THE DECLARATION OF PARIS NEGOTIATION
If regarded merely from the view-point of strict chronology there
accompanied Seward's "foreign war" policy a negotiation with Great
Britain which was of importance as the first effort of the American
Secretary of State to bring European nations to a definite support of
the Northern cause. It was also the first negotiation undertaken by
Adams in London, and as a man new to the diplomatic service he attached
to it an unusual importance, even, seemingly, to the extent of
permitting personal chagrin at the ultimate failure of the negotiation
to distort his usually cool and fair judgment. The matter in question
was the offer of the United States to accede by a convention to the
Declaration of Paris of 1856, establishing certain international rules
for the conduct of maritime warfare.
This negotiation has received scant attention in history. It failed to
result in a treaty, therefore it has appeared to be negligible. Yet it
was at the time of very great importance in affecting the attitude
toward each other of Great Britain and the United States, and of the men
who spoke for their respective countries. The bald facts of the
negotiation appear with exactness in Moore's _Digest of International
Law_[236], but without comment as to motives, and, more briefly, in
Bernard's _Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil
War_[237], at the conclusion of which the author writes, with sarcasm,
"I refrain from any comment on this negotiation[238]." Nicolay and Hay's
_Lincoln_, and Rhodes' _United States_, give the matter but passing and
inadequate treatment. It was reviewed in some detail in the American
argument before the Geneva court of arbitration in the case of the
_Alabama_, but was there presented merely as a part of the general
American complaint of British neutrality. In fact, but three historical
students, so far as the present writer has been able to discover, have
examined this negotiation in detail and presented their conclusions as
to purposes and motives--so important to an understanding of British
intentions at the moment when the flames of civil war were rapidly
spreading in America.
These three, each with an established historical reputation, exhibit
decided differences in interpretation of diplomatic incidents and
documents. The first careful analysis was presented by Henry Adams, son
of the American Minister in London during the Civil War, and then acting
as his private secretary, in his _Historical Essays_, published in 1891;
the second study is by Bancroft, in his _Life of Seward_, 1900; while
the third is by Charles Francis Adams (also son of the American
Minister), who, in his _Life_ of his father, published 1900, gave a
chapter to the subject and treated it on lines similar to those laid
down by his brother Henry, but who, in 1912, came to the conclusion,
through further study, that he had earlier been in error and developed a
very different view in a monograph entitled, "Seward and the Declaration
of Paris."
[Illustration: C.F. ADAMS (_From a photograph in the United States
Embassy, London, by kind permission_)]
If these historiographic details seem unduly minute, partaking as they
do of the nature of a foot-note, in a work otherwise general in
treatment, the author's answer is that the personality of two of the
writers mentioned and their intimate knowledge of the effect of the
negotiation upon the mind of the American Minister in London are
themselves important historical data; a further answer is the fact
that the materials now available from the British Foreign Office
archives throw much new light both on the course of the negotiation and
on British purposes. It is here planned, therefore, first to review the
main facts as previously known; second, to summarize the arguments and
conclusions of the three historians; third, to re-examine the
negotiation in the light of the new material; and, finally, to express
an opinion on its conduct and conclusions as an evidence of
British policy.
In 1854, during the Crimean War, Great Britain and France, the chief
maritime belligerents engaged against Russia, voluntarily agreed to
respect neutral commerce under either the neutral's or the enemy's flag.
This was a distinct step forward in the practice of maritime warfare,
the accepted international rules of which had not been formally altered
since the Napoleonic period. The action of Great Britain was due in
part, according to a later statement in Parliament by Palmerston, March
18, 1862, to a fear that unless a greater respect were paid than
formerly to neutral rights, the Allies would quickly win the ill-will of
the United States, then the most powerful maritime neutral, and would
run the danger of forcing that country into belligerent alliance with
Russia[239]. No doubt there were other reasons, also, for the barbarous
rules and practices of maritime warfare in earlier times were by now
regarded as semi-civilized by the writers of all nations. Certainly the
action of the belligerents in 1854 met with general approval and in the
result was written into international law at the Congress of Paris in
1856, where, at the conclusion of the war, the belligerents and some
leading neutrals were gathered.
The Declaration of Paris on maritime warfare covered four points:
"1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished.
"2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception
of contraband of war.
"3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war,
are not liable to capture under enemy's flag.
"4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective;
that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to
prevent access to the coast of the enemy[240]."
This agreement was adopted by Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia,
Russia, Sardinia and Turkey, and it was further agreed that a general
invitation to accede should be extended to all nations, but with the
proviso "that the powers which shall have signed it, or which shall
accede thereto, shall not in future enter into any arrangement,
concerning the application of the law of neutrals in time of war, which
does not rest altogether upon the four principles embodied in the said
declaration[241]." In other words it must be accepted in whole, and not
in part, and the powers acceding pledging themselves not to enter into
any subsequent treaties or engagements on maritime law which did not
stipulate observance of all four points. Within a short time nearly all
the maritime nations of the world had given official adherence to the
Declaration of Paris.
But the United States refused to do so. She had long stood in the
advance guard of nations demanding respect for neutral rights. Little by
little her avowed principles of international law as regards neutrals,
first scoffed at, had crept into acceptance in treaty stipulations.
Secretary of State Marcy now declared, in July, 1856, that the United
States would accede to the Declaration if a fifth article were added to
it protecting all private property at sea, when not contraband. This
covered not only cargo, but the vessel as well, and its effect would
have been to exclude from belligerent operations non-contraband enemy's
goods under the enemy's flag, if goods and ship were privately owned.
Maritime warfare on the high seas would have been limited to battles
between governmentally operated war-ships. Unless this rule were adopted
also, Secretary Marcy declared that "the United States could not forgo
the right to send out privateers, which in the past had proved her most
effective maritime weapon in time of war, and which, since she had no
large navy, were essential to her fighting power."
"War on private property," said the Americans, "had been abolished on
land; why should it not be abolished also on the sea?" The American
proposal met with general support among the smaller maritime nations. It
was believed that the one great obstacle to the adoption of Marcy's
amendment lay in the naval supremacy of Great Britain, and that obstacle
proved insurmountable. Thus the United States refused to accede to the
Declaration, and there the matter rested until 1861. But on April 17
Jefferson Davis proclaimed for the Southern Confederacy the issue of
privateers against Northern commerce. On April 24 Seward instructed
representatives abroad, recounting the Marcy proposal and expressing the
hope that it still might meet with a favourable reception, but
authorizing them to enter into conventions for American adherence to the
Declaration of 1856 on the four points alone. This instruction was sent
to the Ministers in Great Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, Austria,
Belgium, Italy, and Denmark; and on May 10 to the Netherlands.
Having received this instruction, Adams, at the close of his first
meeting with Russell on May 18, after having developed at length the
American position relative to the issue of the British Proclamation of
Neutrality, briefly added that he was directed to offer adherence by
means of a convention, to the Declaration of Paris. Russell replied that
Great Britain was willing to negotiate, but "seemed to desire to leave
the subject in the hands of Lord Lyons, to whom he intimated that he had
already transmitted authority[242]...." Adams therefore did not press
the matter, waiting further information and instruction from Washington.
Nearly two weeks earlier Russell had, in fact, approached the Government
of France with a suggestion that the two leading maritime powers should
propose to the American belligerents adherence to the second and third
articles of the Declaration of Paris. France had agreed and the date of
Russell's instruction to Lyons was May 18, the day of the interview with
Adams. Confusion now arose in both London and Washington as to the place
where the arrangement was to be concluded. The causes of this confusion
will be considered later in this chapter; here it is sufficient to note
that the negotiation was finally undertaken at London.
On July 18 Russell informed Adams that Great Britain was ready to enter
into a convention with the United States, provided a similar convention
was signed with France at the same time. This convention, as submitted
by Adams, simply recorded an agreement by the two powers to abide by the
four points of the Declaration of Paris, using the exact wording of that
document[243]. Adams' draft had been communicated to Russell on July 13.
There then followed a delay required by the necessity of securing
similar action by Dayton, the American Minister at Paris, but on July 29
Adams reported to Russell that this had been done and that he was ready
to sign. Two days later, July 31, Russell replied that he, also, was
ready, but concluded his letter, "I need scarcely add that on the part
of Great Britain the engagement will be prospective, and will not
invalidate anything already done[244]." It was not until August 8,
however, that Cowley, the British Ambassador to France, reported that
Dayton had informed Thouvenel, French Foreign Minister, that he was
ready to sign the similar convention with France[245]. With no
understanding, apparently, of the causes of further delay, and
professing complete ignorance of the meaning of Russell's phrase, just
quoted[246], Adams waited the expected invitation to an official
interview for the affixing of signatures. Since it was a condition of
the negotiation that this should be done simultaneously in London and
Paris, the further delay that now occurred caused him no misgivings.
On August 19 Russell requested Adams to name a convenient day "in the
course of this week," and prefaced this request with the statement that
he enclosed a copy of a Declaration which he proposed to make in
writing, upon signing the convention. "You will observe," he wrote,
"that it is intended to prevent any misconception as to the nature of
the engagement to be taken by Her Majesty." The proposed
Declaration read:
"In affixing his signature to the Convention of this day
between Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland
and the United States of America, the Earl Russell declares,
by order of Her Majesty, that Her Majesty does not intend
thereby to undertake any engagement which shall have any
bearing, direct or indirect, on the internal differences now
prevailing in the United States[247]."
Under his instructions to negotiate a convention for a pure and simple
adherence to the Declaration of Paris, Adams could not now go on to
official signature. Nor was he inclined to do so. Sincerely believing,
as he stated to Russell in a communication of August 23, that the United
States was "acting with the single purpose of aiding to establish a
permanent doctrine for all time," and with the object of "ameliorating
the horrors of warfare all over the globe," he objected "to accompany
the act with a proceeding somewhat novel and anomalous," which on the
face of it seemed to imply a suspicion on the part of Great Britain that
the United States was "desirous at this time to take a part in the
Declaration [of Paris], not from any high purpose or durable policy, but
with the view of securing some small temporary object in the unhappy
struggle which is going on at home[248]." He also pointed out that
Russell's proposed declaration either was or was not a part of the
convention. If it was a part then the Senate of the United States must
ratify it as well as the convention itself, and he would have gone
beyond his instructions in submitting it. If not a part of the
convention there could be no advantage in making the Declaration since,
unratified by the Senate, it would have no force. Adams therefore
declined to proceed further with the matter until he had received new
instructions from Washington.
To this Russell answered, August 28, with a very explicit exposition of
his reasons. Great Britain, he said, had declared her neutrality in the
American conflict, thereby recognizing the belligerent rights of the
South. It followed that the South "might by the law of nations arm
privateers," and that these "must be regarded as the armed vessels of a
belligerent." But the United States had refused to recognize the status
of belligerency, and could therefore maintain that privateers issued by
the Southern States were in fact pirates, and might argue that a
European Power signing a convention with the United States, embodying
the principles of the Declaration of Paris, "would be bound to treat the
privateers of the so-called Confederate States as pirates." Hence
Russell pointed out, the two countries, arguing from contradictory
premises as to the status of the conflict in America, might become
involved in charges of bad faith and of violation of the convention. He
had therefore merely intended by his suggested declaration to prevent
any misconception by the United States.
"It is in this spirit that Her Majesty's Government decline
to bind themselves, without a clear explanation on their
part, to a Convention which, seemingly confined to an
adoption of the Declaration of Paris of 1856, might be
construed as an engagement to interfere in the unhappy
dissensions now prevailing in the United States; an
interference which would be contrary to Her Majesty's public
declarations, and would be a reversal of the policy which Her
Majesty has deliberately sanctioned[249]."
Thus the negotiation closed. Seward in declining to accept the proposed
declaration gave varying reasons in his instructions to Adams, in
London, and to Dayton, in Paris, for an exactly similar declaration had
been insisted upon by France, but he did not argue the question save in
generalities. He told Dayton that the supposed possible "intervention"
which Great Britain and France seemed to fear they would be called upon
to make was exactly the action which the United States desired to
forestall, and he notified Adams that he could not consent since the
proposed Declaration "would be virtually a new and distinct article
incorporated into the projected convention[250]." The first formal
negotiation of the United States during the Civil War, and of the new
American Minister in London, had come to an inglorious conclusion.
Diplomats and Foreign Secretaries were, quite naturally, disturbed, and
were even suspicious of each others' motives, but the public, not at the
moment informed save on the American offer and the result, paid little
attention to these "inner circle" controversies[251].
What then were the hidden purposes, if such existed, of the negotiating
powers. The first answer in historical writing was that offered by Henry
Adams[252], in an essay entitled "The Declaration of Paris, 1861," in
the preparation of which the author studied with care all the diplomatic
correspondence available in print[253]. His treatment presents Russell
as engaged in a policy of deception with the view of obtaining an
ultimate advantage to Great Britain in the field of commercial rivalry
and maritime supremacy. Following Henry Adams' argument Russell, on May
9, brought to the attention of France a proposal for a joint request on
the American belligerents to respect the second and third articles of
the Declaration of Paris, and received an acquiescent reply. After some
further exchanges of proposed terms of instructions to the British and
French Ministers at Washington, Russell, on May 18, sent a despatch to
Lyons with instructions for his action. On this same day Russell, in his
first interview with Adams, "before these despatches [to Lyons] could
have left the Foreign Office," and replying to Adams' proposal to
negotiate on the Declaration of Paris as a _whole_--that is to say, on
all four articles--intimated that instructions had already gone to
Lyons, with directions to assent to any modification of the article on
privateering that the United States might desire. Adams understood
Russell to prefer that the negotiation (for such Adams thought it was to
be) should take place in Washington, and did not press the matter.
This was deliberate deceit; first in a statement of fact since the
interview with Adams took place at noon on May 18, at Russell's country
house nine miles from London, and in all reasonable supposition the
despatch to Lyons would not have been sent until the Foreign Secretary's
return to his office; second because Lyons was not instructed to
_negotiate_ on the Declaration. The interpretation is justified
therefore that Russell "evaded the offer of the United States
Government." The result of this evasion was delay, but when Seward
learned from Lyons that he had no authority to negotiate a convention
and Adams received renewed instructions to proceed, the latter "kept his
temper, but the affair made a lasting impression on his mind, and shook
his faith in the straightforwardness of the British Government." In
renewing his overtures at London, Adams made explanations of the
previous "misunderstanding" and to these Russell replied with further
"inaccuracies" as to what had been said at the first interview.
Thus beginning his survey with an assertion of British deceit and
evasion from the very outset, and incidentally remarking that Lyons, at
Washington, "made little disguise of his leanings" toward the South,
Henry Adams depicts Russell as leading France along a line of policy
distinctly unfriendly to the North. Examining each point in the
negotiation as already narrated, he summarized it as follows:
"The story has shown that Russell and his colleagues ...
induced the French Government to violate the pledge in the
protocol of the Declaration of Paris in order to offer to
both belligerents a partial adhesion, which must exclude the
United States from a simple adhesion, to the Declaration of
Paris, while it placed both belligerents on the same apparent
footing. These steps were taken in haste before Adams could
obtain an interview. When Adams by an effort unexpected to
Russell obtained an interview at Pembroke Lodge at noon of
Saturday, May 18, and according to Russell's report of May
21, said that the United States were 'disposed to adhere to
the Declaration of Paris,' Russell evaded the offer, saying
that he had already sent sufficient instructions to Lyons,
although the instructions were not sufficient, nor had they
been sent. When this evasion was afterward brought to his
notice by Adams, Russell, revising his report to Lyons, made
such changes in it as should represent the first proposal as
coming from himself, and the evasion to have come from Adams.
When at last obliged to read the American offer, Russell
declared that he had never heard of it before, although he
had himself reported it to Lyons and Lyons had reported it to
him. When compelled to take the offer for consideration,
Russell, though always professing to welcome adhesion pure
and simple, required the co-operation of Dayton. When Adams
overcame this last obstacle, Russell interposed a written
proviso, which as he knew from Lyons would prevent
ratification. When Adams paid no attention to the proviso but
insisted on signature of the treaty, Russell at last wrote a
declaration in the nature of an insult, which could not be
disregarded[254]."
In this presentation of the case to the jury certain minor points are
insisted upon to establish a ground for suspicion--as the question of
who first made the proposal--that are not essential to Henry Adams'
conclusions. This conclusion is that "From the delays interposed by
Russell, Adams must conclude that the British Cabinet was trying one
device after another to evade the proposition; and finally, from the
written declaration of August 19, he could draw no other inference than
that Russell had resorted to the only defensive weapon left to him, in
order to avoid the avowal of his true motives and policy[255]." The
_motive_ of this tortuous proceeding, the author believed to have been a
deep-laid scheme to revive, _after_ the American War was ended, the
earlier international practice of Great Britain, in treating as subject
to belligerent seizure enemy's goods under the neutral flag. It was the
American stand, argues Henry Adams, that in 1854 had compelled Great
Britain to renounce this practice. A complete American adherence, now,
to the Declaration, would for ever tie Britain's hands, but if there
were no such complete adherence and only temporary observation of the
second article, after the war had resulted in the disruption of the
United States, thus removing the chief supporter of that article, Great
Britain would feel free to resume her old-time practice when she engaged
in war. If Great Britain made a formal treaty with the United States she
would feel bound to respect it; the Declaration of Paris as it stood
constituted "a mere agreement, which was binding, as Lord Malmesbury
declared, only so long as it was convenient to respect it[256]." Thus
the second article of the Declaration of Paris, not the first on
privateering, was in the eye of the British Cabinet in the negotiation
of 1861. Henry Adams ends his essay: "After the manner in which Russell
received the advances of President Lincoln, no American Minister in
London could safely act on any other assumption than that the British
Government meant, at the first convenient opportunity, to revive the
belligerent pretensions dormant since the War of 1812[257]."
This analysis was published in 1891. Still more briefly summarized it
depicts an unfriendly, almost hostile attitude on the part of Russell
and Lyons, deceit and evasion by the former, selfish British policy, and
throughout a blind following on by France, yielding to Russell's
leadership. The American proposal is regarded merely as a simple and
sincere offer to join in supporting an improved international practice
in war-times. But when Frederic Bancroft, the biographer of Seward,
examined the negotiation he was compelled to ask himself whether this
was all, indeed, that the American Secretary of State had in view.
Bancroft's analysis may be stated more briefly[258].
Seward's general instruction, Bancroft notes, bore date of April 24,
nearly a month before any foreign Power had recognized Southern
belligerent rights; it indicates "a plan by which he hoped to remove all
excuse for such action." In despatches to Dayton, Seward asserted a
twofold motive: "a sincere desire to co-operate with other progressive
nations in the melioration of the rigours of maritime war," and "to
remove every cause that any foreign Power could have for the recognition
of the insurgents as a belligerent Power[259]." This last result was not
so clear to Dayton at Paris, nor was the mechanism of operation ever
openly stated by Seward. But he did write, later, that the proposal of
accession to the Declaration of Paris was tendered "as the act of this
Federal Government, to be obligatory equally upon disloyal as upon loyal
citizens." "It did not," writes Bancroft, "require the gift of prophecy
to tell what would result in case the offer of accession on the part of
the United States should be accepted[260]."
Seward's object was to place the European nations in a position where
they, as well as the United States, would be forced to regard Southern
privateers as pirates, and treat them as such. This was a conceivable
result of the negotiation before European recognition of Southern
belligerency, but even after that recognition and after Dayton had
pointed out the impossibility of such a result, Seward pressed for the
treaty and instructed Dayton not to raise the question with France. He
still had in mind this main object. "If Seward," says Bancroft, "had not
intended to use the adherence of the United States to the declaration as
a lever to force the other Powers to treat the Confederates as pirates,
or at least to cease regarding them as belligerents, he might easily and
unofficially have removed all such suspicions[261]." In an interview
with Lyons on July 6 Seward urged a quick conclusion of the treaty,
arguing that its effect upon the revolted states could be determined
afterwards. Naturally Lyons was alarmed and gave warning to Russell.
"Probably it was this advice that caused Russell to insist on the
explanatory declaration[262]."
It would appear, then, that Seward much underestimated the acuteness of
Russell and Thouvenel, and expected them "to walk into a trap." Nor
could his claim "that there was no difference between a nation entirely
at peace and one in circumstances like those of the United States at
this time" be taken seriously. "He was furnishing his opponent with
evidences of his lack of candour." This clouded the effect that would
have followed "a wise and generous policy toward neutrals, which had
doubtless been in Seward's mind from the beginning[263]." In the end he
concluded the negotiation gracefully, writing to Adams a pledge of
American respect for the second and third articles of the Declaration of
Paris--exactly that which Lyons had originally been instructed by
Russell to secure.
"We regard Great Britain as a friend. Her Majesty's flag,
according to our traditional principles, covers enemy's goods
not contraband of war. Goods of Her Majesty's subjects, not
contraband of war, are exempt from confiscation, though found
under a neutral or disloyal flag. No depredations shall be
committed by our naval forces or by those of any of our
citizens, so far as we can prevent it, upon the vessels or
property of British subjects. Our blockade, being effective,
must be respected[264]."
Thus Bancroft regards Seward's proposals of April 24 as in part the
result of humanitarian motives and in part as having a concealed purpose
of Northern advantage. This last he calls a "trap." And it is to be
noted that in Seward's final pledge to Adams the phrase "those of any of
our citizens" reserves, for the North, since the negotiation had failed,
the right to issue privateers on her own account. But Russell also, says
Bancroft, was not "altogether artless and frank." He had in view a
British commercial advantage during the war, since if the United States
respected the second and third articles of the Declaration of Paris, and
"if Confederate privateers should roam the ocean and seize the ships and
goods of citizens of the North, all the better for other commercial
nations; for it would soon cause the commerce of the United States to be
carried on under foreign flags, especially the British and French[265]."
Ulterior motive is, therefore, ascribed to both parties in the
negotiation, and that of Seward is treated as conceived at the moment
when a policy of seeking European friendship was dominant at Washington,
but with the hope of securing at least negative European support.
Seward's persistence after European recognition of Southern belligerency
is regarded as a characteristic obstinacy without a clear view of
possible resulting dangerous complications.
This view discredits the acumen of the American Secretary of State and
it does not completely satisfy the third historian to examine the
incident in detail. Nor does he agree on the basis of British policy.
Charles Francis Adams, in his "Life" of his father, writing in 1899,
followed in the main the view of his brother, Henry Adams. But in 1912
he reviewed the negotiation at great length with different
conclusions[266]. His thesis is that the Declaration of Paris
negotiation was an essential part of Seward's "foreign war policy," in
that in case a treaty was signed with Great Britain and France and then
those Powers refused to aid in the suppression of Southern privateering,
or at least permitted them access to British and French ports, a good
ground of complaint leading to war would be established. _This_ was the
ultimate ulterior purpose in Seward's mind; the negotiation was but a
method of fixing a quarrel on some foreign Power in case the United
States should seek, as Seward desired, a cementing of the rift at home
by a foreign war.
In the details of the negotiation C.F. Adams agrees with Bancroft, but
with this new interpretation. The opening misunderstanding he ascribed,
as did Lyons, to the simple fact that Seward "had refused to see the
despatch" in which Russell's proposals were made[267]. Seward's
instructions of July 6, after the misunderstanding was made clear to
him, pushing the negotiation, were drawn when he was "still riding a
very high horse--the No. 10 charger, in fact, he had mounted on the 21st
of the previous May[268]," and this warlike charger he continued to ride
until the sobering Northern defeat at Bull Run, July 21, put an end to
his folly. If that battle had been a Northern victory he would have gone
on with his project. Now, with the end of a period of brain-storm and
the emergence of sanity in foreign policy, "Secretary Seward in due time
(September 7) pronounced the proposed reservation [by Russell] quite
'inadmissible.' And here the curtain fell on this somewhat prolonged and
not altogether creditable diplomatic farce[269]."
Incidentally C.F. Adams examined also British action and intention.
Lyons is wholly exonerated. "Of him it may be fairly said that his
course throughout seems to furnish no ground for criticism[270]." And
Lyons is quoted as having understood, in the end, the real purpose of
Seward's policy in seeking embroilment with Europe. He wrote to Russell
on December 6 upon the American publication of despatches, accompanying
the President's annual message: "Little doubt can remain, after reading
the papers, that the accession was offered solely with the view to the
effect it would have on the privateering operations of the Southern
States; and that a refusal on the part of England and France, after
having accepted the accession, to treat the Southern privateers as
pirates, would have been made a serious grievance, if not a ground of
quarrel[271]...." As to Russell, combating Henry Adams' view, it is
asserted that it was the great good fortune of the United States that
the British Foreign Secretary, having declared a policy of neutrality,
was not to be driven from its honest application by irritations, nor
seduced into a position where the continuation of that policy would be
difficult.
Before entering upon an account of the bearing of the newly available
British materials on the negotiation--materials which will in themselves
offer sufficient comment on the theories of Henry Adams, and in less
degree of Bancroft--it is best to note here the fallacy in C.F. Adams'
main thesis. If the analysis given in the preceding chapter of the
initiation and duration of Seward's "foreign war policy" is correct,
then the Declaration of Paris negotiation had no essential relation
whatever to that policy. The instructions to Adams were sent to eight
other Ministers. Is it conceivable that Seward desired a war with the
whole maritime world? The date, April 24, antedates any deliberate
proposal of a foreign war, whatever he may have been brooding, and in
fact stamps the offer as part of that friendly policy toward Europe
which Lincoln had insisted upon. Seward's frenzy for a foreign war did
not come to a head until the news had been received of England's
determination to recognize Southern belligerency. This was in the second
week of May and on the twenty-first Despatch No. 10 marked the decline,
not the beginning, of a belligerent policy, and by the President's
orders. By May 24 probably, by the twenty-seventh certainly, Seward had
yielded and was rapidly beginning to turn to expressions of
friendship[272]. Yet it was only on May 18 that Russell's first
instructions to Lyons were sent, and not until late in June that the
"misunderstanding" cleared away, instructions were despatched by Seward
to push the Declaration of Paris negotiations at London and Paris. The
battle of Bull Run had nothing to do with a new policy. Thus chronology
forbids the inclusion of this negotiation, either in its inception,
progress, or conclusion, as an agency intended to make possible, on just
grounds, a foreign war.
A mere chronological examination of documents, both printed and in
archives, permits a clearer view of British policy on the Declaration of
Paris. Recalling the facts of the American situation known in London it
will be remembered that on May 1 the British Government and Parliament
became aware that a civil war was inevitable and that the South planned
to issue privateers. On that day Russell asked the Admiralty to
reinforce the British fleet in West Indian waters that British commerce
might be adequately protected. Five days later, May 6, he announced in
the Commons that Great Britain must be strictly neutral, and that a
policy of close harmony with France was being matured; and on this day
he proposed through Cowley, in Paris, that Great Britain and France each
ask _both_ the contending parties in America to abide by the second and
third articles of the Declaration of Paris[273]. If there was ulterior
motive here it does not appear in any despatch either then or later,
passing between any of the British diplomats concerned--Russell, Cowley,
and Lyons. The plain fact was that the United States was not an adherent
to the Declaration, that the South had announced privateering, and the
North a blockade, and that the only portions of the Declaration in
regard to which the belligerents had as yet made no statement were the
second and third articles.
It was, indeed, an anxious time for the British Government. On May 9
Forster asked in the Commons what would be the Government's attitude
toward a British subject serving on a Southern privateer[274]. The next
day in the Lords there occurred a debate the general burden of which was
that privateering was in fact piracy, but that under the conditions of
the American previous stand, it could not be treated as such[275]. Both
in the Commons and the Lords speakers were referred to the forthcoming
Proclamation of Neutrality, but the uncertainty developed in both
debates is very probably reflected in the new despatch now sent to
Cowley, on May 11[276]. By that despatch France was asked to send an
instruction to Mercier in Washington similar to a draft instruction
intended for Lyons, a copy of which was enclosed to Cowley, the object
being to secure from the American belligerents adherence to _all_ the
articles, privateering included, of the Declaration of Paris[277].
Whatever Russell's purpose in thus altering his original suggestion, it
met with a prompt check from France. On May 9 Thouvenel had agreed
heartily to the proposal of May 6, adding the practical advice that the
best method of approach to the Confederacy would be through the consuls
in the South[278]. Now, on May 13, Russell was informed that Thouvenel
feared that England and France would get into serious trouble if the
North agreed to accede on privateering and the South did not. Cowley
reported that he had argued with Thouvenel that privateers were pirates
and ought to be treated as such, but that Thouvenel refused to do more
than instruct Mercier on the second and third articles[279]. For the
moment Russell appears to have yielded easily to this French advice. On
May 13 he had that interview with the Southern commissioners in which he
mentioned a communication about to be made to the South[280]; and on May
15 the London _Times_, presumably reflecting governmental decision, in
commenting on the Proclamation of Neutrality, developed at some length
the idea that British citizens, if they served on Southern privateers,
could claim no protection from Great Britain if the North chose to treat
them as pirates. May 16, Cowley reported that Thouvenel had written
Mercier in the terms of Russell's draft to Lyons of the eleventh, but
omitting the part about privateering[281], and on this same day Russell
sent to Cowley a copy of a _new_ draft of instructions to Lyons,
seemingly in exact accord with the French idea[282]. On the seventeenth,
Cowley reported this as highly satisfactory to Thouvenel[283]. Finally
on May 18 the completed instruction was despatched.
It was on this same day, May 18, that Adams had his first interview with
Russell. All that had been planned by Great Britain and France had been
based on their estimate of the necessity of the situation. They had no
knowledge of Seward's instructions of April 24. When therefore Adams,
toward the conclusion of his interview, stated his authority to
negotiate a convention, he undoubtedly took Russell by surprise. So far
as he was concerned a suggestion to the North, the result of an
agreement made with France after some discussion and delay, was in fact
completed, and the draft finally drawn _two days before_, on the
sixteenth. Even if not actually sent, as Henry Adams thinks, it was a
completed agreement. Russell might well speak of it as an instruction
already given to Lyons. Moreover there were two points in Adams'
conversation of the eighteenth likely to give Russell cause for thought.
The first was Adams' protest against the British recognition of a status
of belligerency. If the North felt so earnestly about this, had it been
wise to instruct Lyons to make an approach to the South? This required
consideration. And in the second place did not Adams' offer again open
up the prospect of somehow getting from the North at least a formal and
permanent renunciation of privateering?
For if an examination is made of Russell's instruction to Lyons of May
18 it appears that he had not, after all, dropped that reference to
privateering which Thouvenel had omitted in his own instructions to
Mercier. Adams understood Russell to have said that he "had already
transmitted authority [to Lyons] to assent to any modification of the
only point in issue which the Government of the United States might
prefer. On that matter he believed that there would be no difficulty
whatever[284]." This clearly referred to privateering. Russell's
instructions to Lyons took up the points of the Declaration of Paris in
reverse order. That on blockades was now generally accepted by all
nations. The principle of the third article had "long been recognized as
law, both in Great Britain and in the United States." The second
article, "sanctioned by the United States in the earliest period of the
history of their independence," had been opposed, formerly, by Great
Britain, but having acquiesced in the Declaration of 1856, "she means to
adhere to the principle she then adopted." Thus briefly stating his
confidence that the United States would agree on three of the articles,
Russell explained at length his views as to privateering in the
American crisis.
"There remains only to be considered Article I, namely, that
relating to privateering, from which the Government of the
United States withheld their assent. Under these
circumstances it is expedient to consider what is required on
this subject by the general law of nations. Now it must be
borne in mind that privateers bearing the flag of one or
other of the belligerents may be manned by lawless and
abandoned men, who may commit, for the sake of plunder, the
most destructive and sanguinary outrages. There can be no
question, however, but that the commander and crew of a ship
bearing a letter of marque must, by the law of nations, carry
on their hostilities according to the established laws of
war. Her Majesty's Government must, therefore, hold any
Government issuing such letters of marque responsible for,
and liable to make good, any losses sustained by Her
Majesty's subjects in consequence of wrongful proceedings of
vessels sailing under such letters of marque.
"In this way, the object of the Declaration of Paris may to a
certain extent be attained without the adoption of any new
principle.
"You will urge these points upon Mr. Seward[285]."
What did Russell mean by this cautious statement? The facts known to him
were that Davis had proclaimed the issue of letters of marque and that
Lincoln had countered by proclaiming Southern privateering to be
piracy[286]. He did not know that Seward was prepared to renounce
privateering, but he must have thought it likely from Lincoln's
proclamation, and have regarded this as a good time to strike for an
object desired by all the European maritime nations since 1856. Russell
could not, while Great Britain was neutral, join the United States in
treating Southern privateers as pirates, but he here offered to come as
close to it as he dared, by asserting that Great Britain would use
vigilance in upholding the law of nations. This language might be
interpreted as intended for the admonition of the North also, but the
_facts_ of the then known situation make it applicable to Southern
activities alone. Russell had desired to include privateering in the
proposals to the United States and to the South, but Thouvenel's
criticisms forced him to a half-measure of suggestion to the North, and
a full statement of the delicacy of the situation in the less formal
letter to Lyons accompanying his official instructions. This was also
dated May 18. In it Russell directed Lyons to transmit to the British
Consul at Charleston or New Orleans a copy of the official instruction
"to be communicated at Montgomery to the President of the so-styled
Confederate States," and he further explained his purpose and the
British position:
"... You will not err in encouraging the Government to which
you are accredited to carry into effect any disposition which
they may evince to recognize the Declaration of Paris in
regard to privateering....
"You will clearly understand that Her Majesty's Government
cannot accept the renunciation of privateering on the part of
the Government of the United States if coupled with the
condition that they should enforce its renunciation on the
Confederate States, either by denying their right to issue
letters of marque, or by interfering with the belligerent
operations of vessels holding from them such letters of
marque, so long as they carry on hostilities according to the
recognized principles and under the admitted liabilities of
the law of nations[287]."
Certainly this was clear enough and was demanded by the British policy
of neutrality. Russell had guarded against the complication feared by
Thouvenel, but he still hoped by a half-pledge to the North and a
half-threat to the South to secure from both belligerents a
renunciation of privateering. In short he was not yet fully convinced of
the wisdom of the French limitation. Moreover he believed that Thouvenel
might yet be won to his own opinion, for in an unprinted portion of this
same private letter to Lyons of May 18 Russell wrote:
"I have further to state to you, with reference to my
despatch of this day that H.M. Govt. were in the first
instance inclined to propose to both of the contending
parties to adopt the first clause of the Declaration of
Paris, by which privateering is renounced. But after
communication with the French Govt. it appeared best to limit
our propositions in the manner explained in my despatch.
"I understand however from Lord Cowley that, although M.
Mercier is not absolutely instructed to advert to the
abolition of privateering, yet that some latitude of action
is left to him on that point should he deem it advisable to
exercise it[288]."
Lyons and Mercier saw more clearly than did Russell what was in Seward's
mind. Lyons had been instructed in the despatch just cited to use his
own discretion as to joint action with the French Minister so long only
as the two countries took the same stand. He was to pursue whatever
method seemed most "conciliatory." His first private comment on
receiving Russell's instruction was, "Mr. Seward will be furious when he
finds that his adherence to the Declaration of Paris will not stop the
Southern privateering[289]," and in an official confidential despatch of
the same day, June 4, he gave Russell clear warning of what Seward
expected from his overture through Adams[290]. So delicate did the
matter appear to Lyons and Mercier that they agreed to keep quiet for a
time at least about their instructions, hoping to be relieved by the
transfer of the whole matter to London and Paris[291]. But in London
Russell was at this moment taking up again his favoured purpose. On June
6 he wrote to Grey (temporarily replacing Cowley at Paris) that he
understood a communication had been made in Paris, as in London, for an
American adherence to the Declaration of Paris; "... it may open the way
to the abolition of Privateering all over the world. But ... we ought
not to use any menace to the Confederate States with a view of obtaining
this desirable object[292]." Evidently, in his opinion, the South would
not dare to hold out and no "menace" would be required[293]. Six days
later, however, having learned from the French Ambassador that Dayton in
Paris had made clear to Thouvenel the expectation of the United States
that France would treat Southern privateers as pirates, Russell wrote
that England, of course, could not agree to any such conclusion[294].
Nevertheless this did not mean that Russell yet saw any real objection
to concluding a convention with the United States. Apparently he could
not believe that so obvious an inconsistency with the declared
neutrality of Great Britain was expected to be obtained by the American
Secretary of State.
Others were more suspicious. Lyons reported on June 13 that Seward had
specifically informed Mercier of his belief that a convention signed
would bind England and France to aid in suppressing Southern
privateering[295]. The effect of this on Lyons and Mercier was to
impress upon them the advisability of an _official_ notification to
Seward, of English and French neutrality--a step not yet taken and which
was still postponed, awaiting further instructions[296]. On June 15 the
two Ministers finally concluded they could no longer delay and made that
joint visit to Seward which resulted in his refusal to receive them as
acting together, or to receive officially their instructions, though he
read these for his private information. The remainder of June was spent
by Lyons in attempting to put matters on a more formal basis, yet not
pushing them unduly for fear of arousing Seward's anger. June 17, Lyons
told Seward, privately, and alone, that Great Britain _must_ have some
intercourse with the South if only for the protection of British
interests. Seward's reply was that the United States might "shut its
eyes" to this, but that if notified of what England and France were
doing, the United States would be compelled to make protest. Lyons
thereupon urged Seward to distinguish between his official and personal
knowledge, but Lyons and Mercier again postponed beginning the
negotiation with the Confederacy[297]. Yet while thus reporting this
postponement in one letter, Lyons, in another letter of the same date,
indicated that the two Ministers thought that they had found a solution
of the problem of how to approach, yet not negotiate with, the
Confederacy. The idea was Mercier's. Their consuls in the South were to
be instructed to go, not to the Southern President, but to the Governor
of the State selected, thus avoiding any overture to the Confederate
Government[298]. Even with this solution possible they still hesitated,
feeling as Lyons wrote "a little pusillanimous," but believing they had
prevented an explosion[299]. Moreover Lyons was a bit uneasy because of
an important difference, so it seemed to him, in his formal instructions
and those of Mercier. The latter had no orders, as had Lyons, to notify
Seward, if the agreement on maritime law was made in Washington, that
such agreement would not affect the belligerent right of the South to
issue privateers[300]. Apparently Mercier had been given no instructions
to make this clear--let alone any "latitude" to deal with
privateering--although, as a matter of fact, he had already given Seward
his personal opinion in accord with Lyons' instructions; but this was
not an official French stand. Lyons was therefore greatly relieved, the
"misunderstanding" now cleared away, that new instructions were being
sent to Adams to go on with the convention in London. His only
subsequent comment of moment was sent to Russell on July 8, when he
learned from Seward that Dayton, in Paris, had been directed to raise no
further question as to what would or would not be demanded of France in
case a convention were signed for an American adherence to the
Declaration of Paris. Lyons now repeated his former advice that under no
circumstances should a convention be signed without a distinct
declaration of no British responsibility or duty as regards Southern
privateers[301].
The entire matter was now transferred to London and Paris. Lyons' report
of the misunderstanding and that new instructions were being sent to
Adams was received on June 30. Russell replied to Lyons on July 5 that
Adams had "never made any proposition" on the Declaration of Paris, and
that he would now await one[302]. July 11, Adams made his formal offer
to sign a convention and communicated a draft of it on the thirteenth.
On the day intervening, the twelfth, Russell took a very important step
indicative of his sincerity throughout, of his lack of any ulterior
motive, and of his anxiety to carry through the negotiation with no
resulting irritations or complications with the United States. He
recalled his instructions to Lyons about communicating with the
Confederacy, stating that in any case he had never intended that Lyons
should act without first officially notifying Seward. This recall was
now made, he wrote, because to go on might "create fresh irritation
without any adequate result," but if in the meantime Lyons had already
started negotiations with the South he might "proceed in them to the
end[303]."
Having taken this step in the hope that it might avert friction with the
United States, Russell, now distinctly eager to secure American
adherence to the Declaration in full, was ready to conclude the
convention at once. The warnings received from many sources did not
dismay him. He probably thought that no actual difficulties would ensue,
believing that the South would not venture to continue privateering.
Even if France were disinclined to make a convention he appears to have
been ready for signature by Great Britain alone, for on July 15 he
telegraphed Cowley, "I conclude there can be no objection to my signing
a Convention with the U.S. Minister giving the adherence of the U.S. to
the Declaration of Paris so far as concerns Gt. Britain. Answer
immediately by telegraph[304]." Cowley replied on the sixteenth that
Thouvenel could not object, but thought it a wrong move[305]. Cowley in
a private letter of the same day thought that unless there were "very
cogent reasons for signing a Convention at once with Adams," it would be
better to wait until France could be brought in, and he expressed again
his fear of the danger involved in Adams' proposal[306]. The same
objection was promptly made by Palmerston when shown the draft of a
reply to Adams. Palmerston suggested the insertion of a statement that
while ready to sign a convention Great Britain would do so only at the
same time with France[307]. Thus advised Russell telegraphed in the late
afternoon of the sixteenth to Cowley that he would "wait for your
despatches to-morrow," and that no reply had yet been given Adams[308],
and on the seventeenth he wrote enclosing a draft, approved by
Palmerston and the Queen, stating that Great Britain had no desire to
act alone if Dayton really had instructions identical with those of
Adams. He added that if thought desirable Adams and Dayton might be
informed verbally, that the proposed Convention would in no way alter
the Proclamation of Neutrality[309].
The remaining steps in the negotiation have already been narrated[310].
Russell informed Adams of the requirement of a similar French
convention, Adams secured action by Dayton, and in spite of continued
French reluctance and suspicion[311] all was ready in mid-August for the
affixing of signatures, when Russell, in execution of his previous
promise, and evidently now impressed with the need of an explicit
understanding, gave notice of his intended declaration in writing to be
attached to the convention[312]. On August 20 both Adams and Dayton
refused to sign, the former taking the ground, and with evident
sincerity, that the "exception" gave evidence of a British suspicion
that was insulting to his country, while Dayton had "hardly concealed"
from Thouvenel that this same "exception" was the very object of the
Convention[313]. While preparing his rejoinder to Adams' complaint
Russell wrote in a note to Palmerston "it all looks as if a trap had
been prepared[314]." He, too, at last, was forced to a conclusion long
since reached by every other diplomat, save Adams, engaged in this
negotiation.
But in reviewing the details of the entire affair it would appear that
in its initiation by Seward there is no proof that he then thought of
any definite "trap". April 24 antedated any knowledge by Seward of
British or French policy on neutrality, and he was engaged in attempting
to secure a friendly attitude by foreign Powers. One means of doing this
was by giving assurances on maritime law in time of war. True he
probably foresaw an advantage through expected aid in repressing
privateering, but primarily he hoped to persuade the maritime Powers not
to recognize Southern belligerency. It was in fact this question of
belligerency that determined all his policy throughout the first six
months of the American conflict. He was obstinately determined to
maintain that no such status existed, and throughout the whole war he
returned again and again to pressure on foreign Powers to recall their
proclamations of neutrality. Refusing to recognize foreign neutrality as
final Seward persisted in this negotiation in the hope that if completed
it would place Great Britain and France in a position where they would
be forced to reconsider their declared policy. A demand upon them to aid
in suppressing privateering might indeed then be used as an argument,
but the object was not privateering in itself; that object was the
recall of the recognition of Southern belligerency. In the end he simply
could not agree to the limiting declaration for it would have
constituted an acknowledgment by the United States itself of the
existence of a state of war.
In all of this Adams, seemingly, had no share. He acted on the simple
and straightforward theory that the United States, pursuing a
conciliatory policy, was now offering to adhere to international rules
advocated by all the maritime powers. As a result he felt both
personally and patriotically aggrieved that suspicion was directed
toward the American overtures[315]. For him the failure of the
negotiation had temporarily, at least, an unfortunate result: "So far
as the assumed friendliness of Earl Russell to the United States was
concerned, the scales had fallen from his eyes. His faith in the
straightforwardness of any portion of the Palmerston-Russell Ministry
was gone[316]."
And for Russell also the affair spelled a certain disillusionment, not,
it is true, in the good faith of Adams, for whom he still preserved a
high regard. Russell felt that his policy of a straightforward British
neutrality, his quick acquiescence in the blockade, even before actually
effective, his early order closing British ports to prizes of
Confederate privateers[317], were all evidences of at least a friendly
attitude toward the North. He may, as did nearly every Englishman at the
moment, think the re-union of America impossible, but he had begun with
the plan of strict neutrality, and certainly with no thought of
offensive action against the North. His first thought in the Declaration
of Paris negotiation was to persuade both belligerents to acquiesce in a
portion of the rules of that Declaration, but almost at once he saw the
larger advantage to the world of a complete adherence by the United
States. This became Russell's fixed idea in which he persisted against
warnings and obstacles. Because of this he attempted to recall the
instruction to approach the South, was ready even, until prohibited by
Palmerston, to depart from a policy of close joint action with France,
and in the end was forced by that prohibition to make a limiting
declaration guarding British neutrality. In it all there is no evidence
of any hidden motive nor of any other than a straightforward, even if
obstinately blind, procedure. The effect on Russell, at last grudgingly
admitting that there had been a "trap," was as unfortunate for good
understanding as in the case of Adams. He also was irritated,
suspicious, and soon less convinced that a policy of strict neutrality
could long be maintained[318].
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 236: VII., pp. 568-583.]
[Footnote 237: Ch. 8.]
[Footnote 238: _Ibid._, p. 181.]
[Footnote 239: Henry Adams, _Historical Essays_, p. 275.]
[Footnote 240: Text as given in Moore, _Digest_, VII, p. 562.]
[Footnote 241: _Ibid._, p. 563.]
[Footnote 242: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 94. Adams to
Seward, May 21, 1861.]
[Footnote 243: Text given in _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol
XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 18.]
[Footnote 244: _Ibid._, No. 25.]
[Footnote 245: _Ibid._, No. 26.]
[Footnote 246: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 124. Adams to
Seward, Aug. 2, 1861.]
[Footnote 247: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV,
"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 28.]
[Footnote 248: _Ibid._, No. 31.]
[Footnote 249: _Ibid._, No. 32.]
[Footnote 250: Moore, _Digest_. VII, pp. 578 and 581.]
[Footnote 251: The point of Russell's Declaration was made very early in
the London press. Thus the _Saturday Review_. June 8, 1861, commenting
on the report that America was ready to adhere to the Declaration of
Paris, stated that this could have no effect on the present war but
would be welcomed for its application after this war was over.]
[Footnote 252: In the general American argument before the Geneva
Arbitration Court it was stated that the practical effect of British
diplomacy in this connection was that "Great Britain was thus to gain
the benefit to its neutral commerce of the recognition of the second and
third articles, the rebel privateers and cruisers were to be protected
and their devastation legalized, while the United States were to be
deprived of a dangerous weapon of assault upon Great Britain." Cited in
Nicolay and Hay, _Lincoln_, IV, p. 280.]
[Footnote 253: Henry Adams, _Historical Essays_, pp. 237-279.]
[Footnote 254: _Ibid._, p. 271.]
[Footnote 255: _Ibid._, p. 273.]
[Footnote 256: _Ibid._, p. 277.]
[Footnote 257: This same view was maintained, though without stating
details, by Henry Adams, as late as 1907. See his "Education of Henry
Adams," Private Edition, p. 128.]
[Footnote 258: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, Ch. 31.]
[Footnote 259: Cited by Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 189.]
[Footnote 260: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 261: _Ibid._, p. 193.]
[Footnote 262: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 263: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 264: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 1431 Seward to
Adams, Sept. 7, 1861.]
[Footnote 265: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 196. This speculation is not
supported by any reference to documents revealing such a purpose. While
it may seem a reasonable speculation it does not appear to be borne out
by the new British materials cited later in this chapter.]
[Footnote 266: C.F. Adams, "Seward and The Declaration of Paris" _Mass.
Hist. Soc. Proceedings_, XLVI, pp. 23-81.]
[Footnote 267: _Ibid._, p. 57. The quotation is from a despatch by Lyons
of Dec. 6, 1861; but this is inexact language. It is true that Seward
had refused to receive officially this despatch, but he had read and
considered it in private. Hence he knew _privately_ the facts of
Russell's proposal and that Lyons had no instructions to negotiate. The
incident of this despatch has been treated by me in Chapter IV, where I
regard Seward's refusal to receive officially the despatch as primarily
a refusal to be notified of Great Britain's proclamation of neutrality.
Bancroft treats this incident as primarily a clever refusal by Seward to
be approached officially by Lyons and Mercier in a joint representation,
thus blocking a plan of joint action. (Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 181.)
I agree with C.F. Adams that the only effect of this, so far as the
negotiation is concerned was that "Seward, by what has always, for some
reason not at once apparent, passed for a very astute proceeding, caused
a transfer of the whole negotiation from Washington to London and
Paris." ("Seward and the Declaration of Paris," p. 50.)]
[Footnote 268: _Ibid._, p. 51.]
[Footnote 269: _Ibid._, p. 64.]
[Footnote 270: _Ibid._, p. 60.]
[Footnote 271: _Ibid._, p. 58.]
[Footnote 272: Bancroft says June 8. But see _ante_, p. 130.]
[Footnote 273: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 1. It was
with reference to this that Palmerston, on May 5, wrote to Russell: "If
any step were thought advisable, perhaps the best mode of our feeling
our way would be to communicate confidentially with the South by the men
who have come over here from thence, and with the North by Dallas, who
is about to return in a few days. Dallas, it is true, is not a political
friend of Lincoln, but on the contrary rather leans to the South; but
still he might be an organ, if it should be deemed prudent to take any
step." (Palmerston MS.)]
[Footnote 274: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., Vol. CLXII, p. 1763.]
[Footnote 275: _Ibid._, pp. 1830-34.]
[Footnote 276: This instruction never got into the printed Parliamentary
papers, nor did any others of the many containing the like suggestion,
for they would have revealed a persistence by Russell against French
advice--to which he ultimately was forced to yield--a persistence in
seeking to bind the belligerents on the first article of the Declaration
of Paris, as well as on articles two and three. The points at which
Russell returned to this idea are indicated in this chapter.]
[Footnote 277: F.O., France, Vol. 1376. No. 563. Draft.]
[Footnote 278: F.O., France, Vol. 1390. No. 684. Cowley to Russell, May
9, 1861.]
[Footnote 279: F.O., France, Vol. 1391. No. 713. Cowley to Russell, May
13, 1861.]
[Footnote 280: Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_, II,
p. 40.]
[Footnote 281: F.O., France, Vol. 1391. No. 733.]
[Footnote 282: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 5.]
[Footnote 283: _Ibid._, No. 6. Note that this and the preceding document
are all that appeared in the Parliamentary Papers. Thouvenel's amendment
of Russell's plan did not appear.]
[Footnote 284: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, Adams to Seward,
May 21, 1861.]
[Footnote 285: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 7.]
[Footnote 286: The text of these proclamations, transmitted by Lyons,
had been officially received in London on May 10.]
[Footnote 287: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 8.]
[Footnote 288: F.O., Am., Vol. 755. No. 139. "Seen by Ld. P. and the
Queen."]
[Footnote 289: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 4, 1861. (Printed
in Newton, _Lyons_, I, 42.)]
[Footnote 290: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 12. Marked
"Received," June 17.]
[Footnote 291: F.O., Am., Vol. 765. No. 262. Lyons to Russell, June 8,
1861. Also Russell Papers, June 10, 1861. This disinclination to act
extended also to the matter of getting in touch with the South, which
they also postponed. It appeared that Mercier was instructed to order
the French Consul at New Orleans to go in person to President Davis.
Both diplomats were very fearful of an "outbreak" from Seward on this
planned proposal to the Confederacy.]
[Footnote 292: F.O., France, Vol. 1376. No. 35. Draft. "Seen by Ld.
Palmerston and the Queen."]
[Footnote 293: In Washington, so different was the point of view, Lyons
and Mercier were now convinced they could not let Seward know of the
proposal to be made to the South. They feared he would send them their
passports. Mercier in informal talk had explained to Seward his
instructions on the Declaration of Paris in so far as the North was
concerned. Lyons and Mercier now planned a joint visit and
representation to Seward--that which was actually attempted on June
15--but were decided to say nothing about the South, until they learned
the effect of this "joint proposal." F.O., Am., Vol. 765. No. 262. Lyons
to Russell, June 8, 1861.]
[Footnote 294: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 10. Russell
to Grey, June 12, 1861.]
[Footnote 295: Stoeckl was writing his Government that the state to
which the negotiation had come was full of danger and might lead to a
serious quarrel. He thought Russia should keep out of it until results
were clearer. On this report Gortchakoff margined "C'est aussi mon
avis." (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., June 12-24, 1861. No. 1359.)]
[Footnote 296: F.O., Am., Vol. 766. No. 278.]
[Footnote 297: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 14. Lyons to
Russell, June 17, 1861. "Recd. June 30." It was in this interview that
Lyons discovered Seward's misconception as to the position of the
proposed negotiation, and made clear to Seward that he had no
instructions to sign a convention.]
[Footnote 298: F.O., Am., Vol. 766. No. 284.]
[Footnote 299: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 18, 1861.]
[Footnote 300: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, June 21, 1861.]
[Footnote 301: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 22. Writing
privately on the same day Lyons comments on Mercier's "extreme caution"
in his relations with Seward. Lyons implied that all this personal,
rather than official communication of documents to Seward was Mercier's
idea, and that he, Lyons, doubted the wisdom of this course, but had
agreed to it because of the desire to act in perfect harmony with
France. Russell Papers, Lyons to Russell, July 8, 1861.]
[Footnote 302: Lyons Papers.]
[Footnote 303: F.O., Am., Vol 756. No. 227. On this same day Russell was
writing privately to Edward Everett, in Boston, a clear statement of the
British position, defending the Proclamation of Neutrality and adding,
"It is not our practice to treat five millions of freemen as pirates,
and to hang their sailors if they stop our merchantmen. But unless we
mean to treat them as pirates and to hang them, we could not deny them
belligerent rights." C.F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris,"
pp. 49-50.]
[Footnote 304: F.O., France, Vol. 1377. No. 176. Draft. Russell to
Cowley, July 15, 1861.]
[Footnote 305: F.O., France, Vol. 1394. No. 871.]
[Footnote 306: Russell Papers. Also in a despatch of July 16 Cowley
repeated his objections and stated that Dayton had not yet approached
France. (F.O., France, Vol. 1394. No. 871.)]
[Footnote 307: F.O., Am., Vol. 755. No. 168. Enclosure. Palmerston's
Note to Russell was not sent to Adams but his exact language is used in
the last paragraph of the communication to Adams, November 18, as
printed in _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 19.]
[Footnote 308: F.O., France, Vol. 1378. No. 730. Russell to Cowley, July
17, 1861. Containing draft of telegram sent on 16th at 4.30 p.m.]
[Footnote 309: _Ibid._, No. 729.]
[Footnote 310: See _ante_ pp. 142-45.]
[Footnote 311: F.O., France, Vol. 1394. No. 905. Cowley to Russell, July
26, 1861.]
[Footnote 312: It should be noted that during this period Russell
learned that on July 5, Lyons, before receiving the recall of
instructions, had finally begun through Consul Bunch at Charleston the
overtures to the South. On July 24, Russell approved this action
(_Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence
respecting International Maritime Law." No. 23.)]
[Footnote 313: F.O., France, Vol. 1395. No. 1031. Cowley to Russell,
August 20, 1861.]
[Footnote 314: Palmerston MS., Russell to Palmerston, August 26, 1861.]
[Footnote 315: See C.F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris,"
pp. 58 and 74.]
[Footnote 316: Adams, _Life of C.F. Adams_, p. 209.]
[Footnote 317: The Confederate Commissions on August 14, 1861, just
before the critical moment in the Declaration of Paris negotiation, had
made vigorous protest against this British order, characterizing it as
giving a "favour" to the Government at Washington, and thus as lacking
in neutrality. Quoted by C.F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of
Paris," p. 31.]
[Footnote 318: A few facts about Southern privateering not directly
pertinent to this chapter are yet not without interest. There was no
case during the Civil War of a vessel actually going out as a privateer
(i.e., a private vessel operating under government letters of marque)
from a foreign port. (Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris," p.
38.) No Southern privateer ever entered a British port. (Bernard,
_Neutrality of Great Britain_, p. 181). As a result of Seward's general
instruction of April 24, a convention was actually signed with Russia in
August, but it was not presented by Seward for ratification to the
United States Senate. Schleiden in a report to the Senate of Bremen at
the time of the _Trent_ affair, Nov. 14, 1861, stated that the Russian
Ambassador, von Stoeckl, inquired of Seward "whether the U.S. would
equip privateers in case war should break out with England and France.
Seward replied 'that is a matter of course.' Mr. Stoeckl thereupon
remarked that in any case no American privateer would be permitted to
cruise in the northern part of the Pacific because Russia, which is the
only state that has ports in those regions, would treat them as pirates
in accordance with the Convention of August 24. Mr. Seward then
exclaimed: 'I never thought of that. I must write to Mr. Clay about
it.'" (Schleiden MS.)]