[47:1] It must be remembered that in reality Norway had an almost
entirely equal influence in the joint Consular service, as questions
refering to Consular matters were decided in a joint Cabinet, and a
Norwegian government department conducted the mercantile part of affairs.
[47:2] It does not follow, however, that at least the majority of the
members of the Norwegian government tried to come to an agreement.
[48:1] A very sensible and intelligent article written by Mr FRITZ
HANSEN, member of the last Union Committee, may especially be brought to
notice.
[48:2] N:o 10.
[49:1] N:o 10.
[50:1] This is proved by the motion on the Union question brought forward
in the Lower Chamber of the Swedish Parliament. See N:o 14.
[50:2] N:o 11.
[51:1] NANSEN does not even mention the document in his book.
[51:2] N:o 12.
[52:1] This last alternative was considered to imply proposals for a
compromise, which had now and then been hinted at, namely, that a
Chancellor of the Union should direct all matters concerning Union
policy, but each of the Kingdoms should have its own Minister for Foreign
affairs, chiefly with Consular affairs under their especial direction.
The proposal was said to have been brought forward in the first place at
the meeting of the last Union Committee by one of the Norwegian radical
representatives.
[52:2] N:o 13 and 14.
[52:3] NANSEN (page 87) rouses suspicion in every possible way against
this Swedish offer. He implies that the new offer, made immediately after
the breaking off of the negotiations, which, of course, was caused by
Swedish perfidy, was not likely to inspire confidence, and especially as
it did not include »the same guarantees we had before». It must
nevertheless be observed that this treaty contained far _greater_
guarantees, partly on account of the unanimous decision of the Diet,
partly on the grounds that the Crown Prince's programme was far easier to
carry out than the programme of the Communiqué, which implied that the
Consular question would solve itself. NANSEN also mentions that »the last
Union Committee worked on a similar basis without being able to come to a
decision, as the Swedish proposals were not acceptable to any section of
the Norwegian Commissioners». To this it must be observed that this
Swedish offer was more conciliatory towards the Norwegian wishes, than
the Norwegian majority's proposal had been in the last Union Committee.
Why therefore could it not be accepted by the Norwegians?
[53:1] N:o 15.
[53:2] N:o 16.
[54:1] N:o 17.
[55:1] Page 14.
[56:1] NANSEN (pag. 93).
[58:1] NANSEN page 93.
[58:2] There is no protocol of this Cabinet meeting, only a complete
report, communicated to the government of Christiania by the delegates of
the Cabinet.
Compare with N:o 19.
[58:3] N:o 18.
[58:4] Compare N:o 27.
[59:1] N:os 18, 19 and 21.
[59:2] On the Norwegian side they attach great praise to themselves for
having given the King a few day's grace in order to form a new Ministry.
The Norwegian Cabinet also blame the King (Compare with N:o 21) for not
having made use of this truce, and plainly imply hereby, that the King in
fact abdicated of his own accord. The King replied to this by alluding to
the Cabinets open threats (Compare with N:o 19) that the man who, after
being warned by the King, dared to approach the King as adviser, from
that moment lost his national rights; in other words, however the King
might act, the Revolution would come. The King is therefore reproached
for not endeavouring to form a new Ministry, after he had been threatened
with the revolution if the attempt had shown any sign of success. How
truly Norwegian!
[60:1] N:o 21.
[60:2] N:o 22.
[60:3] The terms of this communication are almost word for word the same
as in the address to the King.
[60:4] N:o 23.
[60:5] N:o 24.
[60:6] N:o 25.
[60:7] One reeds, for exemple, NANSENS arguments in real exaggerated
Norwegian logic. (page 94).
[61:1] Compare N:o 1 § 112 and N:o 2 § 12.
[61:2] »The kingdom of Norway is a free, independent, indivisible and
inalienable realm, united with Sweden under one King.»
[61:3] N:o 26.
[62:1] N:o 27.
[62:2] N:o 28. They are careful not to confute the King's defence of the
legality of his action.
[63:1] Compare, with N:os 15 and 16.