Scripture. We shall not, at present, enter upon the examination
of the proof-texts, though we hold the Holy Scriptures to be the
ultimate authority on all theological questions, but shall
compare it with acknowledged Scripture principles. And, yet, it
may be very reasonably expected that some attention will be paid
to the passage which, according to custom, has been selected as
presenting the subject of discourse. It is the very first proof
-text adduced by the _Westminster Confession of Faith_, but it
fails to meet the demand made upon it. It does not contain the
doctrine sought to be proved. It does, indeed, assert the
predestination of believers to certain blessings, a point not in
dispute, and also that they are predestinated to these blessings
according to God's purpose; but all this is very far from
teaching that _God has foreordained whatsoever comes to pass_.
The proof is supposed by some to be contained in the remaining
portion of the passage--"who worketh all things," &c. But we must
take the entire expression of the apostle in order to get his
meaning, "who worketh all things after the counsel of his own
will." By this he means to say, merely, that, in whatever God
does towards men or angels, he is uncontrolled. He carries out
his own free purposes. He does not conform to the counsels of
others. He does not yield to the clamors of discontented
subjects, or make concessions to contemporary and independent
powers. The words are thus paraphrased by McKnight, a Calvinistic
commentator: "According to the gracious purpose of him, who
effectually accomplisheth all his benevolent intentions, by the
most proper means, according to the wise determination of his own
will." We may, with as much propriety, argue from the apostolic
injunction, "Do all things without murmurings and disputings"
(Phil. ii. 14), that Christians are required by the law of God to
_do all things_ absolutely, as, from the clause under consideration,
that God has decreed and executes whatsoever comes to pass. But, if
our brethren insist upon so understanding the apostle, we shall
hold them to their interpretation. We shall not allow them to
contradict it whenever the exigencies of the argument may render it
convenient.
1. In the first place, this theory of predestination is
inconsistent with the doctrine of man's free moral agency. The
force of this objection is readily perceived. It is _impossible_
that we should be free agents, when all the _external circumstances_
that affect us, and all our _mental_ and _bodily acts_, are
predetermined and brought about by God. Man is thus reduced to, a
mere passive instrument. He is nothing more than a complicate and
curious machine--a man-machine, an automaton--whose every movement
is conceived, determined, directed, controlled by a supervisor. It
avails nothing to apply to him terms which signify freedom. We may
say that he has _the power to will_; that he _actually wills_; but
the difficulty is not relieved. The being who endowed him with this
faculty has foreordained and brings to pass, by a well-directed
agency, every movement of that faculty. We may say that he _wills
according to his inclinations_, and is therefore free; but God has
decreed and brings to pass all his inclinations. We may say that he
acts according to his will, and not against his will; still nothing
is gained, since all his purposes, and the movements by which he
executes them, are equally preordained and brought to pass by
God. We may say that he is _conscious_ of _acting freely_, but
this is a mere delusion, if the doctrine we are considering be
true. By the very logic which reconciles it with free agency in
man, I will undertake to prove that every steamboat and every
railroad-engine is a free agent. Calvinistic free agency must be
something analogous to Bishop Hughes's freedom of conscience,
indestructible and inviolable, in its very nature and essence; so
that a man may be denied the privilege of reading the Bible, or
of propagating or entertaining any opinions contrary to the
Church of Rome--he may be thrown into prison, and put to torture,
for refusing to subscribe to its dogmas, or to worship according
to forms which he holds to be idolatrous--and yet he enjoys
freedom of conscience. So, according to the teachings of modern
Calvinism, man is a free agent, notwithstanding all the
_circumstances_ which _surround_ him, with all his _sensations,
emotions, desires, purposes, volitions_ and _acts_ were _decreed
from eternity_, and brought to pass by a power which he can
_neither control_ nor _resist_. This free agency must then be
something absolutely inviolable in its nature and essence,
something which God himself cannot destroy or impinge except by
terminating the existence of the being in whom it inheres. As
Bishop Hughes's freedom of conscience is very different from what
is generally understood to be freedom of conscience, so the free
agency which may be made to harmonize with this doctrine, is
different from what is usually understood to be free agency. It
is not the power to act otherwise than as we do act, or to choose
or will otherwise than as we do choose or will.
2. This doctrine, being at variance with man's free agency, is,
by necessary consequence, at variance with his _moral accountability_.
There would be as much reason in holding the _atmosphere_ accountable,
or the _trees_, or the _grass_, or the _clods_, or the _stones_. All
his _views_, _feelings_, and _volitions_, being thus predetermined,
he can no more be accountable for them than for the _circumstances_
of his _birth_, or the _natural color_ of his _skin_. He cannot
reasonably be made the subject of commendation or censure--of reward
or punishment.
3. It also follows, from this doctrine, that there is not, and
cannot be any such thing as sin. If man be not a free agent--if
he be incapable of acting otherwise than as predetermined by
Jehovah--he is incapable of either virtue or vice. It would be as
reasonable to predicate virtue or vice of the flux and reflux of
the tides, or the circulation of the blood, as of man or angel
under such circumstances.
And, mark! if we, for the sake of the argument, should admit that
man is capable of _virtue_, notwithstanding all his acts are
foreordained and rendered infallibly certain by a power which he
cannot successfully resist, he is still incapable of _vice_. He
cannot sin, for this plain, all-sufficient reason--he cannot act
otherwise than according to the will of God. "Nothing comes to
pass in time but what was decreed from eternity." "None of the
decrees of God can be defeated or fail of execution." So
Calvinism explicitly affirms.
Further, while the inference that there is and can be no sin is
fairly deducible from the supposition that man is not a free
agent, it does not depend upon that supposition. Let it be
admitted, for the purpose of the argument, that man is a free
agent, and capable of sinning, notwithstanding all his actions
were predetermined, and what is the state of the case? _Still he
has not sinned_. He has done nothing but what God freely willed
and ordained he should do. The perfect obedience of Christ
consisted in his doing in all respects the will of the Father.
Either, then, it may be sinful to do the will of God, or there
is--there can be no sin. I do not know of any way in which this
consequence can be avoided. I do not believe that it can.
Let us take another view of this point. Let the advocates of this
doctrine succeed in proving that man is a free agent, in the
proper sense of the term, and capable of sinning, notwithstanding
all his actions are decreed and brought to pass by God, and we
have before us this remarkable result: _Every individual of the
human race, while in a state of probation, without a knowledge of
God's predetermination respecting him, and without any controlling
influence brought to bear upon him, has, in every instance, willed
and acted in accordance with the will of God_. The result is
_universal voluntary holiness_. Here, then, is a dilemma. Either
there is _no possibility of sin or of holiness_, or, if there be
a possibility of sin or of holiness, there is, in fact, _no sin_
--there is, in fact, _universal holiness_.
4. If it be asserted that sin exists, notwithstanding this
perfect coincidence between the will of God and the conduct of
his creatures, it will follow, most conclusively, that _God is
the author of sin_. He has decreed and brings to pass all the
sensations, perceptions, emotions, inclinations, volitions, and
overt actions, of the whole human race. Various attempts have
been made to avoid this result, but they are all futile. The
_Confession of Faith_ says: "God, from all eternity, did, by the
most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably
ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God
the author of sin." We pay all respect to this as a disclaimer. Our
Presbyterian brethren do not intend to charge God with being the
author of sin. But we are compelled to regard these propositions
as directly contradictory to each other. Is not a being the author
of that which he originally designs and decrees, and subsequently
brings into existence? and is it not maintained that he decreed
from all eternity, and brings to pass whatever occurs? Either sin
has not come to pass, or God is the author of it. It is useless
to say that God has brought to pass the act, but not the sinfulness.
The sinfulness has come to pass. It is useless to say that sin is
man's, and not God's act. Man does nothing but what God has decreed,
and, in some infallible way leads him to do. "God's power," says Dr.
Chalmers, "gives birth to _every purpose_; it gives impulse to
_every desire_, gives shape and color to _every conception_." Says
Fisher, in his _Catechism_: "God not only efficaciously concurs in
producing the action as to the matter of it, but likewise predetermines
the creature to such or such an action, and not to another, shutting
up all other ways of acting, and leaving only that open which he
had determined to be done." We might, with vastly more plausibility,
deny that Paul was the author of his Epistles, because he employed an
amanuensis, or, for the same reason, deny that Milton was the author
of _Paradise Lost_. It is useless here to speculate upon the reasons
which induced God to ordain and bring sin to pass. We are now concerned
with the fact merely, and we hence conclude that he is the author of
sin and the only being properly answerable for it.
5. If the advocates of this doctrine should still insist that it
does not make God the author of sin; that man is a free agent,
and properly responsible for his actions, notwithstanding they
are foreordained; I press them with this plain consequence--God
is, to say the least, a participant in the sinning. And he is not
merely a _coadjutor_, but the _principal_--the principal in
_every instance of sinning_. He originates the first conception
of the sinning act. He forms the plan. He arranges all the
circumstances. He, by his providence, applies the influence by
which the result is effectuated. Here, then, is a dilemma from
which there is no escape. Either God is, _strictly and properly_,
the _author of sin_, or he is a _participant_ therein, and not
merely accessory, but _the principal_, the _plotter_, the _prime
mover_, the RINGLEADER thereof.
6. Another inevitable consequence of this doctrine is that,
admitting the existence of sin, God _prefers sin to holiness_ in
every instance in which sin takes place. This consequence is too
plain to require much illustration. If God _freely_ ordained
whatsoever comes to pass; if he was not under a fatal necessity
of ordaining just as he did; if he had it in his power to ordain
otherwise, he could have ordained holiness in the place of sin.
The fact that he was free and unnecessitated in his decrees, and
could ordain the one or the other, according to his good
pleasure, is proof substantial that he prefers sin to holiness in
every instance in which sin occurs. Had he preferred holiness, he
could have decreed it, and it would have come to pass. This
consequence has been admitted, and is, by many Calvinists at this
day, maintained as a doctrine. In fact, it has been a matter of
dispute amongst Calvinists--Dr. Taylor, of Connecticut, taking
one side, and Dr. Tyler, of Connecticut, taking the other. But
what a shocking conception! (See _Christian Spectator_, vol. iv.
p. 465.)
7. Nor can we resist the further conclusion, from these premises,
that sin is not a real evil, but, on the contrary, a good, and
that in every instance in which it is preferred to holiness, it
is worthy of such preference. This reasoning proceeds upon the
assumption that God is a being of infinite goodness and wisdom,
and, therefore, always prefers good to evil, being, of course,
always able to distinguish the one from the other.
This inference also has been admitted by many of the advocates of
Calvinistic predestination. They distinctly affirm that sin is
the necessary means of the greatest good, and, as such, so far.
as it exists, is preferable on the whole to holiness in its
stead--that its existence is, on the whole, for the best. I give
as authority for this affirmation, a publication of the
Presbyterian Board, entitled _Old and New Theology_. On the first
page we find this explicit statement: "It has been a common
sentiment among New England divines, since the time of Edwards,
that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, and as
such, so far as it exists, is preferable, on the whole, to
holiness in its stead."
I do not charge Dr. Musgrave with holding this inference as a
doctrine, and yet it is very clearly asserted in an argument
designed to prove the Calvinistic doctrine of foreordination.
"There must," says he, "have been a time when no creature
existed, as God alone is from everlasting. Before creation, and
from all eternity, all things that are possible, as well as all
things that actually have or will come to pass in time, must have
been perfectly known to God. He must, therefore, have known what
beings and events would, on the whole, be most for his own glory,
and the greatest good of the universe; and therefore, as an
infinitely wise, benevolent, and Almighty Being, he could not but
have chosen or determined, that such beings and events, and SUCH
ONLY, should come to pass in time." "The conclusion is,
therefore, to our minds, irresistible, that if God be infinitely
wise, benevolent, and powerful, and perfectly foreknew what
beings and events would, _on the whole_, BE BEST, he must have
chosen and ordained that they should exist, or be permitted to
occur; and that, consequently, everything that does actually come
to pass in time, has been eternally and unchangeably foreordained."
Here it is argued that God, as an infinitely wise, benevolent,
and powerful being, must have _known_ and _preferred_, and
_decreed_, that just such beings should exist and events occur,
as would, on the whole, be most for his own glory, and the
_greatest good_ of the universe, _and such only_; and that,
consequently, he has eternally, and unchangeably foreordained
everything that does actually come to pass in time. Now it is
plain that all the events which have come to pass in time must
answer this description--must be for the best, for his highest
glory--or the argument falls to the ground.
The Rev. Jas. McChain, one of the editors of the _Calvinistic
Magazine_, in a discourse published in that periodical, December,
1847, thus undertakes to prove that God "has foreordained
whatsoever comes to pass:" "Jehovah is infinitely _wise_; does he
not, therefore, know what it is BEST should take place? He is
infinitely _benevolent_; will he not choose, then, that _shall
take place_ which he knows is FOR THE BEST? He is infinitely
_powerful_; can he not, therefore, cause _to take place_ what he
_chooses shall take place_? The Most High is infinitely wise, and
_knows_ what it is BEST should come to pass--benevolent, and
_chooses_ to bring to pass WHAT IS BEST--powerful, and _does_
bring to pass what he chooses as BEST." "Surely his infinite
wisdom and goodness will choose and determine whatsoever it is
best should take place, and his almighty power will perfectly
carry out his plan."
It is not my intention, at this time, to point out the fallacy of
these arguments. I quote them to show that the consequence which
I have deduced from the doctrine that God has decreed whatsoever
comes to pass--that sin is not an evil, but a good, and worthy of
being preferred to holiness in every instance in which it occurs--
is actually recognized as a truth, and used as a premise in
proof of the Calvinistic doctrine of the decrees.
8. And how can we avoid adopting as a legitimate conclusion, the
licentious infidel maxim, that "WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT"?
9. It is obvious, at the first glance, that this doctrine
destroys all reasonable ground for repentance. Of what shall we
repent? Of sinning? Let it first be proved that, according to
this doctrine, any one has sinned, or can sin. But, if sin be
possible, yet in every instance of sinning we have done the will
of God. He freely and unchangeably predestinated the act from all
eternity. His providence brought it to pass. Before we feel
ourselves authorized to repent we should be sure that God has
repented of his purposes and acts. And, even then, there would be
no good reason for repentance upon the part of his creatures.
For, if we, for the sake of the argument, allow that they are
able to act otherwise than as they do, notwithstanding the Divine
decrees, they are morally bound to submit cordially to those
decrees, leaving to God the responsibility of decreeing wisely.
Hence there is no room for repentance.
This is precisely the application made of this doctrine by an
intelligent Calvinistic lady of New England, Mrs. Elizabeth
Stuart Phelps, daughter of the late Prof. Stuart, of Andover, and
authoress of certain very popular works. In the memorial of her,
prefixed to _The Last Leaf of Sunny Side_, she is quoted as
saying in her diary: "I never _could_ understand or divine
before, my claim upon the Deity's overruling care. Now I do get a
glimpse of it--enough to make me feel like an infant in its
mother's arms. Every event, of every day, of every hour, is
unalterably fixed. Each day is but the turning over a new leaf of
my history, already written by the finger of God--every letter of
it. Should I wish to re-write--to alter--one? Oh, no! no!! no!!!"
Here, you perceive, is no ground for repentance. It is repudiated.
She would not alter an event of her life, a letter of her history.
She carries this acquiescence in the Divine decrees so far as to
say in another place: "I have no hope but in my Saviour and if He
has not saved me, then this too, I know, is just, and God's
decrees I would not change."
10. Nor can prayer be more reasonable than repentance. For what
shall we pray? That God would reverse his eternal decrees? This
would be to reflect upon his attributes. Are his decrees wrong?
Besides, the doctrine in question affirms them to be unchangeable.
Shall we pray that God may accomplish them? This can add nothing
to the certainty of their accomplishment; for they cannot be
defeated. So we are distinctly assured by the advocates of this
theory. The only apology that can be offered for prayer, on the
part of those who believe this doctrine, is that it is decreed
they shall pray. But a prayer offered in strict logical accordance
with this theory would be a manifest absurdity.
11. Another legitimate consequence of this doctrine is that man
is not in a state of probation. There is a flat contradiction
between the idea that man is in a state of probation and the
affirmation that the whole series of volitions, states, actions,
and events of his life is fixed, unchangeably, by the Divine
decree, before he comes into existence. I have long regarded this
as an inevitable deduction from the Calvinistic doctrine of
decrees, but it was not until lately that I found it actually
advanced as a doctrine by a Calvinistic writer. On page 77 of
_Fisher's Catechism_, the following occurs:--
"_Q_. Is there any danger in asserting that man is not now in a
state of probation, as Adam was?--_Ans_. No."
"_Q_. What, then, is the dangerous consequence of asserting that
fallen man is still in a state of probation?--_Ans_. This
dangerous consequence would follow, that mankind are hereby
supposed to be still under a covenant of works that can justify
the doer!"
I do not mean to be understood that this dogma is held by all
Calvinists, but, whether held or not, it is a legitimate
inference.
12. Let us now notice the bearing of this strange tenet upon some
of the leading doctrines and facts of Christianity. Take the
doctrine of the Fall--which is understood to be that God made man
in his own image--holy; righteous, capable of standing in his
integrity, yet liable to be seduced from it; and that man
voluntarily transgressed, brought guilt and depravity upon
himself, and involved his posterity in moral degradation and
ruin. But, if the Calvinistic doctrine of decrees be true, there
was obviously no fall in the case. There was a change in the
condition of Adam, but that change was a part of God's eternal
plan. Nothing occurred but what belonged to the divinely
predetermined series of events. If Adam had acted otherwise than
as he did, God's original purposes would have been frustrated. If
there were any fall, it should be predicated of the Divine
decrees rather than of the human subject thereof.
13. Again: The plan of redemption, it is supposed, was designed
to rescue him from a deplorable, desperate condition, in which
his perverseness had placed him; but, if the doctrine we are
considering be true, the redemption, so called, is nothing but a
part of a chain of predetermined events. He _was, and is, at no
time_, in _any other condition_ than was _devised_ and _decreed_
by _Jehovah as most conducive to his own glory_ and _the highest
good of the universe_. Thus, the redemption, about which so much
is said, is resolved into a mere nullity.
14. Again: The glorious doctrine of Christ crucified thrills the
bosom of the church with intense emotions of fear, and penitence,
and hope, and gratitude, and joy. Paul attached so much
importance to it as to say: "For I determined to know nothing
among men save Christ and him crucified." But, view it in the
light of the doctrine that God has decreed whatsoever comes to
pass, and what does it amount to? The sufferings and death of
Christ derive their importance from the fact of their being
propitiatory--an atonement. But for what shall they atone? For
acts which were determined upon, as a part of God's plan, for his
glory, and the good of the universe, millions of ages before the
human actors were born; for acts which no more need to be atoned
for than the actions of Jesus Christ himself. To say that those
acts were wrong is to reflect upon the decrees of God, since
"nothing has come to pass but what was decreed by him;" since,
according to Mr. Barnes, we are "to interpret the decrees of God
by facts, and the actual result, by whatever means brought about,
expresses the design of God." If men need atonement, they need it
for doing the will of God, and for nothing else. Need I add that,
in view of the Calvinistic doctrine of decrees, the doctrine of
atonement by the sufferings and death of Christ is absolute
nonsense?
15. Again: I affirm of this doctrine that it renders utterly
baseless the _doctrine of pardon_, or the remission of sins. It
renders the offer of pardon a mockery. For what is pardon
offered? For _doing the will of God_--for doing just _what he
decreed_ we should do; for _carrying into effect_ his _eternal
counsels_. How can any man need pardon if this doctrine be true?
Should it be said, in reply, that although the decrees of God
have been invariably fulfilled, yet his _precepts_ have been
violated, I rejoin that the violation of these precepts was,
according to the Calvinistic hypothesis, specifically _decreed_.
Unless decreed, it could not have come to pass. Hence, the
violation was inevitable, from the very nature of the case. God
offers pardon to his creatures, who have invariably, from the
commencement of their being, fulfilled his decrees. He offers
pardon to them for violating commands which it was impossible for
them to keep, inasmuch as he had eternally decreed that they
should not keep them, and his decrees are infinitely wise and
holy, and cannot be, frustrated.
Further, if God's decrees are righteous (and we are told
explicitly by the creed we are reviewing that they had their
origin in his "wise and holy counsel"), it follows that his
precepts must be unrighteous, whenever they are assumed to be in
opposition to his decrees; and surely no one can need pardon for
pursuing a righteous course in opposition to an unrighteous one.
If it be said that his precepts and his decrees are all equally
righteous, it follows that a course in direct opposition, in all
respects, to a righteous law is, nevertheless, a righteous
course, and thus the distinction between righteousness and
unrighteousness is destroyed. View the subject in whatever light
you may, and the offer of pardon in connection with the
Calvinistic doctrine of decrees, becomes an impertinence and an
absurdity.