[Sidenote: _Norwegian policy after the grounding of the Consular
negotiations._]
The breaking off of the Consular negotiations undoubtedly put Norwegian
politicians into a very difficult situation. Thanks to the close
connection between the Union policy and the internal party disputes in
Norway, a popular interest has arisen for Union Politics which in
comparison with the realities disputed over, may be regarded as
extremely abnormal[47:1]. With the lack of consideration which in
critical moments distinguishes a similarly excited state on the people's
part, it was to be expected that the issue of the negotiations on the
Consular question would rouse their passions
It can hardly be said that Norwegian politics stood the trial in the
situation. To a Norwegian, that which followed may appear as a powerful
and magnificent achievement. Outsiders can content themselves by stating
that _the high-flown Radical politics of the last 20 years now bear their
fruit_.
In these days much is said of »necessity» in the development of events.
»Necessity», it is said, »has been stronger than the wishes of
individuals». To those who in any degree believe in personal influence
and personal responsibility, and not only the _needs_ in the progress of
history, it may be of interest to observe how those who now advance to
the front in Norway--MICHELSEN, LÖVLAND, BERNER, ARCTANDER--belong to
the old ranks of radicals from the beginning of 1890. Scarcely any
leading men have more strongly emphasized the importance of _creating_
public opinion than the Norwegian radical leaders, and few, with regard
to this, have better conformed their conduct to their views. The road to
do so these men pointed out was now followed at an unchecked pace. The
Norwegian radical policy had reached a climax.
The following events in Norway point decidedly to an energetic and
designing leadership organised from the beginning. It may be left unsaid
how far back the plans that where brought to light after the foundering
of the Consular question, were in existence. That they had already been
discussed long before that period can hardly be doubted. Neither can it
be doubted that just in reference to these plans, strong efforts had been
set at work on the Norwegian side to get the Consular negotiations broken
off[47:2]. And it is an indisputable fact that those men of action in
Norway had scarcely dared to take the step, if the ever threatening
danger in the east had not been allayed for a time; the real importance
of the Union to which they had for some years been alive, could be laid
to rest.
That the old traditions of the radicals now took the most prominent place
became manifest in innumerable ways. One symtom of this, was the
systematic labour of exciting opinions against Sweden. The orgies of
Swedish hatred and »national persecution», which in Christiania were held
in the Spring of 1905, far outstepped the limits of decency which even a
Norwegian ought to feel. The coarsest invectives were flung against the
government and people of Sweden. All Europe rang with accusations of
breach of agreement, ambitions for the supremacy spread from Christiania.
A few sensible and intelligent Norwegians, who really comprehended that
the Swedish government's claims had legal grounds, and were not meant as
an insult to Norway, made themselves heard[48:1] in the beginning, but
their voices were soon silenced in the tumultuons confusion that reigned.
In Norway feelings were excited, which more than ever gave Norwegian
opinion a tone of unreasonableness.
Another symptom was the distinctness with which the Union separation
shone as the goal. This was shown in the Cabinet meeting by the very
tactless, but very Norwegian expressions when the break-down of the
negotiations was officially announced. The old King was pleased to
express his hearty wishes, »that the two Kingdoms which could soon
celebrate the centenary of their Union, would never let any differences
of opinion break their bonds, as it was the safest security for the
independency, safety and happiness of the Scandinavian country and its
two peoples». To this, the Norwegian Cabinet replied that they had taken
the liberty in all humble submission to dissuade His Majesty from making
this speech[48:2].
A third symptom, and the one most significant of the spirit that now
dominated Norwegian politics was the road that they were soon unanimous
on taking. One cannot help feeling that it is a punishment for old sins,
that when Norway has to take a decisive step, and goes from words to
actions, it is not done openly and with honest intent. Norway does not
choose the straight road, it chooses winding crooked paths, which the
peculiar advocacy of Norwegian politicians long ago staked out. Norway's
breaking out of the Union is not a manly act committed under a sense of
personal responsibility, it is a miserable judicial process, in which
Norway, at the same time party to and self made judge in the case,
artfully tries to establish the guilt of their opponents--Sweden and
the Union King--in order to throw the burden of responsibility on them.
[Sidenote: _The question of resuming negotiations._]
In the Cabinet meeting held on Feb. 7:th 1905[49:1] the Swedish Minister
for Foreign affairs, Count GYLDENSTOLPE, pointed out that the chief cause
of the wrecking of the negotiations was, that the Swedish Minister for
Foreign affairs was supposed still to be at the head of the Foreign
policy of the Union, and he advocated the desirability of resuming
negotiations on this phase of the Union problem. The Minister for Foreign
affairs only expressed what had in fact been the wish of the Swedish side
all along, and what especially the Swedish negotiators during the first
stage of the negotiations, had urgently insisted on. The opinion that the
break down of the Consular negotiations ought to be immediate cause of
the renewal of negotiations which were also to include the question of
Foreign Administration, seemed at first to be regarded with favour from
the Norwegian side. The majority of the Norwegian government led by Mr
HAGERUP shared this opinion, though with one reservation. Evidently under
the influence of the general feelings in Norway, Mr HAGERUP considered
that if fresh negotiations respecting a revision of the Act of Union led
to no results, the old state of things could not possibly be allowed to
continue, but by voluntary agreements they must instead try to obtain
»more independent bases for the Co-operation of the two Nations», in
other words, prepare for the disssolution of the Union. In this way, said
he, it will be possible to establish a peaceful and honorable Union
Treaty. This was the programme he proposed in the Storting when he
announced the termination of the negotiations, and he further developed
it when he resigned in March.
A policy on those lines would at least have been open and honest, and
even if the results had brought about the rupture of the Union, it would
not have roused strong ill-will; it would, in fact, have preserved the
possibility of establishing conditions of Co-operation on more
independent lines. Though Sweden which, in the eyes of all Europe, was
responsible for the Union, could never take the _initiative_ in the
matter of dissolving the Union, a Norwegian proposal in the terms
presented by Mr HAGERUP had certainly not been refused without further
consideration[50:1].
But it soon appeared that Mr HAGERUP'S programme was not likely to be
favourably received in Norway. Immediately after the announcement of the
termination of the negotiations, the Storthing had summoned a so called
Special Committee to examine the conditions of the Union. The members of
this Committee soon went against the majority of the government, and
therefore, when the State Secretaries MICHELSEN and SCHÖNING at the end
of February protested against Mr HAGERUP'S proceeding, in sending in his
resignation, a complete crisis within the Cabinet was reached.
The king had, meanwhile, immediately after the termination of the
negotiations, resigned the government to the Crown Prince in the capacity
of Regent. After the Crown Prince Regent had conferred with the leading
politicians in Christiania, he made known his personal opinion on the
matter in a document adressed to the President of the Special Committee
appointed by the Storthing[50:2] He earnestly expresses his conviction
that the strength and prosperity of the two Kingdoms lies in the
preservation of the Union. He emphatically declared that the Union was
not the chief object for the _dynasty_, but it ought to be so to _the two
peoples_ concerned. He expressed warnings against the dissolution of the
Union, and urged that fresh negotiations, on a broader basis, should be
entered into for the settlement of all matters concerning the Union.
The persuasive tone of this document could not fail to make an effect,
but the Norwegian press tried hard to explain away the contents by
informing the public of their wonderful discovery, that the document was
of no »Constitutional importance», and shrewdly trying to prove that the
Crown Prince had no legal right to make known his opinion in that
manner[51:1].
Those who now held the reins in Norway, had to carry out their plans
before the worked up excitement cooled down. Therfore the way of the
negotiations was so dangerous. The Crown Prince found it necessary to
consent to a change of Ministry. Mr MICHELSEN, who was pointed out as the
man equal to the situation, was summoned, also a so called mixed Cabinet
consisting of Ministers of different parties; the two Prime Ministers,
however, Mr MICHELSEN und Mr LÖVLAND, were rank radicals. In the
beginning of March the Special Committee appointed by the Storthing were
able preliminarily to communicate the plan to be followed; it was not a
novel one, it was the old method from the beginning of the nineties to
take matters, especially those relating to the Consular service, into
»their own hands».
In the middle of March the Crown Prince returned to Stockholm, and here
twelve members of the Diet were immediately summoned, according to
decrees in the government regulations, in order to confer with the Crown
Prince Regent on the matter.
On the 5th April the Crown Prince, as Regent, dictated a proposal in the
joint Cabinet[51:2] that the two governments should immediately open
negotiations in view of the settlement of all matters concerning the
Union on the basis of the programme for a mutual Minister for Foreign
affairs and separate Consular services. He, at the same time, declared
himself willing to accept other proposals for the settlement of the
matter so long as the joint control of Foreign affairs was allowed to
remain undisturbed, as that was an indispensable guarantee for the
continuance of the Union[52:1].
On the publication of the Crown Prince-Regent's proposal, the Prime
Minister BOSTRÖM, against whom the wrath of the Norwegians had especially
been directed, resigned his office, which was immediately placed in the
hands of State Secretary RAMSTEDT. The Crown Prince's proposal was
immediately unanimously adopted on motions from the leading men in both
Chambers of the Diet[52:2].
_In this we thus find a clear and unevasive offer from Sweden to Norway,
for the establisment of full equality within the Union, and that too in
terms to which Sweden would never have consented but a few years
back_[52:3].
But the course of Norwegian politics could not be obstructed. The goal
was already in sight. In a communication from the Norwegian government of
the 17th April the reasons for the refusal are set forth. They are
typically Norwegian. It refers to preceding negotiations, the failure of
which is solely accountable to the circumstance that on the part of
Sweden it has been found impossible to accede to all the Norwegian
demands. The termination of the Consular negotiations had especially
»given ground for great disappointment, and if increased by a renewal of
similar unfortunate experiments, will threaten the gravest danger to the
good relations existent between the two peoples». The Norwegian
government knows what means to employ to produce »these good relations»,
namely, establishing its own Consular Service in the way prognosticated
in the past. This accomplished, »that confidence, which is the mainspring
of every friendly and fruitful inquiry into difficult and delicate
relations in a Union, will have revived». Norway is thus always the
injured one, and there is never a thought that Sweden on her part might
have or possibly _could find_ cause for displeausure over Norwegian Union
Policy[53:1].
In a joint Cabinet in Stockholm on April 23rd the aforementioned
statements were carried[53:2]. The Swedish Cabinet found it impossible,
for the present, to resume negotiations. The Norwegian Cabinet stated
imperatively--to those who would believe it--that it is not the
object of Norwegian action to have the present Union dissolved(!), but
they were in unity with the Swedish Cabinet. The Crown Prince deeply
deplored being forced to let these decisions remain final.
In the beginning of May the Swedish Diet resolved, on the basis of the
above mentioned motions, to address the King respecting the support they
had given the Crown Prince's resolution[54:1]. The Diet deeply deplored
the refusal already given by the Norwegians, but considered it possible
that their unanimous support of the Crown Prince's programme would lead
eventually to more favourable results.
[Sidenote: _Norwegian agitation._]
While these efforts on the part of the Regent and Sweden were being made
to bring Norway to reason, an energetic and designing agitation was being
carried on from Christiania. The press went over almost entirely to the
side of the programme; from Trondhjem alone, where union partisanship was
not altogether inclined to submit to the dictates from Christiania, were
heard hesitations.
Strong efforts were made in the Storthing to win over the doubting and
unwilling ones, and they were in the main successful. Then followed a
most energetic propaganda in order to win European opinion on Norway's
side. The European press was well supplied with materials for forming an
opinion of the situation, and with articles in German and English
newspapers, it became possible to persuade the doubting ones at home,
that Norway's cause was a righteous one,--all Europe saw that.
[Sidenote: _Proposal from the Special Committee of the Storthing._]
When the ground was thus well prepared the Special Committee of the
Storthing presented their proposals.
This recommends as before mentioned the old well-known tactics of the
first days of the Consular dispute. The modifications which were added
were only designed to hasten events, so that agitated minds should not
have time to reflect, and reason in some way be restored. In the
beginning of the 90's the so-called State subsidy line was followed, that
is, a certain sum of money was voted for the purpose of establishing a
separate Consular Service within a given time. This measure had meanwhile
shown that a delay would occur which would under present circumstances be
exceedingly inconvenient. Therefore the so-called legal measure was
adopted. The Resolution on the Norwegian Consular Service should be
presented to the King in the form of a law, the advantage in this being
that according to the Norwegian Constitution, a law shall be laid before
the King immediately after the resolution passed by the Storthing. But
there was an obstacle to this: the King's right of veto! On the ground of
the fundamental law, that if the King refuses his sanction to a bill
three successive times after it has been passed by the unaltered
resolution of the Storting, it becomes the law of the land without his
assent, the personal wishes of the king with regard to legal matters had
of recent times been to a certain extent respected. Thus so recently as
1900 the law applying to Consular Fees had been refused sanction by the
Crown Prince-Regent against the decision of the Ministry, and the Prime
Minister had countersigned the decision. But now the last vestige of
Sovereign power was refused. By a resolution that the law should commence
to act on April 1st 1906 all possibility of the King pronouncing his veto
was cut off beforehand. The settlement of affairs should immediately be
brought to a climax.
The proposed law made no provisions as to the relations of the Consuls to
the Minister of Foreign affairs. That matter was to be settled by a
Norwegian State Ordinance, dictated by the Ministry. It is easy to
imagine its intended basis by the Special Committee emphatically
declaring it to be their opinion that the Norwegian Cabinet had made too
many concessions in the last Consular negotiations. To begin with, it was
intimated in the Norwegian papers, that the matter referring to the
Consular Service and Diplomatic Department would be settled by treaty
with Sweden, a most illusive moderation, considering Norway, as
previously mentioned[55:1], by fixing the date when the laws would first
be in force, had alone the power of considering the basis of the possible
agreement. But this intimation was very soon contradicted; Norway would
take matters entirely into her own hands. And it was openly hinted, that
if the King found that he ought to sanction the law, they would then
proceed further with the question of their own Minister for Foreign
affairs.
[Sidenote: _The revolutionary basis of the proposal._]
The tactics in the whole of the procedings are characterised as being
revolutionary against the Union, its object being by one sided Norwegian
resolutions to dissolve the joint Foreign Administration. And as regards
the Consular question it has been explained that to withdraw without
consulting Sweden a part of the Foreign affairs from the Minister of
Foreign affairs who was mainly responsible for them, was utterly
unreasonable.
To what then did the Storthing invite the King? Simply this, _to take a
revolutionary step against the Union, to an initiatory dissolution of the
Union, to a protracted undermining of the foundation of the Union_, far
more dangerous than severing it at one blow. And the ugly thought in the
background was this: If the King did not submit to this, it would be
shouted out all over the world, that the King was faithless to the
interests of Norway, and had denied Norway's Sovereign rights; then he
should bear the blame for what would happen, the revolutionary rupture of
the bonds of Union. But not alone on him would the blame be thrown. The
King in the first place should be put to the proof. But, if the King said
'No', »it cannot», Mr NANSEN says, »be the result of Norwegian influence,
_but on account of Swedish pressure_»[56:1]. Here we are met by the
dishonourable train of thought that has formed the foundation on which
the Norwegian Radicals have built the whole of their work for undermining
the Union, that is, never to acknowledge the true motive--piety towards
the Union--when the King opposed the one-sided disloyal demands of
Norway, but instead always point to Swedish interests as the ruling
motive. And nevertheless, it is certain, that no Swedish-Norwegian King
has kept in view the Union, and _all it implied on all sides_, more
faithfully than King OSCAR II.
_They closed all roads by which the King would be able to decide the
Consular Question in a manner acceptable from a Union point of view; by
this means, they forced the King to exercise his veto--and then they
cast the responsibility of the revolution on him and Sweden._ This is the
basis of the tactics of the Norwegian Revolution. The characteristicness
of this is sufficiently evident.
[Sidenote: _The decision in the Storthing._]
The debate on the proposal of the Special Committee in the Storthing was
fixed for the day after the National Anniversary, May 17th. National
revelries were to precede to encourage and excite. In Christiania,
especially, the day was celebrated in such a manner, that there could be
no doubt as to what was in the wind. NANSEN used big words about Norway,
and big words against Sweden, and in the presence of several thousand
persons, a memorial wreath was laid--as on several previous years--on
a Colonel KREBS' grave; during the short strife between Sweden and Norway
in 1814, the man had succeeded in repulsing a Swedish regiment!
These imposing preparations were followed by the decision of the
Storthing. It was first proposed to decide unanimously without any
debate. But there were a few members in the Storthing who ventured to
protest in words--in actions no one dared to protest.
With a frankness evidently embarrassing to all present, Mr HAGERUP
pointed out the two only possible alternatives with reference to the
decision; to retract, or to rupture. The latter alternative he evidently
found most acceptable, and in Norway's real interest, he warned them as
to what the issue might be. He proposed that the decision with respect to
these eventualities--which might exceed both the Constitution and the
Act of Union--should be deferred till after the new elections, as the
Constitution with an almost torturing emphasis insists on caution when a
change in the government system is contemplated. Even the rest of the few
in the minority made known their different views, and among them the
Shipowner JÖRGEN KNUDSEN openly confessed that he saw no forcible reasons
for dissolving the joint Consular Service.
But the issue was plain. After Mr HAGERUP'S proposal for an adjournment
was voted against with a minority of few the Consular law was passed
unanimously.
[Sidenote: _King Oscar's position in regard to the Consular law._]
Nothing remained now but to continue. The uncertainty in various quarters
as to how king OSCAR would express himself, simply implied ignorance of
the political situation in an historical light. No Norwegian acquainted
with the real facts of the case, could be in doubts as to the King's
reply. Norway herself had dictated it and the innocent distrust of
NANSEN[58:1] and Norwegian newspapers, that the King, as they said,
»would really refuse Norway her right» seemed rather unnatural.
[Sidenote: _The Cabinet meeting. 27th May 1905_]
On the 27th May a Cabinet meeting was held at the Royal Palace in
Stockholm[58:2]. To the Norwegian Cabinet's appeal for sanction to the
Consular law, the King replied that the present regulations for the joint
Consular service as resolved in a joint Cabinet according to the Act of
the Union § 5, also under the same conditions, that is to say, by treaty
with Sweden, must be dissolved, and refused his sanction. The Cabinet
raised the strongest objections to this, and referred to Norway's
loyal(!) endeavours to advance the cause. The King's decree implied a
violation of Norway's independence and Sovereign right, and would
undoubtedly lead to the dissolution of the Union. The Cabinet thereupon,
sent in their resignations[58:3], which the King, meanwhile, refused to
allow, as he had _at present_ no prospect of forming a new Ministry. Then
ensued a discussion between the King and the Ministers. The King
maintained his right based on the Constitutional law, to exercise his
veto according to his own judgment and maintained the duty of the
Minister of State to countersign his decision. The Cabinet sought, on
their side, to defend the interpretation given in later years to the
fundamental law, that it presupposed the right of refusing
countersignature, but could, as a precedent, for present circumstances,
only quote the not altogether applicable opinion--after full
consideration--of the Norwegian Cabinet in 1847[58:4].
[Sidenote: _The situation after the 27nd May._]
Now the situation was as follows: The King had been forced to the
extremity of exercising his undoubted right, according to Constitutional
law, to form his decision according to his own judgment. It was
furthermore the Prime Minister's undoubted duty to countersign his
decree, the Cabinet, by raising protestations, were released from
constitutional responsibility for the royal decree according to the rules
of the fundamental law. But the Cabinet maintained another interpretation
of the fundamental law, and sent in their resignations, which the King,
meanwhile, refused to grant as he could not _for the present_--»now»--
form a new Ministry.
This word 'now' in the King's refusal to the Cabinets appeal to resign,
undoubtedly implies a reminder of earlier similar situations in the
beginning of 1890, when the Ministry--on one or two occasions _Radical_
--had remained in office some time after they had tendered their appeals
to resign, as the King was unable to form a new ministry. It was also
without doubt the legislative duty of the Ministry to remain at their
post till the King released them. For, according to the general
constitutional and administrative ideas of justice, it is the King who
releases his Ministers; they have no legal right to retire of themselves.
It is not Norway's _King_ who has transgressed the law, in spite of all
the accusations to that effect from Norway's government[59:1]. _The law
was transgressed on June 6th by the Norwegian Cabinet, when they informed
the King that they resigned office_[59:2].
[Sidenote: _The Norwegian Revolution._]
Their chief reason for this proceeding they declared to be their
inability to be a party to the King's policy, which according to their
opinion, was not in accordance with the Norwegian Constitution, and
declared themselves to be 'free men' entitled to the right to resign
office[60:1]. King OSCAR immediately sent protestations against this
proceeding on the part of the Ministers, both to the Storthing and the
Premier[60:2]. But before these came to hand, the next act was played
out.
On the 7th June the Cabinet informed the Storthing of their
resignation[60:3]. The Storthing forgetful of the very important little
word _now_ categorically recorded the fact that the King had declared
himself incapable of forming a new government, and came to the conclusion
that the Constitutional Royal Power was »no longer effectual», on which
the late Ministers were admonished to take up the reins of government,
which, according to Constitutional law, was the King's prerogative alone.
The King was therefore deposed. But Norwegian logic went boldly further.
King OSCAR having ceased to act as Norway's King, the declaration
followed, that the Union with Sweden was dissolved[60:4]. This was all
communicated in an address which the Storthing prayed to be allowed to
deliver to King OSCAR by a deputation[60:5]. The King of course replied
that he would not receive any deputation from the revolutionary
Storthing[60:6].
It is now these resolutions which are not called revolutionary in Norway.
They are, on the contrary, perfectly legal[60:7]!
The King was dethroned, because, supported by rights given by the
Constitution, he refused to sanction a resolution in conflict with the
principles of the Union, to which Norway, according to the first
paragraph of her Constitution, is bound.
The Union with Sweden was declared dissolved without reference to Sweden,
or observation of the terms in which the slightest change in the
Constitution and the Act of Union must be carried out[61:1]. And this
last resolution was carried in spite of the Constitutional prescription
that changes in the same must not come in strife with the principles of
State law, to which, if ever, the Union with Sweden belongs; as the
freedom and independence of Norway, according to the first paragraph of
the Constitution, are inseparably connected with this Union[61:2].
As aforementioned, all this is not revolution in Norway. Conceptions of
laws and rights have long shown themselves in strange lights in that
country.
[Sidenote: _Protestations of Sweden and the Union King._]
On June 9th Sweden declared her protest against the Norwegian revolution.
In the Cabinet Council to which the Swedish Chambers were summoned to
meet in on Extraordinary session[61:3], the Prime Minister strongly
emphasised the fact that the Norwegian Storthing's proceedings had deeply
violated Sweden's rights.
The following day, June 10th, King OSCAR issued his protest in an address
to the Norwegian Storthing[62:1]. In clear and convincing terms the King
maintains his formal legal right to form his resolution in opposition to
the Cabinet's opinion. And he, as forcibly, maintains that it was in the
capacity of the chief representative of the _Union_ that he had
considered it his duty to refuse his sanction to the Consular law. As
Union-King, he emphasizes his right and prerogative, even in opposition
to Norwegian public opinion in general, to maintain the principles of the
Union, and he finally refers to the decisions of himself and Sweden »if
Norway's attack on the existing Union should lead to its _legal_
dissolution».
[Sidenote: _Address of the Storthing 19th June 1905._]
The reply to this address of the King was an address[62:2] from the
Storthing on June 19th formally to His Majesty the King, but in reality
to the Swedish nation. In this it is explained that the Norwegian people
entertain no feelings of dislike or ill-will to the Swedish people, and
appeals to the Swedish State powers to promote a peaceful agreement on
both sides. The Storthing addressed this appeal to the people who by
their magnanimity and chivalry had won such a prominent place in the
ranks of Nations.
The Swedish nation had good cause for thinking that it might have
received this compliment _a little sooner_, instead of the overwhelming
mass of infamous accusations which it had formerly had to accept with a
good grace. And above all, it is their opinion that if Norway had
formerly adjusted its actions in accordance with their present ideas of
the Swedish nation, the present situation would now have been different
in all respects.
The document of the 19:th June contains also one detail, which has since,
step by step, been forced to the front by the Norwegian agitation, and
therefore deserves its separate explanation. This said that the Swedish
government on the 25:th April had emphatically refused to resume
negotiations, with the dissolution of the union as an alternative, in
case unity on the new forms of the union could not be arrived at, and on
this account, from Norway's side they have tried to cast the blame on
Sweden for the revolution of June 7:th under the pretext that Sweden had
already refused settlement by negotiation. What are the real conditions?
In the Norwegian Government's proposal of the 17:th April negotiations
are firmly _refused_, before the Consular question has been settled.
Therefore Norway has never proposed negotiations respecting the
situation which followed upon the 27:th May, when the King exercised his
veto against the Consular law. Furthermore, attention must be drawn to
the Norwegian government's wording of the _presuppositions_ for an
eventual negotiation. It should be carried on »_on an entirely free basis
with full recognition of the Sovereignty of each country without any
reservation or restriction whatever_», and among other matters, it was
stipulated, that, if the negotiations fell through, each Kingdom should
be able to decide, of its own accord, »the future form of its national
existence.» Thus the Swedish government was to accept in advance the
Norwegian Radicals legal conception of the Union, driven, to it by the
contingency that if Norway did not get her will in the matter, she would
break out, on her own accord, of the Union. It is manifestly against this
_method_ of negotiating matters, with its legal grounds and its premature
threat to rupture the Union on Norway's side, that the Swedish Prime
Minister appeals, when he speaks of a presupposition for negotiations on
the Norwegian side »as incompatible with the Union and the Act of Union.»
The Prime Minister can never have intended to contest the absurdity, that
the Union cannot legally be dissolved, so that it was not on that account
that he refused to negotiate.
But the Norwegian Cabinet hastened, craftily, to construe the contents af
the Prime Minister's speech, by maintaining that there was a possibility
for dissolving the Union[63:1]. Of all the cunning devices, the object of
which has been, on Norway's side, cowardly to cast the blame on Sweden,
this has been one of the most disgusting, so much the more so as the
majority of the Storthing itself opposed Mr HAGERUP'S proposal, and this
was certainly not previous to, nor after the Council of the 25:th April,
when it was seriously proposed, that a treaty for the dissolution of the
Union should be drawn up, in the event of the King exercising his veto;
the tactics that were adopted on 7:th June were made up a long time
beforehand.--
On the 20:th June the Diet assembled.