[Sidenote: [1808-1814 A.D.]]
The Spaniards have boldly asserted the deliverance of the peninsula to be
the work of their hands. This claim is unjust to the fame of Wellington,
injurious to the glory of the British arms. The imbecility of Charles
IV, the vileness of Ferdinand, the corruption imputed to Godoy, were
undoubtedly the proximate causes of the calamities which overwhelmed
Spain; but the primary, the historical cause, was the despotism springing
from the union of a superstitious court and a sanguinary priesthood, a
despotism which suppressed knowledge, contracted the public mind, sapped
the foundation of military and civil virtue, and prepared the way for
invasion. No foreign potentate would have attempted to steal into the
fortresses of a great kingdom, if the prying eyes and clamorous tongues
of a free press had been ready to expose his projects, and a disciplined
army present to avenge the insult: Spain, destitute of both, was first
circumvented by the wiles, and then ravaged by the arms of Napoleon. She
was deceived and fettered because the public voice was stifled; she was
scourged and torn because her military institutions were decayed.
When an English force took the field, the Spaniards ceased to act as
principals in a contest carried on in the heart of their country and
involving their existence as an independent nation. After the first burst
of indignation the cause of independence created little enthusiasm.
Horrible barbarities were exercised on French soldiers thrown by sickness
or the fortune of war into the power of the invaded, and this dreadful
spirit of personal hatred was kept alive by the exactions and severe
retaliations of the invader; but no great general exertion to drive
the latter from the soil was made, at least none was sustained with
steadfast courage in the field; manifestoes, decrees, lofty boasts, like
a cloud of canvas covering a rotten hull, made a gallant appearance, but
real strength and firmness could nowhere be found.
Strange indeed was the spectacle presented--patriotism supporting a vile
system of government, a popular assembly working to restore a despotic
monarch, the higher classes seeking a foreign master, the lower armed in
the cause of bigotry and misrule. The upstart leaders, secretly abhorring
freedom though governing in her name, trembled at the democratic
activity they excited; and while calling forth all the bad passions of
the multitude repressed the patriotism that would regenerate as well as
save. The country suffered the evils without enjoying the benefits of
a revolution; tumults and assassinations terrified and disgusted the
sensible part of the community; a corrupt administration of the resources
extinguished patriotism; neglect ruined the armies. The peasant-soldier,
usually flying at the first onset, threw away his arms and went home;
or, attracted by the license of the _partidas_, joined the banners of
men, the most part originally robbers, who were as oppressive to the
people as the enemy; and these guerilla chiefs would in their turn have
been quickly exterminated, had not the French, pressed by the British
battalions, been compelled to keep in large masses: this was the secret
of Spanish constancy. Copious supplies from England and the valour of the
Anglo-Portuguese troops supported the war, and it was the gigantic vigour
with which the duke of Wellington resisted the fierceness of France and
sustained the weakness of three inefficient cabinets that delivered the
peninsula.[b]
WAR DECLARED ON FRANCE
The slaughter of the 2nd of May at Madrid, and the treatment of
Ferdinand at Bayonne were as the spark of fire to the mine, and the
explosion, beginning in the original cradle of Spanish liberty, the
Asturias, spread in the course of the month over all Spain. _Juntas_,
or councils, composed of the most influential and generally of the most
enlightened persons of their respective neighbourhoods, were formed in
every province, and most large towns. Many excesses and crimes were
committed; many persons fell sacrifices to the suspicions, justly or
unjustly excited by their own conduct, of being agents and partisans of
the French. When Seville, as next in importance to Madrid and Barcelona,
and therefore first of the unsubdued cities of Spain, claimed for her
junta the title of supreme, and a degree of authority over the others,
the other juntas frankly acknowledged her pretensions. In the name of
Ferdinand VII, the supreme junta of Seville, on the 6th of June, declared
war against Napoleon and France. Orders were issued for enrolling the
whole male population of Spain, combined with judicious instructions
to the Spanish leaders to avoid risking their raw soldiers in pitched
battles against the disciplined veterans of France; and fast-sailing
vessels were sent to the colonies, to warn them against the designs of
France and claim obedience to the supreme junta, as lawfully exercising
the authority of Ferdinand.
JOSEPH BONAPARTE CHOSEN KING OF SPAIN
The crown of Spain Napoleon is said to have originally destined for
Lucien Bonaparte, the ablest of his brothers. But Lucien was a republican
upon principle; he had besides accumulated in the public service a large
fortune, which he was enjoying at Rome in the pleasures of taste and
literature; and, in addition to the sacrifice of his principles and his
tastes, Napoleon required from him that of his affections. He would not
comply with Napoleon’s desire that he should repudiate the mother of
his children in order to wed a princess. He is believed to have refused
the crown of Spain; and Napoleon assigned it to Joseph, already king of
Naples.
A sort of Spanish assembly, meant as a substitute for the cortes, and
called by the French name of the “notables,” was summoned to Bayonne, to
meet and acknowledge Joseph, and to accept the new constitution to be
conferred upon them with their new king. Many obeyed the call, some from
believing resistance to the power of Napoleon impossible; some preferring
reforms imposed by the hand of a foreign conqueror to the vices of their
late government; and more from motives of personal interest.
Joseph then selected his ministers, the great officers of his household,
etc. Urquijo, who had succeeded to Saavedra under Charles IV, and been
like him displaced by Godoy’s jealousy, was appointed secretary of state;
Cevallos minister for foreign affairs; Jovellanos for the interior;
Cabarrus of finance; Pinuela of justice; Azanza of the Indies; Mazarredo
of the marine; O’Farrel of the war department. Jovellanos alone firmly
and perseveringly refused to hold office under the intrusive king. But of
those present some appear to have accepted the places offered them merely
because they saw no other means of getting back to their own side of the
Pyrenees.
The new king of Spain entered his allotted kingdom on the 9th of July,
1808, and issued proclamations inviting his subjects to submission by the
fairest promises of good government. But he found it requisite to pause
at Vitoria, until his imperial brother’s generals should make way for
his progress to his capital. This did not seem likely to be an affair of
any great difficulty, for the insurgents were as yet unsupported from
abroad. The war between England and Spain was declared to be at an end.
But the strength of England was then frittered away in various remote
expeditions; and the only immediately disposable force consisted of about
nine thousand men, who had been assembled at Cork for an attack upon
South America. All hostile measures against the Spanish colonies were now
out of the question; and Sir Arthur Wellesley [afterwards made duke of
Wellington], to whom the command of this small body of men was given, was
directed to proceed with it to the assistance of Spain and Portugal.
On the first symptoms of resistance, Murat had fortified the palace of
Buen Retiro, nearly adjoining Madrid, made dispositions for defending the
capital (which his successor, Savary, followed up), and sent generals of
merited reputation, with considerable divisions of the army, in several
directions, to suppress the rebellion, as it was termed, and control the
country. The success of the adverse parties in these different situations
had been various. At Cadiz, a French squadron had been compelled to
surrender, and that nominally without the aid of the British fleet,
which, however, lying off the mouth of the harbour, prevented Admiral
Rosilly from escaping to sea. Moncey had been repulsed with considerable
loss from before Valencia.[113]
But the greatest battle that had yet occurred in this war was now to
be fought for the purpose of opening Joseph’s road to Madrid, whither
Napoleon had enjoined him to repair with all speed. Cuesta, with the
army of Castile, and Blake with that of Galicia, had united at Rio Seco,
where their combined forces amounted to thirty thousand men. Bessières
attacked them on the 14th of July with little more than fifteen thousand.
The superior skill and discipline of the French very soon prevailed over
their courage and numbers. They lost five or six thousand men, killed
and wounded, and twelve hundred prisoners. The two generals threw the
blame on each other, and separated in mutual disgust. This victory cost
Bessières less than four hundred men. Joseph pursued his journey; and on
the 20th made his triumphant entry into Madrid. Orders had been given
that the streets through which the procession was to pass should be
decorated, according to Spanish custom, by hanging tapestry, etc., from
the windows, and that the church bells should be rung. The inhabitants
obeyed; but the tapestry they hung out was old, dirty, and ragged, and
the bells tolled as for a funeral. The meanest of the populace scorned
to pick up the money scattered amongst them as the king passed, leaving
it to the French soldiers; and the theatres, which were opened gratis in
honour of the day, were filled only by Frenchmen. The council of Castile,
which had previously seemed disposed to submit, refused to take the oath
required of them to the new sovereign and constitution, alleging that
both must first receive the sanction of the nation through the cortes;
and the Spanish soldiers, who did duty jointly with the French, deserted
by whole guards at a time, leaving not a single sentinel at his post.
The first tidings received by Joseph at Madrid were in harmony with the
character of his reception.
Dupont had advanced prosperously, defeating all who opposed him, as
far as Cordova, which he took by storm, but almost without resistance.
However, Castaños, an old soldier, attacked Dupont with about double his
numbers, and gained a victory so complete that at Baylen, whither four
days of engagement had drawn the French main body, and upon the very day
of Joseph’s entrance into Madrid, Dupont, with nearly twenty thousand
men, surrendered upon condition of being sent with his whole corps to
France. The terms of the capitulation were afterwards broken by the
vindictive rage of the peasantry, whom their generals could not control.
Numbers were put to death, and the rest, instead of being sent to France,
were confined in the hulks in the bay of Cadiz, where they suffered every
kind of misery, and the greater part perished.[c] In its moral effects
the battle of Baylen was one of those events which, insignificant in
themselves, cause great changes in the affairs of nations. The defeat of
Rio Seco, the preparations of Moncey for a second attack on Valencia,
the miserable plight of Saragossa, the despondency of the ablest men of
Spain, and the disgust and terror generally excited by the excesses of
the populace, weighed heavy on the Spanish cause: one victory more, and
the moral as well as the physical force of Spain would have been crushed.
The victory of Baylen opened as it were a new crater for Spanish pride,
vanity, and arrogance; the glory of past ages seemed to be renewed,
every man thought himself a Cid, and, in the surrender of Dupont, saw,
not the deliverance of Spain, but the immediate conquest of France. “We
are obliged to our friends the English,” was a common phrase among them
when conversing with the officers of Sir John Moore’s army; “we thank
them for their good-will, we shall escort them through France to Calais,
the journey will be pleasanter than a long voyage: they shall not have
the trouble of fighting the French, and we shall be pleased to have them
spectators of our victories.” This absurd confidence might have led to
great things, but it was a voice--nothing more.[b]
Madrid, upon which the victorious Andalusian army could now advance
unopposed, was no longer deemed a residence for Joseph; and on the 31st
of July, after a residence of ten days, having summoned Bessières from
the pursuit of Blake and Cuesta to protect his retreat, the king and his
party evacuated the capital, and withdrew to Vitoria. Another triumph
obtained soon afterwards by the Spaniards was the successful defence of
Saragossa.[c]
On the morning of the 4th of August, after feigning an attack upon the
Aljaferia and gate of Portillo, the formidable battery of San Engracia
was suddenly set to work, twenty-six pieces simultaneously vomited
fire upon the convent of this name, and nearly all the defenders of it
perished in the ruins. At five o’clock all the batteries of Saragossa
were levelled; the French, crossing the Huerva, precipitated themselves
into the town by two wide breaches. Then followed fierce hand-to-hand
fights, sustained with desperate valour among the dead bodies and ruins.
At the fiercest moment of the fight, General Verdier caused the following
brief message to be brought to Palafox: “Peace and capitulation?”
“War and steel!” answered without hesitation the leader of the men of
Saragossa. The bloody contest was continued; trampling on the dead the
French advanced triumphantly. But the news of Baylen caused them to raise
the siege.[e]
THE ENGLISH APPEAR
At this period of the war a new actor appeared upon the stage, upon
whom thenceforward, the fortune of the peninsula mainly depended. On
the 12th of July, 1808, the British expedition sailed from Cork; and
its commander, Sir Arthur Wellesley, as soon as the whole was fairly
under way, preceded it in a frigate, in order to gather the information
requisite for regulating its destination. Landing was made in Mondego
Bay. It was the 5th of August before all the troops were on shore.
Spencer having arrived during the landing, his junction raised the
numbers of the little army to thirteen thousand; and with them Sir Arthur
began his march towards Lisbon.
Upon receiving intelligence of Sir Arthur’s landing, Junot sent
Laborde, one of the ablest of the French generals, from Lisbon, with
three thousand foot and five hundred horse to check the progress
of the British; and calling in his various detachments, he ordered
them severally to effect their junction with Laborde. Under these
circumstances, the English commander’s object was to prevent the junction
of the several detachments--an object which the skill and celerity of
his movements enabled him, in the most important instance, to effect.
Wellesley was thus enabled to attack Laborde at Roliza on the 17th of
August, with great numerical superiority. He drove him from his position
with comparative facility; but Laborde fell back about a mile to much
stronger ground, where he again awaited the English, and here the battle
was sanguinary. Laborde, after displaying both skill and intrepidity,
abandoned the contest, retreating in good order.
After the victory was gained, Sir Arthur, now reinforced to about
sixteen thousand men, proposed turning the left flank of the position
occupied by Junot and his united forces--about fourteen thousand men--and
endeavouring to cut him off from Lisbon. But, unfortunately, Sir Arthur
Wellesley was no longer commander-in-chief. The English ministry had not
known how to appreciate the man whose extraordinary talents had as yet
only been tried in India; and three senior officers had been appointed
to supersede him, and, as it proved, each other. The nomination of one
of these could not be blamed, for Sir John Moore then certainly ranked
higher in public estimation as a general than Sir Arthur Wellesley; but
Sir Harry Burrard and Sir Hew Dalrymple had never been in situations to
display military capacity. Sir Harry Burrard arrived on the very day that
the reinforcements joined Sir Arthur; and with all the caution of old
age refused to sanction the advance of an army deficient in cavalry and
artillery horses, especially as ten thousand men were daily expected with
Sir John Moore.
On the morning of the 21st, Junot fell upon the British army, with the
impetuosity characterising his countrymen and Napoleon’s warriors. They
were, however, repulsed in every attack; the defects of the position,
and the almost total want of cavalry, were immediately remedied by the
ability of the general, and the loss was far greater on the side of the
French, and less on that of the British, than at Roliza. The battle was
over by noon; a considerable portion of the army had not been engaged,
and Sir Arthur proposed to follow up his victory, pursue the retreating
enemy, cut him off from Lisbon, and thus deliver the capital from the
French yoke. Again Burrard’s caution prevailed to forbid the pursuit, and
still the army remained at Vimeiro.
Sir Harry Burrard’s authority expired almost as soon as he had thus
unfortunately used it; and on the 22nd Sir Hew Dalrymple landed to take
the supreme command. On the evening of the same day, before he could well
make himself master of the state of affairs, General Kellermann was sent
by Junot to the British camp to propose an armistice, and the evacuation
of Portugal by the French troops upon conditions. Such as it was, the
so-called Convention of Cintra was signed, and Portugal delivered
from her conquerors, on the 30th of August, within a month of General
Wellesley’s landing.
The authority of Queen Maria and the prince-regent was now restored
throughout Portugal. Sir Hew Dalrymple reinstated the council of regency
appointed by the prince at his departure, and began his preparations for
entering Spain. He was, however, recalled to stand a sort of trial for
concluding the Convention of Cintra which provoked wild rage in England;
Sir Harry Burrard and Sir Arthur Wellesley returned home to give evidence
upon the subject, and the command devolved upon Sir John Moore.
About sixty thousand French troops were now left in Spain. But the
British army with all its reinforcements did not exceed twenty-five
thousand men. Sir John Moore was of a temperament rather desponding than
sanguine: although a brave and able officer, he had not the self-reliance
characteristic of a master-mind, and the conduct of the Spaniards
abundantly justified his mistrust of the allies, in co-operation with
whom he was required to risk an army too valuable to be rashly hazarded,
but too small singly to engage the French forces now concentrated upon
the Ebro. But now that Spanish energy had driven the intrusive king and
his foreign troops almost to the foot of the Pyrenees, Spanish pride
deemed all accomplished, and the restraints that had compelled union
were no more. Provincial ambition, local, and even individual interests,
jealousy, and intrigue tainted the patriotism of the juntas.
Meanwhile discussions were going on as to the mode of government to
be adopted. Florida-Blanca, the president of the Murcian junta, and
the Council of Castile (which, on the evacuation of Madrid, had there
assumed the reins of government) strongly pointed out the necessity of
some central executive power, and the evils resulting from the existing
anarchy of independent juntas. The convocation of the cortes, or the
choice of a Sicilian prince as regent, were proposed, amongst other
expedients. At length it was agreed that each junta should send two
deputies from its own body to form a central and sovereign junta, each
separate junta, however, still governing its own province. The central
junta was installed at Aranjuez on the 26th of September. Florida-Blanca,
one of the Murcian deputies, was chosen president (Jovellanos was the
only other member of much reputation), and its first measure was a solemn
proclamation of Ferdinand VII.
France was now pouring one hundred thousand additional men into Spain,
Ney, duke of Elchingen, temporarily holding the command until the emperor
should arrive from Erfurt to rule the war in person. The French army was,
however, still waiting Napoleon’s arrival to make a forward movement,
when the Spaniards, to the number of 130,000 men, formed in a crescent
around them.
One of Sir Arthur Wellesley’s reasons for approving the Convention of
Cintra had been that it immediately set the English army at liberty to
enter Spain. But this advantage was either neglected or lost in the care
of investigating the circumstances of that convention. It was not till
the beginning of October that Sir John Moore received orders to enter
Spain, and co-operate with the armies assembled around the French. Sir
David Baird was, at the same time, sent to Corunna with ten thousand men,
to act under Moore, who appointed Salamanca for their junction. Neither
food nor means of transport had been provided; Baird was unfurnished with
pecuniary resources, whilst the Galician and Austrian juntas, though so
abundantly supplied by the profuse munificence of the English ministry,
refused the troops of their benefactors every kind of succour. Indeed,
most of the juntas appear to have misapplied the money sent by England
to their own purposes, and often to have made no use whatever of the
arms and stores. Moore could not cross the frontiers till the 11th of
November; and the absurd precipitation of the central junta, and of those
inexperienced generals who were equal in authority to Castaños, had
already brought the Spanish forces into collision with the French. After
many days’ skirmishing and manœuvring, Blake had been defeated, October
30th, by Lefebvre, but had retreated, rallied his men, and being joined
by some of La Romana’s troops, again made head.
Napoleon himself entered Spain on the 8th of November, and the influence
of his genius was immediately apparent. On the 10th, Soult, duke of
Dalmatia, attacked, defeated, and utterly routed Belvedere. He then
turned upon the line of retreat of Blake, whom Victor, duke of Belluno,
defeated at Espinosa on the 11th, and Soult finally annihilated at
Reynosa on the 13th. The greater part of the veterans brought back from
the Baltic were destroyed in Blake’s successive defeats. Blake fled to
the Asturian mountains, where he reunited the relics of his army, and
met La Romana, who, though disappointed in all his schemes, assumed
the command of these routed troops, and exerted himself strenuously to
reorganise and reinforce them. The emperor now turned his forces against
Castaños and Palafox, whilst his cavalry swept the plains of Leon and
Castile. On the 23rd, Lannes attacked Castaños and Palafox at Tudela, and
completely routed them.
[Illustration: NAPOLEON IN THE PYRENEES]
Napoleon now advanced upon Madrid, and on the 30th reached and attacked
the Somosierra. The pass was defended by General San Juan; his troops
fled after firing one volley, and afterwards sought to excuse their panic
by accusing their unfortunate commander of treachery, and murdering him.
The French crossed the mountains almost unopposed, and appeared before
Madrid. In the moment of danger the inefficiency of the central junta
became apparent. On the approach of the French armies the whole body fled
towards Badajoz.
[Illustration: GUENCA]
Napoleon appeared before Madrid on the 2nd of December, and summoned the
city to surrender, with fearful threats in case of resistance. On the
morning of the 5th Morla surrendered Madrid. The emperor took possession
of the palace of the kings of Spain; and in his proclamations threatened
the Spaniards that, unless by their conduct they earned Joseph’s pardon,
he would find another kingdom for his brother, and make Spain a French
province. Such threats were not adapted to conciliate the haughty
Spaniards; and the really beneficial decrees he promulgated, diminishing
the exorbitant power of the clergy and the number of monks and nuns,
by exasperating the whole ecclesiastical body, confirmed the nation in
its enmity to him and his dynasty. Regardless of this enmity, however,
Napoleon prepared to overrun and subjugate Portugal and the south of
Spain with his grand army, whilst a division of thirty-five thousand
men again besieged Saragossa. The central junta continued its fight to
Seville, and the troops, which the different generals had rallied in
considerable numbers, prepared to defend the Sierra Morena and the Tagus.
MOORE’S FAMOUS RETREAT
Moore’s situation was unquestionably one of great difficulty. The
French are stated to have had two hundred thousand men in Spain; he
could not bring into the field above twenty-five thousand; Madrid had
fallen; and of the Spanish armies nothing remained within his reach
but the few thousands, half clothed and half armed, that La Romana was
endeavouring to organise. Moore had lost all confidence in Spanish
professions, and was convinced that Frere, who vehemently urged him to
attempt something, was deceived by his zeal in the Spanish cause and
his ignorance of the Spanish character. Nevertheless Moore resolved to
make such a diversion as should recall Napoleon from the south and from
Portugal, and, if possible, to destroy Soult, who was within his reach
with inferior numbers, before he could be reinforced. But he undertook
this bold and generous enterprise with a heavy heart, and, as appears
from his own letters, as sacrificing his own judgment to what he knew
were the expectations of the British public. Moore began his movement on
the 11th, effected his junction with Baird, and reached Sahagun on the
21st of December. There he halted two days for his supplies, meaning to
attack Soult on the 24th. But on the 23rd he received information that
Napoleon, upon hearing of his advance, had suspended all his operations
in the south and west, and was marching in full force against the
English. The projected diversion was thus accomplished; and he began his
retreat towards Galicia, where he proposed embarking, and carrying his
army southwards to join the Spanish forces collecting in Andalusia. The
retreat was most disastrous. Officers and men disliked it; the bonds
of discipline were early relaxed, and the bulk of the army was a mere
drunken mob, never resuming any semblance of order or propriety except
when there appeared a prospect of a battle. Then all were again found
British soldiers.[c]
[Illustration: LISBON IN 1800
(From an old Spanish print)]
Before discussing this famous disaster we may quote the words of H. M.
Stephens,[d] who, after calling Moore “the only English general who has
gained lasting fame by the conduct of a retreat,” and referring to his
death as showing “how a modern Bayard should die in battle--every thought
for others, none for himself,” thus sums up his position in history:
“It may be possible, in the face of his heroic death, to exaggerate
Moore’s actual military services, but his influence on the British army
cannot be overrated. The true military spirit of discipline and of
valour, both in officers and men, had become nearly extinct during the
American war. Abercromby, who looked back to the traditions of Minden,
was the first to attempt to revive it, and his work was carried on
by Moore. The formation of the light regiments at Shorncliffe was the
answer to the new French tactics, and it was left to Wellington to show
the success of the experiment. Moore’s powers as a statesman are shown
in his despatches written at Salamanca, and he had the truest gift of a
great man--that of judging men. It may be noticed that, while Wellington
perpetually grumbled at the bad qualities of his officers and formed no
school, Moore’s name is associated with the career of all who made their
mark. Among generals, Hope, Graham, Sir E. Paget, Hill, and Craufurd, all
felt and submitted to his ascendency, and of younger officers it was ever
the proud boast of the Napiers, Colborne, the Beckwiths, and Barnard that
they were the pupils of Moore, not of Wellington. Nay more, he inspired
an historian. The description of Moore’s retreat in Napier[i] is perhaps
the finest piece of military history in the English language, not only
because the author was present, but because his heart was with the leader
of that retreat; and, if Napier felt towards Wellington as the soldiers
of the Tenth legion felt towards Cæsar,[114] he felt towards Moore the
personal love and devotion of a cavalier towards Montrose.”
We can do no better than quote at some length Napier’s famous account
from his work, which has been favourably compared with those of
Thucydides, Xenophon, and Cæsar.[a]
_Napier’s Story of Moore’s Retreat_
[Sidenote: [1808-1809 A.D.]]
That Moore succoured Spain in her extremity, and, in her hour of
weakness, intercepted the blow descending to crush her, no man of candour
can deny. For what troops, what preparations, what courage, what capacity
was there in the south to have resisted even for an instant the progress
of a man like Napoleon, who, in ten days and in the depth of winter,
crossing the snowy ridge of the Carpentinos, had traversed two hundred
miles of hostile country, and transported fifty thousand men from Madrid
to Astorga in a shorter time than a Spanish courier would have taken to
travel the same distance? This stupendous march was rendered fruitless
by the quickness of Moore; but Napoleon, though he failed to destroy
the English army, resolved, nevertheless, to cast it forth from the
peninsula. Being himself recalled to France by tidings that the Austrian
storm was ready to burst, he fixed upon Soult to continue the pursuit.
Including Laborde, Heudelet, and Loison’s division, nearly sixty thousand
men and ninety-one guns were put on the track of the English army.
Soult, nowise inferior to any of his nation, if the emperor be excepted,
followed Moore with vigour. Nineteen thousand British troops posted in
strong ground might have offered battle to very superior numbers; yet
where was the use of merely fighting an enemy who had three hundred
thousand men in Spain? Nothing could be gained, but Moore might by
a quick retreat reach his ships unmolested, and carry his army from
that narrow corner to the southern provinces and renew the war under
more favourable circumstances. But in the immense wine-vaults of
Bembibre hundreds of men remained inebriated, the followers of the
army crowded the houses, and many of Romana’s disbanded men were mixed
with this heterogeneous mass of marauders, drunkards, muleteers,
women, and children. Moore, leaving a small guard with them, proceeded
to Calcabellos. At Calcabellos the reserve took up a position, Baird
marched to Herrerias, and Moore went on to Villa Franca; but in that
town also great excesses had been committed by the preceding divisions;
the magazines were plundered, the bakers driven from the ovens, the
wine-stores forced, the commissaries prevented making the regular
distributions; the doors of the houses were broken, and a scandalous
insubordination then showed a discreditable relaxation of discipline by
the officers. Moore arrested this disorder, and caused one man taken in
the act of plundering a magazine to be hanged in the market-place.
Under the most favourable circumstances, the tail of a retreating force
exhibits terrible scenes of distress, and on the road near Nogales the
followers of the army were dying fast from cold and hunger. The soldiers,
barefooted, harassed, and weakened by their excesses at Bembibre and
Villa Franca, were dropping to the rear by hundreds, while broken carts,
dead animals, and the piteous spectacle of women and children, struggling
or falling exhausted in the snow, completed a picture of war, which like
Janus has a double face.
The British army was not provided to fight above one battle; there were
no draught cattle, no means of transporting reserve ammunition, no
magazines, no hospitals, no second line, no provisions: a defeat would
have been ruin, a victory useless. A battle is always a serious affair;
two battles in such circumstances, though both should be victories,
would have been destruction. A terrible storm of wind and rain, mixed
with sleet, commenced as the army broke up from the position at Lugo;
the marks were destroyed, the guides lost the true direction, only one
of the divisions gained the main road, the other two were bewildered,
and when daylight broke the rear columns were still near to Lugo. The
fatigue, the depression of mind occasioned by this misfortune, and the
want of shoes broke the order of the march, stragglers became numerous,
and unfortunately Baird, thinking to relieve the men during a halt which
took place in the night, desired the leading division to take refuge
from the weather in some houses a little way off the road. Complete
disorganisation followed this imprudent act. The commander-in-chief, who
covered this march with the reserve and cavalry, ordered several bridges
to be destroyed, but the engineers failed of success in every attempt.
As the troops approached Corunna, on January 12th, 1809, the general’s
looks were directed towards the harbour, but an expanse of water
painfully convinced him that to fortune at least he was in no way
beholden; contrary winds still detained the fleet at Vigo, and the last
consuming exertion made by the army was rendered fruitless. The men were
put into quarters, and their leader awaited the progress of events.
The reserve was posted between the village of El Burgo and the road of
Santiago de Compostella. For twelve days these hardy soldiers had covered
the retreat, during which time they traversed eighty miles of road in two
marches, passed several nights under arms in the snow of the mountains,
were seven times engaged, and now took the outposts having fewer men
missing from the ranks, including those who had fallen in battle, than
any other division in the army: an admirable instance of the value of
good discipline, and a manifest proof of the malignant injustice with
which Moore has been accused of precipitating his retreat beyond the
measure of human strength.
Now a painful measure was adopted; the ground in front of Corunna is
impracticable for cavalry, the horses were generally foundered, it was
impossible to embark them all in the face of an enemy, and a great
number were reluctantly ordered to be shot; worn down and foot-broken,
they would otherwise have been distributed among the French cavalry, or
used as draught cattle until death relieved them from procrastinated
suffering. But the very fact of their being so foundered was one of the
results of inexperience; the cavalry had come out to Corunna without
proper equipments, the horses were ruined, not for want of shoes but
want of hammers and nails to put them on. Soon the French gathered on
the Mero, and Moore sought a position of battle. On the evening of the
14th the transports from Vigo hove in sight; the dismounted cavalry,
the sick, the best horses, and fifty pieces of artillery were embarked,
six British and three Spanish guns being kept on shore for action. When
Laborde’s division arrived, on the 15th, the French force was not less
than twenty thousand men, and Soult made no idle evolutions of display.
Distributing his lighter guns along the front of his position, he opened
a fire from the heavy battery on his left, and instantly descended the
mountain with three columns covered by clouds of skirmishers. The ground
about that village was intersected by stone walls and hollow roads; a
severe scrambling fight ensued, the French were forced back with great
loss, but, being reinforced, renewed the fight beyond the village.
Major Napier,[115] commanding the 50th, was wounded and taken prisoner,
and Elvina then became the scene of another contest. The line of the
skirmishers being supported vigorously, checked the advance of the
enemy’s troops in the valley; at the same time the centre and left of the
army also became engaged, and a furious action ensued along the line, in
the valley, and on the hills. Sir John Moore, while earnestly watching
the result of the fight about the village of Elvina, was struck on the
left breast by a cannon-shot.
Notwithstanding this great disaster the troops gained ground, and when
the night set in, their line was considerably advanced beyond the
original position of the morning, while the French were falling back in
confusion. Their disorder facilitated the original plan of embarking
during the night. Hope, upon whom the command had devolved, resolved
therefore to ship the army, and so complete were the arrangements that no
confusion or difficulty occurred; the pickets kindled fires to cover the
retreat, and were themselves withdrawn at daybreak to embark under the
protection of Hill’s brigade, which was in position under the ramparts of
Corunna.
When the morning of the sixteenth dawned, the French, seeing the British
position abandoned, pushed some battalions to the heights of San Lucia,
and about midday opened a battery on the shipping in the harbour. This
caused great confusion amongst the transports, several masters cut their
cables, and four vessels went on shore, but the troops were rescued by
the men-of-war’s boats, the stranded vessels burned, and the fleet got
out of harbour. Hill then embarked at the citadel, which was maintained
by a rearguard under Beresford until the 18th, when, the wounded being
all on board, the troops likewise embarked; the inhabitants faithfully
maintained the town meanwhile, and the fleet sailed for England. The
loss of the British, never officially published, was estimated at eight
hundred; of the French at three thousand. The latter is probably an
exaggeration, yet it must have been great.
From the spot where he fell, the general was carried to the town by his
soldiers; his blood flowed fast and the torture of the wound was great;
yet the unshaken firmness of his mind made those about him, seeing the
resolution of his countenance, express a hope of his recovery: he looked
steadfastly at the injury for a moment, and said: “No, I feel that to
be impossible.” Several times he caused his attendants to stop and turn
round, that he might behold the field of battle; and when the firing
indicated the advance of the British, he discovered his satisfaction and
permitted the bearers to proceed. When life was almost extinct, with
an unsubdued spirit, as if anticipating the baseness of his posthumous
calumniators, he exclaimed: “I hope the people of England will be
satisfied. I hope my country will do me justice.” In a few minutes
afterwards he died, and his corpse, wrapped in a military cloak, was
interred by the officers of his staff in the citadel of Corunna. The guns
of the enemy paid his funeral honours, and Soult with a noble feeling of
respect for his valour raised a monument to his memory on the field.[b]
_A Spanish Opinion of the Retreat_
English historians, especially Napier,[b] are so severe in their
aspersions on the Spanish that it is only fair to give the words of a
Spanish historian and contemporary, the count de Toreño, who says:
“The residents of Corunna with disinterested zeal not only assisted
the English, but also kept faith with them, and did not immediately
surrender the fortress, a noble example rarely given by towns when they
see themselves abandoned by those from whom they expected protection and
aid. So ended General Moore’s retreat, censured by some among his own
compatriots, upheld and even praised by others. Leaving the investigation
and criticism of this campaign to military men, we are of opinion that
the chance of being compelled to fight before his troops embarked, and
also his having ended his days honourably on the field of battle, have
lent lustre to the glory and good name of General Moore. For the rest,
if a veteran well-disciplined army such as the English, provided with
abundant supplies, began a retreat before combating, in the progress of
which retreat there were witnessed such disorders, such damage, such
scandals, who can wonder that there were disorders and confusion in the
Spanish retreats, executed after fighting, with an army of raw recruits,
lacking all resources, and in their own country? We do not say this to
detract from British glory, but in defence of our own, so reviled by
certain English writers--by those indeed who took part in this disastrous
campaign.”[f]
FRENCH SUCCESSES
[Sidenote: [1809 A.D.]]
In Catalonia an attempt by the Spaniards to recover Barcelona was
defeated by St. Cyr, who likewise took Rosas. In Galicia La Romana
sheltered himself and his little band amidst the mountains, whilst Soult
overran the province; Corunna surrendered to him as soon as the English
troops were safe on board, and Ferrol followed its example, delivering up
the squadron in its port.
On the 22nd of January, 1809, Joseph returned to Madrid. His second
entrance does not appear to have called forth the same demonstrations of
national feeling as the first. The municipality and the several councils
received him with loud professions of loyalty, and all the population
took the oath of allegiance.
Saragossa had been invested by Marshal Moncey the 20th of December,
1808, and summoned to surrender; Palafox gave the answer that might
be expected from his conduct in the former siege, and with his brave
townsmen prepared to stand a second, yet more destructive. For a while
the siege languished, and dissension existed amongst the besieging
generals. But, on the 22nd of January, 1809, Lannes assumed the command;
and on the 1st of February the besiegers forced their entrance into the
town, and for three weeks the struggle, street by street and house by
house, was maintained, with all the circumstances of affecting heroism
recorded on the former occasion. But the numbers that had thronged to
defend Saragossa were her bane: pestilence was engendered in the crowded
cellars, and proved a yet more deadly foe than the French. The posts
were manned by hospital patients, sitting, because they could not stand;
Palafox was in his bed delirious; and on the 22nd of February the junta
capitulated. Lannes violated the capitulation in many points, and sent
Palafox, whose liberty had been stipulated, prisoner to France. The
central junta loaded the city and all its inhabitants and defenders with
praises, honour, and rewards.[116]
The reconquest of Portugal was now the object of the French. Soult was
appointed governor of that kingdom, and ordered to invade it from the
north, whilst Victor and Lapisse were to co-operate with him, the former
in the south, and the latter from Ciudad Rodrigo.
Soult took Oporto by storm on the 29th of March, fixed his headquarters
there, and seems to have meditated becoming king of northern Lusitania,
if not of Portugal. But Oporto was the limit of his conquest. Behind him
La Romana, who had rallied his constantly increasing army, found Ney
full employment, and Silveira was again master of Tras-os-Montes. In
the south Victor could not invade Alemtejo till he should have defeated
Cuesta and the Estremaduran army; and Lapisse could not make himself
master of Ciudad Rodrigo, which was defended chiefly by Sir Robert Wilson
with his Lusitanian legion. This legion was the first attempt, in the
course of the war, to improve the Portuguese soldiers, by placing them
under British officers. The prince of Brazil was induced to send General
Beresford a commission as field-marshal and general-in-chief of the
Portuguese army. With this commission, Beresford landed early in March,
and immediately proceeded to train the troops and to place over them as
many effective English officers as he thought national jealousy would
bear (always, however, nominally commanded by a native colonel).
Bonaparte is calculated to have had at this time about 270,000 men in
the peninsula. These he deemed amply sufficient for its subjugation, and
at the moment could not well reinforce them. His alarms touching Austria
had proved just. If Napoleon was successful as ever in Germany, his
generals were not equally prosperous in the peninsula. And what was of
yet more consequence, on the 22nd of April, Sir Arthur Wellesley arrived
in the Tagus, bearing the character of general-in-chief of the English
and Portuguese troops.
WELLINGTON RESUMES CONTROL
There was no hesitation in Sir Arthur’s measures. He resolved first to
clear Portugal of invaders, then to assist Spain. On the 6th of May,
leaving a body of British and Portuguese on the Tagus to watch Victor, he
began his march from Coimbra with about thirteen thousand British troops,
three thousand Germans, and nine thousand of Beresford’s new levies, to
effect the first of these objects. The French troops, who had ventured
to take post south of the Douro, were everywhere outmanœuvred and driven
back. Soult, having broken the bridges and secured the boats upon the
Douro, a broad and rapid stream, believed the English could only cross by
their ship-boats at the mouth of the river. But on the 12th, Sir Arthur
contrived to procure four barges at a point where a wood concealed the
river, and a hill his army, from the town, whilst his guns could play on
the point at which the men were to land; and before the French suspected
so daring an attempt, some companies were passed over who made good their
footing.
Soult, after a short contest, evacuated Oporto, and precipitately
retreated. The pursuit was continued for five days, till the French
marshal, sacrificing his artillery, stores, baggage, and even his
sick and wounded, escaped with the remnant of his troops, by mountain
paths through which no regularly equipped and appointed army could
attempt to follow. Sir Arthur then abandoned the chase, appointed Trant
military governor of Oporto (the bishop had fled to Lisbon, where he
was thenceforward a leading member of the regency), and leaving the
protection of the northern provinces to Silveira and his Portuguese,
returned southwards, to assist Cuesta against Victor. The utter
impracticability of this brave, zealous, and upright, but narrow-minded,
prejudiced, and obstinate old man,[117] thwarted every scheme proposed,
and thus wasted much valuable time. The British commander found it
impossible to obtain from his Spanish coadjutor either provisions or
means of transport for his artillery and stores.
The French now returned with superior numbers, under the command of the
king, aided by his major-general, Marshal Jourdan. Upon the 27th and
28th of July they attacked the allies at Talavera. The battle, long,
obstinately contested, and sanguinary, ended in the complete defeat of
the assailants; but the destitute and exhausted condition of the English
troops, who were without provisions for man or horse, prevented their
pursuing the discomfited enemy, who was consequently enabled to retreat
in good order. The good that should have resulted from the victory was
further counteracted by an alarm from the north, and Cuesta’s perverse
temper.
La Romana had rallied and increased his little army, and had so harassed
Soult and Ney, that they, considering likewise the greater importance of
the transactions then taking place in the south, resolved to evacuate the
province. They did so, and Galicia remained thenceforward unmolested by
invaders. In their progress southwards the two marshals were joined by
Mortier, and Soult received from Napoleon the command of the combined
corps with orders to march upon the English and Cuesta. The Spaniards
stationed to secure the mountain passes fled; and Sir Arthur led the
British army against this new foe, intrusting to Cuesta the maintenance
of the post of Talavera. An apprehension of Victor’s advancing anew
induced Cuesta to evacuate Talavera, and he hastened after Wellesley,
leaving fifteen hundred British wounded to the enemy, whilst it is said
many of his own carts were removed empty. This step, and Soult’s advance
in unexpected strength, exposed Sir Arthur to be cut off from Portugal.
His troops were starving; and as the protection of Portugal was the point
chiefly insisted upon in his instructions, he retreated to a frontier
position on the Guadiana. Venegas was defeated at Almonacid. Blake’s army
of Aragon and Valencia had been beaten and dispersed; and the fall of
Spain appeared to be inevitable. Venegas’ repeated defeats had now made
him so unpopular that the command of his army was taken from him.
Meanwhile the central junta exerted themselves to reinforce Cuesta’s
army, which had been surprised and half destroyed by the enemy since
its separation from the English; and they thought of removing the
unmanageable general. A paralytic stroke saved them that trouble, by
compelling him to resign. The command of the principal army of fifty
thousand men was given to Areizaga who was ordered to free Madrid,
before the reinforcements, set at liberty by the end of the Austrian
war, could reach Spain. The same peculiarity of the Spanish character,
namely, assuming as done whatever is promised, or even wished, seems to
have convinced the inexperienced statesmen of the central junta that the
general they had sent to conquer could not be beaten, and that a decree,
ordering the English army to be well supplied, must answer every purpose,
though they took no measures for procuring the provisions or the cattle
required. Lord Wellington remained in his cantonments; and on the 17th of
November, Areizaga was totally defeated at Ocaña. The French now menaced
Portugal: the British general was prepared for its protection.
The French were masters of nearly all Spain north of the Sierra Morena,
with the exception of Galicia, Valencia, and Catalonia; and in this last
province, although it resisted most stoutly, the French army, under St.
Cyr, held the field, and Gerona, one of the most important fortresses not
in their hands, fell in December, after emulating the glory of Saragossa
during a seven months’ siege.[118] But their garrisons were distressed,
and their communications were harassed both by the British cruisers
on the coast, and by the Catalans themselves, who were almost all in
arms, as _miquelets_ or _guerrillas_, displaying the same indomitable
spirit they had shown in former wars. In the course of the year 1809,
as the regular armies were defeated and dispersed, the example of the
Catalans was followed throughout Spain; and bands of guerillas consisting
of peasants, deserters, outlaws--of individuals, in short, of all
classes--were everywhere established, the command of which was assumed
by men of talent and resolution, likewise of all classes--officers,
monks, physicians, yeomen, or smugglers. This was a mode of warfare
to which the climate was favourable, the vindictive Spanish character
peculiarly adapted, and habits of discipline unnecessary. They appeared
in force wherever a blow was to be struck; when pursued, they dispersed
and vanished. A few of the guerilla leaders, as Juan Martin Diaz, better
known as the Empecinado, Julian Sanchez, Juan Diaz Porlier, Don Mariano
de Renovalos Longa, and last, and far the greatest, the two Minas, uncle
and nephew, acquired a celebrity that renders the record of their names
indispensable in Spanish history.
[Sidenote: [1809-1810 A.D.]]
The central junta, opposed by the local junta, and alarmed at their own
unpopularity, were now prevailed upon to transfer their authority to a
regency of five persons. The regency, instead of devoting their time and
thoughts to calling forth the resources and energies of the country, or
even to the defence of Cadiz, began their administration by a vehement
attack upon the measures of the central junta, accused that body of
usurpation and peculation, threw some of the members into prison, and
banished even the excellent Jovellanos to his native province, where
his conduct was ordered to be watched. Alburquerque was deprived of
the government of Cadiz and sent as ambassador to England, where he
soon died, of mortification, it is said, at his ill usage. Whilst the
regency were persecuting their predecessors, or occupied with commercial
interests, Andalusia and Granada submitted at once to the conqueror, who
met resistance only from Cadiz.
The war with Austria was now over, and it was generally expected that
the dreaded Napoleon would return to the peninsula, to bear down all
resistance by the energy of his own mighty genius. But he sent his
favourite general, Masséna, whom he had surnamed the Spoiled Child of
Victory, to conquer Portugal, drive the English into the sea, and, it was
supposed, receive the crown of Portugal as his reward.
The Spaniards had now no army on foot deserving the name, and central
Spain, from the Pyrenees to the lines before Cadiz, was nominally in
the possession of King Joseph, Galicia and Estremadura, on the western,
and Murcia, Valencia, and Catalonia on the eastern side, with a few
fortresses, being all that yet remained unconquered; and, in Catalonia,
Suchet was slowly making formidable progress. But the temper of the
people never was less subdued, and the war had assumed a character of
extraordinary ferocity.
Napoleon deemed that professional soldiers only had a right to fight;
and instead of respecting the patriotic feeling that roused the whole
nation to struggle for independence, he considered the armed peasantry
as mere licentious rebels against their lawful king. Hence whilst the
ordinary courtesies of war were observed towards the British, nearly all
the Spaniards and the irregular Portuguese troops were treated with
wanton cruelty, and their women exposed to the grossest outrage from the
French soldiery, until almost every individual in the Spanish guerilla
bands, and the Portuguese irregulars, had a private injury to revenge;
and even sympathy in their resentments can barely palliate the sanguinary
temper in which that revenge was sought. And to these personal motives of
exasperation was added a deep sense of religious horror, since the French
emperor had seized upon the estates of the church, upon Rome itself, and
carried Pope Pius VII, who refused to sanction his spoliation, a prisoner
to France. From the influence of so many various feelings, the whole of
Spain was now overrun by fierce guerillas, and Joseph, in fact, was only
master of the places actually occupied by French soldiers.
As soon as the French movements threatened Portugal, Lord Wellington
could not hope, with 27,000 British, and 30,000 nearly untried Portuguese
troops, to defend Portugal against 80,000 French veterans, led by an able
general, and supported by bodies of 30,000 or 40,000 men, acting as a
rearguard.
THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS
The British commander was even then directing the construction of those
military works, known as the lines of Torres Vedras, by which the
naturally strong ground covering Lisbon was rendered nearly impregnable;
and his main object upon the frontier appears to have been retarding the
enemy’s advance, until those lines should be perfected and the harvest
gathered in. He intended that the inhabitants should then evacuate the
intermediate district, with all their provisions and movable property;
and that he himself, retreating to his lines, should draw Masséna into a
desert country, where the French marshal could not subsist his troops,
and would find himself confronted by a strong army, in an impregnable
position, whilst his rear and communications were harassed by militia and
_ordenanzas_, the proper name of the Portuguese armed peasantry.
Masséna, recently created by his imperial master, the prince of Essling,
dedicated the spring to assembling his army, and making preparations;
nor was it until he began the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo that the line by
which he proposed to invade Portugal was ascertained. That town was
gallantly defended by its governor, Herrasti, assisted by the guerilla
chief, Sanchez, from the 4th of June till the 10th of July, 1810. When
the place was no longer tenable, Sanchez and his band, breaking through
the besiegers, escaped, and Herrasti capitulated. Lord Wellington’s plan
required that he should hazard no attempt to relieve the besieged,[119]
but his menacing position had long kept Masséna’s usually enterprising
temper in check, and continued to do so; for upwards of a month was
suffered to elapse after the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo ere the French
general proceeded to lay siege to the neighbouring Portuguese fortress,
Almeida.
[Illustration: SALAMANCA]
[Sidenote: [1810 A.D.]]
The allied army, falling back as he advanced, offered no interruption.
But an English officer commanded the Portuguese garrison in Almeida, and
a defence yet longer than Ciudad Rodrigo’s was confidently expected. An
accident caused the explosion of the principal powder magazine on the
26th of August, when, through the panic of some and the treachery of
others, the garrison flung down their arms, and forced the mortified
governor to capitulate. Masséna concentrated his forces about the middle
of September and prepared, as he hoped, to drive the British to their
ships. Lord Wellington arranged his army upon the ridge of Busaco,
and awaited the enemy. The French troops scaled the steep ascent with
daring alacrity, but were driven down again with heavy loss. The French
killed and wounded in this battle are estimated at from five to six
thousand, those of the allies at twelve hundred: but perhaps not the
least important event of the day was that the Portuguese troops displayed
a steadiness of courage which had scarcely been as yet expected from
their training. On the following day Masséna, learning that there was
a mountain road by which he could turn the left of his adversary’s
position, filed off his troops in that direction, vainly hoping to
reach Coimbra the first. On the 29th Lord Wellington prevented him, by
retreating upon that city along the direct road.
It was not till they actually saw the allied army retreating before
the invaders that the inhabitants prepared to obey Lord Wellington’s
proclamation, and forsake their homes. And now it was too late to
attain the end for which the order had been given. The provisions were
left behind, the mills were scarcely damaged; whilst the helpless and
desolate crowds that, flying from the enemy, accompanied the troops,
encumbered their march, and gave birth to the usual disorders of a
retreat. Such disorders were, however, repressed by the vigour with
which Lord Wellington punished, and the precautions he took to prevent
them; whilst Masséna’s negligence indulged his troops in a license that
rendered the disorder of the pursuing far greater than even now was
that of the retreating army. At Coimbra alone the French troops, during
the three days they spent there, wasted and destroyed stores that might
have supplied two months’ subsistence. But at Coimbra Masséna was still
ignorant of the existence of the lines of Torres Vedras; and still
believing that he was merely chasing the British to their ships, he
probably saw no need of restraining his troops or of providing against
famine.
On the 10th of October the allied army took up its position within
those extraordinary lines, of which one end rested upon the sea, and
the other upon the Tagus, extending in length twenty-nine miles, at
about thirty-five miles average distance from Lisbon. The utmost skill
of the engineer had been exerted to improve the natural strength of
this mountain line, and to supply its deficiencies. A second line of
fortifications had been prepared some ten miles nearer Lisbon, in
case the first should be lost, or prove too extensive for the numbers
occupying it; and a third to protect a possible forced embarkation. But
this danger was happily gone by. Reinforcements arrived from England,
additional Portuguese corps were assembled, and La Romana, at Lord
Wellington’s request, brought in two Spanish divisions. Before the end of
the month seventy thousand regular troops were within the lines, ready to
be moved, along convenient roads, to whatever points might be threatened,
whilst sixty thousand Portuguese militia manned the different forts and
redoubts that commanded the approaches.
Masséna halted in disagreeable surprise before the stupendous fortress.
He was obliged to send foraging detachments to great distances; these
were cruelly harassed, and sometimes cut off by the Portuguese militia
and ordenanzas. Towards the middle of November, Masséna withdrew from
before the lines, and took up a strong position at Santarem, upon the
Tagus. Wellington, to observe him, stationed himself in advance of his
lines, upon which he could fall back at a moment’s warning.
Throughout the greater part of Spain meanwhile a desultory warfare had
been carried on, in which the French were generally successful. Victor
was conducting the siege of Cadiz, an operation that proceeded languidly
on both sides, from want of numbers on Victor’s, and the usual causes on
that of the Spaniards.
The assembling of the cortes was looked to as the period and as the
means of the regeneration of Spain. These hopes were confirmed, and the
peculiar character of the Spanish resolution was, at the same time,
curiously illustrated by the mode in which the elections were carried
on, even in the provinces most thoroughly occupied by the French.
Considerable bodies of armed peasants, or of guerillas, sometimes
temporarily drove the French from the town where an election was
appointed to take place, sometimes merely held them at bay, whilst
the suffrages were collected. And thus, almost everywhere, deputies
were elected who, sooner or later, found their way to Cadiz. On the
24th of September, 1810, the cortes were solemnly opened. The assembly
immediately decreed a new levy of 150,000 men, together with provision
for the support and equipment of all the Spanish armies. But then, as
if this decree had sufficed for expelling the enemy, who held the whole
country in subjection, they dedicated their whole attention to framing
a constitution, and to establishing sweeping theories, resembling those
adopted by the French National Assembly, and equally democratic in their
tenor. The disputes that ensued between the cortes and the regency ended
in the dissolution of the latter body, for whom was substituted an
executive council of three. The cortes offended the clergy by attacking
the Inquisition, and attempting other ecclesiastical reforms for which
the country was unripe, exasperated the whole church, and sowed the
seeds of the fatal subsequent reaction that robbed Spain of all the
internal benefits she ought to have derived from the restoration of her
representative legislature.
[Sidenote: [1810-1811 A.D.]]
Although they had allowed the colonies to send deputies to the cortes,
they were not willing to treat the colonists as brethren. The colonies
had unanimously professed their loyalty to Ferdinand, and their adhesion
to the national cause. The emissaries employed by Napoleon and Joseph to
seduce them had been everywhere derided and punished; and the American
revenues, regularly conveyed to the mother-country by English vessels,
ought, if fairly applied, to have done much towards supporting the war.
On the intelligence of the surrender of Seville, the subjugation of
Andalusia, and the flight and dispersion of the central junta, the
province of Caracas assumed that Spain was conquered; and, declaring
that it never would submit to Joseph, cast off the authority of the
mother-country whilst proclaiming inviolable fidelity to Ferdinand.
This example was followed by the other provinces of Terra Firma, as the
north coast of the South American continent was called; and on the 19th
of April, 1810, the Venezuela confederation proclaimed its independent
existence under Ferdinand VII. They refused to acknowledge the Cadiz
regency and cortes, with whom they carried on a paper war; and those
bodies, vehemently resenting this daring assertion of independence,
divided the forces that should have been dedicated to the expulsion of
the enemy from Spain, in order to compel colonial submission.
From the injudicious appointment to the chief command of the worst of all
the Spanish generals, Lapeña, Cadiz must have fallen, if Soult had not
been ordered by Napoleon to co-operate with Masséna against Portugal.
Lapeña, to whom Graham, as a measure of conciliation, gave up the supreme
command, stood inactive in a safe and distant post, with eleven thousand
Spaniards, whilst at Barrosa, Graham, with little more than four thousand
English and Portuguese, fought and defeated nearly nine thousand French.
By the Spanish general’s refusal even to pursue the beaten enemy, the
benefit of this hardly won success was lost. The council and cortes
approved of Lapeña’s conduct: he claimed the merit of the victory, and
Graham, in disgust, resigning his command to General Cooke, joined
Lord Wellington. La Romana died on the 24th of January, 1811. Olivenza
had capitulated on the 22nd, and the French laid siege to Badajoz. La
Romana’s successor, Mendizabal, was defeated by Soult; but Don Raphael
Menacho, the governor of Badajoz, defended the place stoutly, and Soult
remained before it. In Portugal the winter had passed with little
alteration. Wellington and Masséna had spent it in watching each other.
[Sidenote: [1811 A.D.]]
By the end of February, 1811, the provisions, which the obstinacy of the
regents had left to the French, were exhausted. Masséna learned from his
partisans in Lisbon that English reinforcements had landed on the 2nd of
March, and on the 6th he had evacuated Santarem and begun his retreat. He
conducted it with great skill, stained, however, with as great and wanton
cruelty. In fact, this retreat, though highly honourable to the general’s
abilities, remains one of the foulest blots upon the moral character of
the French army.[120] But the pursuit was conducted by Lord Wellington
with yet greater ability, every strong position taken by the French army
being immediately turned by the British; and on the 5th of April Masséna
was finally driven across the frontiers of Portugal. This retreat cost
the French about six thousand men, and the allies a tenth of that number.
Masséna’s previous losses are estimated at twenty-five or thirty thousand.
FAILURES IN SPAIN
Lord Wellington, having now again delivered Portugal, asked for such
reinforcements as might enable him to undertake the deliverance of Spain,
without being, as before, dependent upon the obstinate generals and
feeble counsels of that country. But to the feasibility of his future
schemes, and even to the maintenance of Portugal and of Cadiz, the
recovery of Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Badajoz was indispensable. The
first of these fortresses Wellington immediately blockaded, and directed
Marshal Beresford to lay siege to the last.