A SOLDIER OF FORTUNE
_He was the mildest manner'd man that ever scuttled ship
or cut a throat._
--DON JUAN
At Collinsville, Connecticut, about March 1, 1857, John Brown gave out
the first evidence that he contemplated inciting an insurrection in the
Southern States. He was there making his usual appeal for money. To a
group of citizens, among whom was a Mr. Charles Blair, he told the story
of Black Jack; and, as was his custom in such recitals, he drew from his
boot a trophy of the fight--a two-edged dirk-knife with a blade about
eight inches long--which he had taken from Captain Pate; and said, that
if he "had a lot of those things to attach to poles about six feet long,
they would be a capital weapon of defense for the settlers of Kansas to
keep in their log cabins to defend themselves against any sudden attack
that might be made upon them." And then turning to Blair, whom he knew
to be an edge-tool maker, asked him what it would "cost to make five
hundred or a thousand of those things" as he described them. To this
Blair replied that he would make "five hundred for a dollar and a
quarter apiece; or if he wanted a thousand, they might be made for a
dollar apiece." To this Brown replied that he would want them made.
March 30th, a contract for the thousand spears was signed. Brown
agreeing to pay five hundred dollars within ten days. At the time agreed
upon he paid three hundred dollars; but April 25th, he remitted two
hundred and fifty dollars more. This amount Blair expended in purchasing
material, and in making a part of the order; after which he suspended
work on it until such time as Brown would advance additional funds.
There was some correspondence between the parties in February and March,
1858, but nothing further was done in the matter until June 3, 1859,
when Brown again called upon Blair and made satisfactory arrangements
for payment of the remaining four hundred and fifty dollars; whereupon
Blair renewed work upon the order, and, on September 17th, delivered the
spears complete, at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.[269]
In New York City, Brown made the acquaintance of an Englishman who
entered into his life more largely, and gave greater direction to his
actions, than his biographers have acknowledged. This man was "Colonel"
Hugh Forbes. Brown called upon him, it is said, with a letter of
introduction from the Rev. Joshua Leavitt. The date of their meeting is
not given; but, since Brown is not reported as being in that city during
1857, after his visit there, January 23d-26th,[270] it may be assumed
that they met upon that occasion, and together planned to precipitate a
revolution in the South, through an insurrection of the slave
population. Forbes was a practical as well as a professional
revolutionist. He had served with Garibaldi. Mr. Villard refers to him
as "a suave adventurer of considerable ability." To Mr. Horace Greeley
he was "fanatical and mercenary and wholly wanting in common sense."
Gerrit Smith described him as a "handsome, soldierly-looking man,
skillful in the sword-exercise, and with some military experience picked
up under Garibaldi." Before entering the latter's service he had been a
"silk merchant at Sienna." In Mr. Sanborn's opinion he was a "brave,
vainglorious, undisciplined person, with little discretion, and quite
wanting in qualities that would fit him to be a leader of American
soldiers. Yet he was ambitious, eager to head a crusade against
slavery." In New York he taught fencing, and did some work on the
_Tribune_ as reporter and translator.
It was not unnatural that these two adventurers should meet and unite
their fortunes in a revolutionary venture. Also, there was some
similarity in their lives. Both were "typical of the human flotsam and
jetsam washed up by every revolutionary movement." Forbes had been
washed up by Garibaldi's "revolution" in Italy, and Brown had been
washed up by Robinson's revolution in Kansas. Forbes was looking for an
adventure, and Brown had a make-believe one on hand, which, if prudently
handled, might be made to serve the purposes of their mutual ambitions.
The suave adventurer was the stronger character. He impressed Brown with
his knowledge of military science, and with the value his services would
be in their undertaking, and so fascinated the "grim, self-willed,
resolute chieftain" that he engaged his services at one hundred dollars
per month, and paid him six months' salary in advance. Mr. Villard
says:[271]
John Brown, the reticent and self-contained, unbosomed
himself to this man as he had not to his Massachusetts
friends who advanced the money upon which he lived and
plotted.
In relation to this Mr. Sanborn says:[272]
It was about this time that Brown made the unlucky
acquaintance of Hugh Forbes, was pleased with him, and
engaged him to drill his soldiers at a salary of one
hundred dollars a month, even going so far as to pay him
six hundred dollars in advance.
Both of these major transactions--the placing of the order for the
spears, and the employment of Forbes, as stated--are so discreditable to
ordinary intelligence, that they impeach Brown's sanity, except upon the
sole hypothesis, that these two men had, at that time, so matured their
plans for attempting a revolution, through an insurrection of the
slaves, that Brown felt justified in placing the order for the spears,
and in engaging the services of a man capable of directing large
military operations. It is impossible to believe that Brown contemplated
giving up a thousand dollars for a purpose so tame and absurd as the
distribution of a thousand spears among the Free-State settlers of
Kansas. They were already well armed with modern weapons--fire-arms--and
knew how to use them; while the proposal to employ a "drill-master" at
such a salary, in view of the state of his treasury, to drill such a lot
of nightriders as he could use in Kansas, is quite as preposterous. If
Brown needed the services of a drill-master, he knew where one could be
had for less money. There were plenty of men available who had served in
the volunteer army in Mexico, or had been discharged, or had deserted
from the regular army--men of the Aaron D. Stevens class--who were
competent to command as well as to drill. He also knew that many such
men were ready and anxious to engage in adventures in the Kansas field,
who would serve without compensation, other than a share of the
prospective plunder.
From the time of his alliance with Forbes, Brown pressed forward
steadily, with a single definite ultimate purpose. The conquest of the
Southern States was on; and the Osawatomie Guerrilla had become the
Soldier of Fortune.
Brown and Forbes moved upon the theory that the slaves were the rightful
owners of their masters' property. They believed that every slave
regarded his master as an enemy, who denied him a right to his family,
and appropriated to himself the fruits of his labor; that freedom was
the hope and the dream of every slave; that each lived in a state of
expectancy, awaiting the coming of a "Liberator" who would lead them in
a crusade for liberty. Also, they believed that every slave would fight
for his freedom. Self-constituting themselves "Liberators," they
regarded each slave as already enrolled in their service. The problems
before them were how to arouse these units of energy; how to incite the
slaves to simultaneous activity, and how to organize and direct them as
an operating force. The man who had killed his friendly neighbors with
nonchalance, and had taken their horses, could not understand why
another man, a slave, should hesitate to kill an enemy, such as has been
described, and take his horses and lands, and be further rewarded by the
benefaction of liberty.
As results of their plotting, and planning, and scheming, they seem to
have figured out to their entire satisfaction, how they could destroy
the slave-holding population of the Southern States and confiscate their
property; and then, with the aid of their negro allies, thus liberated
from slavery, and with the assistance of the non-slave-holding whites in
the South and the ambitious and daring in the North, who would be lured
to join them, they could create an army; invade the South; take
possession of the several State governments, and reorganize them under
the jurisdiction of a Provisional Government.
Brown was a disunionist,[273] and believed his revolution would result
in a dissolution of the Union. His friends--Redpath, Sanborn, Higginson,
Smith _et al._, were disunionists, and he lived in an atmosphere
saturated with the toxin of disunion sentiment. Also, he was an
optimist, and believed that while he ravaged the South with his bloody
scourge, the disunion propaganda in the North would assert itself to his
advantage, and create such a diversion in his favor, as would leave him
and Forbes free to deal with the South and its problems in their own
way. Only under such conditions could he hope to seize the property of
slave-holders, "personal and real, wherever and whenever it may be found
in either Free or Slave States." From their point of view, or as they
hoped to make it appear, their revolution was to be an affair between
the citizens of a block of sovereign States, in the result of which the
Federal Government would not be especially concerned. They would act
within the limits of the States involved for revolutionary purposes,
and not in unnecessarily aggressive hostility toward the United States.
At the same time, these adventurers well understood that no matter how
successful they might be in starting their revolution, there would
probably come a time when the Federal army would have to be reckoned
with; that the General Government would attempt to intervene in behalf
of local order, at least, and might seriously embarrass their operations
or wholly defeat them. This visible menace they not only planned to
overcome, or eliminate from the problem, but actually to turn it into a
valuable asset, by transposing it bodily to their side of the military
equation. They planned, in apparent sincerity of purpose, to accomplish
what appears to be the most colossal of all imaginable absurdities: to
have the men of the United States army abandon their colors and accept
service in their army; or, as Brown expressed it, to make an "actual
exchange of service from that of Satan to the service of God."
To poison the minds of the soldiery of the Union and to ripen them for
revolt against their colors, they planned to begin a campaign of
education; to publish and distribute in the army, a series of tracts,
for the instruction of the officers and enlisted men in public morals
and in patriotism. In the division of their labors, to Forbes was
assigned the Department of Literature. In pursuance of his duties, he
proceeded to prepare a "Manual of the Patriotic Volunteer," and a tract,
which was the first of what was to be a series of tracts, entitled "The
Duty of the Soldier."[274] The tract was headed in small type:
"Presented with respectful and kind feelings, to the Officers and
Soldiers of the United States Army in Kansas." Mr. Villard says[275] the
object of the tract was to win them from their allegiance to their
colors. That it does this indirectly by asking whether the "Soldiers of
the Republic" should be "vile living machines and thus sustain Wrong
against Right." That it contained "three printed pages of rambling and
discursive discussion of the soldiery of the ancient Republics and of
the princes of Antiquity, and a consideration of Authority, legitimate
and illegitimate--as ill-fitted as possible an appeal to the regular
soldier of 1857." Appended to the copy in his possession is a closing
remark in Brown's handwriting as follows:
It is as much the duty of the common soldier of the U. S.
Army according to his ability and opportunity, to be
informed _upon all subjects_ in any way affecting the
political or general welfare of his country; and to watch
with jealous vigilance, the course and management of all
public functionaries both civil and military: and to govern
his actions as a citizen Soldier accordingly: as though he
were President of the United States.
Respectfully yours,
A SOLDIER.
To one person at least, this literary performance was a serious matter.
In the promotion of it, John Brown was deeply, deadly in earnest. The
statement that "Forbes and not Brown, was the author of the tract"[276]
is not correct, and to characterize the paper as Forbes's attempt to
seduce the soldiery of the Union,[277] is equally misleading. The scheme
originated with Brown; he furnished the subject. To Forbes he assigned
the duty of preparing the text for publication. Writing to Rev. Theodore
Parker, from Boston, March 7, 1858, he said:
... I want you to undertake to provide a substitute for an
address you saw last season, directed to the officers and
soldiers of the United States Army. The ideas contained in
that address I, of course, like for I furnished the
skeleton. I never had the ability to clothe those ideas in
language at all, to satisfy myself.... In the first place
it must be short or it will not be generally read. It must
be in the simplest or plainest language, without the least
affectation of the scholar about it, and yet be worded
with great clearness and power.... The address should be
appropriate, and particularly adapted to the peculiar
circumstances we anticipate, and should look to the actual
change of service from that of Satan to the service of God.
It should be in short, a most earnest and powerful appeal
to men's sense of right and to their feelings of humanity.
Soldiers are men, and no man can certainly calculate the
value and importance of getting a single "nail into old
Captain Kidd's chest." It should be provided beforehand,
and be ready in advance to distribute by all persons, male
and female, who may be disposed to favor the right.... Now,
my dear sir, I have told you about as well as I know how,
what I am anxious at once to secure. Will you write the
tracts, or get them written, so that I may commence
colporteur?[278]
There can be no doubt that Brown placed a high estimate upon the value
of this tract, but we know from the postscript thereto, that, although
the tract was dedicated to the "Officers and Soldiers" of the army, it
was the "common soldier" that he hoped to arouse and incite. His effort
to convert the army to his service, by means of a tract, may be called
madness, but it may also be said there was "method" in the madness. If
he had been criticised in relation to this matter, he would probably
have said in reply what he said to Mr. Sanborn, defending his action in
ordering the thousand spears: "Wise men may ridicule the idea; but I
take the whole responsibility of that job;" which was equivalent to
saying: "You do not comprehend the scope of my scheme, or the use which
I intend to make of these spears. When they have accomplished their
silent but deadly work, the wisdom of my conduct concerning them will
appear." The trouble in this case was how to obtain an opportunity to
inject the virus of revolt into the ranks of the army--how to start the
contagion--how to get his proposition before the troops, and to explain
what he intended to do; and what he would have at his disposal to offer
in the way of rewards for services in his army, without putting himself
and his plans in peril. How he intended to use the tract can only be
surmised. But the fact remains that he had to begin this all important
move somehow or somewhere, and the tract was, probably, evolved from his
inner consciousness to meet that necessity. It may therefore be assumed
that, under cover of discussing the generalities contained in the tract,
Brown hoped to make acquaintances among the enlisted men of the army in
whom he could confide, and who would serve his purpose by fomenting the
revolt.
In projecting his campaign, Brown was a law unto himself, untrammelled
by the accepted usages of war. The excess of his ardor and enthusiasm
led him to believe that he could corrupt the rank and file of the army.
In his philosophy, the daring, dangerous, adventurous men who largely
composed the enlisted men of the army at that time, having no hope of
promotion in the service, would become eager listeners to his proposal.
Before them, he would throw open the storehouses of his prospective
empire, that they might behold the volume of his treasures, and select
that which they desired. His army was to be created; he had the men in
view--the slaves whom he would set free--but not the officers to command
them. If the enlisted men would desert from their service singly or _en
masse_, and thus temporarily paralyze the United States forces, and join
him, they could immediately become commissioned officers in his army and
share with him the honors, the booty, and the beauty of the rich country
he intended to ravage. By means of these "mighty and soul satisfying
rewards" he hoped to "seduce the soldiery of the Union." The campaign of
education was a stratagem.
It is not apparent that Forbes, at any time, showed a desire to quit
Brown's service, or any disinclination to follow him westward. It is
true that he was in arrears at one time with his literary work, but
that was due to an incidental diversion of his activities in other
directions--soliciting contributions and collecting money from various
benevolent persons, including Mr. Greeley and Mr. Gerrit Smith. Forbes
also had been making necessary arrangements for the comfort of his
family--a wife and a daughter. The former being in Paris, and the latter
in New York, he wisely decided, in view of the character of the pending
military operations, to have the latter return to the care of her
mother. Brown, who was paying the price, required results rather than
explanations. It appears that Forbes had not prepared the "Manual"
within the time in which he had led his impetuous chief to believe it
would be forthcoming; and this had aroused an unwarranted suspicion in
his mind that his subordinate was lagging. It is also true that Forbes
had been indiscreet from a "military" point of view. He had talked, as
one having authority, or knowingly, about the situation in Kansas, and
had committed the very serious mistake of expressing a doubt that their
services would be needed there before winter, which would have a
tendency to discourage contributions to the "cause of freedom." In
addition to all this, Brown became suspicious that the "Colonel" was
ambitious, and aspired to supersede him in command; or, it may be that
he became jealous because of his subordinate's brilliant
accomplishments--his "military bearing" and qualifications. Mr. Sanborn
confirmed Brown's distrust of him. He says that "Forbes was ambitious
and apparently desirous of taking Brown's place in command." It may,
however, be nearer the truth to assume that the depleted condition of
the exchequer had much to do with Brown's "dissatisfaction" with Forbes.
There is no apparent reason why Forbes should have preceded Brown into
Kansas, and the fact that he arrived at Tabor August 9th, two days after
the arrival of his chief, is proof of commendable alacrity on his part
to take up and continue his duties. Besides, Forbes brought with him
copies of the "Manual," and copies of Brown's specialty: "The Duty of
the Soldier." With these evidences of his ability, fidelity, and
loyalty, the shadows of distrust were all dispelled, and Forbes's
restoration to Brown's confidence and favor resulted immediately. The
next day Brown was in a hopeful mood, and wrote very encouragingly to
Mr. Stearns, sending him copies of the tracts and, incidentally,
impressing upon his attention the important fact that he was "in
immediate want of Five Hundred to One Thousand Dollars for secret
service and no questions asked."
There can be no doubt that in their poverty, but dreaming of the
splendors of war, of marching armies, and the possibilities of empire,
these two bankrupt but hopeful speculators in destiny gazed wistfully
upon the order for the seven thousand dollars that Stearns had given to
Brown after his "Farewell to the Plymouth Rocks" effort. The question
was, how to get some of it. Unfortunately for their purpose, Mars was
not doing a thing for them; they were unable to detect even so much as a
_trace_ of a war-cloud upon the Kansas sky; and the $7,000 could only be
used for the subsistence of the make-believe troopers when in "active
service." Under these circumstances they did the best they could; they
made as much as possible out of nothing. They wrote Mr. Stearns what he
already knew; that there was no fighting in Kansas "just then"; and,
that while "Rather interesting times were expected, no great excitement
is reported." But "Our next advices may entirely change the aspect of
things." From this, Mr. Stearns was to be led to infer that imminent
danger to the Free-State cause was lurking somewhere, and that the
sagacious leader was already upon the trail of it. Also, the hope that
Brown earnestly expressed that the "Friends of Freedom" would respond to
his call and "prove me now herewith," was intended to move Mr. Stearns
to authorize Brown to draw upon him for a part of the seven thousand
dollars for their immediate necessities. But, although the request was
wisely framed and neatly but urgently pressed, it failed to raise any
money. To Theodore Parker Brown wrote September 11th:[279]
MY DEAR SIR: Please find on other side, first number of a
series of tracts lately gotten up here. I need not say I
did not prepare it; but I would be glad to know what you
think of it, and much obliged for any suggestions you see
proper to make. My particular object in writing is to say,
that I am in immediate want of some five hundred or one
thousand dollars for secret service, and no questions
asked. I want the friends of freedom to "prove me now
herewith."... Have no news to send by _letter_.
Stranded at Tabor, without means to go anywhere, or with which to do
anything, the two leaders of the revolution had abundant leisure to
compare their respective plans of operation, and their views upon
methods of procedure, as well as to formulate and agree upon final plans
for the invasion and conquest. Forbes, later, disclaimed any intention
to participate in "Brown's" purpose to overthrow the State Governments,
and establish a provisional government; but that disclaimer came as an
incident in his effort to supersede Brown, after his name had been
dropped from the muster and pay-roll. November 1st, the financial
embargo was raised by the receipt of two hundred and fifty dollars: one
hundred and fifty from Lane, and one hundred from Mr. Adair. It was not
a large sum of money, when compared with the expenses usually incurred
in "mobilizing" even a small army, or, as compared with the magnitude of
the operations they intended to inaugurate; but it was large enough to
enable the filibusters to start doing something.
In their dreams of the Provisional Government and in their planning for
the Provisional army, they decided to open a school for instruction in
the science of war and in the science of civil government, at some point
convenient to the scene of the prospective conflict; whereat the persons
whom Brown had in view for his subordinate commanders--general
officers, division and military district commanders--could be swiftly
educated and fitted for their respective duties and responsibilities.
Forbes, whose position was that of a chief of staff, was to have charge
of the school. November 2d, he took passage from Nebraska City for the
East to find a suitable location, in Ashtabula County, Ohio, for the War
College which was to be improvised; and Brown, as we have seen,
proceeded to Kansas to further finance their venture if local
conditions--"disturbances"--became favorable for fiscal operations; and
to matriculate the tyros.
He had been in correspondence with Holmes--the "Little Hornet"--and
other adventurers whom he thought would engage in his enterprises. Cook
agreed to join him and recommended others--Richard Realf, Luke F.
Parsons, and Richard J. Hinton.[280] On Sunday, November 8th, Brown met
Cook and Parsons, near Lawrence, and came to an understanding with them
for organizing a party to steal some horses; or, as Mr. Villard puts it:
"To organize a company for the purpose of putting a stop to the
aggressions of the pro-slavery forces." A few days later he notified the
members of the party to meet at the appointed rendezvous. Cook met him
on the 16th, at Mrs. Sheridan's, near Topeka. The next day Aaron D.
Stevens, Charles W. Moffet, and John H. Kagi joined them, and the party
set out on the contemplated expedition.
In their camp north of Topeka that evening. Brown took the men into his
confidence, and disclosed to them his intention to attempt the conquest
of the Southern States.[281] "Here," says Cook in his confession, "for
the first time I learned that we were to leave Kansas to attend a
military school during the winter." It is for the reader to decide for
himself whether or not the party stole any horses that night, or what
other steps they took, if any, to put "a stop to the aggressions of the
pro-slavery forces." Their destination was Tabor, Iowa; they were horse
thieves, and were in a secret camp, north of Topeka. Continuing his
narrative Cook says: "Next morning I was sent back to Lawrence to get a
draft of $80 cashed, and to get Parsons, Realf and Hinton, to go back
with me." He relates how he with Realf and Parsons, made the trip to
Tabor; but the route traveled by Brown, Stevens, Moffet, and Kagi, and
the incidents of their journey, if any, are not given.
December 2d, there were assembled at Tabor, John Brown, Owen Brown, A.
D. Stevens, Charles W. Moffett, C. P. Tidd, John H. Kagi, Richard Realf,
Luke F. Parsons, John E. Cook, and W. M. Leeman; also Richard
Richardson, a runaway slave whom Brown had picked up at Tabor. "Here,"
Cook says, "we found that Captain Brown's ultimate destination was the
State of Virginia"; and these were the men he had selected for his
commanders in the Army of the Invasion. They were not a coterie of
humanitarians or sentimentalists whom he had picked up, mooning about in
Kansas; but a lot of care-free, reckless, ambitious young men who had
parted their moorings to an orderly life. Of them Senator Doolittle,
speaking for the minority of the Mason Committee said: "It was from such
elements [lawless] that John Brown concocted his conspiracy consisting
of young men and boys over whom he had entire control, many of them
foreigners and none of substance or position in the country."[282] It is
not in the "dominating spirit of John Brown himself must be found the
true reason for their readiness to join in so desperate a venture as
Brown outlined to them or because of their readiness to go any lengths
to undermine slavery."[283] Cook knew Brown's career from the
Pottawatomie to Osawatomie, and approved of his system for undermining
things. Parsons was with him in the Osawatomie cattle raid. Stevens had
graduated from a volunteer in the Mexican War, to a private in the
First Dragoons, United States army. He was insubordinate, and had been
tried for mutiny and for assaulting an officer--Major George A. H.
Blake, First Dragoons--and sentenced to death. The sentence had been
commuted to confinement, for three years at hard labor, in the military
prison at Fort Leavenworth, from which he escaped and joined the
Free-State forces in Kansas. He became colonel of the Second Regiment in
the Free-State army under the name of Charles Whipple. It was not Brown
and his magnetism or any insipid nonsense about "philanthropy or love
for the slave" that appealed to these adventurers, but the scheme which
he unfolded before them. It was the charm of the glittering expanse of
opportunity which he pressed upon their mental conceptions, that won,
and enlisted them in the venture.
On December 4th, with their plunder, ordnance stores and camp and
garrison equipment, Brown and his staff set out from Tabor for
Ashtabula. There had been argument, disagreement, and some wrangling at
Tabor about the practicability of the undertaking; but yielding to the
force of Brown's exposition of it, opposition was silenced and
confidence of success supplanted doubt in the minds of all. Of the march
across Iowa to Iowa City and Springdale, Mr. Villard, quoting from
fragments of Owen Brown's diary, that survived the wreck at Harper's
Ferry, says: "Progress was slow, for all of the men walked and the
weather was bitter cold. On December 8, the entry reads: 'Cold, wet and
snowy; hot discussion about the Bible and war--warm argument about the
effects of the abolition of slavery upon the Southern States, Northern
States Commerce and manufactures, also upon the British provinces and
the civilized world; whence came our civilization and origin? Talk about
prejudices against color; question proposed for debate,--greatest
general, Washington or Napoleon.'" The party arrived at Springdale,
Iowa, on the 28th or 29th of December. Early in January, 1858, Brown
changed his plans about going to Ashtabula County, and for opening there
the School of Instruction. On January 11th, he located his men for the
winter at the home of Mr. William Maxson, the latter agreeing to take
the wagons and horses from Brown on account for boarding. The War
College was then opened at Springdale, instead of in Ashtabula County;
and with Stevens in charge instead of Forbes. Continuing his narrative
about the doings of the school, Mr. Villard says:[284] "On the 12th
(February) there was 'talk about our adventures and plans.' In the main,
discussion ranged from theology and spiritualism to caloric engines, and
covered every imaginable subject between them. Much talk of war and
fighting there was, and drilling with wooden swords. Stevens, by reason
of his service in the Mexican War, and subsequently in the United States
Dragoons, was drill-master in default of Forbes. Sometimes they went
into the woods to look for natural fortifications; again they discussed
dislodging the enemy from a hill-top by means of zig-zag trenches.
Forbes manual was diligently perused." Also they organized a "moot
legislature and beguiled the long winter evenings, drafting laws for an
ideal 'State of Topeka.' It followed the regulation procedure with its
bills and debates." The curriculum in this school is evidence of the
character of the duties the students therein were being fitted to
perform; they were being instructed in the higher strategy of war, in
the command of troops and in the science of government. Writing to Mr.
Sanborn from Brooklyn, February 26th, Brown said:[285]
I want to put into the hands of my young men, copies of
Plutarch's "Lives," Irving's "Life of Washington," the best
written Life of Napoleon, and other similar books, together
with maps and statistics of States ... I also want to get a
quantity of best white cotton drilling--some hundred
pieces, if I can get it. The use of this article I will
explain hereafter.
About January 1st, the two Soldiers of Fortune--Brown and
Forbes--arrived at the parting of their ways. They seem to have been in
agreement and in full sympathy with each other when they separated
November 2d; for Brown at that time gave Forbes a letter to Mr.
Frederick Douglass, commending him to his confidence and asking Douglass
to assist him. The letter Forbes lost no time in presenting. He stopped
at Rochester, as he went east, and got what money he could. Mr. Douglass
says[286] that he was not favorably impressed with Forbes at first, but
took him to a hotel and paid his board while he remained, and gave him
some money for his family in Europe, then in destitute circumstances. He
introduced him to some of his German friends whom Forbes "soon wore out
with his endless begging."
Failing to collect money for the cause, as fast as he thought he was
entitled to, or as fast as he needed it, Forbes began to try to force
contributions from Brown's friends, claiming that he had been employed
by him, and that sums of money were due him on account of arrears of
salary. Later he threatened to expose Brown's plans of invasion,
believing, or assuming to believe, that such plans were a part of a
general conspiracy, among the northern Abolitionists, to overthrow
slavery. Information relating to his conduct was received by Brown at
Springdale, and caused him to halt there until he could ascertain the
extent of Forbes's defection. Upon confirmation of his advices, and
being unable to pay Forbes's salary, he dropped him; refused to answer
his letters, and changed his plans of procedure. Pressed by his
necessities, Forbes became aggressive, and, carrying his case to Mr.
Charles Sumner and to Mr. Henry Wilson, and to Mr. William H. Seward,
denounced Brown as "reckless, unreliable and vicious." He approached
Mr. Wilson in the Senate chamber at Washington and demanded that Brown
and his men be disarmed.
While Forbes caused Brown no end of trouble, the case was not nearly so
serious as it would have been, if his eastern patrons had known what
Forbes was talking about. Brown, whose "sincerity of purpose was above
suspicion," and who "was so transparent that all men can see him
through," had led them, throughout the whole extent of their
intercourse, to think and believe that his operations were to be
undertaken solely for the defense of the Free-State settlers in Kansas;
they knew nothing about his plans for operations in Virginia. In the
face of this condition of affairs, Forbes could make no progress, by
means of his threats to make exposures, and was immediately discredited;
for, as Mr. Douglass said, "Nobody believed him although the scoundrel
told the truth." He was discreet however, in his controversy with Brown
and in his denunciation of him, in this respect: he was careful not to
give his troubles publicity, or to do anything that would otherwise
imperil or wreck the general proposition.
Forbes did not, at first, comprehend Brown's autocracy in the
scheme--that he had no associates--and, that while he depended upon his
generous friends to finance the enterprise, he had not taken them into
his confidence, but was in reality practicing a deception upon them.
When the facts of the situation finally became apparent to his
understanding, he then sought to discredit Brown and his plans, and to
ingratiate himself with his clientage, so as to supersede him in
leadership, and in control of any general plan of action, in relation to
slavery, that might thereafter be agreed upon and undertaken. With this
purpose in view, Forbes addressed a letter to Dr. Samuel G. Howe, May
14, 1858, submitting to him a very weak statement of the violent and
dangerous things which Brown intended to do, for comparison with a
statement of the safe and sane things, that, in his judgment, could be
done: claiming that he had urged his plan upon Brown, and that he had,
at one time, succeeded in obtaining Brown's consent thereto: and that it
had been adopted by them under the name of "The Well-Matured Plan."
Extracts from this letter are published by Mr. Villard on pages 313-314.
Forbes, setting up a straw man for the purpose of knocking him down,
stated that Brown proposed, with from twenty-five to fifty colored and
white men, well armed and taking with them a quantity of spare arms, "to
beat up a slave quarter in Virginia." To this Forbes offered objections
as follows: "No preparatory notice having been given to the slaves [no
notice could go or with prudence be given to them] the invitation to
rise might, unless they were already in a state of agitation, meet with
no response or a feeble one." To this Brown had replied, that he "was
sure of a response." He calculated that he could get "on the first night
from 200 to 500. Half, or thereabouts, of this first lot, he proposed to
keep with him, amounting to a hundred or so of them, and make a dash at
the Harper's Ferry manufactory, destroying what he could not carry off.
The other men, not of this party, were to be subdivided into three,
four, or five distinct parties, each under two or three of the original
band, and would beat up other slave quarters whence more men would be
sent to join him." "He [Brown] argued that were he pressed by the U. S.
Troops, which, after a few weeks, might concentrate, he could easily
maintain himself in the Alleghenies and that his New England partisans
would in the meantime, call a Northern Convention, restore tranquility
and overthrow the pro-slavery administration." This, Forbes contended,
could at most be "a mere local explosion. A slave insurrection, being
from the very nature of things deficient in men of education and
experience, would under such a system as B. proposed, be either a flash
in the pan or would leap beyond his control, or any control, when it
would become a scene of anarchy and would assuredly be suppressed." On
the other hand Brown considered "foreign intervention as not
impossible." As to the dream of a Northern convention, Forbes
"considered it as a settled fallacy. Brown's New England friends would
not have courage to show themselves as long as the issue was doubtful,"
and added: "see my letter to J. B. dated 23rd February."
Since Forbes's letters to Brown deal directly, and without
dissimulation, with the matters under consideration, it is exceedingly
regrettable that they have been withheld from publication. They would
expose the flimsy fictions which have been put forth concerning the
fictitious company of "volunteer-regulars": and that Forbes had been
employed as a drill-master for it. Also, it is especially regrettable
that his letter of February 23d has been suppressed. For there can be no
doubt that it would disclose their plans for the invasion; the means
they relied upon for success, and the broad lines which they expected to
operate upon. It contained, in all probability, a discussion, from
Forbes's point of view, of the insurrection; of armies and conquest; of
government, and relations with foreign States; of northern conventions,
and of international complications. This correspondence was suppressed,
doubtless, because the publication of it would dissipate the theory that
it was an altruistic "Foray into Virginia" that Brown had in view, or an
illogical guerrilla "raid."
The passing of Forbes came with an "adroit and stinging" reply from Dr.
Howe to his letter of May 14th, who, among other things said: "I infer
from your language that you have obtained (in confidence) some
information concerning an expedition which you think to be commendable,
provided _you_ could manage it, but which you will _betray_ and
_denounce_ if he does not give it up! You are, sir, the guardian of your
own honor--but I trust that for your children's sake, at least, you will
never let your passion lead you to a course that might make them
blush."[287]