German side first of all the character of a defence accompanied by
offensive tactics, and subsequently, after the attack at the Yser had
proved unsuccessful and when further troops had to be conveyed to the
East, was completely transformed at the end of November, 1914, into
an entrenched war. It ought, however, to be realised that though in
the World War entrenched fighting has gained such prevalence and
importance, this is not necessarily a result of the highly developed
technical science of our age, but first and foremost the result of
the inability of our enemies to break through the German fronts in
the East and the West. If the armies of the two contending parties
had been equally efficient, it would have been impossible for us to
maintain our positions for any length of time, in view of the
overwhelming numerical superiority of the forces which were directed
against ourselves and Austria-Hungary from all sides. It lay with
our opponents with their vast numbers, when they had forced us to
retreat, to give to the War once again the character of a war of
movement. They did not succeed in doing so. On the other hand, the
forces of the Central Powers were insufficient to enable them to push
the offensive to any considerable extent beyond the permanent
positions taken up on the Western front at the end of 1914 and on the
Eastern front in the autumn of 1915, and on their side to pass once
more to the war of movement. This was reserved in the further course
of events for the Serbian and (a year later) the Roumanian theatres
of war. In view of our central position, we were obliged, since we
had not succeeded in breaking through at the Marne, to content
ourselves with an "offensive with a limited goal," to use the words
of Clausewitz. He says further: "A defence which is organised on
conquered territory has a much more irritating character than one
upon our own soil: The offensive principle is engrafted on it in a
certain measure."[7] The course of the World War has quite confirmed
this. But at the same time this view involves the admission that the
maintenance of such a defence ought in itself to be considered as an
important success. Apart from this offensive defensive, the only
possibility for the Central Powers could be to anticipate the enemy's
actions in particular cases, as was done by our army at Verdun and by
the Austro-Hungarian army in the Venetian Alps; the initiative as a
whole we were obliged to leave to the enemy. Consequently, we were
driven to the tenacious, to a large extent passive, retention of our
entrenched lines, and to their consolidation with the aid of every
means furnished by the art of field-fortification.
According to the notions that prevailed up to that time, the
possibility might have been considered, where our troops were
suffering heavy losses as a result of holding on under exposure to
the fire of the enemy's heaviest artillery and bomb-throwers, and
where the latter had done destruction to our trenches, of allowing
the enemy to break through, and then driving him back again by means
of the reserves at the back of our lines. This procedure was, in
fact, from the beginning employed several times with success at
various sections of the front against bodies of the enemy forces
which had broken through. To extend it systematically to larger
sections of the front, and thereby on our side to resort to a certain
extent to the methods of the war of movement, seemed to the Supreme
Command for a long time inadvisable, in view of the limited forces
and artillery at their disposition. Experience had, moreover, shown
how difficult it is to straighten out salients which have once been
formed on an entrenched front. Even when salients have been
enveloped, they have, by the very nature of modern methods of
fighting and effectiveness of weapons in entrenched warfare, been
held both by ourselves and by our enemies, in so far as the nature of
the ground made this possible.
The more and more insistent attempts of our enemies to prepare the
way for their infantry by the mechanical power of bomb-throwers and
heavy artillery led to a different method of defensive fighting. The
German Army Report of the 17th of April, 1917, describes it briefly
in the following words:
"In the presence of modern artillery fire, which flattens out
positions and produces broad deep craters, rigid defence is no longer
possible. The struggle is no longer for a line, but for a whole
deeply echeloned fortified zone. So the contest for the foremost
positions surges this way and that, with the aim, even if it involves
the loss of implements of war, of saving the lives of the men, and at
the same time of weakening the enemy by inflicting on him severe and
sanguinary losses."
This procedure preserved the lives and at the same time the morale of
the troops, who now no longer saw themselves to the same extent as
hitherto exposed without means of defence to the devastating fire of
the enemy. The enemy could be allowed to boast of his slight local
successes, if only his attempts to break through were frustrated. It
remained none the less a prerequisite condition of this new procedure
that adequate reserves of troops for the counter-thrust, as well as
munitions, should be at hand. Deficiencies in both these respects
were revealed more than once in the defensive engagements of the
years 1915 and 1916 on the Western front.
It did not seem advisable to leave large sections of the front open
to the enemy with a view to subsequently meeting him in a great
offensive engagement on the French or Belgian territory occupied by
us, thereby giving the situation quite a different character from a
strategic point of view. Such a counter-attack on a large scale
would have involved the reconquest of the newly-organised enemy
positions, and if the counter-attack did not effect a complete
recovery, this method would in course of time have amounted to the
surrender of larger and larger portions of the enemy territory
occupied by our troops. To be sure, many of our positions exhibited
serious defects, since their selection was not the result of
forethought and a free choice; they were situated wherever our own or
the enemy's attack had been brought to a standstill in the autumn of
1914. Moreover, quite apart from the moral factor, which in these
days of extreme publicity has quite another significance than was
formerly the case, and apart from the endeavours of the enemy Press
to exploit for their own ends even our most trifling reverses, such
reverses as were inevitable from time to time, the objects at stake
were far too precious to justify us in yielding up large stretches of
territory, even if it were only temporarily. We had to strive to
turn to the best possible account the productive district of Northern
France, with its wealth of industries.
The shifting back of portions of our front in the district of the
Ancre, the Somme, and the Oise at the end of the winter of 1916-17
did not take place until the situation as a whole had been to a
certain extent transformed, and after we had been able to prepare
stronger and more favourable positions in the rear. This evacuation
of the front line took the enemy more or less by surprise. Our
skilfully executed withdrawal resulted in considerable losses to the
enemy when they subsequently pressed forward, while we gained time as
well as greater security and husbanded our forces. Moreover, it was
only the most westward projections of our front which were concerned
in this withdrawal.
According to Clausewitz, war must be subject to the one supreme law
of decision by force of arms. In this sense did Frederick the Great,
Napoleon, and Moltke conduct their operations. With them it was a
question of the annihilation of the enemy's forces, not of the
winning and keeping of provinces. If the entrenched battles of the
present War had for their purpose the holding of ground that had been
won, none the less the implied contradiction with the theories of the
greatest generals of modern times is only apparent. In the World War
it was a question of battle-fronts which we held and in contending
for which our opponents sacrificed the blood of their troops, and not
of a cordon of positions after the fashion of those of the eighteenth
century. The entrenched lines of that time served principally to
keep the enemy at a distance, and as far as possible to obviate a
pitched battle. Considering the inadequacy of the means of attack at
that time and of the old hired armies, as well as the inferior
mobility and deficient driving force of a linear _ordre de bataille_
they frequently fulfilled their purpose.
When, however, war was dominated by the will of a powerful leader, it
took on immediately quite a different aspect. Nevertheless it must
not be overlooked that even Napoleon frequently advocates entrenched
positions, and that he himself at times, when his troops had been
brought to a standstill, had recourse to them, for instance in 1807
at the Passarge, and in the autumn of 1813, when, though his defence
remained mobile, he constructed extensive temporary fortifications on
the Elbe. Frederick the Great, too, finally adapted himself to a
Bunzelwitz. Already at the conclusion of the campaign of 1758, he
admitted[8] that to attack the enemy without having first secured for
oneself a superiority as regards firearms would be much as if a mob
armed with cudgels were to engage an armed military force; that it
was necessary to adopt the Austrian system of a powerful artillery,
however inconvenient this might be; and that lessons might be learnt
from the enemy in regard to the skilful exploitation of the ground.
"The best infantry in the world," he said, "may in certain cases be
thrown into disorder, when it has to contend against the enemy, his
guns, and disadvantages of ground. Our own infantry, enfeebled and
demoralised alike by victories and defeats, demand to be sparingly
employed for difficult undertakings. One must be guided by a
consideration of their intrinsic worth."
After the Seven Years' War, the King gave even more emphatic
expression to these views in the military section of his _Politisches
Testament vom Jahre 1768_. In this he says: "We must reckon upon the
possibility of a mere contest for entrenched positions
(_Postenkrieg_) with the Austrians"; and he says further:
"Formerly victories were won by the courage and strength of an army;
now it is always the artillery that decides, and the skill of a
general consists in bringing up his troops against the enemy without
allowing them to be crushed before the beginning of the offensive
proper."
Although the conduct of war at the time of Frederick the Great, being
based upon entirely different political and economic conditions, was
quite different from our conduct of war, none the less it engendered
many phenomena, as is proved by the King's observations, which have
been repeated in the present World War, though in a different form.
In any case it is clear from the words of King Frederick that both
during and after the Seven Years' War he was constantly at pains, pen
in hand, to attain clearness with regard to the most important
questions of the military art. We may well see in this an
exhortation that we should apply to every innovation that is to be
introduced the touchstone of the experiences of previous wars, if we
desire to be preserved from one-sidedness.
Hence it would be wrong to maintain that, in the future, entrenched
warfare must necessarily play such a dominant part as it has played
in the present War. Even King Frederick speaks of an entrenched war
against the Austrians only as a consequence of their skill in
choosing favourable positions. That, even in his later years, he
still conceded the chief importance to decision on the field of
battle is evident from his plans for the Bavarian War of Succession,
and in spite of the inaction which, as it turned out, marked the
course of this armed demonstration--for it was really nothing
else--here too he had based his chief hopes upon a "good battle" in
Moravia.
We shall have to consider how, in future, to preserve for war the
character of the war of movement, all the more so since, in the World
War, it has only been by the war of movement that we have reaped
decisive results. It will, of course, be accompanied by many of the
features of entrenched warfare, and, in consequence of the necessity
of bringing up and setting in operation the numerous present-day
methods of attack, it will be slow. An approximate illustration of
this is furnished by the course of the operations in East Prussia and
Lithuania and of the Germano-Austro-Hungarian offensive in Galicia
and Poland in the summer of 1915, as well as by the campaigns in
Serbia, Transylvania, and Roumania; and the rapid progress of
operations in these instances furnishes convincing proof that the
resolute will of a leader, combined with the valour of his troops, is
capable of overcoming those difficulties which the bringing up of
their numerous weapons of war entails upon a modern army. For this
kind of warfare we ourselves had received just the appropriate
training, and we were in fact superior to all the other armies. Such
a form of warfare is decisive, and will always remain decisive; the
years which we have spent in our trenches do not alter this fact in
any way.
That spirit of the offensive which is peculiar to our army we must
study to preserve by every means in our power. It has achieved
striking results in this War, and has recently once again proved its
effectiveness in the summer of 1917 in Eastern Galicia and in the
defensive battles in North France and Flanders. But we must not lose
sight of the fact that from time to time, at the beginning, a
systematic adherence to offensive tactics, even where the situation
rendered it more advisable to make full use of the strength which the
effectiveness of present-day weapons gives to defensive tactics, cost
us a heavy sacrifice. In any case the War has proved that the
assertion often made in time of peace that the spade digs the grave
of the offensive is not correct. This assertion may be compared with
the saying which was current in the Prussian army, to its very great
detriment, before the battle of Jena: "Skirmishing encourages the
scoundrel in human nature." From the military point of view Goethe
is right when he says: "For it is just where ideas are lacking that a
phrase is most welcome." Catch-words are always prejudicial in their
effect, and most of all so when it is a question of the blood of our
sons and brothers. It was not only King Frederick who expressed his
sense of the importance of selecting strong positions. Napoleon, the
representative of the most uncompromising offensive, told the
officers of his engineer-corps in 1806 that in the coming campaign
against Prussia he intended that a very great quantity of earth
should be shovelled up.[9] And Moltke writes[10]:
"The offensive is by no means merely tactical. A clever military
leader will succeed in many cases in choosing defensive positions of
such an offensive nature from a strategic point of view that the
opponent is compelled to attack us in them.... A strategical
offensive consorts very well with a tactical defence."
It was, it is true, as early as 1865 that the Chief of the General
Staff of the Prussian army wrote those words: "But he belonged to the
number of those great and rare men in whose case a profound study of
theory has almost been a substitute for practice."[11] Thus
Königgrätz, Metz, and Sedan did not cause him to alter his views
materially. Again, in 1874, he says:
"I am convinced that, as a result of the improvement of firearms, the
tactical defensive has acquired a great advantage (from a local
tactical point of view) over the offensive. It is true that in the
campaign of 1870 we always took the offensive and that we attacked
and captured the strongest positions of the enemy, but with what a
sacrifice? It seems to me to be more advantageous only to proceed to
an offensive after having repelled several attacks by the enemy."[12]
The Field-Marshal certainly did not overlook the fact that such an
opportunity of this nature as presented itself to Napoleon at
Austerlitz occurs but seldom and cannot be created at will. It is
sufficient, then, to draw attention to the fact that any leader who
has recourse to defence, wherever this is in conformity with the
situation, is showing himself in full agreement with the greatest
military leaders of the past.
War is, to quote the well-known phrase of Clausewitz, "the
continuation of politics by other means." It has already been
mentioned that it has resulted from the political and economic
situation that we and our allies have had to wage battle on the two
fronts under difficulties which had hitherto not been suspected and
which have continually increased. It was this that gave rise to the
peculiar form of the present War, as well as to the necessity,
notwithstanding the power of the blows which we dealt, of continually
husbanding the forces at our disposal. Hence the judgment pronounced
by Clausewitz on the conduct of King Frederick in the year 1760 is
fully applicable to our Supreme Command. He said[13]: "The whole
campaign exhibits a husbanding of forces, accompanied by the greatest
activity and skill." Numerous other comparisons with the Seven
Years' War present themselves, only that as the theatre of war, in
place of the Eastern and Central districts of Germany on which
Frederick the Great fought, we must substitute Europe. Just as at
that time Prussian regiments fought at Rossbach and a month later at
Leuthen, so now our army corps and divisions have fought first in the
West, then in the East, then in the Balkans, and _vice versa_. Just
as Frederick the Great at that time held the inner line, so did we
also in the World War. This has proved to be to our advantage (just
as it proved to Frederick's advantage), even though the difficulties
of the situation as a whole still remained. If, as we hope, policy
succeeds in future in preventing the recurrence of such a menacing
situation, or at any rate in producing the effect that we shall have
greater freedom for violent and decisive blows in one direction, then
the War will take a different shape and will be more like former wars.
Our business, therefore, is to maintain the fundamental ideas of war
as they lived in the German army up to the year 1914, to soak them in
the experiences of the present War, and to make the fullest technical
use of these experiences, but to do all this without giving an
entirely new direction to our thinking on strategy and tactics. We
can only strive continually after perfection; we cannot attain it.
Even King Frederick had to resign himself to this fact. In the
Testament of 1768 he writes:
"The military art demands continual study, if one wishes to attain a
thorough mastery of it. I am far from flattering myself that I have
exhausted it. I am even of opinion that a human lifetime is not long
enough in order to pursue it to the very end, because with every
fresh campaign I have acquired new views as the result of new
experiences, and because there still remain a multitude of things
concerning which fate has not permitted me to collect any experience."
Even less than at the time of Frederick the Great, when conditions
remained in all essential respects unchanged, and such alterations as
occurred in the weapons of war were insignificant as compared with
to-day, can we now tell whether the next campaign will not cause us
to form new views. Napoleon once declared that one must alter one's
tactics every ten years, if one wished to maintain one's superiority.
We proceeded in accordance with this principle prior to the War. Our
armaments were at the highest level of efficiency; our service
regulations were entirely up to date and adapted to the most recent
experiences of war, in particular the experience of the
Russo-Japanese war. This in itself is an indication that the World
War need not effect revolutionary changes; in fact it is impossible
that it should do so. On the whole, our training was quite on the
right lines. The wide scope which our regulations always allowed
made it easy for the troops to adapt themselves to the needs
resulting from the effect of modern weapons. Thus they adapted
themselves to the entrenched warfare to which they were unaccustomed
and which they disliked. The principles for attacking enemy
positions and for the defence of one's own have, as we have already
mentioned, been changed several times, in accordance with the conduct
of the enemy and the nature and strength of his weapons. In matters
of detail new experiences have been gleaned over and over again, but
the fundamental tendency of our regulations has not really been
affected. It has been proved they were right in everywhere giving
precedence to mind over form, for that adaptability which had been
inculcated in our whole army down to the man in the ranks proved
decisive. It resulted in the fact that the spirit and the nature of
this War were recognised in the army long before they were generally
recognised at home.
It is true that during the long peace the army had become very inert
in many respects. Innovations were only tardily adopted. Many tried
to extract from the regulations a compromise between what was old and
past and what was new and enduring. In this they overlooked the fact
that even enduring things will constantly call for improvements.
This applies also to the experiences afforded by this World War.
They cannot continue indefinitely to be authoritative any more than
the experiences of earlier wars, if only because the development of
technical science both on the land and in the air can never come to a
standstill. Above all, the individual must impress upon himself that
a certain partiality must always attach to his own particular
experiences. Our troops have exhibited a striking faculty of
adapting themselves to circumstances, but the same cannot be said of
all their officers; and this prolonged trench warfare in itself has a
dangerous tendency to engender a one-sided view. It has also to be
remembered that the conditions in the East and the West respectively
were entirely different.
A certain inertia, however, in the case of such a great organism as
is presented by the army, although it may prove a hindrance on
occasion, has also its good side. A certain amount of conservatism
is indispensable; it helps to secure a continuous progress, and not a
progress by leaps and bounds. We have already shown that the fact
that a thing is old is by no means necessarily a reason for
discarding it; we have been able to point to many phenomena similar
to those of the time of Moltke, Napoleon, nay, even of Frederick the
Great. Of course these similarities are only evident when we
consider the thing as a whole. The tactics of 1870-71 had become out
of date long before the World War, and occasional reversions to them,
such as occurred with us here and there before the War, will now have
to be renounced once and for all. Within certain limits, however,
the phenomena of war repeat themselves not infrequently, although the
form is always altered, and they have to be duly adapted to present
conditions.
[1] Vol. vii. _Feldzug_, 1812.
[2] _Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte und Taktik_. V. _Der 18 August,
1870_, p. 407.
[3] Stegemann, _loc. cit._, i., 211.
[4] _On War_, vol. iii., p. 4. [_Vom Kriege. Skizzen zum VII. B._, 2
Kap.]
[5] Pierron, _Méthodes de guerre_, 1.
[6] _On War_, vol. iii., p. 155. [_Vom Kriege. Skizzen zum VII.
B._, 2 Kap.]
[7] _On War_, vol. iii., p. 72. [_Vom Kriege. Skizzen zum VII. B._,
26 Kap.]
[8] _Betrachtungen über die Taktik_, etc.
[9] Foucart. _Jéna_.
[10] _Taktisch-Strategische Aufsätze_. Bemerkungen über den Einfluss
der verbesserten Feuerwaffen.
[11] Dragomirow. _Skizzen des Oesterreichisch-Preussischen Krieges
im Jahre 1866_.
[12] _Taktische Aufgaben_.
[13] Vol. x., _Strategische Beleuchtung mehrerer Feldzüge_.
Friedrich der Grosse.
V
THE ARMY IN THE FUTURE
Although the effect of the World War has by no means been to
revolutionise military art completely, none the less it is incumbent
upon us to draw from it a number of lessons both as regards the
further development of our army and also as regards our mode of
training.
From the point of view of organisation it must first of all be
realised that no organisation can possibly cover all the possible
contingencies of war, and that, therefore, it is of the first
importance to make it as elastic and adaptable as possible. In the
course of the World War the attempt to preserve the original
formations, and thereby to secure the continuous influence of the
leaders over their troops, was found to be impossible of realisation,
or at any rate it had to be restricted to the divisions. The latter
became strategic units and were correspondingly developed; the army
corps became in many cases an army-group, and the number of its
divisions underwent constant fluctuation. The question of the
expediency of the triple division of the higher units was relegated
forthwith to the background in face of the imperative demands of the
War. This is by no means a novel experience. Napoleon never
hesitated to alter the number of divisions in his army corps. The
latter were made up in accordance with the demands of the situation,
the personality of the leader, and the number of subordinate units
which were available.