CHAPTER XI

WASHINGTON RETIRES FROM PUBLIC LIFE

The Treaty with England had scarely been put in operation before the

Treaty with France, of which Washington also felt the importance, came

to the front. Monroe was not an aggressive agent. Perhaps very

few civilized Americans could have filled that position to the

satisfaction of his American countrymen. They wished the French to

acknowledge and explain various acts which they qualified as outrages,

whereas the French regarded as glories what they called grievances.

The men of the Directory which now ruled France did not profess the

atrocious methods of the Terrorists, but they could not afford in

treating with a foreigner to disavow the Terrorists. In the summer of

'96, Washington, being dissatisfied with Monroe's results, recalled

him, and sent in his place Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, to whom

President Adams afterwards added John Marshall and Elbridge Gerry,

forming a Commission of three. Some of the President's critics have

regarded his treatment of Monroe as unfair, and they imply that it

was inspired by partisanship. He had always been an undisguised

Federalist, whereas Monroe, during the past year or more, had followed

Jefferson and become an unswerving Democrat. The publication here of

a copy of Monroe's letter to the French Committee of Public Safety

caused a sensation; for he had asserted that he was not instructed to

ask for the repeal of the French decrees by which the spoliation of

American commerce had been practised, and he added that if the decrees

benefited France, the United States would submit not only with

patience but with pleasure. What wonder that Washington, in reading

this letter and taking in the full enormity of Monroe's words, should

have allowed himself the exclamation, "Extraordinary!" What wonder

that in due course of time he recalled Monroe from Paris and replaced

him with a man whom he could trust!

The settlement of affairs with France did not come until after

Washington ceased to be President. I will, therefore, say no more

about it, except to refer to the outrageous conduct of the French, who

hurried two of the Commissioners out of France, and, apparently at the

instigation of Talleyrand, declared that they must pay a great deal of

money before they made any arrangement, to which Charles Pinckney made

the famous rejoinder, "Millions for defence, but not one cent for

tribute." The negotiations became so stormy that war seemed imminent.

Congress authorized President Adams to enlist ten thousand men to be

put into the field in case of need, and he wrote to Washington: "We

must have your name, if you will in any case permit us to use it.

There will be more efficacy in it than in many an army." McHenry, the

Secretary of War, wrote: "You see how the storm thickens, and that our

vessel will soon require its ancient pilot. Will you--may we flatter

ourselves, that in a crisis so awful and important, you will accept

the command of all our armies? I hope you will, because you alone can

unite all hearts and all hands, if it is possible that they can be

united."[1]

[Footnote 1: Irving, V, 290.]

To President Adams Washington replied on July 4, 1799: "As my whole

life has been dedicated to my country in one shape or another, for the

poor remains of it, it is not an object to contend for ease and quiet,

when all that is valuable is at stake, further than to be satisfied

that the sacrifice I should make of these, is acceptable and desired

by my country."[1]

[Footnote 1: _Ibid_., 291.]

Congress voted to restore for Washington the rank of

Commander-in-Chief, and he agreed with the Secretary of War that the

three Major-Generals should be Alexander Hamilton, Inspector-General;

Charles C. Pinckney, who was still in Europe; and Henry Knox. But a

change came over the passions of France; Napoleon Bonaparte, the new

despot who had taken control of that hysterical republic for himself,

was now aspiring to something higher and larger than the humiliation

of the United States and his menace in that direction ceased.

We need to note two or three events before Washington's term ended

because they were thoroughly characteristic. First of these was the

Whiskey Insurrection in western Pennsylvania. The inhabitants first

grew surly, then broke out in insurrection on account of the Excise

Law. They found it cheaper to convert their corn and grain into

whiskey, which could be more easily transported, but the Government

insisted that the Excise Law, being a law, should be obeyed. The

malcontents held a great mass meeting on Braddock's Field, denounced

the law and declared that they would not obey it. Washington issued a

proclamation calling upon the people to resume their peaceable life.

He called also on the Governors of Pennsylvania, Maryland, New

Jersey, and Virginia for troops, which they furnished. His right-hand

lieutenant was Alexander Hamilton, who felt quite as keenly as he

did himself the importance of putting down such an insurrection.

Washington knew that if any body of the people were allowed unpunished

to rise and disobey any law which pinched or irritated them, all law

and order would very soon go by the board. His action was one of the

great examples in government which he set the people of the United

States. He showed that we must never parley or haggle with sedition,

treason, or lawlessness, but must strike a blow that cannot be

parried, and at once. The Whiskey Insurrectionists may have imagined

that they were too remote to be reached in their western wilderness,

but he taught them a most salutary lesson that, as they were in the

Union, the power of the Union could and would reach them.

One of the matters which Washington could not have foreseen was the

outrageous abuse of the press, which surpassed in virulence and

indecency anything hitherto known in the United States. At first the

journalistic thugs took care not to vilify Washington personally,

but, as they became more outrageous, they spared neither him nor his

family. Freneau, Bache, and Giles were among the most malignant of

these infamous men; and most suspicious is it that two of them at

least were protégés of Thomas Jefferson. Once, when the attack was

particularly atrocious, and the average citizen might well be excused

if he believed that Jefferson wrote it, Jefferson, unmindful of the

full bearing of the French proverb, _Qui s'excuse s'accuse_, wrote

to Washington exculpating himself and protesting that he was not the

author of that particular attack, and added that he had never written

any article of that kind for the press. Many years later the editor of

that newspaper, one of the most shameless of the malignants, calmly

reported in a batch of reminiscences that Jefferson did contribute

many of the most flagrant articles. Senator Lodge, in commenting

on this affair, caustically remarks: "Strict veracity was not the

strongest characteristic of either Freneau or Jefferson, and it is

really of but little consequence whether Freneau was lying in his old

age or in the prime of life."[1]

[Footnote 1: Lodge, II, 223.]

An unbiassed searcher after truth to-day will find that the

circumstantial evidence runs very strongly against Jefferson. He

brought Freneau over from New York to Philadelphia, he knew the sort

of work that Freneau would and could do, he gave him an office in the

State Department, he probably discussed the topics which the "National

Gazette" was to take up, and he probably read the proof of the

articles which that paper was to publish. In his animosities the cloak

of charity neither became him nor fitted him.

Several years later, when Bache's paper, the "Aurora," printed some

material which Washington's enemies hoped would damage him, Jefferson

again took alarm and wrote to Washington to free himself from blame.

To him, the magnanimous President replied in part:

If I had entertained any suspicions before, that the queries,

which have been published in Bache's paper, proceeded from you,

the assurances you have given of the contrary would have removed

them; but the truth is, I harbored none. I am at no loss to

_conjecture_ from what source they flowed, through what channel

they were conveyed, and for what purpose they and similar

publications appear. They were known to be in the hands of Mr.

Parker in the early part of the last session of Congress. They

were shown about by Mr. Giles during the session, and they made

their public exhibition about the close of it.

Perceiving and probably hearing, that no abuse in the gazettes

would induce me to take notice of anonymous publications against

me, those, who were disposed to do me _such friendly offices_,

have embraced without restraint every opportunity to weaken the

confidence of the people; and, by having the whole game in their

hands, they have scrupled not to publish things that do not, as

well as those which do exist, and to mutilate the latter, so as to

make them subserve the purposes which they have in view.[1]

[Footnote 1: Ford, XIII, 229.]

Washington's opinion of the scurrilous crusade against him, he

expressed in the following letter to Henry Lee:

But in what will this abuse terminate? For the result, as it

respects myself, I care not; for I have a consolation within that

no earthly efforts can deprive me of, and that is, that neither

ambition nor interested motives have influenced my conduct. The

arrows of malevolence, therefore, however barbed and well pointed,

never can reach the most vulnerable part of me; though, whilst I

am up as a mark, they will be continually aimed. The publications

in Freneau's and Bache's papers are outrages in that style in

proportion as their pieces are treated with contempt and are

passed by in silence by those at whom they are aimed. The tendency

of them, however, is too obvious to be mistaken by men of cool

and dispassionate minds, and, in my opinion, ought to alarm them,

because it is difficult to prescribe bounds to the effect.[1]

[Footnote 1: Lodge, II, 236.]

By his refusal to take notice of these indecencies, Washington set a

high example. In other countries, in France and England, for example,

the victims of such abuse resorted to duels with their abusers: a very

foolish and inadequate practice, since it happened as often as not

that the aggrieved person was killed. In taking no notice of the

calumnies, therefore, Washington prevented the President of the United

States from being drawn into an unseemly duel. We cannot fail to

recognize also that Washington was very sensitive to the maintenance

of freedom of speech. He seems to have acted on the belief that it was

better that occasionally license should degenerate into abuse than

that liberty should be suppressed. He was the President of the first

government in the world which did not control the utterances of its

people. Perhaps he may have supposed that their patriotism would

restrain them from excesses, and there can be no doubt that the insane

gibes of the Freneaus and the Baches gave him much pain because they

proved that those scorpions were not up to the level which the new

Nation offered them.

As the time for the conclusion of Washington's second term drew near,

he left no doubt as to his intentions. Though some of his best friends

urged him to stand for reëlection, he firmly declined. He felt that he

had done enough for his country in sacrificing the last eight years to

it. He had seen it through its formative period, and had, he thought,

steered it into clear, quiet water, so that there was no threatening

danger to demand his continuance at the helm. Many persons thought

that he was more than glad to be relieved of the increasing abuse of

the scurrilous editors. No doubt he was, but we can hardly agree that

merely for the sake of that relief he would abandon his Presidential

post. But does it not seem more likely that his unwillingness to

convert the Presidency into a life office, and so to give the critics

of the American experiment a valid cause for opposition, led him to

establish the precedent that two terms were enough? More than once in

the century and a quarter since he retired in 1797, over-ambitious

Presidents have schemed to win a third election and flattering

sycophants have encouraged them to believe that they could attain it.

But before they came to the test Washington's example--"no more than

two"--has blocked their advance. In this respect also we must admit

that he looked far into the future and saw what would be best for

posterity. The second term as it has proved is bad enough, diverting

a President during his first term to devote much of his energy and

attention to setting traps to secure the second. It might be better

to have only one term to last six years, instead of four, which would

enable a President to give all his time to the duties of his office,

instead of giving a large part of it to the chase after a reëlection.

As soon as Washington determined irrevocably to retire, he began

thinking of the "Farewell Address" which he desired to deliver to his

countrymen as the best legacy he could bequeath. Several years before

he had talked it over with Madison, with whom he was then on very

friendly terms, and Madison had drafted a good deal of it. Now he

turned to Hamilton, giving him the topics as far as they had been

outlined, and bidding him to rewrite it if he thought it desirable. In

September, 1796, Washington read the "Address" before the assembled

Congress.

The "Farewell Address" belongs among the few supreme utterances on

human government. Its author seems to be completely detached from all

personal or local interests. He tries to see the thing as it is, and

as it is likely to be in its American environment. His advice applies

directly to the American people, and only in so far as what he says

has in a large sense human pertinence do we find in it more than a

local application.

"Be united" is the summary and inspiration of the entire "Address."

"Be united and be American"; as an individual each person must feel

himself most strongly an American. He urges against the poisonous

effects of parties. He warns against the evils that may arise when

parties choose different foreign nations for their favorites.

The great rule of conduct for us [he says] in regard to foreign

Nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with

them as little _Political_ connection as possible. So far as

we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with

perfect good faith. Here let us stop.

Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or

a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent

controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our

concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate

ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her

politics, ... or enmities.

Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to

pursue a different course. If we remain one People, under an

efficient government, the period is not far off, when we may defy

material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an

attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve

upon to be scrupulously respected. When belligerent nations, under

the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly

hazard the giving us provocation when we may choose peace or war,

as our interest guided by justice shall counsel.

Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our

own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny

with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity

in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humour or

caprice?

Compared with Machiavelli's "Prince," which must come to the mind of

every one who reads the "Farewell Address," one sees at once that the

"Prince" is more limber, it may be more spontaneous, but the great

difference between the two is in their fundamental conception. The

"Address" is frankly a preachment and much of its impressiveness comes

from that fact. The "Prince," on the other hand, has little concern

with the moral aspect of politics discussed and makes no pretence of

condemning immoral practices or making itself a champion of virtue. In

other words, Washington addresses an audience which had passed through

the Puritan Revolution, while Machiavelli spoke to men who were

familiar with the ideals and crimes of the Italian Renaissance.

Washington spread his gospel so clearly that all persons were sure to

learn and inwardly digest it, and many of them assented to it in their

minds, although they did not follow it In their conduct. His paramount

exhortations--"Be united"--"Be Americans"; "do not be drawn into

complications with foreign powers"--at times had a very real living

pertinence. The only doctrine which still causes controversy is that

which touches our attitude towards foreign countries. During the late

World War we heard it revived, and a great many persons who had never

read the "Farewell Address" gravely reminded us of Washington's

warning against "entangling alliances." As a matter of fact, that

phrase does not appear in the "Farewell Address" at all. It was first

used by Thomas Jefferson in his first Inaugural Address, March 4,

1801, sixteen months after Washington was dead and buried. No doubt

the meaning could be deduced from what Washington said in more than

one passage of his "Farewell." But to understand in 1914 what he said

or implied in 1796, we must be historical. In 1796 the country was

torn by conflicting parties for and against strong friendship, if not

an actual alliance, between the United States on one side and Great

Britain or France on the other. Any foreign alliance that could be

made in 1914, however, could not have been, for the same reason, with

either Great Britain or France. The aim proposed by its advocates was

to curb and destroy the German domination of the world. Now Washington

was almost if not quite the most actual of modern statesmen. All

his arrangements at a given moment were directed at the needs and

likelihood of the moment, and in 1914 he would have planned as 1914

demanded. He would have steered his ship by the wind that blew then

and not by the wind that had blown and vanished one hundred and twenty

years before.

Some one has remarked that, while Washington achieved a great victory

in the ratification of the Jay Treaty, that event broke up the

Federalist Party. That is probably inexact, but the break-up of

the Federalist Party was taking place during the last years of

Washington's second administration. The changes in Washington's

Cabinet were most significant, especially as they nearly all meant the

change from a more important to a less important Secretary. Thus

John Jay, the first Secretary of State, really only an incumbent _ad

interim_, gave way to Thomas Jefferson, who was replaced by Edmund

Randolph in 1794, and who in turn was succeeded by Timothy Pickering

in 1795. Alexander Hamilton was Secretary of the Treasury from the

beginning in 1789 to 1795, when he made way for Oliver Wolcott, Jr.

Henry Knox, the original Secretary of War, was succeeded by Timothy

Pickering in 1795, who, after less than a year, was followed by James

McHenry. Edmund Randolph served as Attorney-General in 1789 to 1794,

then retiring for William Bradford who, after a brief year, was

replaced by Charles Lee. The Postmaster-Generalship was filled from

1789 to 1791 by Samuel Osgood, and then by Timothy Pickering. Thus at

the end of Washington's eight years we find that in the place of two

really eminent men, like Jefferson and Hamilton, he was served by

Edmund Randolph and Oliver Wolcott, Jr., and James McHenry, good

routine men at the best, mediocrities if judged by comparison with

their predecessors. Moreover, the reputation for discretion of some

of them, suffered. Thus Randolph had not long been Secretary of State

when Joseph Fauchet, the French Minister, produced some papers which

could be construed as implying that Randolph had accepted money.

Randolph was known to be impecunious, but his personal honor had never

been suspected. Washington with characteristic candor sent Randolph

the batch of incriminating letters. Randolph protested that he

"forgave" the President and tried to exculpate himself in the

newspapers. Even that process of deflation did not suffice and he

had recourse to a "Vindication," which was read by few and popularly

believed to vindicate nobody. Washington is believed to have held

Randolph as guiltless, but as weak and as indiscreet. He pitied the

ignominy, for Randolph had been in a way Washington's protégé, whose

career had much interested him and whose downfall for such a cause was

doubly poignant.

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