CONSTANTINOPLE, _Sept. 9th, 1879_.
Three months have elapsed since my last letter, and were it not for the
suffering people we might treat of the history of the Turkish Government
during these months as so many acts in a comedy; but human suffering is
never ridiculous, and those who live in the midst of it find nothing
amusing in the obstinate stupidity which causes it. It is not pleasant
to live among the ruins of a crumbling Empire, however picturesque these
ruins may appear at a distance, and however much it may be for the
interest of foreign politicians to leave them undisturbed. Whatever may
be the course of contemporary thought in England, where the fate of
Turkey has unfortunately become a party question, the people of Turkey
can only think of it as it affects their own interests, and they desire
above all things that the people of England, without distinction of
party, should understand their condition as it is. This is a reasonable
desire, whether anything can be done for them or not; and these letters
are intended to represent contemporary life and thought _in Turkey_.
The Fall of Khaireddin Pacha.
Khaireddin Pacha commenced life as a Circassian slave in Tunis. He came
to Constantinople last year as an exiled Prime Minister of the Bey, but
possessed of immense wealth which he had accumulated while in office,
and with a high reputation for learning, skill as an administrator, and
devotion to the faith of Islam. He was well received by the Sultan, who
often consulted him in regard to political affairs; and finally, through
the influence of France and England, he was appointed Grand Vizier. But
he made no friends among the Turkish Pachas, and had no party in the
country. Even the most liberal of the governing class regarded him as an
interloper, who had neither the ability nor the experience necessary to
fit him for the place which he had secured by European influence. He
reciprocated their distrust, and spoke of them freely as a band of
bandits. He was too good a Mussulman to attempt to build up a party
among the Christians. He depended simply upon his personal influence
over the Sultan and the support of the French and English Ambassadors.
He succeeded in exiling all the ex-Grand Viziers, but he had still more
dangerous enemies among his own colleagues, who thwarted him at every
step, worked upon the fears of the Sultan, and brought the affairs of
the Government to a dead-lock. He finally proposed to the Sultan a plan
of Government which, under the name of reform, involved an abdication of
his supreme power in favour of the Grand Vizier. This was supported by
all the influence of France, England, and Austria, but opposed by the
Ulema and almost the whole governing class. It led to a formal decision
on the part of the Ulema, which is of far greater importance than the
fall of the Grand Vizier which was the first result of it. It declared
that the Sultan ruled the Empire as Caliph, that he was bound by the
Sheriat or sacred law, and that he could not delegate his authority to
another. Under this decision there can be no such thing as civil
government in Turkey. Civil law can never take the place of the Sheriat,
and the emancipation of the Christian subjects of the Porte is an
impossibility. The Ulema admit the necessity of administrative reform,
and recognize the fact that the Empire is in peril; but it must be a
return to ancient customs, and not a recognition of the principles of
European civilization. They are in favour of limiting the power of the
Sultan, but it must be limited by an extension of the influence of the
Ulema. This triumph of the Ulema is the one important feature of the
Ministerial crisis. As Khaireddin had no party, there are few who regret
his fall. As few had any faith in the influence of English moral suasion
applied to the Sultan by Sir A. H. Layard, there are few who are
disappointed at its failure; but it may be well to note that Sir A. H.
Layard and Khaireddin Pacha have both attempted to control the Turkish
Government by their personal influence over the Sultan, and have both
been defeated by the stronger influence of palace intrigue. There are no
doubt certain advantages in maintaining intimate personal relations with
an absolute sovereign, but, in fact, no sovereign is so absolute that he
cannot be to a great extent controlled by his Ministers; and the
Ambassador who is intimate with the Sultan, and seeks to control his
actions, is certain to excite the jealousy and opposition of the
Ministers and the palace. Even with the Sultan himself, he is obliged to
assume a very different tone from that which he would use in dealing
with a Minister. He may smile, but he cannot frown--he may suggest, but
he cannot threaten--he may persuade, but he cannot dictate--he may
secure a promise, but he cannot exact its fulfilment. In the present
case he has certainly failed to keep his own _protégé_ in office, and,
what is more important, he has failed to secure any modifications in the
system of government.
The Ulema who have triumphed in this conflict are the most powerful,
compact, and thoroughly organized body in Turkey. They represent all the
wealthy and influential Turkish families. They monopolize the two great
departments of law and religion, and the revenues of the higher orders
of the hierarchy are immense. Those who are not fanatics by nature or
conviction are so by profession, and their idea of reform is a return to
the good old days of the Caliph of Bagdad. The Sultan is afraid of them,
and he has reason to be so. When the crisis came it was much easier and
safer for him to yield to them than to follow the counsels of Sir A. H.
Layard, or to abdicate in favour of Khaireddin Pacha. He could invite
the former to dinner oftener than ever, and give the latter a pension.
He had nothing to fear from either.
The office of Grand Vizier was abolished for the second time within two
years, and a Prime Minister appointed who could be trusted to do
nothing; and it is a curious fact that this office is now abolished for
the sake of increasing the power of the Sultan, while it was given up
two years ago for the purpose of limiting his authority and
strengthening that of the Ministry. It was Achmet Vefik Pacha, the most
determined and independent man in Turkey, who was then appointed Prime
Minister. It is Arifi Pacha, a man who never had an idea of his own, who
is now selected to fill the place; while men of strong will and
reactionary proclivities like Osman Pacha and Said Pacha continue to
hold their places as Ministers of War and Justice.
Sultan Murad.
It must not be supposed that all the Turks are satisfied with this
triumph of the Ulema, and the rule of Osman Pacha. Those who are out of
office are, of course, dissatisfied. But beyond this there is a strong
party at Constantinople which favours a radical change in the Government
as the only hope of saving the Empire from destruction. They would limit
the power of the Sultan by a genuine Constitution, and a Representative
Assembly; but they believe that this can never be accomplished under the
present Sultan. The fate of Mithad Pacha is always before their eyes.
Their plan is to dethrone Hamid and reinstate Murad, whose liberal views
are well known, and whose health is such that he could not resist
radical measures even if he did not favour them. I have no means of
knowing the real strength of this party, or exactly who are its leaders,
nor do I know anything more of the health of Sultan Murad than the fact
that his partisans declare that he is quite as sane and strong as his
brother. But there is such a party, and it is confident of ultimate
success. Of course, it is not supported by the British Ambassador, as
Mithad Pacha was in the overthrow of Sultan Abd-ul-Aziz; but it may have
other foreign influence behind it, and it would, no doubt, result in the
immediate recall of Mithad Pacha to the capital. As I am
constitutionally a Conservative and opposed to revolution, I have not
much sympathy with this movement; but I have no doubt that, if Turkey is
to be left to herself to work out her own destiny, there is more to be
hoped from a Representative Assembly than from any other possible
modification of the Government. Mithad Pacha's Parliament was a surprise
to the world, and not least to those who devised it. His Constitution
was a fraud designed to deceive Europe. The members of his Assembly were
selected by the Government, its acts were ignored. It was finally
disbanded, and many of its members were imprisoned. But in spite of all
this it demonstrated the fact that there was material in Turkey for an
independent Assembly, which would be qualified by a little experience to
control the Government, and would favour radical reforms in the
administration. The governing class at Constantinople is hopelessly
corrupt and effete, but men came up to this Assembly from the interior,
who might in time have supplanted the present rulers, and infused new
life into the administration. Those who now favour an Independent
Parliament believe that the present Sultan will never consent to it, and
therefore propose to reinstate Murad; but it is possible that if English
moral suasion were turned in this direction, it might meet with more
success than it has obtained thus far. The Ulema would probably oppose
it, although they accepted it as part of the plan of Mithad Pacha.
Circumstances have changed, and their experience of the last Assembly
was not satisfactory.
There is no reason to suppose that Sultan Murad himself has any part in
this plan, or any knowledge of it. He is kept a close prisoner, and
guarded from all outside influences with the greatest care, but his name
is powerful, for his misfortunes and the well-known amiability of his
character have roused the sympathy of the common people in his behalf.
They are inclined to regard him as their rightful sovereign, and to
believe that he might save them from their present misery. They may be
mistaken, but all the world sympathizes with their kindly feeling
towards this unhappy prince, whose mind gave way under the burden of
responsibility which was suddenly forced upon him, and the shock which
he experienced at the death of his uncle and his Ministers, who was
himself deposed before he had regained his faculties, and who, for no
fault of his own, is doomed to spend his life as a prisoner of State.
The Progress of Reform.
We are officially assured that the change in the Ministry will in no way
impede the progress of reform, which has already been carried out in the
Department of Justice, and which is soon to be applied to the civil
administration. The plan has already been elaborated. It has been sent
to the Valis for their approval, and will soon be submitted to the
Eastern Roumelia Commission, after which it will be considered by the
Sultan and, if approved by him, will be proclaimed in the form of a new
_Hatt_. It professes to be a plan for a reorganization of the Vilayets,
on the principle of decentralization and local self-government. It does
not seem to excite much interest in any quarter, probably for the reason
that all this exists already _on paper_, and that if Aali Pacha could
not execute the elaborate scheme, which he proclaimed when the Vilayets
were organized, there is not much probability that the new _Hatt_ will
be any more effective. The people of Turkey have no faith in paper
reforms. They are issued as easily as paper money, and are as easily
repudiated; they are like leading articles in the daily papers--they are
written, read, and forgotten, alike by the author and the reader, within
the twenty-four hours. There is an old proverb current among the Turks
which says, "The decrees of the Sultan last three days--the day they are
made, the day they are kept, and the day they are forgotten." If the
proverb were a new one, the second day would be omitted.
The reforms which have been completed by Said Pacha, the Minister of
Justice, are not of a nature to encourage the hopes of the people. A
large number of new officials have been appointed, but they are of the
same class as those already in office. Indeed, there seems to have been
a special purpose in these appointments of making it known to the people
that no change was to be expected in the method of administering the
law. Only seventeen out of one hundred and eighty-three of these new
officials are Christians, and the Turkish papers take pains to declare
that it is absurd to suppose that Christians are competent to hold these
offices. This is the result of the demand of Lord Salisbury that the
Courts of the Empire should be reorganized under European control. They
will continue to be what they have been, and it will be but a small
consolation to the suffering people of Turkey to know that they have
been condemned in strong terms by the British Government. The worst
feature of the case is that the law offers no man any protection against
arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. A man may be thrown into prison and
kept there for years without any trial or any knowledge of the charges
brought against him. Such cases are very common. Or he may he beaten by
the police, or chained in a dungeon, on the most frivolous charge. I
knew a case the other day of a Greek who was severely beaten because he
requested a police officer to arrest a Turk who was plundering his shop
in broad day. All this was done in the presence of a European gentleman,
too. There are several Armenians in prison now in Constantinople whose
only offence was the wearing of hats in place of the fez. At the same
time, crimes of every description are committed with impunity without
any apparent effort on the part of the authorities to discover the
perpetrators. Almost in sight of Constantinople, and under the immediate
jurisdiction of the capital, is a district where for months the peaceful
inhabitants of Adabazar have been plundered and murdered by the
Circassians. They have appealed again and again to Constantinople for
protection. They have tried to interest the Ambassadors in their behalf.
They sent a deputation to the Grand Vizier. He had no time to see them,
but turned them over to another official who requested them to present
him in writing a statement of the reforms which they thought were needed
in the Empire! A few hundred soldiers, or even one determined man sent
from Constantinople, would have restored order; but nothing could be
done. Five men were murdered while the deputation was in this city. The
whole Turkish coast of the Black Sea is infested with brigands who
plunder at will. They are well known, but no one thinks of arresting or
punishing them. Travellers are only secure when they are provided with a
safe-conduct from the leaders. The Reports of the new Consuls in Asia
Minor acknowledge a state of things which is almost too bad to be
believed. There is no security in the administration of the law for
person, property, or life, and there seems to be no prospect of any
improvement. Some more radical reform is needed than the appointment of
one hundred and sixty-six new Turkish judges.
A scheme of financial reform has also been projected, and the foreign
Embassies have been invited to nominate a certain number of persons as
inspectors to superintend the collection of the revenue; but this is
nothing new. The Imperial Ottoman Bank has nominally held this position
for many years, and at times has exercised some control, no doubt with
advantage to the Government. A new system of taxation, carried out under
the control of honest and responsible Europeans, would increase the
revenue of the Government without adding to the burdens of the people;
but the place where reform is most needed is in the expenditure rather
than the collection of the revenue. The present scheme does not command
confidence in Constantinople in regard to the collection of the taxes,
and it offers no security for the control of the expenses of the
Government. The truth is that the whole financial system is hopelessly
corrupt, and, however it may be patched or mended, it will be rotten
still. There is no hope for the Turkish Government until it is ready to
put its finances into the hands of competent Europeans who shall have
absolute control over everything connected with expenditure as well as
collection; and I am sorry to say that there seems to be no present
prospect of any such arrangement. The enormous expenditure of the Palace
is unlimited and uncontrolled, and the Sultan will not submit to any
control. Financial reform must begin there, or it will amount to
nothing. The present Sultan before he came to the throne was known to be
a very careful and economical man, and no doubt he would be glad to be
so now, but he has not the courage to break with the traditions of the
past--give up his thousands of slaves, women, and palace officials, and
live like a European sovereign rather than an Oriental despot. So long
as he maintains the present system he must have money, no matter who
starves for want of it; and he must continue to take money, on his
personal order, from whatever department of the Government may be so
happy as to have any in its treasury.
The Government is bankrupt; its revenues are not half enough to meet its
current expenses; its army is starving; its civil service forced to live
on plunder; its income mortgaged for years in advance to secure loans on
which it is paying thirty or forty per cent. interest in one form or
another; but still no one would dare to suggest to the Sultan the
possibility of his reducing his own expenses to a sum equal to that
expended by the Queen of England. Thus far all talk of financial reform
is prompted by the desire to borrow more money in Europe to meet the
present wants of the Government. These difficulties once surmounted,
everything would go on as before. It is no friendship to Turkey to lend
her money, until such time as the Sultan and his Ministers are ready for
a real reform, beginning at the Palace, and conducted under the control
of Europeans appointed and supported by their own Governments. But there
is no prospect of any such arrangement.
The Turks do not appreciate the dangers which beset them. They see that
the country is in an unsettled state, and they feel the want of money;
but the evils of which the people complain are nothing new. They exist
now in an aggravated form, on account of the war and the confusion which
has reigned for several years at Constantinople; but the Turks see no
reason why they should not be reduced to a normal state, and be quietly
endured for centuries to come, as they have been for centuries past.
Their attention is directed exclusively to their foreign relations, and
whatever is said or done about reform is intended solely to conciliate
public opinion in Europe. Could the rulers here be brought face to face
with a really independent Representative Assembly, freely chosen by the
people, they would be made to think less of Europe and more of Turkey.
They would see that their rule has become well-nigh intolerable, even to
the Mussulman population of the Empire. Then there would be some hope of
genuine administration and financial reform. It is even possible that
the Christian element in such an Assembly might be strong enough to
secure, in time, the emancipation of the non-Mussulman population--and
it should never be forgotten that this must come in some form. England
does not insist upon it now, but she will, and so will all Europe. It
would be far better for Turkey if it could be brought about by the
Christians themselves; but if it is not, it will be forced upon the
Turks by direct European intervention, or possibly by the overthrow of
the Empire.
The Egyptian Crisis.
The affairs of Egypt have been so fully discussed in England that it is
unnecessary for me to do more than to indicate the course of thought on
this subject at Constantinople. At the outset, the Sultan and his
Ministers sympathized with the Khedive. They feared that European
intervention at Cairo would pave the way for a similar intervention
here; and when he appealed to the Sultan he had reason to expect his
support. But the Turks thought they saw their opportunity to regain
their hold on Egypt, and the Khedive was summarily removed. The Turkish
papers here did not hesitate to rejoice over it as a "new conquest of
Egypt," and it is still believed here that this view of the subject was
encouraged by England, that it was the purpose of Lord Beaconsfield to
escape from the embarrassing demands of France by restoring Egypt to the
control of the Sultan.
But when the Turks found that they had been misled or mistaken, and that
Egypt was less than ever under their control, they regretted the steps
which had been taken, and began once more to sympathize with the Khedive
whom they had deposed. He was very liberal in his expenditure of money
at Constantinople, and always found it for his interest to maintain a
host of retainers here; but the new Khedive will have no money to spend
here, and will need agents in Paris and London rather than in
Constantinople. The tribute-money no longer comes here, but is paid to
bondholders in England and France. There is no hope of putting any more
Turks into lucrative offices in Egypt. In short, the connection of that
country with Turkey is no longer anything more than nominal, and the
Turks feel their disappointment very keenly. They have now but one hope
left. They understand very well the difficulties which must arise from a
joint protectorate by France and England, and hope that the mutual
jealousies of these Powers may throw Egypt once more into the hands of
Turkey. The tone of the French press, even of so cautious and
conservative a periodical as the _Revue des Deux Mondes_, gives them
some ground for this hope; but the Khedive lost his throne by giving too
much importance to this mutual jealousy, which manifested itself much
more plainly in Egypt than it did in Europe; and it is to be hoped that
the Turks will be equally disappointed. Every one in the East regards
the present situation as impracticable and temporary, but it may result
in the independence of Egypt under a general European protectorate, or
in a further division of the Ottoman Empire by the annexation of Egypt
to England and Syria to France. The opportunity of annexing Egypt
without compensation to France was lost when England refused to listen
to the suggestions of Germany three years ago, because, as Lord Derby is
reported to have said, it would have shocked the moral sense of the
world.
The Greek Question.
The Greek Question is not a simple one. Very few questions connected
with the East are simple. The aspirations of the kingdom of Greece are
natural. Her appeal to Europe was justifiable, and there can be no
question of the advantage which it would be to Greece, and to the
populations of Epirus, Thessaly, and Crete, if these provinces were
annexed to the kingdom. If this were all, they would be annexed, and all
the world would rejoice. It is to be regretted that the Congress of
Berlin did not shut its eyes to other considerations and settle it
off-hand in this way; but they did not, and no Power now exists which
can do so.
These provinces belong to Turkey, and she cannot see that it is for her
interest to give them up. Greece cannot possibly offer her anything in
return for them, and, as against Turkey, she has no claim upon them. The
Congress of Berlin advised Turkey to arrange, by friendly negotiation,
for the cession of a part of them; but there is really no ground upon
which a negotiation can be based. Turkey is ready to yield something out
of respect to Europe, but she naturally wishes to give up as little as
possible. Then there are other Powers interested. Austria and Italy, but
especially the former, have their own views of the destiny of European
Turkey, and their own plans of aggrandizement. Albania and Macedonia
have to be considered. England, France, and Russia, also, are looking
forward to the future, and questioning how the settlement of this
question will affect their plans for the final solution of the Eastern
Question. Here is room for intrigues without end, and complications
without limit.
The Greeks are indignant, especially against England and Austria; and
their papers here have used some very disagreeable language. They are
now solemnly protesting against the right of Sir A. H. Layard and Count
Zichy to take a short vacation, so long as this question remains
unsettled. Some of them seem to believe that Osman Pacha really
contemplates a reconquest of Greece itself, and that England might
consent to it. All this is absurd; but there can be no doubt about the
fact that England and Austria have thus far opposed the claims of
Greece, and that Austria and Turkey have, each in her own way,
contributed to excite discontent in Albania, and keep up a state of
anarchy in Macedonia. A leading paper in Vienna, ten days ago, openly
declared that it was the intention of Austria to push on to Salonica,
after taking possession of Novi Bazaar. She certainly has very little
sympathy with Greece, and if this question is to be settled at all she
will keep the Greeks as far from Salonica as possible.
The Turkish papers are allowed to discuss this question with perfect
freedom, and one of the most moderate, the _Djeridei-Havadis_, says:--
"If the Hellenic Kingdom is desirous of avoiding a war with the
Albanians, it ought to follow the line of conduct proposed by the
Porte. If it acts in opposition to it, a war will follow which can
only result in ruin, as has happened before. If the Porte had only
to satisfy Greece, it is probable that it would show itself
yielding, but the Imperial Government cannot, with a light heart,
provoke a conflict and see the blood of its subjects poured out, for
the Albanians have decided to defend their country, arms in hand. It
is astonishing that Europe, in seconding the demands of Greece,
completely forgets the rights of the Albanians."
The Commission appointed to settle this question is now in session at
Constantinople, and some arrangement may be made, but the current
opinion in the city, among both Greeks and Turks, is that neither party
will yield anything. Another meeting is to be held to-morrow; and if
the Greeks are ready to give up Janina, a settlement is possible--in
spite of the Albanians. The impression is that they will not fight,
although the Greeks in Thessaly and Epirus have roused their hostility,
and have failed to do anything to conciliate them in past years. They
have an honest fear of being Hellenized by force, and although they have
little sympathy for the Turkish Government, and are constantly
quarrelling among themselves, they still have a strong national pride,
and they may take up arms in good earnest. If they do, it will be a
serious matter for Greece.
The Principality of Bulgaria.
Bulgaria is enjoying a brief period of comparative repose. The Russians
have left the country. The Prince has assumed the reins of Government.
The people are busy with their harvests, and, except in certain
districts where the disbanded soldiers of the Turkish army have taken to
brigandage, there is peace and quiet everywhere, and there is no reason
to fear anything more disquieting than the excitement of a general
election.
The Principality has a great advantage over Eastern Roumelia, in that it
has secured its independence, and can work out its destiny by itself,
without any interference on the part of the Turks or of an European
Commission; but both Prince and people are without experience, and there
are no popular leaders who have any practical knowledge of government.
The people are jealous of their newly-acquired rights, and naturally
opinionated and disputatious. The coming elections will no doubt cause
great political excitement, and the new Assembly will not be very easily
managed, or be likely to win the admiration of Europe by its wisdom. It
should be remembered, however, that this lack of experience is the
misfortune and not the fault of the Bulgarians, and that Europe has not
dealt with them in a way to win their confidence and command their
respect. It has left them with a grievance which they can never forget
for a moment, which must influence all their political action, and which
forces them to maintain intimate relations with Russia, which is not a
country where they can learn political wisdom, although it has given
them a Constitution which is a model of liberality. There was nothing in
the Russian administration of the province which was adapted to prepare
them for such a Constitution, or teach them how to conduct a free and
liberal government. Prince and people have to begin everything for
themselves. Indeed, they are probably worse off than they would have
been if there had been no civil administration attempted in the province
by the Russians. An army of occupation of any country is unfitted for
the organization of civil government. This was attempted on a grand
scale in the Southern States of America after the civil war, and under
exceptionally favourable circumstances, but all these civil governments,
established and fostered by military force, were unsatisfactory while
they continued, and disappeared when the army was withdrawn. If this was
a work which could not be accomplished by the United States, and by an
army which was made up chiefly of civilians, it is not strange that,
with all possible goodwill, the Czar of Russia failed to establish a
satisfactory civil administration in Bulgaria. He gave them as good a
Prince as was to be found in the German market, and as liberal a
Constitution as any in Europe. He maintained order and protected all
classes as long as his soldiers remained in the country; but the whole
administration was necessarily Russian in its spirit and methods, and
altogether unlike what it ought to be under the new Constitution. The
Bulgarians who were trained under it will have to unlearn much that they
have learned, and begin anew, or they will fail to satisfy the people.
All this is the misfortune rather than the fault of the nation, and it
has a right to expect that Europe will be patient and friendly, while it
gains by experience the wisdom which no nation has ever acquired in any
other way.
Prince Alexander is young, and as inexperienced as his people, but those
who know him best have confidence in his good sense, and he is said to
be not unlike the late Prince Albert in character. He will need all his
good qualities to attain success; and if successful, he will certainly
deserve to be ranked with the Prince Consort and King Leopold. His work
certainly involves more self-denial than either of theirs, and not less
tact and good sense. He was no doubt elected through the influence of
Russia; but he is no mere creature of the Czar, and has no desire to act
as a Russian agent. On the contrary, he is heartily in sympathy with the
liberal ideas of the West, and anxious to secure the goodwill of
England. Thanks to the efforts of Mr. Palgrave, the English
Consul-General, this does not seem to the Bulgarians so hopeless a task
as it once did.
The Prince was received by his people with the greatest enthusiasm. No
sovereign was ever more heartily welcomed, and each stage of his journey
was a new triumph. He probably appreciated this all the more from the
fact that his visit to Constantinople was made as disagreeable as
possible. He was first refused permission to come at all, on the
pretence that his life would be in danger. This plea was too absurd to
deceive any one, but it might have caused serious difficulty if he had
not appealed to the Great Powers, and at the same time manifested a
disposition to conciliate the Porte by proposing to limit his stay at
Constantinople to a visit of a few hours. He arrived in the Bosphorus in
the morning, and left in the afternoon. He was received by the Sultan,
but was told that owing to the pressure of business his Firman was not
ready, and could not be delivered to him. No Bulgarian was allowed to
approach him, and no boat allowed to go out to his steamer. Large bodies
of troops were stationed along his route and about the Russian Embassy,
and he was treated very much like a prisoner of State. It is not easy to
understand why this farce was played by the Turks, or what they expected
to gain by it. They probably refused the permission in the first place
with the intention of treating him as an ordinary Turkish Vali, and
sending his Firman to be read in public at Tirnova by a Turkish
official; but after the failure of this plan there was no obvious reason
for treating him as they did at Constantinople. Some have supposed that
it was intended as a studied insult to the Prince, others that it was an
elaborate practical joke played upon the Russian Embassy, which had at
one time suggested that it was unnecessary for the Prince to come to
Constantinople, as other vassal Princes had always done. But whatever
may have been the motive which prompted this singular treatment, it only
served to make the reception of the Prince the next day at Varna more
impressive, and to give more importance to the wild enthusiasm of his
new subjects, who could not have received him with greater joy if he had
himself just delivered them from the hated rule of the Turks. He was
inaugurated at Tirnova, the ancient capital, and then went at once to
Sofia, the new seat of government. His first difficulty was the choice
of a Ministry. Two parties had already been developed in the
Constitutional Assembly which adopted the Constitution and elected the
Prince. They grew out of a difference of opinion in regard to religious
liberty, freedom of the press, the right of association, with other
similar questions, and at once assumed the names, Conservative and
Liberal. The Conservative party included the clergy of the Bulgarian
Church, and some of the best educated and most enlightened Bulgarians,
who felt that too much liberty was a dangerous thing for a people
brought so suddenly from bondage to freedom--who feared that the country
would be flooded with Nihilism, Socialism, and all other isms. The
Liberal party, however, had a large majority in the Assembly, and was
led with considerable skill by two or three experienced politicians, who
were wise enough to avoid extreme measures. When the Prince arrived, he
attempted to form a Ministry which should include the leaders of both
these parties; but for some reason the majority of those selected were
Conservatives, and the Liberals declined to serve with them, so that he
has a Conservative Ministry, with the probability that the new Assembly
will have a strong Liberal majority. This is an unfortunate beginning,
as the party conflict which is likely to ensue will probably weaken the
influence of some of the best men in the nation, who are really Liberal
in their views, but who fear that absolute liberty will degenerate into
license and sap the foundations of religion and morality. They do not
think that the people are ready for "a free Church in a free State."
They fail to see that the influence of the Church can only be
strengthened by educating the clergy and reviving their spiritual life.
The Bulgarians are naturally a religious people; but, both while they
were under the Greek Patriarch, and since they have received their
independence, their Church has been an essentially political
organization. It needs now to be spiritualized. The best men of both
parties acknowledge this; but, as in all other countries, there is a
difference of opinion as to how far it should be defended and supported
by the State.
I have said that this division of parties was an unfortunate beginning
for this new State, but after all it is far better that there should be
real living questions before the people than that politics should
degenerate into a new struggle for office. The very discussion of these
questions will tend to educate the people and revive the Church, and it
will probably be found that when a new Liberal Ministry is formed the
responsibilities of office will make it as conservative in most respects
as the present Government. The Prince has the confidence of all the
people, and will no doubt accept the result of the coming elections as a
Constitutional sovereign, and then direct the attention of the people to
other questions of the utmost importance concerning the organization of
the various departments of the Government. No doubt serious difficulties
will be encountered and mistakes will be made, but the spirit of the
people is good. They desire good order, peace, and quiet, and they will
make every effort to secure it. They merit the sympathy and goodwill of
all civilized nations, and especially of those who believe in free
government and liberal institutions.
Eastern Roumelia.
The condition of affairs in Eastern Roumelia is much less hopeful, as
the difficulties encountered in the organization of the Government are
very much greater and more numerous. North of the Balkans they are only
such as might be experienced by any new Representative Government in any
civilized country, but in the nondescript province of Roumelia the
people are suffering from evils inflicted upon them by the Congress of
Berlin. Everything is unsettled. No one knows who rules the country, or
what is the form of government. It seems to be for the interest of
certain parties to prolong this state of things and introduce as much
disorder as possible. The people are kept in a constant state of
excitement, and no one knows what to expect from one day to another. The
Congress of Berlin is primarily responsible for this, and no doubt it
was for the interest of Austria to keep up a state of anarchy and
confusion in European Turkey. It was her plan to absorb the European
provinces herself, and the way must be kept open to Salonica and if
possible to Constantinople. It is believed here that England went to
Berlin with a secret agreement to support these pretensions of Austria,
but no one sees exactly how England is to profit by this arrangement. It
is certain that no one in Turkey gained anything by the division of
Bulgaria, but the evils which have resulted would have been much less if
in addition to this division the Congress had not devised the
extraordinary scheme of giving different forms of Government to the two
Bulgarias. This plan, of course, insured the permanent discontent of the
whole Bulgarian nation, but, worse than this, it made the impression
upon the Turks and Greeks that the arrangement for Eastern Roumelia was
only a temporary one, and that by skilful agitation they might overturn
it. They have not failed to improve this opportunity. The Phanariote
and Roumelian Greeks are doing everything in their power to create
disturbance and cause difficulty in Eastern Roumelia. An unceasing
torrent of abuse is poured out upon the Bulgarians by the Greek papers
and their French organ the _Phare du Bosphore_. They are full of false
statements and misrepresentations of every kind, and a portion of the
Greeks in the province act in full sympathy with these papers. Free
Greece does not sympathize with this crusade, and an attempt was made a
few weeks since to induce the Greeks here to come to an understanding
with the Bulgarian Church, by withdrawing the excommunication and
arranging for harmonious co-operation. It is understood that the
Patriarch was in favour of this, but the Greek papers here opposed it
with a violence which was incomprehensible to the uninitiated. They
declared that "the maintenance of the schism was the only hope of
Hellenism," and appealed to the Porte to prevent by force a
reconciliation "which would inevitably result in the union of Greeks and
Bulgarians to drive out the Turks and divide the country between them,"
This opposition on the part of the Phanariotes prevented the execution
of the plan.
The Turks also are doing what they can to create disturbance in the
province, and find some excuse for occupying it with their army. This
was, of course, to be expected, and is in some degree excusable. They
naturally wish to regain possession of this rich province, and they feel
that they have cause of complaint against the Bulgarians, who do not
receive the returning refugees with much cordiality. There are real
difficulties on both sides which cannot fail to give rise to serious
trouble. It is a pity that the whole arrangement could not have been
left to a really impartial Commission, free to act on principles of
equity and common sense. The difficulties are such as these, for
example. There are many towns where the Bulgarian quarter was burned by
the Turks. When the Turks fled and the Bulgarians returned, they
occupied the Turkish houses, and they are now naturally disinclined to
give them up to the refugees and camp in the fields. Again, there are
many cases where the Bulgarians were deprived of their lands in the most
iniquitous manner some years ago, under the pretence of a new law in
regard to title-deeds. These lands were seized by rich Turks, who fled
during the war, but now come back to claim them. The Bulgarians have the
original titles and the Turks new ones. To whom do the lands rightly
belong?
There are other cases where Turks return who are known to have taken
part in the massacres. There has been a general amnesty, but it can
hardly be expected that these persons will be well received. These are
only a few of the many difficulties connected with the return of the
refugees which irritate the Turks and the Bulgarians both; and in some
cases both parties merit our sympathy.
In addition to these deliberate attempts to make trouble on the part of
the Turks, Greeks, and also of some few hot-headed Bulgarians who are
foolish enough to suppose that a disturbance might hasten their union
with the Principality, the confusion in the Government is a source of
constant trouble. No one knows what the Government is. The Porte claims
supreme authority, and sends peremptory orders to the Pacha. The Pacha
naturally considers himself the head of the Government. The European
Commission claims the right to exercise control whenever it sees fit.
The Consuls assume the right to intrigue or to dictate in the name of
their respective Governments. The Administrative Council, a majority of
which is Bulgarian, considers itself to be responsible for the
administration, and there is a Constitution of hundreds of articles
which is theoretically the law of the land. A National Assembly is soon
to be added to the list. The militia have been under the command of a
Levantine Frenchman, who was not responsible to the Governor, and who
does not appear to have had a single qualification for his office.
Happily he has just been replaced by a better man.
Having inflicted all this confusion upon Eastern Roumelia, the European
Powers are complaining that the people do not know how to govern
themselves! Perhaps they do not, but as yet they have had no opportunity
to make the experiment. If peace and quiet is ever to be restored to
this unhappy province, the Government must be simplified and
consolidated; it must be left to manage its own affairs, and to make the
best it can of the elaborate Constitution which Europe has conferred
upon it. Alecko Pacha is not a great man, but he was the best man
available for his position, and he is a man who is much more likely to
throw up his office in disgust at the trouble which it gives him than to
lend himself to any scheme for resisting the will of Europe. He ought to
be encouraged and supported. The Bulgarians, who constitute the majority
of the population, are discontented at the arbitrary action which
separated them from the Principality, but they are satisfied that they
have nothing to gain from any present agitation of this question, and
they only desire to be left to govern themselves in accordance with the
decision of Europe, and to be assured that they will not be turned over
again to the tender mercies of the Turkish Government. The fear of this
is universal, and it is this fear which keeps them in a state of
constant excitement. It is not without reason. A large Turkish army is
camped on their borders. The Porte is seeking some excuse for entering
the province. Certain European representatives at Philippopolis are
always threatening this, and the people believe that they are intriguing
to bring it about. Everything is in confusion and uncertainty in regard
to the Government, and nothing seems settled. There can be no peace and
quiet in a country which is in constant fear of invasion, and something
ought to be done to remove this fear from Eastern Roumelia. The Turkish
army should certainly be removed, and the Porte should be warned to let
Alecko Pacha alone and allow him to organize his Government as best he
can. If this source of fear and irritation were removed, the Bulgarians
would accept the situation and make the best of it. It would be for
their interest to do so, and an industrious, thrifty population is
always quick to see what is for its interest.
The gymnastic clubs, which were originally formed for another purpose,
are now kept up and supported by sober, conservative men, simply from
this fear of a Turkish invasion. If the fear were removed these
associations would be dissolved at once, as they ought to be; for
Bulgarian merchants are not in the habit of spending money for anything
which is not essential to their well-being. These clubs are not
revolutionary, but they might become a source of disorder if they were
made permanent.
It is not probable that the European Powers will allow any invasion of
the country; but the Turks have always in hand the pretence of sending
troops to occupy the Balkans, and this fact to some extent justifies the
fears of the Bulgarians. If there were danger of another Russian
invasion, the Turks would be fully justified in occupying the passes at
once, and there is nothing in Eastern Roumelia to prevent or even delay
such an occupation; but under present circumstances, when there is
nothing to be feared from Russia--when peace and quiet is the thing of
all others to be desired--the occupation of the Balkans would be a
crime.