a larger number of machine-guns than was provided for by us in time
of peace. In defensive warfare, as we have already pointed out, the
tendency has been more and more to husband the reserves of men, and
to wage the battle in the foremost line by mechanical means,
machine-guns and mines, backed up by the artillery. The field
artillery, whose duty it was to work in the closest co-operation with
the infantry, required not so much an absolute increase in the number
of batteries as an increase in the number of batteries of howitzers.
On the other hand, in the case of the garrison artillery, the
engineers, the bomb-throwing companies, the railway, telegraph, and
motor troops, and the flying corps, a considerable increase has
proved to be necessary. It will not be necessary to increase the
numbers of the cavalry in the future; but the cavalry will doubtless
have to be kept at its present strength, which will perhaps make it
possible in a future war to manage with a smaller force of reserve
cavalry, so that the men and horses will be available for other
purposes. In face of modern firearms and mass-armies the cavalry is
very much restricted in its opportunities for reconnaissance, and to
a large extent it has been superseded by the aeroplane. None the
less, this long entrenched war, and the fact that in the course of it
this valuable weapon has only been employed in the same way as the
infantry, must not lead us to form false conclusions. At the
beginning of the War, in the West and, later on, in the East
(especially in Lithuania), our cavalry have performed very valuable
services, and the same may be said in regard to the campaign against
Roumania. As soon as the War was carried into the open country, the
cavalry at once asserted its importance. It becomes indispensable
both as a supplement to aircraft in reconnaissance at close quarters
and also as a mobile defensive weapon. Moreover, it is essential to
have a swiftly-moving arm which can be rapidly transferred from one
place to another. At the same time, in the training of the cavalry
in time of peace, due attention must be paid to trench-warfare, and
far more attention must be devoted to fighting on foot than has
hitherto been the case.
In our great manœuvres the conditions of this World War can only
partially be represented. The manœuvres will, of course, be more
adapted to the present-day mode of fighting, and since, on our
drilling-grounds, trench-digging is only rarely feasible, we shall
practise it in the manœuvres, provided that it is in accordance
with the situation which has been arranged, and provided that it can
be effected without injury to the fields. In other respects,
however, it will not be possible to organise our great manœuvres
in the future in conformity with the conditions which prevailed in
the great majority of cases in this War. We cannot in our peace
manœuvres furnish a representation of trench-warfare on a large
scale. All that we can do is to practise attacks on a field-position
oftener than has hitherto been the case. Their number and extent,
however, must always be comparatively limited by a consideration of
the expense which they involve. Hence all that we can do is to give
the companies and battalions a thorough training in trench-warfare
and make them familiar with all the circumstances which it engenders.
In the case of our frontier forces, the requisite training could be
combined to a large extent with the construction of new
fortifications. This would incidentally effect an economy of
civilian labour. Also portions of the troops stationed in the
interior of the country might be dispatched temporarily to the
frontier for this purpose. It will always be our task to see that we
preserve correct views in respect to trench-warfare, but that at the
same time we do not give it the predominant place in our training.
The predominant place--it cannot be insisted on too often--belongs to
the war of movement, though in a somewhat different form from that
with which we were familiar before the War.
In this connection there should be a greater insistence, in our peace
training, upon the dragging out of operations which is inevitable in
war, provided, that is to say, that this can be done without
prejudice to the freshness of the troops and the initiative of their
leaders. As early as 1861 Moltke wrote[1]:
"If manœuvres are not to engender false notions, full
consideration must be given to the ground and the dimensions. The
whole course of the battle will thereby become different and slower."
These words, which were written long before 1866, have received very
little attention. In an order of King William issued after the
Battle of Gravelotte-St. Privat he says:
"I must remind you that the attack on an enemy position must first be
prepared for by the artillery and by well-directed rifle-fire.... I
certainly accord the fullest recognition to the brave assault of the
infantry, for whom hitherto no task has seemed too difficult, but I
also expect that the intelligence of the officers shall enable them
in future to reap the same successes at a much less considerable
sacrifice, by dint of a skilful exploitation of the ground, a more
thorough preparation for the attack, and the employment of suitable
formations."
Similarly, at the beginning of the present War, many of the
engagements might have developed more tranquilly and systematically
and at less cost of life, and at the same time have reaped more
decisive results. None the less, we may rejoice that the following
words of Clausewitz are completely applicable to our infantry: "Happy
the army in which an untimely boldness frequently manifests itself;
it is an exuberant growth which shows a rich soil."[2] We must
endeavour to maintain, by every means in our power, this splendid
vigour in attack of our infantry. The infantry must not expect the
artillery to do everything; just as little, of course, must it attack
prematurely in such a manner as to render it impossible for the
artillery to exercise its full effectiveness at the right moment.
Hence it will be an important duty of the commanding officers in
future peace manœuvres to see that their troops preserve clear
notions concerning the seriousness, the scope, and the duration of
present-day warfare, and at the same time to emphasise continually
the effectiveness of modern arms. Co-operation between the infantry
and the artillery must in any event be ensured. A good means of
achieving this would be to effect a mutual interchange between the
officers in command of the infantry and the artillery respectively.
Generally speaking, we must devote more attention to tactics on a
large scale, and less to strategy. Above all, even in sham fights
and cavalry manœuvres, the important thing is not to spin out
great strategic theories, but to develop the power of forming a just
conception of purely tactical situations on a simple plan, and to
practise the technique of command. Operations on a large scale must
be left for the tours of the General Staff--especially the Great
General Staff. Certainly it is desirable that just conceptions
regarding operations on a large scale should also be instilled into
the generality of the officers' corps; but in this respect the study
of the World War and lectures upon it will afford a rich field of
instruction and inspiration. The greatest possible simplicity, such
as war demands, must also prevail in regard to the exercises
practised on the drilling-ground.
Our traditional drill must in any event remain the permanent
imperishable foundation of our training.
"Its importance consists in the fact that it inspires the soldier
with a sense of the urgent necessity to obey his officer. The habit
of obedience which is developed by means of military service helps to
produce this effect."[3]
The War has confirmed in the fullest degree the value of drill. We
have to thank our permanent military training schools for the
discipline which has made it possible to solve the most difficult
problems of attack and defence with an array of masses of troops. It
is the result of these schools that the German soldier has not
recoiled before any task. The best proof of this is the
half-reluctant recognition which it has extracted from the enemy.
In regard to the autumn battle of 1915, in Champagne, General
Cherfils writes[4]:
"The French soldier detaches himself from his officer far too
readily. Each one goes where he wills. Thus it came about that our
infantry lost in a moment territory which they had just won with
great difficulty, and, moreover, they left on it a half of their
man-power. The German is a true soldier. Discipline has become a
part of his flesh and blood. That is his greatest source of
strength."
The _France Militaire_ writes[5] with respect to the Anglo-French
offensive on the Somme in July, 1916:
"The great homogeneity of the German army is evident from the fact
that it was possible for the German command to withdraw some twenty
different battalions from at least ten divisions, in order that they
might oppose these improvised formations to the Anglo-French
offensive. And these troops were drawn from all portions of the
front. This was, to be sure, only an emergency measure. The Germans
certainly would not have had recourse to it if it had not been
necessary, and we must try not to bring ourselves into a similar
situation, and we must always bear in mind that the maintenance of
the formations is an element of victory. At the same time, it is a
sign of great homogeneity and of a splendid co-operation between the
various commands that it was possible for the Germans to undertake
such a manœuvre on such an extensive scale and in the space of a
few hours.
"The opponents of a long term of active military service and of
thorough preparation in time of peace should consider the following
facts: A militia army with an abridged term of training may perform
heroic deeds, the regiments may exhibit a high standard of cohesion,
but such an army will lose all its strength if circumstances compel
it to break up its principal units, and to blend these together. It
is only where uniformity of training has penetrated into the lowest
ranks, and where a thorough military training has been established,
that such venturesome undertakings are feasible."
In the case of the numerous new formations which the enormous
increase of our army in the course of the War has rendered necessary,
we have always endeavoured, as far as was possible, to compose these
new bodies of troops in such a way, and to furnish them with such a
thorough training, as would give them the solidity of the old troops.
In August, 1914, in the case of the newly-formed Reserve-Corps, we
had to endeavour to dispense with these advantages. In their case,
the period of training was not really adequate to transform them into
thoroughly efficient battle-troops. The experience of the officers,
very few of whom were on the active list at the time, with all their
good will, was not really adequate, and the same was true in many
cases in respect of their physical fitness. This applies equally to
a large proportion of the men in the ranks, that is to say, of the
young war-volunteers. They had excellent qualities, and were filled
with the purest patriotic enthusiasm; but this could not compensate
for the lack of soldierly discipline and physical hardening which can
be acquired only in the course of a thorough military training.
These new troops could not be equal to coping with the difficult
conditions which prevailed at Ypres. They have only gradually, in
the course of the War, and as a result of the subsequent improvement
of their officers' corps, been brought up to the level of the old
troops. The Prussian Landwehr of 1813 furnished an illustration of
exactly the same thing. They broke down, at the beginning of the
campaign, at Goldberg, Kulm, and in the pursuit after the battle of
Katzbach; it was not until Wartenburg and Möckern, and after they had
been very much diminished in the process, that they had become
thoroughly efficient troops.
Scharnhorst, their creator, had not originally contemplated the
employment of the Landwehr as a troop of the first line. It was only
necessity which led to the enrolment of the Landwehr among the
field-troops; just as in August, 1914, necessity compelled the German
command to throw in on the right wing of the Western army troops
which were not yet fully trained.
The zeal of reformers, after the defeats of the year 1806,
undoubtedly contributed to make the difference between the old and
the new in the Prussian army appear much greater than it actually
was. Scharnhorst and his disciples frequently overshot the mark
deliberately, in order to attain their purpose, for they were under
the necessity of overcoming a host of prejudices on the part of those
who adhered to the externals of the Frederician tradition, and not to
its inner significance. This, however, does not in any way alter the
fact that it was really the resuscitated old Prussian army, though
filled with an entirely new spirit, that we have to thank for the
liberation of 1813. It was the same much-abused officers' corps, the
"Junkers" of the year 1806, who led to victory an army the best parts
of which were composed of veteran soldiers. The great achievements
of the army of 1813 in the face of the enemy were due to the
excellence of its _cadres_, and the same was the case a century
later. The achievements of the War of Liberation, like our ability
to hold out in the World War, were only rendered possible by the fact
that a sufficient number of experienced officers and veteran soldiers
were available, for even the men of the home and reserve regiments of
1813 had for the most part already served in the old army.
The value of the so-called "Krümper" system introduced by Scharnhorst
has been hitherto very much exaggerated. It can by no means be
described as a successful attempt to manage with a short term of
service on a large scale. The principle of it was the creation of a
war reserve which should always be available, by means of a constant
furloughing of a number of men to the districts from which the
regiments had been drawn and the insertion of recruits in their
place. Nevertheless, in the brief period between 1808 and 1813
(during which, moreover, the mobilisation of half the standing army
for the auxiliary corps which had to be supplied for Napoleon's
campaign of 1812 against Russia was a disturbing factor) this system
proved incapable of furnishing anything like such a strong war
reserve as that which in 1813 made it possible, in addition to
filling up the ranks of the regular troops, to create fifty-two
reserve battalions, which were assembled in regiments during the
truce. By far the greater part of the imposing reserve force which
was available in the provinces consisted of soldiers who had received
their training in the old army and had been subjected to its rigid
discipline.
The words of Camille Rousset[6] in reference to Napoleon's new
formations of the year 1813 are more or less true of every improvised
army:
"If the Battle of the Katzbach had been fought by stout men and
thoroughly trained soldiers, it is possible that Macdonald would not
have been defeated, or at any rate would have suffered only such a
reverse as could have been made good again; fought as it was with
young men and with soldiers whose training dated from yesterday, it
became the beginning of a catastrophe. No clearer demonstration has
ever been furnished of the power of physical and moral energy, of
fortitude of body and spirit in the face of inclemency of the
weather, hunger and thirst, and all the sufferings of war, the power,
in fact, of that stoicism which is no sudden phenomenon, but the
gradual and unconscious result of military training, which is in fact
nothing else than a heightened sense of honour and duty."
The American Civil War of the sixties of last century would not have
lasted four years if the Union had had at its disposal an efficient
fighting army with which to overcome the Southern States. Both the
militia and the volunteer levies broke down. Only after a long time
did they become really efficient fighting troops.
Lord Kitchener's creation of a strong English army during the World
War was unquestionably an immense achievement. He built up twelve
divisions out of the six regular divisions existing before the War,
and twenty-eight divisions out of the fourteen very imperfectly
organised territorial divisions. This doubling of the hitherto
existing English army was then supplemented by the thirty so-called
Kitchener divisions. All these new formations, before they were put
into the line, went through a long period of training, first at home
and afterwards behind the front in France. The long entrenched
warfare afforded the possibility for this. They were only by degrees
sent into the fighting lines. Not until the beginning of 1916 were
the English in a position to take over longer sections of the front,
which had hitherto been held by the French. They were subsequently
reinforced in France, and at the beginning of 1917 their lines were
extended still further towards the south. Thus, though the great
English army of the World War is a new creation, it is anything but a
loose and hasty improvisation. The experience which could be derived
from military history in respect to improvised armies was, on the
contrary, thoroughly taken into consideration by Kitchener in
accomplishing his task. The advocates of a shorter term of service
than existed among us before the War cannot in any case instance the
Kitchener divisions as a justification of their views, any more than
they can do so in the case of our own new formations during the War
or those of earlier times. Moreover, it has to be considered that
the Kitchener divisions were trained exclusively for the simple tasks
of trench-warfare. The English army is by no means fit for a war of
movement. Captured English officers have admitted this fact. Their
higher officers lack the necessary knowledge, which can be acquired
only by long training and by regarding it as a life-task. Napoleon
said, not without reason, "It is possible to capture a strong
position by means of a young army, but not to conduct a campaign to a
victorious conclusion."
In regard to the abridgment and simplification of our Infantry
Regulations there may be various opinions. The War certainly
furnishes a great deal of instruction on this subject. Military
drill in itself is, however, prejudicial to war-efficiency, and
consequently a hindrance to true preparation for war, only when it is
carried to excess, that is to say, when the insistence upon formal
drill is pushed beyond the limits of the Regulations. Provided that
this is avoided, military drill--the War has proved it beyond any
doubt--is entirely beneficial as regards training for active service.
In regard to the latter, in a short time and by equally simple means,
the same degree of subordination cannot be enforced under all
conditions; for though undoubtedly much of what the infantry soldier
has to learn in respect to the use of the rifle in warfare may be
drilled into him, yet the Regulation of 1906 (No. 158) expressly
indicates as the aim of the individual training of the rifleman that
"the soldier should be trained to become an intellectually
self-reliant and technically conscientious rifleman," for on one
point there can be no doubt, namely, that training with a view to
actual fighting must always take the first place, great as is the
value of rigorous drilling in achieving this end. This training
engenders in the troops the habit of doing their best, and hence of
doing it even in the face of danger. It helps them, too, to acquire
that "proud and distinguished appearance" which was insisted upon by
Prince Frederick Charles.
Here as everywhere, the real question is how much importance is to be
conceded to formal drill. The important thing to be kept in mind is
that drill is to be considered, not as an end in itself, but only as
a means to an end. It is inevitable that it should happen from time
to time that a few individual pedants, who, moreover, have not kept
the prospect of war steadily in view, should go astray. It will be
the duty of the superior officers in charge of these matters to see
that these deviations do not lead us too far away from the proper
goal of all training. It will be their duty to see that it does not
happen that--to use a phrase of Scharnhorst--"the mechanical heads
triumph," and they must constantly bear in mind that success in war
falls only to him who is capable of emancipating himself from the
bonds of custom when the occasion demands.
We must not carry too far our cult of tradition. Blind adherence to
tradition in the place of a living continuous development is an evil.
A great and proud tradition is a wonderfully invigorating thing in an
army, and nothing can take the place of it, but it ought not to be
nurtured for its own sake, but for the sake of the firmness and
stability which it gives to the army as a whole.
The years of exhaustion which followed the great war-period at the
beginning of the nineteenth century were not calculated to inspire a
warlike spirit in the Prussian army and to shape its training with a
view to the needs of war. Hence a pronounced tendency in the
direction of review tactics very soon manifested itself. This
phenomenon has frequently occurred after wars of long duration, and
it is easily understandable. But it is all the more important that
we should be on our guard against its reappearance. The ambition of
Frederick the Great to see that "admirable discipline" of his troops,
which had become relaxed in the course of the Seven Years' War, once
more restored allowed him to overlook many an extravagance which the
resurgent drill-devil provoked in the army. His own thoughts, as his
later writings prove, were always concerned with the needs of actual
war and the most glorious side of the soldierly profession, but his
generals became more and more immersed in the minor arts of the
drilling-ground. The uneventful course of the Bavarian War of
Succession was not calculated to diminish the pedantry of peace drill.
The tendency in the direction of review tactics, which again became
predominant in the first decades following the War of Liberation, had
begun to manifest itself in a peculiar way during the war, even in
the Prussian army, and first of all in the Guards. It was our
brotherhood in arms with the Russians which resulted in the marked
predominance of parade drill (as though it were not a means to an
end, but in itself the end of training), and with it a tendency to
triviality. The manœuvres in the environments of Berlin were,
under Frederick William III., merely spectacles; they degenerated for
the most part into mere military sports. The Tsar Alexander and his
brothers all took the same unspeakable delight in military pedantry,
and it could not but happen that, in view of the intimate ties of
blood and friendship which existed between the Courts of Petrograd
and Berlin, similar tendencies should have been transmitted to
Prussia. Thus that training which had been originally derived from
Prussian models, though endowed with greater rigour after the manner
of the Tsar Paul, which, moreover, was organised entirely with a view
to outward show in a manner quite opposed to the old Prussian models,
was reintroduced into Prussia in this distorted form.
Under Scharnhorst's general rules for manœuvres on a large scale,
pre-arrangement of the course the manœuvres were to take was
declared to be inadmissible; but, after the great war-period, parade
manœuvres, the critical moments of which were exactly planned out
beforehand, were once again revived. The brief and concise
Regulations of 1812 seemed to those in charge of military affairs too
simple for peace-time. General Krauseneck, a distinguished
collaborator in the drawing-up of the Regulations and afterwards
Chief of the General Staff, discovered, when he took over the command
of a division in 1821, that quite a number of supplementary orders
had been added, and he found himself compelled to protest against
them. He writes[7]:
"We had never doubted that time and the experience of war might
entail alterations, and that simplifications might be effected, but
we never dreamed that the Regulations--in which we had aimed at the
greatest possible brevity and clearness, as one of the most essential
requirements--would, after a war which had been conducted to a
glorious conclusion, be criticised as insufficiently detailed and
precise. It is not only useless, it is harmful, to aim at excessive
hair-splitting preciseness in the case of every order, and to strive
after uniformity with a scrupulousness that borders on pedantry.
Such a uniformity can never be attained, and, even if it could be
attained, it would not repay the trouble and energy expended upon it."