predestination upon the doctrine of _regeneration_? Regeneration
is usually understood to be a change by which unholy dispositions
--dispositions at variance with the character and will of God
--are substituted by those in accordance therewith. But, if
Calvinism be true, regeneration is nothing more than a preordained
change from doing the will of God perfectly in one way, to doing
it perfectly in another way.
17. A consequence of this theory has been incidentally brought to
view in illustrating a preceding argument, which deserves a
distinct statement. It is that God has two hostile wills, in
relation to the same thing--his decrees, and his published
commands and prohibitions. He has enjoined certain modes of
action, by the most solemn legislation, and yet decreed, from all
eternity, that multitudes of those whom he has subjected to those
obligations, shall constantly act at variance therewith; so that
multitudes of human beings are doing his will perfectly, and yet
violating his will at the same time.
18. This theory makes all civil government manifestly unreasonable.
Civil government proceeds upon the supposition that man is a free
agent, capable of choosing and acting otherwise than as he does;
but this theory, as we have seen, is incompatible with free agency.
And should we admit, for the sake of the argument, that it is not
incompatible with free agency, it is still irreconcilable with
civil government. Civil legislation prohibits various modes of
acting. It assumes that the forbidden actions are wrong--
injurious to society--whereas, this theory represents that all
the actions that have been performed, or will be performed, were
freely willed, purposed, decreed, foreordained, and brought to
pass by God himself--that there are no events, and can be none,
but what are in precise harmony with his eternal purposes--so
that, unless we suppose that God has from all eternity freely
decreed what is wrong and injurious, thereby subjecting human
legislators to the necessity of opposing his will in order to
prevent outrage and injury, civil legislation admits of no
justification or apology.
And if this theory is incompatible with civil legislation, it is
not less so with civil jurisprudence. Men assume the right to
inflict severe punishment upon their fellow-men for doing what
cannot be avoided, or for not doing what they cannot possibly do.
Or, if it be admitted, for the sake of the argument, that they
could act otherwise, still they are punished for doing and
suffering, in all respects, the will of God, for merely
exemplifying his eternal unchangeable decrees. Take either
alternative, and human jurisprudence is palpably iniquitous.
The only plausible apology that can be offered in behalf of civil
government is, either that human legislators and judges, and
jurors, and counsel, and sheriffs, and constables are passive
instruments in the hands of God, in which case their proceedings
are ludicrous, the actors being mere puppets, exhibiting all the
appearance of self-determined motion, and yet, like those famous
characters called _Punch_ and _Judy_, acting only as determined
and effected by the wire-worker; or, admitting that they are
free, and executing their own determinations, they too are doing
precisely what God has foreordained; so that, in this respect,
the jury who pronounce the verdict of guilty, and the judge who
pronounces the sentence of death, are upon a level with the
alleged criminal. All have done, and are doing, just the things
which God has decreed they should do, neither more nor less.
19. I cannot but regard this theory as subversive of every
rational idea of a Divine moral government. Moral government
implies precepts or prohibitions, or both, enforced by rewards
and penalties, and addressed authoritatively to beings capable of
either obedience or disobedience. But of what use are precepts or
prohibitions if every act of every individual is fixed beforehand
by the Divine decrees? As well might moral codes be addressed to
steam-engines or to whirlwinds. The only plausible attempt that
can be made to reconcile this theory of predestination with a
Divine moral government, is to apply the term moral government to
a certain class of preordained influences designed to bring about
a certain class of preordained results. But this is moral
government in name merely. The process which the advocates of
this theory call moral government is just as mechanical as that
by which the motions of the planets are controlled. The judiciary
system of the Divine government, with all its solemn pageantry,
is thus reduced to a mere farce. Beings are arraigned, with great
judicial pomp, and condemned, or approved, punished or rewarded
for actions which were decreed innumerable ages before they were
born, and brought to pass by influences beyond their control, for
actions which were devised, decreed, and irresistibly brought to
pass by the judge himself.
20. We are now prepared for another consequence, which hangs like
a millstone around the neck of this theory, and is sufficient, of
itself, to sink it to the depths. It represents God not only as
decreeing one thing and commanding another directly adverse
thereto, but also as decreeing and bringing to pass opposite and
contradictory events. He ordained that one man should believe the
Holy Scriptures, and reverence them, and that another man should,
at the same time, deny, and hate, and vilify them. He ordained
that men should at one period of their lives preach the gospel,
and write in favor of Christianity, and at another period become
infidel lecturers and disputants. He decreed that some should
believe the Calvinistic doctrine of decrees, and teach it, and
that others should, at the same time, regard it as false and
oppose it. He has ordained that men shall take opposite sides on
all great questions, religious, philosophical, or political. He
ordained the fugitive slave law and the recent Nebraska and
Kansas enactment, and all the opposition from ministers and
laymen, with which these measures have been regarded. He has
ordained that one party shall laud them as just and patriotic,
and that another party shall condemn and hate them as diabolical.
He ordained the arrest of that man on the suspicion of murder,
with all the conflicting opinions as to his guilt or innocence,
the contradictory testimony of the witnesses, the contrary
pleadings of the counsel, the verdict of the jury pronouncing him
guilty, the sentence of the judge condemning him to death, and
the pardon of the governor under the full conviction of his
innocence. All the conflicting opinions and acts in the fiercest
controversy that ever raged, this theory traces up to the Divine
foreordination.
21. It must have appeared to the audience, by this time, that the
character of God is fearfully involved in this inquiry.
(1). We have already seen that this theory draws after it the
logical consequences that God is the author of sin, or, if not
the author of it in the strict and proper sense of the term, at
least the plotter--the prime mover of it; that he prefers sin to
holiness in every instance in which sin takes place; that he
regards sin as the necessary means of the greatest good; that he
has, at the same time, two hostile wills relative to the same
thing. And now what shall we say of his _wisdom_, when we find
him decreeing acts, and bringing them to pass, and yet,
peremptorily forbidding them--enjoining acts, by formal solemn
legislation, which, from all eternity he has foreordained shall
never be performed? When we find him ordaining measures for the
promotion, and measures for the counteraction, of his own plans?
When we find him ordaining all the contradictions and vacillations
by which human conduct is diversified and disgraced?--when every
example of the most contemptible folly that ever turned the laugh,
or the sneer, or the frown, or the sentiment of pity upon its
immediate perpetrators, can be traced to the free counsels and
designs of God, and finds its origin there?
(2). What shall we say of the _sincerity_ of God when we find him
enjoining one class of actions on pain of eternal damnation,
while yet he has decreed, and by unfailing means brings to pass,
in the same subjects, an entirely opposite class?--when we find
him threatening, and expostulating, and professing to be grieved,
on account of conduct which had its origin in his own free
purposes, and is effected by his own providence?--when we find
him engaged in enforcing two wills respecting the same thing, one
directly the opposite of the other, one of which must necessarily
fail of accomplishment, and then, wrathfully charging the failure
upon those who have acted in all respects as he ordained they
should?--when we find him offering salvation to all men, and
solemnly asseverating that it is his will that all men should
come to the knowledge of the truth, while yet the sinning, and
ultimate damnation of myriads, were decreed innumerable ages
before they existed?
(3). What shall we say of his _holiness_, when the vilest crimes
that ever caused the blush of shame, or the feeling of indignation
or horror--_fornication, adultery, bestiality, fraud, oppression,
lying, murder_--are in perfect coincidence with his eternal
purposes, parts of his great plan, when he chose them in preference
to their opposites, with all the means and appliances, great and
small, by which they were brought to pass?
(4). And what shall we say of his _equity_ and _justice_, when we
find him placing his subjects under the necessity of violating
his will in one way or another, either his secret decrees or his
published enactments? When we find him rewarding one class of his
subjects for fulfilling his decrees, and damning another class
with everlasting tortures for doing precisely the same thing?
(5). And where is his _benevolence_, when he freely chooses,
prefers, ordains, and brings to pass all the sin and misery in
the universe?
22. Again: It is obvious that this theory lays the foundation of
a new system of morals. If it be insisted upon that, notwithstanding
God has decreed whatsoever comes to pass, he is perfectly sincere,
just, holy, and benevolent, we shall have obtained certain ethical
principles which, if carried out into universal practice, would
subvert all social order, and destroy all confidence. For instance,
it will follow:--
First. That a ruler may secretly will, purpose, decree,
foreordain, that his, subjects shall act in a certain way. He may
put into operation effective measures to secure their concurrence
with his designs. Meantime, he may profess a profound and
insuperable dissatisfaction with a very large proportion of the
actions which he has predetermined and induced; he may indignantly
condemn and threaten to punish the actors; he may do all this,
and yet be perfectly sincere. In other words, what men usually
regard as the most thorough-paced duplicity, is in entire accordance
with perfect sincerity. By this principle, the worst hypocrite that
ever lived may be fully vindicated from the charge of hypocrisy.
Again: A being may give existence to a vast multitude of other
beings, inferior, dependent, but yet intelligent. He may assert
over their actions the most absolute control. He may predetermine
and bring to pass every one of their actions. He may "shut up all
other ways of acting, and leave that only open which he had
determined to be done." Meanwhile, he may issue laws peremptorily
requiring conduct directly opposite to his unchangeable
predeterminations, thus placing his creatures under the dire
necessity of violating his secret decrees, or his published laws;
and yet he may, with perfect justice, arraign, condemn, and
punish them for the violation of these laws, consigning them to
eternal misery. This theory will furnish us with a criterion of
moral character--a code by which the Neros, Domitians, Caligulas,
and Diocletians, whom men have reprobated and abhorred as
tyrants, may be triumphantly vindicated and made honorable.
Again: A being may be the author, or, if not, in the strictest
sense, the author, at least the planner, the prime mover of all
the wickedness that ever existed. He may use effective influences
in bringing it to pass, so that it may be said, in truth, that he
freely and unchangeably preordained and produced it, and yet he
may be perfectly holy.
And again: A being may purpose, foreordain, and bring to pass all
the sin and misery in the universe, and yet be perfectly
benevolent. Here is a principle of ethics which will more than
cover and vindicate the most atrocious cruelties of the Romish
inquisition. The rum-seller, so called, who is the agent of
incalculable mischief, may find under it the most ample
protection. His designs terminate upon the sale of his liquors,
and the gains which result. If he could sell his fiery commodity,
and secure his gains without the misery, he would. But, according
to our new code of ethical principles, he might go much further.
He might design, as an end, all the wretchedness that results,
and prosecute his traffic as a means to secure that end, and yet
be perfectly benevolent.
Is it not plain that this theory, if adopted and carried out to
its legitimate logical results, must revolutionize and reverse
all our established conceptions of wisdom, sincerity, holiness,
equity, justice, and benevolence, and introduce an entirely new
estimate of moral conduct?
23. Further: This theory furnishes the most complete
justification of all the conduct of the worst men that ever
lived, both by the ethical principles which may be deduced from
it, and by the single consideration that their every action is in
perfect harmony with the Divine will. The New Testament speaks of
men being without excuse; but I ask, what better excuse can be
desired than that the conduct in question is in precise
accordance with the will of God? Men sometimes think it an
apology to say that they acted hastily--that they were misled by
others--that they were not aware of the mischief likely to result
from their course; but this doctrine puts them at once upon the
highest possible ground of justification. The poor reprobate may
be silenced, at the day of judgment, by the terrors which
surround him, and by the stern authority of the judge, but _not
by the want of a valid plea_. When the sentence shall go forth
consigning him to perdition for the deeds done in the body, he
will have in readiness, whether allowed to utter it or not, the
unanswerable answer: "Lord, the deeds for which I am condemned
were in all respects what thou didst predetermine. I have
executed from first to last thy wise and holy counsels. Had I
acted otherwise, I should have frustrated thy free purposes,
formed before the foundation of the world. I have, indeed, gone
contrary to thy published law, but that thou didst render
inevitable by making that law antagonistic to thy eternal decree,
which thou dost not allow to be thwarted, in any instance, by man
or angel."
This plea would be equally conclusive before any human tribunal.
There are Calvinistic lawyers, or lawyers who are members of
Calvinistic churches or congregations. The names of some of these
are appended to a note soliciting for publication Dr. Boardman's
sermons on _Election_. In defending alleged criminals, men of
their profession often tax their ingenuity to the utmost for
arguments. If the insanity of the prisoner can be established,
they expect his acquittal, though he may have perpetrated the
fatal violence. But why do they never offer, in behalf of the
prisoner intrusting his case to them, that he has done nothing
but what God willed and decreed from all eternity he should do?
that, from the beginning to the end of the affair, he was but
executing the counsels of Heaven--counsels which Heaven never
suffers to be frustrated, either as to the end, or the instrument.
Some of them believe the doctrine, and desire that the public
should believe it. Why, then, do they never plead it when pledged
to give their client the benefit of every available argument? Is
it nothing to be able to say for him that he has not swerved a
hair's-breadth from the designs of the great Sovereign of the
universe, at whose judgment-seat all the decisions of human
tribunals will be reviewed? They dare not offer such a plea.
They know that common sense would laugh them out of countenance,
if not out of court. And if all present were believers in the
doctrine, they could not attempt to reduce it to its legitimate
practical application without laughing in each other's faces--
such is its essential absurdity. They may circulate it in
sermons, in which eloquent nonsense is drivelled with impunity,
but they will not venture to propound it in a court, where common
sense and equity bear sway.
24. If this doctrine be true, it is wholly unnecessary for any of
you to impose any restraint upon your passions or wills. Are you
tempted to indulge in sensuality, or to defraud your neighbor,
and even to assassinate him? And does the inquiry arise in your
mind whether the act to which you are tempted is according to the
will of God? You have only to do it, and the result proves that
it is decreed. So says Mr. Barnes: "The result, by whatever means
brought about, expresses the design of God." If the act be not
decreed, you cannot do it, though you try. If you can, it is
decreed _that you should_; and your doing it is as inevitable as
destiny itself. So you may just go forward, and the result will
be right; that is, if God's decrees are right.
25. It is also an obvious consequence of this doctrine that no
man can contribute anything to hip personal salvation; that his
salvation or damnation is fixed wholly by the Divine decrees. He.
cannot influence his destiny by any effort he can make. There is
no use in his trying. Indeed, the _Westminster Confession of
Faith_ informs us directly that man is "altogether passive" in
"regeneration," and that his "perseverance" "depends not upon his
own free will, but upon the immutability of the decree of
election." So that all the exhortations of the gospel and of the
pulpit, are utterly irrelevant. There is a very significant
passage bearing upon this point in Chalmer's discourse on
Predestination: "And now," says he, "you can have no difficulty
in understanding how it is that we make our calling and election
sure. _It is not in the power of the elect to make their election
surer in itself than it really is, for this is a sureness which
is not capable of receiving any addition_. It is not in the power
of the elect to make it surer to God--for all futurity is
submitted to his all-seeing eye, and his absolute knowledge
stands in need of no confirmation. But there is such a thing as
the elect being ignorant for a time of their own election, and
their being made sure of it in the way of evidence and discovery."
The amount is that a man may ascertain by exertion the fact of his
election, but he can do nothing towards securing it. Thus Mr.
Wesley's famous consequence is established. "The elect shall be
saved, do what they will; the reprobate shall be damned, do what
they can." It is plain from these reasonings that this doctrine
tends to spiritual inactivity, and countenances licentiousness.
But we are told, by Dr. Boardman, that the Divine "decrees are
not the rule of our duty;" that "we are not held responsible for
not conforming to them;" that "we are not bound to act with the
least reference to them." (p. 45.) What! The subjects of a
government not bound to act with the least reference to the
decrees of its sovereign!--not responsible for not conforming to
them!! This is surely a strange doctrine. It is an indirect
concession that the practical bearing of the Calvinistic doctrine
of decrees cannot be defended. But it is said that we have no
right to make God's secret decrees our rule. Very true. We are
not arguing from his secret decrees, but from what our brethren
profess to know. If the doctrine in question be a secret, we
would like to know by what authority it is so confidently stated
in the _Confession of Faith_ and the _Catechism_. How did they
come by the knowledge of God's secret decree? They may claim to
be better educated than we are, and more intelligent, to have
minds of a superior natural constitution; but we protest against
their claiming to be intrusted with the secrets of heaven.
26. This wonderful doctrine makes out the devil and his angels to
be faithful servants of God. They have done, throughout the past,
and are doing now, precisely what God, in his wise and holy
counsel, foreordained they should do.
27. It leads to Universalism. If all beings do as God has
decreed, upon what ground can God punish any of them, then, in
futurity? You have only to connect with this doctrine the
declaration that God is benevolent, or just, and Universalism
follows.
28. It leads to rank infidelity. It is to my mind more reasonable
to believe that God has made no written revelation of his will,
than that he has revealed such a doctrine as this. Let the
opinion become prevalent that it is a doctrine of the Bible, and,
as the consequence, the Bible will be rejected by thousands, yea,
hundreds of thousands. It is impossible for the ablest disputant
to maintain a respectable argument against infidelity while
standing upon this ground. He must assume the opposite ground, as
the basis of his argument, or he will fail signally. The infidel
objects to the Bible that it represents God as sanctioning crime,
and making favorites of its perpetrators, and hence concludes
that it cannot be true.
The usual reply is that, so far from having sanctioned vice and
its perpetrators, he has solemnly prohibited it; that he holds
the perpetrator guilty, condemns him to severe punishment, and
will remit that punishment only in view of repentance, and
reformation, and an atonement which fully vindicates the Divine
government, and most impressively manifests its abhorrence of the
course pursued by the transgressor. But what says this doctrine?
That God has freely, and from all eternity _willed, decreed,
foreordained, whatsoever_ comes to pass. The infidel objects that
the Bible contains contradictions, and hence cannot be the word
of God. The usual answer admits that God cannot contradict
himself, but denies that the Bible is chargeable with self
-contradiction. Whereas, this doctrine declares that God has
decreed and brought to pass all the contradictions that were ever
uttered. Can it be that God is the author of a book which
represents him as ordaining and bringing to pass all the acts of
crime and folly that were ever committed, including all the lies
that were ever uttered, as having two hostile wills in relation
to the same event, as decreeing that his creatures should pursue
a certain course, and yet commanding them to pursue a contrary
course, and then, damning them, thousands upon thousands, for
doing what he decreed they should do? It is impossible for the
infidel to frame a stronger argument than this doctrine supplies
him with.
I have shown, unanswerably, I think, that this doctrine leads, by
obvious deduction, to the doctrine that God prefers sin to
holiness in every instance in which sin takes place, and that sin
is the necessary means of the greatest good. I will now quote an
eminent Calvinistic minister upon the tendencies of this
doctrine. He is commenting upon what he calls "the third
solution" of the question, "For what reason has God permitted sin
to enter the universe?" which he states to be that "God chose
that sin should enter the universe as the necessary means of the
greatest possible good. Wherever it exists, therefore, it is, in
the whole, better than holiness would be in its place"--the very
doctrine which we are told by high Calvinistic authority, has
been a "common sentiment among New England divines since the days
of Edwards." He says:--