convince him that America must
yield. Apparently, he had recognized from the first that America was in
an impossible situation and that the prisoners must be released _if the
demand were made_. The comment of those who were "wise after the event"
was that true policy would have dictated an immediate release of the
prisoners as seized in violation of international law, before any
complaint could be received from Great Britain. This leaves out of
consideration the political difficulties at home of an administration
already seriously weakened by a long-continued failure to "press the
war," and it also fails to recognize that in the American Cabinet itself
a proposal by Seward to release, made immediately, would in all
probability have been negatived. Blair, in the Cabinet, and Sumner in
the Senate, were, indeed, in favour of prompt release, but Lincoln seems
to have thought the prisoners must be held, even though he feared they
might become "white elephants." All that Seward could do at first was to
notify Adams that Wilkes had acted without instructions[472].
On Christmas morning the Cabinet met to consider the answer to Great
Britain. Sumner attended and read letters from Bright and Cobden,
earnestly urging a yielding by America and depicting the strength of
British feeling. Bright wrote: "If you are resolved to succeed against
the South, _have no war with England_; make every concession that can be
made; don't even hesitate to tell the world _that you will even concede
what two years ago no Power would have asked of you_, rather than give
another nation a pretence for assisting in the breaking up of your
country[473]." Without doubt Bright's letters had great influence on
Lincoln and on other Cabinet members, greatly aiding Seward, but that
his task was difficult is shown by the fact that an entire morning's
discussion brought no conclusion. Adjournment was taken until the next
day and after another long debate Seward had the fortune to persuade his
associates to a hearty unanimity on December 26. The American reply in
the form of a communication to Lyons was presented to him by Seward on
the 27th, and on that same day Lyons forwarded it to Russell. It did not
contain an apology, but Lyons wrote that since the prisoners were to be
released and acknowledgment was made that reparation was due to Great
Britain, he considered that British demands were "so far substantially
complied with" that he should remain at his post until he received
further orders[474].
Seward's reply was immediately printed in the American papers. Lyons
reported that it was very well received and that the public was calm and
apparently contented with the outcome[475]. He thought that "thus the
preparation for war ... has prevented war." Seward's argument reviewed
at great length all the conditions of the incident, dilated on many
points of international law both relevant and irrelevant, narrated the
past relations of the two nations on "right of search," and finally took
the ground that Mason and Slidell were contraband of war and justly
subject to capture, but that Wilkes had erred in not bringing the
_Trent_, with her passengers, into port for trial by an American prize
court. Therefore the two envoys with their secretaries would be handed
over promptly to such persons as Lyons might designate. It was, says
Seward's biographer, not a great state paper, was defective in argument,
and contained many contradictions[476], but, he adds, that it was
intended primarily for the American public and to meet the situation at
home. Another critic sums up Seward's difficulties: he had to persuade a
President and a reluctant Cabinet, to support the naval idol of the day,
to reconcile a Congress which had passed resolutions highly commending
Wilkes, and to pacify a public earlier worked up to fever pitch[477].
Still more important than ill-founded assertions about the nature of
contraband of war, a term not reconcilable with the _neutral port_
destination of the _Trent_, was the likening of Mason and Slidell to
"ambassadors of independent states." For eight months Seward had
protested to Europe "that the Confederates were not belligerents, but
insurgents," and now "his whole argument rested on the fact that they
were belligerents[478].... But this did not later alter a return to his
old position nor prevent renewed arguments to induce a recall by
European states of their proclamations of neutrality.
On the afternoon of January 8, a telegram from Lyons was received in
London, stating that the envoys would be released and the next day came
his despatch enclosing a copy of Seward's answer. The envoys themselves
did not reach England until January 30, and the delay in their voyage
gave time for an almost complete disappearance of public interest in
them[479]. January 10, Russell instructed Lyons that Great Britain was
well satisfied with the fact and manner of the American answer, and
regarded the incident as closed, but that it could not agree with
portions of Seward's argument and would answer these later. This was
done on January 23, but the reply was mainly a mere formality and is of
interest only as revealing a further shift in the opinion of the legal
advisers, with emphasis on the question of what constitutes
contraband[480]. Possibly the British Government was embarrassed by the
fact that while France had strongly supported England at Washington,
Thouvenel had told Cowley "... that the conduct pursued by Capt. Wilkes,
whether the United States claimed to be considered as Belligerents, _or
as a Government engaged in putting down a rebellion_, was a violation of
all those principles of Maritime international law, which France had
ever supported[481] ..." and had instructed Mercier to so state to
Seward. This implied a reflection on former British practice, especially
as regards the exercise of a right of search to recover its own citizens
and is indicative of the correctness of Adams' judgment that one main
reason for European support of Great Britain in the _Trent_ crisis, was
the general desire to tie her to a limitation of belligerent
maritime power.
In notifying Russell of the release of the prisoners, Lyons had stated
that he would caution the Commander of the ship conveying them that they
were "not to be received with honours or treated otherwise than as
distinguished _private_ gentlemen[482]." Russell was equally cautious,
seeing Mason, shortly after arrival in London, "unofficially at my own
house," on February 10, refusing to read his credentials, and after
listening to a statement of his instructions, replying that "nothing had
hitherto occurred which would justify or induce" Great Britain to depart
from a position of neutrality[483]. Russell had already suggested that
Thouvenel use the same method with Slidell[484]. This procedure does not
necessarily indicate a change in governmental attitude, for it is
exactly in line with that pursued toward the Confederate Commissioners
before the _Trent_; but the _Trent_ controversy might naturally have
been expected to have brought about an _easier_ relation between Russell
and a Southern representative. That it did not do so is evidence of
Russell's care not to give offence to Northern susceptibilities. Also,
in relief at the outcome of the _Trent_, he was convinced, momentarily
at least, that the general British suspicion of Seward was unfounded. "I
do not," he wrote to Gladstone, "believe that Seward has any animosity
to this country. It is all buncom" (_sic_)[485]. Apparently it was
beginning to be realized by British statesmen that Seward's "high tone"
which they had interpreted, with some justification earlier, as
especially inimical to England, now indicated a foreign policy based
upon one object only--the restoration of the Union, and that in pursuit
of this object he was but seeking to make clear to European nations that
the United States was still powerful enough to resent foreign
interference. The final decision in the _Trent_ affair, such was the
situation in the American Cabinet, rested on Seward alone and that
decision was, from the first, for peace.
Nor did Seward later hold any grudge over the outcome. America in
general, however, though breathing freely again as the war cloud passed,
was bitter. "The feeling against Great Britain is of intense hatred and
the conclusion of the whole matter is, that we must give up the
traitors, put down the rebellion, increase our navy, perfect the
discipline of the 600,000 men in the field, and then fight Great
Britain[486]." Lowell, in one of the most emotional of his "Bigelow
Papers," wrote, on January 6, 1862:
"It don't seem hardly right, John,
When both my hands was full,
To stump me to a fight, John--
Your cousin, tu, John Bull!
Ole Uncle S., sez he, 'I guess
We know it now,' sez he,
'The lion's paw is all the law,
Accordin' to J.B.,
Thet's fit for you an' me[487]!'"
It was not the demand itself for the release of Mason and Slidell that
in the end so stirred America as the warlike tone of the British press
and the preparations of the Government. Even after their surrender
America was further incensed by British boasting that America had
yielded to a threat of war, as in the _Punch_ cartoon of a penitent
small boy, Uncle Sam, who "says he is very sorry and that he didn't mean
to do it," and so escapes the birching Britannia was about to
administer. America had, in all truth, yielded to a threat, but disliked
being told so, and regarded the threat itself as evidence of British
ill-will[488]. This was long the attitude of the American public.
In England the knowledge of America's decision caused a great national
sigh of relief, coupled with a determination to turn the cold shoulder
to the released envoys. On January 11, the _Times_ recounted the earlier
careers of Mason and Slidell, and stated that these two "more than any
other men," were responsible for the traditional American "insane
prejudice against England," an assertion for which no facts were offered
in proof, and one much overestimating the influence of Mason and Slidell
on American politics before secession. They were "about the most
worthless booty it would be possible to extract from the jaws of the
American lion ... So we do sincerely hope that our countrymen will not
give these fellows anything in the shape of an ovation." Continuing, the
_Times_ argued:
"What they and their secretaries are to do here passes our
conjecture. They are personally nothing to us. They must not
suppose, because we have gone to the very verge of a great
war to rescue them, that therefore they are precious in our
eyes. We should have done just as much to rescue two of their
own Negroes, and, had that been the object of the rescue, the
swarthy Pompey and Caesar would have had just the same right
to triumphal arches and municipal addresses as Messrs. Mason
and Slidell. So, please, British public, let's have none of
these things. Let the Commissioners come up quietly to town,
and have their say with anybody who may have time to listen
to them. For our part, we cannot see how anything they have
to tell can turn the scale of British duty and deliberation."
This complete reversal, not to say somersault, by the leading British
newspaper, was in line with public expressions from all sections save
the extreme pro-Southern. Adams was astonished, writing privately: "The
first effect of the surrender ... has been extraordinary. The current
which ran against us with such extreme violence six weeks ago now seems
to be going with equal fury in our favour[489]." Officially on the same
day he explained this to Seward as caused by a late development in the
crisis of a full understanding, especially "among the quiet and
religious citizens of the middle classes," that if Great Britain did
engage in war with the United States she would be forced to become the
ally of a "slave-holding oligarchy[490]."
Here, in truth, lay the greatest cause of British anxiety during the
period of waiting for an answer and of relief when that answer was
received. If England and America became enemies, wrote Argyll, "we
necessarily became virtually the _Allies_ of the _Scoundrelism_ of the
South[491]." Robert Browning, attempting to explain to his friend Story
the British attitude, declared that early in the war Britain was with
the North, expecting "that the pure and simple rights [of anti-slavery]
in the case would be declared and vigorously carried out without one let
or stop," but that Lincoln's denial of emancipation as an object had
largely destroyed this sympathy. Browning thought this an excusable
though a mistaken judgment since at least: "The _spirit_ of all of Mr.
Lincoln's acts is altogether against Slavery in the end[492]." He
assured Story that the latter was in error "as to men's 'fury' here": "I
have not heard one man, woman or child express anything but dismay at
the prospect of being obliged to go to war on any grounds with
America[493]." And after the affair was over he affirmed: "The purpose
of the North is also understood at last; ... there is no longer the
notion that 'Slavery has nothing to do with it[494].'"
A few extreme pro-Northern enthusiasts held public meetings and passed
resolutions commending the "statesmanlike ability and moderation of
Seward," and rejoicing that Great Britain had not taken sides with a
slave power[495]. In general, however, such sentiments were not
_publicly_ expressed. That they were keenly felt, nevertheless, is
certain. During the height of the crisis, Anthony Trollope, then touring
America, even while sharing fully in the intense British indignation
against Captain Wilkes, wrote:
"These people speak our language, use our prayers, read our
books, are ruled by our laws, dress themselves in our image,
are warm with our blood. They have all our virtues; and their
vices are our own too, loudly as we call out against them.
They are our sons and our daughters, the source of our
greatest pride, and as we grow old they should be the staff
of our age. Such a war as we should now wage with the States
would be an unloosing of hell upon all that is best upon the
world's surface[496]."
The expressions of men like Browning and Trollope may not indeed, be
regarded as typical of either governmental or general public reactions.
Much more exactly and with more authority as representing that
thoughtful opinion of which Adams wrote were the conclusions of John
Stuart Mill. In an article in _Fraser's Magazine_, February, 1862,
making a strong plea for the North, he summarized British feeling about
the _Trent_:
"We had indeed, been wronged. We had suffered an indignity,
and something more than an indignity, which, not to have
resented, would have been to invite a constant succession of
insults and injuries from the same and from every other
quarter. We could have acted no otherwise than we have done;
yet it is impossible to think, without something like a
shudder, from what we have escaped. We, the emancipators of
the slave--who have wearied every Court and Government in
Europe and America with our protests and remonstrances, until
we goaded them into at least ostensibly co-operating with us
to prevent the enslaving of the negro ... _we_ should have
lent a hand to setting up, in one of the most commanding
positions of the world, a powerful republic, devoted not only
to slavery, but to pro-slavery propagandism...."
No such protestations of relief over escape from a possible alliance
with the South were made officially by the Government, or in a debate
upon the _Trent_, February 6, when Parliament reassembled. In the Lords
the Earl of Shelburne thought that America should have made a frank and
open apology. The Earl of Derby twitted the United States with having
yielded to force alone, but said the time "had not yet come" for
recognizing the Confederacy. Lord Dufferin expressed great friendship
for America and declared that Englishmen ought to make themselves better
informed of the real merits of the Civil War. Earl Granville, speaking
for the Government, laid stress upon the difficulties at home of the
Washington administration in pacifying public opinion and asserted a
personal belief that strict neutrality was England's best policy,
"although circumstances may arise which may call for a different
course." On the same day in the Commons the debate was of a like general
tenor to that in the Lords, but Disraeli differed from his chief (Derby)
in that he thought America had been placed in a very difficult position
in which she had acted very honourably. Palmerston took much credit for
the energetic military preparations, but stated "from that position of
strict neutrality, it is not our intention to depart "--an important
declaration if taken, as apparently it was not, as fixing a policy. In
substance all speakers, whether Whig or Tory, praised the Government's
stand, and expressed gratification with the peaceful outcome[497].
A further debate on the _Trent_ was precipitated by Bright on February
17, in connection with the estimates to cover the cost of the military
contingents sent to Canada. He asserted that England by generously
trusting to American honour, might have won her lasting friendship, and
it is worthy of note that for the first time in any speech made by him
_in Parliament_, Bright declared that the war was one for the abolition
of slavery. Palmerston in reply made no comment on the matter of
slavery, but energetically defended the military preparations as a
necessary precaution. Bright's speech was probably intended for American
consumption with the purpose of easing American ill-will, by showing
that even in Parliament there were those who disapproved of that show of
force to which America so much objected. He foresaw that this would long
be the basis of American bitterness. But Palmerston was undoubtedly
correct in characterizing Bright's opinion as a "solitary one." And
looked at from a distance of time it would seem that a British
Government, impressed as it was with a sense of Seward's unfriendliness,
which had not prepared for war when making so strong a demand for
reparation, would have merited the heaviest condemnation. If Mill was
right in stating that the demand for reparation was a necessity, then so
also were the military preparations.
Upon the Government the _Trent_ acted to bring to a head and make more
clear the British relation to the Civil War in America. By November,
1861, the policy of strict neutrality adopted in May, had begun to be
weakened for various reasons already recited--weakened not to the point
of any Cabinet member's advocacy of change, but in a restlessness at the
slow development of a solution in America. Russell was beginning to
_think_, at least, of recognition of the Confederacy. This was clear to
Lyons who, though against such recognition, had understood the drift, if
Schleiden is to be trusted, of Ministerial opinion. Schleiden reported
on December 31 that Lyons had expressed to him much pleasure at the
peaceful conclusion of the _Trent_ affair, and had added, "England will
be too generous not to postpone the recognition of the independence of
the South as long as possible after this experience[498]." But the
_Trent_ operated like a thunder-storm to clear the atmosphere. It
brought out plainly the practical difficulties and dangers, at least as
regards Canada, of a war with America; it resulted in a weakening of the
conviction that Seward was unfriendly; it produced from the British
public an even greater expression of relief, when the incident was
closed, than of anger when it occurred; and it created in a section of
that public a fixed belief, shared by at least one member of the
Cabinet, that the issue in America was that of slavery, in support of
which England could not possibly take a stand.
This did not mean that the British Government, nor any large section of
the public, believed the North could conquer the South. But it did
indicate a renewed vigour for the policy of neutrality and a
determination not to get into war with America. Adams wrote to Seward,
"I am inclined to believe that the happening of the affair of the
_Trent_ just when it did, with just the issue that it had, was rather
opportune than otherwise[499]." Hotze, the confidential agent of the
Confederacy in London, stated, "the _Trent_ affair has done us
incalculable injury," Russell is now "an avowed enemy of our
nationality[500]." Hotze was over-gloomy, but Russell himself declared
to Lyons: "At all events I am heart and soul a neutral ... what a fuss
we have had about these two men[501]."
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 399: The _Trent_ was the cause of the outpouring of more
contemporary articles and pamphlets and has been the subject of more
historical writing later, than any other incident of diplomatic
relations between the United States and Great Britain during the Civil
War--possibly more than all other incidents combined. The account given
in this chapter, therefore, is mainly limited to a brief statement of
the facts together with such new sidelights as are brought out by
hitherto unknown letters of British statesman; to a summary of British
public attitude as shown in the press; and to an estimate of the _after
effect_ of the _Trent_ on British policy. It would be of no service to
list all of the writings. The incident is thoroughly discussed in all
histories, whether British or American and in works devoted to
international law. The contemporary American view is well stated, though
from a strongly anti-British point of view, in Harris, T.L., _The Trent
Affair_, but this monograph is lacking in exact reference for its many
citations and can not be accepted as authoritative. The latest review is
that of C.F. Adams in the _Proceedings_ of the Massachusetts Historical
Society for November, 1911, which called out a reply from R.H. Dana, and
a rejoinder by Mr. Adams in the _Proceedings_ for March, 1912.]
[Footnote 400: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass.
Hist. Soc., XLV, pp. 41-2.)]
[Footnote 401: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
"Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." No. 1. Inclosure. Williams to
Patey, Nov. 9, 1861.]
[Footnote 402: Harris, _The Trent Affair_, pp. 103-109, describes the
exact _force_ used.]
[Footnote 403: Dana, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass. Hist.
Soc., XLV, pp. 509-22.)]
[Footnote 404: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass.
Hist. Soc., XLV, pp. 39-40.)]
[Footnote 405: F.O., America, Vol. 805. Copy, E. Hammond to
Advocate-General, Nov. 9, 1861.]
[Footnote 406: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass.
Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 54.)]
[Footnote 407: _Ibid._, pp. 53-4. Adams' Diary MS. Nov. 12, 1861.]
[Footnote 408: _Ibid._, p. 55.]
[Footnote 409: A full year later, after the publication of the American
volume of despatches for the year 1862, Russell took up this matter with
Adams and as a result of an interview wrote to Lyons, November 28, 1862:
"Lord Palmerston stated to Mr. Adams on the occasion in question that
Her Majesty's Government could not permit any interference with any
vessel, British or Foreign, within British waters; that with regard to
vessels met with at sea, Her Majesty's Government did not mean to
dispute the Belligerent right of the United States Ships of War to
search them; but that the exercise of that right and the right of
detention in certain conditions must in each case be dealt with
according to the circumstances of the case, and that it was not
necessary for him to discuss such matters then because they were not in
point; but that it would not do for the United States Ships of War to
harass British Commerce on the High Seas under the pretence of
preventing the Confederates from receiving things that are Contraband
of War.
"I took an opportunity of mentioning to Mr. Adams, the account which
Lord Palmerston had given me of the language which he had thus held, and
Mr. Adams agreed in its accuracy.
"Nothing must be said on this Subject unless the false statements as to
Lord Palmerston's language should be renewed, when you will state the
real facts to Mr. Seward." (F.O., Am., Vol. 822. No. 295. _Draft_.)
This résumé by Russell contained still other variations from the
original reports of both Palmerston and Adams, but the latter did not
think it worth while to call attention to them.]
[Footnote 410: Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 357, is evidently in error in
stating that the law officers, while admitting the right of an American
war vessel to carry the British Packet into an American port for
adjudication, added, "she would have no right to remove Messrs. Mason
and Slidell and carry them off as prisoners, leaving the ship to pursue
her voyage." Certainly Palmerston did not so understand the
advice given.]
[Footnote 411: Lyons Papers. Hammond to Lyons. F. O., Private. Nov. 16,
1861. This statement about explicit orders to Captain Marchand "not to
endeavour, etc.," is in line with Palmerston's understanding of the
conversation with Adams. But that there was carelessness in reporting
Adams is evident from Hammond's own language for "no instructions to
meddle," which Adams did state, is not the same thing as "instructions
not to meddle." Adams had no intent to deceive, but was misunderstood.
He was himself very anxious over the presence of the _James Adger_ at
Southampton, and hurried her Captain away. Adams informed Russell that
Palmerston had not understood him correctly. He had told Palmerston, "I
had seen the Captain's [Marchand's] instructions, which directed him to
intercept the _Nashville_ if he could, and in case of inability to do
so, to return at once to New York, keeping his eye on such British ships
as might be going to the United States with contraband of war. Lord
Palmerston's recollections and mine differed mainly in this last
particular. Lord Russell then remarked that this statement was exactly
that which he had recollected my making to him. Nothing had been said in
the instructions about other British ships." (State Dept., Eng., Vol.
78. No. 80. Adams to Seward. Nov. 29. 1861.) Hammond's letter mentions
also the excitement of "the Southerners" in England and that they had
"sent out Pilot Boats to intercept and warn the Packet...."]
[Footnote 412: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Milne, Dec. 1, 1861.]
[Footnote 413: _Ibid._, Russell to Lyons, Nov. 16, 1861.]
[Footnote 414: Gladstone Papers. Argyll to Gladstone, Nov. 29, 1861.]
[Footnote 415: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass.
Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 58.)]
[Footnote 416: Moore, _Int. Law Digest_, VII, p. 772. The much argued
international law points in the case of the _Trent_ are given _in
extenso_ by Moore.]
[Footnote 417: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
"Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." No. 2.]
[Footnote 418: _Ibid._, No. 4.]
[Footnote 419: _Ibid._, No. 29. Inclosure.]
[Footnote 420: Troops were in fact shipped for Canada. This resulted,
after the _Trent_ affair had blown over, in a circumstance which
permitted Seward, with keen delight, to extend a courtesy to Great
Britain. Bancroft (II, 245) states that these troops "finding the St.
Lawrence river full of ice, had entered Portland harbour. When
permission was asked for them to cross Maine, Seward promptly ordered
that all facilities should be granted for 'landing and transporting to
Canada or elsewhere troops, stores, and munitions of war of every kind
without exception or reservation.'" It is true that the American press
made much of this, and in tones of derision. The facts, as reported by
Lyons, were that the request was merely "a superfluous application from
a private firm at Montreal for permission to land some Officers' Baggage
at Portland." (Russell Papers, Lyons to Russell, Jan. 20, 1862.) Lyons
was much vexed with this "trick" of Seward's. He wrote to the
Governor-General of Canada and the Lieutenant-Governors of Nova Scotia
and New Brunswick, protesting against an acceptance of Seward's
permission, and finally informed Russell that no English troops were
marched across the State of Maine. (Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell,
Feb. 14, 1862. Also Lyons Papers. Lyons to Monck, Feb. 1, 1862.)]
[Footnote 421: Martin, _Life of the Prince Consort_, V, pp. 418-26.]
[Footnote 422: Still another letter from Russell to Lyons on November
30, but not intended for Seward, outlined the points of complaint and
argument, (1) The _San Jacinto_ did not happen to fall in with the
_Trent_, but laid in wait for her. (2) "Unnecessary and dangerous Acts
of violence" were used. (3) The _Trent_, when stopped was not "searched"
in the "ordinary way," but "certain Passengers" were demanded and taken
by force. (4) No charge was made that the _Trent_ was violating
neutrality, and no authority for his act was offered by Captain Wilkes.
(5) No force ought to be used against an "_unresisting_ Neutral Ship"
except just so much as is necessary to bring her before a prize court.
(6) In the present case the British vessel had done nothing, and
intended nothing, warranting even an inquiry by a prize court. (7) "It
is essential for British Interests, that consistently with the
obligations of neutrality, and of observing any _legal_ and _effective_
blockade, there should be communication between the Dominions of Her
Majesty and the Countries forming the Confederate States." These seven
points were for Lyons' eye alone. They certainly add no strength to the
British position and reflect the uncertainty and confusion of the
Cabinet. The fifth and sixth points contain the essence of what, on more
mature reflection, was to be the British argument. (F.O., Am., Vol. 758.
No. 447. Draft. Russell to Lyons Nov. 30, 1861).]
[Footnote 423: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Dec. 2, 1861.]
[Footnote 424: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 78. Russell to
Yancey, Rost and Mann, Aug. 24, 1861.]
[Footnote 425: _Ibid._, No. 124. Russell to Yancey, Rost and Mann, Dec.
7, 1861.]
[Footnote 426: Gladstone Papers. Gladstone to Robertson Gladstone, Dec.
7, 1861.]
[Footnote 427: _Ibid._, Argyll to Gladstone, Mentone. Dec. 10, 1861.]
[Footnote 428: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, p. 255. Lewis to Clarendon,
Dec. 18, 1861.]
[Footnote 429: _Ibid._, p. 254. Clarendon to Duchess of Manchester, Dec.
17, 1861.]
[Footnote 430: Palmerston MS.]
[Footnote 431: _Ibid._, Russell to Palmerston, Dec. 20, 1861.]
[Footnote 432: Many citations from the _Times_ are given in Harris, _The
Trent Affair_, to show a violent, not to say scurrilous,
anti-Americanism. Unfortunately dates are not cited, and an examination
of the files of the paper shows that Harris' references are frequently
to communications, not to editorials. Also his citations give but one
side of these communications even, for as many argued caution and fair
treatment as expressed violence. Harris apparently did not consult the
_Times_ itself, but used quotations appearing in American papers.
Naturally these would print, in the height of American anti-British
feeling, the bits exhibiting a peevish and unjust British temper. The
British press made exactly similar quotations from the American
newspapers.]
[Footnote 433: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist.
Soc. XLV, p. 43, note.) John Bigelow, at Paris, reported that the London
Press, especially the Tory, was eager to make trouble, and that there
were but two British papers of importance that did not join the hue and
cry--these being controlled by friends of Bright, one in London and one
in Manchester (Bigelow, _Retrospections of An Active Life_, I, p. 384.)
This is not exactly true, but seems to me more nearly so than the
picture presented by Rhodes (III, 526) of England as united in a "calm,
sorrowful, astonished determination."]
[Footnote 434: Cowley sent to Russell on December 3, a letter from Percy
Doyle recounting an interview with Scott in which these statements were
made. (F.O., France, Vol. 1399. No. 1404. Inclosure.)]
[Footnote 435: Dec. 13, 1861. C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair.
(Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 95.)]
[Footnote 436: _Ibid._, p. 37.]
[Footnote 437: _Ibid._, p. 49. The _New York Times_, November 19,
stated, "We do not believe the American heart ever thrilled with more
genuine delight than it did yesterday, at the intelligence of the
capture of Messrs. Slidell and Mason.... We have not the slightest idea
that England will even remonstrate. On the contrary, she will applaud
the gallant act of Lieut. Wilkes, so full of spirit and good sense, and
such an exact imitation of the policy she has always stoutly defended
and invariably pursued ... as for Commodore Wilkes and his command, let
the handsome thing be done, consecrate another _Fourth_ of July to him.
Load him down with services of plate and swords of the cunningest and
costliest art. Let us encourage the happy inspiration that achieved such
a victory." Note the "_Fourth_ of July."]
[Footnote 438: Lyons Papers. Lousada to Lyons. Boston, Nov. 17, 1861.
"Every other man is walking about with a Law Book under his arm and
proving the _right_ of the Ss. Jacintho to stop H.M.'s mail boat."]
[Footnote 439: "Mr. Galt, Canadian Minister, is here. He has frightened
me by his account of the defencelessness of the Province at this
moment." (Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. Dec. 3, 1861.)]
[Footnote 440: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Monck, Dec. 9, 1861.]
[Footnote 441: Rogers, _Speeches by John Bright_, I, p. 189 _seq_.]
[Footnote 442: Among the communications were several on international
law points by "Historicus," answering and belittling American legal
argument. W.V. Harcourt, under this pseudonym, frequently contributed
very acute and very readable articles to the _Times_ on the American
civil war. The _Times_ was berated by English friends of the North.
Cobden wrote Sumner, December 12, "The _Times_ and its yelping imitators
are still doing their worst." (Morley, _Cobden_, II, 392.) Cobden was
himself at one with the _Times_ in suspicion of Seward. "I confess I
have not much opinion of Seward. He is a kind of American Thiers or
Palmerston or Russell--and talks Bunkum. Fortunately, my friend Mr.
Charles Sumner, who is Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, and has really a kind of veto on the acts of Seward, is a
very peaceable and safe man." _(ibid._, p. 386, to Lieut.-Col.
Fitzmayer, Dec. 3, 1861.) It is interesting that Canadian opinion
regarded the _Times_ as the great cause of American ill-will toward
Britain. A letter to Gait asserted that the "war talk" was all a "farce"
(J.H. Pope to Gait, Dec. 26, 1861) and the Toronto _Globe_ attacked the
_Times_ for the creation of bad feeling. The general attitude was that
if _British_ policy resulted in an American blow at Canada, it was a
British, not a Canadian duty, to maintain her defence (Skelton, _Life of
Sir Alexander Tilloch Gait_, pp. 340, 348.) Yet the author states that
in the beginning Canada went through the same phases of feeling on the
_Trent_ as did Great Britain.]
[Footnote 443: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, pp. 81-2.]
[Footnote 444: _Ibid._, I, p. 83. Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams,
Jr., Dec. 13, 1861.]
[Footnote 445: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. Nov. 29,
1861.]
[Footnote 446: See the _Times_, Dec. 14, 1861. Here for the first time
the _Times_ used the expression "the last card" as applied to
emancipation.]
[Footnote 447: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Dec. 11, 1861.]
[Footnote 448: Gladstone Papers. Russell to Gladstone, Dec. 13, 1861. On
the same day Lady Russell wrote Lady Dumfermline: "There can be no doubt
that we have done deeds very like that of Captain Wilkes.... but I wish
we had not done them.... It is all terrible and awful, and I hope and
pray war may be averted--and whatever may have been the first natural
burst of indignation in this country, I believe it would be ready to
execrate the Ministry if all right and honourable means were not taken
to prevent so fearful a calamity." (Dana, _The Trent Affair.
(Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 528.))]
[Footnote 449: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, p. 87. Charles Francis
Adams to his son, Dec. 20, 1861. ]
[Footnote 450: The _Times_, Dec. 16, 1861.]
[Footnote 451: The _Times_ twice printed the full text of the message,
on December 16 and 17.]
[Footnote 452: Gladstone Papers. Milner-Gibson to Gladstone, Dec. 18,
1861.]
[Footnote 453: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, p. 225. Lewis to Clarendon,
Dec. 18, 1861.]
[Footnote 454: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
"Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." No 14. Russell to Lyons, Dec.
19, 1861. The Government did not make public Adams' confirmation of "no
authorization of Wilkes." Possibly it saw no reason for doing so, since
this had been established already by Wilkes' own statements. The point
was later a matter of complaint by Americans, who regarded it as
indicating a peevish and unfriendly attitude. (Willard, _Letter to an
English Friend on the Rebellion in the United States_, p. 23. Boston,
1862.) Also by English friends; Cobden thought Palmerston had
intentionally prolonged British feeling for political purposes.
"Seward's despatch to Adams on the 19th December [_communicated to
Russell_ on the 19th]... virtually settled the matter. To keep alive the
wicked passions in this country as Palmerston and his _Post_ did, was
like the man, and that is the worst that can be said of it." (Morley,
_Cobden_, II, p. 389. To Mr. Paulton, Jan., 1862.)]
[Footnote 455: Davis to Adams. New York. Dec. 21, 1861. C.F. Adams, _The
Trent Affair, (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 107.)]
[Footnote 456: There has crept into American historical writing of
lesser authenticity a story that just at this juncture there appeared,
in the harbours of New York and San Francisco, Russian fleets whose
commanders let it be understood that they had come under "sealed orders"
not to be opened except in a certain grave event and that their presence
was, at least, not an unfriendly indication of Russian sentiment in the
_Trent_ crisis. This is asserted to have bolstered American courage and
to give warrant for the argument that America finally yielded to Great
Britain from no fear of consequences, but merely on a clearer
recognition of the justice of the case. In fact the story is wholly a
myth. The Russian fleets appeared two years later in the fall of 1863,
not in 1861. Harris, _The Trent Affair, _ pp. 208-10, is mainly
responsible for this story, quoting the inaccurate memory of Thurlow
Weed. (_Autobiography_, II, pp. 346-7.) Reliable historians like Rhodes
make no mention of such an incident. The whole story of the Russian
fleets with their exact instructions is told by F. A. Colder, "The
Russian Fleet and the Civil War," _Am. Hist. Rev_., July, 1915.]
[Footnote 457: Weed, _Autobiography_, II, pp. 354-61.]
[Footnote 458: _Ibid._, p. 365. Peabody to Weed, Jan, 17, 1862.]
[Footnote 459: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, p. 91. Charles Francis
Adams to his son, Dec. 27, 1861.]
[Footnote 460: See _ante_. Ch. IV.]
[Footnote 461: The _Times_, Dec. 25, 1861.]
[Footnote 462: James, _William Wetmore Story and his Friends_, II, pp.
108-9. The letters were sent to Robert Browning, who secured their
publication through Dicey.]
[Footnote 463: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. Adams to Motley, Dec. 26,
1861. (_Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 109).]
[Footnote 464: _Ibid._, p. 110.]
[Footnote 465: Palmerston had very close relations with Delane, of the
_Times_, but that paper carefully maintained its independence of any
party or faction.]
[Footnote 466: Gladstone Papers. Argyll to Gladstone, Dec. 30, 1861.]
[Footnote 467: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78. No. 97. Adams to Seward, Jan.
2, 1862.]
[Footnote 468: Palmerston MS.]
[Footnote 469: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 233. Lyons officially reported
that he carried no papers with him _(Parliamentary Papers_, 1862,
_Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." No. 19.
Lyons to Russell, Dec. 19, 1861). Newton (_Lyons_, I, pp. 55-78) shows
that Seward was, in fact, permitted to read the instructions on the
nineteenth.]
[Footnote 470: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, p. 86. C.F. Adams, Jr.,
to Henry Adams, Dec. 19, 1861.]
[Footnote 471: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 234. Adams' letter of December
3 was received on December 21; Dayton's of December 3, on the 24th.]
[Footnote 472: Much ink has flowed to prove that Lincoln's was the wise
view, seeing from the first the necessity of giving up Mason and
Slidell, and that he overrode Seward, e.g., Welles, _Lincoln and
Seward_, and Harris, _The Trent Affair_. Rhodes, III, pp. 522-24, and
Bancroft, _Seward_, II, pp. 232-37, disprove this. Yet the general
contemporary suspicion of Seward's "anti-British policy," even in
Washington, is shown by a despatch sent by Schleiden to the Senate of
Bremen. On December 23 he wrote that letters from Cobden and Lyndhurst
had been seen by Lincoln.
"Both letters have been submitted to the President. He returned them
with the remark that 'peace will not be broken if England is not bent on
war.' At the same time the President has assured my informant that he
would examine the answer of his Secretary of State, word for word, in
order that no expression should remain which could create bad blood
anew, because the strong language which Mr. Seward had used in some of
his former despatches seems to have irritated and insulted England"
(Schleiden Papers). No doubt Sumner was Schleiden's informant. At first
glance Lincoln's reported language would seem to imply that he was
putting pressure on Seward to release the prisoners and Schleiden
apparently so interpreted them. But the fact was that at the date when
this was written Lincoln had not yet committed himself to accepting
Seward's view. He told Seward, "You will go on, of course, preparing
your answer, which, as I understood it, will state the reasons why they
ought to be given up. Now, I have a mind to try my hand at stating the
reasons why they ought _not_ to be given up. We will compare the points
on each side." Lincoln's idea was, in short, to return an answer to
Great Britain, proposing arbitration (Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 234).]
[Footnote 473: Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, XLV, 155. Bright to
Sumner, Dec. 14, 1861. The letters to Sumner on the _Trent_ are all
printed in this volume of the _Proceedings_. The originals are in the
_Sumner Papers_ in the library of Harvard University.]
[Footnote 474: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
"Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." No. 24. Lyons to Russell, Dec.
27, 1861.]
[Footnote 475: F.O., Am., Vol. 777. No. 807. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 31,
1861. But he transmitted a few days later, a "shocking prayer" in the
Senate on December 30, by the Rev. Dr. Sutherland, which showed a bitter
feeling. "O Thou, just Ruler of the world ... we ask help of Thee for
our rulers and our people, that we may patiently, resolutely, and with
one heart abide our time; for it is indeed a day of darkness and
reproach--a day when the high principle of human equity constrained by
the remorseless sweep of physical and armed force, must for the moment,
succumb under the plastic forms of soft diplomacy" (Russell Papers.
Lyons to Russell, Jan. 3, 1862).]
[Footnote 476: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 249-53.]
[Footnote 477: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair. (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist.
Soc., XLV. p. 75).]
[Footnote 478: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 250.]
[Footnote 479: Mason, Slidell, Eustis and McFarland were delivered to
the British ship _Rinaldo_, January 1, 1862. _En route_ to Halifax the
ship encountered a storm that drove her south and finally brought her to
St. Thomas, where the passengers embarked on a packet for Southampton.]
[Footnote 480: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
"Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." Nos. 27 and 35. February 3,
Lyons reported that Sumner, in a fireside talk, had revealed that he was
in possession of copies of the Law Officers' opinions given on November
12 and 28 respectively. Lyons was astounded and commented that the Law
Officers, before giving any more opinions, ought to know this fact
(F.O., Am., Vol. 824. No. 76. Lyons to Russell).]
[Footnote 481: F.O., France, Vol. 1399. No. 1397. Cowley to Russell,
Dec. 3, 1861. The italics are mine.]
[Footnote 482: Newton, _Lyons_, I, 73.]
[Footnote 483: F.O., Am., Vol. 817. No. 57. Draft. Russell to Lyons,
Feb. 11, 1861.]
[Footnote 484: F.O., France, Vol. 1419. No. 73. Draft. Russell to
Cowley, Jan. 20, 1862.]
[Footnote 485: Gladstone Papers. Russell to Gladstone, Jan. 26, 1862.]
[Footnote 486: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, 424. Bowen to Bigelow, Dec.
27, 1861.]
[Footnote 487: _Poems. Bigelow Papers_. "Jonathan to John." After the
release of the envoys there was much correspondence between friends
across the water as to the merits of the case. British friends attempted
to explain and to soothe, usually to their astonished discomfiture on
receiving angry American replies. An excellent illustration of this is
in a pamphlet published in Boston in the fall of 1862, entitled, Field
and Loring, _Correspondence on the Present Relations between Great
Britain and the United States of America_. The American, Loring, wrote,
"The conviction is nearly if not quite universal that we have foes where
we thought we had friends," p. 7.]
[Footnote 488: Dana, _The Trent Affair. (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc.,
XLV, pp. 508-22).]
[Footnote 489: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 99. To his son, Jan. 10,
1862.]
[Footnote 490: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78. No. 99. Adams to Seward, Jan.
10, 1862.]
[Footnote 491: Gladstone Papers. Argyll to Gladstone, Dec. 7, 1861, Also
expressed again to Gladstone. _Ibid._, Jan. 1, 1862.]
[Footnote 492: James, _William Wetmore Story and His Friends_, II, 105.
Browning to Story, Dec. 17, 1861.]
[Footnote 493: _Ibid._, p. 109. To Story, Dec. 31, 1861.]
[Footnote 494: _Ibid._, p. 110. To Story, Jan. 21, 1862.]
[Footnote 495: _Liberator_, Feb. 7, 1862. Giving an account of a meeting
at Bromley-by-Bow.]
[Footnote 496: Trollope, _North America_ (Chapman & Hall, London, 1862),
I, p. 446. Trollope left England in August, 1861, and returned in the
spring of 1862. He toured the North and the West, was a close observer,
and his work, published in midsummer 1862, was very serviceable to the
North, since he both stated the justice of the Northern cause and
prophesied its victory.]
[Footnote 497: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXV, p. 12 _seq_., though not
consecutive as the speeches were made in the course of the debate on the
Address to the Throne.]
[Footnote 498: Schleiden Papers. Schleiden to the Senate of Bremen.]
[Footnote 499: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78. No. 114. Adams to Seward,
Feb. 13, 1862.]
[Footnote 500: Pickett Papers. Hotze to Hunter, March 11, 1862.]
[Footnote 501: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Feb. 8, 1862.]