CHIEVELEY CAMP
Deeply to be deplored, yet generally recognised, was the fact that so
far, no decisive defeat had been inflicted on the Boers. We had fought
gloriously, sometimes successfully; great men and brave had written
their names in blood on the roll of heroes and had passed away, but
nothing decisive had been done. It was true that the enemy had been
routed time after time, but he had got away without chastisement, and in
most cases with his guns. The main reason for his safe flight was our
lack of cavalry, and also the fact, that such horses as we had were not
of the same nimble build as those--inferior, yet smart--which were
possessed by the Boers. These, thoroughly acclimatised and also educated
to the curious nature of the boulder-strewn country, were able to career
into space before our heavier chargers could get even with them.
Lord Methuen had fought three glorious battles successfully, and a
fourth, equally glorious though productive of no result, insomuch as the
distance of his troops from Kimberley remained the same, while their
numbers were very materially attenuated. It was reasonably to be
supposed that a general who had come victoriously through three
engagements--all accomplished within a week--should, in a measure, have
exhausted some of his fighting material, and that such unequalled feats
of arms as had been displayed must be paid for. The morale and stamina
of the troops had been tried in every way. They had faced shot and shell
at Belmont, at Enslin, and at Modder River. They had marched many miles
under a torrid sun and slept many nights exposed to contrasting cold.
Yet, at Majesfontein they had risen to the occasion, and flung
themselves into the hurlyburly of battle as though a hint of fatigue
were unknown. And their ill-success, it was discovered, was mainly due
to treachery, against which it was almost impossible to be entirely
guarded.
The one compliment that can be paid to a Boer is to call him "slim" or
sly, and this slimness in warfare has helped the foe to circumvent the
broader and more open tactics of the Briton. There was, indeed, no
knowing how far or how ingeniously the ramifications of "slimness" had
extended, and, to be even with them at all, our warriors have needed to
add to the courage of lions the astuteness of weasels! Some of the Cape
Dutch had worked surreptitiously for the foe, others affected an
attitude of neutrality, more dangerous than open antagonism; while
Kaffirs, either from fear of being made biltong of, or for bribes, had
lent themselves to delude and trick the British on more than one
occasion. However, notwithstanding impediments, every one waited
anxiously to hear a decisive note in the war news, and continued to hope
for the best. Lord Methuen having done his part, all eyes were now
turned towards the Natal force and Sir Redvers Buller, in expectation of
relief. In England the tension was becoming painful; in the Cape it was
causing colourless loyalty to become tinged with doubt; in the besieged
towns it was bringing patience to the snapping-point. In effect, the
whole nation was standing with bated breath for the great, the important
stroke, and the entire world looked to Colenso, that hitherto unknown
spot in the Empire, for one of the biggest battles of the campaign.
THE BATTLE OF COLENSO
On Friday the 15th December the Ladysmith relief column under Sir
Redvers Buller attacked the enemy in full force. The Dutchmen held very
strong positions north of Colenso, their camps and laagers being linked
with those surrounding the southern side of Ladysmith, while to the
south of the river they also held a formidable and commanding post.
About three miles in front was an open plain, with hardly a vestige of
cover in any direction. All around was a crescent-shaped constellation
of high kopjes. The great hill of Hlangwane, on the left flank of the
enemy, though it was not known at the onset, was strongly fortified, and
_vis-a-vis_ to the Hlangwane guns on the extreme right were posted more
guns. Between these two eminences was the plain aforesaid, veined with
dongas which reached to the terribly steep banks of the river, where
were more intrenchments. From Fort Wylie, another of the fortified
kopjes, the Boers commanded the little village of Colenso and the
expanse of country through which Sir Redvers Buller proposed to advance
to Ladysmith. The Tugela, wide and deep, ran between the foes, except on
the left of the Doer position, where the Dutchmen held both banks of the
river.
Upon their defensive works the Boers had spent a vast amount of labour.
Besides rows of trenches cunningly concealed by grass and scrub upon the
flats on both sides of the river, barbed wire entanglements complicated
the situation both at the trenches and under the water at the river
fords. The water of the river was also deepened by means of
cleverly-made dams, in order that any troops which might endeavour to
ford the current would find themselves carried off their feet.
[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF COLENSO--QUEEN'S (ROYAL WEST SURREY)
REGIMENT LEADING THE CENTRAL ATTACK.
Drawing by J. Finnemore, R.I.]
But, of course, the intricacy of these ingenious arrangements was only
discovered at the cost of bitter experience. Later on, a great deal of
after-the-event wisdom was forthcoming, and the ignorance of all
concerned regarding the nature of the position to be attacked was
severely commented upon. It was said that no satisfactory reconnaissance
of the enemy's position was made, and that accurate knowledge of the
nature of the ground to be passed over was not forthcoming. It was also
averred that neither subordinate officers nor men were informed of what
was expected of them, and that the only maps supplied to regimental
officers were small-scale maps of the whole of South Africa, forty miles
to the inch. However, it is clear that General Buller fully believed in
his ability to force the passage of the Tugela, and viewed the position,
though formidable, as less formidable than it really was. From all
accounts it was plain that all the generals believed the village of
Colenso to be evacuated, and none of them seemed to foresee very
powerful opposition from that quarter or to take into account the
exceeding rapidity with which the Boers managed to return to positions
temporarily vacated.
Selections from the general orders of the day will show the proposed
plan of action, and help to an understanding of how much one side may
propose and the other dispose in a modern campaign:--
GENERAL ORDERS.
"Orders of Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Clery, commanding the
South Natal field forces.
"CHIEVELEY, _Dec. 14, 1899_ (10 P.M.).
"1. The enemy is intrenched in the kopjes north of the Tugela;
one large camp is reported to be near the Ladysmith road, about
five miles north-west of Colenso. Another large camp is
reported in the hills which lie off the Tugela in a northerly
direction from Hlangwane Hill, a rough scrub-covered kopje.
"2. It is the intention of the General Officer Commanding to
force a passage of the Tugela to-morrow.
"3. The 5th Brigade (Major-General Hart's) will move from its
present camp at 4.30 A.M. and march towards Bridle Drift (a
ford about four miles west of Colenso), immediately west of the
junction of Doornkop Spruit and the Tugela. The brigade will
cross at this point, and after crossing move along on the left
bank of the river towards the kopjes north of the iron bridge.
"4. The 2nd Brigade (Major-General Hildyard's) will move from
its present camping-ground at 4 A.M., and, passing south of the
present camping-ground of No. 1 and No. 2 of the divisional
troops, will march in the direction of the iron bridge at
Colenso, and the brigade will cross at this point and gain
possession of the kopjes north of the iron bridge.
"5. The 4th Brigade (Major-General the Hon. N. G. Lyttelton's)
will advance at 4.30 A.M. to the point between Bridle Drift
and the railway south, and can support either the 5th or the
2nd Brigade.
"6. The 6th Brigade (Major-General Barton's), less half a
battalion as escort to the baggage, will move at 4 A.M. east of
the railway in the direction of Hlangwane Hill to a position
where it can protect the right flank of the 2nd Brigade, and,
if necessary, support it or the mounted troops referred to
later as moving towards Hlangwane Hill.
"7. The officer commanding the mounted brigade (the Earl of
Dundonald) will move, at 4 A.M. with a force of 1000 men and
one battery, No. 1 brigade division, in the direction of
Hlangwane Hill. He will cover the right flank of the general
movement, and will endeavour to take up a position on Hlangwane
Hill, where he will enfilade the kopjes north of the iron
bridge. The officer commanding the mounted troops will also
detail two forces of 300 and 500 men, to cover the right and
left flanks respectively and protect the baggage.
"8. The Second Brigade Division of the Royal Field Artillery
will move, at 4.30 A.M., following the Fourth Brigade, and will
take up a position whence it can enfilade the kopjes north of
the iron bridge. The Sixth Brigade (Major-General Barton's)
will act on any orders it receives from Major-General Hart. The
six Naval guns, twelve-pounders, now in position north of the
Fourth Brigade, will advance on the right of the Second Brigade
Division Royal Field Artillery. No. 1 Division Royal Field
Artillery, less one battery detached to the mounted brigade,
will move at 3.30 A.M. east of the railway, and proceed, under
cover of the Sixth Brigade, to a point from which it can
prepare a crossing for the Second Brigade. The six Naval guns
will accompany and act with the Brigade Division."
It must be remembered that the railway bridge had been blown up, but a
footbridge still existed.
[Illustration: SKETCH PLAN OF BATTLE OF COLENSO, MADE ON THE SPOT BY A
MILITARY DRAUGHTSMAN.]
Before dawn Lord Dundonald with a mounted brigade and a battery of
artillery moved to the east, while General Hart and his brigade started
to try and cross Brindle Drift. The field-guns came next with
cavalry--the 1st Royals and 13th Hussars--to protect either flank.
Major-General Hildyard's brigade advanced to occupy the post of honour
in the centre of the theatre of war. On the right were the West Surrey
with the West Yorks in support. On the left marched the Devons with the
East Surrey in rear. At 6 A.M. the Naval Contingent opened the
proceedings. Their 12-pounders began to snort and to roar, and lyddite
whizzed and shrieked over to Grobler's Hill and in the neighbourhood of
Fort Wylie. But it whizzed and shrieked in vain. The Boers were "mum."
They were "lying low," and had determined to keep their position masked
as long as possible. They adopted the same tactics which had so
confounded us at Majesfontein. The infantry now advanced, while Colonels
Long and Hunt made haste--undue haste, as lamentable experience
proved--to come into line with their field-batteries. At this moment,
when all seemed to be going well, when Hart's, Hildyard's, and Barton's
brigades were moving to their several positions, the sudden combined
roar of Boer artillery and musketry was heard, coming not, as might
have been supposed, from the distance, but _from the immediate front_,
and apparently from all sides. A very cyclone of Mauser bullets swept
all around, rattling and barking from the river bank, from trenches
north and south of the Tugela, from Fort Wylie, and from every available
point of vantage. Flame in tongues and forks belched out as from a
crackling bush. The advancing infantry--the Devons and the West
Surrey--found themselves almost carried off their feet; leaden hail beat
the dust around, digging deep into the earth and sending up spurts of
blinding dust, or whistling a warning of death to the heart of many an
honest lad and true. So deadly, so awful was this fusillade, that it
seemed impossible to do aught but flee. Yet the gunners stood tight to
their guns, and the infantry with set faces like masks of bronze,
regardless of the companions that dropped thick and fast around and upon
them, stared Death straight in the face--stared at and recognised and
knew him, and still maintained their ground! More--they advanced; nearer
and ever nearer to the invisible enemy they came, afterwards lying down
and returning the fire with interest, while the guns of Long's and
Hunt's field-batteries boomed and bellowed and vomited fire like Inferno
released. Fort Wylie and its neighbourhood were swept with shrapnel and
almost silenced, but only for a moment. Disaster was in the air. The
concealed sharpshooters of the enemy, who crowded the Boer lines, had
applied themselves to making a concentrated attack on the guns, picking
off horses and officers and men, and finally reducing the snorting
weapons which had been galloped too quickly into action, and were within
700 yards of the enemy's trenches, to a condition of pitiable impotence.
Only the third field-battery and the Naval battery could move, and these
were quickly drawn off to a place of safety. Amidst this scene of
tragedy and uproar the Devons and West Surrey were steadily pursuing
their way with a heroism that absolutely defies description. The enemy
was driven out of the platelayers' and surrounding houses, and Colenso
village was cleared. What the guns failed to do the bayonet
accomplished, and before the glint of the steel--the cold, stern steel
they so much dread--the Boers had bolted. But all around them Krupps and
Maxims and Hotchkiss guns were still working hard, spouting and
shrieking, and tearing earth and men and horses, and throwing them
together in one horrible, hideous heap.
Certainly the advance of Hildyard's men was a noble achievement. Their
effort to capture the road bridge and hold the village of Colenso in
face of a scene of carnage was an act of splendid courage and
determination; but they were assailed with so deadly a storm of shot and
shell that they had no choice but to retire. Though they had imagined
the village to be evacuated, the place had been swarming with Boers,
they evidently having expected to be attacked in this quarter. Not only
were they strongly intrenched, but the guns on the surrounding hills
commanded the position, and when the Boers were temporarily routed the
guns still continued to sweep the whole place with such unerring
accuracy and fierceness that the ground was thickly strewn with the
bodies of the mangled. Until those guns could be silenced, efforts of
the infantry were so much waste of valiant flesh and blood; but our
power to silence them was at an end. The guns of the 14th and 66th
Batteries were doomed. They had, as before said, been approached too
close to the river, and thus been exposed to the unerring rifle-fire of
the Boer mercenaries. The attack was immediately returned, but before
long the whole party, officers, gunners, and horses, were simply mown
down. As fast as more horses were brought up they were annihilated. In
addition to this the gunners ran short of ammunition. To await the
arrival of this, such survivors as there were doubled back to the
shelter of a donga twenty yards in their rear. At that time there was
no intention of abandoning the guns. Superb were the efforts made to
save them. Three officers rushed forward into the open, and, with some
heroic drivers and such horses as they could get, made their way very
deliberately towards the two field-batteries and into the mouth of a
flaming hell. These were Captain Schofield, R.A. (A.D.C. to General
Buller), Captain the Hon. F. Roberts, 60th Rifles, and Captain Congreve,
Rifle Brigade. This glorious bravery was almost an act of suicide, and
in sheer amazement at the wondrous valour of these dauntless Britons,
the Boer rifle-fire, for one instant, was suspended. In the next, shot
and shell burst forth afresh and the scene became too harrowing for
description. Roberts, the gallant and the beloved, dropped, wounded in
five places, while his horse was blown to bits, and Congreve, his jacket
riddled to ribbons, was hit several times. Schofield, by a miracle, came
whole from the ordeal, and succeeded in the almost impossible task of
hauling off the two guns, for which all three and many others had risked
their lives. The rest of the guns were captured by the enemy, but of
this anon.
[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF COLENSO--THE DUBLIN FUSILIERS ATTEMPT TO
FORD THE TUGELA.
Drawing by Rene Bull and Enoch Ward, R.B.A.]
Major-General Hart's Brigade, consisting of the Dublins, Inniskillings,
Borderers, and Connaughts, fulfilled in a measure what was expected of
them. Some of them actually crossed the Tugela, but, alas! to no
purpose. The position near the other side was untenable. A dam had been
thrown across the water to deepen it. Cascades of artillery shrapnel
were so liberally poured upon them, there was no holding up a head in
such a fusillade. Yet they pushed on to the river, and the enemy fell
back before them or dropped under their steady determined fire. The
Dutchmen were driven to the north bank of the Tugela, and the Irish
Brigade gallantly plunged in, thinking the water was knee-deep or at
least fordable, and it was only then that they discovered that the wire
entanglements that had been spread around the trenches were also under
water, and that the flood itself was unexpectedly deep, owing to the
ingenious dam that had been constructed by the "slim" adversary. There
were now ten feet of water instead of two, and sad was the plight of
many a poor fellow of the Dublins and Connaughts, who, weighted with
ammunition and accoutrements, found it impossible to swim to shore or
even to return. They were drowned in the flood, while others dropped in
heaps under the enemy's fire, and even under volleys of our own men,
who, unluckily, mistook them for the foe. But the Irishmen's blood was
up, and some, at any cost, determined to reach the other side to get one
grip of the enemy, but what many of them thought to be the other bank
was merely the bank of a winding spruit, which took them no farther
towards the foe. The disappointment and rage was intense. Boom, boom,
went the cannons roaring their dirge of death; bang, bang, bellowed the
Naval battery in reply; rattling and raking came the bullets above the
heads of the plunging Irishmen; splash, splash, sang the cold muddy
water in their ears as they scrambled from rock to stone or swam for
dear life. All that gallantry could do was done, but there was no
appreciable advance with them, or indeed anywhere--ill-luck or bad
management frustrated the best efforts on every hand. Men fell in heaps;
horses with half their bodies blown away littered the veldt; the guns
were stuck fast--useless lumber, too valuable to leave, too heavy to get
away. Some say that had it not been for the action of the artillery
commander in taking a whole brigade division--three batteries--up at a
gallop to within 700 yards of the enemy's trenches, the day might still
have been ours. The valiant Irishmen would still have pursued their
risky advance. Others declared that the want of proper scouting caused
the whole fiasco, and that all the pluck of the Irish Brigade was so
much heroism wasted. They had no information relative to the
intrenchments of the place to be attacked by them, nor any conception of
the strength of the opposition they were liable to meet. No scouts
appear to have discovered the position of the ford by which they were
ordered to cross, or the nearness of the enemy to that point, and
consequently the brigade marched in quarter-column into the very jaws of
death, only deploying when shells had already begun to burst in their
midst. Like the guns of the Royal Artillery, they found themselves
before they were prepared in the midst of a close and deadly
fusillade--the more deadly and unnerving because on the clearest of days
not a whiff of smoke betrayed the quarters from whence the murderous
assaults were coming.
[Illustration: MAP SHOWING THE ATTEMPTED PASSAGE OF THE RIVER BY GENERAL
BULLER ON DECEMBER 15.]
General Barton's brigade, like Hart's and Hildyard's, failed to effect
its object. It was found impossible to obtain possession of Hlangwane
Hill, which was much more strongly held than it was believed to be. The
troops were assailed from thence by such galling shell and rifle fire
that they were eventually forced to retire.
On the extreme right, the mounted troops, under Lord Dundonald, made a
vigorous attack at the Hlangwane Hill, on which was posted the Boer
pieces which had wrought such devastation among the British batteries.
However, in advancing up the valley, they were outflanked by the Boers,
and had eventually to retire under a storm of bullets. The irregulars,
for their part, worked splendidly. The South African Horse advanced on
the front under a heavy shell fire. Thorneycroft's Horse, the Natal
Carabineers, the Imperial Light Horse, and the Mounted Infantry at the
same time attempted the flanking attack; but the Boer lines, which ran
along some high ground to the right of the flanking party, defeated
their best efforts. Owing to the bad light, and to the fact that the
Boers used smokeless powder, their fire failed to reveal their position,
and the discomfort of the attacking party was considerable.
Meanwhile the 7th Battery, which was with Lord Dundonald, kept shelling
Hlangwane and Fort Wylie in turns, the latter being done in order to
assist the general advance. About noon Lord Dundonald was ordered to
retire. This, however, was immediately impossible. So soon as the men
began to move they became targets for the foe. Many of the men were
reluctant to retire at all, and were pressing in their desire to still
"have a go" at the enemy. The retirement at last, after a two hours'
struggle, was accomplished without undue loss. The 7th Battery, under
command of Major Henshaw, made splendid practice. During the engagement
Lord Dundonald sent a team of gun and waggon horses, under Captain Reed,
to assist the 14th and 66th Batteries to recover their guns. Captain
Reed returned to the 7th Battery, and though he came back with a bullet
in his leg, he insisted on remaining with it until he was ordered back
to camp.
Generals Buller and Clery were ubiquitous, riding coolly about and
directing where the hurricane of lead was thickest, and running risks
which rendered all who saw them anxious for their safety. Indeed, as
some one remarked, one would have thought they were lieutenants trying
to make a name, and not generals with the responsibility of an army on
their minds. The loss of either of these prominent officers would have
been counted by the Boers as a sign of victory, and therefore, when one
was hit in the side and another in the arm by glancing bullets, there
was considerable alarm among those who were near enough to observe what
had taken place. Captain Hughes, R.A.M.C., was killed, and others of the
Staff were wounded. Lord Gerard twice had narrow escapes, his horse
being twice wounded.
A squadron of the Imperial Horse had an exciting experience. The men,
who had dismounted to move in extended order across level country, were
beginning to cross a ploughed field. Suddenly a rifle volley was opened
upon them, and they were forced to lie down for cover. But the enemy,
though on a kopje not 500 yards distant at this time, was quite
invisible; and on this clear, hot day, though the song of the Mauser
went on persistently, there was no smoke to betray the enemy's position.
The Imperial Horse lay quiet, and the enemy thinking they were perhaps
annihilated ceased firing. Presently, however, when the troopers
ventured out, the firing was renewed, and many were killed and wounded.
It is invidious to mention special regiments when all fought so
resolutely. The behaviour of the irregular forces, however, was the
subject of general remark. They held their position under a heavy
cross-fire, refusing to retire without their wounded. And when they did
retire, the movement was executed without flurry, with precision and
composure, as if the battlefield were one vast manoeuvring ground.
Meanwhile the Boers still struggled to outflank our right, and the 13th
Hussars had a lively time, Colonel Blagrove having his charger shot
under him; but there were few serious calamities, only two of the
troopers being killed.
Many instances of heroism were recorded on the part of men and officers
belonging to all the regiments engaged in the battle. Lieutenant
Ponsonby, of Thorneycroft's Horse, while endeavouring to save a wounded
man, was fired at, the shot striking his unhappy burden and mortally
wounding him. The young officer was slightly wounded himself, but
managed to escape after shooting his assailant dead at very close
quarters. The conduct of the Dublins was the subject of universal
praise. They lost heavily; some 216 out of 900 men. When ordered to
retire, although the crossing of the Tugela Drift was a sufficiently
fearful experience, they were intensely disgusted. "Let us only see the
beggars!" they asked. "Give us a chance with the bayonet!" said these
gallant fellows, who had already passed through a hurricane of shot and
shell. The Scottish Fusiliers lost 75 out of 301, but they were still
ready, still bent, if allowed, upon carrying the bridge at all costs.
Their enterprise was badly rewarded. They got left in an untenable
position and were surrounded.
Captain Herbert, Staff Officer to Colonel Long, had his horse killed
under him, while the Colonel himself was severely wounded by a bullet
from a shrapnel shell. Captain White-Thomas, while on his way back to
the limbers to get blankets for the injured, received a nasty wound.
Colonel Brook (Connaught Rangers) was shot, and while being carried off
the field by some of his men, one of these was wounded. The Colonel
insisted on being put down, but Pat also insisted that he was equal to
carrying his burden to a place of safety, and did so, though a shot had
pierced his neck and passed clean out on the other side.
So many valiant deeds were performed that space will not admit of all
being recounted. The irregulars and regulars seemed determined to
out-distance each other in feats of chivalry. Private Farmer, of the
Carabineers, struggled to save a comrade at the risk of his own life.
Colour-Sergeant Byrne, in a storm of bullets, gallantly saved three of
his comrades who were drowning, though he and they were heavily weighted
with ammunition and equipment. Major Gordon, wounded as he was, fiercely
and nobly led on his men till he dropped from exhaustion. The conduct of
some of the drivers was simply amazing, and their daring was repeated
and reflected in the achievements of the infantry. Quite wonderful was
the bearing of these men, mere private soldiers, in their magnificent
nobility of sacrifice, their utter regardlessness of self. Each strove
to set an example to the other of steadfast, almost reckless devotion to
duty.
The circumstances attending the capture of the guns were deeply tragic.
Late in the terrible afternoon, when the red sun was sending horizontal
rays across the blood-dyed field, a strong party of Boers swam the river
for the purpose of seizing the guns and forcing the wounded, who were
huddled together in the donga, to surrender. It was a fearful moment.
Our worn-out, fainting, and dying men were lying about drenched in their
own gore, helpless, and none could move to save the precious guns from
falling into alien hands. Some raged, some wept with mortification at
their powerlessness to stay the inevitable. Three Boers approached them
for the purpose of demanding their instant surrender, and were shot at
from the donga. A larger body then arrived, and though Colonel Bullock
doggedly refused to surrender, and was struck down by their leader, they
eventually forced the party to submit. It is said--let us hope it was
mere report--that they threatened to shoot the wounded if they did not!
However, the fact was mentioned by Sir Redvers Buller, who doubtless had
been well informed on the subject.
The following is the list of casualties in the engagement at Colenso:--
Royal Field Artillery--Killed: Captain A. H. Goldie, Lieutenant
C. B. Schreiber. Royal Dublin Fusiliers--Killed: Captain A. H.
Bacon, Lieutenant P. C. Henry. Royal Inniskilling
Fusiliers--Killed: Captain Frank C. Loftus. Devon
Regiment--Wounded: Captain M. J. Goodwyn (b), Captain J. F.
Radcliffe (b), Captain P. U. W. Vigor (c), Lieutenant H. B. W.
Gardiner (c), Second Lieutenant H. J. Storey (c). Rifle
Brigade--Wounded: Second Lieutenant R. G. Graham (b), Captain
W. N. Congreve (c). Fifth Brigade Staff--Wounded: Captain Hon.
St. Leger Jervis (b). Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers--Died of
wounds: Major G. F. W. Charley. Wounded: Captain A. G.
Hancocks (a), Captain W. F. Hessey (b), Captain E. J. Buckley
(b), Lieutenant H. A. Leverson (b), Second Lieutenant T. W.
Whiffen (b), Lieutenant A. D. Best (b), Lieutenant W. W. Weldon
(c), Lieutenant J. G. Devenish (b). Border Regiment--Wounded:
Major K. H. G. Heygate (b), Captain J. E. S. Probyn (c),
Lieutenant G. T. Marsh (b). Connaught Rangers--Wounded: Colonel
L. G. Brooke (a), Lieutenant G. F. Brooke (a). Royal Dublin
Fusiliers.--Wounded: Major A. W. Gordon (b), Captain H. M.
Stewan (b), Second Lieutenant M'Leod (b). Royal Irish
Fusiliers--Wounded: Captain T. E. R. Brush (b). Royal Horse
Artillery--Wounded: Colonel Long (a). Royal Field
Artillery--Wounded: Lieut.-Colonel H. Hunt (c), Captain H. D.
White-Thomson (c), Captain H. L. Reed (c), Captain F. A. G.
Elton (b). Lieutenant Frank Goodson (c). Royal Army Medical
Corps--Killed: Captain M. C. Hughes. Wounded: Major F. A.
Bracington (? Brannigan) (c). Thorneycroft's Mounted
Infantry--Killed: Lieutenant C. M. Jenkins. Wounded:
Lieutenant W. Otto (b), Lieutenant Ponsonby (c), Second
Lieutenant Holford, 19th Hussars (attached) (a). Natal
Carabiniers--Wounded: D. W. Mackay (b), Lieutenant R. W. Wilson
(c). South African Light Horse--Wounded: Lieutenant B. Banhurst
(b), Lieutenant J. W. Cock (c). King's Royal Rifles--Wounded:
Lieutenant Hon. F. H. S. Roberts (since died). Field
Artillery--Prisoners: Second Lieutenant R. W. St. L. Gethin,
Major A. L. Bailward, Lieutenant A. C. Birch, Second Lieutenant
C. D. Holford, Major W. Y. Foster. Devon Regiment--Prisoners:
Lieut.-Colonel G. Bullock, J. M'N. Walter, Lieutenant S. N. F.
Smyth-Osbourne. Essex Regiment--Prisoner: Lieutenant W. F.
Bonham. Royal Scots Fusiliers--Prisoners: Captain D. H. A.
Dick, Captain H. H. Northy, Lieutenant E. Christian, Lieutenant
E. F. H. Rumbold, Lieutenant M. E. M'Conaghey, Second
Lieutenant G. E. Briggs. Royal Artillery--Missing: Lieutenant
S. T. Butler. Connaught Rangers--Missing: Captain G. H.
Ford-Hutchison, Second Lieutenant E. V. Jones.
(a) dangerously wounded; (b) seriously; (c) slightly.
Our losses were 1167 all told. Killed, 5 officers and 160 men; wounded,
36 officers and 634 men; missing and prisoners, 26 officers and 311
men--a terrible list for one day's work.
[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF COLENSO--THE LAST DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO SAVE
THE GUNS OF THE 14th and 66th BATTERIES.
Drawing by Sidney Paget.]
Sad to state, our ambulances were designedly fired upon. Five shells
fell in the neighbourhood of a waggon packed with wounded, and one party
of ambulance men was forced twice to abandon their work of succour. The
tents of the field-hospitals were no sooner erected than shells fell all
round them, and the men were forced to desist from their labours. The
heroic conduct of the civilian stretcher-bearers was generally the
subject of remark. These men, though fired at by the enemy and injured,
continued zealously to carry on their humane work, and assisted in
saving many lives which might otherwise have been sacrificed. The force
of the enemy opposed to us was estimated at 12,000 to 14,000. From a
tactical standpoint the Boers had overwhelming advantages. Their numbers
were immense, and the dangerous high-banked river, which they themselves
had carefully dammed and filled with wire entanglements, made a
formidable shield for the defensive party. In addition to this, they
had constructed long, highly scientifically-arranged trenches, along
which their Nordenfeldt gun could quickly travel, and thus defy any
attempt of our gunners to get the range. Still the Naval guns were
wonderfully worked, and wrought considerable havoc among the Boers in
the over-hanging kopjes. Though their loss could not be accurately
estimated, it was declared to be about 2000. The trenches were said to
be choked with dead Dutchmen.
On the 16th of December an armistice was agreed upon, to last from noon
till midnight, to enable both sides to collect and bury their dead.
The following "recommendations to notice" illuminated the somewhat sad
nature of the General's despatch:--
"From the General Commanding-in-Chief the Forces in South Africa
to the Secretary of State for War.
"CHIEVELEY CAMP, _Dec. 16, 1899_.
"SIR,--I have the honour to bring the following cases of
Distinguished Service in the Field to your notice.
"At Colenso, on December 15, the detachments serving the guns
of the 14th and 66th Batteries, Royal Field Artillery, had all
been either killed, wounded, or driven from their guns by
infantry fire at close range, and the guns were deserted.
"About 500 yards behind the guns was a donga, in which some of
the few horses and drivers left alive were sheltered. The
intervening space was swept with shell and rifle fire.
"Captain Congreve, Rifle Brigade, who was in the donga,
assisted to hook a team into a limber, went out and assisted to
limber up a gun; being wounded, he took shelter, but seeing
Lieutenant Roberts fall badly wounded, he went out again and
brought him in. Some idea of the nature of the fire may be
gathered from the fact that Captain Congreve was shot through
the leg, through the toe of his boot, grazed on the elbow and
the shoulder, and his horse shot in three places.
"Lieutenant the Honourable F. Roberts, King's Royal Rifles,
assisted Captain Congreve. He was wounded in three places.
"Corporal Nurse, Royal Field Artillery, 66th Battery, also
assisted. I recommend the above three for the Victoria Cross.
"Drivers H. Taylor, Young, Petts, Rockall, Lucas, and Williams,
all of the 66th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, rode the teams,
each team brought in a gun. I recommend all six for the Medal
for Distinguished Conduct in the Field.
"Shortly afterwards Captain H. L. Reed, 7th Battery, Royal
Field Artillery, who had heard of the difficulty, brought down
three teams from his battery to see if he could be of any use.
He was wounded, as were five of the thirteen men who rode with
him; one was killed, his body was found on the field, and
thirteen out of twenty-one horses were killed before he got
half-way to the guns, and he was obliged to retire.
"I recommend Captain Reed for the Victoria Cross, and the
following non-commissioned officers and men, 7th Battery, Royal
Field Artillery, for the Medal for Distinguished Service in the
Field:--
"86,208 Corporal A. Clark, wounded; 87,652 Corporal R. J.
Money; 82,210 Acting-Bombardier J. H. Reeve; 28,286 Driver C.
J. Woodward; 22,054 Driver Wm. Robertson, wounded; 22,061
Driver Wm. Wright, wounded; 22,051 Driver A. C. Hawkins; 26,688
Driver John Patrick Lennox; 22,094 Driver Albert Nugent,
killed; 23,294 Driver James Warden; 32,087 Driver Arthur
Felton, wounded; 83,276 Driver Thomas Musgrove; 26,523
Trumpeter William W. Ayles, wounded.
"I have differentiated in my recommendations, because I thought
that a recommendation for the Victoria Cross required proof of
initiative, something more, in fact, than mere obedience to
orders, and for this reason I have not recommended Captain
Schofield, Royal Artillery, who was acting under orders, though
I desire to record his conduct as most gallant.
"Several other gallant drivers tried, but were all killed, and
I cannot get their names.--I have, &c.,
REDVERS BULLER, General."
Appended is an account of the battle given by Captain Walter Norris
Congreve, one of the heroes of the day. It is deeply interesting, though
it makes little reference to his own gallant action for which he gained
the Victoria Cross:--
"Our big Naval guns shelled the enemy's position off and on all
day, but could get no response. We could see very few Boers
about, and it was a horrid position to attack.... I don't
believe any troops could have taken it. However, we tried
yesterday and failed. We bombarded every place that looked like
holding Boers for two hours, without response and without a
sign of a Boer. To see the shells bursting, you would have
thought nothing could have been left alive in the vicinity.
After this, infantry, which had already got into position,
advanced line after line and extended widely. Instantly
thousands of bullets began pattering about, and their guns
pitched shells all over the place. Where they came from no one
could see till the end. Sir Redvers Buller rode all along the
line, and came in for a good deal of attention from bullets and
shells.
"My first experience was my stick being knocked out of my hand
by a bullet; then a horse beside me was killed by a shell.
About 10 o'clock two batteries which had advanced far too close
ran short of ammunition. Their waggons were about 800 yards
behind, the horses and men sheltering in a deep narrow nullah.
General Buller told them to take the waggons up to the battery,
but instantly they emerged a stream of bullets and shells fell
all round, and most of the men got into the nullah again.
Generals Buller and Cleary stood out in it and said, 'Some of
you go and help Schofield.' A.D.C. Roberts, myself, and two or
three others went to the waggons, and we got two waggons horsed
with the help of a corporal and six gunners. I have never seen
even at field-firing the bullets fly thicker. All one could see
were little tufts of dust all over the ground accompanied by a
whistling noise, 'phut,' where they hit, and an increasing
rattle of musketry somewhere in front.
"My first bullet went through my left sleeve and just made the
point of my elbow bleed. Next a clod of earth caught me a smack
on the other arm; then my horse got one; then my right leg one,
and my horse another. That settled us, for he plunged, and I
fell about 100 yards short of the guns we were going to. A
little nullah was by, and into that I hobbled and sat down. I
had not been in a minute before another bullet hit the toe of
my boot, went into the welt, travelled up, and came out at the
toe-cap, two inches from the end of the toe. It did not even
scratch me, but I shifted my quarters pretty quickly to a
better place, where I found Colonels Hunt and Long, R.A., and a
dozen or so wounded gunners; a doctor, Colonel Bullock, and
about fifteen men of his regiment--all that were left of the
escort and two batteries.
"At about 11 o'clock the fire slackened, and I went out,
finding poor Roberts badly wounded, and with help got him into
the nullah. There we lay from 11 till 4.30: no water, not a
breath of air, no particle of shade, and a sun which I have
never felt hotter even in India. My jacket was taken to shade
Robert's head, and what with blood and dirt I was a pretty
object by the time I got out. At 4.30 the Boers rode up and
asked us to surrender, or they would shoot us all. Colonel
Bullock was the senior unwounded officer, and had, perhaps,
twenty rifles all told. He refused, and they at once began a
fusillade from fifty yards distant, and our people returned it.
It was unpleasant, and only a question of minutes before they
enfiladed our trenches and bagged the lot. Bullock's men
knocked over two, and they then put up a white flag, parleyed,
said we might remove our wounded, and the remainder either be
taken prisoners or fight it out. However, while we were talking
100 or so crept round us. We found loaded rifles at every armed
man's head, and we were forced to give in. One of our
ambulances came up, and we were gradually collected at one
spot, and a colour-sergeant of the Devon Regiment carried me
upon his back."
END OF VOLUME II.
Printed by BALLANTYNE, HANSON & CO.
Edinburgh & London
[Illustration: _Facsimile of MS. of_ MR. RUDYARD KIPLING'S _War Poem_
"THE ABSENT-MINDED BEGGAR"]
[Illustration]
_The above facsimile is printed by arrangement with the Daily Mail
Publishing Co., London_
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TRANSCRIBERS' NOTES |
| |
|General: Errors and inconsistencies in punctuation have been corrected |
| without individual notes. |
|Pages vi, 6, 10: Drakenberg standardised to Drakensberg. |
|Page vii: repeated date 2 November removed. |
|Chart of Staff Appointments; Natal Field Force; 4th Division: Aides- |
| de-Camp(2) blank in original |
|Chart of Staff Appointments; Staff of 1st Army Corps: Orderly |
| Veterinary Officer blank in original |
|Chart of Staff Appointments; 1st Army Corps 3rd Division; 6th Brigade: |
| Aide-de-Camp blank in original |
|Chart of Staff Appointments; Staff of Cavalry Division: Aides-de-Camp |
|(2)--Only one listed in original |
|Page 32: rear-guard standardised to rearguard. |
|Pages 35, 36: Isandhlwana/Isandlwana not standardised as it is used as |
| part of a quotation. |
|Page 37: via standardised to via. [N.B. other usages not standardised as|
| part of a quotation.] |
|Page 44: Blue-jackets standardised to Bluejackets. |
|Page 45: similarily corrected to similarly. |
|Page 46: Brvant corrected to Bryant. |
|Page 51: fortunnately corrected to fortunately. |
|Pages 53, 121: Nordenfelt standardised to Nordenfeldt. |
|Page 82: reconnaisance corrected to reconnaissance. |
|Page 91: Comanding corrected to Commanding. |
|Pages 114, 148: debris/debris not standardised as it is used as part of |
| a quotation. |
|Page 120: McLachlan standardised to M'Lachlan. |
|Page 145: comandeered corrected to commandeered. |
|Page 147: sandbags standardised to sand-bags. |
|Page 150: downhill standardised to down-hill. |
|Page 151: search-light standardised to searchlight. |
|Page 183: The quotation from Addison is actually incorrect. It should |
| read: |
| |
| "A thousand glorious actions, that might claim |
| Triumphant laurels, and immortal fame, |
| Confused in clouds of glorious actions lie, |
| And troops of heroes undistinguished die." |
| |
|Page 185 (footnote): Gingindhlovo standardised to Gingindhlovu. |
|Page 187: Repeated 'the' removed from 'remained the the same' |
| |
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