THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
_Fear made the Gods; audacity, has made kings._
--CREBILLON
Before leaving Springdale for the East, Brown forwarded the ordnance
stores to his son John, at Conneaut, Ohio, who carefully concealed them.
Proceeding to Rochester, New York, he stopped at the home of Mr.
Douglass, where he remained until February 15th. From there he commenced
his correspondence with the men whom he hoped he could induce to advance
the necessary money to float, or to initiate, the revolution; and it was
at the Douglass home that he wrote and revised the constitution for the
Provisional Government which he intended to attempt to set up in the
Southern States. Mr. Douglass stated to Mr. Sanborn[288] that he had a
copy of this Constitution in Brown's own hand writing, "prepared by
himself at my house."
February 2d, he wrote to the Rev. Theodore Parker that he had nearly
perfected arrangements for carrying out an important measure in which
the "world had a deep interest, as well as Kansas," and that he only
lacked from five hundred to eight hundred dollars to enable him "to do
it." Also that it was the "same object for which he had asked for secret
service money last fall"; that he had written to some of their mutual
friends concerning the matter but that none of them understood his
"views as well as you do"; and that he could not explain them without
their committing themselves further than he knew of their doing, closing
with the question, "Do you know some parties whom you could induce to
give their abolition theories a thoroughly practical shape?... Do you
think any of my Garrisonian friends at Boston, Worcester, or any other
place, can be induced to supply a little 'straw' if I will absolutely
make 'bricks'?"[289]
He wrote letters in a similar vein to Gerrit Smith, to Mr. Stearns, to
Mr. Sanborn, and to Mr. Higginson, and sought to have a meeting with
these gentlemen at Mr. Smith's home on February 23d, at which he
intended to submit to them as much of his plans as he thought it
advisable for them to know, for their consideration and approval. Mr.
Sanborn alone responded to his call; he arrived at Peterboro on Monday
evening, February 22d. Brown had arrived there on the preceding
Thursday, and had gone over the scheme with Mr. Smith. During the night
of the 22d, Mr. Sanborn says, the whole outline of the campaign in
Virginia was laid before the little council. "In astonishment and almost
in dismay," they listened to the reading of the constitution that he had
prepared for the government of the territory which he proposed to
conquer; and to a recital of the details of the hazardous adventure. In
the discussion, he explained his "plan of organization, of
fortification, of occupation, and of settlement in the South" and of his
"retreat through the North," if retreat became necessary. He had
foreseen every difficulty they could suggest, and had provided for it
"in some manner." And then he had "God on his side." "If God be for us
who can be against us." All he asked for, in addition to the equipment
which he then had, was "but eight hundred dollars, and would think
himself rich with a thousand." With that he would open his campaign in
the spring, and he had no doubt that the enterprise "would _pay_" as he
said.[290]
The next day Mr. Smith and Mr. Sanborn took up Brown's proposition for
final consideration and agreed to sustain him in it. They reasoned in
this way:
To withhold aid would only delay, not prevent him; nothing
short of betraying him to the enemy would do that. Mr.
Smith restated in his eloquent way the daring propositions
of Brown, the import of which he understood fully; and then
said in substance: "You see how it is; our dear old friend
has made up his mind to this course and cannot be turned
from it. We cannot give him up to die alone; we must
support him. I will raise so many hundred dollars for him;
you must lay the case before your friends in Massachusetts,
and perhaps they will do the same. I see no other
way."[291] For myself I had reached the same conclusion,
and engaged to bring the scheme at once to the attention of
the three Massachusetts men to whom Brown had written, and
also to Dr. S. G. Howe, who had sometimes favored action
almost as extreme as this proposed by Brown.
As to Mr. Smith, he had approved of Colonel Forbes, to whom he gave one
hundred and fifty dollars, and thought that he would "make himself very
useful in our sacred Kansas work." He approved of Brown's "effort to
seduce the soldiers of the Union" and thought his tract, "The Duty of
the Soldier," very well written. After his declaration to Thaddeus
Hyatt:[292] "We must not shrink from fighting for Liberty--& if the
Federal troops fight against her we must fight against them," he had not
far to go to approve of the insurrection and invasion which Brown now
contemplated.
The outcome of the Peterboro conference was satisfactory. Brown
skillfully put his public affairs in the hands of a committee--a war
committee, composed of friends who, he had reason to believe, would
finance his adventure. He therefore directed his energies to the task of
strengthening his organization for the work before him. Among those whom
he sought to enlist under his banner was Mr. Sanborn. To him he wrote
from Peterboro February 24th:[293]
MY DEAR FRIEND: Mr. Morton[294] has taken the liberty of
saying to me that you felt half inclined to make a common
cause with me. I greatly rejoiced for I believe when you
come to look at the ample field I labor in, and the rich
harvest which not only this entire country but the whole
world during the present and future generations may reap
from its successful cultivation, you will feel that you are
out of your element until you find that you are in it, an
entire unit. What an inconceivable amount of good you might
so effect by your counsel, your example, your
encouragement, your natural and acquired ability for active
service! And then how very little we can possibly lose!
Certainly the cause is enough to _live_ for, if not
to--for. I have only had this one opportunity, in a life of
nearly sixty years; and could I be continued ten times as
long again, I might not have again an equal opportunity.
God has honored but comparatively a very small part of
mankind with any possible chance for such mighty and soul
satisfying rewards. But my dear friend if you should make
up your mind to do so, I trust it will be wholly from the
prompting of your own spirit after you have thoroughly
counted the cost. I would flatter no man into such a
measure, if I could do so ever so easily.
I expect nothing but to "endure hardness"; but I expect to
effect a mighty conquest, even though it be like the last
victory of Samson. I felt for a number of years in earlier
life, a steady, strong desire to die; but since I saw any
prospect of becoming a reaper in the great harvest, I have
not only felt quite willing to live, but have enjoyed life
much; and am now rather anxious to live for a few years
more.
It is inconsistent with the tenor of this letter, to draw from it the
conclusion that the "mighty conquest" was a profitless "foray," or a
"raid," that Brown thus invited Mr. Sanborn to engage in; nor did the
latter so understand it. On the contrary he took the proposal seriously,
and was deeply impressed with the broad significance of the undertaking
herein dimly foreshadowed. Commenting thereon he, consistently, said:
Till I follow my noble friend to the other world, on which
his hopes were fixed, I can never read this letter without
emotion. Yet it did not persuade me to comply with his
wish. Long accustomed to guide my life by leadings and
omens from that shrine whose oracles may destroy but can
never deceive, I listened in vain, through months of doubt
and anxiety, for a clear and certain call. But it was
revealed to me that no confidence could be too great, no
trust or affection too extreme toward this aged, poor man
whom the Lord had chosen as his champion.
One might venture to suggest, in this connection, that Mr. Sanborn's
failure to catch any note of a "clear and certain call" during his
months of doubt and anxiety, might be due, possibly, to facts or
conditions existing in the Omnipotent economy. God, "whose mercy
endureth forever," may not have desired that a "generation should pass
off the face of the earth," at that time, "by a violent death." Also,
the absence of any evidence of the Divine approval of Brown's scheme,
raises a question of doubt, that the Lord had really appointed "this
aged poor man as his chosen champion." While, on the other hand, the
lamentable failure of the expedition undertaken in the accomplishment of
this enterprise; and the overwhelming wreck and ruin of those who
engaged in it, point to the theory that God, if he took any active
participation in the matter at all, was opposed to Brown--that he was on
the other side--on the side of the generation of men, women, and
children, who, trusting in His mercy, lived in innocent ignorance of
Brown's plot to destroy them.
Leaving Peterboro on the 24th, Brown began a tour among the colored
people to unite them in support of his campaign. February 26th, to March
3d, he was at Brooklyn at the home of Dr. and Mrs. J. N. Gloucester,
wealthy colored people, and sought their assistance. From Brooklyn he
went to Boston. From there, March 4th, he wrote to his son John:[295]
"As it may require some time to hunt out friends at Bedford,
Chambersburg, Gettysburg, Hagerstown, Md. _or even Harper's Ferry, Va._,
I would like to have you arrange your business so as to set out very
soon." March 6th, he was again at Boston, and on the 15th, at
Philadelphia again, where he met Rev. Stephen Smith, Frederick Douglass,
Rev. Henry H. Garnett, William Sill, and other colored men. His son John
met him there by appointment and thence they went to New York, New
Haven, and to North Elba, where they arrived March 23d. April 2d, they
were at Peterboro for consultation with Gerrit Smith, and from there
they went to Rochester, where they separated. From Rochester, Brown went
to St. Catherine, Canada, in company with a colored man--J. W.
Loguen--where they met, by appointment, Mrs. Harriet Tubman, colored,
known as the "Moses of her People." Brown was cordially received by the
Canadian negroes. They listened to his statement of the things that he
intended to do for their race, and gave him encouragement to believe
that many of them would enter his service.
Believing the money which had been pledged would be promptly furnished,
Brown launched his enterprise, and called a constitutional convention to
meet at Chatham, Canada, to formally adopt a "Provisional Constitution
and Ordinances, for the people of the United States." He then proceeded
to Springdale to report the situation to his captains.
The war party left Springdale April 27th, and arrived at Chatham on the
29th, Brown stopping at the home of James M. Bell, a colored man.
Notices calling the convention were immediately sent out; the form, as
drawn by Cook, was as follows:
Chatham, May -- 1859.
Mr. ----.: Dear Sir:--We have issued a call for a very
_quiet_ Convention at this place, to which we shall be
very happy to see any true friends of freedom and to which
you are most earnestly invited to give your attendance.
Yours respectfully,
JOHN BROWN.
The convention was represented, at Chatham, as being a meeting for the
purpose of organizing a Masonic (colored) lodge; it met May 8th, at 10
o'clock A. M. Only Brown's party and thirty-four colored men were
present. Richard Realf, in his testimony before the Mason Committee,
said that Brown opened the convention with an explanation of the
purposes for which it had been called. That he spoke of the manner in
which he had qualified himself for leadership--by a tour of the European
continent, inspecting all fortifications, especially all earthwork
forts, that he could find, intending to apply such knowledge, with
modifications and inventions of his own, to the warfare he now proposed
to undertake. "He spoke of his studies of Roman warfare, and of Schamyal
the Circassian chief, and of his knowledge of conditions in Hayti, and
of Toussaint L'Ouverture." He said that he expected all the free negroes
in the Northern States to flock to his standard, as well as the negroes
of the Southern States. Mr. Realf further stated that "no salaries were
to be paid to the officers" under this constitution. That it was "purely
out of that which we supposed to be philanthropy--love for the
slave."[296]
After the address Brown produced a copy of the "Provisional
Constitution." The articles were read and adopted unanimously. Each
person present then signed the constitution, and swore allegiance to the
Provisional Government.[297] The nature and purposes of Brown's invasion
of Virginia, in October, 1859, are disclosed in the forty-eight articles
contained in this remarkable historical document.[298]
At a meeting held in the evening, John Brown was elected
commander-in-chief and John H. Kagi. secretary of war. The balloting
for offices was continued on Monday, May 10th, and Richard Realf was
elected secretary of state, George B. Gill, secretary of the treasury,
Owen Brown, treasurer, and Osborn P. Anderson and Alfred M. Ellsworth,
colored, were elected members of Congress.
Article I, of the constitution, provides for qualification of
membership, and includes "all persons of mature age whether proscribed,
oppressed, and enslaved citizens, or of proscribed and oppressed races
of the United States, who shall agree to sustain and enforce the
Provisional Constitution and ordinances of organization, together with
all minor children of such persons, shall be held to be fully entitled
to protection under the same." Articles II, III, IV, and V relate to the
branches of government: Legislative, executive and judicial. A number of
articles relate to the trial of officers, impeachment, or recall of
judges, army appointments, etc., etc. Article XXVIII treats of
"Property." It recites that "All captured or confiscated property, and
all property the product of the labor of those belonging to this
organization and of their families, shall be held as the property of the
whole, equally, without distinction and may be used for the common
benefit, or disposed of for the same object." Article XXXVI is
especially instructive. It reads as follows:
"The entire personal and real property of all persons known to be
acting, either directly or indirectly, with or for the enemy, or found
in arms with them, or found willfully holding slaves, shall be
confiscated and taken whenever and wherever it may be found, in either
Free or Slave States."
Mr. Sanborn says this constitution will be found "well suited to its
purpose--the government of a territory in revolt, of which the chief
occupants should be escaped slaves," an opinion which assumes that the
white population had, in some manner, been eliminated from the
"territory in revolt."
The plan of government was written by Brown, and was adopted in a
solemn manner by sane men, who signed it; and copies of this
Constitution and Ordinances, Brown took with him to Harper's Ferry; and
on the 18th of October, 1859, personally referred to it as an exhibit of
his purposes for being there; and stated that it had been his intention
to have a large number of copies of it printed, and distributed "at
large," so that all might know the character of his invasion. And yet,
after the lapse of fifty years, comes an oracular disquisitor, who, with
an assurance de luxe, asserts that Brown and his followers did not
intend to establish a Provisional Government in the South, or to do any
of the things provided for in this infallible utterance; that his
invasion of Virginia was not an invasion, but a "raid" to carry off some
slaves, which, if successful, would be followed by further guerrilla
warfare in the mountains of Virginia.
Referring, with undisguised impatience, to the irrelation of the
"Constitution and Ordinances" to his conception of what Brown's purposes
were, or to what he desires the historian to declare Brown's purposes to
have been, he says, that "it actually contemplates not merely the
government of forces in armed insurrection against sovereign States,"
but that it "actually goes so far as to establish courts, a regular
judiciary and a Congress." And, "as if that were not enough it provides
for" such heresies in guerrilla warfare as "schools for that same
training of the freed slaves in manual labor which is today so widely
hailed as the readiest solution of the negro problem. Churches too were
to be 'established as soon as may be'--as if anything could be more
inconsistent with his fundamental plan"; which Mr. Villard then
magisterially states was to "break his forces up into small bands hidden
in mountain fastnesses, subsisting as well as possible off the land, and
probably unable to communicate with each other. At this and at other
points," he says, "the whole scheme forbids discussion as a practical
plan of government for such an uprising as was to be carried out by a
handful of whites and droves of utterly illiterate and ignorant blacks,
and may stand as a chief indictment of Brown's saneness of judgment and
of his reasoning powers"; admitting however, that "as a chart for the
course of a State about to secede from the Union and to maintain itself
during a regular revolution, the document was also not without its
admirable features."
Commenting upon the condition of Brown's mind at the time he wrote this
paper, Mr. Villard says that it was "fanatical, concentrated on one idea
to the danger point, but still it remained a mind capable of expressing
itself with rare clearness and force, focussing itself with intense
vigor on the business in hand and going straight to the end in
view."[299]
The preceding clause is in itself a refutation of the author's
criticism. If it be true that when Brown drew up this paper "his mind
was capable of expressing itself with clearness, focussing itself with
vigor on the business in hand and of going straight to the end in view,"
then it must be admitted that the document which he penned was not
intended to serve a purpose so trifling as a _raid_, but that it was
what it purported to be--a form of government or charter for a state
during a period of revolution.
It will be observed that it is not the practicability of a revolution,
such as the provisions of this document would be consistent with, that
constitutes the indictment of Brown's saneness and reasoning powers; but
the fact that the provisions of the constitution are inconsistent with
this author's invention of what Brown's plans were: "A plan of
government for small forces of whites and runaway slaves acting
separately as guerilla bands in mountain fastnesses." It is strictly
true that the provisions of the constitution are so inconsistent with
this fiction as to forbid discussion; but that fact should not
constitute an indictment of _Brown's_ sanity. It merely emphasizes the
fact that there is disagreement between John Brown and his biographer
of fifty years after, concerning the purpose for which Brown wrote the
provisional constitution and ordinances, and suggests, as a bare
possibility of the case, that the assumptions of the biographer as to
what that purpose was may be inconsistent with the tenor of the
constitution. If this biographer had been less eager to confirm in
history the theory that it was a foray or a raid that Brown sought to
execute at Harper's Ferry, he would have discovered that Brown intended
to organize a thorough-going army there,[300] instead of sporadic
guerrilla bands; and that he intended to extend the jurisdiction of this
Provisional Government over the State of Virginia and the South.
It was Brown's intention to begin his campaign at once, May 15th being
the date named; and something, probably, would have happened if he had
received the one thousand dollars promptly, that had been pledged in his
support. Realf, on his arrival at Chatham, wrote that they would remain
there until they had perfected their plans, "which will be in about ten
days or two weeks," after which they would "start for China."[301] Cook
also had something to say. He wrote to some young ladies at Springdale:
... I long for the 10th of May to come. I am anxious to
leave this place, to have my mind occupied with the great
work of our mission.... Through the dark gloom of the
future, I fancy I can almost see the dawning of light of
Freedom.... That I can almost hear the swelling Anthem of
Liberty rising from the millions who have but just cast
aside the fetters and the shackles that bound them. But ere
that day arrives, I fear that we shall hear the crash of
the battle shock and see the red gleaming of the cannon's
lightning.[302]
The seance closed abruptly on the 10th, owing to a collapse of the
exchequer; whereupon the cabinet officials and officers of the general
staff were furloughed, without pay, until such time as they would be
called upon to report to the commander-in-chief for service. They went
to Cleveland, Ohio, and it is said that some of them chafed under the
hardships and inconveniences of earning a living; with the result that a
spasm of "philanthropy and love for the slave" became imminent among
them. So pronounced were the symptoms that the honorable secretary of
state, Mr. Realf, on May 23d, in an official note to the
commander-in-chief, declared that unless "relief" were provided
speedily, those affected might be so inspired by philanthropy and love
for the slave as to "go South and raid by themselves."[303]
The failure to finance the Provisional Government was a result of a
flurry on the bourse, that had its origin in the activities of Colonel
Forbes. He was threatening the rear of Brown's communications. About the
last of April, he wrote from Washington to Mr. Sanborn and to Dr. Howe,
declaring his intention to give publicity to Brown's scheme. A "hurry
call" was accordingly sent out for a meeting of the war committee. At a
conference, May 2d, Mr. Parker and Mr. Steams thought "the plan" should
be "deferred till another year." Dr. Howe thought differently, while Mr.
Sanborn, whose mind was not working forcefully, was in a state of doubt,
which he expressed, May 5th, in a letter to Mr. Higginson.[304] Gerrit
Smith voted with Stearns and Parker. He wrote May 7th: "It seems to me
that in these circumstances Brown must go no further; and I so write
him."[305] May 9th, Higginson voted with Howe. He wrote: "I regard any
postponement as simply abandoning the project." A letter of the 9th from
Hon. Henry Wilson to Dr. Howe, settled the question. He went into the
matter a little deeper, and suggested that their actions might involve
others. He pointed out that if the arms in Brown's possession were used
for any other purpose than to "arm some force in Kansas for defense, _it
might be of disadvantage to the men who were induced to contribute to
that very foolish movement_"; and advised them to "get the arms out of
Brown's control, and keep clear of him, at least for the present."[306]
To this letter Dr. Howe replied on the 12th:
I understand perfectly your meaning. No countenance has
been given Brown for any operations outside of Kansas _by
the Kansas Committee_. I had occasion a few days ago to
send him an earnest message from his friends here, urging
him at once to go to Kansas and take part in the coming
election, and throw the weight of his influence upon the
side of right.... There is in Washington a disappointed and
malicious man working with all the activity which hate and
revenge can inspire to harm Brown, and to cast odium upon
the friends of Kansas in Massachusetts. You probably know
him. He has been to see Mr. Seward. Mr. Hale also can tell
you something about him. God speed the right.[307]
May 15th, he wrote Mr. Wilson, relating to the arms, that "prompt
measures have been taken and will be resolutely followed up to prevent
any such monstrous perversion of a trust as would be the application of
means raised for the defense of Kansas, to a purpose which the
subscribers of the fund would disapprove and violently condemn."[308]
Because of these letters Dr. Howe has been severely criticised; and by
Rear Admiral Chadwick unjustly charged with "gross prevarication."[309]
But, in a time of war, would the distinguished admiral hesitate to
deceive the enemy in a similar manner? The things which the Doctor said
were, of course, untrue, but in saying them he did not intend to wrong
the Senator or to deceive him to his disadvantage. The correspondence
was not personal; Senator Wilson was an intermediary, or a medium of
communication between Colonel Forbes and Brown's war committee. Howe,
acting-for the committee, had the right to deceive the enemy--Forbes--in
this manner. The letters he wrote were a stratagem of the war it was
promoting. Brown would have disposed of Forbes in a more heroic manner.
He wrote from Chatham: "We have those who are thoroughly posted up"
(professional assassins) "to put upon his track and we beg to be allowed
to do so."[310]
On May 14th, Mr. Stearns wrote to Brown enclosing a copy of Senator
Wilson's letter, also notifying him officially, as chairman of the
Massachusetts State Kansas Committee, that the arms in his care
belonging to the committee must not be used for any other purpose than
for the defense of Kansas.[311] He then forestalled any possibility of
future complication relating to the arms by foreclosing a lien, which he
is said to have held, on all the property of the committee; and having
thus obtained the title to the arms, he placed them in Brown's
possession as his personal agent. By this arrangement, Mr. Sanborn says,
The business of the Kansas Committee was put in such shape
that its responsibility for the arms in Brown's possession
should no longer fetter his friends in aiding his main
design.
But as to the character of the transaction he was not quite assured. "It
is still a little difficult," he said, "to explain this transaction
without leaving a suspicion that there was somewhere a breach of trust."
It was also agreed between them that Brown should not further inform the
members of the war committee of his plans in detail, nor "burden
them with knowledge that would be to them both needless and
inconvenient."[312] May 15th, Mr. Stearns wrote to Brown asking him to
come to New York during the next week for consultation; but for reasons
that have not been stated the meeting did not take place; it was
probably called off because arrangements were made for a more
interesting function.
Then as now, there was a Peace Society in existence. Mr. Gerrit Smith
was coming to Boston to deliver an address at its anniversary; and it
was decided to take advantage of his presence in the city, to have a
full meeting of the secret war committee which, Mr. Sanborn says, had
been organized in March, and consisted of Gerrit Smith, Theodore Parker,
Doctor Howe, T. W. Higginson, George L. Stearns, and himself. Mr. Smith
arrived and took lodgings at the Revere House. The committee held its
meeting, at his rooms, on the 24th of May. At this council it was
finally decided to postpone the campaign until the winter or spring of
1859, when the committee would raise for Brown "two or three thousand
dollars."[313]
Mr. Smith, because of his great zeal in the promotion of peace, had the
honor of being chosen to deliver the address at the anniversary of the
Peace Society, and, because of a similar zeal in the promotion of war,
he had the honor of being chosen to preside, as chairman, over the
Revere House deliberations of the war committee. It may be assumed,
because of his versatility, that he acquitted himself creditably in both
of these positions.
The impossibility of harmonizing the public professions of these
apostles of peace, with their secret undertakings as ministers of war,
discourages analyzation of their philosophy; and for the same reason,
discussion of questions of moral obliquity, or of commercial
irregularity in their actions or in the actions of any of them, in
juggling with the liability for Brown's war equipment, and in financing
an assault upon a State of this Union, may be dismissed as being without
profit.
May 31st, Brown returned to Boston full of regret because of the
postponement of the invasion; but with the arms securely in his
possession and with the $500 in gold in his pockets, which his committee
gave him as a salve to soothe his wounded hope; and with the decision of
the Revere House council to raise "two or three thousand dollars" for
his campaign the next spring, his spirits rose, and he left Boston for
North Elba well satisfied with the outcome of the flurry.
June 20th, he went to Cleveland and disposed of the staff, dividing with
them the $500, and making such arrangements for them as circumstances
permitted. Cook was sent to Harper's Ferry, to reconnoiter the field,
and obtain statistics and other information. It is also probable that
Brown would have joined him and begun the work of agitating the slaves
for the coming revolt, if the news from Kansas had not offered an
opportunity for "other occupations." The "disturbances" there,
culminating in the tragedy on the Marias des Cygnes, May 19th, appealed
to him with irresistible force. They "were the immediate cause of his
return to Kansas."[314]